Diogenes of Oinoanda Fr. 32... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.
Not only do we need to understand the word pleasure, but also "virtues" and "happiness" -- as then how do you know you are happy? Is happiness a kind of feeling of pleasure? And then what virtues lead to that feeling?
So this brings up questions for me. Because it would make more sense to say that virtues lead to satisfaction.
We would never say that virtues lead to sex, drinking, and fine food.
For example, if I substituted a word in the follow sentence:
I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that satisfaction is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.
This makes more sense to me. I'm curious to hear what others think?