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  1. EpicureanFriends - Classical Epicurean Philosophy
  2. Cassius

Posts by Cassius

  • Episode 359 - EATAQ41 - According To The Skeptics, Why Aim For The Truth When You Can GIve Up Trying To Be Right And Never Have To Admit That You're Wrong?

    • Cassius
    • November 11, 2026 at 11:40 AM

    We need something labelled better than this to illustrate Cicero's allusion, but here we see the big and little dipper and their relation to Polaris.

    Chatgpt - The Big Dipper and Little Dipper are not separate constellations from the Great Bear and Little Bear. They are recognizable groups of seven stars, called asterisms, within the larger constellations.

    • Big Dipper: Seven bright stars forming part of Ursa Major (the Great Bear). The dipper's handle corresponds approximately to the bear's tail, while its bowl lies in the bear's hindquarters.
    • Little Dipper: Seven stars within Ursa Minor (the Little Bear). Polaris, the North Star, marks the end of the Little Dipper's handle and the tip of the Little Bear's tail.


    Reconnaître les principales constellations : Polaris | National Geographic | National Geographic
  • Episode 359 - EATAQ41 - According To The Skeptics, Why Aim For The Truth When You Can GIve Up Trying To Be Right And Never Have To Admit That You're Wrong?

    • Cassius
    • November 11, 2026 at 10:54 AM

    Good - the article most directly on point dissecting the Navigation analogy is free in full at this link. From the abstract, the writer seems friendly to Cicero and Academic skepticism, but probably the information contained here will be useful in constructing what the Epicureans would have said in reply.

    Quote

    The Ciceronian corpus of philosophical works features on a number of occasions first-person speakers who explain how they live their Academic scepticism, whose hallmark was the rejection of certain knowledge. Lucullus 66 is an interesting instance of this: the Academic way of life is contrasted with that of the dogmatist with reference to an extended allegory relating to navigation at sea by night. The article aims to elucidate this passage, by considering how navigation by the stars worked in antiquity, to what extent the scholarly and poetic tradition of the night sky reflected these realities, and ultimately what the allegory does and does not illustrate. The Academic’s way of navigating life, while being avowedly imperfect and fallible, emerges as entirely serviceable

    https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3…iles/r9880vr95t

    Random notes:

    1. "Finally, Augustine’s Contra Academicos engages closely with Cicero’s Academici libri, including with parts of that work which have not come down to us, but does so in a highly original way which prevents the simple isolation of fragments." --- So that means that one of Augustine's works presents the Christian argument against Academic Skepticism. I was not aware of the existence of that.
    2. I wonder if there is not something in either Lucretius or the letter to Pythocles relevant to this: "The noun consideratio can just mean ‘scrutiny’ or ‘accurate consideration’, but it can be documented that a particular etymology was placed on it by some ancient users of Latin and arguably Cicero, too, viz. the mental act of gathering together the individual stars (stellae) which make up a constellation (sidus) and the holding of all the stars in an evaluative gaze. 12 I have suggested elsewhere that Cicero used the image of a constellation to ‘translate’ a different and, to his readership, less familiar image which he found in his Academic source material and which is preserved in Sextus, 13 namely the notion of the syndrome in the medical sense, i.e. the simultaneous occurrence of a number of symptoms, which individually might be indicative of other conditions but jointly add up to a particular medical condition (M. 7.176‒9):
    3. Here's some of the technical background I was looking for: "At this point it becomes necessary to investigate how exactly the two constellations can be used for navigation, how Cicero assumed they were used for the purposes of our passage, and what learned discussion existed about them at that time. The present-day survivalist would refer to both constellations not directly, but in order to figure out where the North Star is (sc. in the northern hemisphere), i.e. the star which is closest to the celestial pole, the point in the night sky around which the constellations appear to rotate. For the Great Bear, this would involve drawing a line through the two stars marking the rear of the constellation and extending it until one finds the North Star. 19 As to the Little Bear, Polaris or α ursae minoris is actually contained within the constellation; it is the star at the tip of the handle.
  • Episode 359 - EATAQ41 - According To The Skeptics, Why Aim For The Truth When You Can GIve Up Trying To Be Right And Never Have To Admit That You're Wrong?

    • Cassius
    • November 10, 2026 at 4:55 AM

    There's a lot to unpack in Cicero's star guidance analogy, and it's interesting enough that I want to read further.

    I wouldn't trust this ChatGPT summary except for its intended purpose - to point the way to scholarly articles where those who are interested can find more reading material. Here it is:

    Display Spoiler

    Cicero's Two Bears: Cynosura, Helice, and the Navigation of Academic Skepticism

    A study of Cicero, Academica 2 (Lucullus) 66, ancient astronomy, mythology, and modern scholarship   Prepared 10 November 2026 by ChatGPT

    The central problem

    In the passage commonly numbered Academica 2.66 (within Book II, chapter XX in some editions), Cicero speaks as an Academic sceptic who sometimes follows persuasive appearances without claiming infallible knowledge. He compares his intellectual conduct to a sailor's choice between two northern constellations. The more accurate guide is Cynosura (Ursa Minor, the Little Bear), traditionally used by Phoenician sailors. Yet Cicero prefers Helice (Ursa Major, the Great Bear), a larger and more conspicuous constellation traditionally used by Greek sailors. His preference is deliberate: the image acknowledges that his way of forming opinions is less exact than the ideal of perfectly disciplined assent, while defending it as usable for an imperfect human being.

    The essential correction to a common reading is that Cicero is not contrasting one wandering star with a stationary North Star. Both names designate constellations, and both appear to circle the north celestial pole. Cynosura's stars trace smaller apparent circles because the constellation lies nearer the pole. Helice is easier to see but offers a less precise directional reference. The star Polaris, in Ursa Minor, was not as close to the celestial pole in Cicero's time as it is today, because the Earth's axis slowly precesses. Yonge's phrase “the bright north star” is therefore liable to mislead modern readers: it should not be treated as a precise identification of modern Polaris or as an independent third guide.

    1. What Cicero is arguing

    The astronomical analogy belongs to a discussion of assent, perception, and the wise person. Cicero's Academic position rejects the Stoic claim that some cognitive impressions carry an unmistakable guarantee of truth. He nevertheless concedes that, being no sage, he often adopts opinions and sometimes assents to compelling impressions. He distinguishes this practical concession from possessing knowledge or an infallible criterion.

    The navigation image does several things at once:

    1. It concedes a cost. Cicero's preferred course is more expansive and less precise than the route guided by Cynosura. The reference to wandering is an admission of possible error, not a boast that error is better than accuracy.
    2. It contrasts intellectual temperaments. A tiny, tightly turning constellation stands for rigorous precision and restraint; a large, easily recognized constellation stands for a more accommodating, fallible way of proceeding.
    3. It defends practical life without certainty. Sailors can navigate using the Great Bear, even if another guide permits a straighter course. Likewise, a non-sage can conduct inquiry and life through persuasive appearances without claiming certainty.
    4. It limits the claim. Cicero immediately turns back to the wise person, for whom avoiding mistaken assent is a stricter ideal. His own conduct should not automatically be attributed to the fully wise Academic.

    The irony is important: Cicero does not choose the better astronomical instrument. He chooses the less precise one because that better depicts his philosophical practice. Reading the passage as a literal recommendation to sailors reverses its function.

    2. What Aratus actually says about the constellations

    Cicero draws on Aratus, Phaenomena 26–44, a Hellenistic astronomical poem. Aratus describes two Bears circling near the northern axis: Helice, used by Achaean/Greek mariners, and Cynosura, used by Phoenician mariners. He explicitly contrasts Helice's large, readily recognizable appearance with Cynosura's smaller circuit and greater navigational accuracy. Thus the practical advantage of Cynosura is not a modern inference; it is part of Cicero's literary source.

    FeatureHeliceCynosura
    Modern identificationUrsa Major / Great BearUrsa Minor / Little Bear
    Ancient sailing associationGreek/AchaeanPhoenician/Sidonian
    AppearanceLarge, conspicuous, readily recognizedSmaller, less conspicuous
    Apparent rotationLarger circuit about the north celestial poleSmaller circuit about the pole
    NavigationUseful but less preciseBetter approximation to true north
    Cicero's analogyBroad, fallible judgmentTight, disciplined precision

    The “brightness” question requires distinguishing a constellation's visibility from the brightness of a single star. Aratus says that Helice is conspicuous and easy to identify, not that every star in it exceeds every star in Cynosura. Modern Polaris has visual magnitude about 2; the seven familiar stars of the Big Dipper include stars of roughly magnitude 1.8–3.3. The Great Bear's conspicuous pattern, rather than one uniquely superior beacon, explains its usefulness. A brighter-looking guide can nevertheless be worse for finding the pole if it lies farther away from it.

