Posts by Cassius

Quote from Max DuBoff

So, all pleasure is good and is worthy of pursuit. When figuring out what to do, figure out first and foremost what will lead to blessedness, which Epicurus identifies as tranquility. One should only pursue other pleasures when they do not interfere with blessedness.

One way of summarily getting to the conclusion would be to go back to my eariler question: was Emily Austin's book misnamed? Your comment would imply that to be accurate to Epicurus it should have titled it "Living for Tranquility"? Or perhaps maybe "Living for Pleasure Means Living For Tranqility"?

Quote from Max DuBoff

I understand "the goal of nature" as particularly connoting katastematic pleasure (following the use of this term in Men. 133 and VS 25, where it most naturally refers to katastematic pleasure).

If there were a fate it would be that we would once again be going down the Katastematic/Kinetic rabbit hole and all that it entails. DeWitt, Gosling and Taylor, Emily Austin, and Boris Nikolsky can be lined up military-style against virtually the entire rest of academia, with one side incorporating joy and delight along with tranquility into the wider concept of pleasure as all that is desirable, and one side narrowing the goal by elevating "tranquility" to the only thing that is really worthwhile and the only reason we need "pleasure" in the first place.

Max, do you see the lines dividing differently? It will be useful to go through detailed argument but I suspect it would be more efficient to state the end-points as soon as possible. Surely the ancient world did not require battalions of experts to understand Epicurus, or he would not have been so popular (and hated) so we ought to be able to describe the conclusions in human form too.

Thank you for that post Elli!

I am sure someone will ask about this:

Quote from Elli

Epicurus sets no such norms. He does not measure height, origin, class, or wealth. He does not say “whom you are allowed to love in order to marry.” On the contrary, we see him offering an exhortation: “your wife must not be afraid of you, because you did not marry her to serve you, but to be your companion in life”

Is this an actual quote for which there is a citation, or is this exhortation a paraphrase?

Thank you Matt. We have had a very good team of people rotate through over the years, and I am convinced that the material there is some of the best we produce. I've now gotten most all of them converted over into text transcripts which are all available here both with summaries (on the index page) linking to the full transcripts:

Quote from Godfrey

All pleasure is pleasure, full stop. The way to differentiate between various pleasures is not by attempting to rank the pleasures but by looking closely at their intensity, location and duration.

I always "like" it when you call our attention to PD09 on this topic. In this case I have a comment in regard to "All pleasure is pleasure, full stop." That very simple sentence stands at the top of a mountain of specific questions. Yes, I agree, all pleasure is pleasure - but what does that mean? I think the answer is that this is a clear instance in which Epicurus (when he says things like this) is talking conceptually, and saying that the common element in all pleasures is that we find them desirable. That leaves a universe of various ways in which mental and bodily pleasures differ from each other, all while remaining desirable.

PD09 gives us firm evidence that Epicurus was not a dunderhead and that the fully understood that all pleasures are not the same in every respect. The concept of pleasure is extremely broad, and that is why it is broad enough to contain "tranquilty" within it. But the reverse is not true - there are many pleasures that are not 'tranquil". That's in large part why the category term to describe what is desirable in life is "Pleasure," not "tranquility" or "true pleasure" or "worthy pleasure" or "fancy pleasure" or "simple pleasure" or "abiding pleasure" or any other term that places a qualifier on pleasure.

I am tagging Patrikios here because I feel sure he will be interested in Elli's post 10 directly above.

Welcome to Episode 341 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues.

We are now in Section 9 of Book 2

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here:

• Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

As we move into section ten, Lucullus (from the Stoic perspective) attacks those who imply that the mind - a creation of nature - is useless for obtaining knowledge, which has the result of overturning the whole of life.

He then moves to address those who argue that there is a difference between saying everything is uncertain and that nothing can be perceived, and this takes him toward the discussion of Cicero's own position - that it makes sense to say that some things are probable and some are not.

