Posts by Eikadistes

Here's how I read Herodotos — all images are "real", because all images are made of particles, and all particles have a source in nature. I read this to mean that we cannot imagine an image that has not been impressed upon or apprehended by us. We cannot apprehend the ultraviolet colors of flowers like bees. Our mind is limited to compatible physical interactions. Like an artist, the mind is not a metaphysical creator, just a creative re-arranger of pre-existing elements loaned from nature.

So, if we can conceive of it, or retrieve it from memory, or play with it in imagination, then the particles must have come from an existing thing (or things) outside of the subjective mind. If you tell me you believe in centaurs, regardless of your fantasy, I know for a fact that you have experienced both the form of a human, and the form of a horse, both of which were real. A centaur is a real, sublimated image in the mind that so happens to not correspond with a tall, chunky creature.

The same is true of individual gods. Mental images of gods exist, like centaurs, as compound unities of particles that travelled from external objects, into the mind, and were sublimated together to form a new image that does not directly correspond 1:1 with an external object. As I read On Piety, the gods only exist in the mind as compounds made from, specifically, [1] the preconception of blessedness, [2] the concept of immortality, [3] the visual form of a human. Now, if you want to name a specific deity, you're expanding on the sublimation. Aphrodite has [4] sex or love (etc.).

This is why Epíkouros writes that the gods are only "reached" through "contemplation". You can't find a god as anything but a mental image or a physical representation crafted by a human artist because you need a human imagination to sublimate together several different concepts. Without the tool of the imagination (or the hand of the visual artist, making the contents of the mind become chunky), the components of a "god-image" are incapable of properly bonding by themselves.

Quote from Kalosyni

It seems pretty unnatural to "glorify" decay and ugliness (ugly witches, goblins, monsters, and bloodied faces/bodies) and it seems that on some level this is an expression of anger and hopelessness.

I see where you're coming from, but consider the Memento Mori visualized by Epicureans — images of death (like the skeleton mosaics) are historically on-brand when it comes to Epicurean mortality.

Celebrating mortality, in that regard, is also a celebration of the urgency of pursuing happiness, "by having been dispossessed of the yearning for immortality" (Ep. Men. 124). It's also way to face death directly with visual representations and observe that it can't hurt you. It's just a concept.

Granted, Halloween, in my experience, is more about (depending on your age): playing dress-up, collecting candy, trying to get laid, an excuse to drink, or doing it all over for your own kids. It doesn't necessarily have any particular philosophical side that is celebrated as far as that goes.

Still, intellectual-underpining aside, if it's fun, choose it. If not, avoid it.

Quote from TauPhi

2) principle of isonomia

I also want to bring up that in the extant texts, I've only ever found Epíkouros employing isonomia when discussing physical cosmology as the ideal ratio of matter-to-void. I have not come across texts where isonomia and theos are discussed as being related concepts. That's just my own study.

To be honest, I think, properly, I'll have to go back through Philódēmos' texts to reinforce this, because there are so many. I went through Epíkouros' texts before and came to that conclusion.

We do find those words correlated by an Epicurean opponent, though, several hundred years later. And, on this, I respectfully think Cicero left the Garden before he properly understood Zeno.

Quote from TauPhi

Actively constructed subjective imagination cannot be confirmed nor contradicted. 'I imagined it therefore it is', is not compatible with Epicurean system.

I think it can. Dreams are real. We don't choose our dreams, they just happen.

There is a categorical difference when I say, "Last night, I had a dream about X, Y, and Z" versus me completely fabricating a lie and saying "Last night, I had a dream..." when I didn't have a dream.

In one scenario, the dream-forms really happened in my mind. In one, I'm lying to prove a point.

Same thing on drugs. If I'm tripping on acid, and I report back to you later, I could lie to you, and make up images that the serotonin-flooded brain did not actually produce, when in reality, if you hooked some futuristic visual-cortex-reproducing machine to see what my inner-eye is seeing, you'd be able to confirm that I'm subjectively experiencing exactly what my brain is producing.

Happy birthday!

Quote from Eikadistes

Each of us can create our own "him"

Or "her", or a smaller group of "they".

Quote from Patrikios

we have an innate predisposition to form these divine images, but not because gods actually exist.

Is this a correct understanding of how to interpret how Epicurus referred to 'god(s)'?

In general, and from my humble perspective, I think this is right on the money.

I also think this creates coherence for Epíkouros to use both the plural ("deities") and the masculine, accusative, singular pronoun ("him") in the same paragraph. Each of us can create our own "him", so to speak, and the collection of our "hims" are the "they". I then think that the appearance of each of "them" can be conceived of as a reflection of "it" ("the divine nature").

I don't want to distract from your point because I think that you nailed it, but I'd add the caveat that I think ancient Epicureans would say that the gods are real, they just aren't massive animals.

This also provides coherence with the idea that the gods are infinite, not necessarily because the universe is physically infinite and there are infinite god-animals in infinite void, but because there are infinite animals capable of each conceiving of their own deity or collection of deities.

I'm also, personally coming to the conclusion that, internally, in Epicurean documents written from one Epicurean to another, within the context of their own, frank speech, when they wrote theos ("deity"), they may have always implied theon morphes ("the form of a deity") even if they didn't spell out "form" each time. If it were the case that the meant "the appearance of animal-beings" and not "literal super-animals", writing "form" may have been rhetorically redundant for them.

So far as our local holidays go, I keep two quotes from On Piety in mind:

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"...Epíkouros loyally observed all the forms of worship and enjoined upon his friends to observe them..."

"...he is found to have taken part in all the traditional festivals..."

If the Hegemon wore sneakers instead sandals, I imagine he'd carve pumpkins, too.

But also,

Quote

"...Anthḗsteria too must be celebrated..."

The first day of Anthestḗria shared a bit in common with the theme of Halloween (and other "Day of the Dead" holidays, globally). I mention it in the second part in my essay about holy shit:

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..."beginning with [DAY 1] Πιθοίγια (Pithoígia) the “Casket-Opening” during which “libations were offered from the newly-opened jars to the god of wine” and “all the household, including servants or slaves [joined] in the festivity of the occasion” — so long as that person was “over three years of age…” (Encyclopædia Britannica 103). Pithoígia resembles in many ways the Celtic tradition of Samhain, as well as its Christian analogue, All Hallow’s Eve save that Pithoígia is set amidst the floral scenery of Anthestēriṓn (mid-February-to-March), just in time for the wine to have reached its intended perfection as the flowers of next year’s harvest begin to bloom. Participants, within fragrant “rooms […] adorned with spring flowers” would, expectantly, open their tall πίθοι (píthoi, “jars of wine”) anticipating the prize within — symbolically, the jars represent the “grave-jars” of the deceased: fumes from the the previous season’s vintage escape like the vapors of the departed, liberated from their dark tombs. The souls of the dead are mythologized to have escaped the underworld to torment the living. “To protect themselves from the spirits of the dead,” as was the Attic tradition, Athenians were seen “chewing ‘ramnon’, leaves of Hawthorn, or white thorn, and were anointing themselves and their doors with tar” (Psilopoulos, Goddess Mystery Cults and the Miracle… 268).

I think Halloween is a fair analogy to the ancient Greeks days of the dead.

Overall, it's still really popular, if economic activity is any indicator. I think it's tough to get Americans to agree on anything, so if half the neighborhood will put out cobwebs and pumpkins, I think it's a victory for community spirit, but only insofar as the pleasure of celebrating a holiday.

Unless it produces no pleasure. In which case, individuals should practice avoidance.

Quote from Eikadistes

I'm going to condense all of this somewhere soon...

I did the thing. I came up with a more exhaustive list, and found corresponding quotes by Epíkouros and Epicureans that either support or conflict with Theravada Buddhist positions.

Quote from Zarathustra

(2) Nietzsche's relationship to Epicureanism

Welcome! Have you read Nietzsche and Epicurus by Vinod Acharya? I can share a copy if you haven't.

I also keep a collection of Nietzsche's commentary on Epicurus:

• The Anti-Christ
• Beyond Good and Evil
• On the Genealogy of Morals
• Human, All Too Human
• The Gay Science

Please let me know of or find excerpts that are missing! I'm actively searching.

Quote from wbernys

I've actually already read Gellar-Goad's article Don but sad to say I find it a little muddled and think we just need to accept the Epicureans we're wrong on this, they simply didn't have the tools we have. I think explanations of "real meaning" fall a little flat and remind me of how Christians explain Jesus failed apocalyptic predictions.

