Posts by Cassius

I didn't get a chance to do my usual "two pass" editing of this episode, so if someone hears something that really needs to be re-edited, please let me know.

Episode 278 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "Two Opposite Views On 'Being Better Off Dead'"

Last night in our discussion an interesting topic came up that deserves to be memorialized here. Bryan mentiond that in the Diskin Clay article "Epicurus' Last Will and Testament" that Clay argued that dispute Epicurus being devoted to clarify, there amounts to what is an exoteric truth in Epicurean philosophy that is not readily seen on the surface.

The core of the point is that even (or especially) when talking with his students, Epicurus is presuming that the reader or listener will understand the fundamental premises of the philosophy and be able to apply them to understand what Epicurus means, for example, by "pleasure is the absence of pain," or that "death is nothing to us."

In other words, if the reader or listener does not familiarize himself with the fundamentals of the philosophy, it is very easy to totally misunderstand the thrust of Epicurus' position.

I'm posting this a conversation starter to come back to, because I don't remember Clay's specific argument, but i think this is a point that would be very valuable to expand on because it is so important to explain to new readers of Epicurus.

Ok so now I remember why I connect this back to DeWitt's discussion of the gods having to act to maintain their own deathlessness.

it is logically deducible from experience that given the way the universe generally operates, components which have come together will at some point be broken apart. Our earth does not have an unlimited life-span.

However it is not logically deducible as an overriding rule *when* that breaking apart will occur, except by looking at local circumstances. There's no necessity that could not theoretically be defeated through technology to enforce any limit to how long humanity or a single person can live. Even the destruction of the earth or our solar system or galaxy could be outlived by going somewhere else if technology is available to do so. The universe itself is immortal for reasons stated in 5-351 (there's no place outside it), so there's no necessity to perish with any part of the universe *if* you have the capacity to move from destroyed place to stable place.

As for practical application of this, while it *might* be appropriate to say that all men up to today's technology must die, there's no necessary limit as to "when" that must take place, other than the local circumstances of the people involved. People who have the ability to move so as to remain in safe environments, and who have better technology to control aging, will live longer, with no theoretical limit if their ability to move and improve their technology keeps pace with the dangers.

It would seem likely that something like this is where the "intermundia" theory came from.

This is more closely on point:

5-235

First of all, since the body of earth and moisture, and the light breath of the winds and burning heat, of which this sum of things is seen to be made up, are all created of a body that has birth and death, of such, too, must we think that the whole nature of the world is fashioned. For verily things whose parts and limbs we see to be of a body that has birth and of mortal shapes, themselves too we perceive always to have death and birth likewise. Wherefore, when we see the mighty members and parts of the world consumed away and brought to birth again, we may know that sky too likewise and earth had some time of first-beginning, and will suffer destruction.

...

5-306

Again, do you not behold stones too vanquished by time, high towers falling in ruins, and rocks crumbling away, shrines and images of the gods growing weary and worn, while the sacred presence cannot prolong the boundaries of fate nor struggle against the laws of nature? Again, do we not see the monuments of men fallen to bits, and inquiring moreover whether you believe that they grow old? And stones torn up from high mountains rushing headlong, unable to brook or bear the stern strength of a limited time? For indeed they would not be suddenly torn up and fall headlong, if from time everlasting they had held out against all the siege of age without breaking.

5-318

Now once again gaze on this sky, which above and all around holds the whole earth in its embrace: if it begets all things out of itself, as some tell, and receives them again when they perish, it is made altogether of a body that has birth and death. For whatsoever increases and nourishes other things out of itself, must needs be lessened, and replenished when it receives things back.

...

5-351

Moreover, if ever things abide for everlasting, it must needs be either that, because they are of solid body, they beat back assaults, nor suffer anything to come within them, which might unloose the close-locked parts within, such as are the bodies of matter, whose nature we have declared before; or that they are able to continue through all time, because they are exempt from blows, as is the void, which abides untouched nor suffers a whit from assault; or else because there is no supply of room all around, into which things might part asunder and be broken up—even as the sum of sums is eternal—nor is there any room without into which they may leap apart, nor are there bodies which might fall upon them and break them up with stout blow. But neither, as I have shown, is the nature of the world endowed with solid body, since there is void mingled in things; nor yet is it as the void, nor indeed are bodies lacking, which might by chance gather together out of infinite space and overwhelm this sum of things with headstrong hurricane, or bear down on it some other form of dangerous destruction; nor again is there nature of room or space in the deep wanting, into which the walls of the world might be scattered forth; or else they may be pounded and perish by any other force you will. The gate of death then is not shut on sky or sun or earth or the deep waters of the sea, but it stands open facing them with huge vast gaping maw. Wherefore, again, you must needs confess that these same things have a birth; for indeed, things that are of mortal body could not from limitless time up till now have been able to set at defiance the stern strength of immeasurable age.

