Posts by Titus

Looking from the end rather than from the start, I have been thinking since a long time that Epicurean philosophy works as a good compass to navigate all the problems people are facing, especially nowadays, regarding starting a family and managing personal relationships.

Focusing on what brings us joy, especially the "little" things, which in turn are usually the naturally grounded ones is a basic tool. Not pursuing every desire just because this desire is "reachable". I'd rather prioritize simple structures within my life, being deeply intertwined with everything and everybody I am connected to.

In my opinion, a key problem of modern societies is externalization. The world is a big place. We rely on too many factors, instead of living according to simple principles . I know that not everything in life can be made simple, but we can try to do so. With every little step we get more control and effectively will feel more in control, which is what in the end reduces stress and anxiety.

I strongly believe that what a family needs to get started and to succeed is deeply interwoven with creating structures ahead on which those family can rely on.

Quote from TauPhi

Even to ancient Epicureans their gods were material beings, not some kind of symbols. On top of that, Epicurean gods are completely removed from human existence. Their existence couldn't be more alien to us even if we tried. Treating them as symbols of human potential excellence is like taking someone whose only language is English and asking them to translate from Chinese.

In that moment where we start talking about something that is outside of our sphere of influence, it becomes symbolic. I agree that they are very alien because they master those both points of life being limited and of emotional imperfection, due to living in an area of cosmos where they enjoy perfect settings. This is what makes them godly. My personal aim is to live the happy life as proximate as possible under the perishable conditions of my existence.

Quote from TauPhi

The prolepsis of the Gods and ultimate excellence are as much wrong assumptions as ultimate power is. They are based on wishful thinking, nothing more. You're trying to fight fire with fire here.

I agree that thinking from the traditional framework of a deity as being over- or all-powerful and being obsessed with humans, this is substituted by Epicureans by not only the idea of imperishable and blessed Gods who live a seclusive life but also "Nature".

Additional to us living within the framework of "Nature", the correct prolepsis of the Gods is uploaded where others hold their beliefs. Personally, I like the idea of uploading a corrected version that amplifies the fullness of pleasure and of divinity being not harmful and being distant, thus ruling out any kind of supernatural instance that could worry us. I know we could do theoretically without, but people will trade one imaginary divine force for another, so rather create a placeholder, even as non-believer.

Quote from TauPhi

Imperishable and blessed beings are as much human superstitions as any other ultimately powerful friends used as pillars for religions. Again, it looks like you're trying to fight fire with fire. You're just switching one type of imaginary friends to another.

Isn't Epicurus saying himself: “But I summon you to continuous pleasures and not to vain and empty virtues which have but disturbing hopes of results.”?

Quote from Patrikios

I find this way of viewing the prolepsis—as a mental extrapolation of human excellence—makes the ‘prolepsis of gods’ framework feel more natural.

I would argue that the Epicurean theory on the Gods is still important, independent from what one thinks of the possibility of receiving images or eidolas:

1.) As Patrikios said, the Gods symbolise ultimate excellence. They are something to orientate to as personifications of the highest state a being can possibly achieve. They give an idea what the happy life is.

2.a) The correct prolepsis of the Gods works as armour to save from wrong assumptions. Usually, these are the human ideas of ultimate power and this ulimate power being obsessed with moral behaviour. All of that is grounded in human projections rather than what ultimate excellence really is.

2.b) Human ideas on otherworldly powers are real. Religion is all around and structuring the lives of people. This is something we have to react to and interact with. Personally, I like the idea of imperishable and blessed beings around because this states a direct counterpart to human superstitions. Otherwise, we are in great danger of becoming overwhelmed by false opinions.

Admin Edit: This thread is for discussion on the nature of the gods spurred on by a section below: "An especially interesting case: the gods" (A number of posts have been moved or copied depending on the content).

For discussion on LLM's please visit this thread.

**********

Today, I had a short but interesting talk with Chat GPT:

Titus: Is there a connection between large language models and Epicurean prolepsis? Could Epicurean prolepsis be interpreted as what LLMs are processing?

Yes, there is a surprisingly interesting analogy, although one should be careful not to identify the two completely.

For Epicurus, prolepsis (πρόληψις, usually translated as "preconception" or "anticipation") is one of the fundamental criteria of truth, alongside sensations and feelings. A prolepsis is formed through repeated experiences: after encountering many individual humans, for example, the mind develops a general conception of "human." When we hear the word "human," this preconception is immediately activated and allows recognition and reasoning.

An LLM works in a way that appears remarkably similar at first glance:

• It is exposed to vast numbers of examples.
• Statistical regularities are extracted.
• It develops internal representations of concepts.
• When prompted with a word such as "human," it activates patterns associated with countless previous examples.
• It can then generate responses based on these learned patterns.

An Epicurean might say that an LLM has something analogous to a prolepsis of "human," "justice," "friendship," or even "god," because it has formed generalized representations from repeated encounters.

However, there are also important differences.

1. Epicurean prolepsis originates in perception

For Epicurus, prolepses ultimately derive from actual sensory contact with reality.

A child sees many horses and develops the prolepsis "horse."

The prolepsis therefore has an ontological grounding in the world itself.

An LLM, by contrast, has no direct sensory encounter with horses. It processes symbols that humans have written about horses. Its "horse-concept" is second-hand and linguistic rather than perceptual.