    3. Why the North Star is not the obvious ancient answer

    Today Polaris lies less than one degree from the north celestial pole. But axial precession shifts the pole among background stars over a cycle of approximately 26,000 years. In Cicero's first-century BCE sky, Polaris was several degrees farther from the pole than today. Ancient navigators therefore did not have the nearly stationary bright marker that modern northern observers take for granted. The relevant ancient comparison was between recognizable northern star groups with different distances from the pole.

    Every star outside the exact celestial pole changes apparent position during the night, even though the stars maintain nearly fixed positions relative to one another over a human lifetime. “Wandering” in Cicero's metaphor is not the technical astronomical wandering of a planet. It evokes the broader route of the Great Bear and, above all, Cicero's own willingness to entertain opinions. Neither constellation was a wandering planet.

    Nor does the existence of a better celestial guide imply that every sailor could always use it: visibility, familiarity, haze, and the ability to recognize an asterism mattered. Ancient sources record conventional Greek and Phoenician preferences; they do not prove that every individual Greek or Phoenician sailor invariably used only one constellation.

    4. Mythology: why two Bears?

    There is a rich mythology, but the myths do not provide Cicero's explicit reason for choosing Helice. The reason is philosophical and metaphorical, based on Aratus's astronomical comparison.

    One well-known account associates Ursa Major with Callisto, a companion of Artemis transformed into a bear and eventually placed among the stars; her son Arcas is connected with the story in several versions. Other ancient traditions identify Helice and Cynosura as nymphs who nursed the infant Zeus in Crete and were rewarded with places in the sky. The mythological identities vary between authors and should not be flattened into a single canonical tale. The name Cynosura literally evokes a “dog's tail,” an additional reminder that constellation names and mythological identifications were not fixed in one uniform system.

    These stories explain the cultural prominence of the Bears, but not the greater brightness or navigational accuracy of either constellation. Their geometry follows from the position of the stars relative to the celestial pole, not from the narrative of Callisto or Zeus's nurses.

    5. Scholarly studies: citations and assessment

    A. Navigating cognitive success (and failure): Cicero, Lucullus 66

    Bibliographic lead: “Navigating cognitive success (and failure): Cicero, Lucullus 66,” deposited in the University of Oxford Research Archive. Oxford repository record.

    Summary: This is the most directly relevant study located: its abstract specifically identifies Lucullus 66 as an extended night-navigation allegory contrasting Academic scepticism with dogmatism. It investigates ancient navigation and the astronomical-poetic tradition to clarify what the allegory can and cannot establish. Its stated conclusion is that the Academic's admittedly imperfect and fallible method remains serviceable. That directly supports interpreting Helice not as the better astronomical guide but as an adequate model of practical life without guaranteed cognition.

    Assessment: This should be the first article to consult in full. The accessible repository search record provided its title and abstract, but not reliably its author, journal, pagination, or full argument; those details are intentionally not invented here. The summary above reflects the abstract, not an independent reading of the entire paper.

    B. Barney McCullagh, “Aratus’ Phaenomena: the Bears, the Waggons, Kynosura, Helice” (2022)

    Citation: McCullagh, Barney. “Aratus’ Phaenomena: the Bears, the Waggons, Kynosura, Helice.” Învăţământ, Cercetare, Creaţie 8, no. 1 (2022): 217–262. Article and abstract.

    Summary: McCullagh proposes an unusually literary reading of Aratus's northern constellations. The abstract argues that astronomical movement and the succession of visible signs also represent how meanings emerge and recede in Aratus's poetry. It challenges the assumption that the poem was simply a practical navigational manual and emphasizes layered allegory and verbal associations.

    Relevance and limitation: This work is directly about the very two constellations Cicero borrows, and helps explain why Aratus's description could become philosophical imagery. It is not, on the evidence of the accessible abstract, a direct interpretation of Academica 2.66. Its strongly allegorical proposal should be distinguished from the simpler astronomical observation that Cynosura lies closer to the pole.

    C. Kathryn Dorothy Wilson, Signs in the Song: Scientific Poetry in the Hellenistic Period (2015)

    Citation: Wilson, Kathryn Dorothy. Signs in the Song: Scientific Poetry in the Hellenistic Period. PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2015, especially chapter 1, “Aratus, the Poet of Signs.” Open-access PDF.

    Summary: Wilson argues that Aratus's poetry integrates scientific information and literary form rather than simply decorating astronomy with verse. The central concept is sign-reading: the capacity to recognize patterns in nature and act upon them. In discussing the Bears, she notes Aratus's explicit distinction between conspicuous Helice and smaller but more useful Cynosura. This makes the episode particularly apt for Cicero's argument about interpreting appearances: signs can be useful without providing the same degree of precision.

    Assessment: Wilson offers valuable background for the intellectual role of Aratus in Cicero, but her dissertation is principally about Hellenistic didactic poetry, not a line-by-line commentary on Cicero's passage. The final application to Academic assent is an interpretation developed here.

    D. Emma Gee, “Cicero's Astronomy” (2001)

    Citation: Gee, Emma. “Cicero's Astronomy.” The Classical Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2001): 520–536. DOI: 10.1093/cq/51.2.520. Publisher record.

    Summary and relevance: A scholarly study of Cicero's engagement with astronomy and astronomical poetry, particularly useful for contextualizing his longstanding interest in Aratus. Caution: The accessible publisher record does not provide an abstract or enough full text to verify whether Gee discusses Lucullus 66 or reaches a particular conclusion about Helice. It is therefore a contextual research lead, not evidence for a specific interpretation of this passage.

    E. Ancient navigation: “Maritime Space and Night-Time Sailing in the Ancient Eastern Mediterranean”

    Citation: “Maritime Space and Night-Time Sailing in the Ancient Eastern Mediterranean,” in materials from Tropis VII (1999). Conference-volume PDF.

    Summary: The indexed conference text quotes Aratus's contrast between the more readily recognized Helice and the smaller, better navigational Cynosura. It supplies maritime-historical context for taking the astronomical contrast seriously rather than dismissing it as purely decorative poetry. Limitation: The precise author and page range of the relevant contribution were not verified from the indexed excerpt; cite the PDF provisionally until the article's first page is checked.

    6. Primary sources and further checking

    • Cicero, Academica 2.66, also called Lucullus 66, chapter XX in the Yonge translation. Yonge's text.
    • Aratus, Phaenomena 26–44, especially approximately 37–44, describing the two Bears and their contrasting use by Greek and Phoenician sailors. Read this alongside Cicero to see that the advantage of Cynosura is already explicit in the original poem.
    • Hyginus, De astronomia 2.1–2, for ancient identifications and myths of the Bears.
    • M. R. Wright, A Dictionary of Classical Mythology, entries “Ursa Major” and “Ursa Minor.” University of Patras-hosted text.
    • William Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, “Astronomia” (1875), on the ancient names, Phoenician and Greek practices, and the distinction between the whole constellation and the pole star. LacusCurtius text.

    7. Final interpretation

    The apparent paradox dissolves when three different questions are separated:

    Which guide is more accurate? Cynosura, because it turns in a smaller apparent circle near the celestial pole. Which is easier to identify? Helice, because its larger, prominent star pattern stands out. Which does Cicero choose for his analogy? Helice, because he is describing the freer, imperfect intellectual navigation of someone who is not a sage.

    Cicero's point is not that the larger constellation is scientifically superior, nor that myth obliges him to prefer it. He chooses a recognized but less exact guide to dramatize the possibility of a workable life without the Stoic ideal of certainty. The best recent specialist study identified here explicitly frames the passage in terms of cognitive success despite fallibility. Cicero's image thus expresses both intellectual modesty and a practical defense of Academic scepticism.

    Research note: The references above distinguish findings verifiable from accessible abstracts or full text from additional contextual leads. The Oxford paper is especially important and should be checked in full before making detailed claims about its author's precise reconstruction of ancient seamanship.

  • Episode 359 - EATAQ41 - According To The Skeptics, Why Aim For The Truth When You Can GIve Up Trying To Be Right And Never Have To Admit That You're Wrong?

