Yes this is U126.
To look at one manuscript, Vaticanus Palatinus Graecus 182 (Page: 176r), we have αὐτῇ
By changing αὐτῇ to αὐτήν, a little more sting is given to this tame remark: "he thinks that she preaches."
I do like the option of αὐτὴν, and αὐτὴν serving as the accusative subject of παραινεῖν -- "νομίζειν αὐτὴν παραινεῖν" and this could be interpreted without a sting: "he considers her [capable of] advising"
I wanted to share this simplified version of the four points that are the basis of Academic Skepticism's skepticism, with a concrete example. This may not be exactly correct, but it's as good as I understand it. The actually bent oar idea came from Godfrey , thank you Godfrey!
These are undeniably terrible... the videos and, it seems, the stations themselves are robot generated...
Homer’s Odysseus is, first and foremost, a liar. His truth is whatever benefits him.
Odysseus lies to Polyphemus by calling himself “Nobody,” to Athena with a false Cretan identity, to Eumaeus with an invented life story, to the suitors by posing as a beggar, to Penelope by claiming to be the Cretan Aethon, and to Laertes by pretending to be a stranger named Eperitus.
With this in mind, it is good to remember that Homer’s Odyssey presents the stories of the Cyclops, Circe, the Underworld, the Sirens, and Scylla and Charybdis not through the poem’s omniscient narrator, but as stories Odysseus himself tells King Alcinous.
I’ll admit I do not think this fits. A drink is just another pleasure within the meal, not the thing that gives all the other pleasures their order and security. This makes established pleasures sound like an optional side item.
In my analogy from yesterday (over in this post), individual active pleasures are like bricks. Each one is genuinely good, but no single pleasure – or even a random pile of pleasures – automatically produces a complete good life.
Stable pleasure is like the completed building: the secure condition created when pleasures are arranged intelligently through prudence and friendship.
but those words do not capture the "non-sensory" aspect that I think you will find in what Max Duboff wrote, and in many others before him, and that is the real issue.
I agree. For Epicurus, every experience is sensory. There is no experience without sensation.
To such an extent is this true that “Pathos” – which is the word usually translated as “feeling” in Epicurean texts – IS the Greek word “experience.”
Feeling = Experience.
When Emily Austin takes the position that katastematic pleasures are sensory, she is stating the MINORITY position. The more widespread position that is being argued by many is that katastematic pleasure is not sensory at all.
I stay away from secondary sources, so I am a bit blind here, but I would be surprised to see a clear statement that any type of pleasure is “non-sensory” – because that means the pleasure is not experienced at all – which is simply not possible!
If katastematic means simply stable and established then say so, and talk in plain terms about how much we value and appreciate things that we have been able to make stable and established in our lives.
I think there is a lot of common ground to be found here!
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Epicurus cannot conceive of the good without active pleasures, just as we cannot conceive of a brick building without bricks.
You are certainly correct to say that we need bricks to construct brick buildings!
However, it is also clearly true that a single brick -- or even a huge pile of bricks -- is not as good as a whole stable and established brick building.
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Consider:
(1) The active pleasure of studying and talking with friends.
versus
(2) The stable pleasure of confidence (based on what you have studied), or the stable pleasure of security (based on friends and family).
(1) = the building blocks we use to build
(2) = our established building
We do have two complete manuscripts, Codex Oblongus and Codex Quadratus, as well as the partial Gottorpienses -- all Carolingian and from the 800's.
Being able to read and write in Greek was a standard part of the education for the whole class of wealthy Romans. Many refused to read books written in Latin -- and it was common to question if producing "Latin literature" was even desirable. Latin is really a stark and unadorned language.
Cicero considered it patriotic to write fully in Latin, but he admits (just as Lucretius does) that writing completely in Latin is more difficult for him than expressing himself in Greek. In his private letters he switches between Greek and Latin within the same sentence very frequently. And, despite what Shakespeare has told us, Caesar's last words, if he said anything at all, were "καὶ σύ, τέκνον;" Greek was not used to "show off," many literate Romans were just thinking in Greek.
For Epicurean texts generally, the evidence points more to Christian indifference -- they were not burning our books, but they were not preserving them either.
