PHILODEMUS

PHILODEMUS:
A STUDY OF HIS ETHICAL WORKS *ON FRANKNESS*, *ON ECONOMY*, *ON DEATH*

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ABSTRACT

The discovery of Philodemus' library was a considerable contribution to our knowledge of the Epicurean philosophy. It was excavated two centuries ago at Herculaneum, where the Epicureans settled their school in the first century B.C. The library contains a large number of papyri, among which are works of Philodemus; these documents on religion, logic, and morality, as expounded by the Epicureans. Until the present, such aspects of that singular philosophy were known only from a few testimonia of ancient critics, namely, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, and Cicero. At present, the discovery of the treatises of Philodemus allows us to comprehend thoroughly not only the Epicurean doctrines, but also their intentions and aims.

The works of Philodemus were published for the first time at the beginning of the 20th century. Since that time they have been sadly neglected by scholars, with the exception of some Ph.D. dissertations which treat of some parts of Philodemus' philosophical and poetical works. A large part of his works, however, still remains unknown to most classicists. Recently, a new interest in the Philodemian corpus has arisen among classical philologists.

I became acquainted with Philodemus' philosophical treatises during the course which I took last winter with Professor H. Jones, in which we studied the De rerum Natura of Lucretius. An assignment, Philodemus as a philosopher

and poet, stimulated me to engage in a study of his moral treatises, and more generally of the Epicurean philosophy. In this thesis I intend to present Philodemus' views on the role of frankness in the life of the Epicurean; his observations concerning the life of practicality, resourcefulness, and prudent household management; and his thoughts on the nature of death.

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Greek philosophy appealed to Romans, especially to those of the educated classes. But their distrust of things Greek was evident in their belief that they should be selective in their use of Greek philosophy and culture. S.A. Cook underlines this attitude of the Romans in his statement: "From the first, Rome chose what she would study, modified the tradition she received and thought out her ethics and her politics to suit her own circumstances."[1]

A palpable example of Roman circumspection towards things Greek is manifested in the figure of M. Cato who saw in the admiration of Greek culture the betrayal of the ancestral Roman customs. Plutarch illustrates Cato's mistrust of Greeks in the latter's words: "the words of Greeks were born on their lips but those of the Romans in their hearts."[2] Nevertheless, the introduction of Greek philosophy into Roman society was a fact that neither Cato, nor any other conservative Roman, could subvert. By the second century B.C. the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno the Stoic and Epicurus gain more and more adherents among the Romans. Of this the treatises of Cicero are the most valuable affirmation. While the Academic, Peripatetic and

Stoic doctrines appear to have been welcome among the conservative Romans, the Epicurean philosophy aroused an antagonistic reaction among Roman authorities.[3] I conjecture that the cause of that event may be traced in the teaching of the Epicurean doctrines of ἀταραξία, when it took the form of withdrawal from active politics, and of ἡδονή, as any form of pleasure,[4] which were considered dangerous to the preservation of the traditional Roman virtues. Plautus, for example, in the Mercator puts in the mouth of his dramatic persona, Eutychus, an indirect reproach of the Epicurean belief of "λαθὲ βιώσας",[5] when this belief is applied to politics:

> Eu. Etiam loquere, larua?
> vacuom esse istac ted aetate his decebat noxiis. 983a
> itidem ut tempus anni, aetate alia aliud factum
> convenit;
> nam si istuc ius est, senecta aetate scortari senes, 985
> ubi locist res summa nostra publica?
>
> (Mercator, ll. 983-86)

Elsewhere in the same comedy the old man Demiphon, it seems to me, parodies the doctrine of pleasure

> demum igitur quom sis iam senex, tum in otium
> te conloces, dum protest ames: id iam lucrumst

quod vivis.

(ibid, ll.552-4)

We know that Epicurus preached that the Epicurean sage should live in ῥαστώνη, and should aim at pleasure through ἀταραξία of mind and ἀηονία of body.[6] Now, in the above passage, the Latin word otium translates the Greek word ῥαστώνη, (in Lucretius' poem De Rerum Natura the term otium is the Latin translation of ῥαστώνη), and the word ames, which means "love", which denotes a kind of pleasure, and, in particular, sexual pleasure, can be related to ἡδονή. Both of these terms, namely ῥαστώνη and ἡδονή, in the Epicurean philosophy, indicate a way of life the Epicureans favoured. Of course, the Epicureans did not identify ἡδονή with sexual pleasure, as Plautus does, because Epicurus taught that some pleasures should be avoided since they provoke pain afterwards.[7] It is, however, probable that Plautus expresses in the above passage (ll. 553-554), a popular belief which was current among the lower classes of Romans who were influenced by Greek ideas. But it is certain that among the Greek ideas which circulated in Roman society were those of Epicurus. And it is equally certain that the vulgar crowd had misunderstood the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure and sought in it an intellectual framework which would vindicate their wanton life. This is confirmed by a statement of Cicero, in the Tusc. Disp., in which, speaking about the influence

of Amafinius' work on the Roman people, says:

> ... C. Amafinius exstitit dicens, cuius libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam, sive quod erat cognitu perfacilis, sive quod invitabantur illecebris blandae voluptatis, sive etium, quia nihil erat prolatum melius, illus (quod erat), tenebant.
>
> (Tusculan Disputations, IV, iii, 6)

Elsewhere, in the same treatise, Cicero says that the Epicurean philosophy was widely known, even among people with inferior education

> Quid enim dicant et quid sentiant ii,qui sunt ab ea disciplina, nemo ne mediocriter quidem doctus ignorat.
>
> (Tusc. Disp. II, iii, 7)

We do not know, of course, to what extend Epicureanism was prevalent among the upper classes of Roman society, but we know that in the second century a certain learned man, Titus Albucius, spent his life preaching the Epicurean philosophy. Cicero reports that T. Albucius had written a treatise on the Epicurean religion, reproving the Academics and Peripatetics for their views on this matter.[8] Cicero speaks

contemptuously of Albucius, because the latter passed his youth in Athens, trained in the Epicurean philosophy and adopted Greek manners:

> Doctus etiam Graecis T. Albucius vel potius plane Graecus. Loquor ut opinor; sed licet ex orationibus iudicare. Fuit autem Athenis adulescens, perfectus Epicurius evaserat, minime aptum ad dicendum genus.
>
> (Brutus, XXXV, 131)

In De Finibus Cicero relates about Albucius a story concerning the years he lived in Athens; Scaevola, when he was praetor at Athens, greeted Albucius with a poem mocking his Greek manners.[9] And in his In Pisonem Cicero accuses Albucius of celebrating a private triumph, when the latter was general in Sardinia.[10]

Nevertheless, Epicureanism's gradually growing popularity reached its peak in the first century B.C. Its influence extended even to philosophers of rival theories. Pierre Grimal[11] suggests that Hecaton, a Stoic philosopher, adopted the Epicurean ideals in the matter of friendship. The same scholar, further, believes that Panaetius' renunciation of the Platonic theory of immortality of soul was due to the influence of the Epicureans.

The most celebrated Epicureans at that time, were C. Amafinius, G. Rabirius, and T. Catius Insubre who became the teachers of the crowd. Cicero reports that Amafinius' books on physics[12] and on the doctrine of pleasure were widely circulated among the Romans of the lower classes.[13] The reasons for the growing success of Epicureanism, as it can be conjectured from the previously quoted passage of Cicero (Tusc. Disp. IV, iii, 6), were, first, that, as a practical philosophy, it appealed to a practically minded people, and, secondly, that in the middle of social turmoil and political unrest Epicureanism provided discontented Romans with an alternative life-style. The most notable example of a sensitive Roman who detached himself from the social turmoil and political unrest all around him is Lucretius. Unfortunately, 'history' has not provided us with adequate information about Lucretius' life and his bonds with his contemporary Roman Epicureans. Cicero is silent on the matter of Lucretius' life. The only available information we have is that supplied to us by his poem De Rerum Natura. Through the lines of that poem, the man is disclosed in all his sensitivity and keenness of mind. N. Dewitt calls him σοφός as having discovered the value of Epicurean philosophy by personal study.[14] Deeply concerned with human problems, Lucretius attempts to free his fellow-citizens from the fears that ensnare them, presenting the Epicurean philosophy

in a new light, as a philosophy which preaches freedom of the individual who as a result is able to govern his life according to his own free will.

Epicureanism was officially established in Italy by the Epicurean 'gardens' in Naples and Herculaneum. Siro and Philodemus of Gadara were the teachers of a large number of Romans who, afterwards, played a dramatic role in the political and cultural life of Rome .[15] Philodemus studied the Epicurean doctrines under the guidance of Zeno of Sidon, leader of the Athenian 'garden', and arrived in Italy around 80 B.C.[16] Cicero, in his In Pisonem, portrays Philodemus as an eruditissimus and prolific Epicurean philosopher and poet.[17] But Cicero also attempts to sully Philodemus' character and reputation, because of his own envy towards Piso whose teacher Philodemus was.[18] Elsewhere, however, he revises his opinion and refers to Philodemus as an excellent and learned friend:

> Familiares nostros, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos
>
> (De Finibus II, 119)

The friendship of Philodemus with Piso, who donated to him the villa at Herculaneum,[19] inaugurates an important chapter in the history of Epicureanism. Piso was the

father-in-law of Caesar, a fact that allows us to infer that Epicureanism had expanded its influence among eminent political men. It is known that Caesar himself was affected by the Epicurean ideas,[20] and many Romans in his circle of friends, such as Lucius Manlius Torquatus, Hirtius and Pansa, Dolabella, Cassius the liberator, Trebatius the jurist, T. Pomponius Atticus, P. Paetus, C. Gallus, and others were Epicureans.[21] It is probable that these people studied Epicureanism at Herculaneum under the guidance of Philodemus, but we do not have any certain testimony.

The considerable activity of the school at Herculaneum has been testified to by the large number of works of Philodemus and other Epicurean philosophers that were discovered at Herculaneum in 1752 A.D. Philodemus' treatises cover many areas of philosophy, such as logic, religion, morality. Some titles of Philodemus' preserved treatises are: The Method of Inference, Rhetoric, on Gods, on Death, on Frankness, on Flattery, on Economy, on Wrath etc. His writings do not present much originality, but they are especially useful, because they supply us with valuable information concerning the Epicurean doctrines. All of the treatises are written in an intelligible and simple style without use of technical language and pompous rhetoric. Most of them are addressed to the students of the school,

and this is perhaps a reason for their simple style. Besides his prose works Philodemus wrote epigrams which are preserved in the Anthologia Palatina, and distinguished for their sophisticated style, pun and witticism. His poems seem to have influenced poets of the late Republic and Augustan literary circles, such as Catullus, one of whose poems, according to T. Frank, is written on the same pattern as a convivial poem of Philodemus,[22] or Horace who refers to Philodemus' poems in one of his Satires.[23] It is unlikely, however, that these poets studied at Philodemus' school; most probably they knew him from the school of Siro in Naples, or from his poems.[24] Furthermore, the influence of Philodemus' poems on Virgil, Martial, Tibullus, and Propertius is discussed by J.I.M. Tait.[25] A fact we should note is that Philodemus appears to be mostly known among the Romans for his poetic rather than for his philosophical works, since, as we have already seen, his reputation is due to his poetic activity. Therefore, I conjecture that Philodemus' school was not a place which many Roman "docti" frequented, though Cicero reports that famous Roman citizens were in contact with the Epicureans:

> Et quod quaeritur saepe cur tam multi sint Epicurei, sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem haec maxime allicit quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem. Homines optimi non intellegunt totam rationem everti si ita res se habeat.
>
> (De Finibus I, vii 25)

For, Philodemus himself, in his treatise "Περὶ Παρρησίας" states that eminent Romans are not amenable to παρρησία as it is practised by the Epicurean school.[26]

Siro's school, on the other hand, seems to have gained greater popularity, though we have no information available about his teaching. In Siro's school we find Varius Rufus, Quintilius Varus, Vergil and others.[27] In the Appendix Vergiliana, the collection of poems that are attributed to Vergil without, of course, any certainty, there is a poem, Catalepton V, in which Vergil expresses the desire to be initiated into Epicureanism, in order to find spiritual serenity and liberation from cares:

> Nos ad beatos vela mittimus portus
> magni petentes docta dicta Sironis
> vitamque ab omni vindicabimus cura.
>
> (ll. 8-10)

And, again, in Catalepton VIII, he refers to the years he was studying Epicureanism in the school of Siro.

> Villula, quae Sironis eras, et pauper agelle, -
> verum illi domino tu quoque divitiae -
> me tibi, et hos una mecum, quos semper
> amavi, si quid de patria tristius audiero,
> commendo, in primisque patrem.
>
> (ll. 1-5)

Virgil's youthful poems express a deep desire for peace and serenity far from the turmoils of political life. In the

Eclogue X, for example, his desire for "ignobile otium" is related to serene rural life which is not disturbed by the political agitations and wars. In the later years of his career, Virgil appears to renounce the Epicurean views, and to favour the Stoic theories. In the sixth book of the Aeneid, for example, he expressed belief in immortality. Apparently, in Virgil's later poems it is a fusion of Epicurean and Stoic ideas that seems to represent the author's current belief. Discussing this point, J. Oros-Reta remarks: "Virgile a pris des Épicuriens une partie de leur amour pour les choses délicates de la vie, leur croyance en la possibilité de l' harmonie et de la tranquillité humaines, leur intérêt pour la nature et pour les questions scientifiques, et leur conception à l' égard du progrès humain, partant de principles simples. Nous savons que l' idéal de l' amitié humaine et de la coopération entre les hommes était un point commun entre épicuriens et stoiciens; mais Virgile, comme tant d' autres des ses contemporains, hommes de leur temps, a su le faire sien." [28]

Finally, Cicero himself was not unmoved by the growing success of Epicureanism. He studied the Epicurean philosophy under Phaedrus' guidance in 90 B.C. in Rome. In his speeches he showed a thorough knowledge of Epicureanism though he attacked it for its hedonistic and utilitarian

theories. His attacks irreparably damaged the reputation and the fate of Epicureanism. Preparing the way for the eventual silencing of Epicurean adherents after the first century, he provided the vocabulary of vituperation for their opponents. He incorporated in his writings the misrepresentation that ultimately became a permanent part of the history of Epicureanism. For many centuries, after Cicero, Epicureanism was equated with unbridled hedonism, and Cicero's writings were often the source of this attitude.

In conclusion, we can say that the first century B.C. was simultaneously the climax of the promulgation of Epicureanism in the Roman world, and the starting point of a decline that was completed in the fourth century A.D., when the Emperor Julian was able to say: "But indeed the gods have already in their wisdom destroyed (Epicurus') works, so that most of his books have ceased to be."[29]

FOOTNOTES

1. S.A. Cook, Cambridge Ancient History, New York, 1930, VIII, p.463.

2. Plutarch, Lives II, Cato Major XII. 4, 5, XVI. 2, Loeb Classical Library, translated by B. Perrin, London, 1914 .

3. We know that the first Greek Epicureans at Rome, namely Alkios and Philiskus, were expelled by the authorities, in 173 B.C. For an account of the first Epicureans in Rome, see Pierre Grimal, L' Epicurisme Romain, Association Guillaume Bude, Actes du VIII Congres, Paris, 1968, pp.139-168.

4. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus says:

> Τήν ἡδονήν ἀρχήν καί τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.
>
> (D.L. X, 128-129)
>
> ἀρχή καί ρίζα παντός ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρός ἡδονή· καί τά σοφά καί τά περιττά ἐπί ταύτην ἔχει τήν ἀναφοράν.
>
> (See n.5, C. Bailey, ibid, chap. V., 59, p.134)

These maxims were an easy subject of misunderstanding by the vulgar Romans, who, under the guise of being devotees of Epicureanism, practised excessive indulgence.

5. Cyril Bailey, Epicurus: The Extant Remains, Chapter V, Fragmenta Epicurea, 86, p.138.

6. ibid, III, Epicurus to Menoeceus, 127 sqq. p.82 ff.

7. Epicurus taught:

> Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.
>
> (C. Bailey, ibid, chapt. IV, VIII, p.96.)

8. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I, 93.

9. Cicero, De Finibus, I, 9.

10. Cicero, In Pisonem, 92.

11. Pierre Grimal: L' Epicurisme Romain, Association Guillaume Bude, Actes du VIII Congres, Paris, 1968, pp.143-144.

12. Cicero, Academica, I, 6.

13. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., IV, iii, 6.

14. Norman Dewitt: Epicurus and his philosophy, Minnesota, 1854, pp.93-94.

15. Cicero, De Finibus I, vii, 25; for an evaluation of the influence of Philodemus on the Latin poets, see

Jane I.M. Tait Philodemus' influence on the Latin Poets, Bryn Maur, 1941, chapter II.

16. For a detailed account of the life of Philodemus in Greece and Italy, see Jane I.M. Tait, ibid, chapter I.

17. Cicero, In Pisonem, 68-70.

18. Cicero refer to Philodemus not by the latter's name, but by the term Graeculus, a name which was given to the freedmen who were attached to eminent Romans. He actually attempts to present Philodemus as one of them; see Cicero In Pisonem, 68-70. We know that the Graeculus of Cicero is Philodemus from C.Q. Asconius Pedianus who identifies that Graeculus with Philodemus, in his commentary on Cicero's In Pisonem, 68; see C.Q. Asconii Pediani, Orationum Ciceronis quinque enarratio, Oxford, 1966, ed. by A.C. Clark, p.167; For an evaluation of the relations between Cicero and Piso, see J.I.M. Tait, ibid., p.5ff.

19. For an account of the relations between Philodemus and L.C. Piso Caesoninus, see Ph. H. Delacy and W. Allen: The patrons of Philodemus, Classical Philology XXXIV, 1939, pp.59-64.

20. For an evaluation of Epicureanism's influence of Caesar, see M. Rambaud: Cesar et l' epicurisme d' apres les

Commentaires, A.G.B., Paris, 1968, p.411ff.

21. Norman Dewitt, Notes on the History of Epicureanism, T.A.P.A. IXiii, 1932, pp.166-176.

22. T. Frank, Catullus and Horace, New York, 1965, pp.28-29.

23. Horace, Satires I, ii, 119-120.

24. In the school of Siro, Virgil, Varius Rufus and other eminent poets and learned people studied, with whom Horace was associated. It is probable that Catullus knew Philodemus mostly as poet, because according to Cicero (In Pisonem, 68-70) Philodemus was known among the Romans as a good poet as well as philosopher.

25. supra, p.9, n.15.

26. A. Olivieri, Philodemus, Περί Παρρησίας libellus, Lipsiae, 1914, coll.XXII-XXIV.

27. T. Frank: Vergil: A Biography, New York, 1965, chapter V, pp.47-63.

28. For an evaluation of the influence of Epicureanism on Vergil, see J. Oros-Reta Virgile et l' epicurisme, A.G.B., 1968, p.446.

29. The Works of the Emperor Julian, Fragment of a Letter to a Priest 301 C-D. Loeb Classical Library, transl. by Wilmer C. Wright.

