Posts by Robert

wbernys we could also approach the question from the opposite direction: "what causes people to make imprudent choices?" Off the top of my head, I would say there's an easy problem and a harder problem.

The easy problem involves people who make choices based on empty opinion or pursuit of unnatural desires. In those cases, the answer seems simple: they have not acquired knowledge (nature, tetrapharmakon) and thus are driven by false assumptions or dispositions untempered by wisdom.

The harder problem involves the category of "natural but unnecessary," as there seems to be no fixed rule and prudent action depends on correct operation of the hedonic calculus. But (to echo Cassius's point) how do we learn to calculate correctly? Might it require obtaining sufficient data, in the form of pleasurable and painful experiences, until we are able to arrive at general guidelines?

Cassius I'll defer to your point about it being appropriate for Epicureans to define the telos in terms of "happiness" if that term is being used in the correct Epicurean sense. I just don't want to see it used as a way to downplay ἡδονή. I have the impression that Gassendi did a bit of this--though I'll have to go back and look at his essays again.

As you say, "happiness" sometimes denotes a feeling, and a feeling can't be untrue/unreal. Even Pinsof acknowledges that happiness feels great.

Regarding happiness as a concept, though, wouldn't the validity depend on the criteria? If someone invents a type of εὐδαιμονία that is not founded on sensations, feelings, or prolepsis, then the concept is empty opinion and thus illusory. Since the majority of people are not Epicureans, would it be likely that many if not most people use incorrect criteria, and thus empty opinion/illusion prevails?

I have the sense that we are "agreeing fiercely," so this is all just to clarify/correct my earlier post.

The distinction between "pleasure" and "happiness" seems like it might be relevant to this conversation we're having about illusion and storytelling.

Happiness concepts might be illusory, but a warm bowl of pho brings actual, physical pleasure (if you like pho, of course). And if I get bitten by a snake, it's going to actually hurt. These are true sensations and not just invented narratives.

I think Matteng made a similar point earlier, suggesting that Epicureanism has a more robust response to evolutionary determinism, compared to Stoicism for example.

If this line of argument is correct, it would be a reason to question formulations of Epicureanism (such as Gassendi's) that frame the telos as happiness rather than pleasure.

Quote from DaveT

The stories we tell ourselves can be and probably mostly are illusions. They are subjective. They are the interpretations we make of what our senses tell us. In other words our anxieties are also illusions. I don't therefore have a problem if he wants to say happiness is an illusion. However, at the same time it is illusory it is an illusion that results from active prudent pursuit of pleasure. But in no sense is it bullshit.

Dave, my thoughts exactly. Except you've expressed them far more succinctly!

Quote from Matteng

I like challenging articles like these; they allow one to examine and defend—or rethink—one’s own ideas and attitudes, as well as to develop more well-founded arguments and viewpoints.

There are also points against Stoic views in it ( against Virtue ethics as Virtue signaling for status or if happiness would be excluded from externals and would only center in the head about itself it would have no function and Evolution/Nature would get rid of that organisms.

For me, a key point is the reduction of suffering. One can criticize the pursuit of happiness in various ways, but ultimately, choosing one's own harm and suffering is self-contradictory and self-destructive.

Furthermore, uncovering and dispelling illusions ultimately serves the goal of a happier life.

Overall, however, I believe that Epicurean philosophy offers many good answers to the criticism and would even agree on certain points (e.g., the limits of pleasure and pain, the concept of happiness, opposition to Cyrenaic notions of happiness, and non-prudent or non-virtuous approaches to pleasure/happiness).

I agree that the essays raise interesting questions. Like hard determinism, evolutionary psychology presents some challenges that just about any philosophical position has to respond to.