This is probably the biggest difference from an Epicurean standpoint.

2. Epicurean prolepsis has evidential force

Epicurus regarded prolepses as a criterion of truth because they are naturally formed by repeated encounters with real things.

For example, all peoples possess some prolepsis of blessed and imperishable gods. Epicurus regarded this as evidence that the gods exist, even if many false opinions are attached to them.

An LLM's internal representations do not have this status. They merely reflect statistical patterns in its training data. If a society collectively believed dragons existed, an LLM would develop a strong representation of dragons without dragons being real.

Thus an Epicurean would likely deny that an LLM's "preconceptions" have the same epistemological authority as human prolepses.

3. The strongest analogy: pattern abstraction

The closest parallel is probably this:

Epicurean prolepsis is the mind's natural abstraction of recurring features from experience.

An LLM's embeddings and latent representations are statistical abstractions of recurring features from text.

Both systems:

• accumulate repeated inputs,
• compress information,
• form general categories,
• enable recognition of new instances.

In modern cognitive science, some scholars even describe human concepts as prototype-like statistical structures rather than fixed definitions. In that respect, Epicurus can seem surprisingly modern.

A deeper Epicurean reflection

There is an intriguing possibility that Epicurus would have found LLMs philosophically illuminating.

The existence of LLMs demonstrates that sophisticated concepts can emerge from repeated exposure without requiring innate Platonic Forms, divine illumination, or Aristotelian essences. General notions arise naturally from accumulated experience.

That is actually very close to the anti-Platonic spirit of Epicurean epistemology.

An Epicurean might therefore say:

Quote

"The language model shows how a system can acquire general conceptions through repeated impressions alone, without any need for transcendent universals."

That sounds remarkably Epicurean.

Yet Epicurus would probably add an important caveat:

Quote

"The model possesses only something analogous to prolepsis. Genuine prolepsis arises from a living being's direct interaction with reality through sensation."

So the connection is real and philosophically fruitful. LLMs can be viewed as a kind of artificial demonstration of how generalized concepts emerge from repeated inputs—a process that bears a strong family resemblance to Epicurean prolepsis, even though Epicurus would likely reserve the term prolepsis for conceptions ultimately grounded in actual sensory experience.

Titus: Conversely, LLMs could be interpreted as proof of the validity of Epicurean prolepsis. Although they are not grounded in direct exposure to sensual stimulation, their pattern recognition seems to enhance Epicurus' idea of prolepsis.

I think there is a strong argument in that direction, though perhaps not as a proof in the strict sense.

The historical challenge to Epicurean prolepsis was always: How can mere repetition of impressions generate meaningful general concepts?

Many philosophers after Epicurus doubted that this was sufficient:

• Platonists argued that universals must somehow pre-exist experience.
• Rationalists argued that important concepts require innate structures.
• Some theologians argued that knowledge of certain truths requires divine illumination.

An LLM demonstrates something remarkable: from exposure to enormous numbers of individual examples, a system can develop highly sophisticated conceptual structures without possessing explicit definitions or innate metaphysical forms.

That is very much in the spirit of Epicurus.

What LLMs seem to vindicate

An Epicurean could point to LLMs and say:

Quote

"Look, a machine exposed to countless individual instances develops a functional understanding of categories, relationships, analogies, and even abstract reasoning. Why should we think the human mind requires Platonic Forms?"

In that sense, LLMs strengthen the plausibility of the Epicurean claim that repeated impressions naturally generate general notions.

Epicurus argued:

1. Repeated encounters create memory.
2. Memories accumulate.
3. General conceptions emerge.
4. These conceptions become tools for recognition and reasoning.

Modern machine learning shows that a system can indeed move from countless particulars to surprisingly powerful generalizations.

An especially interesting case: the gods

Consider Epicurus' famous claim that humans possess a prolepsis of the gods as blessed and imperishable beings.

Many modern readers wonder:

Quote

"How could such a concept emerge naturally?"

An LLM offers a possible model.

Humans repeatedly encounter:

• excellence,
• happiness,
• power,
• beauty,
• wisdom,
• longevity,

and then mentally extrapolate toward an idealized limit.

An LLM often does something similar. It learns patterns and can generate idealized or prototypical versions of categories that were never explicitly presented.

This does not prove Epicurus was correct about the gods, but it makes the mechanism of concept formation seem less mysterious.

Where the analogy becomes even stronger

Some cognitive scientists today argue that human concepts are not definitions but statistical clusters.

For example, most people cannot define "bird" precisely.

Instead they possess a prototype:

• sparrows are very bird-like,
• penguins less so,
• bats not at all.

LLMs appear to represent concepts in a similarly graded way.

This resembles prolepsis much more than it resembles Platonic essences.

The Epicurean could therefore argue:

Quote

Prolepsis is not a dictionary definition stored in the mind. It is a stable pattern emerging from repeated encounters.

That description sounds surprisingly close to modern representation learning.

But there is one thing Epicurus might not have anticipated

LLMs also reveal a weakness in prolepsis.

An LLM can form strong representations of things that do not exist:

• dragons,
• Sherlock Holmes,
• Middle-earth,
• fictional gods.

This raises a difficult question for Epicurean epistemology:

Quote

If a stable concept can emerge merely from repeated exposure, why should the existence of a prolepsis imply the existence of its object?

