Posts by Matteng

I thought a little further about desire and the natural/necessary desires.

- Yes unfulfilled desires are/causes pain

- The faculty of pain/pleasure is there to guide us to fulfill these desires and gives pleasure when it is followed

- Without desire and the pleasure in fulfilling and pain in not fulfilling, life would vanish.

=> Our whole body exists for that, we have arms, legs, stomachs, organs, brain etc. which we would not need if we have no need for searching for food/drink/security. Like a stork, often seen as a divine animal but all it organs are selected/adapted / evolved for efficient survival in swamps.

It would be like in Christianity the thoughts about "heaven". If you have no needs/desires/motives for what do you need a body ? A house ? A city ? What are you doing ?

We would be empty roboters but with no function because a function has only meaning and evolved when fulfilling a purpose, a telos.

Yes the natural / necessary desires are of the highest value. Wirhout them life declines like in a depression

Often these desires are shortened as desires for the stomach, a prejudice from Cicero/Stoics/Platonists which say „ we desire perfect knowledge and harmony wirh the cosmos, you Epicureans only to get your stomach full…“

But the core embraced desires include

- Body / health (Aponia)

- Life/ Security (Life means more than having a healthy body, sometimes we have to sacrifice health or choose pain for living )

- Happiness /Eudaimonia/Ataraxia

( which means more than simply to live, you can live a miserable life with an troubled frustrated mind and sometimes we limit/ sacrifice our life or parts for our values, like in extremes dying for a friend/ love/community / or our dignity )

So natural/necessary desires include a whole set of personal values and Emotions imo and how I understand the letter of menoceus.

Hi I found an article which supports the Epicurean view of anger as taught by Philodemus and speaks out against the view of the Stoics (although unfortunately only Aristotle's philosophy is mentioned in passing as more realistic, I think Epicurean themes are unfortunately still too unknown in some circles):

Stoics in Need of Anger Management | Issue 163 | Philosophy Now

Inside the necessary / natural desires there could be the level from top to bottom ( just my idea/ proposal):

1. Desires for happines ( eudaimonia )
2. Desires for Life

3. Desires for body/health

But like Maslow maybe a hierarchy would be not so realistic.

For example I could sacrifice 3 (health) for 2. ( living ) in cutting a part of the body or toxicate me to live better.

And 2( living ) don‘t mean a happy life (1), so it can make sense to limit „life“ for happiness, in the extreme case in dying for a friend/ loved person so that you fulfill stage 1 but not 2 and 3 but to get to 1 you need a body (1) and a life (2) in the first place 😉

I don't know if it fits here, but I would also be interested in the views on the Stoic paradoxes and Cicero's defense of them

Cicero’s Stoic Paradoxes

One of the most famous secondary sources on Stoicism is a collection of six essays by Cicero (who considered himself an Academic Platonist, but was sympathetic…

howtobeastoic.wordpress.com

For example "Virtue is the only good", all virtue is equal and all vice, (here are interesting contradictions for example Marcus Aurelius says no one can harm him only vice can do and vice is bad and it is rational to feel bad only about vice and virtue is the only good so it is only good to feel good about virtue ( chara, joy ), so the Stoic Sage feels joy but every Non-Sage (like Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Seneca and everyone + every Stoic prokopton ) is maximised harmed already because they are in a vicious state and it is right to feel bad about it .... )

Discussed here:

https://howtobeastoic.wordpress.com/2018/04/13/sto…sm-and-remorse/.

)
What would an Epicurean critic of these and the other paradoxes would look like?

To make it basic, how would you all label these pleasures with:

-kinetik, kastatematic

- rational/ or active produced( awareness, reflection, gratitude…) , nonrational/ or passive from body produced

-Aponia/ Ataraxia

->
1. Hungry: Pain

2. Eat: Pleasure

? Kinetic( temporary), nonrational/ (bodily pleasure)

3. Full/Not hungry: Pleasure

? Katastematic (static), bodily, Aponia

4. Reasonable Hope to get full in future:

Pleasure, Katastematic, rational joy (mind), Ataraxia ?

5. Gratitude for ability to fulfilling necessary desires in future ( with help of virtue, friends/community):

Pleasure, Katastematic, rational joy (mind), Ataraxia ?

Have I forgotten something?

Your thoughts?

Quote from Kalosyni

Quote from Cassius

Why does Epicurus consider the absence of pain to be pleasure?

When pain is absent from the body, the appreciation of that experience is mentally enjoyable.

***

And here is a full list of pleasures:

- enjoyable and pleasant bodily sensations (sights, sounds, tastes, touch, smell, etc.)

- the cessation of pain in the body (when pain is no longer present) (pain = sharp, piercing, burning, stinging, throbing, heavy)

- awareness that the body is healthy (no pain present)

- enjoyable and pleasant mental feelings and thoughts (joy, clarity, calm, strength, gratitude)

- the cessation of unpleasant emotions (fear, worry, anxiety)

- awareness of a clear mind free from unpleasant emotions (fear, worry, anxiety)

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A good list about Pleasures.
One question:
I see they some include/not include awareness/ attention / appreciation, so there is an active / virtuous activity to feel these pleasures.