    • Cassius
    • November 9, 2026 at 4:20 PM

    One of the issue we came across in this Episode was the Cicero stating early in his own defense of Academic Skepticism that he himself was "not a wise man." (See quote below)

    Combined with other statements we've come across already, and more we expect to confront, it's pretty clear that the question of "whether knowledge is possible" is closely related to the question of the existence of a wisdom - or of the wise man. Socrates of course said something to the effect that he was the wisest of men because he knew that he knew nothing. Does that mean Socrates, or the god, held Socrates to be a wise man? Likewise it appears that the Stoics held that the wise man can know truth, but that wise men as as rare as phoenixes. I also think I recall from Tusculan Disputations or On Ends that Cicero criticized Epicurus (or his followers) for holding Epicurus to be a wise man.

    So the question of whether someone is "wise" or "a wise man" appears to be very close to a term of art in this debate about knowledge.

    At this point I haven't found it yet but it will be worth pinning this down if possible. Do we have direct quotes stating that Epicurus was "wise" or "a wise man," or that in distinction with Socrates Epicurus "knows" the things he teaches as true? If so that will fit into the reconstruction of how the Epicureans themselves spoke about this question of the possibility of knowledge.

    Quote from Cicero - Academic Questions - Section XX

    But I myself am very apt to adopt opinions, for I am not a wise man, and I direct my thoughts, steering not to that little Cynosura,

    The nightly star, which shining not in vain,

    Guides the Phœnician sailor o’er the main,

    as Aratus says; — and those mariners steer in a more direct course because they keep looking at the constellation,

    Which in its inner course and orbit brief

    Surely revolves; —

    but looking rather towards Helice, and the bright north star, that is to say, to these reasons of a more expansive kind, not polished away to a point; and therefore I roam and wander about in a freer course. However, the question, as I said just now, is not about myself, but about a wise man.

    Display More


    In this quote above I left in this elaborate analogy or illustration of choosing to navigate by the North Star verses CIcero saying that he is better off navigating by a more expansive view.

    We (Joshua) addressed this in the podcast that will be out later this week, but the allegory is deep and probably also deserves a lot more development. Presumably Cicero is saying that he does not accept that the North Star truly reflects a fixed point by which to navigate, but if he can't be sure of that why would he think it makes sense to pick a wider constellation that roams and is much more difficult to pin down? Joshua picks out details of the story of the nurses of Zeus for whom the stars are named, and I suspect there is more to that story as to why one of the nurses seems the most reliable while the other nurse roamed about.

    All Brittain says is:

  • Under What Circumstances, If Any, Would An Epicurean Choose A Course That Produced (For Example) 98% Pleasure And 2% Pain Over A Course That Was 100% Pleasure and 0% Pain?

    • Cassius
    • November 9, 2026 at 1:52 PM

    I want to throw this into the mix as well:

    It seems clear that the question of identifying a "heap" (the sorites issue) was known to Epicurus, and his statement that he would not know the good if you subtracted the various specific pleasures that he listed (in the saying recorded by Cicero) is a restatement of how "the good" does not exist apart from specific things which we find to be good, just as the heap does not exist apart from the grains that compose it.

    In discussing heaps of sand, we can easily understand that one heap may contain more grains than another heap, and therefore be larger and recognizably be different. But is not the point that both heaps, no matter how much larger one may be than the other, are both "heaps?" In other words a heap does not become more of a heap, strictly speaking, by adding more grains of sand.

    Happiness considered to be a life of pleasure is conceptually the same. Whether the life is 100% pleasure or 98% pleasure, or whether it lasts ten years or a hundred years, it remains a life of pleasure and therefore a happy life, and it can be legitimately said one life of happiness is not more of a life of happiness than another, even though the larger one would clearly be preferable if you have the choice between them.

    I am not saying that this is the only way to explain why PD 19 says what it says (PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure). However this is one plausible explanation, and any competing explanations have to be equally or more consistent with common sense reasoning and Epicurus' other sayings.

  • Under What Circumstances, If Any, Would An Epicurean Choose A Course That Produced (For Example) 98% Pleasure And 2% Pain Over A Course That Was 100% Pleasure and 0% Pain?

    • Cassius
    • November 9, 2026 at 1:42 PM

    I would think that the following from Diogenes Laertius is relevant to this question of how Epicurus looks at conceptual terminology and how concepts can vary in degree but still be essentially the same.

    Quote

    [121] He will erect statues of others, but whether he had one himself or not, he would be indifferent. Only the Wise man could discourse rightly on music and poetry, but in practice he would not compose poems. One wise man is not wiser than another.

    [122] They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity, that health is a blessing to some, but indifferent to others, that courage does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage.


    So even though most of us would readily say that some actions are "more wise" than are others, Epicurus can still say that "to be wise" means that one wise man is not wiser than another.

    Similarly most of us would probably agree that faults have a common unity in being faults, and yet clearly some faults are of more gravity - can cause more pain - than others.

    Even the word "health," a term which we can see as easy to apply and of equal value for everyone, and for which there is a great disposition to erect as a goal of life, is a blessing to some but a matter of indifference to thers.

    We should probably ask the same question about happiness. Can one happy man be more happy than another? Is happiness like wisdom, for which one wise many is not wiser than another, or is happiness like health, in which one healhy man can be healthier (or at least value it more) than another.

    And of course I'd ask the same question about "ataraxia"? Can one many who is not disturbed be less disturbed than another?

    I am writing all this to bring out what I think is an underappreciated point: That talking about happiness and pleasure in the abstract is clearly the best philosophical goal, but the analysis doesn't stop there. There are varying kinds (and degrees?) of happiness and varying kinds and degrees of pleasure . (Also at 122: "They say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures.")

    What do we tell people about how to determine which pleasure is "greater" when we explain what Epicurus meant when he talked about the wise man at the banquet or the question of how to consider length of time in measuring pleasure?

  • Under What Circumstances, If Any, Would An Epicurean Choose A Course That Produced (For Example) 98% Pleasure And 2% Pain Over A Course That Was 100% Pleasure and 0% Pain?

    • Cassius
    • November 9, 2026 at 12:00 PM

    Separating out "pleasure in the abstract" into practical decisionmaking involving "specific pleasures" probably requires us to face a number of questions, including these:

    1. Is it true that some pleasures are "more pleasurable" than others?
    2. If this is NOT true, then
      1. is it appropriate to stop and say the answer to the question is "Never," because pleasures are totally interchangeable and even the "simplest pleasures" are just as pleasurable as "complex pleasures"?
    3. If this IS true, then
      1. Does that mean that some situations which involve 2% pain are more preferable that some situations which involve 0% pain?
      2. What situations would those be? How would we describe the factors that would have to be weighed?

    My own view is that there are clearly situations where the intensity or duration or parts of the body affected would justify choosing a course of action that produced 98% pleasure and 2% pain would be preferable to a situation that involved pleasures that were "lesser" but still involved 100% of total experience.

    But I also have the impression that many people who study Epicurus will say that "100% pleasure is always better."

    How would we untangle these questions? This is just another way of asking a question that I don't think modern discussion of Epicurus addresses very clearly, but which I think must be addressed for the philosophy to make sense. I feel sure the ancient Epicureans would have had a quick answer to this.

  • Welcome DevinH!

    • Cassius
    • November 8, 2026 at 6:15 AM
    Quote from DevinH

    I'm certainly not a skeptic by any means, since that just leads to paralysis, but I wonder what folks' feelings are on the matter?

    This is an area where it is particularly helpful to expose yourself to what the various types of skeptics had (have) to say. I find that people have a hard time accepting that the various leaders (Pyrrho, Carneades) were as extreme as they were. And people today tend to view skepticism in a "loose" way (viewing it as "challenging authority") rather than in the philosophical way of being committed to the view that knowledge is effectively impossible no matter how much evidence one has. So the question really has to be focused on the logical extreme - What does it mean to say that something is known? When we say that something is "known," have we accepted a viewpoint that only an omnipotent and omnipresent god could meet? If we have accepted such a view - and many seem to do that, because anything is possible isn't it? - then we have a big problem. Epicurus didn't accept such a standard as the correct one.

    Quote from DevinH

    For example, I mentioned PD19/20, and it's an area I struggle with. If I measure a life by the fraction of it spent in pleasure, a short life at 100% equals a long one at 100%, and I can follow PD19/20 that far. But I also personally feel the pull to have more time within my lifetime (so long as life is pleasurable). Lucretius touches on it in book 5 ("Whoever has been born must want to continue in life, so long as fond pleasure shall keep him..."). That's the pull I feel, even if PD19/20 says more time doesn't add anything.