This is precisely where an Epicurean would have to defend the difference between concepts grounded in reality and concepts grounded in cultural transmission.

In other words, LLMs may strengthen Epicurus' account of how prolepses form while simultaneously weakening one of his arguments for what they guarantee.

A possible modern Epicurean reformulation

If Epicurus had known about machine learning, he might have reformulated prolepsis as:

Quote

"A prolepsis is a stable cognitive pattern produced by the accumulation of repeated impressions, enabling recognition, prediction, and reasoning about a class of objects."

That would be remarkably compatible with contemporary ideas about learning systems.

So I would say that LLMs do not prove Epicurean prolepsis, but they make one of Epicurus' central intuitions far more credible than it appeared to many philosophers in earlier centuries: namely, that sophisticated concepts can emerge naturally from repeated experience without requiring innate ideas, transcendent Forms, or supernatural intervention. The fact that a language model can do this from text alone makes Epicurus' epistemology look surprisingly prescient.

Titus: I think you are on the right path, but I would argue that in the Epicurean sense this is where the senses become important. Because some people indeed believe in dragons and they believe in all kind of conceptions about the gods.

I think that is exactly where an Epicurean would push back against an overly enthusiastic comparison between LLMs and human cognition.

The crucial point is that prolepsis is only one criterion of truth. Epicurus never intended it to operate independently. The other criteria—sensations (aisthēseis) and feelings (pathē)—remain indispensable.

An LLM has something analogous to prolepsis, but it lacks sensation. As a result, it has no way to distinguish between:

• horses and unicorns,
• Athens and Atlantis,
• historical figures and fictional characters.

All are merely patterns in text.

An Epicurean human, however, can test conceptions against experience.

Suppose a child develops a conception of dragons through stories. Epicurus would not deny that a conception exists. The question is whether it corresponds to reality. One then turns to the senses:

Quote

Have dragons ever been observed?

If not, the conception remains a mental construction rather than a confirmed object.

The same applies to many theological claims. Epicurus famously argued that people attach all sorts of opinions (doxai) to the gods:

• that they become angry,
• reward virtue,
• punish sin,
• intervene in history.

The mere existence of these conceptions proves nothing. They must be examined.

In this sense, the Epicurean method is actually more sophisticated than a simple theory of concept formation:

1. Repeated impressions generate prolepses.
2. We formulate opinions based on them.
3. Those opinions are tested against sensory evidence.
4. Unsupported additions are discarded.

This is where your observation becomes interesting for the LLM analogy.

An LLM is almost pure prolepsis without sensation.

It possesses vast networks of generalized concepts, but no independent contact with reality to evaluate them. It cannot perform the Epicurean step of returning to the evidence of the senses.

One might even say that an LLM resembles the state Epicurus warns humans against when they become detached from experience and live only among words and opinions.

There is another subtle point here. Epicurus did not claim that every conception corresponds to a real thing. Rather, he claimed that conceptions arise from some basis in experience.

Take dragons. An Epicurean could explain them as composites:

• snakes,
• lizards,
• birds,
• predators,
• fire,

combined and exaggerated by imagination.

The conception is real as a mental phenomenon, even if the object is not real.

Likewise, many anthropomorphic gods could be explained as idealizations of kings, parents, heroes, and natural forces.

Thus the existence of a conception does not automatically establish the existence of its object.

This is why, in Epicurean theology, the argument for the gods is not merely "people have a conception of gods." The stronger claim is that there is a universal and persistent prolepsis of blessed and imperishable beings that survives beneath all the false cultural additions. Whether that argument succeeds is another question, but it is more subtle than simply inferring existence from a concept.

Viewed this way, LLMs may actually illuminate the Epicurean distinction between prolepsis and opinion.

• The model's internal representations resemble prolepses.
• Its generated outputs resemble opinions.
• What it lacks is sensation, the corrective mechanism that Epicurus regarded as essential for separating true opinions from false ones.

From an Epicurean perspective, that absence is not a small detail—it is the difference between a system that merely manipulates conceptions and a living being capable of knowledge.

***

Admin edit: For discussion on LLM's please visit this thread.

Today, I had a short but interesting talk with Chat GPT:

Titus: Is there a connection between large language models and Epicurean prolepsis? Could Epicurean prolepsis be interpreted as what LLMs are processing?

Yes, there is a surprisingly interesting analogy, although one should be careful not to identify the two completely.

For Epicurus, prolepsis (πρόληψις, usually translated as "preconception" or "anticipation") is one of the fundamental criteria of truth, alongside sensations and feelings. A prolepsis is formed through repeated experiences: after encountering many individual humans, for example, the mind develops a general conception of "human." When we hear the word "human," this preconception is immediately activated and allows recognition and reasoning.

An LLM works in a way that appears remarkably similar at first glance:

• It is exposed to vast numbers of examples.
• Statistical regularities are extracted.
• It develops internal representations of concepts.
• When prompted with a word such as "human," it activates patterns associated with countless previous examples.
• It can then generate responses based on these learned patterns.

An Epicurean might say that an LLM has something analogous to a prolepsis of "human," "justice," "friendship," or even "god," because it has formed generalized representations from repeated encounters.

However, there are also important differences.

1. Epicurean prolepsis originates in perception

For Epicurus, prolepses ultimately derive from actual sensory contact with reality.