Here's a quote from Lucretius which says that the ordinances of nature control "being brought to birth under the same law, will exist and grow and be strong and lusty....." where I might have expected him to complete the cycle by adding "and die" if the "and die" were part of the "ordinances of nature" :

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2-294 - Nor was the store of matter ever more closely packed nor again set at larger distances apart. For neither does anything come to increase it nor pass away from it. Wherefore the bodies of the first-beginnings in the ages past moved with the same motion as now, and hereafter will be borne on for ever in the same way; such things as have been wont to come to being will be brought to birth under the same law, will exist and grow and be strong and lusty, inasmuch as is granted to each by the ordinances of nature. Nor can any force change the sum of things; for neither is there anything outside, into which any kind of matter may escape from the universe, nor whence new forces can arise and burst into the universe and change the whole nature of things and alter its motions.

That was Bailey - this is Munro:

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Nor was the store of matter ever more closely massed nor held apart by larger spaces between; for nothing is either added to its bulk or lost to it. Wherefore the bodies of the first-beginnings in time gone by moved in the same way in which now they move, and will ever hereafter be borne along in like manner, and the things which have been wont to be begotten will be begotten after the same law and will be and will grow and will wax in strength so far as is given to each by the decrees of nature And no force can change the sum of things; for there is nothing outside, either into which any kind of matter can escape out of the universe or out of which a new supply can arise and burst into the universe and change all the nature of things and alter their motions.

Thanks for those responses. I can see from a logical point of view that change implies that what was there before is no longer the same, but I am not sure that the quotes we have are saying that there "must" be an end to a compound thing that has come into being.

For example what Don has quoted which says "out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved" --- as to the part about things arising from the atoms, we deduce that the things we see "must" have arisen from the atoms because of the arguments that Lucretius goes through about the existence of atoms being required to explain the starting point of each thing (from the eternal atoms).

But I am not sure that we have the same degree of argument that the thing which has arisen "must" eventually be broken up - or do we?

I seem to remember that there is a section in Lucretius about disruption being caused from blows from outside, but I don't recall a statement that says that at some point the blows from outside - which are sufficiently overcome while the being is growing or in good heath - cannot be warded off indefinitely.

In this current episode of the podcast we are seeing Cicero say in regard to the stoics that their position on the soul surviving death is lacking because the Stoics admit that the soul does survive death for at least a period of time, and as Cicero said, the main hurdle is getting to the point where the soul can survive for any length of time outside the body, and the question of "how long" it can survive is secondary.

Here, the "how long" question is front and center, and we know that some bodies survive for much longer periods of time than others do. So the real question is whether there is a "force of necessity' that requires that a thing that has come into being "must" be destroyed over some length of time in the future.

I see a difference in saying "all things must arise from atoms" (which I think is sufficiently proven by the logical argument) and "all things must be destroyed back into their constituent atoms" (which I don't think is clearly stated or necessitated by the atomic theory as best I can tell).

And let me be clear that I'm not accusing Epicurus or Lucretius of inconsistency - I am looking into whether we are reading into Epicurus a Platonic-like rule of necessity that Cicero thinks makes sense, but which is not inherently part of the atomic theory.

As anecdotal input, I don't recall that either DeWitt or Diskin Clay considered "all things that come together must break apart" as one of the core ideas in physics when they assembled their speculative list of twelve most important physics ideas. (I''ll check back on Clay's version).

Edit: As to Clay's version, these are his ten primary compiled from comparing Herodotus to Lucretius:

1. Nothing comes into being out of nothing. 38.8—39.1 I 145-150, 159-160 ~
2. Nothing is reduced to nothing. _ 39.1-2 I 215-218, 237
3. The universe always was as it is and always will be. 39.2—5 II 294-307; V 359--363
4. The universe is made up of bodies and void. 39.6-40.2 I 418-428
5. Bodies are atoms and their compounds.40.7—9 I 488-486
6. The universe is infinite. 41.6——10 I 958-964, 1001
'7. Atoms are infinite in number and space extends without limit. 41.11—-42.4 I 1008-1020
8. Atoms of similar shape are infinite in number, but the variety of their shapes is indefinite, not infinite. 42.l0—43.4 II 522-527
9. Atomic motion is constant and of two kinds. 43.5-44.1 II 95-102 (I 952)
10. Atoms share only three of the characteristics of sensible things: shape, weight, mass. 54.3—6 II 748-752

This subject comes up in Episode 278 of the Lucretius Today podcast, but I know it has been mentioned here before so I will look for and link any previous threads I can find. (This may also be covered in discussions about the god.) The issue is the proposition, which the Epicureans (at least Lucretius) apparently endorsed: "All things which have a beginning must also have an end." Related questions are "Must all living things die?" and "Does anything exist eternally the same except atoms and void?"

