Posts by Cassius

I am likely to eventually break this out into a discussion of its own, but in this episode of the podcast Joshua brings up the question of "doxa" vs "episteme." From wikipedia:

Doxa (Ancient Greek: δόξα; from verb δοκεῖν, dokein, 'to appear, to seem, to think, to accept')^[1] is a common belief or popular opinion. In classical rhetoric, doxa is contrasted with episteme ('knowledge').

We're having many simultaneous discussions about these issues right now, and it seems to me to be a good idea to try to be as clear as possible on what Epicurus considered to be "knowledge" vs what he considered to be "opinion."

"Knowledge" is a term to me that seems pretty clear, but probably "opinion" needs clarification as to whether "opinion" (as a word standing alone) is always to be viewed with suspicion, (probably yes?) while "knowledge" (as a word standing alone) implies something much more firm.

So that's something that needs to be clarified, but after that, the big issue is deciding what Epicurus held to be "known" and therefore relied upon with confidence vs "opinion" in which probability might be the best that can be said for it.

Specifically, as examples, did Epicurus hold PD01 and PD02 as written to be "knowledge" or some lesser standard, better described as "opinion."

Clearly Epicurus held many things mentioned in the letter to Pythocles to be open to numbers of possibilities, so as to those mostly astronomical issues I'd say those are "opinion."

But what about the affirmative statements in PD01, PD02? We'll also want to consider the many affirmative statements made in the letter to Menoeceus, and the most general of statements in Herodotus, but we ought not bite off more than can be chewed too quickly.

Were the positions stated in PD01 and PD02 considered by Epicurus to be "known" (knowledge)? Would he have admitted any aspect of them to be only "probably" true?

EDIT: It will presumably be important to incorporate as primary sources:

1. What Lucretius says about this topic in Book 4 (a very long section but especially here
2. What Diogenes of Oinoanda has to say about this in Fragment 5.

   1. Fr. 5 [Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find? Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

So regardless of the rest of the implications, one of the basic questions is apparently: Did Epicurus number friendship as being among the virtues? (Or considered under the category name "virtue.")

I am inclined to agree with the excerpts Don posted to the effect that the answer is "Yes." ("Yes - friendship is a virtue.")

Does anyone (TauPhi perhaps?) disagree with that?

I am presuming Don that you do agree?

Welcome to Episode 328 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will focus on the ending of Section 8.

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

• Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Quote

VIII.

The third part of philosophy, which is next in order, being conversant about reason and discussion, was thus handled by both schools. They said that, although it originated in the senses, still the power of judging of the truth was not in the senses. They insisted upon it that intellect was the judge of things. They thought that the only thing deserving of belief, because it alone discerned that which was always simple and uniform, and which perceived its real character. This they call idea, having already received this name from Plato; and we properly entitle it species.

But they thought that all the senses were dull and slow, and that they did not by any means perceive those things which appeared subjected to the senses; which were either so small as to be unable to come under the notice of sense, or so moveable and rapid that none of them was ever one consistent thing, nor even the same thing, because everything was in a continual state of transition and disappearance. And therefore they called all this division of things one resting wholly on opinion. But they thought that science had no existence anywhere except in the notions and reasonings of the mind; on which account they approved of the definitions of things, and employed them on everything which was brought under discussion. The explanation of words also was approved of — that is to say, the explanation of the cause why everything was named as it was; and that they called etymology. Afterwards they used arguments, and, as it were, marks of things, for the proof and conclusion of what they wished to have explained; in which the whole system of dialectics — that is to say, of an oration brought to its conclusion by ratiocination, was handed down. And to this there was added, as a kind of second part, the oratorical power of speaking, which consists in developing a continued discourse, composed in a manner adapted to produce conviction.

It occurs to me to add here that in some of our physics discussions recently we have had reason to focus on the importance of "emergence" or "emergent qualities" to the nature of the way things are.

Probably friendship and love and the issues you are talking about have an analogy there.

At the beginning of any relationship there are simple and direct interactions, but over time those deepen and expand and something emerges that is far different from what was present at the beginning.

For example there's a world of difference between buying a hamburger at a counter and living together for decades, raising a family, etc. And yet the latter type of relationship can emerge from the former, and it is completely proper to consider both of relationships as true and real and proper, and in no way is one less real or conflicting with the other.