A child sees many horses and develops the prolepsis "horse."

The prolepsis therefore has an ontological grounding in the world itself.

An LLM, by contrast, has no direct sensory encounter with horses. It processes symbols that humans have written about horses. Its "horse-concept" is second-hand and linguistic rather than perceptual.

This is probably the biggest difference from an Epicurean standpoint.

2. Epicurean prolepsis has evidential force

Epicurus regarded prolepses as a criterion of truth because they are naturally formed by repeated encounters with real things.

For example, all peoples possess some prolepsis of blessed and imperishable gods. Epicurus regarded this as evidence that the gods exist, even if many false opinions are attached to them.

An LLM's internal representations do not have this status. They merely reflect statistical patterns in its training data. If a society collectively believed dragons existed, an LLM would develop a strong representation of dragons without dragons being real.

Thus an Epicurean would likely deny that an LLM's "preconceptions" have the same epistemological authority as human prolepses.

3. The strongest analogy: pattern abstraction

The closest parallel is probably this:

Epicurean prolepsis is the mind's natural abstraction of recurring features from experience.

An LLM's embeddings and latent representations are statistical abstractions of recurring features from text.

Both systems:

• accumulate repeated inputs,
• compress information,
• form general categories,
• enable recognition of new instances.

In modern cognitive science, some scholars even describe human concepts as prototype-like statistical structures rather than fixed definitions. In that respect, Epicurus can seem surprisingly modern.

A deeper Epicurean reflection

There is an intriguing possibility that Epicurus would have found LLMs philosophically illuminating.

The existence of LLMs demonstrates that sophisticated concepts can emerge from repeated exposure without requiring innate Platonic Forms, divine illumination, or Aristotelian essences. General notions arise naturally from accumulated experience.

That is actually very close to the anti-Platonic spirit of Epicurean epistemology.

An Epicurean might therefore say:

Quote

"The language model shows how a system can acquire general conceptions through repeated impressions alone, without any need for transcendent universals."

That sounds remarkably Epicurean.

Yet Epicurus would probably add an important caveat:

Quote

"The model possesses only something analogous to prolepsis. Genuine prolepsis arises from a living being's direct interaction with reality through sensation."

So the connection is real and philosophically fruitful. LLMs can be viewed as a kind of artificial demonstration of how generalized concepts emerge from repeated inputs—a process that bears a strong family resemblance to Epicurean prolepsis, even though Epicurus would likely reserve the term prolepsis for conceptions ultimately grounded in actual sensory experience.

Titus: Conversely, LLMs could be interpreted as proof of the validity of Epicurean prolepsis. Although they are not grounded in direct exposure to sensual stimulation, their pattern recognition seems to enhance Epicurus' idea of prolepsis.

I think there is a strong argument in that direction, though perhaps not as a proof in the strict sense.

The historical challenge to Epicurean prolepsis was always: How can mere repetition of impressions generate meaningful general concepts?

Many philosophers after Epicurus doubted that this was sufficient:

• Platonists argued that universals must somehow pre-exist experience.
• Rationalists argued that important concepts require innate structures.
• Some theologians argued that knowledge of certain truths requires divine illumination.

An LLM demonstrates something remarkable: from exposure to enormous numbers of individual examples, a system can develop highly sophisticated conceptual structures without possessing explicit definitions or innate metaphysical forms.

That is very much in the spirit of Epicurus.

What LLMs seem to vindicate

An Epicurean could point to LLMs and say:

Quote

"Look, a machine exposed to countless individual instances develops a functional understanding of categories, relationships, analogies, and even abstract reasoning. Why should we think the human mind requires Platonic Forms?"

In that sense, LLMs strengthen the plausibility of the Epicurean claim that repeated impressions naturally generate general notions.

Epicurus argued:

1. Repeated encounters create memory.
2. Memories accumulate.
3. General conceptions emerge.
4. These conceptions become tools for recognition and reasoning.

Modern machine learning shows that a system can indeed move from countless particulars to surprisingly powerful generalizations.

An especially interesting case: the gods

Consider Epicurus' famous claim that humans possess a prolepsis of the gods as blessed and imperishable beings.

Many modern readers wonder:

Quote

"How could such a concept emerge naturally?"

An LLM offers a possible model.

Humans repeatedly encounter:

• excellence,
• happiness,
• power,
• beauty,
• wisdom,
• longevity,

and then mentally extrapolate toward an idealized limit.

An LLM often does something similar. It learns patterns and can generate idealized or prototypical versions of categories that were never explicitly presented.

This does not prove Epicurus was correct about the gods, but it makes the mechanism of concept formation seem less mysterious.

Where the analogy becomes even stronger

Some cognitive scientists today argue that human concepts are not definitions but statistical clusters.

For example, most people cannot define "bird" precisely.

Instead they possess a prototype:

• sparrows are very bird-like,
• penguins less so,
• bats not at all.

LLMs appear to represent concepts in a similarly graded way.

This resembles prolepsis much more than it resembles Platonic essences.

The Epicurean could therefore argue:

Quote

Prolepsis is not a dictionary definition stored in the mind. It is a stable pattern emerging from repeated encounters.

That description sounds surprisingly close to modern representation learning.

But there is one thing Epicurus might not have anticipated

LLMs also reveal a weakness in prolepsis.