"Look well and listen well whether any of our assailants bring forward a single argument from Anaximenes and from Anaxagoras, when, though the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies were more recent and taught largely, even their ashes are not so warm as that a single spark can be struck out from them against the Christian faith."
Augustine (fl. 394 CE), Letter 118.12
Some early Christian writers, before Christianity's integration into the Empire, also viewed the Epicureans as a bit of an example based in the Epicurean rejection of a conventional education. For example Tertullian, who was the first major Christian writer to compose in Latin, shakes his finger at Rome as says:
"We reject your spectacles equally to the extent that [we reject] their origins, which we know to be derived from superstition – and because we stay away from the very things for which they are conducted. There is nothing for us to say, see, or hear with the insanity of the circus, with the imprudence of the theater, with the atrocity of the arena, with the vanity of the exercise ground. How do we offend, if we prefer other pleasures? If we do not wish to be accused of knowing [them] – the fault is ours, perhaps, but not yours! But we reject the things which are pleasing to you all, nor do our things delight you all: given that it was permitted for the Epicureans to determine a certain truth of pleasure – that is, calmness of soul (animī aequitātem) – so too [it should be permitted] for the grand concerns of the Christian life."
Tertullian (fl. 200 CE), Apologetics, 38
Also relevant:
"If human nature is capable of wisdom: then artisans and peasants and women and, finally, all who bear the human form ought to be taught so that they may become wise – and so that a wise public may be formed from every language, condition, sex and age… the Stoics sensed this to such a degree that they said philosophizing is necessary even for slaves and women – and Epicurus as well, who invites those untrained in all literature into philosophy…"
Lactantius (fl. c. 290 CE), Divine Institutes, 3.25.4 & 7
We do have Alexander of Abonoteichus publicly burning Epicurus’ Principal Doctrines in the marketplace, but he was an insane occultist and not a Christian.
Along the same lines, I'll throw in some quotes from Epicurean sources:
"And you, sir, should consider it something most blessed (μακαριώτατον τι) to have rightly grasped what is best of all among what exists that we are able to conceive!"
The Oxyrhynchus Consolation, P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 16-26
"…but all are found to be charlatans – while being looked upon according to the outlined method – while keeping far away from saying the necessary things about friendship (or from the other things that contribute to living blessedly (μακαρίως)) -- [the outlined method] from which indeed I also saw Philísta properly adorned from youth by such a reasoning [i.e., by Epicurus' philosophy] until death – and just as is proper for one who had not yet taken on any vices."
Carneiscus of Lampsacus, Philísta, P.Herc. 1027, fr. 192, col. 11, 12
"… that which the other philosophers ascribe to [a god]. They must surely know that [a god] does not have a spherical bodily form, nor a tendency towards arguments, anger, or pettiness, but rather has a bodily form that approaches the sublime, and a disposition that disregards all that is impure, being entirely devoted to blessedness (μακαριότητα) and incorruptibility."
Demetrius Laco (fl.c. 90 BCE), De forma dei, P.Herc. 1055 col. 21 (column 25)
"(Μακαρίζω) I bless you, O dear one, because – clear of all education – You have rushed toward philosophy!"
Epicurus via Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 13.53
"while spending a blessed (μακαρίαν) and at the same time the final day of my life, we were composing these things to you all. Strangury has also followed along – and dysenteric feelings do not leave out the excess of their extent."
Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.22
"nor [does the wise man suppose chance to be] an uncertain cause of everything – for he does not believe that either good or evil is given from [chance] to men for living blessedly (μακαρίως). Nevertheless [he does suppose that] the beginnings of great goods or [great] evils are supplied by [chance].”
Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.134b
"...We say that pleasure is the beginning and the end [i.e., the fulfilment] of living blessedly (μακαρίως)."
Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.128d
"an unwavering observation of these [desires] knows how to lead every choice and avoidance back to the body's health and the soul's undisturbedness – since this is the fulfillment of living blessedly (μακαρίως)"
Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.128a
"Efforts, considerations, moods, and graces do not harmonize with blessedness (μακαριότητι) – but these things arise in weakness, fear, and in additional need from those nearby."