    At one and the same time

    1. Life is desirable, which means all things being equal (you have the ability to experience more pleasure than pain) a longer life is better, and it is desirable to continue to live.
    2. But all things aren't equal. Even in best cases with current technology, humans get old and infirm and sick and even continuing to live becomes painful.
    3. And more important than that, we very legitimately do not value all non-painful experiences as holding the same amount of pleasure for us. Most of us are going to instinctively agree that we would rather live X number of years in freedom than X+Y number of years as a slave. (Insert here your preferred example of extremely good vs extremely bad.) So quality of life matters - a lot.
    4. Epicurus was well aware of these issues. He wrote in the letter to Menoeceus about the desirability of life and that the time factor (length of life) does not override all other factors. The wise man whether young or old does not make haste to end his life because life is desirable, and the same standard (pleasure) applies at any age. Likewise, a wise man at a banquet chooses not the most food, but the most pleasant food, and so the wise man doesn't seek to live the longest life, but the most pleasant.
    5. So we have to consider that while all pleasure is pleasing because it is desirable, all pleasure is not equally pleasing to us (in every respect), so we have to determine what "most pleasant" means, and choose the "most pleasant," not merely the largest quantity. So when Epicurus talks about the "limit of pleasure" we have to think very carefully about what that means. It clearly does not simply mean "that which lasts the longest."

    In my view a lot of people have a problem balancing these considerations. They can't keep in mind both that (1) pleasure is a general umbrella concept that (2) cannot be separated from individual real-life instances of pleasure. "Orange" does not exist except when considered as what is common between "things that are orange." This is where discussion of the "sorites" / heap question helps focus the mind on this issue.

    So yes "pleasure" as a concept cannot improve past "pure pleasure." 100% pleasure is indeed the limit of pleasure - "nothing can be more true than this" as Torquatus said to Cicero -- because when you categorize all experience into pleasure or pain, then when you have no pain you be definition have the purest pleasure.

    But identifying "pure pleasure" as you goal - as helpful as it is philosophically - does not tell you directly what to do when you get out of bed in the morning. You have to apply that viewpoint - which you should hold confidently as a matter of something that you know to be true - to your individual circumstances, many of which you may only have a vague grasp of at any particular moment.

    Quote from DevinH

    I've used this thought experiment to test this: what happens as our medical technology improves? Let's say my grandchildren can live 500 years. Today I would say a long 90-year lifespan lived in a state of ataraxia would pretty much max out both the % quality and the length criterion, an ideal one might aspire to. However, in this new world, if 90 years is no longer a long, full life, does the assessment change? I honestly don't know, and it's an area I have not been able to really work out on my own in a vacuum.

    The only part of that paragraph I'd comment on at this point is that it is very important to be clear what you (anyone) means by "state of ataraxia." What some people think that term means is something that I personally would not want for a day or a year or a lifetime, and I would argue Epicurus wouldn't and didn't want either.

    Every conversation has a context and in general I am at the point where use of an untranslated Greek word to describe the goal of life is a red flag to me, Unless I know the context of the discussion very clearly I usually think that the conversation at that point needs to drop back immediately and make very clear what is being discussed.

    Even here at EpicureanFriends it is not safe at all to think that any two people have the same mental concept of what "ataraxia" really means. "Absence of disturbance" sounds fine until you remember that many people (especially Stoics) explicitly or implicitly hold the view that pleasure itself is a disturbance. It's less true here than elsewhere, but much writing about Epicurus is so shot-through with Stoicism and Platonism that it's not safe to take this issue for granted.


    Eventually a lot of the discussion of ethics can start to sound like a word game. I don't think it is, but what is certainly not a word game is that Epicurus takes a firm position that there are no supernatural gods and that there is no life after death. Within that context no one has the luxury to debate ethical questions endlessly and suspend judgment on every question indefinitely. You have only a set amount of time to live, and you cannot be born again. Unless your goal is "quietude" - which is the problem with some definitions of the word "ataraxia" - then you need to ability to take a confident and firm position about what your real goal is. While being "quiet" or "undisturbed" is sometimes a pleasure, it is certainly not the only pleasure, nor is it always a pleasure. You don't want to be undisturbed while taking a nap on a railroad track in front of an oncoming train. "Pleasure" is the wider term and the most accurate statement of the ultimate goal, not "quietude" or "calmness" or "absence of disturbance."

    Epicurus points to "pleasure" as the best umbrella-term-way to look at it. But there are people who will tell you that you should accept their definition of all sorts of other words (piety, logic, virtue, meaningfulness, etc) as what you should do with your life. It's not just a word game when you realize how important it is for you to get the answers to these questions right.

  • Using AI to create flow charts of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 3:41 PM

    By coincidence some of the same issues we're discussing here arise in another thread in which Kalosyni has made us aware of a competing psycho-sociological group (devoted to what they call Self-Determination Theory). The link below goes to my own comment where I am going through the philosophical implications of that group's focus, but the entire thread is useful. It's a good example of the issues involved here in this thread. Much of psychology and sociology is embedded with philosophical presumptions that the ancient Greco Romans were discussing in detail 2000 years ago. If you let them take you down the wrong road, modern papers can start you thinking that these issues were discovered for the first time in the last 20 years, and no amount of "research" makes up for the narrowness of the view that results.

    Post

    RE: Does Self-Determination Theory Fit in With Epicurean Philosophy?

    This is the final conclusion paragraph of their "The Theory" page:

    […]



    SDT gives strong indication of being as much a sociological or even political group than any kind of personal therapy or insight into ultimate questions of life.

    Also, the same emphasis is in the last paragraph of what is apparently one of their seminal articles from 2001 (underlining is mine):

    […]

    Cassius
    November 7, 2026 at 3:34 PM
  • Does Self-Determination Theory Fit in With Epicurean Philosophy?

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 3:34 PM

    This is the final conclusion paragraph of their "The Theory" page:

    Quote from Self-determinationtheory.org

    By focusing on the fundamental psychological tendencies toward intrinsic motivation and integration, SDT occupies a unique position in psychology, as it addresses not only the central questions of why people do what they do, but also the costs and benefits of various ways of socially regulating or promoting behavior. Overviews of the theory can be found in Ryan and Deci (2000) and in Deci and Ryan (1985, 2000), as well as numerous other articles and chapters identified here on our website.


    SDT gives strong indication of being as much a sociological or even political group than any kind of personal therapy or insight into ultimate questions of life.

    Also, the same emphasis is in the last paragraph of what is apparently one of their seminal articles from 2001 (underlining is mine):

    Quote from ON HAPPINESS AND HUMAN POTENTIALS: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci

    Perhaps the concern of greatest importance, not only for psychological theorists, but also for humanity, is the study of the relations between personal well-being and the broader issues of the collective wellness of humanity and the wellness of the planet. It is clear that, as individuals pursue aims they find satisfying or pleasurable, they may create conditions that make more formidable the attainment of well-being by others. An important issue, therefore, concerns the extent to which factors that foster individual well-being can be aligned or made congruent with factors that facilitate wellness at collective or global levels. Such research will, one would hope, point the way toward means through which individuals can seek hedonic or eudaimonic outcomes in ways that are sustainable in the context of the four billion others who also aspire to be fully functioning and satisfied in this earthly life.

  • Does Self-Determination Theory Fit in With Epicurean Philosophy?

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 3:14 PM

    I'm not going to have more time to explore this at present myself, but I see that these particular writings are apparently significant indications of their Aristotelian focus. These articles would presumably lead us right back into core discussions of the differences between Aristotelian views of life (based on their being a prime move and intelligent direction as a basis for a system of virtue ethics), vs the Epicurean position (that there is no prime mover, no intelligent design, no absolute virtue, no reason to defer to the great men of Athens or anywhere else as a standard of how to live, and that the best way of life is that oriented toward pleasure - widely understood as all that we find desirable using our natural faculties). No doubt Ryan and Deci and their cohorts have all sorts of specific observations that might be helpful, just like we can find good cooking and fine wine and specific pleasures in most any intellectual group. The question though isn't how well they cook, but how they identify the best life given the true nature of the universe and our place in it.

    Their major writings relevant to ancient philosophy

    Several publications are especially important.

    Ryan and Deci (2001)

    On Happiness and Human Potentials: A Review of Research on Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being.

    Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 141–166.

    Their foundational comparative review of hedonic and eudaimonic theories of well-being.

    Read full PDF

    Ryan, Huta, and Deci (2008)

    Living Well: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Eudaimonia.

    Journal of Happiness Studies, 9, 139–170.

    Probably the single most important article for your investigation. It directly discusses Aristotle, hedonic happiness, and the relationship between Aristotle's philosophy and SDT.