An LLM can form strong representations of things that do not exist:

• dragons,
• Sherlock Holmes,
• Middle-earth,
• fictional gods.

This raises a difficult question for Epicurean epistemology:

Quote

If a stable concept can emerge merely from repeated exposure, why should the existence of a prolepsis imply the existence of its object?

This is precisely where an Epicurean would have to defend the difference between concepts grounded in reality and concepts grounded in cultural transmission.

In other words, LLMs may strengthen Epicurus' account of how prolepses form while simultaneously weakening one of his arguments for what they guarantee.

A possible modern Epicurean reformulation

If Epicurus had known about machine learning, he might have reformulated prolepsis as:

Quote

"A prolepsis is a stable cognitive pattern produced by the accumulation of repeated impressions, enabling recognition, prediction, and reasoning about a class of objects."

That would be remarkably compatible with contemporary ideas about learning systems.

So I would say that LLMs do not prove Epicurean prolepsis, but they make one of Epicurus' central intuitions far more credible than it appeared to many philosophers in earlier centuries: namely, that sophisticated concepts can emerge naturally from repeated experience without requiring innate ideas, transcendent Forms, or supernatural intervention. The fact that a language model can do this from text alone makes Epicurus' epistemology look surprisingly prescient.

Titus: I think you are on the right path, but I would argue that in the Epicurean sense this is where the senses become important. Because some people indeed believe in dragons and they believe in all kind of conceptions about the gods.

I think that is exactly where an Epicurean would push back against an overly enthusiastic comparison between LLMs and human cognition.

The crucial point is that prolepsis is only one criterion of truth. Epicurus never intended it to operate independently. The other criteria—sensations (aisthēseis) and feelings (pathē)—remain indispensable.

An LLM has something analogous to prolepsis, but it lacks sensation. As a result, it has no way to distinguish between:

• horses and unicorns,
• Athens and Atlantis,
• historical figures and fictional characters.

All are merely patterns in text.

An Epicurean human, however, can test conceptions against experience.

Suppose a child develops a conception of dragons through stories. Epicurus would not deny that a conception exists. The question is whether it corresponds to reality. One then turns to the senses:

Quote

Have dragons ever been observed?

If not, the conception remains a mental construction rather than a confirmed object.

The same applies to many theological claims. Epicurus famously argued that people attach all sorts of opinions (doxai) to the gods:

• that they become angry,
• reward virtue,
• punish sin,
• intervene in history.

The mere existence of these conceptions proves nothing. They must be examined.

In this sense, the Epicurean method is actually more sophisticated than a simple theory of concept formation:

1. Repeated impressions generate prolepses.
2. We formulate opinions based on them.
3. Those opinions are tested against sensory evidence.
4. Unsupported additions are discarded.

This is where your observation becomes interesting for the LLM analogy.

An LLM is almost pure prolepsis without sensation.

It possesses vast networks of generalized concepts, but no independent contact with reality to evaluate them. It cannot perform the Epicurean step of returning to the evidence of the senses.

One might even say that an LLM resembles the state Epicurus warns humans against when they become detached from experience and live only among words and opinions.

There is another subtle point here. Epicurus did not claim that every conception corresponds to a real thing. Rather, he claimed that conceptions arise from some basis in experience.

Take dragons. An Epicurean could explain them as composites:

• snakes,
• lizards,
• birds,
• predators,
• fire,

combined and exaggerated by imagination.

The conception is real as a mental phenomenon, even if the object is not real.

Likewise, many anthropomorphic gods could be explained as idealizations of kings, parents, heroes, and natural forces.

Thus the existence of a conception does not automatically establish the existence of its object.

This is why, in Epicurean theology, the argument for the gods is not merely "people have a conception of gods." The stronger claim is that there is a universal and persistent prolepsis of blessed and imperishable beings that survives beneath all the false cultural additions. Whether that argument succeeds is another question, but it is more subtle than simply inferring existence from a concept.

Viewed this way, LLMs may actually illuminate the Epicurean distinction between prolepsis and opinion.

• The model's internal representations resemble prolepses.
• Its generated outputs resemble opinions.
• What it lacks is sensation, the corrective mechanism that Epicurus regarded as essential for separating true opinions from false ones.

From an Epicurean perspective, that absence is not a small detail—it is the difference between a system that merely manipulates conceptions and a living being capable of knowledge.

*****

Admin edit: For discussion of prolepsis of the gods, please visit this thread.

Quote

The New Epicurean website has a very helpful and organized listing of Seneca’s letters that cite or refer to Epicurus, arranged according to topic.

I am familiar with almost all works on Sadler's list, but it reminds me to buy a German edition of Plutarch that is focussed on his anti-epicurean writings.

Quote from TauPhi

Virtues are clearly dependant on social contracts and these contracts evolve over time. So do the virtues.

At least this insight is truly Epicurean (last maxims of the Principal Doctrines). The book shows this to us indirectly, at least hundreds of years later.

Quote from Cassius

I don't know that it is limited to England by any means

I meant an "English speaker" thing. Sometimes the interpretation of topics is related to the use of a language, which influences their interpretations. I corrected my original post to "English speaker thing".