Epicurus via Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 10.77a
"Friendship dances around the inhabited world – proclaiming, indeed, to all of us to be awakened to the blessing."
VS 52
"it is not the young who is considered blessed (μακαριστὸς) -- but the old man who has lived correctly."
VS 17
"Οf the things that wisdom provides for the blessedness (μακαριότητα) of one's whole life – by far the greatest thing is the Possession of friendship."
ΚΔ 27
"pious is the He who preserves the immortality and the supreme blessedness (ἄκραν μακα[ριότητ]α) of a god (along with all those things connected to us) – but impious towards a god [is he] Who banishes either [immortality or blessedness from the gods]."
Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.40.1138
"He also calls the life of perfection "the most pleasant and most happy ([ἥ]διστον καὶ μ[ακαρι]ώτατον)" in the work On Holiness – and He considers it necessary that all that is base is guarded by our mind paying attention to good attitudes – for making familiar all that happens to us for having happiness and particularly for having [it be] adequate."
Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.44.1258
"…[Epicurus does not exclude them] nor those people who toil through their disturbances over thoughts concerning the best and most blessed natures (μακαριστοτάτων φύσεων): but [Epicurus] says that he calls them to feast well and also the others – all those in the household, with no one excluded from outside – as many as have goodwill both toward himself and toward his friends. for [Epicurus says that] doing this is not engaging in demagoguery – the empty and unnatural kind of demagoguery – but they are acting within what is proper for nature: [they are] remembering all those who possess goodwill toward us, so that they may join together in sacredly cooking what for all their own blessedness (μακαρίαι)… …is fitting…"
Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Epicurus, Book 1, P.Herc. 1232, f. 2 (col. 27) | f. 9 (col. 28)
I may be misunderstanding or being overly-literal.
The age in which Epicurus lived was very “sick.” Athens was no longer independent, but instead was repeatedly handed between competing Macedonian kings.
For most of Epicurus’ life, the Greek world was in a civil war, stretching from the time he was 18 until he was about 60!
This included some of the largest and highest-casualty battles the Greek world had yet seen. Nevertheless, it seems that “being well-adjusted” during this was in fact Epicurus' goal.
Let me throw this quote in:
"However, with the study of grammar being twofold [1] the one promising to teach the elements and their combinations and being in general an art of writing and reading, and [2] the other being, in comparison, a deeper ability: not consisting merely in the bare knowledge of letters but also in the investigation of their discovery and their nature, and in addition the parts of speech composed of letters and all other matters of the same kind – it is not our purpose now to invalidate the first; for that it is useful is agreed by all men, and amongst these men we must place Epicurus, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the professors; in his book On Gifts and Gratitude he definitely tries to prove that it is necessary for the wise to learn the written letters [i.e., become literate]. Necessary, as we should say, not for the wise only but for all people."
Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1.49
But learning to read is of course a lower bar than having a (1) generalized liberal education or (2) specific professional training, both of which Epicurus considered unhelpful, for example:
"...because [the members] of your [Epicurean school], indeed, argue quite well that there is no need for him who is going to be a philosopher to know literature."
Cicero (fl. 65 BCE), De Finibus, 2.4.12
Hello Patrikios
Thank you for the question. Yes, we are accustomed to the list of (1) sensations, (2) feelings/experiences, and (3a) anticipations, but KD 24 gives us instead (1) sensations, (2) feelings/experiences and (3b) whole appearance-based attention of mental perception.
Because all true ideas are based upon impressions from external sources, the use of "appearance-based (phantastikḗ)" here is only further explaining the object of mental focus. (A false idea is an idea that is not based upon appearances from external sources. If there is no object or circumstance that corresponds to an idea, the word used for that idea is a label for something that does not exist.)
(3b) "Epibole tes dianoias (the attention of mental perception)" is equivalent to our modern use of "attention" or "focus." This is the action of our mind.
(3a) "Prolepsis (anticipation)" is a general "mental sense" of something. This is the object of our mind's action.
For example, you can "focus" your attention to your "general sense" of what a cow is. Or, to use the technical language, you can use your attention of mental perception toward your anticipation of a cow's qualities.
Even when considering (i.e., mentally focusing) on non-visible objects, that mental focus is still "appearance-based" due to the fact that it must be based on analogy from what is visible to correspond to reality [i.e., be "true"].
