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I would add that an Epicurean understanding of pleasure is tied to an understanding of desires. Desires are not pleasures, and desires are integral to the conditions of one's life. Epicurus famously breaks desires into natural/necessary, natural/unnecessary, and unnatural thus unnecessary. Whether something is natural, necessary, etc is to some degree determined by the amount of pleasure and/or pain it will cause to a specific individual. And this varies based on specifics such as the person's a…

(Quote from Don) I agree with this: well stated!

That's a juicy question Marco ! There has been a controversy over the centuries over just that, and the terminology is "katastematic" v "kinetic" pleasure. Katastematic is considered "stable" pleasure and kinetic is considered "active" pleasure. There's a ton of technical debate over whether there are actually two types at all and whether one is a "higher" pleasure or whether pleasure is pleasure, period. Here's a place on the forum to explore the subject: Kinetic and Katastematic Pleasure The "…

(Quote from Philia) I'm not sure that it's correct to have an underlying assumption that short-term physical pleasures are equally as important as long-term mental pleasures. To put words into Epicurus' mouth, I think that he would say that the most important thing is a correct understanding of his philosophy and that this would provide the pleasure of freedom from fear. Having achieved that, one can vary, embellish, and add icing to the cake through various other pleasures, both short- and long…

I remember the discussion, but I don't remember the pleasing graphic quality of the final product. Very nice!

Don makes an excellent point! Thinking out loud (as it were), pleasure is nothing more than one "side" of the faculty of feelings. That's it. It's a reflex and a guide. If the goal is a life of continuous pleasure, all that means is to continuously be aware of and be guided by your faculty of feelings. So wouldn't all the talk of duration, intensity, absence of pain and so forth really be misleading? At least it seems so in terms of daily living. Analyzing one's desires would be far more useful…

(Quote from Cassius) Of course they're not. But at what point are we becoming Plato writing Philebus? Neither pleasures nor desires should be generalized, they are all specific to person, time, situation, etc. But isn't discussing whether duration is more important than intensity (regarding a particular Feeling) tantamount to discussing whether it's better to look at a squirrel than a tree (an admittedly poor example regarding the importance wrt a particular sensation)? Maybe it would be more pr…

(Quote from Cassius) To me, by giving categories of desires he's providing a method for prudent analysis of a given decision or action. The feelings are a critical part for evaluating but having the framework of categories is, to me, a major innovation: we experience feelings but we can work with desires.

LM 127, Epicurus Wiki: One should keep in mind that among desires, some are natural and some are vain. Of those that are natural, some are necessary and some unnecessary. Of those that are necessary, some are necessary for happiness, some for health, and some for life itself. A correct view of these matters enables one to base every choice and avoidance upon whether it secures or upsets bodily comfort and peace of mind – the goal of a happy life. LM 127, Long and Sedley's The Hellenistic Philoso…

I was trying to point out that "these things" or "these matters", being the various categories of desires, "makes it possible" or "enables one" to refer choices and avoidances to pleasure and pain. So, conversely, without understanding the categories of desires one can't make proper decisions regarding pleasure and pain. It wasn't my intention to question that bodily health and freedom from disturbance could refer to anything other than pleasure in this instance. Apologies for the lack of clarit…

Communicating is a good start! So to me the key idea is that desires are fundamentally different from pleasures. At least this is how I understand it. As to categories, I think that Epicurus would consider his categories of desires to be "natural", but a useful tool. Unfortunately my dinner is getting cold so I'll need to come back to this....

(Quote from Cassius) I agree with much of this, but I still think that there are subtle but useful differences between desire and pleasure. - Pleasure is a Feeling, a faculty, a criterion or measurement. Desire is not. - To my limited understanding, pleasure and desire are neurologically/biochemically different. - Pleasure is "The Goal", desire is not. - As a Feeling and as "The Goal", pleasure is what organisms strive for from birth in order to thrive. Desire is something that can be either goo…

Pardon the delay.... Referring back to post #66, here's the Wikipedia link for desire fwiw: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desire. I haven't had the chance to read the whole article but this excerpt from the beginning is to me pretty spot. I've underlined one sentence but the rest is also pertinent. (Quote) I wouldn't limit a desire to a mental concept, it could also be a physical or psychological craving. I'm not very familiar with Nussbaum. Is she in the "absence of pain" camp? I can see how, i…

(Quote from Don) I'm still trying to wrap my head around desire as well. Don I think we're in agreement as to pleasure, although I'm not sure whether Cassius agrees with our take. (???) The first sentence of the Wikipedia quote lists desire as wanting, wishing, longing or craving; I've also seen it called an emotion. I agree that agency is key to desire, I'm just not sure how it all fits together. Thinking this through, say for example that you had just decided to give up alcohol. You find yours…

I agree with Don in post #83. And I would add that to me the only point in ranking pleasures is to argue with opponents of Epicurus. The end result of that is comparable to having a fourth leg of the Canon: it's an interpretation that tries to accommodate someone who isn't necessarily interested in understanding EP but rather in undermining it. So I think at some point we reach a limit to the value of studying Cicero if our goal is to live the philosophy. I realize though that there are two agen…

I would argue that Cicero is a cow At first blush my bovine rebuttal is that it's true that all organic life possesses the faculty of Feelings to some degree. What distinguishes you and I, but not Cicero (partly because he's dead) from a cow is our degree of awareness of our Feelings.

Returning to my obsession with pleasure v desire, I'd add the thought that perhaps when you are fully aware of your pleasure, you aren't experiencing desire. This doesn't mean that desire is opposed to pleasure, only that it can result in pleasure and is different from pleasure. If pleasure and desire were equivalent then you would experience maximum desire at the same time as maximum pleasure. I find that that isn't the case. Therefore it doesn't make sense to rank or categorize pleasures, at l…

Desire, Wikipedia excerpt from post #74: "Desires are states of mind that are expressed by terms like "wanting", "wishing", "longing" or "craving". A great variety of features is commonly associated with desires. They are seen as propositional attitudes towards conceivable states of affairs. They aim to change the world by representing how the world should be, unlike beliefs, which aim to represent how the world actually is. Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent to reali…