It does not strike me as completely clear that Epicurus endorsed as a general rule of physics that "all things which come into being must also pass out of being," but closely related concepts seem to appear in Lucretius.

Here is how it comes up in "Tusculan Disputations" Part 1 section 32:

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M. You take it right; that is the very thing: shall we give, therefore, any credit to Panætius, when he dissents from his master, Plato? whom he everywhere calls divine, the wisest, the holiest of men, the Homer of philosophers; and whom he opposes in nothing except this single opinion of the soul's immortality: for he maintains what nobody denies, that everything which has been generated will perish; and that even souls are generated, which he thinks appears from their resemblance to those of the men who begot them; for that likeness is as apparent in the turn of their minds as in their bodies. But he brings another reason; that there is nothing which is sensible of pain which is not also liable to disease; but whatever is liable to disease must be liable to death; the soul is sensible of pain, therefore it is liable to perish.

Here's a passage from Book One of Lucretius:

Quote from Munro Version

1-511 : Again since there is void in things begotten, solid matter must exist about this void, and no thing can be proved by true reason to conceal in its body and have within it void, unless you choose to allow that that which holds it in is solid. Again that can be nothing but a union of matter which can keep in the void of things. Matter therefore, which consists of a solid body, may be everlasting, though all things else are dissolved.

And from book five:

Quote from Bailey

5-235: First of all, since the body of earth and moisture, and the light breath of the winds and burning heat, of which this sum of things is seen to be made up, are all created of a body that has birth and death, of such, too, must we think that the whole nature of the world is fashioned. For verily things whose parts and limbs we see to be of a body that has birth and of mortal shapes, themselves too we perceive always to have death and birth likewise. Wherefore, when we see the mighty members and parts of the world consumed away and brought to birth again, we may know that sky too likewise and earth had some time of first-beginning, and will suffer destruction.

I am not able to find an exact equivalent in Herodotus, though I may be overlooking it.

So the question comes down to: How close does Epicurus come to taking the position that "All things which have a beginning must have an end."

Is that some kind of natural law? Is it an Epicurean position?

Yes it seems that the battle of Philippi could easily have gone the other way, and it's fascinating to think of what might have changed if a devoted Epicurean (as opposed to Caesar, who may have been Epicurean to some extent but didn't seem so philosophically inclined) had become one of the most powerful men in Rome for a much longer time.

Quote from Joshua

...I had no idea that there was even a suggestion that the authorship of the Letter to Pythocles was in dispute in the late second and early first centuries BC; that actually blows my mind.

I can't cite a source but I know I've read in background reading (maybe one of Bailey's books or something like that) but I know I've seen it elsewhere asserted that the authorship of Pythocles was disputed. I've never put much stock in that, but I suppose it's possible. However the content as far as I am concerned gives no reason to doubt its reliability. I've never seen anyone question any of it's content - that would be interesting to discuss if anyone has seen that.

I merged our recent discussion of the effect of unmixed wine with the previous thread on voluntary death since the topic is essentially the same. As discussion on this has progressed one aspect that seem particularly interesting is Bryan's latest post as to the Gaul who was reported to have committed suicide by unmixed wine. Further, there seem to be reasonable conjecture that drinking unmixed wine might have been an accepted euphemism for suicide, or that drinking of unmixed wine was at times accompanied by poison. All of this would need citations to texts for them to become more viable suggestions, so we can pursue all of this discussion here with all the background in one place.

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We discussed this issue briefly in tonight's Wednesday Zoom and I thought I remembered that there was another Epicurean thought to have committed suicide. As is often the case i can sometimes remember the first letter of a name but often mess up the main part. In this case the name I could not remember did start with a D, but it appears to be one Diodorus as referenced by Seneca (see below).

And I see in that earlier thread that there is some issue that maybe Democritus went out in similar way.

