Posts by Don

On this topic, I keep coming back to the assertion in Cicero (Is it elsewhere?) that the gods live in the between-cosmos area of the universe. By definition, that means there is no world, no world-system, no ordered part of the universe on which a human-shaped god could reside. By definition, the intermundia/metakosmos has no "world." Are we to imagine them floating around like bubbles? They literally would not have a spot to stand or sit in this area of the universe. That's why I have a hard time accepting that Epicurus believed gods were existent beings somehow residing "between world-systems." Quick lunch time rant for now.

I'll hopefully have a chance to address some of @Twentier's very valid concerns from my perspective this evening.

*But* we don't have prolepseis of the good and pleasure. One is a philosophical concept, the other is a direct connection to reality. Epicurus did posit prolepseis of the god and justice.

Some good points you raise. Heading out the door to work, but I wanted to get this down...

I think the "existence" of something doesn't necessarily mean its being able to be touched or seen. Epicurus clearly says the gods are only perceptible by the mind... at least to us mortals.

There is also the issue of Epicurus's saying that we have a prolepsis of justice. Just can't be seen or touched but "we know it when we see it" due to a prolepsis. Of course, for my part, we have the same issue with that in that if justice is, at its root, to neither be intentionally harmed nor to intentionally harm others, that also has a load of semantic and conceptual content for something (the prolepsis) that I think we believe is a pre-rational faculty.

Throwing it out there for discussion.

This episode made me go back and examine the relevant sections of the letter to Menoikeus... And I found myself asking "What *really* is the prolepsis of the gods that Epicurus is proposing?" I thought it's straight forward: A god is a blessed and imperishable 'being'. But I'm not so sure. Let me break down the text and show where I'm coming from:

First, on the one hand, believing that the god is a blessed and imperishable thing as is the common, general understanding of the god... πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων,...

First = not numerically, but "primarily, foremost, most importantly."

believe = νομίζων "believing, holding, considering" (present active participle of νομῐ́ζω) To me "believing" involves a cognitive act of choosing to believe, hold, or acknowledge something. You can choose to believe the earth is flat. However, once you have evidence available, you can become convinced to believe the earth is round. Believe that the god is blessed and imperishable has too much semantic and conceptual content to be the prolepsis, which I believe most of us take to be a pre-rational, pre-conceptual impression (like sensations).

Even ζῷον (as I've mentioned before) can be a "living being/animal" but also an "image" of a living being as in the painting of a horse. Could Epicurus be hedging his bets here? Is the god only apprehended by the mind and contemplation because it is really is an image constructed by the mind, like the painting on a cloth or wall, in the mind itself of the one who turns their thoughts toward the god?

...as the common understanding (mental perception, idea, concept) of the god has been outlined...ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη,

The use of ὑπεγράφη (hypegraphe) is especially interesting in this context because this word literally means to be outlined with the intent of someone filling in the details, like the image of letters indicated by a teacher by an outline or tracing for the student to then follow. It seems according to this, the most basic characteristics of the god are merely outlines in our mind on top of which all the incorrect assumptions and concepts of the hoi polloi are piled on. But those characteristics of blessedness and imperishability seem far too "detailed" to be considered ὑπεγράφη (hypegraphe).

Then we have:
Do not attribute anything foreign to the incorruptibility or incongruous with the blessedness of itself (i.e., the god)! μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε.

Believe everything about which a god is able to preserve its own imperishability and blessedness for itself. πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετα ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτον δόξαζε.

In this case, "believe" is actually δόξαζε (doxaze) "think, suppose, imagine, hold the opinion that" This word is connected with δοξαι in Principle Doctrines κυριαι δοξαι (kyriai doxai)

So, Epicurus exhorts his students to believe the god is a blessed and imperishable being (or the image of a being in their mind), to hold the believe that the god is able to preserve its own blessedness and imperishability, because the common idea of the god is engraved somehow in our minds by the faintest outline.

I still find it hard to believe that the prolepsis of the gods includes all that, somehow including all that conceptual framework.

This line of thought is one reason I continue to be intrigued by the "idealist" position of the Epicurean gods. The god's blessedness and incorruptibility is maintained by our very focus on their blessedness and incorruptibility in our minds. As we approach a temple or image, that image of blessedness and incorruptibility allows the Epicurean to interact with a divine image as the physical representation of that image in the mind of a blessed and incorruptible being - and ONLY as that - without all the baggage of imagining a vengeful, wrathful god.