For example, as you indicate, Stoics like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius would probably not take kindly to the notion that they were just virtue-signaling. Maybe, indeed, Marcus Aurelius's son rejected Stoicism because he came to see that it was BS, and that life is really about tasty yum-yums, sex, and being a faux gladiator. But since "showing off our health and virtue" is something we want, according to Pinsof, can we say that the Stoics were wrong in pursuing it? This is where it gets complex. We might need to adopt a kind of meta-philosophical stance in which we recognize that philosophy is illusory, from a certain perspective, yet also necessary, because the impulse to philosophize and seek wisdom is part of our conditioning.

Regarding the reduction of suffering, one observation I would make is that, in various philosophical contexts, this is usually posited within a certain framework. For instance, in Epicureanism, it occurs within a hedonistic framework in which pleasure is both possible and sustainable. Thus, following Epicurean logic, if we were able to eliminate suffering entirely, we would still have pleasure. As I understand it, this is "the blessed life of the gods." It wouldn't, in other words, be some kind of null state.

In Buddhism, the cessation of suffering is taught within the metaphysical framework of karma and samsaric rebirth, which is why death in Buddhism doesn't constitute the end of suffering. The reason I make this observation is that the framework is sometimes needed in order to avoid the problem that Cassius raises--"elimination of suffering" as a telos is easy to achieve. (Traditional) Buddhists get out of bed in the morning because they believe there is no escape from samsara (and thus no way to eliminate suffering) except via the "noble eightfold path." Epicureans do so because life is pleasurable, especially when your prudent decisions minimize bodily pain and mental anguish.

Matteng I found these provocative (in a good way). Have you read any of Robert Wright's books? The Moral Animal was a memorable read for me.

I have a favorable view of evolutionary psychology and feel it has strong explanatory and predictive power. That is, it often serves as a reliable guide to how people actually behave (as opposed to how we think we behave), and this can relieve some anxieties.

That said, I also think the approach has limitations.

For one thing, it tends to fall into the kind of logical trap suggested by VS40. If evolutionary conditioning motivates our behavior, then it follows that our concepts of happiness are also motivated by evolutionary conditioning--and therefore valid. It's not clear why we should abandon them.

Indeed, Pinsof appears to stumble in this fashion towards the end of the second essay, when he discusses the centrality of "pursuit of happiness" in Western thinking and says we should extricate ourselves from it. But why? The West is doing pretty well. What if the notion of pursuing happiness contributed in some way to the comparative success of the societies in question?

It seems to me that, from an Epicurean point of view, evolutionary conditioning would fall under the category of "necessity," and Epicureans believe we do not have to be controlled by necessity (VS9). To put this a little differently, Pinsof may overestimate the extent to which we are biology-driven automatons (or sentient thermostats) and underestimate the degree to which we can self-fashion, set rational goals, and take prudent steps to achieve them. Contrary to his overgeneralizing "we," some people do make a decision to pay more attention to sunsets, work less, be less anger-prone, take up birdwatching or pastels, and so on. We'd need to look at what the science says about people who set out consciously to improve their overall happiness.

Relatedly, he seems to define happiness mainly in terms of event-specific moments of enjoyment--eating pizza, getting a promotion, driving out of the dealer lot in your new car, or achieving temporary bliss during meditation. This emphasis aligns with the "guessing-game" model he advances in his essays, and he's almost certainly right that habituation diminishes the pleasurable impact of such events. It's a rather Cyrenaic view of happiness, though, and he seems less interested in the possibility of long-term increases in our baseline sense of well-being.

Again, though, what I'm commenting on here has more to do with perceived limitations of the approach, rather than questioning its value. I do think that it's valuable and can make us less puzzled about behavior--other people's and our own.

Cassius-Yes, I think you're likely correct. Erasmus and so on were intelligent, well-read, and rational people, and thus had a motive for fashioning an intelligent, well-read, and rational Christianity.

For a time, this approach would also have served the interests of the Church--going back to the Roman Christian era, we encounter the idea that Christianity has transcended all the sects and, in doing so, unified philosophy. That leads to Platonism+Jesus, Stoicism+Jesus, Epicureanism+Jesus, etc.