    Read full PDF

    Deci and Ryan (2008)

    Hedonia, Eudaimonia, and Well-Being: An Introduction.

    Journal of Happiness Studies, 9, 1–11.

    Explicitly contrasts hedonic and eudaimonic theories and identifies Aristotle as a historical source for the latter.

    Read full PDF

    Ryan, Curren, and Deci (2013)

    What Humans Need: Flourishing in Aristotelian Philosophy and Self-Determination Theory.

    In The Best Within Us: Positive Psychology Perspectives on Eudaimonia, pp. 57–75.

    This is their most explicitly Aristotelian collaboration, written with philosopher Randall Curren.

    Publisher's chapter

    Ryan and Deci (2017)

    Self-Determination Theory: Basic Psychological Needs in Motivation, Development, and Wellness.

    Guilford Press.

    Their major systematic statement of SDT, incorporating the accumulated research on autonomy, competence, relatedness, and human wellness.

    Official publication listing

    The 2001 and 2008 articles provide the strongest readily accessible primary evidence for their explicit philosophical judgments. The 2013 chapter is particularly important because its very subject is the connection between Aristotelian philosophy and SDT.

    Self Determination Theory+4


    3. Aristotle: A clear and affirmative philosophical affinity

    The strongest evidence appears in the 2008 article Living Well.

    Ryan, Huta, and Deci explicitly acknowledge that Aristotle was the originator of the eudaimonic tradition they are examining. They discuss his reasons for distinguishing eudaimonic happiness from hedonic happiness, including his unfavorable assessment of the latter.

    They then identify several Aristotelian themes that closely resemble SDT:

    • Actualization of intrinsic human capacities and excellences.
    • Reflective awareness and deliberate choice.
    • Volition rather than externally compelled behavior.
    • Pursuit of activities and goals worthwhile in themselves.
    • Human flourishing understood as a way of living rather than simply a pleasant mental state.

    Their assessment is unusually direct:

    Quote

    "Many of these elements in Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia are at the core of self-determination theory’s (SDT’s) conceptions of wellness."

    — Ryan, Huta, and Deci (2008), Living Well.

    Self Determination Theory


    This is not merely an observation that Aristotle anticipated modern psychological terminology. They affirm an actual conceptual overlap between his ethical theory and their account of psychological wellness.

  • Does Self-Determination Theory Fit in With Epicurean Philosophy?

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 1:48 PM

    ... And that in itself opens up many lanes of fruitful discussion, because if we can identify where Aristotle goes wrong that will point out problem areas to expect to find in anyone who develops an elaborate theory from the same perspective.

  • Does Self-Determination Theory Fit in With Epicurean Philosophy?

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 1:43 PM

    First research indicates its heavily Aristotelian and considers Hedonism to be a problem.

  • Welcome DevinH!

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 12:00 PM
    Quote from DevinH

    In working on my own I've developed some readings that I suspect drift from the classical positions, most notably around PD 19 and 20 and whether more time at the fullness of pleasure adds anything. I'd like to test those against people who know the texts far better than I do, and be corrected where I'm wrong.


    Devin this would be an excellent topic to discuss whenever you are ready. Approach it however you wish here in this thread and we can move it later into a more appropriate forum if/when it gets long enough. Discussions of the meaning of limits of pleasure and how that relates to how to assess length of life are always of key interest.

  • Welcome DevinH!

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 10:12 AM

    Again, welcome DevinH - Your background indicates that you have lots to offer the discussions here. Take your time and weigh in on whatever areas interest you first and most.

    Your science / technical background gives you expertise that will be particularly useful in our "canonics" discussions on the nature of truth and reality, and how and when we move from the accumulation of evidence to the decision that we have enough information to take a firm position on a topic.

    That's what we've been discussing for many weeks on the podcast, but I freely admit that it is a topic that most people aren't immediately familiar with or see the relevancy of.

    Also given your orientation I think you will find the DeWitt book the most helpful way you could proceed to dig deeper. You won't agree with all of it by any means, but it is almost alone among the "modern" books that attempts to give you an overview of the entire philosophy and how it fits together. That integrative perspective will color every detail that you read as time goes by, and like most of us you'll probably go through many revisions of how you view the more advanced topics like prolepsis or the nature of "gods."

    I'll also particular point toward the academic articles of Dr. David Sedley. If he's written an article on a specific focus you'll likely find his research to be among the most thorough and his reasoning to conclusions to be the soundest.

    There's a tremendous amount of information to digest and it's helpful to all of us to talk about it in a friendly and constructive way, among people who are largely (but of course to differing degrees) on board with the full sweep of Epicurean philosophy.

  • Using AI to create flow charts of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 7:59 AM
    Quote from Patrikios

    What I have found is that these new details in modern science and psychology have much to say, mostly to reinforce Epicurean principles; but more importantly to give people today assurance that the Epicurean way is Nature’s way, as modern science and psychology continue to reinforce.

    Patrikios:

    Thanks for your post and I agree with your conclusion there. What we consider to be modern science reinforces Epicurean conclusions to the extent that it explores and brings to light new facts. We are always going to test our conclusions against facts and evidence, and welcome new instances of those, because we are committed to the truth and to making decisions based on truth, just as Epicurus was initially motivated to reject the "something from nothing" implications of the world arising spontaneously from chaos.

    The comments that you see me make repeatedly are intended mainly for the people who lurk here or read our threads without content - or worse yet might take them out of context.

    There are deep issues in what often gets included as part of "modern science" that are addressed through Epicurean canonics but are not apparent in most casual discussions of modern science. Many people talk as if "modern science" supersedes the answers that Epicurus gives (such as the primary principal doctgrines) and it always needs to be clear that we need to test the conclusions (not the facts, but the presumptions and conclusions) of modern science against the conclusions that there is no supernatural realm and the conclusions that follow, such as that there is no life after death.

    Social sciences such as psychology (much more than biology or the other "hard" sciences - often carry embedded presumptions that should not be accepted on face value. Even the question of what "health" means in the psychological context is a highly loaded question, and I think it is a very bad idea for philosophy to get too far in bed with psychology unless the particular psychology or psychologist make very clear at the outset what their presumptions are about the nature of the universe and humanity's place in it

  • Welcome DevinH!

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 6:34 AM

    Thanks DevinH for your detailed and very interesting post and the kind words about the podcast and the forum. We look forward to having you and to hearing much more from you!

  • Welcome DevinH!

    • Cassius
    • November 7, 2026 at 6:31 AM

    Welcome DevinH !

    DevinH tells us:

    I've registered and confirmed my email.

    My username is: DevinH

    I have read and agree to the Community Standards, Rules, and Terms of Use, including the "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean" statement and the posting policy. I understand the forum is committed to classical Epicurean positions, and I'll participate on that basis.

    My background and interest: I'm a scientist ... I work in biotech process development. My footer may read as a lot of ambition. I've left it intact anyway, since I'm joining for frank criticism and it seems wrong to start by hiding things that I might need to examine.

    I searched for decades for a philosophical and emotional home. I used to call myself a humanist, but I could never find a core for why it was right. Either it rested on absolute morality, which seemed plainly wrong, or it rested on nothing, and it felt hollow. When I came across Epicureanism five years ago, it felt less like a discovery than a home I had always lived in. It just felt right from the start, and the edges I first resisted mostly turned out, after study and reflection, to be right as well. Grounding the good in pleasure, something I actually feel that has a fully physical basis gave me the foundation I'd been searching for. The physics, and the almost insane degree of accuracy, fit how I already saw the world as a biologist. I now use it as a practical framework for how I work, how I treat the people close to me, and how I weigh my choices. I fail more often than I would like to admit, but I hope the community you have built is a place to explore and have peers challenge one's approach to the philosophy. I also have a strong interest in the Herculaneum papyri and follow the Vesuvius Challenge. Amazing that we get new thought from a richer epicurean past every year!!

    Reading so far: Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, which is my foundation for the physics and the way to life that flows from it, and the Principal Doctrines, which I'm using as the spine of my study notes. I haven't yet worked through the letters or Philodemus. Next up is DeWitt's Epicurus and His Philosophy, which I have but haven't started, then the Torquatus section of Cicero's On Ends, as your reading page recommends, and Philodemus' On Death. I'm also working my way through the podcast, lovingly. It's been wonderful and a part of my commute for years.

    Why I'm requesting an account: I've been studying and practicing mostly alone, though I talk about it with people a lot. I've come to see that as the biggest gap. In working on my own I've developed some readings that I suspect drift from the classical positions, most notably around PD 19 and 20 and whether more time at the fullness of pleasure adds anything. I'd like to test those against people who know the texts far better than I do, and be corrected where I'm wrong.