Still very much a work-in-progress but that a direction of inquiry I'm heading down.

Excellent, thought-provoking episode! Thank you all.

Quote from Julia

Epicurus' redefinition of pleasure was rather only a reinstatement of its pure form, before all the manipulations of culture came to taint it; the way toddlers and piglets still perceive it.

I admit I haven't thought of it in that way before, but I like it.

The longest treatise on language by Epicurus left to us is Book 28 of On Nature:

Epicurus, On nature, book 28

Epicurus, On nature, book 28

www.academia.edu

Sedley's translation is the best source to dig into that work.

Quote from Julia

The key of VS71 is in the grammar more than the words: "is accomplished", not "is being accomplished"! VS71 places my point of view after (the completion of) the action, not during (the process of) the action.

It does appear you're correct. To use Saint-Andre's translation as a starting point:

VS71. Ask this question of every desire: what will happen to me if the object of desire is achieved, and what if not?
πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;
NOTE: Literally, τὸ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον means something like "what is sought because of this desire" (cf. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 1098b22); however "the object of desire" is more readable in modern English.

A more literal translation (sacrificing eloquence) would be:

Concerning all the desires, this question must be applied: What will happen to me if what is sought because of this desire should be fulfilled? and what if it is not fulfilled?

τελεσθῇ is a 3rd person Singular Aorist Subjunctive Passive verb. One page I found explains the aorist subjunctive as " if the subjunctive mood is used in a purpose or result clause, then the action should not be thought of as a possible result, but should be viewed as a definite outcome that will happen as a result of another stated action." That seems to apply here, since applying the accomplishment of the desire is a result of asking the question. It is also doing the action and asking "what will happen to me" if this action is completed. It seems to be the person is:

1. Recognizing a desire in themselves
2. Trying to imagine themselves in the future as having accomplished the action that fulfills the desire
3. Imagining what will happen to them after that desire is fulfilled: Did the action fulfilling the desire bring pleasure or bring pain?
4. Then acting in accordance with that future self's feeling of pleasure or pain.

Quote from Titus

The point is not to ask what's in my power and what is beyond my capabilities and to examine everything that comes to my mind according to this procedure. The key is to actually focus on what's important in life, what does have priority and what is established by nature as the foundation of life.

I would agree that for the most part; however, the Stoics have no monopoly on what is usually ascribed to them:

Quote from Epicurus, letter to Menoikeus

whom do you consider is better or more powerful than one who holds pious beliefs concerning the gods; one who has absolutely no fears concerning death; one who has rationally determined the τέλος of one's natural state; and the one who grasps that, on the one hand, good things (namely pleasures) are both easily attained and easily secured, and, on the other hand, evil things (or pains) are either short in time or brief in suffering; someone who laughs at Fate which is introduced onto the stage of life by many as the mistress of all things? For that person, even though some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some by our own power, for although necessity is beyond our control, they see that chance is unstable and there is no other master beyond themselves, so that praise and its opposite are inseparably connected to themselves.

Quote from Godfrey

Re post #12 graphic: also include PDs 15, 21, 26 and 29, in addition to 30.

FYI:

15. Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion have no end. ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν (kenōn < emptiness, void) δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

ἄπειρον = infinity "no-limit"

Limited in this PD is ὥρισται which includes the connotation of "limit (one thing according to another)"

"Easy to acquire" reminds me of the 3rd line of the tetrapharmakos.

I like the connotation of ὁ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει. Those based on empty beliefs εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει. ἐκπίπτει has a meaning "to fall out, fall down" but also to be cast ashore or suffer shipwreck, to be driven out or banished, etc. εἰς ἄπειρον "into infinity." So, to me, this has the underlying meaning of having an empty desire for limitless wealth is like being banished to search for satisfaction in your wealth into the infinite void with no end in sight forever.

Quote from Joshua

The rules of pig-Latin;

https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~morelanj/RAO/prepare2.html

Wikipedia has a surprisingly extensive article on Pig Latin:

Pig Latin - Wikipedia

Quote from Don

πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν

VS79 has a form of this word:

He who is as peace within himself also causes no trouble for others. ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος. (Ho atarakhos heautō kai heterō aokhlētos)

I didn't address Godfrey 's original thesis!