I'm intrigued by the fact that Erasmus seems to be siding here with Diogenes of Oenoanda against the Stoics--I know very little of Erasmus and his writings, but I gather (thank you, AI) that he insisted on the importance of feeling and compared the Stoic sage to a marble statue. Maybe someone who has read "In Praise of Folly" can confirm this.

Quote from Joshua

Robert, you might be interested in a dialogue by Desiderius Erasmus called The Epicurean. That's not a great version of the text to read from, but unfortunately I'm not at home at the moment. Here's a seminal passage from a cleaner text:

Quote

[...] If they are Epicureans that live pleasantly, none are more truly Epicureans, than those that live holily and religiously. And if we are taken with Names, no Body more deserves the Name of an Epicurean, than that adorable Prince of Christian Philosophers; for Ἐπίκουρος in Greek signifies as much as an Helper. Therefor when the Law of Nature was almost erased by Vice; and the Law of Moses rather incited than than cured Lusts, when the Tyrant Satan ruled without Controul in the World, he alone afforded present Help to perishing Mankind. So that they are mightily mistaken that foolishly represent Christ, as by Nature, to be a rigid melancholick Person, and that he invited us to an unpleasant Life; when he alone show'd the Way to the most comfortable Life in the World [...].

Edit to add; It's possible that this is Erasmus' response to Lucian's high praise of Epicurus in his letter on Alexander the Oracle-Monger.

Erasmus collaborated with his friend and correspondent Thomas More on an edition of Lucian's dialogues.

Christian ataraxia, eh? Yes, very intrigued by this text--and thank you for extricating that crucial passage. I've only just skimmed the rest at this point, but I notice that our buddy Hedonius starts off by rejecting Stoicism and the Peripatetics before making the case for a Christianized Epicureanism. That in itself is pretty interesting.

A question I wonder about, though, is whether this or similar lines of thinking existed around 300 C.E. Alternatively, (more than) a millenium later, are Erasmus and Gassendi crypto-Epicureans who are using Christianity as their cover?

Quote from Kalosyni

Regarding DeWitt's ideas, this may just be a "coincidence" of ideas, and not an actuality of there being a particular source. The only "blessed and incorruptible God" within Christianity would be in the Unitarian Universalist movement. Pretty sure that all others believe that God judges, punishes, and supernaturally heals and intervenes.

Religion most often leans upon "reliance on God", "submission to God", "surrendering to God" -- all of which require a suspension of reason. And this leans toward a type of "skeptic" philosophy of life...after-all "God works in mysterious ways".

But for Epicurean philosophy we see that Vatican Saying 65 says: "It is foolish to ask of the gods that which we can supply for ourselves."

At least from what I've seen, Christianity has this really odd wrinkle. On the one hand, God is perfectly good, without fault, and blessed--In Greek Orthodoxy, the word μακάρ is used, just as it is in Epicureanism (I have wondered if they stole it from Epicureanism). But, as you say, there's also the element of judgment and wrath.

I don't know how this contradiction can be resolved--and I get the sense that various Christian denominations don't agree either. An explanation that I've heard in Orthodox contexts is that it isn't God who is raging and punishing people--it's the people themselves who are removing themselves from God's blessedness.

Calvinists and the like have some other set of explanations and I don't get those at all.

I agree with you that religion tends towards unreason, but as a former Catholic school kid I should mention that Catholicism tries very hard to place its belief system on a rational footing. Whether they succeed in this is another question.

Quote from Cassius

I certainly agree I can see that that would be attractive to pursue - if it were true. I agree that what you're talking about probably happened to a degree, but like Lucian mentions in Alexander the Oracle Monger the authentic Epicureans who followed the full philosophy were probably the most resistant to it. And this is a caution against those who do nothing today but stress the "happiness" aspect of it -- if you don't also explain the nature of the universe and how to be confident about your conclusions then you'll fall prey to exactly the kind of thing you are talking about.