From my humble attempts at translating, I have never found a statement where Epíkouros positively says that the sun is a hot melon a few miles up. He never gives a definite size, suggesting that "the [Sun] in relation to itself, either [it is] greater [than] of that which is being observed, or slightly smaller, or [it is] as great as it happens to be." (Epistle to Pythokles 91). His thesis, as I read, is that astronomical objects are too distant to allow us to make accurate measurements.

(If disagreements in measurements between the JWST and the Hubble are any indication, we are still struggling over this point of contention, except on the scale of massive, cosmic filaments).

Even as a general observation, Epíkouros seems to indicate that the sun is "truly great", as he writes to Pythokles (so I've translated personally) "the size of both the Sun and of the rest of the glowers appears of such [great] size in relation to us [and] truly is so great" (10.91). Compared to other nearby objects, the sun cannot be easily "obstructed" behind a tree the way that a piece of fruit becomes completely obstructed. You need an eclipse; in other words, the only things big enough to block the sun other massive objects whose size we cannot accurately measure.

Also, just a quick side-note: we take "the size of the sun" for granted. It's not obvious. Consider neutron stars, which are the size of New York City, and can only shed heat on planets that orbit extremely close. Hypothetically, all this time of human history, prior to the 20th-century, the sun could have been a neutron star the size of New York City, and we wouldn't have known the difference.

I'd also like to add their context as naturalists and materialists. Epíkouros' personal philosophical hero was the naturalist Anaxagoras, who uniquely theorized that the sun was, at least, as big as a massive, geographical landmass (he names the Peloponnese). Further, having regularly sailed along the Ionian coast, Epíkouros (and the rest of the Ionians, I imagine) clearly witnessed mountains shrinking in the distance as they sailed, whereas the sun never shrinks. It would have been radically anomalous for Epíkouros to have suggested that the sun is smaller than mountains.

But he did get "heat" totally wrong. There are no "heat" particles. With respect, II think "the sun is a hot melon" is an attractive argument to opponents, but it is a colorful exxageration. There are plenty of other things Epíkouros got wrong that are educational points of comparison (like "heat").

Quote from wbernys

I was immediately enthralled but didn't immediately accept all the principal doctrines (especially 3 and 18)and even was a Cyrenaic for a little bit

We all go through a Cyrenaic phase. I won't hold that against you.

Quote from Kalosyni

Parallels can be seen between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism. (I just found this if you want to read about the comparison between the two).

I include a brief mention of those parallels in my paper about holy shit. There is a historical possibility that Nāgārjuna (the founder of the Madhyamaka philosophy, one of the primary influences of Mahāyāna Buddhism which represents the majority of practitioners), was directly inspired or influenced by the works of Sextus Empiricus. He may literally have had physical access to translations of those works. Granted (so I think), Pyrrhonism was, in the first place, inspired by a tradition (or traditions) that shared similar philosophical positions as Buddhism, so there is a direct, historical exchange between ancient Greece and India when it comes to skeptical philosophy.

Huh ... I guess my brain is set to auto-update my file on the Dhammapada once a year.

Anyway, I came back to ask myself the exact opposite question, for an unrelated reason, and I came across these verses that strike me as being very "epicurean" in tone:

6. There are those who do not realize that one day we all must die. But those who do realize this settle their quarrels.

11. Those who mistake the unessential to be essential and the essential to be unessential, dwelling in wrong thoughts, never arrive at the essential.

12. Those who know the essential to be essential and the unessential to be unessential, dwelling in right thoughts, do arrive at the essential.

24. Ever grows the glory of him who is energetic, mindful and pure in conduct, discerning and self-controlled, righteous and heedful.

26. The foolish and ignorant indulge in heedlessness, but the wise one keeps his heedfulness as his best treasure.

28. Just as one upon the summit of a mountain beholds the groundlings, even so when the wise man casts away heedlessness by heedfulness and ascends the high tower of wisdom, this sorrowless sage beholds the sorrowing and foolish multitude.

41. Ere long, alas! this body will lie upon the earth, unheeded and lifeless, like a useless log.

66. Fools of little wit are enemies unto themselves as they move about doing evil deeds, the fruits of which are bitter.

67. Ill done is that action fo doing which one repents later, and the fruit of which one, weeping, reaps with tears.

68. Well done is that action of doing which one repents not later, and the fruit of which one, reaps with delight and happiness.

73. The fool seeks undeserved reputation, precedence among monks, authority over monasteries, and honor among householders.