Are they then all kinetic pleasures ?

Or what is when I am not aware of the absence of pain, is the absence of pain than a static ( kastatematic) pleasure ?

Or is this a false categorizing ?
Do I need a constant/active awareness for pleasure?

Is there such a thing as nonrational and rational pleasure?
As the 1. comes automatic from the body like eating tasteful, the 2. from eg. Gratefulness/ appreciation ?

What is perhaps missing (Cicero/Cyrenaics/many peoples opinion):

What speaks against the idea that intense sensual pleasures go beyond the limit of absence of pain? (my ideas: short-livedness, negative consequences of maintaining these pleasures e.g. numbness, hedonic treadmill, costs, ungratefulness, harming friendships and other values ( which are in core Pleasure) ...)

Your thoughts ?

Yes there is a Volume 1 it is about other topics,: language, medicine and metereology

Epicureanism and Scientific Debates Antiquity and Late Reception

Epicureanism and Scientific Debates Antiquity and Late Reception

www.academia.edu

Hello everyone, I became aware of this new work on "Academia". In it you can find deeper connections between ethics and epistemology from Epicurus' philosophy. I'm currently still reading it and have discovered very new, refreshing texts/topics. I just wanted to share it with you

That is the link:

F. Masi-P.-M. Morel-F. Verde (eds.), Epicureanism and Scientific Debates. Epicurean Tradition and its Ancient Reception, Volume II. Epistemology and Ethics

F. Masi-P.-M. Morel-F. Verde (eds.), Epicureanism and Scientific Debates. Epicurean Tradition and its Ancient Reception, Volume II. Epistemology and Ethics

www.academia.edu

If you are logged in it is for free.

It is too big to attach it (3 MB ).

Cassius I know Alex O'Conner from past videos on youtube.

His ethical ideas are very Epicurean-> It is all about Pleasure/ Pain (I saw a video with Peter Singer in which he repeatedly emphasized that it was all about pleasure / pain ).

His metaphysics is / was a strong determinism => no free will.

For me it is important that I can make decision and am a agent. Because I see what direction wise and not so wise decisions can lead and that the world is more complex and creates steadily new causes thant the abstract words "cause/effect" let assume.

Searching on youtube the mainstreams says we have no "free will" (what depends on definition). Here is defense but I know this can be an endless debate:

Seems so that in religions and some more idealistic philosophys there is sometimes some hedonophobia.

For example for some Stoics pursueing Pleasure was seen as a vice, i read it often but have now not a good example. Here is some from Seneca, what makes me wonder because in other letters he appreciates Epicurean teachings :

From the Stoicism community on Reddit

Explore this post and more from the Stoicism community

www.reddit.com

Don, thanks. Another prejudice is that Epicureans friendship means to them to isolate with only some few friends from society.

But I understand friendship (Philia) in Epicureanism as a attitude / virtue like also Aristotles defines it.

Philia - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

And it is a form of love. That would challenge Senecas quote where he mentions that the Stoic school is the most kind:

https://modernstoicism.com/the-stoic-love…Clemency%203.3).

I read the article today by chance and wanted to start a thread. But looked to see if there was already an article about neuro science and found it with exactly this article 🤗. In positive psychology, a distinction is made between hedonistic, happiness(Pleasure) and Eudaimonia. Do I understand it correctly that Eumonia happiness is also hedonistic happiness at its core? That would really be a point on the side of the Epicureans against the Stoics. Then there would be no essential difference between pleasure and the Stoic joy (chara).

In Stoic groups it is often claimed that Stoics understand Human Nature better and that like in Ciceros „On Ends“(the Stoic parts ) that Pleasure is only a delusionary byproduct of self preservation and that sociability / familiarization ( oikeiosis ) is an essential part of human nature and that Epicureans would deny that humans are social beings. I would like to discuss more about the current view of neuroscience/psychology of human nature to get clear how much it fits with Epicurean Philosophy ( a further example would be the hedonic treadmill)

I've finished the book, but I still have to digest it a bit.
What I like is:

• How he shows that Cicero, Plutarch and co. leave out certain teachings of Epicurus and reinforce their prejudices against his teachings or even start them in the first place

  
  

• Epicurus' teachings highlight how important laws and a social/political order are in order to meet natural/necessary needs, keyword security (contrary to the prejudice that Epicurus' teachings are against good morals and that he is an enemy of laws).

• It is shown that a political community contains both: security and danger and that motivation and circumstances are important when it comes to the question of political participation (yes for security, no for fame, empty ideas/needs)

  
  

• Epicurus' teachings go beyond what is socially necessary, Philia (friendship) is highlighted and that for a happy life the Epicureans emphasize that one should live honorably (which includes philanthropy, compassion, helpfulness, i.e. all social feelings and character traits.

• The fear of punishment exists to protect the Epicurean sage, he does not act virtuously out of fear but out of insight because it contributes to a happy life.