And I can't think of any better way to mistakenly prepare the ground for conversion to Christianity-like religion than to reduce Epicurean philosophy to nothing more than a version of don't fear god, don't fear death, what's good is easy to get and what's terrible is endurable.

Those who think that Epicurean philosophy boils down to nothing more than that are going to be the first to line up for the tent revivals of every charlatan who wanders into town because every aspect of that can be claimed to be delivered by Christianity.

Your point here reminds me of Lucretius's concern that inadequate understanding of the cosmos could lead some people to lapse back into superstition. (Book V, 65-91). In fact, in the light of what you've just written here, I can understand better why Lucretius devotes so much of his poem to physics.

And I agree with what you're saying about going beyond a few maxims--I feel this is true for any system of thought, really. Modern presentations of Stoicism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc. often cherry-pick the cool-sounding wisdom and skip over the problematic cosmology. But that stuff comes to bite you past a certain point. Fortunately, for Epicureans, we have an essentially sound view of how the universe works, and this in turn supports the ethics.

Somewhat tangentially--but getting us back to Plato--I happened to see this piece over the weekend, in which the author suggests (towards the end) that misinterpretation of an NDE set Plato off in the direction of forms and disembodied virtue and what not. Probably too reductive, but maybe not entirely wrong.

Thank you for pointing me to DeWitt's essay--I'd forgotten about it and am adding it to my reading list.

That's a great point you raise about Epicurus's view of hard determinism. Wonder if we can relate this also to his participatory attitude with regard to religious ceremonies.

The question interests me for a couple reasons. One is that I'm curious about the kind of experience my religious friends are having (not being religious myself). And I'm also interested in how Christianity may or may not have appropriated aspects of Epicureanism--this is something I recall DeWitt writing about in the later chapters of his book. My sense is that the Christians might have borrowed the Epicurean view of pleasure and grafted onto it the notion that you can join a blessed and incorruptible God through the intercession of Jesus. Which would certainly strike many as an appealing idea.

What do you think?

Enjoyed this. Having recently finished reading Arenson, I appreciate how you wove her survey of Plato-Aristotle-Epicurus into your discussion. Since, as you point out, DeWitt's book is nearing its centenary, adding the more recent contributions of Arenson and Sedley makes (to my mind) the piece feel more complete.

A possible complicating question: do otherworldly philosophies such as Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Christianity hold an appeal because, under some circumstances and for some people, the idea of an eternal divine realm is pleasurable? Take Boethius, for example, awaiting torture and execution. KD4 might have provided consolation to him in those circumstances, but he apparently found ascent of the soul and theosis to be a more attractive possibility.

Assuming he derived genuine pleasure from holding these views--and, of course, we can't know--was be still misguided in his choice? And, if so, based on what criterion?

Quote from Matteng

Epicurus is frequently criticized because he allegedly advised against political engagement.
But he teached against unnecessary desires like fame not to engage for better circumstances.

Epicureans engage in politics when necessary. Why should one engage when unnecessary ? Yes for fame.
And the ancient politicians assassinated each other often.
Security is a natural/ necessary desire and for that Epicureans would engage in politics.

In an ideal community of friends there is maybe no one necessary who rules over others. Anarchy in a good sense.

And would I be a woman and would live in ancient time with no access to politics and the duty to give birth until you die with low or no medical help I would only laugh about the view of Stoic-like duty and the Epicurean garden would be the very best and healty place for me.

Thanks, Matteng. I appreciate your perspective on this. Perhaps it's also worth taking into account the political environment of his time.

This is a bit tangential, but my understanding is that, for several centuries after the fall of Mycenae, Greece was a fairly anarchic place, with people living in decentralized communities rather than an organized polis. I wonder if there is some echo of that in the Epicurean approach, even though he came on the scene much later.

Kalosyni, I think it's great. I tested it on my Facebook with a private post, and the dimensions seemed to work well. I think it's a useful tool for introducing the philosophy to others.