This all could beneficially be given a chart or a graph, but I would avoid overlaying it on the modern brain. Below is an my attempt from over ten years ago, but it’s not very good.
Yes it is bad but something about Epicurus looking like a zombie and shaking to rave music had me laughing.
Forgiveness restores peace
Certainly true!
In fact, if Plutarch is correct, Epicureans were even known to say, “Let even this have forgiveness” more literally it means "Let even this have a mutual understanding" which is a certainly a helpful mantra to have in mind for working well with others.
"ἐχέτω δὲ συγγνώμην καὶ τοῦτο" – ὡς λέγουσι!
“Let even this have pardon" – as they say!
Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1118D
This is a rough version of Book Two.
The next book will take a year.
I don't remember Epicurus talking about the intermundia.
Let me throw in some quotes as a jumping-off point, I may be misunderstanding.
"...that Cosmoi such as this are also infinite in number is able to be thoroughly comprehended, and that such a Cosmos also has the force to be produced both in a cosmos and in the intermundia [μετακοσμίῳ] – which we say is the separation intervening between cosmoi"
[Epicurus to Pythocles, Lives 10.89a]
"Acknowledging the divine to be eternal and incorruptible, [Epicurus] says that a god has providential care for nothing, and that there is no such thing at all as providence or fate, but that all things are made by chance. For the divine reposes in the intermundane spaces [ἐν τοῖς μετακοσμίοις], (as they) are thus styled by him (for outside the world he determined that there is a certain habitation of the divine denominated "the intermundane spaces [τὰ μετακόσμια]" and that the divine surrenders himself to pleasure, and takes his ease in the midst of supreme happiness) – and that neither has he any concerns of business, nor does he devote his attention to them."
Saint Hippolytus of Rome (fl.c. 210 CE), "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies) 22.3
I find it hard to believe Epicurus would advocate for giant humans with quasi-blood floating in a no-place without a world to inhabit.
Philodemus' On Piety makes a clear case for this -- the idea is that a process can be eternal -- just as if a waterfall was always fed it would never stop existing, and all waterfalls are impervious to bullets, swords, and other direct damage.
Worlds are closed systems, so the waterfalls in a world will eventually stop -- but between worlds there is no closed system and the flow of matter is infinite.
Are you saying that Philodemus was going his own direction with the statements in that work?
Also, I feel as though Cicero tracks well here and can be supported from other angles, are you saying Cicero is making this up?
"And since it is agreed that the gods are most blessed, and that no one can be blessed without virtue, nor can virtue exist without reason, nor can reason reside anywhere except in human form, it must be admitted that the gods are of human appearance–yet that form is not a body but as it were a body, and it does not have blood but as it were blood. Epicurus, however, who has not only seen with the mind but also handled, as it were with the hand, things hidden and deeply concealed, teaches that the power and nature of the gods are such that they are perceived not by sense but by mind, and not with any solidity nor as countable things, like those which he, because of their firmness, calls steremnia; but rather through images apprehended by likeness and succession, since an infinite series of similar images arises from innumerable indivisibles and flows toward us, while with the greatest delight the mind, fixed and intent upon those images, grasps by understanding what the nature is that is both blessed and eternal."
Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.16.43 - 20.56 (Velleius' monologue)
Amen (to use the religious term... still looking for a good Epicurean alternative).
I am being cheeky at this point -- you know the term better than most! The “religious-based” affirmative of choice was:
"νὴ Δία"
Philodemus quoting Epicurus, On Piety, 1.31.877-898
"νὴ Δία"
Plutarch quoting Epicurus, Non Posse, 1101A
"νὴ Δία"
Plutarch quoting Epicurus, Against Colotes, 1112E
"ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία"
Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 2 sup.)
"νὴ Δία"
Eusebius of Caesarea quoting Epicurus, Preparation for the Gospel, 14.27.10, 779A
"νὴ Δία"
[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 25 fin.
"νὴ Δία"
The Oxyrhynchus Consolation, P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 1-11
false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"
Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα).
We have the category "pending (προσμένον)" for things which are simultaneously not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον) and not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον), because indeed in that case there is no evidence either way.