Post

RE: Did Epicurus Commit Suicide Due To His Disease? (Merger of Two Threads On When Voluntary Death Makes Sense)

More from James Warren (same source):

it is the result of a calculation that the alternative would be a continued life of pain. Provided life has pleasure left in it,we will continue to live. And the Epicurean sage will be sufficiently schooled to continue to find pleasure in life under conditions which others would find unbearable—Epicurus' own example of composure in the face of terminal illness demonstrates this. 345 Seneca reports the suicide of an Epicurean named Diodorus. On this…

Cassius

December 8, 2022 at 10:14 PM

I don't know that we've previously discussed this article by Maria Bitsori:

Epicurus' death

The aim is to present how an eminent philosopher perceived, reported and faced his progressing and ultimately fatal uropathy, 23 centuries ago. All available…

www.academia.edu

It gets close to the issue but as I read through it doesn't really address the argument at length. I see that it does include a reference I've never seen before. The way it's written it sure sounds like it's referencing Epicurus, but the footnote refers to Marcus Aurelius (Marcus Aurelius (1930) Meditations: 9. 41. Edited and translated by Haines CR. The Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp 254–257) Perhaps Aurelius is referring to Epicurus, or perhaps I'm just not reading it properly.

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Epicurus obviously followed these palliative measures in his final-stage disease. Surgery could have been a more appropriate management. Surgical interventions in urinary tract diseases were not unknown at the time [7], but most probably they couldn’t help in this specific case. On the other hand, the philosopher himself did not seem eager to accept any extraordinary medical intervention: ‘‘nor did I let the physicians ride the high horse as if they were doing grand things’’ [15]

Very interesting! There must be something else going on, or else we need to revise our general view that Epicurus did not commit suicide!

This is a pretty important point, actually, so will be good to do our best to track it down.

In reading further today I see this post by Al-Hakiim von Grof

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RE: The “Absence of Pain” Problem

[…]

At the potential risk of repeating concepts already shared in this thread I’ll take a stab at explaining my understanding. What follows is just opinion based on my understanding of Epicurus and lived experience.


To answer your question directly: absolutely. Not stubbing one’s toe is pleasurable. Not just in the nervous “rush” and laughter that happens after a near miss or just in the idea of not stubbing one’s toe, or recalling a stubbed toe’s pain and therefore being grateful for…

Al-Hakiim von Grof

April 29, 2025 at 9:41 PM

What he describes there is the way I would interpret "there are two feelings, pleasure and pain." The default state of life is pleasure (of all kinds and manners of description). Whenever there is any deviation from that state of pleasure, that deviation (of all kinds and manners of description) deserves the name of "pain."

That's the only logically rigorous way I can interpret "there are two feelings, pleasure and pain." Any attempt to subdivide the pleasures and the pains is going to require some kind of further intellectual analysis that may at times be helpful but may equally lead to all kinds of rabbit holes that take the focus off of the fact that we should ultimately look to Nature to tell us what pleasure is, not to gods or to ideal forms.

To make it easier for Patrikios to find the other main article referencing this topic, here's the Diskin Clay article where he goes down a similar path to DeWitt's interpretation. Don is definitely correct to say that the list does not survive for us to be sure what it said:

File

"Epicurus' Last Will and Testament" - by Diskin Clay

Article by Diskin Clay

Cassius

January 23, 2021 at 3:15 PM

Quote from Pacatus

This seems to me to point up what I consider to be the major error of the Cyrenaics (as articulated by Aristippus the Younger): that there is a third “neutral” condition that is neither pleasure nor pain. The Epicurean category of katastematic pleasure – in addition to the kinetic pleasures that seem to be the only ones the Cyrenaics recognized – corrects this error.

Yep I agree that this was an error by the Cyreniacs. But there's a book to be written to explain exactly "why" this was an error. Were the Cyreniacs less human than everyone else and "felt" things differently, or were they failing to make an intellectual point that Epicurus made later?

Further, I am not sure that it is correct to say that "katastematic" pleasure is what fills in the "neutral" gap. That would be an interesting question. While Don and I differ on the implications of katastematic pleasure, I am not sure that even Don would say that.

The relevant text from Diogenes Laertius 10-136 (Hicks) is:

Quote

He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are: “Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest.” The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are: “Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.”

In relation to 10-34 Hicks:

Quote

Opinion they also call conception or assumption, and declare it to be true and false; for it is true if it is subsequently confirmed or if it is not contradicted by evidence, and false if it is not subsequently confirmed or is contradicted by evidence. Hence the introduction of the phrase, “that which awaits” confirmation, e.g. to wait and get close to the tower and then learn what it looks like at close quarters. They affirm that there are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one is favourable and the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined; and that there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words. So much, then, for his division and criterion in their main outline.