My only hesitation has to do with the color scheme. I had my computer in inverted colors mode when I first saw this, and in that mode it displays white lettering on a blue background. I thought it looked fantastic. Later, I switched to regular mode and I wasn't as delighted with the black on yellow. These are subjective preferences, of course, but I think for social media especially it's good to have more visual "pop."

I took a photo of the blue backdrop version:

Quote from Cassius

We're already at the point where you have serious and qualified academic authorities who take multiple incompatible views of what the distinction means. That leads me to conclude that anyone who asserts that they are the confident arbiter of truth on this issue is blowing smoke. There's enough contradictory inference to support just about any conclusion someone would like to reach -- until you go back to the original Platonic / Aristotelian starting point of the debate.

Yes, I agree that no one should be overly confident about their take on this issue. We're just missing too many texts. It's tantalizing to read that passage in Diogenes Laertius and see his references to various works by Epicurus and Metrodorus--texts that would help resolve these debates, if only we had access to them!

As we don't, alas, I'll continue with reading Arenson's opening chapters this week and see if they strengthen my trust in her model (which I already find fairly persuasive). I'll let you know how it goes.

I've had the chance now to delve into this book--so far I've read chapters 5-8, and I'll next go to the beginning and pick it up from there. I tabled Chapter 4 temporarily as I didn't feel an immediate need to revisit the problems posed by De Finibus.

Just to set my bearings, here are take-homes from the chapters I read, as I understand them.

• Katastematic pleasure is conscious, pleasurable, and sustained perception of one's well-being (Arenson uses the term "organic health"). Conscious perception is critical here. Bodily health is not pleasurable unless we are aware of it. The Epicurean highest good is not a perception-less state, but rather "belongs to an organism that suffers minimal disturbance to its normal operations and remains confident that its painless state will continue.”

  Anticipation and recollection are elements of this kind of pleasure, which can be cultivated by means of the tetrapharmakon in combination with taking care of the body via proper nutrition and exercise.

• Kinetic pleasure encompasses what Arenson terms "restorative pleasures." These involve a return to the state of well-being following a disruption, such as the pangs caused by hunger or thirst.
  
• "Non-restorative pleasures," which are enjoyable but don't involve the disruption-restoration dynamic, belong in the katastematic category. Here, Arenson includes pleasures such as conversation, enjoying a beautiful view, hearing lovely sounds, and sex. In the latter case, I understand Arenson to be making a distinction between sex as sensory pleasure (in and of itself) and sex as the result of intense, disruptive craving. If so, her view might link up nicely with Book 4 of DRN.

At this point in my reading, I'm persuaded by her interpretation of katastematic pleasure as awareness of well-being. I'm less sold on her views regarding kinetic and non-restorative pleasures, but i probably need to mull her arguments further--and the foundations for it may be clearer after I read the opening chapters.

One thing that gives me pause: Arenson wants to include "active" pleasures in the katastematic category in part because she fears Epicureans would otherwise lead boring, passive lives. I don't quite get this. Even if all active pleasures (per Sedley) were to be defined as kinetic, that doesn't mean we're supposed to renounce them. An Epicurean's life can be as active as he or she wants it to be, as long as our choices are guided by prudence, courage, moderation, and justice. Contrast two situations

• An Epicurean like Diogenes of Oenoanda, who led an active, cosmopolitan life
• An ascetic monk who leads a passive life and fears God/the afterlife due to religious superstition

It seems to me that the Epicurean here can enjoy a combination of well-chosen kinetic pleasures and katastematic ones--and this is true even if Arenson's non-restorative pleasures are in fact kinetic. The monk would enjoy only the kinetic pleasures allowed by the monastic code, and any katastematic pleasure would be compromised by fears and false beliefs.

So some aspects of Arenson's model give me pause--though, again, this could change as I reflect on it further. And I'll add that, whether or not we accept her model, she argues for it quite thoroughly and in the process delivers a useful summary of the debate. Thank you, Cassius, for making us aware of her work!