I would argue that Epicurus expects his students to apply his philosophical methods in both good times and bad, in times of upheaval and in times of jubilation.

The questions you pose are intriguing and would serve as a good starting point for planning ahead in those times of upheaval that inevitably arise in our lives. They also seem to get at those aspects of our lives over which we have control and those which are subject to chance. Making the most of those parts of our lives that we do have control over - that we have agency over - seems to me a big part of Epicurus's philosophy.

Quote from Cassius

I perceive that in some minds, this statement of only two criteria sounds like Epicurus was referring to "the pleasures of the moment" and "the pains of the moment." ... etc...

Fully agree with all this in your number 2 paragraph. Well stated, Cassius. My understanding is that the "pleasures/pains of the moment" considerations are more inline with the Cyrenaic position.

Quote from Cassius

All the discussion of "natural" and "necessary" is *contextual*, and cannot be reduced to universals that apply to all people at all times and all places. Even breathing can be postponed if by holding your breath to swim out of a cave you save your life. As Torquatus said, the classification has a principle, that things which are most natural and most necessary are generally going to be the easiest to obtain, and therefore can generally be obtained with the least resulting pain, but that is **not** a general statement that nature universally demands that you eat bread and drink water and live in a cave. It is only a general consideration that can serve as a guide when you don't have enough information to be confident that what you can do will be achievable, but over time you learn to know what is and is not possible, so you move out of the cave and you start eating more than bread and drinking more than water, unless circumstances demand it.

I don't think "natural" and "necessary" are as contextual as you're trying to make out. The literal translation of the pertinent Menoikeus section (127-128) is:

Quote from Epicurus - Letter to Menoikeus, 127-8

Furthermore, on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life.

The 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones' uses ΚΕΝΑΙ which is a form of the same exact word Epicurus uses for the void in "atoms & void."

My reading is:

1. Natural Desires

A. Natural *and* Necessary Desires

i. Necessary for Eudaimonia

ii. Necessary for "Freedom from Disturbance in the Body" (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν)

iii. Necessary for Living Itself (πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν)

B. Only Natural Desires (αἱ φυσικαὶ μόνον)

2. Empty, Fruitless "Void" Desires

I find that "the ones which are only natural" interesting. I'm not sure how to interpret that, honestly.

To get back to Cassius' commentary, specifically: "All the discussion of "natural" and "necessary" is *contextual*, and cannot be reduced to universals that apply to all people at all times and all places. Even breathing can be postponed if by holding your breath to swim out of a cave you save your life."

A distinction has to be made between natural/necessary behaviors and "desires." It is a universal that we mammals find breathing, eating, sleeping, and shelter necessary to continue living. Of course, we'll postpone breathing when swimming out of a cave because we can't breathe water and we desire to continue living if at all possible. I don't see that as an example of a contextual desire.

"things which are most natural and most necessary are generally going to be the easiest to obtain, and therefore can generally be obtained with the least resulting pain, but that is **not** a general statement that nature universally demands that you eat bread and drink water and live in a cave."

Your water/cave metaphor seems to be a bit of a non sequitur here. If you're living in a cave, it is going to require quite a bit of effort to obtain bread and make sure you have sufficient water stored away... unless you're living directly beside a spring and have bread delivered to you... in which case you'll need a baker who's willing to trek up the mountain... but then you'll need... and so on.

My understanding is that nature provides sufficient amounts of what we need to live - if we were to be in dire straits - which is why Epicurus, from time to time, limited his food and drink to see how much he could live on and still be satisfied. Then, after his fasting experiment, went back to living "normally" until his next experiment.

Quote from Cassius

I laughed because I am supposed to but I am not sure I get it ? I can see the "pig" double-meaning, but why put the "vay" at the end?

Latin: Veni, vidi, vici (I came, I saw, I conquered)

"Old School" Pig Latin: eni-vay,...

English: Pigs can fly. > Igs-pay an-cay y-flay.

Seen on Facebook.... Made me chuckle...

Joshua : I'm definitely intrigued by the direction you're going. Sedley makes distinctions between singular and plural, but I don't believe in the way you're proposing. I do think some translators gloss over the singular/plural in those sections. I'd be curious to dig into the Greek in those and quantify singulars and plurals.