CHAPTER II

ON FRANKNESS

ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ
ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤ' ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗΝ ΕΞΕΙΡ-
ΓΑΣΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΗΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΒΙ-
ΩΝ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΖΗΝΩΝΟ[Σ ΣΧΟ]ΛΩΝ
Ο ΕΣΤΙ [·] ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑΣ

As we have already seen from the introductory chapter of the present work, Philodemus was the one of the two (the other one was Siro) pioneers of the official introduction of Epicureanism in Italy. With the foundation of his school at Herculaneum,[1] Philodemus follows the tradition established by Plato, Aristotle and, later, Epicurus whose practice was to preach their doctrines in a given place, such as Academy, Lyceum or the Garden of Epicurus, and who avoided the public speeches which the Sophists delivered in the market place of Athens in order to teach their doctrines to their students.

The peculiarity of the Epicurean school lies in the importance the Epicureans gave to practicing παρρησία, in a time (Hellenistic and Roman age) when the freedom of speech was not considered as a public virtue,[2] to

correct the moral deficiencies of their recruits, and to communicate to them the doctrines of Epicurus. The importance of παρρησία may be seen in the fact that Philodemus dedicates a whole treatise to the analysis of the form of παρρησία which the Epicureans used to initiate their adherents to the Epicurean way of life. Before, however, beginning the examination of the present treatise, it will be useful to give some information about the present conditions of the text, so that the reader may better understand the way I treat of the subject.

The treatise of Philodemus on Frankness (Περὶ Παρρησίας) is preserved in a papyrus discovered at Herculaneum (Papyrus Herculanensis, 1471, published in 1805 in Naples). It contains 88 fragments and 24 columns in varying states of preservation. I have followed A. Olivieri's text (it contains88 fragments and 24 columns, and it was published in Leipzig in 1914) accepting the restorations adopted by him. A. Olivieri's edition of the text of papyrus includes an appendix of uncertain fragments and an index concerning Philodemus vocabulary. I should note,however, that the preserved part of the treatise presents many problems concerning the interpretation of Philodemus ideas. First, the text begins abruptly in the middle of a sentence, a fact that makes it difficult, or rather impossible, to

understand what Philodemus is writing about in the introductory sentence. Also, it was impossible for me to understand if the first fragment we have was part of Philodemus introduction or part of a later section of his treatise. The same problem exists in the rest of the treatise. Thus, it was very difficult, to find the order in which the central ideas occur in the text and so to solve the problem of what παρρησία is. A. Olivieri[3] has made an attempt to put the fragments in a sequence, but it seems unsuccessful, since among the fragments which refer to παρρησία as a method of correction, there intervene fragments which refer to the disposition of the Epicurean sage or the students. Things are better in the part of the treatise, which is arranged in columns, because, there, the gaps in the text are fewer and the sequence of ideas is better preserved.[4] A second category of problems is that of the state of the text: many words are missing, and many others are uncertainly restored, or having dots under the letters. Thus,any presentation of the ideas of Philodemus as preserved in this papyrus' text must be considered probable rather than certain. In spite of these difficulties I have attempted to make on intelligible whole of the ideas in the treatise.

I should note, in addition, that I was greatly helped

in the understanding of the fragments by two previous studies of this treatise, undertaken by M. Gigante and N. Dewitt respectively. M. Gigante, in his paper entitled Philodème Sur la Liberté de parole, throws a fair light on Philodemus' presentation of παρρησία, as a τέχνη, and especially as στοχαστικὴ τέχνη (conjectural art), which aims at curing people of their moral defects.[5] N. Dewitt, on the other hand, presents an absolutely different treatment of the Περὶ Παρρησίας. His paper deals with the administrative structure of the Epicurean school; which is revealed in the background of the treatise, namely in the gradations in the hierarchy of the school of teachers and students, in the description of the characters of teachers and students and in the fundamental principles that govern the school.[6]

In my own treatment of the same subject I intend to bring forth the relationship between παρρησία as a τέχνη practised by the Epicurean sages, and παρρησία as a method of correction of the students and of their initiation into Epicurean philosophy, by discussing those fragments which show first that παρρησία is an art which is practised in various ways, the purpose of which is to help and cure people of their faults, and second, that, in order for it to be successful, it must be practised by people of a

certain character, whose way of life is consistent with their teaching, so that the teachers may become a living example.[7]

It will be useful, however, to discuss briefly the meaning which παρρησία had in the Classical age, and the meaning which it appears to have in the Hellenistic and Roman age. The word παρρησία derives from the words πᾶς and ῥῆσις.[8] It indicates, therefore, initially the right of an individual to tell freely everything he thinks of another person, or of political affairs, or of philosophical and religious matters. In its good sense, as frankness, παρρησία was the celebrated privilege of the Athenians in the classical age. Euripides in Hippolytus declares:

ἐλεύθεροι παρρησίᾳ θάλλοντες
οἰκεῖεν πόλιν κλεινῶν Ἀθηνῶν
(ll. 422 sq)

We observe from this line that παρρησία has a special association with the ἐλεύθερους. It was the privilege of free born people, since a slave could not express freely his opinion on a matter from fear that he displease his master and be punished. This special practice of παρρησία is indicated, also, by Plato's premise in the Republic.

ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται.
(Republic, 557 b)

In a free city every free-born man speaks freely, expressing his opinion on every matter. The city is full of παρρησία says Plato implying that it was practised by philosophers, rhetoricians, politicians or common people. In the Gorgias, again, Plato presents Socrates as saying that παρρησία is the privilege of those people who attempt to investigate the human soul and preach to people the right way of living, implying by the word 'people' the sages like Socrates himself.

> Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσῃς περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτα ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τἀληθῆ. ἐνοῶ γάρ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν.
>
> (Gorgias, 486e-487a)

But I should note that in the fourth century B.C. the term παρρησία presents a shift in meaning from a good sense to a bad one. Thus in Plato's Phaedrus, for example, the expression " ἡ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς παρρησία "[9] has a bad connotation, indicating irreverence towards the gods, because a man should speak with circumspection about the gods without offending them.[10] As licence of tongue παρρησία appears to be practised by the great-souled man in Aristotle's description of his character in Nicomachean

Ethics, because he speaks with licence of tongue to the common people when he despises them:

> μεγαλοψύχου δέ καί τό μηδενός δεῖσθαι ἤ μογις... ἀναγκαῖον δέ καί φανερόμισον εἶναι καί φανερόφιλον· τό γάρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου. καί μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἤ τῆς δόξης, καί λέγειν καί πράττειν φανερῶς· παρρησιαστής γάρ διά τό καταφρονεῖν, διό καί ἀληθευτικός, πλήν ὅσα μή δι' εἰρωνείαν·...
>
> (Nicomachean Ethics, IV, iii, 26, 28)[11]

As a result of the practice of παρρησία as licence of tongue, in the Hellenistic age it ceases to be considered as a public virtue and becomes a private virtue. F.C. Babbit, the translator of Plutarch's first volume of Moralia in the introduction to the treatise Πῶς ἄν τις διακρίνειε τόν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου, remarks that: "under the political conditions existing in Plutarch's day it was probably safer to cultivate it (i.e. παρρησία, frankness) as a private virtue."[12]

In Italy, in the first century B.C., Philodemus cultivates παρρησία in his school as a method of instruction, and as a virtue which distinguishes the Epicurean sage from the vulgar pedagogues and common people. The title Τῶν κατ' ἐπιτομήν ἐξειρ-

γαφμένων περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βί-
ων ἐκ τῶν Ζηνωνο[ς σχο]λῶν
ὃ ἐστι περὶ [·]παρρ[η]σίας

of the treatise which Philodemus dedicated to this subject, i.e. παρρησία , confirms the hints about the nature of παρρησία appearing in my earlier discussion: παρρησία is an ἦθος and βίος, it is the moral element in character and a way of life. The term ἦθος is generally translated as '<u>character</u>'. Character in its most comprehensive sense depends on the moral virtues that are engendered in a <u>man's self</u> by practice (ἔθος).[13] Παρρησία , therefore, being associated with ἦθος and βίος , probably means the habit of speaking frankly, which is engendered in a man by instruction and by practice. For, Aristotle maintains that the moral virtues that are engendered in a man's character derive from learning and practice and not from nature.[14] Consequently a man who has this virtue, παρρησία , acts and lives in accord with it. He becomes a παρρησιαστής by character. Philodemus, it seems to me, holds this view with respect to παρρησία , since throughout his treatise he attempts to show that an Epicurean sage or student must practise παρρησία and must be willing to accept παρρησία . At this point lies the special association of παρρησία with εὔνοια as I shall try to show below.

Besides being a virtue, παρρησία becomes in the hands of the Epicurean sage the permanent method by which he corrects and instructs his students. In fragment 68 of the treatise we read that freedom of speech is an art practised in various ways.

(παρρησίας)[15] ποικίλης τε φιλοτεχνί- 1
ας οὔσης, οἵαν ἐπεσημη-
νάμεθα, καὶ τῆς κερα-
υμένης δαφιλέσι τοῖς ἐ-
παίνοις καὶ προτρεπομέ- 5
νης τἀκόλουθα τοῖς ἀ-
γαθοῖς πράττειν, οἷς ἔχουσι,
πῶς οὐκ ἄν τῶν τοιού-
των ποιοῖτο τὰς ὑπομνή-
σεις; καὶ κατὰ τὰς δι]δομέ- 10
νας δὲ [τῆς] πρὸς παρρησί[αν] ἀφορμὰς

(11.1-11)

The above passage since it is mutilated does not give us information about Philodemus' argument that παρρησία is φιλοτεχνία, as the expression οἵαν ἐπισημηνάμεθα indicates. The term φιλοτέχνια, on the other hand, assures us that the Epicureans considered παρρησία as a kind of τέχνη. The word φιλοτεχνία derives from the verb φιλοτεχνέω which means 'to love art', 'to practice an art'. Φιλοτεχνία, then, takes the meaning of 'enthusiasm for art'.[16] In Philodemus' treatise On Music there is the expression ἡ περὶ [τὴν Μουσικὴν] φιλοτεχνία,[17] which has the meaning of the enthusiasm for the art of

music.

From that meaning (enthusiasm for art) φιλοτεχνία acquires the meaning of 'craftmanship' of sculptors, of pyramid-builders, or of 'ingenuity', 'artifice' with regard to the intellectual capacities of a man, or of 'artistic or ingenious construction of a thing'.[18] The shifting of the meaning of φιλοτεχνία from 'enthusiasm for art' to 'craftmanship' and 'ingenuity', probably, is due to the fact that a man who likes something very much, and in the present case, the art, gives all his efforts to being excellent in the art he practises; he reaches ingenuity in art; thus, the art he practises is ingenious. Philodemus, therefore, seems to me to use φιλοτεχνία in this last meaning, as an ingenious and excellent art. Παρρησία is an excellent art, for its purpose is excellent. It turns people towards practicing the right things (τἀκολουθα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς) (frg. 68, ll. 6-7). M. Gigante argues that παρρησία as φιλοτεχνία has come to mean an 'excellent art' because it is contrasted with κακοτεχνία which means 'bad art'.[19] Carneades and other adherents of Plato, as Sextus Empiricus reports, had labeled rhetoric as κακοτεχνία, 'false artifice'.[20]

In order to understand the Epicurean premise that

παρρησία is an art, we should note what art means in the Epicurean philosophical vocabulary and what its purpose is. Art, for the Epicureans, is the method that provides an advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) to the life of men.[21] Nature has created the universe full of imperfections. Lucretius reports that:

> nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
> naturam rerum: tanta stat praedida culpa.
>
> (Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, V, 198-199)

The art employed by the people to correct the imperfections of nature and to lead people to the attainment of τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τέλος , which lies in the avoidance of every pain by establishing ἀταραξία for the mind and ἀπονία for the body, the two basic elements which comprise the Epicurean concept of ἡδονή .[22] Epicurus declared

> καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν· ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν...
> (D.L. X, 128, 129)

Accordingly, παρρησία is the method that releases people from their moral errors and provides the τὸ συμφέρον in their life. This is made explicit by the fragment I of the Περὶ Παρρησίας in which we read that certain people being unable to recognize their errors and attain the τὸ συμφέρον

for themselves, do not trust παρρησία .

ὑποπῖπτον γάρ
δή καί τό τινας μήτε συν-
αισθάνεσθαι τάς ἁμαρτίας,
μήθ' ὅ συνφέρει διαγινώσ-
κειν, ἀπ[ιστ]ε̣ῖν ποεῖ.

(Frag. 1, ll.1-5)

In Col. XXb Philodemus writes that the people who are unable to realize their τό συμφέρονcommit wrongs and suffer wrongs,

πολλά γάρ ἐκ τῶν
ἐναντίων πάσχουσι καί
πράττουσι αἱ τοῦ συνφέ-
ροντος ἀδιαλόγιστοι ψυ-
χαι,[

(Col. XXb, ll.6-10)

relating again παρρησία to τό συμφέρον .[23] The trust which Philodemus shows in the effectiveness of παρρησία to correct the moral errors of a man and to lead him to the attainment of the Epicurean end is indicated by the fragment 64 in which he advises the sages to practise παρρησία until the final fulfilment of its purpose.[24]

What kind of art παρρησία is, is manifested in the fragment 1. There Philodemus explains in a very obscure way how the sage practices παρρησία .

καθό-
λου τ' ἐπιπαρρησιάζεται
σοφὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος ἀνήρ,
ὅτι μὲν στοχαζόμενος
εὐ[λ]ογίαι[ι]ς ἔδε[ξ]ε παγίως
οὐδέν (Fr. 1, 11.5-9)[9]

Generally, the sage and the philosopher use the freedom of speech in the sense that they think in a conjectural way by the means of probable arguments without any rigidity.

M. Gigante has suggested for the last sentence of the above passage the following restoration " εὐ[λ]ογίαι[ι]ς ἔδε[ξ]ε παγίως / οὐδέν ."[25] It seems to me that the suggested restoration is very probable, because the word στοχαζόμενος meaning the act of guessing or of conjecturing is contradicted by the word παγίως which means 'with rigidity'. For, something which is the result of guesswork cannot be rigid, unchanging, since any guess is subject to change when more information and arguments are supplied for making a case on a given subject. Further, the term πάγιος is used in association with ἐπιστήμη , the scientific knowledge which is rigid and fixed. Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics draws the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and εὐστοχία defining the first as a thing which we know scientifically cannot vary, while defining the second as a thing that ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν .[26]

Philodemus in the Rhetoric makes a distinction between τέχνη "τὴν τὸ μεθοδικὸν ἔχου-/σαν καὶ ἑστηκός" and τέχνη "τὴν στοχαζομένην/ τοῦ ὡς ἐπ[ὶ] τὸ πολὺ καὶ κα-/τὰ τὸ εὔλογον.[27] The first τέχνη is that which has an invariable method (τὸ μεθοδικον) and is fixed (τὸ ἑστηκός); this form of τέχνη gives, in other words, fixed of rigid results. The second form of τέχνη is that which depends on στοχασμός (guess) and on τὸ εὔλογον (the fair argument, the probable argument), and, consequently, it cannot give rigid results. Again, Philodemus in Rhetoric says,

> Οὐ πᾶς τεχνίτης, ἐὰν ἔ[χῃ] φρέ-
> νας, [ἐπα]ναγέλλεται τὸ
> τέλος διὰ παντὸς π[οι-
> ήσειν. [Ο]ὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς οὔ-
> τε κυβερνήτης [ο]ὔτε τοξό-
> της οὔτε ἁπλῶς ὅσοι
> τὰς ἐπιστήμας[28] οὐ παγί-
> ως ἔ[χουσιν ἀλ]λὰ στοχαστικάς.
>
> (I, p. 26)

Philodemus then considers παρρησία as a στοχαστικὴ τέχνη which depends on τὸ εὔλογον, and not as a πάγια τέχνη , which has τὸ μεθοδικόν and τὸ ἑστηκός . That παρρησία is a στοχαστικὴ τέχνη is confirmed, further, by the fragment 57 in which Philodemus explains that sometimes the sage fails in his judgement of certain subjects though he composes his

reasonable arguments (εὐλόγιστα) from the most accurate probable signs which the given subjects supply to him, because his arguments depend on a reasonable guess (εὐλόγιστα στοχαστά).

κἂν μή]
κατειλήφῃ ἐρ[ῶν]τας
ἢ κατασ[χ]έτους κακίαις
τισίν, ἀλλὰ σημειωσά-
μενον. εὐλόγιστα δὲ στο-
χαστὰ μὴ διὰ παντ‹ὸς› ἀ-
ποβαίνειν οἷα κατηλπίσ-
θη, κἂν ἄκρως ἐκ τῶν [ε]ἰκό-
των συντίθηται τὰ τῆς
εὐλογίας, δεῖ γ[ε κἂν θέ·]σει (?)[29]
ὁμολογῆσαι, διότι λόγος
αἱρεῖ κατενχειρεῖν Ε
(Fr. 57, ll.1-12)

It is necessary to confess that the reasonable guesses do not always result as was hoped, though the reasonable arguments (τὰ τῆς εὐλογίας) are derived from the most accurate apparent signs (εἰκότων), because the mind (λόγος) grasps the undertaken argument.
(ll.5-10)

Philodemus explains that παρρησία is στοχαστικὴ τέχνη because the human mind is that which plays the primary role in the understanding of a given subject, and in composing the arguments by guesswork. Furthermore the association of παρρησία with εὐλογία and τὸ εἰκός (as it appears in fragments 1 and 57) argues about its conjectural character. The word εὐλογία composed of the adverb εὖ and the noun λόγος

meaning initially a fair argument, in the fifth century, with the rise of the sophistic rhetoric, took the form of probable argument.[30] It was due to the assumption that the reactions of a man, or of a state may be predicted, because a man or a state tends to act in a particular way under particular circumstances. Thus the argument of probality acquired an important role in the oratory and prose of the fifth century.[31] Thucydides, for example, built his whole 'history' on the principles of likelihood, expediency, and nature, arguing that a man or state seeking always τὸ συμφέρον acts in a certain way under certain circumstances because his reactions derive from the emotions that at any moment conquer him.[32] Thus, he presents the general Diodotus in the Athenian assembly arguing that the revolution of Mytileneans was due to the emotion of anger which was aroused in them because of their poverty.[33] A man, therefore, can guess what the probable reaction of people will be under certain circumstances. Thereby, the argument of probability seems to have been used by the Epicurean philosophers to make their 'diagnosis' about the moral defects of the recruits, and, then, by using παρρησία to argue their cases to the students in order to correct them. Philodemus in fragment 57, as we have already seen,[34] says that a sage makes his case on the character of a given student by observing the latter's external

reactions (εἰκότα). The word εἰκός originated in the rationalistic era of the fifth century took the notion of a sign apparent, or probable. Aristotle in Rhetoric I, ii. 15 speaking about signs defines the τὸ εἰκὸς as a sign "which generally happens, not however unreservedly, as some define it, but the sign which is concerned with things that may be other than they are, being so related to that in regard to which it is probable as the universal to the particular."[35] In that meaning, it seems to me, Philodemus uses the εἰκότα in the above fragment (fr.57, l.8), as 'apparent' signs. In the fragment 63, for example, what is εἰκός is used as a sign of the moral sickness of a student, as the τὸ σημεῖον is the sign of bodily sickness.

παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστιν ὥσ-
περ εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὑπολαβών
διὰ σημείων εὐλόγων
προσδεῖσθαι τουτονὶ τινα
κενώματος, εἶτα διαπεσών
ἐν τῆι σημειώσει μηδέ-
ποτε πάλι κενῶσαι τοῦ-
τον ἄλλη<ι> νόσωι συνεχόμε-
νον. ὥστε νο[ῦ]ν καὶ δι' αὐ-
τὸ τοῦτο πάλι παι[ρ]ρησιάσεται. (fr.63 ll.3-12)

As a physician recognizes the disease of a man from probable signs (l.5), and applies his medicines accordingly, in the same way the Epicurean sage recognizes the moral errors of his disciplines from probable signs (εἰκότα) and practices παρρησία on them, as a physician uses his medicines, to correct them. In fragment 71, Philodemus states that a sage recognizes in advance what the reaction of a student will be towards παρρησία from the εἰκότα ,

and acts accordingly.

θεω-
ρήσας δ̣τ̣[ι κα]τασκευαζό-
μενος τ̣' ἀπαισχυνθείη,
μετρίως τε τὸ συναντη-
σαν οἴσει καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀγέ- 5
νητον. προειδὼς τ̣ε πολ-
λοὺς εἰκὸς ἀπαυχενίζειν
τῶν νέων καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
(Fr. 71, ll.1-8)

That the practice of freedom of speech, being a conjectural art, must be applied at the appropriate time (καιρός) in order to be fruitful, is the next subject treated by Philodemus. The word καιρός is another term used abundantly in the Sophistic and rhetorical vocabulary of the fifth century. Since it denotes opportune time or place or circumstance, it is the principal that determines the time, the proofs and the style the sage should choose in order to practise frankness as a method of correction. In fragment 22, for example, we read that the sage will work out the great changes in the character of his disciples, who have committed errors, at the opportune time (καιρός):

με[ταθ]ήσ̣[ει το]ὺ-
τους, [τῆς] τῶν ἰδιωμάτων
αὐτ̣[ῶν ἐ]υθηνήσεως οἰκο-
νομ̣ο̣υμένης πρὸς ταῖς
ἄλλαις, ἃς ὁ τε καιρὸς [κ]αὶ τὰ <ἕτερα>
παραπ̣[λήσια] δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς, τι-
μαῖς. ἀγαγοι δ' ἂν ἰσῶς π̣ο-

Ι[έ]ὁ σο[φ]ός, ἂν ἡ[ι] σπανιωτά-
τη], παρ[ρ]ησίαν

(Fr. 22, ll.1-9)

The μετάθεσις operates only when the sage has grasped the appropriate opportunity. Every postponement is incompatible with παρρησία . In fragment 25 we read:

οὐδ' εἰς καιρὸν ἐνχρονί-
ζειν ἐπιζη[τ]οῦμεν οὐδὲ
κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον, καὶ τοῦ
πῶς διὰ παρρησίας ἐπιτε-
ναῦμεν τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς
εὔνοιαν τῶν κατ[α]σκευα-
ζομ[έ]νων παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πε-
παρρησιάσθαι

(Fr. 25, ll.1-8)

The above passage sets forth a new relationship, that of παρρησία - καιρός - εὔνοια . The Epicurean sage, Philodemus seems to suggest, must act 'on time' through παρρησία in order to obtain the εὔνοια of the students, who are in the course of preparation, κατασκευαζόμενοι (ll.6-7), towards παρρησία. The importance of εὔνοια lies at the point that a student should be willing to hear the frank speech of his teacher, in order to correct himself. Philodemus, further, maintains that even the awakening of goodwill (εὔνοια) in a recruit is a matter of calculation, the choice of appropriate time or way of practising frankness. This particular treatment of the subject,

i.e. the relationship between παρρησία - εὔνοια - καιρός, reminds us of the way in which the Sophists used to construct their arguments. They based them upon the τὸ εἰκός, τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ φυσικον. We have already proved that Philodemus had connected the art of παρρησία with the τὸ εἰκός, and τὸ συμφέρον.[36] In the present passage (Fr. 25, ll.1-8), Philodemus associates the practice of παρρησία with the εὔνοια, which is a matter of man's nature. The word εὔνοια, in antiquity, was used indicating both an intellectual and a psychological state of human nature. For example, Aeschylus in the Supplices uses the word εὔνοια to mean "good will" of mind, κατ' εὐνοίαν φρενῶν,[37] and "impulses of kindness", τοῖς ἠθέσιν γὰρ πᾶς τις εὐνοίας φέρει.[38] Philodemus, it seems to me, maintains both of the above meanings of the word because he suggests that the purpose of a sage is first to obtain the goodwill (i.e. "friendly disposition") of the students towards accepting παρρησία (Fr. 25, ll.4-8), and, secondly, to cultivate the good will (i.e. the good will of mind) of the students towards practicing παρρησία (Fr. VXIIb, ll.1-6)

οὐ δια-]
λαμβάνου σ[ι], καὶ μόνοις
καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἀπ' εὐ-
νοίας καὶ πάντα προσφε-
ρομένους ὅσα παρη<ι>ν[ο]ῦ-
μεν

(Col. XVIIb, 1-6)

The relationship παρρησία - καιρός - εὔνοια brings forth another fundamental element of the Epicurean technique of correction, the ἀκρίβεια . In the Col. Va of the present treatise, we read:

ὥστε θρασέως παρρησία
χρήσο]νται πρὸς [ἀργίας
κα]ὶ ἀ[να]βολάς. [δι]ὸ ἀ[κρι-
βέστεροι πῶς ὑπάρ[ξουσιν
ἐν σπάνει τῶν πρὸς [εὔνοι-
αν καὶ φιλίαν εὐθετῶν
γενηθέντες καὶ πα[ρὰ τὴν
ἀπομίμ[ν]ησιν δέ: τὴν πο-
λυχρόνιον τῶν κα[θηγησα-
μένων;

(Col. Va, 1-10)

The above passage through a contradictory statement brings forth the idea that only the Epicurean technique of speaking freely can be labeled an ἀκριβής method and art. The word ἀκρίβεια means 'precision'. In the present passage it is associated with a παρρησία which is used with "haste in respect to idleness and delays" (ll.1-3) by vulgar pedagogues who lack εὔνοιαν (1.5) and φιλίαν (1.6). Thus, the students who study under the guidance of those pedagogues cannot become ἀκριβεῖς (ll. 3-4). But Philodemus in fragment 25 claimed that παρρησία should be practised "on time" in order to be fruitful;[39] the παρρησία which the vulgar pedagogues use, since it is not practised on time, cannot be fruitful. Such a παρρησία is

precise. For precision means "to practise παρρησία 'on time'". Further, the vulgar pedagogues use παρρησία without εὔνοια and φιλία , a fact that leads us to consider that the way they think and speak is not the appropriate one for the correction of their students. Their παρρησία , then, is not ἀκριβής ; for it lacks presicion of thinking, and speaking. Philodemus probably accuses other 'schools' of not using frankness in the right way to correct their students. Those 'schools' cannot, consequently, mould ἀκριβεῖς students with respect to παρρησία and, even with respect to their whole life and character, since we have seen above that παρρησία is associated with ἦθος and βίος , because the students are mouldedin accordance with their teacher's living example of a way of life (παρὰ τὴν ἀπομίμ[ν]ησιν δὲ τὴν πολυχρόνιον τῶν καθηγησαμένων Philodemus, in the present passage (Va), brings forth another idea connected with the method the Epicureans use to correct their students, the idea of imitation. The word as it occurs in the passage may be rendered ἀπομίμνησις or ἀπομίμησις since the ν is set in double brackets. The term ἀπομίμνησις meaning 'remembering' or 'recognizing'[40] does not suggest the act of ἀπομίμησις imitation. Further, the word ἀπομίμνησις does not occur in any Greek passage meaning 'imitation'. On the other hand, the word ἀπομίμησις meaning 'imitation'[41] renders precisely the idea of the l.8 of the above fragment (Va). Thus, it seems to me, that the correct reading of

the word is implying the act of deliberate imitation. My argument, that ἀπομίμησις here means 'deliberate imitation' is supported by the fragment 45 in which we read:

> καὶ τὸ συνεχὸν καὶ κυρι-
> ώτατον, Ἐπικούρῳ, κα-
> θ' ὃν ἴσμεν ἡκιστ' ἐψεύσθη, πει-
> θαρχήσομεν, ὡς καὶ παρῄνεσε....
>
> (Fr. 45, ll.6-9)

The life of Epicurus should become the ultimate goal of imitation for the students, who have chosen to live in accord with his philosophy. The pledge to Epicurus is a tacit assumption that he was the unique guide on the road of ἀκρίβεια and excellence. He was the man who attained the ultimate pleasure and showed the road towards it with the example of his life. Metrodorus declared that:

> ὁ Ἐπικούρου βίος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων συγκρινόμενος
> ἕνεκεν ἡμερότητος καὶ αὐτάρκειας μῦθος ἂν νομισθείη
>
> (C. Bailey ibid, chapter V fr. XXXVI)

Elsewhere (Fr. 84) παρρησία takes the form of admonition (νουθέτησις, νουθετεία, νουθετεῖν). The technique of admonition is presented in its own right in fragment 66; the sage conquers the resistance of his disciples, who are possessed by alienated passions (ἀλλότρια), towards correction, by means of admonition.

The most celebrated form of admonition is the κηδεμονικὴ νουθέτησις. The expression κηδεμονικὴ νουθέτησις, meaning paternal admonition, underlines the

element of paternal affection and concern which the Epicurean sage feels for his students. In fragment 26 the κηδεμονικὴ νουθέτησις is contrasted with irony. Philodemus, here, is probably referring to the Socratic irony; for Socrates used to prove the wrongs of his fellow-people by professing ignorance on a given subject.[42] The admonition provides a reciprocal benefit to the sage and the students, the capacity of tolerance on the part of the students and the goodwill of the sages are inspired by the desire for a mutual solution through admonition.

καὶ τὸ δι' ἀλ]λήλων σώ<ι>-
ζεσθαι πρὸς εὐφορ<ί>αν καὶ
μεγάλην εὔνοιαν ἐφόδι-
ον ἡγουμένους,* ἐπεὶ καὶ
τὸ νεωτέροις κατὰ τὴν
δ[ι]άθεσιν πειθαρχῆσαί
π[οτε, ἔτι δὲ] τὴν νουθέτη-
σιν ἐνεγκεῖν δεξιῶς ἀγα-
θό]ν καὶ πρόσφορον <ἐστιν>
(fr. 36, ll. 1-9)

The task of admonition is assigned to the Epicurean philosopher, and the confidence in the effectiveness of such a method is affirmed in fr. 35 (μάλιστα ζητήσομεν νουθετεῖν), and in fr. 45 (μετὰ πολλῆς πεποιθήσεως ἄλλους νουθετήσομεν). The confidence the Epicureans show in admonition is underlined, further, by the fact that they attempt to admonish eminent people as well as the vulgar crowd.[43] Elsewhere, Philodemus

reports that the sage is supported in the task of reproof and admonition by his students (Fr. 38). In Col. XVIIa the sage is compared with the σοφὸς ἰατρὸς who is called upon to make an incision to cure a sick man; in the same way the sage uses admonition to correct his disciples.

Having discussed what kind of art παρρησία is, and what the characteristics of that art are, we will proceed to a discussion of the various ways in which παρρησία is practised. We have already seen that it is ποικίλη φιλοτεχνία .[44] It can be used ἁπλῶς (Fr.10), i.e. straightforwardly, without any adornment, in the case of students of stubborn character. Or it can be used in a more subtle way (κομψότερον) (Fr. 9): the sage, instead of reproving directly the students for their faults, by finding faults with the strangers, or reporting the errors he had committed in his youth, turns his disciples to repentance. Plutarch illustrates this method by the example of his professor Ammonius: "My professor, Ammonius, at an afternoon lecture perceived that some of his students had eaten a luncheon that was anything but frugal, and so he ordered his freedman to chastise his own servant, remarking by way of explanation that "that boy cannot lunch without his wine." At the same time he glanced towards us

so that the rebuke took hold of the guilty.[45]

Sometimes the sage uses the μέτρια ἐπιτίμησις in order to correct his students, as Epicurus did with Pythocles (Fr. 6). The term μέτρια ἐπιτίμησις probably is related to the kind of rebuke Epicurus used in the Letter to Pythocles in order to prove to the latter that his opinions on divinity were wrong, by proving the ignorance of Pythocles with respect to divine matters.[46] In fragment 13 Philodemus seems to suggest that the sage reprehends his students in cases of insult. In fragment 87 the sage who calms his angry recruits is compared to Hercules calming the Stymphalian birds by music.[47]

Next, Philodemus relates the behaviour of the sage to the application of frankness in various ways. The sage must not get angry with the κατασκευαζόμενους (Fr. 2); he must not lose his courage in practising παρρησία when he is disappointed by the bad reputation of παρρησία , (an allusion to the fact that παρρησία has ceased to be considered as a public virtue at that time), or by the loss of some of his students. He must possess an urbane disposition endowed with prudence, wisdom, moderation, love, in contrast to vulgar pedagogues who have a malicious

character (μοχθηρὰ διάθεσις).[48]

The aim of παρρησία is to help people to correct their moral faults. Philodemus seems to consider it as an art of succour (βοήθεια), analogous to medicine, and as the unique proper food for the moral health of students (Fr. 18).[49] Thus Philodemus exhorts his disciples to reject and forget every other intellectual τροφή as useless. As βοήθεια , παρρησία helps the students to correct their faults, and attain the Epicurean end (Fr. 67). Yet, this help is given in various ways. For example, in fragment 43 συνπάθια (=συμπάθεια) is a form of help, which functions through the reciprocal love and respect that both student and teacher feel, with respect to the good as well as to the wicked elements of their character.

γε-
νησό[μενον] φιλότροπον
εἰ δὲ [ἀγαθ]ῶν πῶς οὐχὶ καί
τῶν κακῶν; ὡς γὰρ ἕνε-
κεν εὐφροσύνη[ς] ἐκείνων
οὕτω καὶ τούτων προσήκει
συνπαθίας χάριν, δι' ἣν βοη-
θούμεθα. (fr. 43, ll. 1-8)

The term συνπάθια produced from the verb συμπάσχω , 'feel along with someone else', or 'suffer along with,' reflects the emotional and intellectual concern of one person for another. Epicurus in fragment LXVI says:

Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες.[50]

The meditation upon the wickedness of one's character by an intimate results in the βοήθεια , because a friend advises his friend on the ways the latter should use in order to get rid of his faults. In fragment 79 of the current treatise, we read:

ἀλλὰ συν-
παθῶ[ς] τὰς ἁμαρτίας ὑπο-
λαμβάνειν καὶ μὴ] καθυ-
βρίζειν μηδὲ λοιδορεῖ]ν

(Fr. 18, 9-12)

The sage considers with sympathy the moral errors of his disciples without insulting or abusing them. Aristotle describes the feeling of sympathy among friends as follows: "the mere presence of friends is pleasant both in prosperity and adversity. Sorrow is lightened by the sympathy of friends."[51] In tragedy the feeling of sympathy is expressed through an emotional 'identification' of the audience with the actors. The audience feel that sufferings of the protagonists as if they were their own, like devout Christians contemplating a picture of a cruel martyrdom. At other times the audience might share the emotional responses of the chorus, hating Pentheus with the Maenads in the first part of the "Bacchae", or pitying Cassandra with the Argive elders in Agamemnon.

In Epicurus and Philodemus, the concept of sympathy has the special connection of meditation which is realized in the form of practical help through frankness.

The result of the moral help of παρρησία, is the βοήθεια of the 'sinners', and the final acquaintance with τὸ συμφέρον.[52] Epicurus illustrates the therapeutic character of παρρησία by comparing it with medicine:

> Κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὑφ' οὗ μηδέν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐδέν ὄφελος μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων ἐκβαλλούσαν, οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος.
>
> (C. Bailey, ibid, chapt. V, Fr. 54)

In order that the therapeutic character of παρρησία may function, the student must regard the sage as father-confessor, and look upon him confidently; mistakes and shortcomings must be frankly reported to him, so that the student may be cured (Fr. 49). The student must place himself in the hands of the sage, since he is the only protector from the secular evils that threaten the student, and the guide to right thought and action. As Diomedes "placed his life in the hands" of Odysseus at their nocturnal patroling in Troy, in a same way, the student

must show confidence in his teacher, by saying as another Diomedes[53](Fr. 40)

> τούτου γε σπομένοιο καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο
> ἄμφω νοστήσαιμεν, ἐπεὶ περὶοιδε νοῆσαι
>
> (Iliad. K 246-247)

In fragments 16 and 46 the therapeutic function of παρρησία is 'identified' with purification (κάθαρσις). The word occurs in the Hippocratic corpus and has the meaning of purgation of bodily disorders. In the religious or liturgical vocabulary the word means 'expiation' from emotional disorders. In the Bacchae Dionysus in the prologue says that his mystical rites are cathartic. Philodemus, it seems to me, uses the term κάθαρσις with the liturgical or religious meaning as 'expiation' of intellectual and emotional disorders in the mind, such as irrational desires, fear, love. Subsequently, the Epicurean sage is represented as the uniquely righteous therapist, since in contrast to the vulgar pedagogues, he possesses the knowledge to liberate his disciples from their errors (Fr. 44).

All the edifying work of παρρησία lies in the notion of φιλία . It is the necessary consequence and presumption of friendship. The relation παρρησία-φιλία in the

'Epicurean garden' became the foundation-stone of the function of the school. Epicurus characterizes friendship, the quintessence of his philosophy.

ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

(C. Bailey, Fr. XXVII)

A real friend, from the point of view of Philodemus, is concerned for the correction of his friend:

διάβολον τε γὰρ οὐχ ἡγήσεται
τὸν ἐπιθυμοῦντα τὸν φίλον τυχεῖν
διορθώσεως, ὅταν μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν τις,
ἀλλὰ φιλόφιλον.

(Fr. 50)

In the above passage we can trace the Epicurean concept of friendship as an ὠφέλεια springing primarily from self-interest.

πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἑαυτὴν αἱρετή· ἀρχὴν
δ' εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.

(C. Bailey, ibid, chapt. IV, Fr. XXIII)

For the Epicureans believed that personal advantage is that which determines primarily the conservation of

friendship. J. Ferguson argues that the major reason for the preservation of the Epicurean doctrine of friendship after all the other philosophical creeds on friendship had ceased to be effective was due to that special association of friendship with advantage. The same scholar, also, argues that the Epicurean understanding of friendship was the predecessor of the Christian conception of friendship; Christian doctrine developed a parallel doctrine on φιλία because it was influenced by Epicureanism.[54]

The amenable and friendly disposition of all the members of the 'garden' is verified by the principle of equality. There is no discrimination among the members of the school arising from property, position or age; every one is treated in accord with his disposition and knowledge of the Epicurean philosophy; and every sage is treated respectfully and enjoys veneration for his wisdom and perfection.

πάντες γὰρ ὁμοίως
καὶ φιλοῦσι κατ' ἀξίαν ἑκά-
στου καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας
βλέπουσι καὶ τὰς διὰ παρ-
ρησίας [

(Col. IIIb, 10-14)

Consequently, the gradation in the hierarchy of the Epicurean educators is sustained by virtue and superiority in wisdom and perfection. There are two distinct levels

of educators: a) the sage, and b) the philosopher. Professor N. Dewitt[55] discerns a third grade, that of philologus, suggesting that he is a 'junior' because he makes mistakes against which he is warned (Fr. 37). Philodemus, however, it seems to me, is, here, referring to the vulgar pedagogues who possessed no virtues analogous to those of the Epicureans (Col. X). In addition the sage was not permitted to make mistakes, since he was the living prototype for a student on the road of perfection. Consequently such an idea, as N. Dewitt suggests, contradicts the principles of Epicureanism, and cannot be valid. Both the sages and philosophers are called καθηγηταί or καθηγεμόνες. N. Dewitt, again, argues that the word καθηγεμών has "more dignity" than the word καθηγητής;[56] for, Metrodorus and Hermarchus, who had stood close to Epicurus in Athens, were called καθηγεμόνες in Philodemus treatise De ira.[57] But in the present treatise Philodemus makes no such a distinction, using either καθηγεμών or καθηγητής to indicate the Epicurean sage as well as the vulgar pedagogues.[58] Seneca in his Epistles[59] explains that the Epicureans used the word καθηγεμων rather than παιδαγωγός because they considered their philosophy as a 'guide to life', and themselves as conductors towards the attainment of the Epicurean end (ἡδονή).

The disciples, on the other hand, are classified as συνήθεις and κατασκευαζόμενοι with respect to their advance in the Epicurean philosophy. To the first class belong those students who are advanced in understanding of the entire Epicurean philosophy, while to the second those who are in the course of being prepared to accept the most subtle principles of that philosophy. Further, there are levels of gradation among the κατασκευαζόμενοι which depend upon the disposition which the students show towards παρρησία ; for, the Epicurean sage uses different methods of practicing παρρησία, related to students' disposition.[60] Thus, they classified their students as those who were recognized as impressionable, or willful, or more in need of constraint (Fr. 7); those who were weak and petulant (Fr. 59), or those who were incorrigible, or lazy, and never show a great improvement (Col. V). Finally, all the members of the Epicurean fraternity are called συσχολάζοντες being united in a common attempt to attain through παρρησία the Epicurean end.

FOOTNOTES

1. For an account of the Epicurean schools in Italy, see T. Frank, Vergil. New York, 1965, p.47 ff and 87 ff; J.I.M Tait, Philodemus' influence on the Latin poets, Bryn Mawr, 1441m p.1 ff; Schmid Wolfagang, L'importance des Papyrus d'Herculaneum pour l'étude de l'Épicurisme, A.G.B., 1968 pp.190-196.

2. infra p.93

3. A. Olivieri, Philodemus Περὶ Παρρησίας libellus, Lipsiae, 1914.

4. see for an example, Philodemus Περὶ Παρρησίας, Coll. XX-XXV. The text of Περὶ Παρρησίας consisted of 88 fragments and 24 columns is one fragment.

5. M. Gigante, Philodème: sur la liberté de parole, A.G.B., 1968, pp.196-217.

6. N. DeWitt, Organization and procedure in Epicurean Groups, Cl. Ph. XXXI, 1936, pp.205-211.

7. Philodemus expresses that belief in fragment 16_{5-9}

πείθειν δέ καί διά
τῶν [ἔρ]γων, ἀλλὰ μή μό-
νον δ[ιὰ τ]ο[ῦ] λέ[γει]ν, ὅτι τὴν ἡ
παρρ[η]σίαν σπ]ανίως ἐνη-
νόχασι

8. L.S.J. Greek-English Lexicon, see under the word παρρησία .

9. Plato, Phaedrus, 240e.

10. J.S.J. ibid, see n. 8.

11. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum Teubneriana, Leipzig , 1908.

12. Plutarch, Moralia, Loeb Classical Library, v.I, p.263, translated by F.C. Babbitt.

13. For the meaning of the word ἦθος see Aristotle Rhetoric, Loeb Classical Library, p.477; for the meaning of the word ἔθος see Aristotle N.E. II_2.

14. Aristotle, N.E. II i 1-8.

15. I have added παρρησίας as the subject of the participle οὔσης, because I believe the term "φιλοτεχνία" refers to it (παρρησία). For παρρησία as a kind of τέχνη see infra pp.25 sgg.

16. See Plato, Critias, 109c.

17. See Philodemus, On Music, p.19.K.

18. For the meaning of the word φιλοτεχνία see L.S.J. Greek-English Lexicon, under the word φιλοτεχνέω .

19. See M. Gigante, ibid., p.208.

20. Sextus Empiricus, Πρὸς Μαθηματικούς 2.12 and 20; G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p.322.

21. For an evaluation of the relation between τέχνη and τὸ συμφέρον see M. Isnardi-Parente, Physis et techne dans quelques textes epicuriens, pp.263-271.

22. D.L. X, 127-128.

23. See n.20.

24. See Fr. 64

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάλι
π]αρρησιάσεται, διότι πρό-
τερον οὐδὲν ἤνυσε, καὶ
πάλι ποήσει τοῦτο καὶ πάλιν,
ἵν' εἰ μὴ νῦν ἀλλὰ νοῦν] [τελεσφορήσῃ

(11.8-12)

25. See M. Gigante, ibid, pp.202-203.

26. Aristotle, N.E. VI iii 2.

27. Philodemus, Rhetorica, v.I, p.53.

28. ἐπιστήμη, here, is used in the sense of skill, or knowledge not in the strict sense as scientific knowledge, because Philodemus relates it with τέχνη στοχαστική.

29. The phrase κἂν μὴ θέλῃ is a restoration suggested by A. Olivieri; I have not translated it because I cannot understand the syntactic function of this phrase in the present passage.

30. L.S.J. ibid, see under word εὐλογία and εὔλογος.

31. For an account on the sophistic arguments, see J. Finley, Thucydides, chapter II.

32. ibid, chapter II, V.

33. ibid, chapters II and VII.

34. supra, pp. 29 sqq.

35. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.ii.15, Loeb Classical Library, translated by J.H. Freese.

36. supra pp.31-33.

37. Aeschylus, Supplices, 1.940.

38. ibid, 1.489.

39. supra, p.34.

40. L.S.J., see under the word ἀπομιμνήσκω.

41. ibid, see under the word ἀπομίμησις .

42. see also, Aristotle, N.E. II, ii.12, III.iii.6.

43. Philodemus: Περὶ Παρρησίας, Col. VII$_a$.

44. supra, p. 25 sqq., fr. 68.

45. Plutarch, Moralia, 70.E translated by F.C. Bubbitt.

46. D.L. X, 77 sq.

47. B. Frisher, The Sculpted Word, California, 1982, p.

48. Philodemus, ibid, Col. I.

49. N. DeWitt, ibid, suggested that the word τροφή (Fr. 18, l.5) refers to the previous literary education (music, poetry) a student has received by other vulgar pedagogues. It seems to me, however, that Philodemus here calls παρρησία a τροφή, and suggests to his students to "spit out" such a παρρησία because it is useless; see for an account on this subject M. Gigante ibid, p. 209.

50. C. Bailey, Epicurus: The extant remains, chapter V, Fr. LXVI.

51. Aristotle, N.E. IV vii, translated by H. Rackham.

52. supra, pp. 29 sqq. for the relation between παρρησία and τὸ συμφέρον.

53. Philodemus, ibid, Fr. 40, 11.9-10.

54. J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient Word, London, 1958, see under the chapter on Friendship.

55. See, N. DeWitt, ibid, p.206.

56. See, N. DeWitt, ibid, p.206.

57. C. Wilke, Philodemi De ira liber, Lipsiae, 1914, Col. XIV, 11.1-4.

58. See Philodemus, ibid, fragment 45 in which he calls by the name καθηγητής the Epicurean sage. In Col. Va 11.9-10 and Col. Vb 11.1-2 Philodemus calls by the name καθηγεμών the vulgar pedagogue and the Epicurean sage respectively.

59. Seneca, Epistles, 52_3.

60. supra, p.42.

CHAPTER III

ON ECONOMY

ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ
Περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν
ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν
καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσι
καὶ περὶ ἃ
θ

Epicureanism frequently has been accused of being a philosophy which has little to say about virtue, or about what is right or fitting for a man to do. Cicero attacked the Epicureans on this point, and, because their philosophy afforded no officii praecepta, denied that it was a philosophy at all.[1] It is known, of course, that Cicero[2] as a faithful Academic attempted deliberately to ridicule and denounce the philosophy of pleasure which preached non-involvement in politics. Thus, he appears to forget the Epicurean maxim " δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία ;"[3] a maxim which argues that the practice of the most eminent of virtues, i.e δικαιοσύνη , ensures the attainment of the μέγιστον ἀγαθόν , which is pleasure in the form of ἀταραξία of mind and ἀπονία of body.[4]

However, if we are to accept Cicero's accusation that Epicurus did not use the word 'virtue' in his

teaching, Philodemus affords us with a corpus of moral teachings in which the words ἀρετή and κακία occupy a predominant position.

His treatise Περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν describes a group of officia that a philosopher has to practise in order to accommodate his life to the Epicurean creeds.

The text of the treatise has been edited by C. Jensen in Leipzig in 1907, under the title Philodemus Περὶ Οἰκονομίας libellus. The text of this treatise is preserved in a papyrus discovered at Herculaneum (papyrus Herculanensis, 1424,puplished in 1805 in Naples). It contains 30 columns and 3 fragments, in varying states of preservation. I have followed C. Jensen's text accepting the restorations adopted by him. C. Jensen has arranged the columns and fragments in the order in which they appear in the papyrus' text which has been preserved in a very good condition. The text is divided clearly into three parts: the first,Col. I - Col. VII_{37} ,refers to the Xenophon's treatise On Economy. Philodemus concludes this section of his treatise by saying that he will not speak of the Xenophon's views on agriculture, which formed part of Xenophon's treatise of economy, because it does

not fall into the area of interests of a philosopher.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ
οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ προδιατρίβειν
τοῖς Ξενοφῶντος οἰκονο-
μικοῖς, τῶν ἐφεξῆς γεωργι-
κὴν τέχνην περιεχόντων,
ἣν ἀπ' ἰδίας ἐμπειρίας, οὐκ
ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας γίνεσθαι συμβαί-
νει· πρόσθετι δ' οὔτ' ἀναγκαία γι-
νώσκεσθαι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
πέφυκεν οὔτ' οἰκεῖα τὰ κατ' αὐ-
τὴν ἔργα συντελεῖσθαι δι' αὐ-
τῶν

(Col. VII 26-37)

The first part of the treatise is the most badly preserved. It begins abruptly from the middle of a sentence which refers to the technical terms τὸ κοσμητικόν and τὸ χρηστικόν which were used by Xenophon to define two rudimentary functions of household management. Probably Philodemus had written more about Xenophon's technical terms of economy because the sentence begins with ἔτι δέ..., which means that another sentence with μέν preceded. We do not know how extensive was the missing part of the treatise but if we are to judge from the part Philodemus dedicates to the treatment of Theophrastus' economy which is five columns long, the present part of the treatise should not be much longer. Therefore, it is probable that the longer part of this section of the treatise has been preserved and we have missed only the introduction,

or a little more besides the introduction which presumbly contained a discussion of the basic elements that define the function of Xenophon's economy. The preserved part of this section, however, presents many problems because the fragments are not arranged in a coherent order, and there are gaps in the sequence of ideas, words are missing, sentences are missing altogether, or in some passages only isolated words are preserved. We are helped, however, in the reconstruction of the ideas expressed, by Xenophon's treatise On Economy, since many words, or sentences, or passages that appear in Philodemus' text are quotations of Xenophon's treatise. The main difficulty of the section lies in understanding those fragmentary passages which present Philodemus' arguments against Xenophon's views.

The second section of Philodemus treatise deals with Theophrastus' views on economy. It consists of seven columns (VII_{37} - XII_{3}) well preserved, with few gaps in them, and arranged in a coherent order. Philodemus in the introductory sentence of this section gives the name of Theophrastus as the author of the ideas Philodemus expresses, though C. Armstrong who edited Aristotles' treatise on economy argues that the actual author is not Theophrastus but Aristotle.[5]

Finally in the last section of the treatise Philodemus expresses the Epicurean views on economy. It is the longest section of the treatise; it consists of sixteen columns XII_3 - XXVIII, well preserved with the fragments being arranged in a clear order so that the sequence of ideas is clearly discernible. The treatise ends with a reference to special topics related to economy such as wealth, poverty, luxury and a humble way of life about which Philodemus claims to deliver lectures (Col. XXVIII, 1-10). We cannot, of course, tell with certainty whether the treatise ended here or it continued further; but, generally, this part presents an almost complete picture of the Epicurean outlook; thus, the part which is probably missing is not so essential for the illumination of the ideas Philodemus expresses in the remaining part.

In the third section of the present treatise I have concentrated my attention upon presenting in the foreground the Epicurean views on economy, while in the background I make some references to the views of Xenophon and Theophrastus so far as it helps to clarify some ideas of Philodemus. The central point of my study turns upon the meaning of χρήματα - πλοῦτος, in relation to the Epicurean sage's management. I have been generous in quotations, because it seems to me that to confront the prospective reader with particular texts and analyses of them is

probably the best way of furnishing him with the clues he will need.

The third part of Philodemus treatise opens with a statement which proposes the form of economy Philodemus is going to discuss, establishing the line of demarcation between his own treatment of that subject and that of Xenophon and Theophrastus:

Διαλεξόμε-
θα τ[ο]ίνυν οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἰκῳ κα-
λῶ[ς] ἔστιν βιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἱ'στα- 7
σθαι δεῖ περί χρημάτων κτη-
σεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς, περί [δ]ὲ
τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν 10
οἰκονομικὸν ἰδίως νοεῖσθαι
συμβέβηκεν, οὐδέν διαφε-
ρόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς 13
ὀν[ό]μασιν ὑποτάττειν προ-
αιρ[ο]υμένους, καὶ περί τῆς
φιλοσόφῳ δεούσης κτήσε- 16
ως, [οὐ] τῆς ὁτω[δή]ποτε.
(Col. XII 5-17)

Reading this passage we are confronted with three striking ideas: first, Philodemus is going to speak not about the household management (οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἰκῳ καλῶς ἔστιν βιοῦν); second, he professes to speak about χρήματα the acquisition of them and the preservation of them; and, third, Philodemus introduces the peculiar idea that he will speak about the way which an Epicurean sage uses to acquire necessary goods (φιλοσόφῳ δεούσης κτήσεως),

(οὐ τῆς ὁτῳδήποτε) and not about the way which common people use to acquire goods.

We shall start the analysis of the above ideas beginning with the third idea presented. Philodemus furnishes us with the clue that he is interested in discussing a philosopher's possessions. Thus, immediately, his treatise takes an elitist form; for it refers not to everybody but only to those trained in the Epicurean philosophy and living in accord with its creeds. We can inquire about the sources of that idea in the fact that the Epicureans confined their teaching only to the people who attended their school, avoiding making public speeches,[6] and even more they confined their advanced and specialized teaching to those who were to become Epicurean philosophers; (in the Letter to Herodotus,[7] Epicurus clarifies the role of a small epitome of his physics by stating that it mainly is addressed to those who are not willing to undertake a thorough study of all his treatises on that subject, but simply to take a sort of education). Further, the books of Epicureans were addressed to the narrow circle of the students of the school, and to intimates (for example, the letters of Epicurus are addressed to particular persons, friends of Epicurus, and discuss special subjects; yet, Philodemus addresses his treatise On Frankness to his

students (in Fr. 18 he says ὦ παῖ), or his book on Rhetoric, to a certain Gaius, and his book on The good king according to Homer, to his friend Piso). Thus, it is reasonable, as I think, that the subjects which Philodemus discusses fall into the areas which were of interest to his students and friends, and that they were intented to furnish them with advice that would be useful to them in their attempt to organize their life in accord with the Epicurean doctrines.

The first idea Philodemus introduces in the quoted passage[8] is a negative statement; he will not discuss how a man owing a household (οἶκος) should administer his life (οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκῳ καλῶς ἔστιν βιοῦν). This statement introduces us to an aspect of economy which takes the form of household management, in contrast to economy which concerns the management of (χρήματα) which Philodemus is going to deal with.[9] The important word in the above statement is the term οἶκος which is actually a technical term used by Xenophon and Theophrastus to indicate a large estate. According to Xenophon, οἶκος includes everything that a man possesses. In the dialogue between Socrates and Critoboulus, in Xenophon's treatise on Economy, οἶκος is defined as follows:

(Σ.) οἶκος δέ δή τί δοκεῖ ἡμῖν εἶναι; ἆρα ὅπερ οἰκία, ἢ καί ὅσα τις ἔξω τῆς οἰκίας κέκτηται, πάντα τοῦ οἴκου ταῦτα ἐστίν;

(Κ.) Ἐμοί γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, δοκεῖ, καί εἰ μηδ' ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ πόλει εἴη τῷ κεκτημένῳ, πάντα τοῦ οἴκου εἶναι ὅσα τις κέκτηται.

(Oeconomicus, I, 5)

The role of management, therefore, according to Xenophon, is summed up in the good management of one's estate and possessions:

(Κ.) δοκεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, οἰκονόμου ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι εὖ οἰκεῖν τόν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον

(Ibid., I, 2)

I surmise that the initial statement of Philodemus (οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκῳ καλῶς ἔστιν βιοῦν) is related to Xenophon's and Theophrastus' views, because Philodemus in the lines 12-15 of the above quotation (p.62) uses the words πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὑποτάττειν προαιρουμένους. Those who had discussed economy from a different point of view were Xenophon and Theophrastus whose ideas Philodemus sets out in the first and second section of his own treatise.

Philodemus denounces those philosophers' form of economy contrasting with it his own understanding of

economy and χρήματα [10]. The key word in Philodemus' economic system is the term χρήματα . The word χρῆμα etymologically derives from the verb χράομαι which means "to make use", "to need" and, therefore, χρῆμα had originally the meaning of "thing needed," as it has been preserved in the formulas παραχρῆμα or παρά χρῆμα [11]; or it has the meaning of a thing that one needs or uses; Liddell-Scott introduce as example Xenophon's use of the word in Oeconomicus I, 9 sq. where it is used in plural.