And I agree wholeheartedly with her "big picture" conclusion at the end of Chapter 7: unlike the Cyrenaics, who pursue any and all pleasures heedlessly and risk both immediate pain and unpleasant memories, Epicureans factor in long-term well-being (and the desire to be able to reflect happily on past pleasures) in our hedonic calculations.

wbernys My take was probably too simplistic, so thank you for presenting a more nuanced view.

We sometimes hear the term "public service" used in connection with politics--that is, people who take up political careers like to describe themselves as public servants. Of course, ambition and desire for power are never far away, yet I do think some are being sincere, at least to an extent. I'm not sure if an equivalent term to "public servant" existed in Epicurus's times. And I wonder what he would have made of the distinction.

On a simple, practical level, it's a job that has to get done, by someone.

wbernysYour approach to this question makes sense to me. More specifically, I agree that it's important to view happiness in Epicurean terms--as there are other notions of happiness out there. Some would consider success in public life or high military honors to be the very apex of happiness.

One question that interests me: given that Epicurus valued friendship, and understood that friendship carries obligations, why wasn't he willing to extend the same principle to the polis? After all, a polis is also a social grouping. And it confers many of the benefits that Epiricus associated with friendship. An Epicurean is willing to die for a friend, but not for the polis (via military service)? Curious to know what you think.

Quote from TauPhi

Here's how I see pleasure. It took me a while to understand that there's nothing to lose and nothing to gain in life. It took me a while longer to comprehend this. It took me yet another while longer to embrace this. And finally I felt it. And this 'it' that I feel ever since is pleasure. It is not avoidance of pain, it is not unhinged indulgence. It is a sense of wonder about being alive for a brief moment, with all the consequences of that fact. I try to keep my body healthy and my mind sharp. I feel pleasure when I can barely walk home after an intense training. I struggle and I feel pleasure in finding solutions. I face my fears and I feel pleasure if I manage to overcome them. I feel pleasure when I read a good book and when I learn something new. I feel pleasure when I see people love me because I am a part of their lives. I fail sometimes. I succeed sometimes. I weep sometimes and I smile sometimes. It does not matter to me anymore when life is going to kill me. Anytime is equally good since I've realised that my life is a pleasure to live and I gladly let my life of pleasure eventually kill me.

This is expressed beautifully. However long it took, at least you realized these things. I get the sense that some people never do. It's only recently that I've started to see things this way myself.

Godfrey I'm not sure we've interacted on the forum before, so hi! I enjoyed reading this and feel it could be quite benefical in terms of encouraging people to think along Epicurean lines. Most importantly, it helps dispel the stigma around the word "hedonism," showing that we don't have to fall into the familiar Saturday night-Sunday morning dynamic of alternating between excess and a penitential hairshirt.

Kalosyni's "unpacking" is valuable as well. The part about personal values gave me some thought. I feel (and someone may correct me here) this is more of a modern, perspectivist take than an Epicurean one, strictly speaking, since Epicureanism has its own set of values. A personal value system based on endurance of suffering for the sake of the afterlife wouldn't align very well, for instance. More pragmatically, though, individualism, subjectivity and personal value-formation are foundational to the modern way of thinking, and I can see the justification for presenting the basic philosophical approach in modern terms--especially given that the writer is not setting up shop as a practicing Epicurean, but rather someone who has been influenced by this and other Greek philosophies.

The part you underlined about health not being just about the absence of disease but also about the presence of joy caught my attention because of the recent discussions about "katastematic pleasure." The passage from Diogenes Laertius on this subject tells us that ataraxia and aponia (i.e. freedom from disease) is static pleasure and joy and exultation are active pleasures involving motion. Crucially, as Boris Nikolsky argues in the article that Cassius shared with us, the two are not to be seen as opposed to each other, but rather as simultaneous and connected--that is, when we are not in the grip of pain, disease, or mental anguish, we are able to experience joy. So, at least in Nikolsky's interpretation, the passage aligns well with what Erica Oberg has to say.