Thanks for a thought-provoking proposal!

For what it's worth, here is a relevant section from my Menoikeus commentary and translation:

τὸν θεὸν ζῷον "a god (is a) ζῷον. But what is a ζῷον?

ζῷον (zōon) is where English zoology comes from.

LSJ gives two primary definitions:

• living being, animal
• in art, figure, image, not necessarily of animals (or a sign of the Zodiac)

So, unfortunately, at this point in the Letter we can't necessarily resolve the question of what the nature of the gods (or of a god) is according to Epicurus. Some scholars think Epicurus believed the gods were material beings ("living being, animal") somehow living between the various world-systems (cosmos) in the universe. Some think Epicurus believed the gods were mental representations or personifications of the concepts ("figure, image, sign") of blessedness.

...

θεοὶ εἰσιν. "Gods exist." "There are gods."

The implications of those two words have had entire essays written about them. We looked at this a little in 123b with ζώον. But Epicurus is not equivocating here: Gods exist. What he means by this we simply have to discover from his extant works and fragments. Again, if we take Sedley's position, each person has their own personal concept of a god. Many people, many individual gods. Those gods exist.

123f. ἐναργὴς γαρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις.

• Here's our δέ "on the other hand."
• ἐναργὴς [δέ] ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις

"And the knowledge (ἡ γνῶσις (gnōsis)) of them (θεοί "gods", note the plural here) is ἐναργὴς." But what does ἐναργὴς mean?

LSJ provides two primary definitions:

• visible, palpable, in bodily shape, properly of gods appearing in their own forms (in Homer); so of a dream or vision; ex., ἐναργὴς ταῦρος "in visible form a bull, a very bull"
• manifest to the mind's eye, distinct

Epicurus can't mean the first meaning since he's adamant that the gods don't interact with humans. But the second definition coincides with his contention (and the idea of the prolepsis of the gods) that the gods are apprehended by the mind only. In first Principal Doctrine's scholia (i.e., a note added to the text by a later author), we read τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς "the gods are conceived of through contemplation by reasoning." We don't - can't! - see the Epicurean gods with our physical eyes as Homer describes seeing the Olympian gods "in visible form." Homer's gods were εναργής in one sense of the word; Epicurus's in the other sense. The truth of the gods' existence in Epicurus's philosophy takes place entirely in our minds by reasoning through their existence by means of contemplation. But through that contemplation, Epicurus asserts that their existence is εναργής "clearly discernible to us / manifest to us in our minds."

This emphasis on contemplation is interesting in light of the characteristic of the Epicurean sage in Diogenes Laertius Book X.30: μᾶλλόν τε εὐφρανθήσεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις. I continue to maintain that "in contemplation" is the best translation of ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις for this characteristic of the sage: "The sage will also enjoy themselves more than others in contemplation, speculation, and theorizing." Many translators see this as referring to state festivals and spectacles. I've explored the use of the word elsewhere in Diogenes Laertius' work as well as in Aristotle online. https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…tion?authuser=0 If the gods are "manifest" in contemplation, this seems consistent with that characteristic of an Epicurean sage.

Unfortunately, this does nothing to resolve our problem with puzzling out how a god is a ζώον. Are they physically-existent material beings? Are they existing only as mental perceptions manifest merely to the mind's eye? The ambiguous nature of εναργής doesn't necessarily help us fully. It does, however, set up some of Epicurus's clever wordplay contrasting his view with Homer's.

The Data Over Dogma guys did a whole episode debunking the Christian doctrine (not articulated until the 2nd c CE) of creation ex nihilo. It also seems important to note that ex nihilo creation was *not* the general consensus in the ancient world. Although a young Epicurus turned to philosophy when his "schoolmasters ... could not tell him the meaning of "chaos" in Hesiod," he substituted the eternally-existent atoms to explain "where" the universe came from. The pre-existing Chaos provided the building blocks for the cosmos/world-system in Greek mythology even if the elementary school teachers couldn't explain where that came from or what it was to little Epicurus. Schoolmaster there is γραμματιστής or one who literally teaches how to write the letters of the alphabet and other elementary-school level material.

I found the episode fascinating: