Posts by Cassius

I started on that in the the prior post but deleted it because i was getting too long.

In summary, my view of that is that Epicurus is speaking conceptually as to the nature of the goal.

The essential premise that is unstated here but which is present in PD03 and recorded at length by Cicero in Torquatus' explanation of Epicurean ethics, there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and when you don't have pain you have pleasure. All this is reinforced immediately in the letter by the following:

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129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

It's my view that Epicurus expected Menoeceus or any other student of his reading the letter to understand the wider context of there being only two feelings. Unfortunately, people today don't know the context, so they don't understand how saying "absence of pain" is the equivalent of saying "pleasure."

To me that context resolves the part of the passage that is arguably the worst if not understood. "When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure."

When you know that "absence of pleasure" means "pain" just like "absence of pain" means pleasure, you realize that he's just stating the obvious. When you have pain, that means there's a gap in your goal of life that needs to be filled with pleasure. When you have no pain, that means there is no gap in your goal of life, because your life is already filled with pleasure. At that point, you have no further need for more pleasure, because your life is already filled with pleasure. This does not deprecate pleasure but emphasizes that pleasure is the only thing that really counts.

You'll also see here on the forum lots of discussion of "the limit of pleasure" as referenced in PD03 and in reference to an argument by Plato, who alleged that because pleasure has no limit then it cannot be the ultimate good.

By showing that pleasure does have a limit, and thus there is a state which can be described as "the best," Epicurus refute's Plato's argument. When you think about it, it's obvious that the best state of pleasure is 100% pleasure. At that point, you have no need, or ability to experience, anything more.

I have several collections of quotes on this as I'm constantly working on a better presentation of them. Here are three:

On Epicurean Views Of Pleasure - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

A second is here: https://wiki.epicureanfriends.com/doku.php/the_norm_is_pleasure_too

And a third:

Article

A Gate To Be Burst: "Absence of Pain"

It is interesting to think about what Lucretius had in mind in Book One of “On The Nature of Things” when he spoke about Epicurus "yearning to be the first to burst through the close-set bolts upon the gates of nature." What kind of gates was he talking about? Who bolted them? How do those gates keep us from Nature?

I can't be sure which gates Lucretius had in mind, but I can suggest one "gate" that is particularly in need of bursting, as it stands directly in the way of a better understanding…

Cassius

February 12, 2024 at 1:26 PM

Don's summary of the issue is excellent. I would only add that in addition to the conclusion that there's no reason to read Epicurus because he's the same as Buddhism and Stoicism, you of course add on the huge baggage of why one should not choose to pursue Buddhism or Stoicism.

Quote from Rolf

That said, I’m not sure I quite see the point at issue here. Pleasures vary in duration, intensity, and location. Of course I would prefer a katastematic pleasure. More sustainable, longer lasting pleasure. It’s like asking someone if they want $1000 now or $100 per month for 2 years. It’s a matter of prudence.

Yes, that statement illustrates how confusing this question can be. The issue is that when most people (excluding those who see it like Don does) talk about katastematic pleasure, they are not simply referring to "any pleasure that is sustainable and longer lasting." And they are not talking about katastematic pleasure as "one of many kinds of pleasure." The point I am arguing against is that many people explicitly or implicitly state that katastematic pleasure, which they equate with "ataraxia" or "freedom from pain" is the ultimate goal of Epicurean pleasure, rather than the much wider term "pleasure," which includes katastemic pleasure, but also includes kinetic pleasure.

Of course at this point we're already down the road of glazing over peoples' eyes because they understandably aren't sure what "katastematic" and "kinetic" means, so they default to thinking that it means "ataraxia" which is also highly ambiguous or just "absence of pain" which means nothing standing alone any more than it would be to say "absence of elephants." "Absence of....." doesn't tell you anything unless you have a conceptual framework that there are only two possibilities, and that the only other possibility is pleasure. But the people I am arguing against rarely explain that, because their whole issue is that they don't want to accept the common understanding of "pleasure" in the first place, because that would draw a bright red line between Epicurus and Buddhism and Stoicism.

So many commentators package this question into the view that katastematic pleasure is the only really desirable pleasure, and that the only reason we care about kinetic pleasures is so that we can obtain katastematic pleasure. They argue that once we have katasatematic pleasure we no longer have need of kinetic pleasure, and they'll cite this part of the letter to Menoeceus: "For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure."

And indeed if you are the normal man on the street today and take that statement at face value, it DOES sound Buddhist or Stoic or worse. The problem only gets resolved when you take into account Epicurus's many statements about pleasure in the rest of the philosophy, including the fact that (as with gods) Epicurus is giving a very unusual meaning to a term that everyone else uses differently. But no man-on-the-street has the experience to be able to do that, so they run in the opposite direction. Which in my view is exactly the goal of the perps I am referring to, because their goal is to remain smugly happy in their eclectic blends of Buddism and Stoicism without worry that anyone will ever see that Epicurus was arguing against their position, not in favor of it.

Gosling and Taylor exhaustively go through many examples of the contradictions that the standard view of katastematic pleasure causes, G&T conclude that these contradictions do not mean that katastematic pleasure is somehow the ultimate goal of Epicurean philosophy: they conclude that Epicurus saw pleasure as a unified thing, and that katastematic pleasure is only one sort of pleasure. And that's where Nikolsky picks up and points out that in the centuries between Epicurus and Cicero (and additional time after that to Diogenes Laertius) people like Carneades - in their fetish to categorize things - placed an emphasis on this division that is not mentioned by the true believers like Lucretius and Diogenes of Oinoanda or to my recollection Philodemus either, and thus was not of major significance to Epicurus himself.

But it's become the hallmark of discussion of Epicurus in the modern world because when accepted in the way it is often discussed, it turns much of the philosophy upside down and makes much of the rest of it self-contradictory.

Yes, Don thanks, that is a comment by Diogenes Laertius, who is consistent with Cicero and Athenaeus (if Nikolsky's comments below are correct). To make it easier on those who have not read Nikolsky's full article, here is his abstract explaining how he takes the clues set out by Gosling & Taylor and then explains how these three men may have come to make their commentary. For those who can go down the rabbit hole without being distracted and turned off, it's a fascinating subject.

G&T really do a great job of tracking down all aspects of "The Greeks on Pleasure" from the earliest days, through Epicurus, and through the original and later uses of these terms. I've read it all through once, but can't say I have a command of it at all. It's a bear to try to dive in and then come up for air.

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ABSTRACT
The paper deals with the question of the attribution to Epicurus of the classification of pleasures into 'kinetic' and 'static'. This classification, usually regarded as authentic, confronts us with a number of problems and contradictions. Besides, it is only mentioned in a few sources that are not the most reliable. Following Gosling and Taylor, I believe that the authenticity of the classification may be called in question.

The analysis of the ancient evidence concerning Epicurus' concept of pleasure is made according to the following principle: first, I consider the sources that do not mention the distinction between 'kinetic' and 'static' pleasures, and only then do I compare them with the other group of texts which comprises reports by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus. From the former group of texts there emerges a concept of pleasure as a single and not twofold notion, while such terms as 'motion' and 'state' describe not two different phenomena but only two characteristics of the same phenomenon. On the other hand, the reports comprising the latter group appear to derive from one and the same doxographical tradition, and to be connected with the classification of ethical docrines put forward by the Middle Academy and known as the divisio Carneadea. In conclusion, I argue that the idea of Epicurus' classification of pleasures is based on a misinterpretation of Epicurus' concept in Academic doxography, which tended to contrapose it to doctrines of other schools, above all to the Cyrenaics' views.

Quote from Godfrey

It's been some time since I read Gosling and Taylor, but if I recall correctly, they consider the understanding of philosophy to be something of a one-and-done pleasure and they call it katastematic.

Unfortunately I cannot outright confirm or deny that statement with a particular cite. Since Rolf is new and is actively engaged in this thread, rather than pass over it let me just say I consider that Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure" to be one of the most exhaustive and best resources these issues involving pleasure.