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ πρόβατα ὡσαύτως εἴ τις διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι προβάτοις χρῆσθαι ζημιοῖτο, οὐδὲ τὰ πρόβατα χρήματα τούτῳ εἴη ἄν;
>
> Oeconomicus I, 9

With the discovery of money as a means of buying or selling goods the word changes meaning and in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, it is defined as goods or property:[12]

> χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.
>
> (Nic. Ethics, IV, i)

In the Epicurean vocabulary, however, the word seems to maintain its original meaning, as things that someone needs. Epicurus, in a maxim, says

> ἐλεύθερος βίος οὐ δύναται κτήσασθαι χρήματα πολλά ...
>
> (C. Bailey ibid, chapter V, maxim LXVII)

Jean Bollack commenting on this statement suggests that,

according to Epicurus, a man who lives a liberal life
13
possesses only those things which are necessary to him. Philodemus, it seems to me, uses the term in this fashion of something necessary for the life. For,in Col. XVII in which he discusses the characteristics of a φιλοχρήματος man,he states:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
φαίνεται γε καθάπερ [καὶ] ἐ-
π' ἄλλων, πλειόνων, ἐν οἷς ἀ-
γαθῶν ὄντων δημιουργῶν,
τό γε [ἀρ]κοῦν τὴν χρείαν [ἄρ-
κουν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν.

(11. 14-19)

As it seems from the above quotation, Philodemus distinguishes that which is necessary for the life of an Epicurean sage from the πλείονα which bring more conveniences (ἀγαθά) in the life of a man. What is necessary, then, as I think Philodemus suggests, satisfies the needs of the Epicurean sage. And, Philodemus, continuing his argument in the same column, explains what he means by χρεία , with his reference to food, and particularly to frugal food such as grain and meat.

[ὡς] εἰ-
πεῖν, οὐ κακῶς <ἂν> ἐπιτελῶμι·
οἷον ὁρῶμεν καὶ [περὶ] τὴν
τοῦ σίτου κατεργασίαν ἢ τὴν 22

τῶν ὄψων σκευ]ασίαν· πᾶς
γὰρ τις ἱκανὸς α[ὐ]τῶι τὰ τοι-
αῦτα ποιεῖν μέχρι τῆς [ἀ]ρ-
κούσης χρεία[ς]

(Col. XVII, ll.19-26)

The Epicurean sage furnishes himself with only those goods which are necessary for him.[14] I surmise, therefore, that the term χρήματα is connected with χρεία, and takes the meaning of what is necessary for the life, or rather of what is sufficient for the life (τῆς ἀρκού-σης χρείας). In the question which I left unanswered above, then, what the function of the Epicurean economy in relation to χρήματα is, I would suggest that it is concerned with the acquisition of necessary goods and the preservation of them. This form of economy is considered a τέχνη ;

καὶ τις οἰκο-
νομί]α τέχνη, καὶ τ[ί]ς οὐ
τ[έχνη], δυναμένη δὲ [καθά
περ ὑπ]ὸ πολλ[ῶ]ν οὕτω καὶ ὑ-
πὸ [τοῦ] σοφοῦ γ]ίνεσθαι, καὶ δι[

ὅτι σ[υμφέρουσα] καὶ λυσιτελής 1
ἡ τοι[αὐτη] πρὸς ἄκραν εὐετη-
ρίαν, ἐκείνη δὲ ἀλυσιτελὴς 3
καὶ ταλαίπωρος,...

(Coll.XXI 44- XXII 4)

Philodemus, convincingly, defends his view by associating his economy with the τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ λυσιτελές. Both the words in the Epicurean vocabulary have specific meanings. In the chapter I Περὶ Παρρησίας (p. 21 sqq.) we have already read that the Epicureans regarded τέχνη as a function that offers a kind of help to men by filling the gap an ἔνδεια of nature has created in a man's self, or in the external physical reality. This ἔνδεια is the source of pain; ἡδονή is the cessation of pain;[15] and ἡδονή is the end of living.[16] The τέχνη as a means that supplies the natural ἔνδεια, provides men with ἡδονή which is the ultimate goal of the Epicurean philosophy. At this point τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ λυσιτελές achieved by τέχνη fulfil their proper role.[17] The function of the art of management, according to Philodemus, lies in the serenity and peace which it brings to the life of man:

ὃ μ[ὴ γ' εὐ]τελῆ παρέχει βίον
εἰρη[ν]αίως δὲ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀ-
θορύβ[ω]ς [καὶ μετὰ τῆ]ς ἐλα- 36

χίστη[ς] φρο[ν]τίδος κ]αὶ πρά-
γματε[ί]ας [δια]νυ[ό]μενον·

(Col. XII, ll.34-38)

For, as Philodemus says, faithful to Epicurus' doctrines,[18] that way of life is excellent

ὧι ἡ πλε[ίσ]τη συν[παρέ- 46
πεθ' ἡσυχί]α καὶ εἰρήνη καὶ[έλα- 1
χίστη παρενοχλοῦσα φρον-
τίς·

(Col. XII 46 - Col. XIII 3)

quoting the words of Metrodorus.

We should note that in the above quoted passage (Col. XII, 34-38), there is a word which deserves a brief discussion. Philodemus says that, that form of economy is useful which does not provide a εὐτελὴ life. This word serves as a rebuke to Cynics who are mentioned by name in Col. XII 30-33.[19] Philodemus quoting the words of Metrodorus says that the way of living they preached to men is foolish and very easy (ὅ[τι πο]λ[ὺ κουφοτάτην καὶ ῥᾳ[ι]σ[τη]ν οἱ Κυνικοὶ διαγω- (Col. XII, ll.30-32). The γὴν [ἠ]ρηνί[ται . . .) Cynics taught that a man should live his life with pain and exercise in a level of extreme αὐτάρκεια (self-sufficiency);[20] Diogenes Laertius reports that Diogenes

the Cynic preached to his adherents the following:

ἐν οἴκῳ τ' ἐδίδασκε διακονεῖσθαι λιτῇ τροφῇ χρωμένους καὶ ὕδωρ πίνοντες ἐν χρῷ κουρίας τε καὶ ἀκαλλωπίστους ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἀχίτωνας καὶ ἀνυποδήτους καὶ σιωπηλοὺς καὶ καθ' αὑτοὺς βλέποντας ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς.

(D.L. VI 31)

Epicurus disliked Cynic extravagances and called them "the enemies of Greece "[21], for their life, as it appears from the quoted passage (D.L. VI, 31) precludes decent behaviour, and lowers them to the level of beasts. In contrast, the Epicurean life, being peaceful and serene, demands the undertaking of some toils to maintain its framework of decency. For, as Philodemus states a man cannot reach the Epicurean end, unless he suffers some pains for the preservation of pleasures:

οὐ μὴν οὕτω γε φαίνεται τοῦτο γίνεσθαι τὸ τέλος, ἂν πάντα φύγωμεν, ὧν ὑπαρ-
χ[όν]των κἂν πράγματα πο-
τε ἔχωμεν κἂν ἀγωνιάσαι-
μεν. Πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν πραγμά-
των ἐνποιεῖ μέν τινας λύπας
ὑπάρχοντα, πλείω δ' ὀχλεῖ
μὴ παρόντα.

(Col. XII 3-11)

The end of life (τέλος) is the desire of a man to face with tranquillity whatever may befall. It can be

seen in the satisfaction of the necessary desires which comes after a reasoned choice of which desire should be satisfied and which should be avoided.[22] It is ultimately a matter of calculation; the sage must balance pleasures and pains against one another, and choose the course which in the end brings the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain. For as Philodemus says the Epicurean sage is able to adjust his life according to what is useful for him and what not, in order to attain the ultimate end:

Τοιοῦτο [γ]ὰ[ρ] δῆλ[ο]ν
ὡς [ὁ σ]πουδ[α]ῖος, οἷοις π]ολλὰ
τῶι συμφ[έ]ροντι καὶ ἀ]συμ-
φόρῳ δ[ιορ]ίζων [ἐλέσθαι] μᾶλ-
λο[ν] ἑτέρ[ω]ν ἕτε[ρα, ...
(Col. XIII 19-23)

Philodemus uses as an example to defend his case, the care a sage takes for the preservation of bodily health, and the attempts he makes to maintain good relationships with his friends (Col. XIII, 11-19).

In Col. XIV, 5-9 Philodemus discusses the case of management of wealth. He states that richness is not itself a source of troubles for a man, but it is rather the vain desires of a wealthy man that launch him into troubles:

Οὐ φαινε-
ται δ' ὁ πλοῦτος ἐπιφέρειν ἀ- 6
λυσιτελεῖς δυσχερείας παρ' αὐ-
τόν ἀλλὰ παρά τή[ν] τῶν χρω- 8
μένων κακίαν.
(Col. XIV, 5-9)

We should note that the Epicureans were not hostile to the idea of wealth, but Epicurus declared that an Epicurean sage is able to live with few goods when he lacks many.[23] They were hostile, however, to the management of wealth, as it is presented in the treatises of Xenophon and Theophrastus, to which Philodemus refers in the first and second section of his treatise. For the above quotation, it seems to me, alludes to those forms of management, when Philodemus says: παρὰ τήν τῶν χρωμένων κακίαν.

We shall discuss briefly the views of the above authors in order to understand better this view (Col. XIV, ll. 5-9) of Philodemus. Xenophon located the function of household management in the increase of one's property.[24] He preached, first, that a man should take care of the servants he uses. Some servants continually try to run away from their employer, while others are willing to work and to stay at their posts.[25] Second, he should take care of the distribution of his money; some people spend money

not only for necessary purposes, but also for what brings harm to the owner and to the estate.[26] Third, he should, also, be concerned with the age of workers and animals; some ages are considered profitable, while others are not.[27] Fourth, he should be careful, further, in the choice of bailiffs, and laws which govern the administration of a household.[28] Finally, an important thing for the increase of property is the state of the relationship between husband and wife; the cooperation between them contributes to the increase of property.[29]

Philodemus ridicules these theories as springing from a sleepy mind:

τοῖς [καθ'] ὕπνον
αὐτ]όν ἡγοῦμαι δοξαζ]ομέ-
νοις ὅμοια λέγειν.

(Col. VII, 24-26)

because that way of management is pregnant with toils and cruel cares:

πολὺς γὰρ ὁ πόνος
ἤδη περὶ τοῦτο καὶ μετὰ φρον-
τίδος ἐκληρᾶς γιγνόμενος

(Col. XIX, 12-14)

Theophrastus' understanding of the administration of a household, on the other hand, can be summed up as consisting of four function: a) τὸ κτητικον (acquiring),

b) τὸ φυλακτικόν (preserving), c) τὸ κοσμητικόν (arranging), and d) τὸ χρηστικόν (using).[30] Philodemus denounces all these functions by suggesting, as it seems to me, that a sage is not concerned for the διατακτικόν, or παραστατικόν, or any function of such an economic system.[31] Those forms of economy (Xenophon's and Theophrastus'), Philodemus refers to in the words οὐ τέχνη,[32] because they do not match the Epicurean doctrine of τέχνη, since, instead of providing pleasure, they increase the troubles:

ἐκείνη δέ ἀλυσιτελὴς
καὶ ταλαίπωρος, ...

(Col. XXII, 3-4)

Having proved the inconsistency of Xenophon's and Theophrastus' administrative theories with the terms τέχνη and τὸ συμφέρον, Philodemus, next, attempts to show what the function of ὀρθὴ οἰκονομία should be. According to him, the function of economy finds its fulfilment in the principle of αὐτάρκεια (self-sufficiency):

πῶι γὰρ μὴ
λυ[πε]ῖσθαι τ[ῶι] παραπολλυμέ-
ν[ωι] μηδὲ διὰ τὴν ἄκρατον
σ[πουδ]ὴν περὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ
το[ὔλατ]τον ὑφ' αὑ[τ]οῦ ζητρί-
οις πει[ν] ἐ[γκ]εῖσθαι, τούτωι
γ'] ὀ[ρ]θῶς οἰκο[νο]μεῖσθαι νο-
μίζω τὸν πλοῦτον

(Col. XIV, 23-30)

The word (ζητρίοις) which is not cited by L. S. J. is perhaps a corruption. Nevertheless the general sense of the passage seems clear: a man should not worry about losing his wealth, or about acquiring more or less wealth. The implication is that he should be satisfied with what he has at hand. This ability, i.e. to be satisfied with what he has at hand, in the Epicurean vocabulary is called self-sufficiency. Epicurus made this idea clear when writing to Idomeneus he said:

> Ἐζηλώσαμεν τὴν αὐτάρκειαν οὐχ ὅπως τοῖς εὐτελέσι καὶ λιτοῖς παντὼς χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως θαρρῶμεν πρὸς αὐτά.
>
> (C. Bailey, ibid, chapt. V, Πρὸς Ἰδομενέα, sent. 29, p. 126)

Self-sufficiency is the quintessence of the Epicurean way of life. It means independence from desires in general, and in the particular case, from desires concerning wealth. Epicurus again stated:

> Εἰ βούλει πλούσιον Πυθοκλέα ποιῆσαι μὴ χρημάτων προστίθει, τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφαίρει.
>
> (C. Bailey, ibid, sent. 28, p. 126)

This leads the sage to be content with simple pleasures which involves no reaction. Indeed, since pleasure is but the removal of pain, simple food and drink can give a complete pleasure.

Philodemus seems to argue this idea in his statement:

οὐ-
τε [γ]ὰρ ἀσχαλᾶι σώφρων ἀ- 45
νὴρ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλ[ον εὐ]θ[α]ρ- 1
ρὴς τῆι ταπεινῆι καὶ πενιχρᾶι
δι[αί]τηι, τὸ φυσικὸν εἰδὼς καὶ ὑ-
πὸ ταύτης διοικούμενον, ...

(Col. XV 45 - Col. XVI 4)

Philodemus argues that the Epicurean sage, having a clear understanding of what human nature demands is able to be content with the little. Given these considerations Philodemus argues that the Epicurean sage is the only good manager (Col. XVI, 21-25); while a man who has wealth as his goal is σωσωρευτής (Col. XVI, 42). Immediately, however, Philodemus explains that by the term καλὸς οἰκονόμος, he does not mean that the sage is a good τεχνίτης, or ἐργάτης since both of these characteristics of a man, presuppose ἐμπειρία (experience in work) and δύναμις (Col. XVII, 1-13). For, the Epicurean sage is not involved in any sort of work but he lives in ῥαστώνη and pleasure with the company of his friends, and fruitful philosophical discussions (Col. XXIII, 11-22).

In Col. XII Philodemus takes up the treatment of the ways of acquiring goods (πορισμός), by refuting, first, the methods of gaining profit Xenophon and Theophrastus suggested, and by setting out the Epicurean method.

The increase of wealth by means of war (δορίκτητον) is regarded as an immoral method, characteristic of the " δοξοκόποι " men.

Ἡμε[ῖς] δέ [λ]έγωμεν ἀκολου-
θοῦντες [τό] μὲν οἴ[ε]σθαι
πορισμόν ἄ[ριστο]ν εἶναι τὸν
δορίκτητον κα[ὶ χ]ρῆσιν, οἵ-
αν ἐποήσατο Γ[ε]λλίας ὁ Σι-
κελιώτης καὶ Σκόπας ὁ Θετ-
ταλὸς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Νικίας
οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, δοξοκόπων ἀνθρώ-
πων εἶναι κατὰ σοφίαν οὐδε-
τέραν, ὡς κἂν [α]ὐτοὶ μαρτυ-
ρήσειεν οἱ βίοι τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα
γραφόντων·

(Col. XXII, 17-28)

Probably in the above passage Philodemus refutes Aristotle who considered war to be a means of acquiring property

διὸ καὶ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσται

(Aristotle, Politics, I, 8). As δοξοκόποι , Philodemus characterizes the politicians and military people.

ὅλως [δ]ὲ φαί-
νονται τὰ[ς ἐπι]τ[εύ]ξεις
εἰς τοὺς πο[λ]ιτικοὺς ἀ-
ναπίθε[σθαι] καὶ τ[οὺ]ς πρακτι-
κούς, ...

(Col. XXII, 28-32)

This type of character is illustrated by the examples of Gellias the Sicilian, and Scopas the Thessalian, and Cimon and Nicias, the Athenians. These people (δοξοκόποι)

do not labour for the goods which lead to ἀταραξία (Col. XXII, 36-48).

Further the acquiring of money from horsemanship and mining is characterized as a ridiculous thing (γελοιότατον), and madness (μανικόν) (Col. XXIII, 1-7). Probably, Philodemus, here, rejects, on the one hand, Xenophon's claim that horsemanship is a profitable work:

> ἦν δέ καὶ ἀφ' ἱππικῆς σοι ἐπιδεικνύω τοὺς μέν εἰς ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐληλυθότας, τοὺς δέ διά τήν ἱππικήν καί πάνυ εὐπόρους ὄντας, καὶ ἅμα ἀγαλλομένους ἐπί τῷ κέρδει;
>
> (Xenophon, Oec. III, 8)

On the other hand, he probably expresses a negative view concerning Theophrastus' belief that mining is the second most important job after agriculture, which a man should do:

> κτήσεως δέ πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια ἡ κατά φύσιν· κατά φύσιν δέ γεωργική πρωτέρα, καὶ δεύτεραι ὅσαι ἀπό τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτική καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη.
>
> (Aristotle, Oecon. 2, 25)

The third kind of πορισμός , which is rejected, is agriculture (Col. XXIII, 7-10). Philodemus in Col. VII lines

25-36 suggests that agriculture is an 'art' springing from personal experience and not from philosophy; thus, a philosopher should not be concerned with it. Epicurus declared that the sage may be fond of the country, "φιλαγρήσειν" (D.L. X, 120), but, Philodemus adds, he must not be an owner of land (Col. XXIII, 9-10). The πορισμός which is suited to a sage's nature is whatever he earns from his teaching, as a token of gratitude from his students and friends to him:

> πρῶτον δέ
> καὶ κάλλιστον ἀπὸ λόγων
> φιλο[σό]φων ἀνδράσιν δεκτι-
> κοῖς μεταδιδομέν[ων] ἀντι-
> μεταλαμβάνειν ⟨τὸ⟩ εὐχάρι-
> στον ἅμα μετὰ σεβασμοῦ
> παντός, ὡς ἐγένετ' Ἐπικού-
> ρωι,
>
> (Col. XXIII, 23-30)

That this principle was respected by all the Epicureans is confirmed by the statement of Epicurus

> χρηματιεῖσθαι τε (τὸν σοφόν) ἀλλ' ἀπὸ
> μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα.
>
> (D.L. X, 121)

The importance of acquiring goods is summed up in the feeling of security the sage experiences upon being released from desires and fears associated with his living. The following quotation seems to me to imply this emotional

state :

ὧν δ' ἐπιτηδευ-
τέον εἰς π[ρ]όοδον καὶ τήρη-
σιν ταύτης τε καὶ τῶν προϋ-
παρχόν[τ]ων ἐν τῆι τῶν ἐ-
πιθυμιῶν εὐσταλείαι καὶ τῶν
φόβων·

(col. XXIII, 36-41)

Security (ἀσφάλεια) was the feeling of freedom from fears about the outcome of the future, or about death, or divinity, or the feeling of release from desires for more wealth, or luxurious banquets, as Philodemus makes explicit in fragments $XXIII_{42}$ - $XXIV_{11}$. N. Dewitt characterizes the word security as the "catch word of Epicureanism".[33] N. Dewitt suggests that both peace and safety were essential conditions for the tranquility of the Epicurean sage. And both security and peace result from reasoning. Epicurus states that:

οὐ γάρ ποτε καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ'
ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα,
τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾶ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς
καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος
τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.