    I understand and agree that pleasure is the highest good, the beginning and end of the happy life. I can't imagine a higher one. As a biologist, I see us as social primates whom nature built to feel pleasure in friendship and community, so for me, living for pleasure and living among friends turn out to be the same project.

    Thanks for running the forum and the podcast.

    Best,
    Devin



    Thank you for registering at EpicureanFriends.com, and for writing to us about your background and interest in Epicurus. We look forward to hearing more from you!

    As a reminder, all posts are subject to our Community Standards, Rules, and Terms of Use.

    Welcome to EpicureanFriends!

  • Episode 359 - EATAQ41 - According To The Skeptics, Why Aim For The Truth When You Can GIve Up Trying To Be Right And Never Have To Admit That You're Wrong?

    • Cassius
    • November 6, 2026 at 4:02 PM

    Welcome to Episode 359 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

    This week we are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues. This week will continue in Section 20 of Book 2, where we are now seeing Cicero argue on behalf of skepticism, and we will be interjecting Epicurean responses.

    Our text will come from
    Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here: Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

    As we proceed through the end of Academic Questions, these are the topics we expect to cover:

    24. Lucullus's Extended Rebuttal of the Academic Doctrine, and His Concluding Appeal to Cicero (2:XIII)
    25. Cicero Begins His Reply (2:XX)
    26. Cicero Lays Out the Syllogism About Assent and Opinion (2:XXI)
    27. Cicero Turns to Antiochus's Own Inconsistency (2:XXII)
    28. Cicero Defends His Citation of the Ancient Philosophers (2:XXIII)
    29. Cicero Adds Chrysippus and the Cyrenaics, Then Returns to Arcesilas and Zeno (2:XXIV)
    30. Cicero Returns to Attacking the Senses (2:XXV)
    31. Cicero Presses the Sun's Size and the Limits of Trained Perception (2:XXVI)
    32. Cicero Turns the "Art" Argument Back on Lucullus (2:XXVII)
    33. Cicero Multiplies Examples From Madness (2:XXVIII)
    34. Cicero Attacks Reason and Dialectics: The Sorites Paradox (2:XXIX)
    35. Cicero Presses the Liar Paradox (2:XXX)
    36. Cicero Presents Carneades's Own Positive Doctrine of Probability (2:XXXI)
    37. Cicero Distinguishes the Academic Position From Epicurus's (2:XXXII)
    38. Cicero Defends Probability Against the Charge That It Cannot Support Memory or Action (2:XXXIII)
    39. Cicero Answers the "Self-Refuting" and "Two Incompatible Propositions" Objections (2:XXXIV)
    40. Cicero Broadens the Argument Beyond the Stoics (2:XXXV)
    41. Cicero Reflects on His Own Position Among the Competing Schools (2:XXXVI)
    42. Cicero's Survey of Disagreement Among the Natural Philosophers (2:XXXVII)
    43. Cicero Presses the Problem of Providence and the Limits of Physics (2:XXXVIII)
    44. Cicero's Survey Continues: The Soul, the Antipodes, and the Motion of the Earth (2:XXXIX)
    45. Cicero Asks Which Natural Philosopher He Would Even Choose to Follow (2:XL)
    46. Cicero Turns to Ethics: Even the Gods Are Disputed (2:XLI)
    47. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part One (2:XLII)
    48. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part Two (2:XLIII)
    49. Cicero Weighs Zeno Against Antiochus on Virtue and the Happy Life (2:XLIV)
    50. Cicero Catalogs the Stoic Paradoxes About the Wise Man (2:XLV)
    51. Cicero's Climactic Debate Between Pleasure and Honor (2:XLVI)
    52. Cicero Turns to the Canon of Truth, and Zeno's Hand (2:XLVII)
    53. The Dialogue's Close (2:XLVIII)


  • Episode 358 - EATAQ40 - The Hypocrisy And Darkness of Academic Skepticism

    • Cassius
    • November 6, 2026 at 4:00 PM

    Summary

    Joshua returns, and Cassius and Joshua read Section 19 of Book Two of Cicero's Academic Questions, where Lucullus ends his defense of knowledge with a personal appeal to Cicero. Cicero has praised philosophy, yet he now follows a philosophy that "confounds what is true with what is false" and robs us of our senses. Even the Cimmerians, denied the light of the sun, had fires to see by, but the skeptics leave "not a single spark." Lucullus then throws Cicero's proudest moment in his face. Cicero swore that he had uncovered the Catilinarian conspiracy, so how can he now say that nothing can be known? Cassius reads Rackham's version and his footnote on the conspiracy of 63 BC. Catulus then answers that Cicero should not be moved by Lucullus's authority, and that Antiochus himself abandoned his opinions when it suited him. Joshua points out that this turns Lucullus's own argument about authority, from the end of Section 18, back against him. He also compares Cicero's challenge to Torquatus in On Ends Book Two: an Epicurean would never dare announce to the assembly that he does everything for pleasure. Cassius argues that the Epicurean can stand before the Senate, the army or the people and explain what pleasure means, while a skeptic cannot consistently urge any action at all. Joshua reviews Antiochus of Ascalon's turn from the skeptical Academy toward the Stoics, and the Roman legend of the Cimmerians living in perpetual darkness, compared with Plato's cave. Cassius closes with Lucretius's torch: without a reliable standard of truth we cannot tell which way to go. Joshua previews Section 20, where Cicero begins his reply as if pleading an important case in court.


    Transcript

    Display Spoiler

    Cassius:

    Welcome to Episode 358 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote On the Nature of Things, the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

    We're back this week with Joshua to continue in Book Two of Cicero's Academic Questions, and we will finish Lucullus's presentation of the Stoic defense of knowledge. In Section 19, which we'll read in just a moment, we'll find the transition where Lucullus's argument comes to its final conclusion, and then Cicero will respond to Lucullus and advocate the skeptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge. We've spent a lot of time over the last several weeks going through Sections 17 and 18 in relatively close detail, so in this episode we'll go straight into 19, and I'll ask Joshua to read that for us. So Joshua, good to have you back this week. Whenever you're ready, just go ahead.

    Joshua:

    Because I was absent last week, it's been two weeks now since we finished Section 18 in the text. At the end of Section 18, Lucullus continued his critique of Academic skepticism on the main question of whether anything can be conceived. Of course, the Academic skeptic's answer is that nothing can be conceived. And he raised the interesting question: is authority no hindrance to entertaining the opinion that nothing can be conceived? When you've got powerful minds like Arcesilaus and Carneades, with great richness of ideas and power of eloquence, is that not a hindrance in the study of philosophy, and in the study of this central question? Who would ever, he says, have embraced so openly and undisguisedly such perverse and false principles, that nothing can be conceived, if it had not been for people like Arcesilaus and Carneades and the weight of their authority? So it won't do for you Academic skeptics to pretend to be aloof from all of this, because your reputation as thinkers, as philosophers, and in the case of Cicero as statesmen, is a weight on the scale that you are not accounting for in convincing people.

    So that's the end of Section 18. In Section 19 we have a transition: the end of Lucullus's argument, a brief discussion among the others in the room, and finally a handoff to Cicero in Section 20, where we'll take up his response to the critique that Lucullus has been making of Academic skepticism. So this is Section 19:

    "These are nearly the arguments which Antiochus used to urge at Alexandria, and many years afterwards, with much more positiveness too, in Syria, when he was there with me, a little before he died. But, as my case is now established, I will not hesitate to warn you, as you are my dearest friend, (he was addressing me,) and one a good deal younger than myself."

    "Me" there is Cicero. And this is still Lucullus speaking:

    "Will you, then, after having extolled philosophy with such panegyrics, and provoked our friend Hortensius, who disagrees with us, now follow that philosophy which confounds what is true with what is false, deprives us of all judgment, strips us of the power of approval, and robs us of all our senses? Even the Cimmerians, to whom some god, or nature, or the foulness of the country that they inhabited, had denied the light of the sun, had still some fires which they were permitted to avail themselves of as if they were light. But those men whom you approve of, after having enveloped us in such darkness, have not left us a single spark to enable us to look around by. And if we follow them, we become bound with such chains that we cannot move. For when assent is taken away, they take away at the same time all motion of our minds, and all our power of action; which not only cannot be done rightly, but which cannot possibly be done at all.

    "Beware, also, lest you become the only person who is not allowed to uphold that opinion. Will you, when you have explained the most secret matters and brought them to light, and said on your oath that you have discovered them..."

    This is the Catiline conspiracy, Cicero's most famous case: he declared before the Roman people, on his oath, that he had discovered the plot.

    "...(which, indeed, I could swear to also, since I learned them from you,) — will you, I say, assert that there is nothing which can be known, comprehended, or perceived? Beware, I entreat you, lest the authority of those most beautiful actions be diminished by your own conduct."

    Or in other words, beware lest the majesty of what you have achieved in the past, in the courts of law and in the political arena, be diminished by the philosophy you now adopt, which says that nothing can be known. If nothing can be known, the Catiline conspiracy cannot be uncovered. We think that's what he's saying here. I'll pause there. There is another paragraph. Cassius, do you have anything to add at this point?

    Cassius:

    Yes, Joshua, I agree with where you're going here. I have the Rackham in front of me, and he says it this way:

    "For by doing away with assent they have done away with all movement of the mind and also all physical activity, which is not only a mistake but an absolute impossibility. Be careful too that you are not the one person for whom it is most illegitimate to uphold this theory of yours. What, when it was you who exposed and brought to light a deeply hidden plot, and said on oath that you knew about it, which I might have said too, having learned about it from you, will you assert that there is no fact whatever that can be learned and comprehended and perceived? Pray take care again and again that you may not yourself cause the authority of that most glorious achievement to be diminished."

    And Rackham has footnotes in which he specifically refers to the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63 BC, and says that Cicero had used that expression in the Senate, and it became a common phrase with which he was often taunted. So this does seem clearly to be a reference, as you say, to one of the most important episodes of Cicero's life, his proudest moment, so to speak, when he had saved the Republic. This is really a great argument by Lucullus: to throw in Cicero's face his own actions, his own statements, his own claim to fame, and point out how inconsistent they are with the philosophy of skepticism. It is a remarkable argument that he's making.

    Joshua:

    And this is where Lucullus comes to the end, because in the last paragraph of Section 19 he stops talking:

    "And having said this he stopped. But Hortensius, admiring all he said very greatly, (so much, indeed, that all the time that Lucullus was speaking he kept lifting up his hands; and it was no wonder, for I do not believe that an argument had ever been conducted against the Academy with more acuteness,)..."

    That's in parentheses, and it's Cicero speaking: "I," Cicero, "do not believe that an argument had ever been conducted against the Academy with more acuteness."

    "...began to exhort me, either jestingly or seriously, (for that was a point that I was not quite sure about,) to abandon my opinions. Then, said Catulus, if the discourse of Lucullus has had such influence over you, — and it has been a wonderful exhibition of memory, accuracy, and ingenuity, — I have nothing to say; nor do I think it my duty to try and deter you from changing opinion if you choose. But I should not think it well for you to be influenced merely by his authority. For he was all but warning you, said he, jestingly, to take care that no worthless tribune of the people, of whom you know what a number there will always be, seize upon you, and ask of you in the public assembly how you are consistent with yourself, when at one time you assert that nothing certain can be discovered, and at another time affirm that you yourself have discovered something. I entreat you, do not let him terrify you."

    This is now Catulus speaking: do not let Lucullus terrify you with this threat.

    "But I would rather have you disagree with him on the merits of the case itself."

    This is a deft piece of work by Cicero.

    "But if you give in to him, I shall not be greatly surprised; for I recollect that Antiochus himself, after he had entertained such opinions for many years, abandoned them as soon as he thought it desirable. When Catulus had said this, they all began to fix their eyes on me."

    On Cicero, of course. This is very interesting, Cassius. Cicero, who is compiling all of this material, allows Lucullus to make this remarkable objection to Academic skepticism: the cornerstone moment of your entire career, Cicero, was built on the ability to ferret out hidden knowledge, and now you're saying that knowledge is impossible, that it's impossible to conceive anything. He allows that, and then he brings in Catulus to say: don't respond to that argument. Don't fall for it. Because if you do, you in turn will be influenced merely by authority, exactly the thing Lucullus had warned about at the very end of Section 18, which we talked about two weeks ago. There's a symmetry here: the two most recent arguments that Lucullus has made in his discourse have now been turned against him. And Catulus is paving a way for Cicero to navigate his response without having to engage with the most damning criticisms.

    Cassius:

    Yes, Joshua. I came into the episode today thinking this was going to be a rather unremarkable section that didn't deserve a lot of attention. But when you read it closely, and realize the analogy that's being made and understand the background, it jumps out at you as an incredibly persuasive argument, and it must have been powerful. And for Cicero himself to commit it to paper says something very remarkable as well. He is pointing to the defining episode of Cicero's entire life, his claim to fame for saving the Republic. Is Cicero now going to turn around and apologize to Catiline and the conspirators, the people he had put to death for trying to overthrow the Republic? How can he be consistent and say that knowledge is impossible, and yet get up in front of the Roman Senate and say that these conspirators were trying to destroy the Republic, and take such strong action as a result?

    Again, you have to take the time to read through this material, follow the footnotes and think about what is being said. But examples like this seem to me very powerful. When you're arguing with somebody about something very important, you don't want to stay in the clouds all the time and play logic games. You want to call on specific real-life examples any time you can. If you wanted to be cynical, I guess you could say that this is Cicero making sure that his actions in saving the Republic are remembered even when somebody wants to question him. But still, it powerfully points out the inconsistency in the skeptical position, which Cicero is nevertheless going to take in the many paragraphs to come. This example here at the end now jumps out at me as something very memorable and very powerful.

    Joshua:

    Cassius, it is incredibly powerful, and it also echoes a charge that Cicero himself makes in Book Two of On Ends, when he is responding to the Epicurean spokesman Torquatus. In Book Two, after talking about Torquatus's ancestor who took the necklet from the enemy, he says:

    "Why, Torquatus, what a state of things does this seem, that you with your name, abilities and distinctions, cannot venture to confess before a public meeting your actions, your thoughts, your aims, your objects, or what that thing is from love of which you desire to carry your undertakings to completion, in fine what it is that you judge to be the best thing in life? What would you be willing to take, on condition that when once you have entered on your office and risen before the assembly (you know you must announce what rules you intend to follow in your administration of the law, and perhaps too, if you think it good to do so, you will say something about your own ancestry and yourself, after the custom of our forefathers) — well then, what would you take to declare that during your term of office you will do everything with a view to pleasure, and that you have never done anything during life except with a view to pleasure? You say, do you suppose me to be such a madman as to speak before ignorant men in that fashion? But make the same statements in court, or, if you are afraid of the crowd, make them in the senate. You will never do it. Why not, unless it be that such speech is disgraceful? Do you suppose then that I and Triarius are fit persons to listen to your disgraceful talk?"

    That is a very similar argument to the one Lucullus has made. Cicero made essentially the same argument in Book Two of On Ends: you Epicureans are not willing to go before the Senate or the assembly. You're not willing to stand in the forum and proclaim what you really think, that you do everything in life with a view to your own satisfaction, your own pleasure. So there is an interesting parallel. In both cases it's a question that demands an answer, and I'm very curious to see how Cicero answers it, or whether he's just going to dodge it.

    Cassius:

    Yes, that will be interesting to see, Joshua. In the meantime, let me pursue your analogy, because I think it's an excellent one. The point is, as you say, which of these two sides will really be able to stand up in front of the Senate, or in front of the people, or in front of the army in camp, and make its case? Which side are we more comfortable arguing ourselves? There's no doubt in my mind: I am far more comfortable arguing that Epicurus was right. If you simply think of pleasure as all that is desirable in life, then whether you're a senator or a soldier or just a member of the public ready to vote, you think about the things that are desirable to you, mentally and bodily, and you put them in the category of pleasure. That is why you are running for office or fighting a battle or doing anything in life: you know what you value, and you're going to pursue it. That is Epicurean philosophy.

    Are you going to get up in front of the Senate or the camp or the people and say, "Well, I don't know, and nobody else does either. Let's talk for hours on end, setting one argument against the other, and we'll all see that nobody really knows. So let's just go home and do nothing. Let's never take a position, because it's impossible to know"? It's very defensible for an Epicurean to get up and explain to the people what pleasure means. But how is Cicero, or some dedicated skeptic, going to get up in front of the Senate and say, "I think you should sentence these conspirators to death because they want to kill you, but I'm not really sure of that. So maybe we ought to talk about it a lot longer, and just talk and talk and talk, and maybe we'll come to some conclusion that we can all live with, though we won't really know for sure. So let's just go home for the night and let them do whatever they're going to do, and we'll hope that they don't murder us in our beds or launch their revolution tonight, because we can't be sure"? There's no way you can logically make Cicero's argument that nothing can be known and still be a public figure like Cicero, saying that certain actions need to be taken because of the facts you have uncovered.