However it is also very long and detailed and not a quick read. Especially in the katastematic pleasure chapter (which is the inspiration for the Boris Nikolsky article here in the files section of the forum which I highly recommend that Rolfe read first) Gosling and Taylor tend to be so cautious in their wording that it is sometimes hard (at least for me) to be sure what their conclusion really is.

It seems to me that they were especially cautious in their wording of the katatestematic discussion, likely because they were aware that they were disagreeing with the powers-that-be in the academic world who take the majority view that Epicurus identified the true goal as ataraxia and ataraxia to be a katastematic pleasure. It is clear that G&T's chapter disagrees with that viewpoint, and Emily Austin states in a footnote in her book that she agrees with G&T's position. G&T also inspired Nikolsky to write his article "Epicurus On Pleasure," but not because G&T stated their conclusion in revolutionary flag-waving terms.

Even thought it's immediately apparent that "katestematic pleasure" has all sorts of issues even describing, the issues can also subtle, and it takes considerable time to understand why the issue is important. But it is very important because getting caught up in amorphous and exotic thoughts that can seem to be implied by the term "katastematic pleasure" is (in my view) the best way to turn any normal person into a useless ivory-tower jellyfish and make them run from Epicurus as fast as they can. And that's the reason why I think that viewpoint is so favored by many, especially by those who can otherwise hardly find it in themselves to utter the word "pleasure."

I would highly recommend to Rolfe or anyone else who has the time (but not early in their reading!!) that they should eventually read the G&T book. If someone is new and simply has to get to the bottom of that issue, read the Nikolsky article as it is much shorter and more clear in its conclusions.

The main danger is to energetic people (either younger like Rolfe or motivated at any age) who pick up from conventional articles praising katastematic pleasure and think it is the true goal of Epicurus. Most of them will sense immediately that there are all sorts of issues and contradictions in it, and they will think that if Epicurus thought that then he is worthless to them, just as they should reject all forms of otherworldy Buddhism / Stoicism / nothingness / ivory tower detachment.

There are very legitimate ways of making sense of what Diogenes Laertius has to say about katastematic pleasure, and Boris Nikolsky offers explanations as do Don and others here. I think Emily Austin made a very good decision to confine it to a footnote in her book and not get distracted by it. There's a time and place for fighting it out on this issue, and we do that here in the forum if you dig into prior discussions, but representing katastematic pleasure to new people as the real goal of Epicurus is the best way to send normal healthy people running away from Epicurean philosophy.

That's the way I see it Rolfe. It is impossible for it to be either "one and done" or "once and ever after in exactly the same condition."

Epicurus could legitimately view the last day of his life as happy or even one of his happiest, given his appreciation for what he had accomplished throughout his life and his present overall circumstances in total. But that appreciation didn't eliminate the presence of his extreme physical pain of his advanced disease that was also present.

It would make no sense for him to have said that he would not have preferred to have the same pleasures but without the accompanying pain. There was no cosmic necessity that he die of kidney disease rather than of old age in his sleep unexpectedly without that pain. The latter would have been preferable.

And he didn't say "Ever since I was 50 and reached a complete understanding of my philosophy I have never felt any pain" or anything like that. He acknowledged his pain but held that his pleasures far outweighed them and that he was happy to be alive to experience that day.

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I think Rolfe is right in picking out any reference to a "neutral state" as being something that's not good Epicurean terminology. The references are pretty clear that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and there's no third or neutral condition outside these two. For example:

Quote

1. Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
2. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
3. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
4. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
   

As to "with highest degree of pleasure coming from a favorite kinetic pleasure" I think this involves the very good question of switching contexts away from the generalizations, like the highest quantity of pleasure is 100% / 0% pain as in PD03, as well as in these cites (some repetition here) .......

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1. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
2. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.

3. On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.

   
   

... to switching to the context of whether it is possible to point to particular people at particular times experiencing particular things and say "There, that's an example of what I am talking about!"