(D.L. X, 132)

Consequently, Philodemus relates the knowledge of the sage with the management of his goods, so that he is able to protect himself from the threat of irrational fears or

desires (Col. XXIV, 7-10). The sage may participate in luxurious banquets without being affected by luxury either in desiring it, or disliking it.

οὐ[δ]ὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖν
καὶ ἀναπρέπειν εἰ[θίστ]αι λαμ-
προτάτα[ις καὶ πλ]ουσιωτάτας
οἰκίας ὡ]ς πολυτέλι[αί τε] δι- 45

αίτη]ς καὶ γυν]α[ικ]ισμοὶ 1
καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὁμοιότ]ροπα, (verb is missing)
(Col. XXIII 42 - Col. XXIV 2)

It is probable that, here, Philodemus implies, in contrast to the moderation with which the Epicureans dealt with luxury, the extravagant response of Cynics to displays of luxury, when he says that the Epicureans are not accustomed to turning upside-down luxurious homes or banquets. I arrive at this conclusion, because Diogenes Laertius relates a story about Diogenes', the Cynic, eccentric behaviour to the hosts of a wealthy house to which he was invited: "someone took Diogenes the Cynic into a magnificent house and warned him not to expectorate, whereupon having cleared his throat, Diogenes discharged the phlegm into the man's face, being unable, he said, to find a meaner receptacle." [34]

A final point to be noted with respect to Philodemus' treatise On Economy is that it is concerned with the disposition

of the sage.

The Epicurean sage should be a φιλάνθρωπος, by sharing his goods with his friends (Col. XVIII, 5-7). The doctrine of φιλανθρωπία in the meaning of love of mankind, originated in the Hellenistic age. It appeared in three forms: a) a readiness to meet and greet people personally, b) charity to the needy, and c) generous hospitality, arising apparently from an enjoyment alike of good food and social intercourse.[35] The Epicurean philanthropy has the form of generous hospitality and charity to the needy as well as of social intercourse.

ὁ σοφὸς εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα συγκαθεὶς μᾶλλον ἐπίσταται μεταδιδόναι ἢ μεταλαμβάνειν.

(C.Bailey ibid , chapter V, frg. XLIV)

The Epicurean φιλάνθρωπος has a similarity to the Aristotelian liberal man (ἐλεύθέριος), who is described as the one who is more concerned with giving to the right recipients than with getting wealth.[36]

In contrast to the Epicurean φιλάνθρωπος stand the common people who dislike φιλανθρωπία in the form of

giving wealth to other people, because they consider it a waste of money (Col. XVIII, 34-37).

A second virtue which characterizes the sage is justice; for as Epicurus says

ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ'ἄδικος
πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.

(D.L. X, 144, Fr. XVII)

Philodemus states that the just man may gain more wealth than the unjust one (Col. XXIV 11-19). Along with justice, friendship is considered another element that should adorn a sage's character. To be friendly towards other people, Philodemus states, secures the wealth and well-being of the sage (Col. XXIV, 19-29). We can trace in that suggestion of Philodemus a note of 'calculation', which is made explicit in Epicurus maxim:

καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας (γίνεσθαι).

(D.L. X, 120)

In contrast, an ἀφιλάνθρωπος and ἀνήμερος [37] disposition makes men helpless, isolated, and even scatter their properties (Col. XXIV, 29-33).

The Epicurean sage, further, must show concern for the preservation of wealth, not only for the present, but for the future too; because the wealth existing in the

present makes people look at the future with hope; thus, the future, when it becomes the present, maintains the pleasure a sage was feeling in the past:

Δεῖ
δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ συνάξειν
τι καὶ τὸ συναχθὲν φυλάξειν
"μὴ τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν", κατ'Ἐ-
πίχαρμον, οὐ μόνον δαπά-
νης ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ προφανέν-
τος κέρδους ἁρπαστικὸν
γινόμενον, προνοεῖν δὲ καὶ
τοῦ μέλλοντος· καὶ γὰρ νῦν
εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ καὶ παρον
γινόμενον εὐφραίνει.
(Col. XXV, 4-14)

Epicurus defended the same view in his Letter to Menoeceus in which he says:

καὶ κτήσεως προνοεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ
μέλλοντος. (D.L. X, 120)

We should note , further, that Philodemus in the above quotation (Col. XXV, 4-14) and particularly in lines 7-8 refutes the maxim of Epicharmus, the Sicilian poet, who, defending the Pythagorean views, declared that a man should care only for the present.[38]

We shall close the present chapter by discussing the last of the ideas which Philodemus uses to advise the Epicurean adherents and sages, the idea of moderation.

In Col. XXVI, 15-18 of the present treatise we read:

τὸ γὰρ πλεονάζον αἰσχρόν
ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον χρήσιμον
εὔσχημον, αἰσχρὸν δὲ πά-
λιν τὸ μηδ[ὲ] ἕν

Philodemus calls the sage to the practice of moderation. He, the sage, being an excellent manager should not succumb to desire for great wealth which is useless, because it is αἰσχρόν. For the Epicureans believed that all the pleasures themselves are good, but not all of them should be chosen because of the concomitant pain they include. On the other hand, extreme poverty is also rebuked by the Epicureans, as we have already seen in the discussion of the Cynics.[39] Philodemus suggests that the balance between the two extremes is maintained with the acquisition of what is useful. Moderation is an essential element which qualifies the Epicurean sage. The satisfaction of the necessary wants provides pleasure and serenity, even if the sage lives in poverty (Col. XXVII). On the contrary, the satisfaction of excessive and vain desires is an almost endless task which provokes the vain desire of more wealth, and subsequently, of more troubles. Epicurus' following maxim defends this idea:

Ἡ πενία μετρωμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει
μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ
ὁρισόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.

(C. Bailey, ibid, Fr. XXV)

FOOTNOTES

1. Cicero, De officii I, 158.

2. That Cicero was an Academic is testified by his belief in the immortality of soul. In his book De Natura Deorum Cicero defends the Platonic theology against other philosophies. For an evaluation of Cicero's beliefs see Anthony Trollope, The life of Cicero, v. II, chapter vii, London, Chapman and Hall, Limited, 193, Piccadilly, 1880.

3. C. Bailey, ibid, chapter V, Fr.80.

4. D.L. X, 127 sq.

5. Aristotle, Oeconomica, Loeb Classical Library, transl. by C. Armstrong.

6. supra, p. 17.

7. D.L. X, 35.

8. supra, p. 62, ll.1-2.

9. ibid l.8.

10. ibid ll.7-9, p. 62.

11. L.S.J., see under the word χρῆμα .

12. The word χρῆμα derives from the root χρη and the suffix μα. The suffix μα indicates that the

notion of the noun is the result of the action of the verb. Thus, if the root χρη means to need, χρῆμα is something needed. Since a man's needs are mainly food, or goods, then, χρῆμα came to refer as an object and not as an (abstruct) idea. Aristotle then uses the word χρῆμα in that meaning as an object (goods, possessions).

13. See Jean Bollack, La pensée du plaisir, pp.540-542.

14. See, D.L. X, 149.

15. D.L. X, 127 sq.

16. D.L. X, 128, 129.

17. For an evaluation of the τὸ συμφέρον of τέχνη see M. Isnardi - Parente Physis et téchne dans quelques textes épicuriens, A.G.B. 1968, pp.263-271.

18. D.L. X, 127-128-129.
19. infra, pp.70-71.
20. For an evaluation of the Cynic doctrine of self sufficiency see J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, chapter V: Autarcy .

21. D.L. X, 8.

22. D.L. X, 129.

23. C, Bailey, ibid, chapter V, Fr. 29.

24. supra, pp. 65

25. Philodemus Περὶ Οἰκονομίας Col. IIIb.

26. ibid, Col. $IIIb_{40-46}$; Xenophon, Oeconomicus III_5.

27. ibid Col. II_{1-3}; Xenophon, ibid III_{10-15}.

28. ibid Col. VII_{10-26}; Xenophon, ibid $XIII_3$ sq., XIV_1sq.

29. ibid Col. II_{3-35}; Xenophon, ibid III_{10-15}.

30. ibid Col. X_{28-34}; Aristotle, Oeconomica A, VI 1344b,22.

31. Phil. ibid Col. $XVII_{41}$ - $XVIII_7$.

32. Phil. ibid Col. XXI_{45-46}.

33. N. DeWitt, Epicurus and his philosophy, Minnesota, 1954, p.184.

34. D.L. VI_{132}, transl. by R.D. Hicks.

35. D.L. III_{98}; for an evaluation of the meaning of Philanthropia in antiquity see J. Ferguson; Moral Values in Ancient World, under the chapter Philanthropia.

36. Aristotle, N.E. II vii 4, IV i.

37. Ἀφιλάνθρωπος is considered that man who lacks the qualities of φιλάνθρωπος whom we described above p. 83 sq. Ἀνήμερος is considered a boorish man. For example the farmer Knemon in Menander's comedy Dyscolus may be

characterized as ἀνήμερος .

38. Plato, Gorgias, 499c.

39. supra, pp.70-71.

CHAPTER IV

ON DEATH

The precariousness of life was a commonplace in ancient thought. Death is an ever-present menace that threatens the life of men. Sophocles, for example, in the first choral song of his tragedy Antigone presents man as having to look in every direction for succour against the foe that is ever in the land, death, but from no quarter finding help.

"Αιδα μόνον φεύξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται.

(Sophocles, Antigone, 1.361)

Several philosophical and theological or mythological theories, which circulated among the Greeks and Romans, aimed at releasing people from the fear of death, by preaching that death is the passage to immortality. But, soon the theories of immortality, connected with notions of retribution and punishment in the afterlife, which resulted from the misdeeds a man had committed during his earthly life, filled the minds of men with fear. Παθεῖν τον ἔρξαντα [1] Aeschylus maintains in the Agamemnon, and Greek tragedy exemplified the realization of this maxim in the fate of Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, Orestes. Man just and unjust is equally prone to some kind of flaw, which deserves retri-

bution, imposed on him by his own deeds, or by destiny. Aeschylus saw as some kind of divine necessity " ἐπεί δ' ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον "[2] the power that drives men to errors. Pindar identified the source of these errors, and the starting point of punishment in the irrational desires - ambition, avarice, power - that conquer the mind of man.

> θεός, ὅ καί πτερόεντ' αἰετόν κίχε, καί θαλάσσαιον παραμείβεται
> δελφῖνα, καί ὑψιφρόνων τιν' ἔκαμψε βροτῶν,...
>
> (Pindar, Pythian Odes II, 11.50-3)

Plato in Phaedo[3] preached the separation of soul from every kind of bodily indulgence, in order to secure the purity that enables it to live an immortal blessed life in the abodes of the eternal ideas.

Epicurus was the first philosopher who attempted to convert the fear of death and punishment in the afterworld to a motive for living. He first gave scientific proofs, pointing out that consciousness which is the basis of every feeling ceases at death, and immortality is nothing but a false opinion sprung from ignorance:

> Συνέθιζε δέ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδέν πρός ἡμᾶς εἶναι τόν θάνατον· ἐπεί πᾶν ἀγαθόν καί κακόν ἐν αἰσθήσει· στέρησις δέ ἐστιν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος ὅθεν γνῶσις ὀρθή τοῦ μηθέν εἶναι πρός ἡμᾶς

τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον.

(Diog. Laertius, Lives, X,124)

Philodemus, faithful to his master's words, in his treatise On Death takes up a scientific and axiomatic refutation of popular beliefs associated with death. The treatise of Philodemus On Death (Περὶ θανάτου) is preserved in a papyrus discovered at Herculaneum (Papyrus Herculanensis, 1050, published in 1804-5 in Naples'). It contains 39 columns in varying states of preservation. I have followed T. Kuiper's text (it contains 39 columns which reproduce exactly the papyrus and was published in Amsterdam in 1925) accepting the restorations adopted by him and maintaining the capital letters of his text (in any fragment I quote) which he uses to denote that word division or interpretation of the letters is uncertain. The text of the present treatise, as it is, presents many problems concerning the interpretation of Philodemus ideas because we do not know what parts of Philodemus' treatise are lost; if these parts were important for a right understanding of the treatise, and if Philodemus in the lost

parts of his treatise presented any new ideas besides those which Epicurus expressed. Yet there are many gaps in the sequence of ideas of the preserved fragments because whole lines or isolated words are missing. Nevertheless, in spite of the imperfections of the text, the basic lines of Philodemus' handling of the present topic, death, are clearly intelligible. The problem of death is substantially reduced to two essential points: first, death brings unconsciousness, and, therefore, is painless; afterlife, as a new dispensation of rewards and retributions, is but an absurd fantasy (Col. I (L.A.Q)O. - Col XX. Fr. 10. O). Second, Philodemus claims that there is no worthy and worthless death since death is nothing but a dissolution of the nucleus of atoms that compose the soul and body bringing man to life (Col. XX, Fr.11.0, 1.34 - Col. XXXIX. Col. 10.0). It is my intention not to discuss the text as a whole but, on the basis of selected passages, to discuss how Philodemus arrives at the conclusion that death should not horrify people, by examining what death is, whether it is painful or not, whether death is a passage to immortality or not, what immortality actually is, and, finally, why men should not be concerned about the way in which they are buried.

In the Col. I, Philodemus explains what death means for the Epicurean philosophers. The basic idea of that

column seems to be that death means lack of consciousness, and, consequently, the disappearance of life.

τὴν ἀναισθησίαν . . . . . [τὴν ἐν]
τῶ[ι] τεθνάναι μη[δέν] . . . . [εἶ]-
ναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς·

(Col. I (1.A.a)O. 11.5-7)

The key word for the interpretation of this passage is the term ἀναισθησία, that is, absolute deprivation of any αἴσθησις. Epicurus, according to Diogenes Laertius, in his Canonics remarks that αἴσθησις is a criterion of perception of the physical world, and of apprehension of the moral world. It takes the form of external sensations, eyesight, hearing, touching, or taste, by which we form the perceptions of physical reality (D.L. ibid, X, 32). As to its application in the moral world, αἴσθησις takes the form of πάθος, of internal feeling of pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (ἀλγηδών) which is the measure of good and evil (D.L. X, 34). Now, the word ἀναισθησία being etymologically produced from the world αἴσθησις and the privative α, has the meaning of lack of sensation. As such, it results in the cessation of any physical and intellectual process that constitute the substance of living, and, consequently, in death. A

question is raised, however, whether the process of death is painful or painless. Certain ancient philosophers held the view that θάνατος is a painful procedure. The Academic philosopher Panaetius, for example, believed that everything which is sensible to pain perishes, establishing, thus, a sort of connection between death and pain. Cicero sums up Panaetius' argument in the following passage:

> Credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? Quem enim omnibus locis divinum, ... , quem Homerum philosophorum appellat, huius hanc unam sententiam de immortalitate animorum non probat. Vult enim, quod nemo negat, quidquid natum sit interire, nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo, qui procreentur, quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus appareat. Alteram autem adfert rationem, nihil esse quod doleat quin id aegrum esse quoque possit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum: dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire.
>
> (Cicero, Tusc. Disp., I, 79)

Philodemus takes up the refutation of the opinion death is painful, in a badly preserved fragment of his treatise. In Col. I 7-13 we read

εὐο[μολόγητον] ... 7
τὸ τὴν στέρησιν τ[ῶν] ..... [ἀγα]-
θῶν μετ' ἀναισθησ[ίας] ..... [ὑ]-
πάρχουσ[α]ν ΑΝΥΠΟΝΕ 10

καὶ οὐ τοιαύτην οἵαν Ε..... 11
ζῆν Η.. ΚΑΝΟΜΕΙΝ .....
καθίστησιν

(Phil. Col.I (I.A.a)O, ll.7-13)

Buresh[4] has suggested the following emendation for the lines 7-11 of the above passage:

εὐομολόγητον (δέ ἐστι) 7
τὸ τὴν στέρησιν τ(ῶν τοῦ ζῆν ἀγα)-
θῶν μετ' ἀναισθησί(ας τελείας ὑ)
πάρχουσαν (ἄνευ πόνου γίνεσθαι) 10
καὶ οὐ τοιαύτην οἵαν Ε..... 11

(Col. I (I.A.a)0, ll.7-11)

The emended passage pleading the proposition that the deprivation of life which takes place with a total lack of perception occurs without pain, appears to be juxtaposed to the sentence beginning with καὶ οὐ ... (l.11) which vindicates the contrary opinion. Death is painful. The origin of such a belief, as Philodemus reports (Col. VIII, Fr. I.O), may be traced in the idea that the process of the separation of the soul from the body provokes disturbances:

[συμβή]- 1
ὄεται τε κατὰ τὸν λόγον πάσας μετ']

ἀκρων ἀλγηδόνων ἐ[πιγίνεσθαι τὰς]
τελευτὰς, ἀξιοῦντωΣ[ν] ἀ]δύν[ατον εἶναι] 3
τὴν ἀνυπέρβλητον λ[ύ]εσθαι συ[μφυΐ]-
αν μὴ μετ' ὀχλήσεω[ς] ἀνυπερβ[λήτου] 5

(Col.VIII Fr.1.0, ll.1-5)

That the soul and body were considered as being in close correspondence is indicated by the word συμφυΐα . Epicurus, in his 'psychology'[5] held the thesis that the soul being composed by very fine atoms like those of air and heat, was a material body whose atoms were kept together by being enclosed in the more solid atoms of the body. The soul so protected had the capacity of producing the accident of sensation, by the motion of its own component atoms, and further, to communicate this sensation to the body. Philodemus, on the other hand, omitting the scientific explanation of the connection between soul and body, gives a moral explanation, by finding in the notion of συμπάθεια the display of the emotional connection between body and soul

φήσομεν γε τὴν συμπάθιαν πρὸΣ τὸ]
σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, . . .

(Philod. On Death, Col.VIII Fr. 1.0, ll.6-7)

The word συμπάθιαν(i.e.,συμπάθειαν) produced from the verb

συμπάσχω, "to feel along with", denotes the reciprocal feeling of pleasure or pain perceived by both, the soul and the body. Jean Bollack[6] in his book on Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus, defines the word συμπάθεια as the "lien d' affinité qui unit le sujet et l' objet de la perception." Συμπάθεια, in Philodemus' treatise Περὶ Παρρησίας, is considered as an essential means of release from mental pains for both teachers and students.[7] In Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus 63. συμπάθεια denotes the maintenance of harmony between body and soul. C. Bailey, in his commentary on Epicurus, conjectures that: "the third part (of the soul) is most capable of acting in harmony with the rest of the body, owing to its subtlety of structure, which enables it to interpenetrate the structure of the body more completely than can either of the other two elements."[8] Whenever, therefore, the soul perceives pain through sensation, it communicates it to the body through the motion of its atoms which penetrate the structure of body; the body, in succession, perceives the feeling of pain by sympathy with soul. Consequently, any break of the συμφυΐα of body and soul perceived through συμπάθεια by the soul and body should be painful, as it was argued by the opponents of Epicureanism.[9]

Philodemus arguing against the case in point, maintains that as soon as the procedure of loosening the atomic

nucleus of soul starts, consciousness ceases to be effective since any consciousness exists only in the soul; thus no painful feeling can be communicated to the body.