Quote from wbernys

Does Epicurus mean natural as innate or natural as in nature approves of it? I think Tim O'Keefe misreads natural desires as meaning innate, whereas it actually means "actually helps with pleasure", this is why natural desires can turn into vain or unnatural desires if they become sources of stress or likely to cause harm. It's natural and should be pursued when brining more pleasure than pain but unnatural when not and should be shunned. There is also the fact that i think Epicurus just outright disagrees that sex or lavish food is necessary for happiness and can't be eliminated and he seems to say the opposite below.

My interpretation has always been that of the natural desires being key factors to focus on. I somewhat would agree that they are "innate" in the sense that they are indiscutible and inherently connected with our being. Not caring for one's health and security/social connections is disastrous. I am confroted with these points every single day, may it be at work, outside or within my social sphere.

Instead, people focus on anything else and do not realize on what basis their house is built on. My life isn't perfect either, but I realize that focusing on natural desires and meditating (finally transferring into action) these points is a great source of realizing what really matters. From there on I refer to Diogenes from Oinoanda:

"when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place"

Diogenes of Oinoanda, fragment 34

Quote from Cassius

The purpose of this forum is to study and promote Classical Epicurean Philosophy as Epicurus taught it. It is extremely important for us to grapple with Epicurus' framing of the term "absence of pain" and explain how Epicurus is about PLEASURE - which can indeed be defined for certain important uses as "absence of pain" or "reduction of pain." But to place PAIN in the center of the philosophy rather than PLEASURE is not what the ancient Epicureans did, and it's not consistent with the mission of this forum to allow for the regular advocacy of that position here.

Maybe this discussion about "absence of pain" is an "English speaker thing". I remember Epicurus receiving a more nuanced interpretation in e.g. German literature. The "absence of pain" discussion is know there as well, but Epicurus is still the philosopher of pleasure (sometimes rather translated to "joy" which is perhaps a good term to include both the status of a healthy being and experiencing appreciated feelings). Obviously, there is just weak connection in the German language between "Epicurean" and food, perhaps this is also a root why English interpreters might dislike the term pleasure.

Generally speaking, in German literature Epicurus is understood as a wise man who taught how to live a joyful life, focussing on the "little" but important aspects while skipping disturbance.

I agree with you that the "absence of pain" might has something to do with other philosophies. Today, Stoicism, Buddhism, even the monotheistic religions are marketed as something that can reduce stress and leads to less pain in life.

There is also the point of "reducing pain" being more doctrinally neutral than "promoting pleasure". Declaring pleasure as an end in itself is like appreciating Epicurus and his philosophy way to much, elevating him to a saint.

It sounds very stark, but perhaps people sometimes deliberately misread Epicurean philosophy or study it just as being worth a superficial reading. A wide range of authors e.g. Karl Popper, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Camus relate to some Epicurean content just to conclude that their own thought is of bigger importance. Okay, this is how egos and new traditions of thought are formed.

Quote from Eikadistes

No doubt, "This wasn't originally intended for an explicitly Epicurean audience".

The Humanist wasn't interested so now I'm sharing it here.

Lol, I read "was" instead of "wasn't" . This explains your emphasis on political/societal topics. On the other side, your text is explicitly at the beginning and in the middle part full of Epicurean thought. This might sound too doctrinal or even religiously for a humanist audience. Did they offer you to change some parts of the article?

Quote from Eikadistes

"...irrevocable changes to the Earth’s biosphere will lead to the displacement of 2 billion human beings and cause the deaths of hundreds of millions more..."

I know that people give well reasoned arguments related to this. But I also know the bigger picture: The more abstract problems are, the more they tend to not enter into realization.

Proof? In my 25 years old geography book from school (data base already 30-35 years old) the authors claimed hunger crises to come in the Sahel Zone, which is the part of Africa situated between the Sahara desert in the north and the tropical climate southwards. Instead of starvation and people going extinct the population has doubled or tripled since. Ironically, in some parts even overweight and obesity go viral now.

What would the authors of the starvation thesis answer if I wrote them a letter with my objections? Probably, they are already retired and aren't interested in these topics anymore. This is the generational dimension of science. People come and go. Perhaps one would answer: "I'm happy that things have developed otherwise... at least in general, but I know a region where people are suffering!" "This is science, hypotheses can be proven wrong!..." "Our research has helped people to adapt to ecological challenges!"

I'm not interested in discussing pros and cons of certain topics as we do not discuss politics here and I don't find it fruitful either. What I observe is that crises and visions of "end times" have a psychological and sociological dimension, but the best part is this: The preacher never pays a price.

Quote from Don

I want to note that where Martin Ferguson Smith gives "states" in the translation, the Greek is κατασ̣τήμασι and καταστημάτων, that is katastēmasi and katastēmatōn.

Do you have a recommendation how to translate this section smoothly where Ferguson instead gives "states"? (Let us first discuss states...)

Great work! I especially like your approach of rendering names as they were spoken in antiquity e.g. Epicurus as Epíkouros. This adds authority to your text.

Some criticism:

Quote from Eikadistes

When it comes to our own futures, Epicurean history provides brave examples like Mētródōros, “undaunted against both disturbances and death”,²⁹² “virtuous and awesome”.²⁹³ To achieve the goal of nature, the Sage of the Garden asks us to “study these and those things, for yourself, day and night, as with those like yourself, and at no time, neither awake nor in a dream will you be confounded, for no living person surrounded by immortal Good seems like a mortal creature.²⁹⁴ As has been spoken more eloquently elsewhere, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Here again, “when you believe in things that you don’t understand, then you suffer.”