I think that's where Patrikos would be correct in pointing to a particular example of a person experiencing some favorite kinetic pleasure without any feeling of mental or bodily pain at the same time. Here we can look back at Torquatus saying repeatedly to Cicero that if you're not experiencing pain then you're experiencing pleasure, and in fact if you represent to me that you are not experiencing any mental or physical pain at all, then what you're telling me is that you're experiencing 100% pleasure, and that's as much pleasure as anyone can experience.

As stated in PD09 pleasures vary in intensity, duration, and parts of the body affected (including the mind) so all experiences of 100% pleasure are not the same for each person, except and only in the respect that if they are 100% for that person then they can't be any better - it's impossible to go past 100%.

I think the main confusion is coming in because people want to compare the experiences of different people when they are "feeling no pain" and they want to say that the particular experiences - though likely involving very different activities - are exactly the same in every respect. As if everyone experiencing 100% pleasure is in some kind of state of euphoria at the right hand of god or something.

It seems to me that that confusion arises from false ideas taught by religion, and that if you start at the beginning of Epicurean philosophy about the nature of the universe, the absence of supernatural gods, the falsity of absolute standards of virtue, and the knowledge that pleasure and pain are feelings given by nature and not concepts or particulars (those are created in our minds) then this problem doesn't trip you up.

When you recognize that the universe is not "designed" and that the atoms and void work together infinite ways over eternal time, and that nature never creates only a single thing of a kind, then you don't even have the expectation that everyone's experiences, pleasurable or painful, are going to be the same.

So Patrikios, who is older like me, due to our age can look upon some experiences as the best we could even hope for, while Rolfe who I understand is much younger, can look aghast at the things that might be 100% pleasing to old guys, and yet there is no philosophical problem. That's why "he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well."

I think it's really good to talk about this because it's a huge stumbling block to people seeing how practical Epicurean philosophy is for everyone. It's particularly a problem for those who want to see Epicurean philosophy grow because our current demographics probably skew toward the nursing home set. There's no reason at all that that has to be the case, and if the ancient world had understood Epicurus that way the philosophy would never have been as successful as it was. As Torquatus said we should be ashamed that we did not learn as early as when we were children what Epicurus was teaching. Epicurean philosophy is at least as appropriate for young energetic and active people as it is for those who are slowing down, and it's not telling everyone to slow down. A lot of us need to stop procrastinating on what's really valuable to us in life and speed up!

There's nothing wrong or right intrinsically with wanting "rest," and there's nothing wrong intrinsically with wanting to "seize the day." The choice is a matter of considering your personal circumstances and recognizing that there's no god or ideal form to answer your question, and the best you or anyone can do is as widely and intelligently as possible pursue as much pleasure as you can and avoid as much pain as you can. But we're not just just talking immediate physical stimulation or giggles and jokes, we talking about how we evaluate the fact that we have only a short time to live and how we judge the total results of our actions in all their consequences.

An entry for this is now in the FILES section:

Diogenes Laertius Book X - Core Texts of Epicurus - Three Public Domain Versions In One PDF - By Tau Phi - Epicureanfriends.com

The Yonge, Bailey, and Hicks Translations of core parts of Diogenes Laertius Book X. The PDF is bookmarked with direct links to the letters of Epicurus and to…

www.epicureanfriends.com

Thanks to Tau Phi for pointing me to this site which contains what appears to be a number of very good Greek / Latin / English resources:

Voci dal mondo antico

Very nicely done. Be sure to open the hamburger menu to see the site map.

Another way of looking at these issues is to compare Epicurean philosophy to rules of evidence that are followed in court (I can speak of the USA but I presume most other courts have similar rules).

Rules of evidence determine what kind of testimony can even be allowed to be heard and considered by the court or jury. Hearsay testimony is mostly disallowed, but it is allowed in some circumstances. There are many other such rules.

But one of the foundational rules of court is that judgments must be made on "evidence," and not on pure speculation. "Circumstantial evidence" (reasonable evaluation of circumstances) is allowed in some cases when "direct evidence" ("I saw it") testimony is not available, or in addition to direct evidence.

But pure speculation ("I think it's possible") is never even allowed in evidence. Courts gain their legitimacy by being based on evidence and not whim, and that means excluding speculations or opinions that are not based on evidence.

Epicurus' canonical approach to life means that he provides rules of evidence that allow you to decide when to believe a thing is true. Epicurus's canonics doesn't require you to be in contact with eternal forms like Plato, or have the testimony of priests to whom truth is revealed like most religions, or to accept that standars of omniscience or omnipotence are a legitimate standard for judging things to be true -- and in fact Epicurus doesn't even accept those as legitimate evidence at all.

Some of the things about that you will read in DeWitt about skepticism:

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In the succession of philosophers the place of Epicurus is immediately after Plato and Pyrrho the skeptic. Platonism and skepticism were among his chief abominations.

He was the first to promulgate a dogmatic philosophy, actuated by a passion for certainty and a detestation of skepticism, which he imputed even to Plato.

....

As for Plato, in an earlier age he might have become a dramatist. Thus it is not astonishing that the fruit of their joint invention was the dramatization of logic which is called dialectic, best exemplified by the Platonic dialogues.

Yet this was only the beginning. One false step invites another. The quest of a definition, of justice, for example, presumes the existence of the thing to be defined. If equilateral triangles did not exist, they certainly could not be defined. Assume that justice can be defined and at once it is assumed that justice exists just as equilateral triangles exist. Hence arose Plato's theory of ideas. The word idea means shape or form and he thought of abstract notions as having an independent existence just as geometrical figures exist, a false analogy. The theory of ideas was rejected as an absurdity by the young Epicurus, because he was a materialist and denied all existences except atoms and space. The theory once rejected, the instrument became useless; scientists have no use for dramatized logic; they depend chiefly upon their senses.
Plato became guilty of another error upon which the sharp-eyed Epicurus did not fail to place a finger. From Pythagoras was inherited the belief in the repeated rebirth or transmigration of souls. Along with
this went the belief that the body was a tomb or prison-house, which blurred the vision of reason and prevented perfection of knowledge. All that the human being perceived was the transient appearance of things as opposed to the eternal ideas. This to Epicurus was virtually skepticism. This error, moreover, was compounded and also aggravated. Closely allied to geometry was the study of astronomy. The latter, in turn, required the observation of heavenly bodies. Thus Plato was in the position of assuming the validity of sensation in the case of the remoter phenomena and denying it in the case of the nearer terrestrial phenomena. This was a glaring inconsistency. The aggravation consisted in the belief that circular motion, which was in those days ascribed to heavenly bodies, was the only perfect and eternal motion and identifiable with Reason itself. Reason, in turn, was identified with the divine nature. Therefore the planets were declared to be gods. This seemed both shocking and absurd to Epicurus: shocking because it meant having more gods to fear, absurd because august gods were assumed to become hurtling balls of fire.

That question would be similar to:

"What would happen if we found that there is a tribe of pink elephants living underground on the other side of the moon and that they created the universe?"

In other words, such a question is absurd because it violates what we are confident about as to the universe, such as that it is not supernatural, that it operates on natural processes of which there is no reason to suspect a supernatural limit, that we observe nature to never make a single thing of kind, that we expect the universe is eternal and that possible combinations of atoms have been continuing infinitely into space and eternally back in time, etc.

This is why canonics / epistemology is much more important an aspect of Epicurean philosophy even than the ethics -- you can't be confident of anything if you don't have a position on when to be confident of something.

Plato taught that nothing is certain except the eternal forms in another dimension. Aristotle taught a watered down version of the same thing. Religion often teaches that only god knows what it right and wrong.

Epicurus teaches that knowledge is possible through the senses, anticipations, and feelings, and that living successfully depends on having confidence in those faculties. And as a result, once we become confident of something like the existence of atoms, or the infinity of worlds and life not limited to earth, we don't even entertain the possibility of those conclusions being invalidated absent some persuasive evidence to the contrary. As we have absolutely no reason to expect that persuasive evidence to the contrary exists, we disregard that possibility. To do otherwise leads to absolute skepticism, which Epicurus campaigns against as much as any other error.

LOL --

I am referring to the point that just as our own medical technology is extending our life spans (or maybe I should say it USED to be doing that) I see no theoretical limit to how far an advanced civilization /species could extend its own life spans.

Naturally, of course!

Sorry it has been a busy day!

Quote from Eikadistes

Then also, we have FELIX QVI POTVIT RERVM COGNOSCERE CAVSAS meaning "Happy [is] the person who knows the causes of things" from a piece of work by Virgil that I forget.

Yes that is a HUGE one! The full quote from the Georgics

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas

Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum

Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari

Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas - Wikipedia

Thinking back to past romances, some of those people were better at different aspects of life than others. Some were smarter, some were more athletic, some were richer - any combination of characteristics you can think of - some brought different combinations of pleasures and pains to the table, all of which I can choose to think of as a lump sum or I can choose to evaluate them independently, and each step of the way during the review those aspects are going to ring painfully or pleasurably. But the bottom line is that if you remember it as affecting you at all, you remember it either positively or negatively, with greater or less duration, greater or less intensity, or greater or less part of the body or mind that is affected. But if you judge it to have affected you, and if it did not affect you painfully, then it is justifiable to judge the affect to have been pleasurable, because you choose to judge all experiences in life to be pleasurable unless they are painful.

Some of the cites behind that are here: https://wiki.epicureanfriends.com/doku.php/the_norm_is_pleasure_too

By no means do I consider this my ultimate motto, but I was always pleased with the motto of the first school I attended, which has stuck with me ever since:

"Fide sed cui vide"

which my teachers translated as "Have faith, but be careful in what."

Excellent! Looks great Tau Phi!

In most cases what I think people think of as mixed are the different reactions in different aspects of their experience, like walking and chewing gum at the same time. Epicurus' pleasure at his philosophy and his friends did not eliminate the pain that he was experiencing in parts of his body on his last day.

There's also the aspect of giving labels to things. Feelings of pleasure and pain are things that occur prior to labels being affixed to them. So yes you can identify a word that encompasses all sorts of reactions at the same time, but that doesn't mean that your natural faculty of pleasure and pain has laid them out that way for you. This is analogous to the eyes and other senses. The eyes and other senses do not assign words to what they are perceiving, they just provide raw perceptual data.

Rolf -

In summary form, it's "good without God" but in the sense of an absolute good that is not related to pleasure. Nietzsche wrote against it for similar reasons. It's an ambiguous term that is more akin to politics than philosophy. There is no recognized definition of what humanism really means - yes there are various groups with their own definitions but there is no systematized statement or formal school where anyone has the right to say is what it really means. And in the sense of implying that there is an absolute good, rather than defining good in relation to pleasure, it's really closer to platonism or stoicism, but without specifying a source for its claims.

EDIT:

In other words, "Good without god" is incomplete, and fails to define what good really means, and equates to "Good without giving a reason"

Check out more details here:

Thread

Epicurean Philosophy Vs. Humanism

I have never considered Epicurean philosophy to be a form of "Humanist" philosophy any more than it is a form of Stoicism or Platonism. I haven't written extensively on this, in part because many Humanists are allies on certain important points, such as rejection of Supernatural Religion.

But I was reminded of this point today and I think it is time to start a thread on it. My position is that "Humanism" is just another "-ism" that has a goal at its center which is very different from…

Cassius

May 27, 2019 at 3:48 PM

I agree with Don and Kalosyni. This is an example of the opening of Book 2 of Lucretius. Thinking about the pains that you are free from is actually pleasurable too. But to be clear there are many kinds of pleasure, and that's not to say that thinking about not stubbing your toe is "the greatest pleasure" - it's just one of many that is open to you while you are alive. There are a lot more pleasures that i would advise pursuing before "meditating on your unstubbed-toe!"