This entire issue of emergence is the path by which we escape the false idea of intelligent design, arbitrary gods, and eternal punishment after death. i don't know that we have record of it being applied in exactly that way but it would be surprising if this example of pleasure weren't related to the way Epicurus analyzed the universe as a whole -- as emerging from simpler starting points.

Just a little more on this (admittedly largely repeating what I already wrote, but for emphasis):

Quote from LAMAR__44

This isn’t me arguing against hedonism,

Consistent with what I wrote about above - there's no problem here in arguing against "hedonism." - I will help you in fact, given that I think it's a poor idea to talk about Epicurean philosophy as "hedonism" in any but very limited circumstances. Those who try to pursue or promote "hedonism" outside the framework of Epicurean philosophy -- especially the wider meaning of "pleasure" that Epicurus uses - do have the problems you are concerned about.

It would appear that somewhere you've picked up that there is in fact a "paradox of hedonism" and that's why I titled the new thread that way. No doubt you're right that a lot of people talk that way on Reddit and elsewhere, but there's no reason to accept the terminology of anti-Epicurean thought here at EpicureanFriends.com. It's no paradox - there's a straightforward way of addressing the question.

Lamar you have asked a very good question and I set it up as a separate thread here:

Thread

Is There A "Paradox of Hedonism"?

Hi Cassius, thanks for welcoming me. I wanted to speak about the paradox of hedonism. This isn’t me arguing against hedonism, but just something I’ve had trouble in resolving and would love to get everyone’s viewpoints here.

Essentially, since we know that pleasure is the sole good, and pain is the sole evil, everything else that we should pursue has the characteristic of being instrumental towards pleasure, and everything we avoid has the characteristic of being instrumental towards pain. This…

LAMAR__44

April 4, 2026 at 7:27 AM

If you have any problems getting access to post in it please let me know.

Good to have you Lamar.

Couple of points:

1 - This is why I don't care to refer to "hedonism" very often. Epicurean philosophy gets placed into that box with certain other groups, but Epicurus is far more subtle than most, and so "hedonism" gets used as a way to dismiss what Epicurus had to say.

2 - You're basically asking the "friendship" question which is discussed by Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends at the following link. I recommend you read through the full Torquatus section to get a feel for the general approach to all such ethical questions, but friendship in particular starts at 65:

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Torquatus

Torquatus himself doesn't take the most aggressive approach, but the most straightforward is the most logical: There is no need to cower in the face of claims that "altruism" or "putting others first" is a categorial imperative. Nature gives us only feelings of pleasure and pain. We take an interest and desire anything only because it brings us pleasure. Once we value a friend or lover highly enough, it brings us pleasure to see their interests fulfilled even if certain interests of ours suffer. And that goes so far that we will at times even die for a friend.

So i wouldn't trouble myself at ALL thinking that you need to live by "hedonism." The standard that applies here at Epicureanfriends and that Epicurus taught is not "hedonism" at all but the entire core of Epicurean philosophy. The fact that you are concerned about this shows that you haven't explored these issues enough -- which is absolutely fine.

Quote from LAMAR__44

but doing this inside of relationships seems to make them feel shallow and transactional, at least for me.

Not to psychologize in your personal situation, but most people pick up this idea from society and general culture, and that's the kind of cultural conditioning that Epicurus warns against when it doesn't make sense when compared to Nature. There is no cosmic or transcental duty of one human being to another human being - bonds of friendship and affection form naturally from community of interest, not because some ideal form exists that compels us in that direction. Examples of this is the discussion of "justice" in the last ten of the Principal Doctrines, and in the discussion of the development of civilization in Lucretius Book 5.

None of us get a deeper understanding of Epicurus without study, and the more we rely on wikipedia or superficial treatments of "hedonism" the more we have to unlearn.

And there's no more complete statement of all this in the ancient record than the full presentation by Torquatus in On Ends.

Glad to have you with us.

Lamar -- Welcome -- please post here as to the subject of the topic and we'll create a full thread in the appropriate place later as needed. Thanks.