76. Should one find a man who points out faults and who reproves, let him follow usch a wise and sagacious person as one would a guide to hidden treasure. It is always better, and never worse, to cultivate such an association.

81. Just as a solid rock is not shaken by the storm, even so the wise are not affected by praise or blame.

84. He is indeed virtuous, wise and righteous who neither for his own sake nor for the sake of another (does any wrong), who does not crave for son, wealth, or kingdom, and does not desire success by unjust means.

101. Better than a thousand useless words is one useful word, hearing which one attains peace.

102. Better than a thousand useless verses is one useful verse, hearing which one attains peace.

110. Better it is to live one day virtuous and meditative than to live a hundred years immoral and uncontrolled.

116. Hasten to do good; restrain your mind from evil. He who is slow in doing good, his mind delights in evil.

123. Just as a trader with a small escort and great wealth would avoid a perilous route, or just as one desiring to live avoids poison, even so should one shun evil.

127. Neither in the sky nor in mid-ocean, nor by entering into mountain clefts, nowhere in the world is there a place where one may escape from the results of evil deeds.

128. Neither in the sky nor in mid-ocean, nor by entering into mountain clefts, nowhere in the world is there a place where one may will not be overcome by death.

131. One who, while himself seeking happiness, oppresses with violence other beings who also desire happiness, will not attain happiness hereafter.

132. One who, while himself seeking happiness, does not oppress with violence other beings who also desire happiness, will find happiness hereafter.

141. Neither going about naked, nor matted locks, nor filth, nor fasting, nor lying on the ground, nor smearing oneself with ashes and dust, nor sitting on the heels (in penance) can purify a mortal who has not overcome doubt.

157. If one holds oneself dear, one should diligently watch oneself. Let the wise man keep vigil during any of the three watches of the night.

206. Good is it to see the Noble Ones; to live with them is ever blissful. One will always be happy by not encountering fools.

280. The idler who does not exert himself when he should, who though young and strong is full of sloth, with a mind full of vain thoughts — such an indolent man does not find the path to wisdom.

290. If by renouncing a lesser happiness one may realize a greater happiness, let the wise man renounce the lesser, having regard for the greater.

328. If for company you find a wise and prudent friend who leads a good life, you should, overcoming all impediments, keep his company joyously and mindfully.

333. Good is virtue until life’s end, good is faith that is steadfast, good is the acquisition of wisdom, and good is the avoidance of evil.

365. One should not despise what one has received, nor envy the gains of others. The monk who envies the gains of others does not attain to meditative absorption.

I'm going to condense all of this somewhere soon, but I this is a great repository for review, so I wanted to place it here, first ... to the growing list of things I keep re-forgetting.

What's up, chump!

Happy Eikas!

Happy birthday, phílos Bryan !

I've consolidated all of my sources here and formatted the names into an ascending list.

At this point, I say no, it does not have something to teach us about preconceptions. I think it's like trying to learn about the physics of stars by observing Van Gogh's painting Starry Night. No matter how advanced or well-defined our models, they are still (for now) just models and analogies.

Maybe it does, insofar as it can teach us what a preconception is not.

As Diogénēs describes of a preconception, it is a "memory of the appearances from abroad", so being able to experience/process sensation, as I read it, is a necessary precursor to a preconception.

In an Epicurean sense, I don't think it's accurate to say that LLM's can have "preconceptions" because they are prone to error. Rather, it looks to me like they are being programmed with "opinions", some of which are true ... but they are not, themselves, standards of truth. They lack the standard of sensation, so they're at the whim of their programmers' memories.

We'll need to get to the point where an android organically dreams of sheep.

If I were on Picard's Enterprise-D, I would, personally, trust Data, but not the ship's computer, even if 99% of their knowledge-base were shared. If I'm going to risk losing my arm, I'm not going to take advice from an armless thing. Give that thing an arm to lose, and then see how it thinks. Likewise, I'll trust Data's description of the texture of kitten fur before the computer's, or the flavor of Picard's tea (probably bitter Earl Grey), over anything else for which it lacks its own sensory organs.

Quote from Titus

I just wanted to share my thoughts on a topic that has been on my mind for a long time.

Really cool thought, though! It's at least worth the thought experiment.

Perhaps the Eureka! moment of a life-changing discovery is more like an intellectual orgasm.

Or maybe it's like getting "abducted by aliens". If you genuinely believe you gained new perspective, you experience both (1) the excitement of certainty, and (2) the fear of social ridicule.