We also have "pending" for phenomena that are apparently both attested and contested, because in that case there is conflicting evidence about the original source (the hypokeimenon) and more observation is needed.
The idealist position would have to argue there is no original source (no hypokeimenon). But according to Epicurus, if there is no original source, the object is not real -- and the proposition that it is real, is necessarily false (such as the proposition "minotaurs exist").
Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216
"While outlining what is true and false, [Epicurus] says 'what is true is that which exists in such a way as it is said to exist -- and what is false is that which does not exist in such a way as it is said to exist. And sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning -- yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists – just as that very thing exists by nature. But with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ – and some of them are true -- but others false'"
false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"
Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα).
We have the category "pending (προσμένον)" for things which are simultaneously not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον) and not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον), because indeed in that case there is no evidence either way.
We also have "pending" for phenomena that are apparently both attested and contested, because in that case there is conflicting evidence about the original source (the hypokeimenon) and more observation is needed.
The idealist position would have to argue there is no original source (no hypokeimenon). But according to Epicurus, if there is no original source, the object is not real -- and the proposition that it is real, is necessarily false (such as the proposition "minotaurs exist").
Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216
"While outlining what is true and false, [Epicurus] says 'what is true is that which exists in such a way as it is said to exist -- and what is false is that which does not exist in such a way as it is said to exist. And sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning -- yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists – just as that very thing exists by nature. But with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ – and some of them are true -- but others false'"
prolepsis to be an experience
Yes, a prolepsis is an experience, but not a process of thought.
The prolepseis are the direct experiences we have when we think of something.
Anybody who uses the words “god” or “water” or “minotaur” has a sense of what they are talking about. That sense is always real, but we are left to determine what physical objects exist as the original source (the hypokeímenon).
If there is no correspondence (sympátheia) between an original source and the prolepsis, then it exists only as a mental impression and the word used for it is “empty."
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Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellenies, 2.4
"Epicurus... supposes an anticipation to be [our mental] perception's certainty: and he defines an anticipation [1] as attention directed toward something evident – and [2] [as attention] directed toward an evident concept of a thing {or "of a situation"}. And [Epicurus says] that it is not possible either to investigate, nor to be at a loss, nor indeed to judge -- but not even to refute -- without an anticipation."
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Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911
"Time is distinguished as existing as an anticipation; and just as, in the Thirty-Second [book of On Nature], Epicurus says that the evident realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing, even though existing as a single [object of thought] among those [other objects of thought] in the original sources [of the films from their bodies], nevertheless [these detectable realities of the gods] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things."
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Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216
"[For Epicurus] the particularly of sensation is to receive only what is present and moving it: but not to thoroughly separate that [1] what is here is one thing -- but [2] what is underlying there is another thing."
"so then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by evident reality -- false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"
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prolepsis to be an experience
Yes, a prolepsis is an experience, but not a process of thought.
The prolepseis are the direct experiences we have when we think of something.
Anybody who uses the words “god” or “water” or “minotaur” has a sense of what they are talking about. That sense is always real, but we are left to determine what physical objects exist as the original source (the hypokeímenon).
If there is no correspondence (sympátheia) between an original source and the prolepsis, then it exists only as a mental impression and the word used for it is “empty."
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Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 CE), Miscellenies, 2.4
"Epicurus... supposes an anticipation to be [our mental] perception's certainty: and he defines an anticipation [1] as attention directed toward something evident – and [2] [as attention] directed toward an evident concept of a thing {or "of a situation"}. And [Epicurus says] that it is not possible either to investigate, nor to be at a loss, nor indeed to judge -- but not even to refute -- without an anticipation."
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Philodemus (fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911
"Time is distinguished as existing as an anticipation; and just as, in the Thirty-Second [book of On Nature], Epicurus says that the evident realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing, even though existing as a single [object of thought] among those [other objects of thought] in the original sources [of the films from their bodies], nevertheless [these detectable realities of the gods] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things."
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Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216
"[For Epicurus] the particularly of sensation is to receive only what is present and moving it: but not to thoroughly separate that [1] what is here is one thing -- but [2] what is underlying there is another thing."
"so then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by evident reality -- false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"
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