Superstition ain’t the way.

I appreciate how your text ends. Conversely, in the paragraphs above you dive too much into politics and fear of the failure of certain policies. This seems to me contrary to your conclusion.

Additionally, the political topics you are talking about seem to be of semantic value and interest for a "Western only" and especially US-American audience (okay, one could also speak of Epicurean philosophy as predominantly for Westerners and this is true if we look at the chain of transmission).

In the letter to Meneoceus Epicurus is warning not only of believing in the myths about the gods but even more about belief that arguably is supported by natural necessity. What Epicurus meant exactly with that section may be open to discussion. Personally, I read it as a warning of Doomsday pessimism in general (as Doomsday never materializes).

His message is otherwise: Life is good and pleasure is the guide of life!

Aside from the introductory part where Diogenes declares his (noble) motifs, this is the section I personally like the most:

Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

Quote from Cassius

Klavan's position is that Epicureanism is intellectually serious, historically influential, and philosophically important to understand — but ultimately self-defeating. It begins by liberating humanity from superstitious fear and ends by stripping life of all significance.

And Klavan also adds:

"Despite what we may profess to the contrary, most of us are moved by a powerful intuition that meaning does exist, at the level of the individual human life. The moral consequences of trying to suppress or explain away this basic intuition are exactly as monstrous and absurd as the physical consequences of trying to do a science experiment while doubting that valid observation is possible. If phrases like “moral worth” have any meaningful content at all then they must be built into the fabric of existence, not just coded as expedient fictions into our evolutionary programming. If so, then it starts to seem eerily possible that our sense of right and wrong is in fact reflective, however distantly, of a logos that governs the whole universe."

I would like to tell him that I clearly acknowledge that meaning does exist, at the level of the individual human life. This is, because at the individual level my feelings and perceptions exist. This is the very reason why something matters.

It's also always funny to read argumentation on logos. This is superstitious in itself. Logos has to be self-evident and non-independent from ourselves, clearly to access and unable to deny. Otherwise I I would like to ask why is it dependent on us to govern the universe? I know, I get him, he would argue logos doesn't depend on us, but we should align with it because it is an ultimate reality we not yet understand correctly...

"Epicureanism has proven a total failure... the idea that Epicurus had that once we cleared away the religious horizon, we would all be free to live these contented, placid lives, I think that has been just totally refuted.”

Is there anything Klavan offers in return? (Except for abstract formulations?)

Quote from Cassius

The Failure of Epicureanism as a System of Belief

In the preface of Gateway to the Epicureans, Spencer Clavin asserts:

Clavin critiques the inadequacy of Epicurean atomism in explaining the complexities of modern physics and the ethical shortcomings in addressing contemporary existential crises. He contends that the simplistic materialism of Epicurus fails to satisfy the human quest for meaning, contributing to widespread despair and societal issues like declining birth rates.

My personal conclusion is, people in the modern (for critics of the term modern I should say "current") world are eaten up by all kinds of sorts of influences and activities in the search for meaning. Conversely, Epicurean thought could be presented as a cure that guides people to focus on the relevant experiences that are within their reach.

Having only read a glimpse of Klavin, it seems his key strategy is adding perfect sounding words, words, words (ideas) without having them to be contested in the real world. Do I get him too short?

Do you think there is something to learn about Epicurean prolepsis through the understanding how AI/LLMs (large language models) work?

If my understanding of LLMs is correct, they form a "general notion" of all kinds of things through the processing of an extraordinary huge data base. Sounds familiar to the Human mind. Although some would say AI is just statistics at work, perhaps this is somehow our own minds function, too.

There are further possible implications like: In which way does prolepsis form? How dependent/exposed is prolepsis on/to its database? How does LLMs relate to the debate on understanding prolepsis as (a) fixed innate ideas vs. (b) forming general notions out of impressions on our minds?

I won't have time in the near future for discussion, but I just wanted to share my thoughts on a topic that has been on my mind for a long time.

Quote from DistantLaughter

I don’t have much more to add, except to say that I now see even more clearly the importance of resisting any framing that elevates katastematic pleasure above other forms, or that risks collapsing Epicurean pleasure into mere tranquility.

IMHO this is the championship of Epicureanism: Integrating a life reform into real existing experiences. We have to acknowledge that very extraordinary approach: Epicurus offers refinement of the existential buiding blocks of life without denial of them. This is somewhat different from the "path-to-enlightenment-with-departure-from-ourselves"-strategy. That life can be good and the stimulus of pleasure, as simple as it is, can be something coherent in an advanced philosophical framework - this just sounds scandalous to many people and hardly to believe.

Does anyone know what happened to Obbink's Philodemus On Piety Part 2? I just can find an online link with no further information.

Quote from Cassius

Titus and Godfrey, in your answers, did you address this question specifically? Do you agree that you can pursue only necessary pleasures and reach 100% pleasure (or happiness)? If you can pursue only necessary pleasures and reach the target, why would you pursue any others than those which are easiest to obtain?

This is a very good question! And I have to admit that I probably missread the original question as I am concerned not with unnecessary desires but with with the category of "vain" desires.