Then as we move into eleven the talk turns more and more to discussing "signs" - and that is the beginning of the point we are looking for - so that we can eventually tackle Philodemus' "On Signs"

Quote from wbernys

I would slightly disagree, caviar and a beautiful view do feel great in the same way as tranquility, afterall pleasure reach it's limit in removing pain,

I have the same reaction, Wbernys, and I would be alert to the direction that some writers seem to take that tranquility does not only not "feel great" -- but that tranquility is not a "feeling" at all. That's how "they" (not referring here to Max) argue that tranquility is not a feeling at all.

This is no doubt a complex subject, so I think one of the ways to help sort it out is to play out the logic ruthlessly, and see if the logic results in an absurd conclusion. The Epicurean texts are replete with references to not even being able to know what good is without reference to the normal sensory pleasures of life, so if we hold fast to that and rule out any construction that the Epicureans didn't really care about normal pleasures because all they wanted is "tranquility," that should be a good way of avoiding an absurd result.

The common sense "pleasure means all types of pleasure" perspective can easily accomodate the value of tranquility as one among many important pleasures, but the "tranquility above all" perspective cannot coexist with the great weight of the authoritative records. Had "tranqulity above all" really been Epicurus' teaching, the Ciceros and Plutarchs and Epictetuses of the world would never had raised a finger to oppose him.

Quote from Noah Calderon

It would require a lot of zeroes to already be in one's bank statement or budget to be confident that raising children would be pleasurable enough to justify the cost, as this post points out.

Raphael Raul what do you think of that formulation? What kind of philosophical perspective can we bring to the question of how many zeroes are required to be confident that the pleasure would outweigh the pain?

Quote from Max DuBoff

It is very clear that the good is pleasure and vice versa, but it is not at all clear waht pleasure(s) actually determine a blessed life. Only the absence of pain does that; but he expects that lots of other pleasures will be present in a blessed life.

As to what plesaures actually determine a blessed life, I think I recall Gosling & Taylor examining that at length in "The Greeks On Pleasure" in their chapter on the katastematic/kinetic issue, and concluding that there is nothing mysterious at all about these pleasures, as they include all the normal and ordinary pleasures of regular human life.

As to how "absence of pain" plays into that, it clearly can't mean "total absence of pain in every aspect of life," if we are to accept (as we should) that Epicurus considered himself to be happy even during his last days of extreme physical pain. On the other hand, if "absence of pain" simply means "pleasure" as Torquatus insists to Cicero repeatedly that it does, then there's no issue, as Epicurus tells us that his mental pleasures from friends and philosophy outweighed the physical pains.

On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”

Quote from Max DuBoff

Two of my more complicated views (can say more later

You certainly can! No time limits are ticking, and your patience and attention to detail is appreciated! I presume I can speak for most everyone that we appreciate your being here and engaging.

Quote from Don

So, tranquility, peace of mind, freedom from anxiety IS foundational.

I never said it was not foundational or fundamental and I agree with you that it is. But foundational and fundamental are very different from "the goal." Those who push something other than pleasure as "the goal" know this very well. Food is foundational and fundamental. Water is foundational and fundamental. Air is foundational and fundamental. But neither food, water, or air are the goals of life. We do not live to eat, drink, or breathe, we eat, drink, and breathe in order to live.

The arguments I am targeting are those by people who are affirmatively taking the time to aswsert to others that Epicurus clearly held tranquility to overrideall other concerns. It certainly does not. As Max's own topics point out, we will sometimes die for friends, even though that does not bring us tranquility. We sometimes have sex, and pursue marriage and children, even though those are far from tranquil activities.

Add to the common sense the clear statements in the texts, to which we could add many more than these, including other sections of the letter to Menoeceus - but these are among the most clear:

As Torquatus said,

The problem before us then is, what is the climax and standard of things good, and this in the opinion of all philosophers must needs be such that we are bound to test all things by it, but the standard itself by nothing. Epicurus places this standard in pleasure, which he lays down to be the supreme good, while pain is the supreme evil; and he founds his proof of this on the following considerations.

