In practice, when you view life as Epicurus suggests, you can find pleasure in all sorts of places and all sorts of things, so you're not going to normally find a "total absence of pleasure" situation.
I feel this doesn’t give “equal logical treatment” to pleasure and pain though. When talking about absence of pain, we talk about absence of pain in a specific location; absence of mental distress, absence of a sore back. And we call this pleasurable:
We can and should through reason and logic affirmatively identify the healthy normal functioning of the mind and body (even when they are not being "stimulated") as pleasure.
So I’m not referring to a total absence of pleasure, but specific instances of the absence of pleasure. I’m talking about the equivalent to the pleasurable absence of pain - the painful absence of pleasure. If the absence of pain is pleasurable, shouldn’t the absence of pleasure be painful? Not only in a theoretical sense, but literally? And if so, does this not contradict the quote I posted above? (“We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensue”)