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Eric you have highlighted a passage in DeWitt that I agree is very important but where I have a different point of view than DeWitt: (Quote) In my view DeWitt would have been better off if he had not used the word "idea" here and had instead used a word like "principle." Not to split hairs, but i think to suggest that we are born with fully formed "ideas" would be a form of Platonism that Epicurus was reacting against. DeWitt consistently points out how Epicurus is antiPlatonic in many areas, an…

My comment in response to the last two posts is that I would emphasize over an over that any single "anticipation" might be just as erroneous as any single glimpse by sight or hearing of the thing being considered. A faculty of being aware that "there's something here I need to pay attention to" does not tell you what you should "conclude" about it. I think that is the main issue that needs to be grappled with in discussing anticipations -- "faculties" are not omniscient or omnipotent and the im…

Don looks like you were typing as I was writing post 10 so be sure you see it as now finished.

(Quote from Don) Yes this is the point we need to drill down on. I firmly think (and I think DeWitt says too) that any anticipation is always (1) reported truthfully - that's what makes it canonical, BUT ALSO - (2) need not be true "to all the facts" or "to the big picture" which is why we check one anticipation against another, just like we check one sight against other sights, one hearing against another hearing, etc . This is EXACTLY the point that DeWitt goes into in regard to the multiple …

(Quote) This is the Bailey version, and it is my understanding that the word here listed as "false suppositions" is or is closely related to the prolepsis word. Let's dig into that, along iwth his "conceptions derived from sensation." This takes us squarely into the "why is it called a PRE-conception vs a conception" argument.

At the risk of quoting too long an excerpt, I need to insert here the reference I have cited before as I think articulating the best way forward in understanding the difference between an "innate idea" versus an "innate principle." This is from Jackson Barwis' book against John Locke's view of innate ideas, and it is the most clear presentation of this issue I have found. I think Barwis is essentially stating the position Epicurus was describing. This also addresses the argument which immediatel…

(Quote from Don) So please help me be as absolutely clear on this as possible, and let's beat the point home like a drum: No data (sensation?) from a canonical faculty is anything other than "reported honestly" so that data is always "true to us at that moment" in the sense that it is reported truly ("honestly," "without injection of opinion.") But at the same time, no "data" / "sensation" from a canonical faculty is ever, in itself, a "concept" or an "understanding" -- it is always simply a "fe…

(Quote from EricR) Respectfully to all concerned let's state all this in a way that is more clear about the "always" and the "absolute" implications. I think the point Epicurus was making is that "YES - "anticipations" as a PRE-conceptual source of raw data are always reported "honestly," but "No! - anticipations are not themselves ethical conceptions / propositions and they are themselves never fully formed conceptions that are absolutely applicable in all circumstances!" Due to the nature of t…

I would say Eric just remember that formulation of absolute law in Cicero's Republic, and compare it to PD 30-40. Epicurus stands for the proposition that there is no absolute justice or absolute ethical standards, other than pleasure and pain as the guide to all choices and avoidances. That means that all subsidiary parts of the philosophy, including anticipations, point in that same direction.

The follow up point Eric is that YES, it is through the anticipations of the people involved that they will reach their decisions as to what is just and what is unjust and they will work as hard as they can to implement those ideas. BUT at the same time they must realize that the answer they reach to their questions is determined by a combination of their own circumstances plus the developed dispositions they bring to the table, and that there is no God, or Ten Commandments, or any other "supern…

This is the position Epicurus was fighting AGAINST, and so you can pretty much REVERSE this and see what Epicurus' position would have been in arguing that these things are impossible due to the nature of the universe. That means that these things don't exist anywhere, and we won't find them existing in anticipations either. Anticipations will be something different - a faculty that allows us to see the issues involved in justice, like an eye allows us to see trees. But in processing our conclus…

This continues to be a key passage too. To any question of whether Nature gives us any standard of conduct whatsoever, in the form of "ideas" "concepts" "justice" or whatever - there is only ONE answer: "What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?'" (and of course the answer implanted there is NOTHING) (Quote)

These are good points to move the discussion along. Let me comment on them: (Quote from Don) Let's start with that one: Yes I do think that everyone has there on sense of pleasure, and I think that is the easiest one to deal with. Some people find pleasure in many different ways -- do we agree on that? If we do, then that's the first indication that a canonical faculty gives different results for different people. Don't we also agree that people see colors in different ways (for example some are…

I would say yes the faculty of pleasure is always the faculty of pleasure, but different people have different pleasure responses to exactly the same stimulus - and some people will find that exact stimulus painful. This means presumably that while it is fair to say that "pleasure" is the same faculty for all, there is no "objective" sense of pleasure that we can point to as leading to the same pleasure response in all situations, so we must always defer to the people involved and ask them "Do Y…

I think we can agree with all you wrote their yet we seem to be separate on something - and I perceive the issue is still the question of whether pleasure is any any sense "objective" across people(s) or is always a matter of individual perceptions.

Aside: I hope everyone who feels they have anything productive to contribute will weigh in with comments or questions as we proceed be side that could certainly help.

(Quote from Don) Ok I think we disagree there. I would say it is NOT the "everyone experiences it" that makes pleasure the standard but that FOR US these faculties are our only means of perception of reality which makes it the standard. 50 million Frenchmen are often "wrong" and while the experience of others is helpful to check out own predictions, it isn't the validation that comes from others concurring that makes pleasure the standard, but our own ability to verify through repetition that is…

Yes I think we are pretty close. It is possible to generalize, and generalizations are generally useful. What I generally am fighting against is what I perceive to be also a "general" point of view of most people we run into in the outside world -- that there is some "objective" measurement to which all people should conform, including their view of whether something is pleasurable or painful. I see this as another instance where it is necessary to simultaneously affirm two things that people th…

Yes I think "capacity" is another good word. It isn't fully developed at birth but improves with use and experience. And nobody forces us to use it - we can choose to ignore it. And it isn't some sort of infallible guide - we can still make mistakes in using it. All those things apply I think to what we're talking about. And the reference to pleasure is a part I find fascinating too. Pleasure is where I think the deepest questions arise as to how that faculty came to be - because the others all …

As to looking for a "first" or primitive form of life millions or billions of years ago I am always going to think that is the wrong approach from an Epicurean perspective. I think Epicurus would insist that there is life throughout the universe, and that the universe had no beginning date. So whatever he would point to as producing this mechanism, or to be it's key characteristics, I do not think he would think that to be time-dependent. I think the appropriate analogy would be that no matter h…