As Diogenes of Oinonada said in Fragment 32

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

And as Torquatus stated in the quote that is currently on the top page of the site:

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on Pleasure, whereas Pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that Pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of Pleasure."

So to be clear I am not accusing any particular individuals of bad faith. But I am accusing these arguments of being absurd and malicious when made in the philosophical context by professionals who should know better. Advocating this position as if they could divine Epicurus' true intent from one short letter better than than Cicero and Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius and even Epicurus himself in other quotations available to us is absurd. DeWitt doesn't come to this conclusion, Gosling and Taylor don't come to this conclusion in their extensive analysis of the katastematic and kinetic pleasure debate (which Emily Austin endorses, even aside from her choice of naming her book) and neither else who is trying to be fair to Epicurus and look at all the evidence.

If this debate had no consequences we could easily put it aside and go along to get along. But it is not only slanderous but offensive to think that Epicurus devoted his life to achieving "tranquility'' or "absence of pain" in the way that these words are understood today. In the end that's my real beef. The road is open foradvocates of something other than pleasure to go further and explain how there are only two feelings, and that Epicurus used words (like "gods") very precisely and in unconventional ways. The could explain in detail that "tranqulity" is but one of many pleasures, and that "absence of pain" means something much different than "nothingness." But in almost every case they fail to do any of that, even while knowing -- as anyone of reasonable intelligence would -- that these words are far more associated wiith resignation, withdrawal, acceptance and asceticism than they are with how Epicurus taught and lived his life

The implication that Epicurean philosophy teaches resignation, withdrawal, acceptance and asceticism is not only wrong but its also insulting, offensive, and slanderous. People who respect Epicurus as a real person for his real contributions ought to come to his defense, as Cosma Raimondi did , or Torquatus or Diogenes of Oinoanda or Lucian did. In Lucian's words, they should be happy to 'strike a blow for Epicurus" in defending him when he is attacked and his life's work is transformed into the opposite of what he taught.

Basic analysis of this issue is also going to be related to, or a subset of, the entire question of friendship relationships, and there we have some clear points:

1 - We pursue friendship for pleasure, even though over time the pleasure of our friends becomes as important to us as our own.

2 - We must run risks in order to obtain friendship. (need the reference for that one)

3 - We know going into a friendship that one of us is likely to die first, so if it is the friend then any friendship is going to entail at least that pain, which is very intense. Of course there are other pains as well, but the pain of a friend dying is particularly intense and serves as a good illustration of the point that friendship or any other relationship among humans is not a rose garden of all pleasures and no pains, and that we choose these relationships, even though there will be a large cost in pain, when we judge that the pleasure will outweigh the pain.

Transcript of this episode:

I have pinned this thread to the top of the "Relationships" forum. There are a huge number of issues that can be picked out of Raphael's post and discussed. If this thread gets long and goes off in different directions we can break it into sub-threads over time so don't worry too much about staying on topic with the most recent post in the thread.

At a zoom meeting tonight we discussed that the topics we need to cover include:

• How does Epicurean philosophy respond in non-political ways to these issues. The wider society issues are part of the facts but not something we ourselves can change. What we CAN chanage is what we do in response to those facts.
• What considerations need to be included in evaluating total pleasure and pain factors arising from these issues?
• How do we balance the fact that any one person can have only a limited impact on society with the history we have of Diogenes of Oinoanda and Lucretius and Epicurus himself devoting much time to "outreach" beyond their own immediate families / circles of friends?
• Is it possible to generalize on the value of spouses and children? These always involve gambles. Do we read Epicurus and Lucretius as saying that the gamble of marriage and children is stacked against us so that we should generally NOT take such chances? Or are decisions like this always contextual? If so what aspects of the context do we generally look toward?

There are many ways at getting at some of these issues, some more mundane than others. Here's a more real-world question:

Did Emily Austin make a mistake in entitling her book "Living For Pleasure?" Should she have titled it "Living For Ataraxia/Tranquility"?

Quote from Max DuBoff

.But the relevant point is that the absence of pain is the important part, rather than any kind of quantity of pleasure or something like that.