    It takes some effort to step out of the ordinary definition of a word like pleasure as immediate sensory stimulation, but you can explain to people that pleasure has a true meaning far beyond what narrow-minded people think. If you're going to be consistent, though, you can't take Cicero's position that nobody knows anything and then go on and say, "We're going to do X, Y and Z anyway, even though we don't know it's the right course." So again, Joshua, I think contrasting this with the discussion with Torquatus is exactly on point. Torquatus, no less than Cicero, took strong action in military and public affairs, and understood that he could justify his actions by his philosophy. Cicero simply cannot do that. We'll see as we go further how Cicero tries to justify it, and I think what we're going to find is that he retreats to the probability argument again.

    But Cicero is on the slippery slope of skepticism that ends in Pyrrhonian, Sextus Empiricus-style skepticism. Cicero is going to try to rescue it and say that he can still make certain decisions, and still save the Republic and so forth. But the logical conclusion of skepticism is Sextus Empiricus's position: nobody knows, and unless I am absolutely compelled to do something, I am not going to say that I know what the right course is. I'm not even going to say that happiness, or eudaimonia, is a logical goal, because taking the position that happiness or any other concrete idea is correct is incompatible with skepticism. That's a point I touched on last week in the part I read from Sextus Empiricus, and we'll come back to it. This is not just an abstract argument with no practical implications. It directly affects the most important decisions in life.

    Joshua:

    This entire section is bookended by references to Antiochus. In the first sentence Lucullus is summarizing his entire presentation: "These are nearly the arguments which Antiochus used to urge at Alexandria," and in Syria when Lucullus traveled with him. And then Catulus, at the very end of Section 19, says to Cicero, "I entreat you, do not let him terrify you," that is, do not let Lucullus terrify you with the threat of standing in front of the people and saying that you don't know anything. "But I would rather have you disagree with him on the merits of the case itself. But if you give in to him, I shall not be greatly surprised; for I recollect that Antiochus himself, after he had entertained such opinions for many years, abandoned them as soon as he thought it desirable."

    I think we've spent a little time in past episodes on Antiochus, but who is this guy, and why do they keep referring to him? You looked into him last week, specifically the question of how he changed his mind during his life. We should probably address exactly what that change was. What did he start out as? Where did he end up? And what is his relationship to this central question of whether knowledge is possible? If we can just get that into place, that will satisfy my curiosity for the moment.

    The Wikipedia page is for Antiochus of Ascalon, and it says that after the decline of the New Academy in the first century BC, his school was the sole inheritor of the Platonic tradition in Athens, and it began the period of philosophy known as Middle Platonism. Despite the emphasis on the Platonic tradition, his ideas were often more Stoic than Platonist. He originally studied under Philo of Larissa, as you mentioned, and Wikipedia says this was for a significant portion of his career. However, the two philosophers later became estranged as a result of a disagreement about skepticism. While at Athens, Antiochus studied Stoicism under the scholarch Mnesarchus. Antiochus tended to abandon the core theses of skepticism, which seemed untenable to him. In doing so, he came into conflict with the prevailing current in the Academy, which at the time was already moderate and willing to compromise, but was still committed to the tradition of Carneades. Or, as Lucullus would say, still committed to honoring the authority of Carneades. This question of authority is more important than I first noticed, as we'll see going forward.

    Cassius:

    So it looks like the important point is that Antiochus started out in the Academy in its skeptical period, loyal to Carneades and the skeptical position, but that as time went by, apparently sometime around 88 BC, Antiochus abandoned the skeptical position and attempted a sort of merger of certain aspects of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, rejecting skepticism and embracing a criterion of truth. So Joshua, is this a good time for us to go back and look at the Cimmerian example that's mentioned at the beginning of this passage?

    Joshua:

    This is part of the charge that Lucullus makes against Cicero and against Academic skepticism: "Will you, then, after having extolled philosophy with such panegyrics, and provoked our friend Hortensius, who disagrees with us, now follow that philosophy which confounds what is true with what is false, deprives us of all judgment, strips us of the power of approval, and robs us of all our senses? Even the Cimmerians, to whom some god, or nature, or the foulness of the country that they inhabited, had denied the light of the sun, had still some fires which they were permitted to avail themselves of as if they were light. But those men whom you approve of, after having enveloped us in such darkness, have not left us a single spark to enable us to look around by. And if we follow them, we become bound with such chains that we cannot move."

    Now, in the allegory of the cave in Plato's Republic, you are without sunlight, without any easy way to tell what's true from what's false, and you are bound by chains and cannot move. You're just looking at the flickering shadows on the wall of the cave, cast by figurines, but you can't see the figurines, and you can't see the fire that is casting the shadows. I guess what Lucullus is saying here is that with Academic skepticism we are like the people in the cave, except that there doesn't appear to be any way out. You haven't given us a single spark to see by. In this analogy it's possible that we couldn't even see the shadows flickering on the wall. It's just darkness.

    And he refers to the Cimmerians, not to be confused with the Sumerians, a much better known people of the ancient world. The Cimmerians were a real historical people, Iron Age mounted nomads who lived on the Pontic–Caspian steppe and in Anatolia, in modern Turkey, in the eighth and seventh centuries BC. But what's really important for the reference here is that the Romans had a mythologized understanding of the Cimmerians, and it developed through a series of stages. In Roman poets like Ovid we have an image of the Cimmerians as a people living in a sunless land of perpetual darkness and silence, beyond the North Wind.

    This parallels in some ways the Greek myth of the Hyperboreans. The Hyperboreans lived beyond the source of Boreas, the personification of the North Wind, except that the Hyperboreans lived in an idyllic land with a temperate climate in spite of its latitude. Because the North Wind didn't blow there, it was a temperate and pleasant place to live, kind of like El Dorado or Shangri-La: a legendary place of peace and plenty where everything's just nice. The Roman version of the Cimmerian myth places their land near the home or palace of the god of sleep, Somnus, a dark and shady place full of mist and cloud, where the sun never shines. It's perpetual darkness and silence. In a place like this the Cimmerians are said to live in tunnels underground, making a living by mining and so on.

    And for some reason, he says, whether some god or nature or the foulness of the country that they inhabited, these people were denied the light of the sun. But even so, they still had fire by which they were permitted to see. "But those men whom you approve of" — this is Lucullus — "after having enveloped us in such darkness, have not left us a single spark to enable us to look around by. And if we follow them, we become bound with such chains that we cannot move."

    Cassius:

    Joshua, that's probably a good place to begin to bring this episode to a conclusion. The Cimmerians give us a concrete example of the importance of having some kind of light by which to determine what the truth is, so that you can take any kind of action at all. You brought up Plato's cave earlier in the episode as well, and this type of analogy is going to continue to be important. Next week, and for many weeks after that, Cicero is going to be presenting the skeptical argument. He and we will need to return to these examples of Plato's cave and the darkness of the Cimmerians, and keep in mind how we evaluate the test of truth. Is there really anything we can trust that will illuminate for us the truths we need to understand? As Lucretius says at the end of Book One of his poem, we need that torch to light our way as we move step by step through life. If there is no reliable standard of truth, then we're going to be lost. We're not going to have any reliable way to determine what direction to go in.

    Joshua:

    And it's at that point, Cassius, that Cicero comes in, in Section 20, summoning up all his power and drawing on all his strength for his defense of the view that nothing can be conceived, and his defense of the view that life is still possible in a world dominated by skepticism. To Cicero's credit, I do like his first line here. He says, "Then I, being no less agitated than I usually am when pleading important causes, began to speak something after this fashion." He is in a villa with a couple of friends, Lucullus, Hortensius and Catulus, and they're talking about philosophy. But he is treating this as if he were in court, pleading the case of someone whose life is on the line, perhaps the case of a friend. This is the level of intensity he describes himself as bringing to a question of philosophy. And that intensity, Cassius, can serve as an example of the kind of effort and energy that we should all bring to philosophy, even if we disagree with everything Cicero stands for.

    Cassius:

    That's exactly right, Joshua, and that's where we'll finish today. We will continue to stand in the role that Cicero denied to the ancient Epicureans. He did not place an Epicurean in this conversation, but we will stand in those shoes and bring to you, as we go forward, what we think is the best understanding of Epicurus's position. Let's close today at that point. As always, we invite everyone to drop by the EpicureanFriends forum and let us know if you have any questions or comments about our episodes. Thanks for your time today. We'll be back again soon. See you then. Bye.

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