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  • Well... I do exactly plan on doing as I please, with no qualifiers! It's just that what I please involves taking pleasure in the pleasure of others, not that I'm trying to avoid causing trouble or disrupting my schedule for reasons unrelated to pleasure. Person B needs to know what kind of person I am-- that my pleasure includes empathy-- and that I care about them. Then they should want me to be selfish for their own sake! I just got back from a 2 hr round trip to take my son for his first COVI…
  • Don that's not a qualifier-- it's just a description of what I like to do, not a restraint separate from my pleasure. And yes, it's in the spirit of PD5. Because virtues have no meaning other than as tools for pleasure. It would be weird to remove my awareness of future consequences from actions in the present-- that seems much more convoluted and unnatural to try and live purely for the present moment, at least for me, lol. So that's not a qualifier either. What I like to do is always in the c…
  • Cassius yes, I agree. In regards to the "others", this varies widely between individuals. I have an unusual degree of feeling based empathy, to the point that observing violence causes my body to hurt at the site of another person's injury. So I actually get pain even at the pain of others who are strangers or enemies. I refrain from causing harm because of that. It's not completely symmetric on the vicarious pleasure end. I do get strong pleasure at knowledge or witnessing pleasure of stranger…
  • Don No, a descriptor is not the same as a qualifier. A qualifier, as you accurately say, limits or modifies -- and I am doing neither. If my description were a qualifier, it would mean that I am _not_ only doing as I please but am limiting or modifying my scope of action beyond doing as I please. And that's not the case. In PD5, Epicurus does not idealize the words prudently, morally, and justly. He doesn't put forth a concept of prudence that would result in the same action for every human in …
  • Don which means morality itself depends on the pleasure of the specific perceiver, since it isn't ideal. Yet you argued above that there are behaviors that will consistently and verifiably lead to a pleasurable life for "any organism." That isn't true. The strongest true statement is that there are behaviors which are highly likely to lead to a pleasurable life for most typical members of a species. Those things are useful to know as a starting place, but for maximum life pleasure, an individua…
  • Cassius yes, I agree that it's an important starting place. It's the same in medicine-- there's almost no treatment that works for 100% of patients. But we obviously want to start with the thing having the highest success rate for most people! And move on to something else if it doesn't work. I am arguing that the exceptions don't prove the rule so much as they demonstrate the scope of the rule, including its limits. Part of that is because of the current discussion ... and part of it is becaus…
  • Don Adding "almost" anyone to your assertion is fine. Low empathy humans are a small percentage of the population. I'm on the other end of atypical-- I can't even stand to watch fake violence in movies, lol. So my decisions regarding potential harm to strangers need to take my atypical responses into account. This is more useful than trying to make myself become typical. It's also helpful to my pleasure to remember that the majority of others are likely not being consciously cruel when they do …
  • (Quote from Don) Don I initially entered this conversation replying to Joshua, and you made these assertions above in your first response to me. Later, you also said there were actions that would lead to pleasurable lives for "any" organism, I disagreed, and you modified your statement to apply to "almost all"-- and that I agreed with. For the first quote above, I would make that same adjustment-- that "almost all" Epicureans are still going to act in ways that most outside observers would label…