If taken literally, this would be a statement that "absence of pain" is a totally separate thing from "any kind or quantity of pleasure" -- in other words - absence of pain is not pleasure at all. Is that your view?

It would probably also be helpful to know more about what you mean in your words as the "additive concept of pleasure." It would seem clear that Epicurus is saying that it is not necessary to add ever-increasing quantities of pleasure ad infinitum to have a happy life. But on the other hand he is also saying that pleasure alpha / omega / goal of life - that a life of happiness is a life of pleasure - so obviously some measure of pleasure is involved.

How would you renconcile those perspectives?

William do you mind breaking apart the quotes and putting a separate thread under each of the names? That will make them easier to find in the future -- if you have enough to make that worthwhile

Quote from Don

PD3 doesn't say The limit of "tranquility" is the removal of all pains. It says the limit of pleasure is the removal all pain. I won't belabor this, but if there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain - if all of one is removed, you're left with the other.

This is a key observation and very well stated.

Of course, the advocates of "tranquility/ataraxia" as the ultimate goal, rather than happiness based on pleasure as Diogenes of Oinoanda shouted about and Torquatus explains at length, have plenty of arguments up their sleeves. One of the arguments to watch out for amounts to: "It doesn't matter that PD3 refers to the limit of quantity of pleasure. Tranquility/ataraxia is not pleasure at all - it's higher than and better than pleasure, and that's why it is the true goal of Epicurean philosophy. After all, Epicurus says when all pain is gone we have no need of pleasure -- so what else could he mean other than that tranquility / ataraxia is not a pleasure at all?"

The key answer to that is to point out how the tranquility argument begins to expose itself as a death cult argument. PD2 and Epicurus's foundational statements on death say that "Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us."

Now you can quibble as well (certain people have no problem quibbling til the cows come home) and say - well "pleasure" is not a "sensation" so that view doesn't count. Ataraxia / Tranquility is not a sensation, but you can experience it while you are alive, and Epicurus is really just channeling the Buddhists and Stoics and assorted ascetics by saying what a wonderful thing it is to be numb.

That argument is nonsense, but if you're the type who reads the sweep of Epicurean texts talking about pleasure, pleasure, pleasure, and there are only two feelings, but you can still come back and say "Epicurus said the goal is ataraxia / tranquility" then your'e the type that just likes to argue and not worry about reaching any productive conclusions. For some people, the argument IS the goal. They could care less that there is absolutely no evidence of ancient Epicureans living the kind of hermitic ascetic lifestyle that they are advocating.

"But Epicurus said all he needed was bread and water and a pot of cheese!" That's a nonsense argument, and Don too has pointed out. It would be more persuasive to argue that Epicurus needed that bread and water to feed his slaves and the accountants he would have needed to manage his properties and handle the schools income and support of others.

The Tranquility/Ataraxia/Ascetic construction of Epicurus is not credible, and no one in the ancient world believed it or argued it. The ancient world understood him to be advocating pleasure, in all its forms, and the best evidence is how the Epicureans lived their own lives. There's not a documentable case anywhere of a single Epicurean setting out with a goal of living as a celibate or in sackcloth and ashes or a hovel or a cave or in isolation or on bread and water.

That entire approach is nonsense, even if it is the consensus of Academia.

Quote from Matteng

Today podcast episodes revolve around these questions too; I’m going to listen to them again, starting to rehear from episode 280

Good luck because that's at least 40 hours of listening!

Quote from Matteng

Donald Robertson once wrote me, that avoiding all Pain leads to experiental avoidance what causes mental health problems and is boring.

That's a case in which i would agree with Donald Robertson and would simply repeat that while an Epicurean god might theoretically be ableto do that, Epicurus was dealing with humans so he said that we regularly choose pain when a pleasure that is greater results.

A lot ofthe problem is that the stoics, like cicero, refuse to allow anything as pleasure other than physical stimulation. if they were right, then their argument would be sound, but they refuse to accept Epicurus' division of pleasure and pain in ethics and canonics, just as they refuse to accept his division of atoms and void in physics.