I would like to say yes, but this is just a theoretical yes as I consider the classification of desires as a guidance tool for choosing priorities. In this sense, the category of natural and necessary desires is something that has to be of number one priority to us.

Quote from Don

127h. τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι,

"then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, there are those necessary for eudaimonia;

Those necessary for eudaimonia are open to interpretation but must be based on Epicurus's philosophy.

127i. αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.

ἀοχλησία "freedom from disturbance"
σώματος genitive singular of σῶμᾰ
σῶμᾰ "the body; one's material body or existence"

“then, those [necessary] for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those [necessary] for life itself.”

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This is very fundamental. This is the basis on which our house is built on. It is of importance to secure ones existential needs and also to have a proper understanding of the universe and ones position within.

The category of just natural desires adds flavour to our lives and is to be pursued if the desires do not conflict with the necessity these desires are related to. Giving a classical example for a natural but not necessary desire is the decision to drink wine instead of water. This is to be approved as long as one doesn't slip into extensive drunkenness, which conflicts with the maintenance of our health or the undisturbedness of the body.

To remain close to your question, from my personal experience the category of natural desires, both necessary and unnecessary, is the proper basis for anything to stay focused on (for the 100%). Since I regard most of our desires to be related to natural stimuli, this doesn't lead to ascetisicm, at least to my understanding.

The "vain" category includes anything else, anything that isn't related directly to naturally arising desires. These are the desires we have to examine very critical.

Epicurus' classification of desires is a helpful tool, but we also have to recognize that it is quite abstract and has to be applied with caution.

Where do we place the desire to earn more money (and the related steps, e.g. building a business or pursuing a career). It is necessary and natural for our survival to have access to material resources. On the other hand, as I've displayed in my previous post, it can become excessive.

So where to place the desire to learn a specific profession or to follow a career path? I totally agree, that the short formula of the 3 categories of desires can fall short very often.

The following lines were first to be meant as a commentary on one of Cassius' statements in our last Sunday Zoom Meeting, but they perfectly fit into this discussion!

"Developing one's best potential" or something similar was a statement of Cassius at the end of our Zoom meeting. Perhaps it's an American perspective to seek for the highest, the best, the ultimate and has to be seen in its cultural context. Or I just don't get him right.

But I'm critical of this phrase as it appears to my ears. According to my understanding, Epicureanism isn't about living a frugal life and achieving tranquility under a state of painlessness. Furthermore, it's searching for pleasure, trusting one's senses, feelings, conceptions of the world. Bringing them together to "dance", as Cassius wrote in his poem "Thus Purred Catius' Cat". According to my understanding, pleasure is both epistemological (a canonical term) and teleological. It's based on our very conditions as human beings and defines also the aims of our life. It is the beginning and the end of the happy life.

In a world where every sensation that isn't painful is pleasant, we just have to open our senses and to see how many pleasurable experiences are at our hands. It enables us to enjoy and enrich ourselves with all that tiny little good influences around us. Good food (especially food!), a nice breeze under a blue sky, a vibrant talk with a friend while walking a thriving urban landscape or a magnificent peace of nature. There are so many good things around all the while, hence I'm not seeking for more, for the better, for the Everest. I am just satisfied and happy. I don't need to be a dollar millionaire, although everybody around me will tell me otherwise. Instead of living a life based on the very foundations of the human nature - as Epicurus emphasizes over and over again in the fragments that are available to us - they worry about abstract things which have no connection to happiness in the first place but are grounded in empty desire. I know, there is this relativism going on, teaching a broad definition of pleasure that is so common that there is ultimately no need for any philosophical insight anymore. I'm not talking about the little obsessions that people are striving for but e.g. about people in their 60s who worry as wealthy persons more about money as they did when they were young and had no money. They think wealth will give them security (and finally immortality!), all the while they should pursue their fundamentals: Learning philosophy, understanding the good life. They end up fighting with their relatives for the bigger share of the inheritance of their parents, ironically they are themselves already in cognitive decline. Otherwise they would recognize they give up precious relationships which build up a cornerstone of happiness. This isn't an extraordinary example but an usual experience you will find all over the place. 10 or 20 years later they end up in a nursing home, money and power then doesn't matter anymore but "moral" strength would, the capacity to stand firm, having a philosophy that guides them through the last mile. Diogenes of Oinoanda, having reached old age is the extraordinary man who reflects his past life, rejoices in the pleasures and the superior understanding of the universe he has achieved. He is at the top, having reached the heights where no snow falls and pure light is shining. This is the man I would like to be!

I like Epicurus' categorisation of desires. According to my understanding, a common misunderstanding is to assume that unnecessary desires are just something that is unnecessary and can be pursued whenever it seems they do not harm. The problem ist, I suggest, that the just natural but unnecessary category already covers what most of us think of as "unnecessary": Something that is related to our natural basis and because of that it is able to give us joy, but it's nothing that is necessary for survival. I am totally okay with that.

The neither natural nor necessary category is there because it relates to events and experiences in life that just nurish abstract ideas and notions about the world. The example of some senior citizens, seduced by greed for money and hunger for endless life, instead of recognizing their limits is something that has a very strong impression on me.

I know Cassius' is fighting the image of the minimalist frugal Epicurean who lives on bread and water but I would like to see more sensitivity as to why there is a category of"unnecessary desires" in the first place.

Brilliant! I'll try to join, too.