Here is an excerpt from the above article (found in the Notes number 1):
QuoteAristotle, in fact, identifies a tripartite division of goods: external goods (ektos agatha ), somatic goods (ta soma agatha ), and psychological goods (ta peri psychen agatha). In this tripartition, the external goods include only goods external
to the body, like money, while bodily goods like health are called somatic goods. However, Aristotle typically collapses the categories of somatic and external into one, indicating the real distinction he wants to draw: that between psychological
goods and everything else. Aristotle takes this division to be commonplace (P1323a24-26), as does Plato (cf. Euthydemus 279b, Philebus 48e).
I was rereading this, and it struck me that Epicurus seems to riff off of Aristotle's categories in a couple ways. First, somatic goods (ta soma agatha ), and psychological goods (ta peri psychen agatha) sound like the health of the body and the serenity of the mind, namely aponia and ataraxia. soma σῶμα is just Greek for "body" (plus some other connotations in the polysemous Greek) and psyche is "mind" (for our purposes, but sometimes translated "soul"). I was also reminded of the division of the necessary desires in the Menoikeus letter:
Quoteof the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body (αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν); then those necessary for life itself.