Posts by Rolf

Welcome to the forum, David! You bring up some really interesting points, and I look forward to hearing more.

Quote from Bryan

Yes I was pointing to the similarities between Heraclitus "the Agitator" and the current theorists in charge as a further charge against them!

Ahh, okay! So you disagree with the dominant hypothesis?

Quote from Cassius

If following dominant interpretations were always a good idea, Epicurus would have accepted intelligent design for his physics and we would all be Abrahamists today!

Haha, I see where you’re coming from Cassius! Though I have to assume that this theory of a “universe in constant transformation” is based in scientific reasoning rather than supernatural leaps of faith and societal control. I’m of course no physicist however.

My question is more about how we decide which parts of Epicurus’ philosophy, and specifically his physics, can/should be dropped when new information comes to light. We discussed a little while ago on Zoom that some of Epicurus’ ideas were absolute and set-in-stone for him, while others were more of a “best guess”. As far as I’m aware, the theory of static atoms and void falls into the former category. If new scientific discoveries contradict Epicurean physics, surely they ought to be accepted, given a scientific worldview?

Now, of course the perspective that Bryan mentioned is only a hypothesis at this stage. My point, however, is less about this specific topic and more about scientific discoveries and consensus potentially being at odds with Epicurus’ physics. Don’s view is a valid one, and probably one I share, but I’m interested in hearing more perspectives on this.

Quote from Bryan

The current dominant interpretation in theoretical physics is far closer to Heraclitus’ flux

Fascinating! Does this mean that we as Epicureans would be wise to align ourselves with modern scientific understanding, adopt this view as the most probable explanation, and ditch the Epicurean view on static atoms and void?

I'm a big fan of this poem, but I feel it's acutely anti-Epicurean. "Raging against the dying of the light" brings to mind a bitter and agonising response to dying. Of course an Epicurean would hardly welcome death (beyond very specific scenarios), raging against it doesn't seem to be the most prudent response in any situation.

Perhaps a forum-wide poll on the topic of prolepsis could be interesting? It seems there are many different ways of interpreting the concept, which may be leading to some confusion when discussing it.

Quote from Don

In light of this excerpt above and others' reactions to my post, I feel I need to define my position a little more.

Very well said Don, and this echoes approximately where I’m at as well. Without a doubt, I think it’s important to combat radical skepticism and find solid ground to stand on that reality exists and behaves in a certain way. What I’m iffy on is the specific theory of prolepsis.

Quote from Cassius

But the faculty of prolepsis is the assembly process, not any particular pattern that is detected or assembled.

This is a helpful analogy, thank you. So to be clear, prolepses are unequivocally not innate ideas?

Quote from Cassius

And so Velleius does not really reference, to my understanding, "a prolepsis of a god." Rather, he is saying that we have a proleptic faculty which disposes us to thoughts which leads to the idea of a god, just as we have a nose which functions in a way that gives us input into a final conception of a flower.

Hmm, I think I get where you’re coming from. A bee is not born knowing what a flower is and how to make honey, but they have the proleptic faculty to do these things without having to learn them from scratch through experience. Am I on the right track?

Welcome to the forum Ulfilas!

If I’m understanding correctly, Epicurus says that prolepsis is a universal guide or criterion that leads us to the knowledge that (among other things) the gods are blessed and incorruptible.

However, many gods that were and are worshipped are violent, jealous etc. Zeus, for example. To this, Epicurus writes:

Quote

For the sayings of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions.

Isn’t this essentially the same as saying, “prolepsis is a universal criterion, except when it isn’t”? On what basis is he able to dismiss these exceptions to his claim as errors?

Cassius, could you perhaps give some more everyday examples of prolepsis? I seem to be misunderstanding what it is at a basic level. Is it incorrect, for instance, that the idea of god itself is a prolepsis, and instead that the capability of believing gods exist is a prolepsis? I feel it would be helpful for me to go back to the “ground floor” and define what prolepsis actually is.

Going off of what Dave said, would it be reasonable to equate prolepsis with instinct?

Actually, could somebody take a crack at explaining fundamentally what prolepsis is? Is it innate knowledge that we’re born it? I’m more confused than I thought!

Much appreciated! I’ll be reading and re-reading your response a few times before fully grasping the ideas I’m sure.

In the meantime, a follow-up question:

How does prolepsis help to disprove that “all this - including our thought processes - have been supernaturally created”? From what I understand, prolepsis just describes instances of in-built knowledge, right? But not where those preconceptions come from? Couldn’t a supernatural believer still just respond, “well those preconceptions come from god”?

On second thoughts, I see what you mean by “Epicurus was a philosopher first” in this context: Something like prolepsis is an important concept within the overarching philosophy even if it doesn’t directly relate to happiness or maximising pleasure. I agree with you on this, and my example of “I know that I want to feel good” was just an example of how I don’t need to know about something fully in order to enquire about it - it was not me saying that Epicurus’ philosophy is only about “the means of happiness”!

The rest, however, I am still unsure about.

Thanks for your response Cassius. Your point about Epicurus being a philosopher first is an important one for sure, though I’ll admit I’m a little confused on how it all relates back to prolepsis and Meno’s paradox. I do see what you’re saying about how a theory of knowledge and an understanding that we can truly know something is importantly, however.

Let me ask you this: How does prolepsis help defend against skepticism and allow us to be confident in our knowledge?

Additionally, why is prolepsis necessary for us to know certain things? Isn’t it possible that we simply learn them from experience? I get that Epicurus had to respond to Meno’s paradox, but why didn’t he simply disagree with the whole premise that we need to have some foreknowledge of something in order to know it?

Please let me know if I’m misunderstanding something!

Welcome Noah! Love the Snufkin avatar - very Epicurean!

I’ve got to be honest, I don’t really understand Meno’s paradox and how it’s helpful in the context of Epicurean philosophy. I just watched Matthew Lampert’s video, and while it was helpful in understanding what Socrates/Plato believed, I disagree fundamentally with the premises of the paradox and I don’t see why it’s something that needs to be solved to move forward.

I can know a bit about something (for instance, I know that I want to feel good), but not know anything about how to accomplish that, but still find out about Epicurean philosophy through online research for instance. I can be completely unaware of something but find out about it from a friend and then go on to study it. It really feels like sophistry detached from real life.

Even when Epicurus takes the solution to prolepsis (which makes a lot more sense than Socrates’ solution obviously), I still don’t see why I would need some kind of preconception of something in order to learn about it. I can learn about the concept of a god from somebody else, and maybe the first person to believe in a god did so because they thought it wad a reasonable conclusion as to why natural phenomena behave the way they do. I also don’t see how “knowing” something means we have no need to “enquire” about it. It’s not like knowing and unknowing is some binary state.

Independent of Meno’s paradox, I feel I have some grasp of prolepsis now. I keep going back to the honeybee example: Bees aren’t just pleasure-pursuing machines, they have some built-in “rules” they follow. They collect pollen, they live in a hive. On the same token, humans have patterns that they’re naturally drawn to, and the human-animal thus has different things that are necessary for happiness than other animals. It’s clear to me that we’re not just born as blank-slates left to pursue pleasure with no guidelines.

Beyond this though, and assuming my understanding here is correct, I’m very much lost on this topic.

Quote from Cassius

But if the "prolepsis" of justice or gods did not exist, we would never begin considering or discussing those concepts in the first place.

Why doesn’t this argument apply to things we don’t have a prolepsis of, such as atoms? If we don’t have a prolepsis of atoms (which I agree we don’t), how could we begin considering or discussing the concept? And why doesn’t the answer to that question also work for gods or justice?