ἐκ τίνος [δή?], κἂν
εἴπ[ωμ]ε[ν ἀλγηδόνιο[ς] αἰτίαν εἶναι],
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων δι[ά]κρισιν [λίαν δε]-
δοίκα[μεν ἧς ταχιστ' ἀ]ποτελε6-
μέν[ης ἀναισθητήσομεν];

(Col.VIII, Fr. 1.0, ll.20-24)

The procedure of separation of the soul from the body, Philodemus calls ἑτεροίωσις (alteration) (Col. VIII, Fr.1.0, 1.12). Epicurus uses the same term, ἑτεροίωσις , to indicate atmospheric changes,

ἑτεροιώσεις ἀέρος καὶ μεταβολάς
(D.L. X, 98)

Ἑτεροίωσις , further, in Philodemus' vocabulary, indicates the alteration that takes place in the formation of the atomic nucleus which composes the soul and body, and results in the production of free atoms (Col. VIII, Fr. 1.0, 11.13-24). That this process is painless is illustrated by a cluster of examples of changes that take place in the organism of human beings, which Philodemus calls μεταβολαί (Col. VIII, Fr. 1.0, 1.38); for example, the case of an old drunk man who falls asleep; or the process of growth of

man from infancy to puberty, to maturity and to old age; or when a man is under the influence of drugs such as opium from poppies (Col. IX, Fr. 2.0, ll.1-8). Thus, Philodemus argues that a man feels no physical pain at the moment of his death. Indeed, the notion of death as something painful, Philodemus seems to argue in Col. III (2.B.a) ll.30-2, is implanted in the mind of people, who, reflecting on death, are conquered by a feeling of insecurity, and overwhelmed by desperation sprung from the thought that they will be deprived of all the goods which they have enjoyed during their life-time. This thought drives them to imagine death as the most cruel and abominable event they have to encounter.

> ...Ε ταλ[α]ίπωρος ἐποι[μώζει ?]
> [οἵω]ν ἐστέρηται διαλελυ[μένος τὸ]
> [σῶμ]α ὑπάρχων

(Col. III (2.B.a.)0. ll.30-2)

In the third book of Lucretius' <u>De Rerum Natura</u> the thoughts that agitate a man are vividly described.

> " Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor
> optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati
> praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent.
> non poteris factis florentibus esse, tuisque
> praesidium. misero misere," aiunt, " omnia ademit
> una dies infesta tibi tot praemia vitae."

(<u>De Rerum Natura</u>, III,ll.894-899)

And Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus maintains that in reality pain exists only in the imagination of people:

ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον
οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει παρών, ἀλλ' ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων

(D.L. X, 125)

> Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect.[10]

The yearning of men for an everlasting pleasure was expressed through the theories of immortality and afterlife. Afterlife was imagined as a precise facsimile of the life on earth. In Col. VI Philodemus, with great economy, describes how the common people imagined afterlife.

[τό γ]ε μήν ἀποκαρτερουν-
[τα αὐτοκ]ρίτως ἀποθνήσ[κ]ειν
[καί πόνοις συ]νέχεσθαι βαρέσιν
[περί βρώματα ἢ] περί [πό]τους ἔργον
[ἐστί νή Δία ἀοπλ]ήκτου φαν[ταsίας]

(Col. VI (6.C.c.)0, ll.10-14)

The words βρώματα and πότοι underline the two fundamental elements that conserve the life, and determine the happiness of a man on the earth. But βρώματα and πότοι, as Philodemus tells us, are the elements that determine the happiness of man in the afterlife too. The image of Hades

as a place where the man continues his life tossed about between happiness and adversity, Philodemus claims, is a creation of an irrational imagination (ἀπόληκτος φαντασία). Φαντασία , imagination, is a mental procedure of perception of the physical world. Epicurus in the Letter to Herodotus defines φαντασία as following:

> καὶ ἣν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων, μορφὴ ἔστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ διημαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεί ἐστιν <ἐπί τοῦ προσμένοντος> ἐπιμαρτυρηθήσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθήσεσθαι, εἶτ' οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρουμένου <ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρουμένου> [κατά τινα κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσαν, καθ' ἣν τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται.]
>
> (D.L. X, 50)

Consequently, a man, by the means of perception, forms in his mind an image of the present world. To this image a personal judgement (αὐτοκρίτως) deriving from beliefs in immortality, is added, and gives birth to the image of the underworld. Since this new mental formation contradicts reality, for there is nothing in the physical world which could assert the existence of the underworld, it is an irrational one (ἀπόληκτος). The ultimate cause of such an irrational thought was, as I have already said (p.102),

the desire of man to live as long as possible in order to enjoy greater pleasures. Philodemus, realizing the need of people for pleasure and security, taught that knowledge, defined as the knowledge of Epicurean philosophy, enables a man to get rid of the ghosts of death and afterlife, and to enjoy complete pleasure within the limited time of his earthly life.

..[ἡ]δονήν ὁπόσος χρόνος τῶι ἀ[ν]-
[θρώπωι] παρασκευάζειν πέφυκεν ὅτ[αν]
[τις αὐ]τῆς καταλάβη[ι] τοὺς ὅρους το
....μα. τὸ σάρκινον εὐθὺς ἀπέλα-
[βε τ]ὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπε[ιρον]
[κἄν αὐτὴν ἄ]πειρος χρόνος περιεποίη[σεν]

(Col. III (2.B.a.)0, ll.34-39)

This passage, though it is obscure and mutilated, is clarified by Epicurus' maxims XVIII, XIX, and XX.

οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδάν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ' ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται.

(D.L. X, 144 [XVIII], ll.1-3)

Ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ

(Ibid., XIX)

and Ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος

λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη. (D.L. X, 145 [XX], ll.1-7)

Bailey in his commentary on Epicurus, interpreting the above passages, suggests that Epicurus seems to believe that the amount of pleasure is limited for both body and mind; there is a point (ὅρος) beyond which pleasure cannot be increased in quantity (μέγεθος), but only varied.[11] For the body according to Epicurus this point is reached when there is ἀπονία, when all pain due to want is removed by the satisfaction of want.[12] Epicurus declares that the satisfaction comes with the fulfilment of the physical and necessary desires of man, such as drink when a man is thirsty.[13] For the mind the limit is the establishment of ἀταραξία by the rational comprehension of the limits of pleasure, and the right understanding of emotions like the desires and fears connected with the conception of death and immortality.[14] Beyond these limiting points a man can only obtain variation of pleasure, and though for the mind variation is good, because it has the ability to distinguish what is actually pleasant and what not, for the body it means the introduction of those pleasures which involve pain, such as the vain desires for fame, wealth, power.[15] The mind, however, knowing the limits of pleasure, drives man to a choice, and avoidance of desires. For the body deprived of

sensation and reason perceives the feeling of pleasure as something which might be indefinitely increased; if this is the case the longer the time, the greater would be the pleasure, and infinite time would produce infinite pleasure.[16] But the mind, as Epicurus states, knows well that this is not so, but there is a quantitative limit for both mind and body. For, as Epicurus states in the maxims XIX and XX,[17] complete pleasure can be attained in finite time, and infinite time could not produce greater pleasure. These views of Epicurus, as analyzed by C. Bailey, it seems to me, clarify Philodemus above statement (p.14), which, actually, presents Epicurus' maxims XVIII, XIX and XX in a condensed form.

I should note, however, that Philodemus in order to argue about the possibility of attainment of complete pleasure within the limited time of man's life brings forth two new arguments: first, the argument of ὁμοείδεια of pleasure, and, second, the argument of ἰσότητα of pleasure.

νῦν [δέ σ]οφῶι γενομένωι καὶ ποσ[όν]
χρόνο[ν ἐ]πιζήσαντ[ι] τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν
ἀπε[ί]λειπται. τῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἰσό-
τητα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ὁμοείδειαν πορεί-
ας γινομέ[νης] ἕως [ε]ἰς ἄπειρον εἰ δυνα-
τὸν εἴη βα[δί]ζειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν·

(Col. XIX, Fr. 9.0, ll.1-6)

First, I should remark that Philodemus, as every Epicurean, considers as μέγιστον ἀγαθόν in the life of man the attainment of complete pleasure, namely the ἀταραξία of mind and ἀπονία of body. Now, this μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, as Philodemus tells us, is ὁμοειδές and ἴσον. These words define two different <u>properties</u> of pleasure. The word ὁμοείδεια refers to quality of pleasure, and the word ἰσότητα refers to quantity of pleasure. I translate ὁμοείδεια as meaning <u>same in nature</u>. I have reached this translation by examining a passage that occurs in Epicurus' fragments. In it, the ancient scholiast speaking about the substance of the nature of the Epicurean gods, separates them into two kinds: those " οὓς μέν κατ' ἀριθμούς ὑφεστῶτας ", and those " οὓς δέ κατά ὁμοείδειαν."[18] Bailey translates the term ὁμοείδεια as <u>identity of form</u>: "the form of the divine body remains always the same."[19] To this <u>identity of form</u>, the divine body is composed by the same kind of atoms, the gods owe their imperishability and eternality. In a same way, pleasure is ὁμοειδής, her nature cannot change, it is always the same. ἀπονία for the body, and ἀταραξία for the mind. Once a man has obtained these qualities, he has attained the complete pleasure and cannot expect to reach a greater pleasure, since the peak and the limit of complete pleasure is ἀπονία and ἀταραξία. Further, complete pleasure as taking the

form of ἀπονία and ἀταραξία is always same in quantity (ἰσότητα), because, once, ἀπονία and ἀταραξία are established, these cannot be greater or smaller but always the same, whether a man lives for a short time, or for a long time, or forever.

τῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἰσό-
τητα αὐ[το]ῦ καὶ τὴν ὁμοείδειαν πορεί-
ας γινομέ[νης] ἕως [εἰ]ς ἄπειρον εἰ δυνα-
τόν εἴη βαδίζειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν·

(Col. XIX, Fr. 9.0, ll.3-6)

Once a man has realized these conditions of pleasure (ὁμοείδεια, and ἰσότητα), he will be happy and he will not desire to live forever. In contrast, a man who ignores the Epicurean doctrine could never attain complete pleasure, even if he were to live as long as Tithonus[20] (Col. XIX, Fr. 9.0, ll.33-38).

Thus, Philodemus argues that the theories of immortality have no practical importance for the people because neither do any witnesses exist to testify to the existence of the underworld, nor should a man long for immortality in order to attain always greater pleasure, because complete pleasure has limits which can be attained within the life-time of man.

Next, Philodemus undertakes to refute philosophical

theories which exhort a man to die early. One of them, as Philodemus reports, preaches that a man should abandon his life at the moment of supreme pleasure.

ἡμεῖς μέν οὖν τοῖς εἰρημένοι[ς χρώ]-
μεθα περὶ τῶν προκειμένων [ἐν οἷς]
πλουσίως κατεγχειροῦσι τὸ λ[άγνον]
παρατιθέντες ὅταν ἐ[κ]πνέοντ[ες ὦ]-
σιν, ὡς μεθ' ἡδονῆ[ς] τελευτῶν[τάς φασι]
τοὺς (?) ἐν τῷ [σ]υνου[σι]άζειν καὶ τὸ [φυσι]-
κὸν [πάθος τῶν ἐ]ν ἀ[ρρ]ωστίαις γόν[ον προ]-
ιεμέ[νων]

(Col. IV (3.C.a.)0., ll.6-13)

Apparently, in this passage Philodemus scolds the Stoics who, according to Cicero, maintained that:

> Et Saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita cum sit beatissimus, si id opportune facere possit. Sic enim censent, opportunitatis esse beate vivere quod est convenienter naturae vivere.
>
> (Cicero, De Finibus III xviii, 61)

Besides the Stoics who have a somewhat opportunistic view of life, there were other philosophers who saw in life nothing but misery. They exhorted man to abandon his life as quickly as possible.

βιωπῶ γὰρ ὅ-
[τι] πολλάκι πολλοῖς τ[ῶν] ἀφρόνω[ν] τὸ
[νέ]ου[ς τελ]ε[υ]τῆσαι λυσ[ιτελέ]στερον·

[φα]ίν[ε]ται καὶ μ]ὴ κατὰ τὴν ἡ̓λικίαν
[ε]ὐθηνοῦσι] τραφῆν[αι οἴ]κοις,
(col. XIII, Fr. 4.0, ll.113-17)

Philodemus states. The philosopher to whom Philodemus refers is probably Theognis, because Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus, 126, accuses him of being the one who encourages youths to die the sooner:

πολὺ δέ χεῖρον καὶ ὁ λέγων, καλὸν μέν μὴ φῦναι,
"φύντα δ' ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀΐδαο περῆσαι"[21]
(D.L. X, 126)

R.D. Hicks the translator of the second volume of Diogenes Laertius' Lives gives in a reference the name of Theognis as the author of the line which Epicurus quotes.[22]

Philodemus denounces the above theories (page 19-20) as pessimistic and defeatist, lacking a real understanding of the order of nature, by setting forth in the following passage, the ends a man should pursue in his life, and which make it worth-living:

τὸ μὲν γάρ, ἵνα συντελέσηται τ[ὰς]
τὰς συνγ[ε]νικὰς καὶ φυσικά[ς] ἐπιθυμία[ς]
καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπολάβη<ι> τὴν οἰ[κ]ειοτάτην
[ἡ]δ[ον]ὴν ἐνδέ[χ]εται διαγωγήν, ὀρεγέσθαι προσ-
[βι]ῶναί τινα χρόνον, ὥστε πληρ[ω]θῆ-
[ναι] τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ πᾶσα[ν] ἐκβαλεῖν
[τὴ]ν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὄ[χ]λησιν ἡ-
[δον]ῆς μεταλαμβάνοντα, νοῦν ἔχον-

[τός ἐ]στιν ἀνθρώπου· τὸ δ' ἵνα τῆς
[ἱ]στορ]ίας (verb is missing), πόσα δή ποτέ τις [π]ροσ[βιώσε]-
[τ' ἔτη] κα[θ]άπερ ἐξὸν ταμ[ι]εῖον τοῦ
[νοῦ παρ]α[π]λησίως τὸν ἀπέρ[αντον]
[κόσμ]ον σ[υμπεριέχειν] [

(Col. XIV, Fr. 5.0, ll.2-14)

The mission of a man is to satisfy all the physical wants that are associated with his nature; their satisfaction brings the τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθόν which Epicurus identified with ἡδονή:

> καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν· ταύτην γάρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.
>
> (D.L. X, 128-129)

The attainment of the end of life presumes a rational process of choice of those pleasures that really free a man from pains. The man who has the ability to choose which desires he should satisfy and which not, is the Epicurean sage (νοῦν ἔχον[τός ἐ]στιν ἀνθρώπου). But what does it mean in this context? Philodemus in ll.10-14 of (Col. XIV, Fr. 5.0) seems to give the answer by maintaining that a man νοῦν ἔχων is that one who would recognize the useful for himself after he has trained in the Epicurean philosophy. The acquisition of the knowledge of the ultimate principles that form and rule

the world, and enable a man to realize the vanity of his irrational fears and desires is the knowledge that only the Epicurean philosophy can furnish a man with. This knowledge Philodemus calls ἱστορία and it is the second major reason that compels a man to remain in life (Col. XIV, Fr. 5.0, 1.10). Epicurus in his Letter to Herodotus accuses the Ionian Philosophers of preaching to people ἱστορία which armed them with knowledge, but did not release them from their fears " ἀλλ' ὁμοίως τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν τοὺς ταῦτα καταδόντας."[23] Jean Bollack in his commentary on Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus presents the antithesis between Epicurus and the Ionian philosophers in his statement: "L' histoire naturelle" soucieuse d' accroitre le savoir s' interdit l' acces a la félicité que la "science naturelle," reflexion sur la nature, se procure."[24]

Having proved the absurdity of the conceptions concerning death and immortality by arguing first, that death is cessation of sensation and dissolution of the body and soul into free atoms, second, that man can attain complete pleasure within his life-time and, therefore, he does not need to be dependent on the theories of immortality, and third that the Epicurean philosophy is that philosophy which

secures man from fears and desires, and makes life worth-living, Philodemus confines the last part of his treatise to demonstrating the irrationality of δόξαι concerning the descendants, inheritance, funeral ceremonies, and commemoration of the dead.

It is vain, Philodemus holds, for someone to be vexed at being childless because he will not have descendants to bear his name:

μάταιο]ν δ' ἐσ-
τι καί τ[ό] λυπεῖσθαι τελευτῶντας
ἐπί τῶ[ι τ]έκνα μή καταλείπειν Δι
ΑΛΕΓ[ΟΥΙ.. χά[ρ]ιν γάρ τοῦ διατηρεῖσ-
θαι τώ[νόματα] καθεύδειν ἔξε[σ]τιν ἐ-
π' ἀμφ[ότερα], μυρίων, μᾶλλον [δ'] ἀπεί-
ρων τ[οῖς αὐ]τοῖς [ὀνό]μασιν πρ[ο]αγο-
[ρευο]μ[έν]ων.

(Col. XXII, Fr. 12.0, 11.9-16)

There are many people on the earth who bear the same name, Philodemus replies ironically. The notion of the necessity of children sprang from the belief that the children care more for their parents than any other man. The Stoics, for example, had assigned great value to the affection between relatives. Zeno, according to Diogenes Laertius, had declared:

δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς καί γονέας σέβεσθαι καί
ἀδελφούς ἐν δευτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ μετά θεούς, φασί

δέ καί τήν πρός τά τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικήν
εἶναι αὐτοῖς καί ἐν φαύλοις μή εἶναι.

(D.L. VII , 120)

Philodemus, in order to refute this opinion, namely that the children care more for their parents, quotes examples from mythology. The children of Danaus and his brother had caused their parents trouble;[25] the children of Cadmus, and the descendants of Heracles shared the same fate:[26]

ὁρῶμεν
δέ κ[α]ί τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πόλλούς τυ[γ]-
χάν[ο]ντας ἀναξαπάσης τ[ι]μῆς ἐννό-
μου κ]αί φυσικῆς ὑπό [φ]ίλων ἀξιολό- 11
γως [εὐ]νοηθάντων πολύ μᾶλλον ἤ
τούς τ[ά] Δαναοῦ καί τἀδελφοῦ καί
τοῦ Κά[δμου τέκνα ἤ γέν]ος Ἡρακλ[έ]-
ους κατ[α]λιπόν[τας]. 15
(Col. XXIII, Fr. 13.0, 11.9-15)

On the other hand, Philodemus states that there are friends who really help each other, such as Epicurus and his friends cared for one another (Col. XXIII, Fr. 13.0, 11.3-8).