Lamar tells us:

Hi, I’ve been interested in Epicureanism for a while and have been reading
the forums at Epicureanfriends for a while now, but I wanted to create a
post on something that I believe hasn’t been touched on which is why I’m
creating an account today.

Welcome LAMAR__44 !

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Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from most other philosophies, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit of truth and happy living through pleasure as explained in the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

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We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from wbernys

s his insistence that all pleasure and pain is found in bodily sensation as Torquatus says.

i think this is a misreading if from it you conclude that Epicurus is deprecating mental experience that is not painful as not being pleasure. Everything about us ultimately arises through the body as we do not exist without it. That means anything mental cannot be separated from the body or presumed to exist without the body. Cicero and the antiEpcureans were taking just the position that you are summarizing, but the thrust of Torquatus' defense of Epicurus is that this is not correct. All mental and bodiily experience that is not painful counts as pleasure because there are only two feelings.

Quote from wbernys

Curious for other opinions on this, is he an update on Epicurus crude hedonism for a more developed one or is he kind of mixing Epicureanism with other concerns or rather orthodox?

I see Diogenes of Oinoanda as completely orthodox and consistent with Lucretius' tone as to sympathy for "hearts in darkness." And of course Epicurus' whole career and school-building was outward-facing.

And I don't know what you would mean in referring to Epicurus' "crude hedonism" unless that's coming from the viewpoint of a Ciceronian or modern dismissal of pleasure there as "crude." And it's the Ciceronian and modern viewpoint that I would dismiss as "crude."

This episode is now up. As I reflect post-editing I regret that we didn't give more examples from Sedley's article about emergence (downward or otherwise) but that's a deep subject on its own and one we'll return to in the future. There's a lot more research and reading to be done on discussion in recent years on this topic, including llustrations that are probably much more dramatic than my "water vs H20" example.

Episode 327 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "Intelligent Design vs Emergence"

The applicable cliche is hard cases make bad law, but the problem is in the one size fits all law rather than in the cases. If Kant was consistent (and I know nothing about his personal life) he would either follow his categorical imperative or ditch the entire effort.

That's why we have courts of equity and executive clemency and jury nullification, to avoid the harsh consequences of these who seek on size fits all at the expense of individual real people.

Hard cases are very useful for focusing the mind and making sure that we all understand the implications of our positions.

Cicero's dilemma on the Cateline Conspiracy and the phrase "The Constitution is not a suicide pact" are also useful extreme hypotheticals.

Quote from TauPhi

I'm pretty sure this attitude will not get you far in promoting Epicurean philosophy.

it's exactly the attitude that people like Lucretius or Diogenes of Oinoanda displayed in calling Epicurus a "savior" or "father" or a virtual "god among men."

Quote from TauPhi

Proofs, knowledge and reality are very much within a grasp and abilities of most people.

And I see that statement as totally inconsistent with your prior statements to the effect that we can never really know truth about the nature of things.

Quote from TauPhi

In science it's called five sigma and it's a statistical significance which scientists agreed on to call a phenomenon proved to be true.

That may well be so. I have no personal allegiance "science" as if the word "science" is the ultimate religion with "scientists" as the priesthood. My allegiance is to Nature and this world, and to the Epicurean perspective - not "statistical significance " and especially not to "what scientists agree on."

This is a huge point and very clearly stated so thanks for bring it up again. Neither Epicurean philosophy nor this forum is dedicated to "science" in the way I think you mean it and the way that term is most often used today as a catch-all for "expert consensus." That's the equivalent of the Platonic adherence to "wisdom" or "logic" as the goal of life rather than to a human-achievable happiness based on pleasure.

Quote from TauPhi

And narrative where you accuse many people over millenia to be infected with "mind virus" and philosophers other than Epicurus to be regressive doesn't promote Epicurean philosophy at all. It makes it sound insane.

I realize that that reaction will come from quarters which are dedicated to "science" and to "skepticism" above all. That's one of those lines of separation from what Epicurus stood for and what he didn't stand for.

As i am editing this podcast I want to insert this note, that at about the 22 minute mark Joshua quotes Plato as taking the position that there is only ONE created world - not "many worlds." This too is something Epicurus directly contradicts.

As an aside many of these same issues are discussed when Joshua quotes from Timaeus at length in Episode 327 of the podcast (to be released later today or tomorrow). This appears in depth around the 15 minute mark but much of the episode is devoted to it.

The importance of these issues is why we are currently going through "Academic Questions." Plato makes very clear in Timaeus that the impossibility of stating anything about this world as more than "probable" is central to his viewpoint.

As to the arguments in recent posts as to the possibility of knowledge and proof and how to define terms, I want to cite and praise as insightful something that Titus raise in another context

Quote from Titus

What I am suggesting is, in analogy to information technology, an Epicurean thought serving on the kernel level that defines how the operative systems operate.

I think this is an excellent analogy to be brought to bear on the problem.

After 2000 years of Judeo-Christianty and all sorts of philosophical regression, and over 500 years of Pythagoreanism and Platonism and Academic Skepticism and even Democriteanism before that, what has happened is essentially the same thing as a "mind virus at the kernel level" which has destroyed any progress that Epicurus made with his canonics.

The virus is the idea that "proof" or "proving something" requires omniscience, omniscience, and omnipresence -- an unhuman an inhuman level of "certainty" that is impossible by definition for a human to reach. This mind virus has destroyed the ability of many people to think that anything can be "proven" or anything can be "known" or that anything can be "real" if it fails to meet such an impossible standard.

This is why I think philosophy has regressed so far since the Epicurean period. Rather than accept Epicurus' position that there is a reasonable standard of proof grounded in the senses in which the mind IS and SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED to be able to prove things in human terms, such a position is denounced as the ultimate sin. Some will say "sin against god" but the majority of modern philosophers and intelligentsia will consider it a "sin against humanism" in a "good-without-god" kind of way.

This argument entirely dismisses or ignores or flies in the face of what is explained at length in Lucretius Book 4. There it is made perfectly clear that those who say "nothing can be known" are not making a simple error, they are removing the possibility of reason and life itself if they fail to "trust the senses." Not only is that section ignored, but it's not even given a legitimate meaning, because it is also clear that the senses in Epicurean philosophy do not contain opinions of their own - the senses simply provide data from which the mind must produce true or false opinion.

This thread makes clear that the Kantian-like attitude is to say that ALL opinion is false and can never be considered "truth" or "the way reality really is." That's clearly not the Epicurean framework, but people are so infected with this mind virus that they don't even recognize the issue and the self-contradiction implied in their anti-knowledge claim.

That self-refutation is what Epicurus latched onto as the most clear way of explaining the problem, and it's probable that that remains the best argument for the Epicurean position.

As Don might say "Thank Zeus" that this section of Lucretius remains preserved, and we can cite it as a red line for what it means to follow Epicurean philosophy:

Quote from Lucretius 4-469

4-469

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

4-478

But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

4-500

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

4-513

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

That's a statement that the kind of skepticism we're arguing about is a "mind virus" and "at the kernel level" and at the end of the day it's not feasible to live the happiest live possible unless you eradicate it from your thinking. I didn't agree with Titus' analogy that it makes sense to try to get too close to supernatural religions in order to plant such a virus in them, but I think an analogy of attacking skepticism as a "mind virus at kernel level" is extremely useful.

Quote from Martin

My reference to being "Kantian" is limited to him as being named as the original source of the distinction between a model and truth.

if you are correct Kant is apparently saying that truth is never possible, on "models," some of which work better than others. I believe Epicurus would say that this is effectively the same thing as saying that "nothing can be known" just using different terminology.

Quote from Eikadistes

Epíkouros and Kant would argue. Kant wouldn't steal a loaf of bread for a starving child. Epíkouros would have died rather than betray a loved one. They fundamentally disagreed on the question of the divisibility of space, and I think you'd have a tough time convincing Epíkouros that a "thing-it-itself" is any thing at all.

Excellently points by Eikadistes. And this bleeds over into comments by DaveT in another thread. I do not believe Epicurus would view someone who would "fail to steal a loaf of bread for a starving child" as simply choosing another path in life. Epicurus would find that conduct outrageous and deserving of strong verbal condemnation if not worse. Ideas have consequences and this is the kind of result of Kantian ideology that deserves the forcefulness of a Nietzsche to condemn in adequate terms.