I can see how it would be easy to read these two together and say that rest vs motion fills in the gap. But DL also implies that the mind vs body distinction is relevant. (Did the Cyreniacs exclude the mind from pleasure?) And I don't think it's logically necessary that adding "states of rest" to "states of motion" thereby rules out any other kind of pleasure. And to me the implication of "there are only two feelings" does not equate to "Yes, and those two categories are "Pleasure of rest" and "Pleasure of Motion." At the very least one might equally say "Yes, and those two categories are Pleasures of the Mind and Pleasures of the Body." And there are probably other ways of subdividing pleasure up as well.

Not trying to pick nits here, but as this subject is so important, we want to be sure that we are not projecting our own views so as to miss other implications.

Yes we had eight people and a good conversation. We will continue to schedule meetings a different times so we can accommodate everyone. If anyone has special needs let us know!

in relation to this topic we also have what Diogenes Laertius recorded about Epicurus' view of the wise man on the rack. i note that Yonge disagrees with Bailey and Hicks as to whether the wise man will cry out in pain (Yonge says that he will not; the other two say he will) but that all agree that the wise man is considered to be happy even while on the rack / under torture.

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Laërtius, c. 222-235 κἂν στρεβλωθῇ δ’ ὁ σοφός, εἶναι αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα. μόνον τε χάριν ἕξειν τὸν σοφόν, καὶ ἐπὶ φίλοις καὶ παροῦσι καὶ ἀποῦσιν ὁμοίως διατε εὐλογοῦντα. ὅτε μέντοι στρεβλοῦται, ἔνθα καὶ μύζει καὶ οἰμώζει. γυναικί τ’ οὐ μιγήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ᾗ οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, ὥς φησι Διογένης ἐν τῇ Ἐπιτομῇ τῶν Ἐπικούρου ἠθικῶν δογμάτων. ...

Yonge, 1853 That even if the wise man were to be put to the torture, he would still be happy. That the wise man will only feel gratitude to his friends, but to them equally whether they are present or absent. Nor will he groan and howl when he is put to the torture.

Hicks, 1925 Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans.

Bailey, 1926 And even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy. Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence. Yet when he is on the rack, then he will cry out and lament.

I cite this because - not trying to flippant but to make a point -- i am not aware that anyone has good evidence that Epicurus had first-hand experience of being on the rack. We know that he was in extreme pain from kidney disease at the end of his life, but that's not the same as being under intentional torture, and yet Epicurus (or later Epicureans) none of whom we know to have been speaking from personal experience, took a strong position on the point.

I would cite this as additional evidence that Epicurus was motivated to speak "philosophically" about "absence of pain." My point in the first post was that the perfect is not the enemy of the good, and that the presence of some amount of pain, even a large amount, does not prevent an Epicurean from pronouncing himself "happy."

Epicurus would never have suggested that we regularly choose pain if a literal state of "total absence of pain" was required to be happy. Epicurus wasn't totally without pain on his last day, and a person on the rack is also not without pain, so there's something about the definition of the term "happy" from an Epicurean viewpoint that allows it to coexist with pain. And a "reduction to the absurd" interpretation of "absence of pain" therefore clearly cannot be what Epicurus was holding up as the practical goal of life from an Epicurean perspective.

Just like happiness can coexist with pain, the goal of life has to take into account that some degree of pain will be present, even chosen, unless we have literally advanced to the state of being totally in control of our circumstances, which no one we know of has yet achieved.

So to close again on my ultimate point, it appears to me that what Epicurus is doing is laying out an extremely practical goal that is also logically consistent. In a universe with no supernatural god and no absolute right and wrong there can be no single course of life that is "best" for everyone. Instead, the general way to state the goal is to take Nature's guidance - physical and mental pleasure and pain - and then do the best we can to make sure that our pleasures outweigh our pains as much as possible. Everyone is different, and for some of us that is indeed going to mean a life of predominantly physical pleasures.

But may of us think more deeply about how we only live for a short time and forever after cease to exist. Those people are going to remember (per Torquatus) that Epicurus held that mental experiences are often longer-lasting and more intense that physical ones. Those people are then going to make a personal assessment of what mental and physical activities bring them the most pleasure, and they will make their choices accordingly. And they will do everything they can to pursue that goal as vigorously as possible, regardless of what anyone tells them that "the gods" want or what "virtue" calls them to do.