Yet, the idea that the children are necessary in order to inherit the property of their parents, so that it will not be seized by strangers was another current belief among the ancients. Euripides, for example, in Alcestis puts in the mouth of Admetus the following:

παῖς δ' ἦν ἐγώ σοι τῶν διάδοχος δόμων,

ὥστ' οὐκ ἄτεκνος κατθανών ἄλλοις δόμον
λείψειν ἔμελλες ὀρφανόν διαρπάσαι.

(Euripides, Alcestis, ll.655-57)

Philodemus arguing against this view in Col. XXIV, Fr. 14.0, replies that a man may leave his property to his friends, and eminent people.

(descendants) ἐὰν δ' ὦσιν πονε[ῆ]ροί, προφυλάξα-
θ[αι] δυνατόν [ἀνδράσ]ι σπουδαίοις καὶ
φί[λ]οις ἀπολείποντα, οὓς ὅ]στις οὐκ ἔχει, δι-
ὰ τ[οῦτ' ἐστιν οἰ>κτρ[ός,

(Col. XXIV, Fr.14.0, ll.13-16)

That Philodemus considered very important the distribution of one's property among his friends and sages, may be seen from a passage in the On Economy, in which Philodemus defines as ἀκριβὴ οἰκονόμον that man who takes care to leave a proportion of his property to his friends, and the rest of it to his children.

Φίλων
μὲν τοίνυν ὑπαργό[ν]των
φειστέον μᾶλλον, ἵν' ἔγωσιν
καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἐ[φ]ό[διον],
καὶ οἷα τ[έ]κνα θετέον, οὐχ ὑ-
παρχόντων δὲ καὶ τῆ[ς] ἀ]κ[ρ]ι-
βεστέρας οἰκονομίας [ἀ]νέ[τέ]-
ον, οὐχ ὅτι τ[ῆ]ς φειδοῦς.

(Philodemus, Oeconomicus,
Col. XXVII, ll.5-12)

Apparently, Philodemus, when he sets forth this idea, has in mind Epicurus' example, who distributed his property to his friends Amynomachus and Timocrates.[27]

Death in a foreign country is of little importance for the Epicurean sage (Col. XXVI, Fr. 15.0). A sage, wherever he lives, can be praised and remembered by his friends, because the only criterion for this, is his contribution to the improvement of his friends and the country by his philosophical teaching (Col. XXVI, Fr. 15.0). Furthermore, death, since it results in the annihilation of man, presents no difference whether it occurs in one place or another. Epicurus, Leonteus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus died in foreign countries, and yet they were praised by their friends (Col. XXVII, Fr. 16.0, 11.1-8). The same view was held by Anaxagoras; when he was asked whether he wished in the event of death to be taken away to Clazomenae, his native land, he answered that there was not such a necessity since from any place the road to the underworld is just as far.[28]

As it makes no difference where a man dies, there is no distinction between worthy and disgraceful death, Philodemus argues in Col. XXVIII, Fr. 2.0 and Col. XXIX, Fr. 17.0. A man, he says, is judged by his actions for the benefit of the society, and not by the way of his death.

There were many men who died in the battle-fields but nobody remembers them; while there were others, such as Themistocles, Pericles, Epicurus who died from sickness lying on a bed, and they were praised by all the men (Col. XXIX, Fr. 17.0, ll.2-15).

It is vain, also, for someone to care about being beautiful at the moment of death. Beauty and ugliness exert no influence on the conservation of the body, since a dead body dissolves into its component atoms (Col. XXIX, Fr. 17.0).[31] Nor should a man care for luxurious and expensive funeral ceremonies, because they do not prevent him from being annihilated (Col. XXX, Fr. 18.0). Epicurus preached " οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν "[29] and Philodemus faithfully follows the views of the Master. An extravagant view on this matter was held by Cynics. Cicero relates a story to Diogenes the Cynic concerning the manner of burial:

> Durior Diogenes et is quidem idem sentiens, sed ut Cynicus asperius, proiici se iussit inhumatum. Tum amici: "Volucribusne et feris? Minime vero", inquit, "sed bacillum propter me quo abigam ponitote. Qui poteris?" illi, "non enim senties. Quid igitur mihi ferarum lanicetus oberit nihil sentienti?"
>
> (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. I, XLIII 109)

Finally, Philodemus states that it makes no difference whether a man dies on earth, or in the sea, or in the air (Col. XXXIII,Col. 4.0 - Col. XXIV, Col.5.0). The same view was held by the Cyrenaics, as Cicero reports:

> Cyrenaeum Theodorum, philosophum non ignobilem, nonne miramur? cui cum Lysimachus rex crucem minaretur: "Istis, quaeso", inquit, "ista horribilia minitare purpuratis tuis: Theodori quidem nihil interest humine an sublime putescat."
>
> (Tusc. Disp. I, XLIII, 102)

The Epicurean indifference as to the manner of burial, or as to the place of death, or as to the manner a man dies, underlines their deep belief in the annihilation of human body and soul when a man dies, or at the moment of death. For them, as Philodemus reports, the importance lies in the commemoration of dead by his friends, whose life was an example for imitation by those who knew him (Col. XXXVI, Col. 7.0). This view was sealed by Epicurus' maxim:

Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες[30]

FOOTNOTES

1. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, l. 1564.

2. ibid, l.218.

3. Plato, Phaedo, 112E - 114C; Socrates narrates a myth about the different lives the human souls live in the afterlife in accordance with the sins each one has committed during its earthly life.

4. Buresch J., Consolationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum Historia Critica, Leipziger Studien IX, 1886.

5. Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X, 83-68.5.

6. J. Bollack, La Lettre d'Epicure, p.266.

7. A. Olivieri, Philodemus: Περὶ Παρρησίας libellus , Lipsiae, 1914, p.43.

8. C. Bailey, Epicurus: The extant remains, Oxford, 1926, p.226.

9. supra, pp. 97-98.

10. Diog. Laertius, Lives, X, 125, Loeb. Class. Library, translated by R.D. Hicks, 1925.

11. C. Bailey, ibid., p.359.

12. D.L. X, 127-128.

13. D.L. X, 149.

14. C. Bailey, ibid., pp.359-360.

15. supra, n.14.

16. ibid., pp.360-361.

17. supra, p.15.

18. D.L. ibid, X, 139 (L).

19. C. Bailey, ibid, p.348.

20. The goddess Eos was inspired with the love of Tithonus. She stole him from Troy and took him to Olympus. She prevailed on Jupiter to grant him immortality. However Tithonus was not happy because he was growing older.

21. Theognis 425, 427.

22. D.L., ibid, X, 126, p.653.

23. ibid., X, 79.

24. J. Bollack, ibid., p.242.

25. Aeschylus, Supplices; this tragedy presents the suffering of Danaus and his fifty daughters which were due to the love which the daughters of Danaus inspired in their fifty cousins, sons of Aegyptus,

brother of Danaus.

26. Probably, Philodemus derived his information from Euripides' Bacchae and Heracles Furiens.

27. D.L. ibid, X, 16-17-18.

28. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. I, 104.

29. D.L., ibid, X, 118.

30. C. Bailey, ibid, chapter V, maxim. LXVI, p.116.

Conclusion

The study of Philodemus' treatises *On Frankness*, *On Economy*, and *On Death* has involved a consideration of the ideas which Philodemus sets out in these treatises, and, complementary to that, a brief description of the state of the text of each treatise. It is my intention in this chapter to underline some of the problems which I faced during my study of Philodemus' treatises, as well as the basic ideas which were involved in the writing of each treatise.

When one turns to study *Philodemus* it becomes clear that the problems he has to encounter are not only problems of analysis and illumination of the sometimes obscure 'writing' of Philodemus, but problems concerning the chronology and tradition of the text. It is striking that so far as I know no paper has been published which sets out any argument about the chronology and transmission of Philodemus' treatises (those at least I have studied), the only exceptions being the paper of C. Habbel "The Rhetorica of Philodemus"[1] in which he establishes 70 B.C. as a *terminus ante quem* for the date of composition of that work, the papers of R. Philippson and H.M. Last *On Signs*[2] which establish 54 B.C. as a *terminus post quem*

for the composition of that work, and the edition of the papyrus text of Philodemus' treatise On Gods by H. Diels[3] who establishes 44 B.C. as the date of composition of that treatise. In connection with these chronologies scholars today believe that most of the treatises of Philodemus must have been written between the years 55 B.C. and 40 B.C.[4] However, there are serious problems concerning the treatises I have studied, which question the precision of that chronology.

First, there are stylistic problems which pose the question whether Philodemus composed most of his treatises in the same period or at different periods of his life. Secondly, Cicero, who is the most valuable witness of the life of Philodemus in Italy since he was contemporary with Philodemus, in his oration In Pisonem written in year 55 B.C refers to Philodemus as being a prolific and elegant poet, as well as eruditus and a philosophia perpolitus philosopher.[5] Elsewhere, in the oration De Finibus written in the year 45 B.C., Cicero reports that Philodemus and Siro were his own friends and homines doctissimi.[6] Is it, then,an indication that Cicero had read some philosophical works of Philodemus before the year 55 B.C. and had decided that Philodemus was a remarkable philosopher with respect to his knowledge and

style of writing? We cannot make any certain case from these testimonia, but it is probable that Cicero at that time had read some of Philodemus' treatises. However the problem of chronology remains, since we do not know whether Philodemus wrote his treatises before his appearance in Italy, or after that.

As I mentioned earlier in this chapter,[7] there is a stylistic difference between Philodemus' treatises On Frankness or On Death, and that On Economy. For example, in his treatises On Frankness and On Death, Philodemus uses mythological examples and references to Greek historical persons in order to argue his ideas.[8] It is striking that he has no references to Roman state of affairs, or to eminent Roman people. Is it an indication that he wrote these treatises at some time before his arrival in Italy, or at some earlier time after his arrival in Italy, when he did not know well the Roman way of living, and he had not become acquainted with eminent Romans? In his treatise On Frankness there is a vague reference to eminent people who do not accept παρρησία as a means of correction.[9] But Philodemus does not define who these "eminent people" are, whether they are Greeks or Romans. In the same treatise, there is another puzzling reference to the students of an Epicurean school in which Philodemus

seems to have taught.[10] Are these references an indication that he wrote this treatise when he was leader of the Epicurean school at Herculaneum? If so, then this treatise must have been written after the year 55 B.C., because after that year Philodemus appears to be leader of the school at Herculaneum, as Cicero indicates in his work De Finibus.[11] But it is still strange that that treatise of Philodemus has no reference to any eminent Roman by name, or to any particular event, as the treatises On Signs, On Gods, Rhetorica, and The good king according to Homer have.[12] On the other hand, Suidas reports that Philodemus at some time, presumably after his student days and before his appearance in Italy, was expelled from Himera on a charge of blasphemy.[13] Is it, then, an indication that Philodemus had founded a school there and presumably had written some treatises for the needs of his students? Unfortunately the lack of evidences limits us in making hypotheses.

A different style of treating a subject is introduced in Philodemus' treatise On Economy. In the preserved fragments of that treatise there is no indication that Philodemus used mythological examples to argue his premises, and, besides, there is a reference to the Roman household management.[14] This reference seems to me to be

a palpable indication that Philodemus wrote that particular treatise at some time after his arrival in Italy, when he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the way which the Romans used to administer their estates. It is reasonable, then,to suggest that the year 80 B.C. or 75 B.C.[15] is a terminus post quem for the date of the composition of that treatise.

Another problem one faces when he turns to study Philodemus is that of the tradition of the text. There is no any indication whether the treatises which we have are the original manuscripts of Philodemus or a later copy written by another Epicurean or copyist. Even our confidence on the matter of authorship of the treatises is based only on the fact that all of them bear the name of Philodemus on their titles. The lack of evidence makes greater certainty in this question almost impossible.

When one turns to consider the distinctive characteristics of Philodemus treatises On Frankness, On Death, and On Economy, it becomes apparent that Philodemus departs from the manner the other Epicureans used in writing. Cicero in Tusculan Disputations written in the year 45 B.C. accuses the Epicureans of writing without charm and any orderly arrangement of their ideas.[16] On the other hand, in

De Finibus he speaks with reverence for Philodemus and calls him homo doctissimus,[17] an indication that Philodemus was admired by Cicero for the manner of his writing. Indeed, Philodemus' treatises present an orderly arrangement of the arguments which he uses to treat of a subject. He seems to use the principles which the Greek rhetoricians had established as proper for writing a speech or a treatise, i.e. an introduction on the subject one is going to speak, an analysis, with arguments against opposite ideas, of the subject one deals with, and a conclusion.[18] The style of Philodemus' writing is elegant adorned with mythological examples and quotations from the Greek poetry. For example in the treatise On Frankness Philodemus uses quotations from Homer's Iliad, Euripides' Phoenissae and Aristophanes' Clouds.[19] Again in the treatise On Death Philodemus illustrates with mythological examples the inconsistency of the secular beliefs in immortality, or in the ties of blood.[20]

If we try to investigate the causes that led Philodemus to use that style, we go back to his teacher Zeno of Sidon. J.I.M. Tait has argued that Philodemus was influenced in the manner of his writing by Zeno of Sidon, who first introduced a different style in his writing from that which was used by the traditional Epicureans, in order

to adjust his writing to the requirements of his age.[21] That the philosophers in the Hellenistic and Roman age sought a new stylistic technique to express their obscure philosophical ideas is asserted by Lucretius' poem De Rerum Natura for which Lucretius says that he chose poetry to express the Epicurean ideas, because poetry attracts people by its elegance and grace:

> ... quoniam haec ratio plerumque videtur
> tristior esse quibus non est tractata, retroque
> volgus abhorret ab hac, volui tibi suaviloquenti
> carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram
> et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle,
> si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere
> versibus in nostris possem, dum perspicis omnem
> naturam rerum qua constet compta figura.

(De Rerum Natura, 1, 943-950)

Finally a last point we should discuss is that of Philodemus' contribution to the advancement and interpretation of Epicurus' doctrines. Philodemus in his treatise On Frankness confesses that he actually sets out the beliefs of his teacher Zeno of Sidon.

Φιλοδήμ[υ]
τῶν κατ' ἐπιτομὴν ἐξειρ-
γασμένων περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βι-
ῶν ἐκ τῶν Ζηνωνὸς ο̣χο̣[λ]ῶν
ἃ ἐστι [.] περὶ παρρησίας

We do not know how much Philodemus has contributed in the presentation of παρρησία as a technique that was used by the Epicureans in order to correct their students and

initiate them into Epicurean doctrines, because we do not know what Zeno of Sidon taught on this matter. Diogenes Laertius does not supply us with any information about the works of Zeno, and it is probable that Philodemus, here, reports what he read from an 'epitome' Zeno had written on this subject as the title of that treatise informs us (τῶν κατ' ἐπιτομήν ἐξειργασμένων).

....

His treatise On Death, on the other hand, seems to follow the ideas of Epicurus concerning what death is, why it is not painful, why a man should not believe in immortality. For Epicurus in his Κύριαι Δόξαι sets forth the ideas Philodemus argues in that treatise.[22] Furthermore, in a Herculaneum papyrus, (no.1012, column 38), there is preserved the title Περὶ νόσων καὶ θανάτου of a treatise by Epicurus on this subject, which, R. D. Hicks suggests, is the full title of a book which Diogenes Laertius attributes to Epicurus, entitled Περὶ νόσων δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην.[23] Probably Philodemus' contribution on this subject, death, is the interpretation of death, he has suggested, namely that death is accompanied by ἀναισθησία, and is therefore not painful (Coll. I-IV), or that pleasure is ὁμοειδής and ἵση and therefore a man needs not to live forever in order to attain complete pleasure (Col. XII). Perhaps, the last part of that treatise concerning worthy

and worthless death is original since Philodemus defends his arguments by using examples from the life and death of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Polyaenus and other eminent Epicurean philosophers.[24]

In his treatise On Economy Philodemus seems to follow the ideas which Metrodorus set out in his book Περὶ Πλούτου, as Philodemus reports in Col. XII of his On Economy. Also, Philodemus may have been influenced by Epicurus book Περὶ αἱρέσεων καὶ φυγῶν, which Diogenes Laertius refers to.[25] In that treatise Philodemus analyzes as we have already seen the meaning of economy, presenting it as an art which drives man to the attainment of the Epicurean end, and relating to that the virtues which a sage should have in order to be a righteous οἰκονόμος. We should remark, however, that Philodemus treatises, even if they have no originality, are very useful for the modern scholars because they fill the gap that the loss of many of Epicurus' works has left in the understanding and evaluation of the Epicurean philosophy.

FOOTNOTES

1. See C. Hubbell, The Rhetorical of Philodemus, trans. of Conn. Acad. of Arts and Sciences, 1920, pp.364-382.

2. H.M. Last, The date of Philodemos De Signis, Cl. Q. (1922) pp.177-180; R. Philippson, de Philodemi libro περὶ σημείων, Berlin, 1881, p.6.

3. H. Diels, Philodemus über die Götter, Berlin, 1915, p.99.

4. See J.I.M. Tait, Philodemus' influence on the Latin poets, pp.13-14.

5. Cicero, In Pisonem, 68-70.

6. Cicero, De Finibus, II_{119}.

7. supra, p. 124.

8. Philodemus, περὶ παρρησίας, Fr. 40, ll.9-10, περὶ θανάτου, Col. XIX, Fr. 9, O, $l._{34}$ etc.

9. Philodemus, περὶ παρρησίας, Col. $XXII_{10}$ sq.

10. ibid, Fr. 18, l.1.

11. Cicero, De Finibus, I vii 25.

12. In the treatise On Signs, Col. 2, ll. 11 sq. Philodemus

mention dwarfs brought to Italy from Syria by Antony. In the treatise On Gods Col. XXX, ll. 35-37, Philodemus refers to a revolutionary movement which was conducted by the liberators against Antony in 44 B.C. In the Rhetorica, Vol. I, p.223, Philodemus mention a Gaius to whom he seems to dedicate his treatise. The treatise On the good king according to Homer is dedicated to Piso.

13. See J.I.M. Tait, ibid, p.1, n.3.

14. Philodemus On Economy, Col. XXIII.

15. J.I.M. Tait argues that Philodemus arrived in Italy between the years 80-75 B.C.; see ibid pp. 1 sq.

16. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. I, 6 and IV, 5-6.

17. Cicero, De Finibus, II, 119.

18. See G. Kennedy, The art of Persuasion in Greece, pp.26-52.

19. In the treatise On Frankness, Frg. 40, the lines 9-10 quote Homer's Iliad book K, 1.246; Col. X lines 5-6 quote Euripides' Phoenissae, 1.1179; and Col. XXIV line 10 quotes Aristophanes' Clouds, 1.1417.

20. In the treatise On Death the column XIX, Fr. 9.0, 1.34 refers to Tithonus, and column XXIII, Fr. 13.0, ll.13-15

refers to Danaus, Kadmus and Heracles.

21. See J.I.M. Tait, ibid, pp.89-91.

22. See C. Bailey, ibid, chapter IV maxims XVIII, XIX, XX.

23. See D.L. Lives Vol. II, Loeb Classical Library, translated by R.D. Hicks, pp.556-557.

24. Philodemus, On Death, Coll. XXV sq.

25. D.L. ibid, X, 27.

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