• What I am not yet sure about and although according to the book it did not represent a challenge for the Epicureans, I do feel that way is the story of Gyges' ring that makes you invisible.

Would someone who follows Epicurus' teachings commit injustices if they were never seen?

In the Stoic Oikeiosis doctrine (which Hermachus was inclined towards) one sees others more and more as belonging to oneself and wants their happiness too. But that is another topic, perhaps more theoretical.
It is often said that injustice towards others is more likely to arise from non-necessary needs, which the Epicurean sage does not have.
But what about natural/necessary needs? But this also includes ataraxia. This is also important to the Stoics. Needs for the body or "life" are less important to Stoics than to Epicureans.

But in the end it is always a matter of weighing things up and I still have to think about it a bit.

The book arrived yesterday and I read the introduction and enjoyed it .

I'm already looking forward to the rest of the book. I think it clears up some prejudices, what is important because some people feel that the political/social aspects are missing or weak in Epicurus' Philosophy because of the hostile writings from the ancient Academics / Stoics.

For example, Massimo Pigliucci had Stoicism and Epicureanism in mind for his philosophy of life and chose Stoicism because he felt that these aspects were not given enough attention in Epicureanism but in Stoicism.

But you can see the tendency of Modern Stoicism to incorporate Epicurus' aspects into the worldview "Atoms or God => Atoms" and denying the Stoic God or more and more the instrumental character of virtue for example when they promote virtue for joy and tranquility.

Pre-ordered it too

This is a topic on which the Epicurean philosophy often has to face with unfair criticism.

The critic (often Stoics to differentiate the both schools harsh):

"Epicureans are hiding in the garden with a few friends without interest in social/political/humankind issues as a whole because it could mean stress / adversity".

Instead justice/friendship (Philia) are essential virtues in Epicurean Philosophy and they engage when necessary (why engage if unneccesary ? Maybe for admiration / fame / empty ideas ? )

And I see friendship (Philia )in an wider sense like in the definition of Aristoteles (kindness to all humans/creatures) but with a practical limit (for example not for enemies, false friends, too harmful people, it is always balanced with prudence ).

I think prudence (phronesis ? ) and friendship (philia) are the two main virtues in Epicurean Philosophy.

Philia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

"As Gerard Hughes points out, in Books VIII and IX of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives examples of philia including:

young lovers (1156b2), lifelong friends (1156b12), cities with one another (1157a26), political or business contacts (1158a28), parents and children (1158b20), fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers (1159b28), members of the same religious society (1160a19), or of the same tribe (1161b14), a cobbler and the person who buys from him. (1163b35)^[2]

All of these different relationships involve getting on well with someone, though Aristotle at times implies that something more like actual liking is required. When he is talking about the character or disposition that falls between obsequiousness or flattery on the one hand and surliness or quarrelsomeness on the other, he says that this state:

has no name, but it would seem to be most like [philia]; for the character of the person in the intermediate state is just what we mean in speaking of a decent friend, except that the friend is also fond of us. (1126b21)

This passage indicates also that, though broad, the notion of philia must be mutual, and thus excludes relationships with inanimate objects, though philia with animals, such as pets, is allowed for (see 1155b27–31) though it considers its existence in the way of inanimate objects could also "inanimately love".

In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines the activity involved in philia (τὸ φιλεῖν) as:

wanting for someone what one thinks good, for his sake and not for one's own, and being inclined, so far as one can, to do such things for him. (1380b36–1381a2)

John M. Cooper argues that this indicates:

that the central idea of φιλíα is that of doing well by someone for his own sake, out of concern for him (and not, or not merely, out of concern for oneself). [... Thus] the different forms of φιλíα [as listed above] could be viewed just as different contexts and circumstances in which this kind of mutual well-doing can arise.^[3]

Aristotle takes philia to be both necessary as a means to happiness ("no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods" [1155a5–6]) and noble or fine (καλόν) in itself. "

There is only one higher form of "love", "agape" but that is a love for/between humans an (supernatural) gods. Christians try to practice it for example in charity.

But it is maybe more limitless and maybe self-destructive as philia.

And without a supernatural god there is no agape in the sense of the definition. So here too meets (meta-)physics ethics

Thank you, I am german (live near Würzburg where is an Epicurean science center on the university) so it is easy to read for me, perfect

Hi,

I came to read an article about Hermarchus where it is mentioned that he tried to integrate the Stoic oikeiosis theory.

Here is the link it is without costs when logged/registered in "Academia" :

Hermachus

I find it very interesting because

1. Maybe it would strengthen Epicurean ethics (justice, friendship, kindness, compassion, altruism, other regarding feelings). Very often it is highlighted how selfish/egoistic Epiurean ethics would be (especially from enemies of Epicurean Ph. )

2. He lives in the time of early Stoicism so maybe there are good defensed / disputes with / against the Stoic ethical theory what is often considered more altruistic and more compassionate.

Do we have texts/ resources from him which are easily accessible?