

EPICUREA



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EPISTULA SECUNDA: EPICURI QUAE FERTUR AD PHYTHOCLEM DE METEORIS

EPISTULA TERTIA: EPICURI AD MENOECEUM MORALIS

LETTER TO HERÓDOTOS

34b. Hello Heródotos

Ἐπίκουρος Ἡροδότῳ, χαίρειν!

Epíkouros to Heródotos, greetings!

35a. Abridgment

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὧς Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν
ἐξακριβοῦν – μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθερεῖν: ἐπιτομὴν
τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας εἰς τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὀλοσχερωτάτων γε δοξῶν τὴν
μνήμην ἱκανῶς αὐτοῖς Παρεσκεύασα – ἵνα παρ’ ἐκάστους τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν τοῖς
κυριωτάτοις βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς Δύνωνται, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν Ἐφάπτωνται τῆς περὶ
φύσεως θεωρίας)

for those who are not able, Heródotos, to examine each of the things
written by us about nature – nor inspect the larger books of what has been
organized: I prepared a summary of the whole effort for retaining the
memory of the most comprehensive judgements sufficiently for themselves
– so that on each occasion, They might be able to provide help for
themselves on the most decisive [judgements], to the extent that They
engage with the [act of mental] envisioning of nature

ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ <i>written again</i>

ἡ βίβλος αἱ βίβλοι	book	ΒΙΒΛΟΣ <i>papyrus</i>
αἱ μείζονες βίβλοι	larger books	
τὰ συντεταγμένα	things organized	ΣΥΝΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΑ <i>to order together</i>
αἱ μείζονες τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλοι	larger books of the things organized	
ἡ ἐπιτομή	summary	ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗ <i>to cut upon</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ <i>state of doing / affair</i>
ἡ ἐπιτομή τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας	summary of the whole effort	
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
κυριώτατον τὰ κυριώτατα	most decisive thing	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ <i>most lordly, masterly</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	<i>[the act of mental]</i> envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of observing</i>
ἡ περὶ φύσεως θεωρία	observation of nature	

35b. Prioritizing Summaries

καὶ Τοὺς προβεβηκότας δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβλέψει, τὸν τύπον τῆς ὅλης
πραγματείας τὸν κατεστοιχειωμένον δεῖ μνημονεύειν – τῆς γὰρ ἀθρόας
ἐπιβολῆς πυκνὸν Δεόμεθα – τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος οὐχ ὁμοίως

and Those who have advanced sufficiently in the observation of the whole,
must remember the impression of the whole work that has been reduced
[to the fundamentals] – for We frequently have need ^[B'] of attention for the
aggregate – but not similarly ^[B'] of [attention] for [the details of] each part

ὁ προβεβηκῶς οἱ προβεβηκότες	he who has advanced	ΠΡΟΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ <i>to have walked forward</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιβλέψις αἱ ἐπιβλέψεις	observation	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΨΙΣ <i>looking upon</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
ὁ τύπος τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας	imprint of the whole effort	
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἐπιβολή	our attention for [the details of] each part	
ἀθρόος <i>(α, ον)</i>	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>

τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	aggregate
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A summary is more often needed than the details. Fix in your mind on the main points of the whole subject more frequently than you review the specific details.

36a. Focused Memory

Βαδιστέον, μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα συνεχῶς: ἐν δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ τὸ τοσοῦτο Ποιητέον – ἀφ’ οὗ ἢ τε κυριωτάτῃ Ἐπιβολὴ ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἔσται: καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος Ἀκρίβωμα πᾶν ἐξευρήσεται, τῶν ὀλοσχερωτάτων τύπων εὖ περιειλημμένων καὶ μνημονευομένων

additionally, It is necessary to proceed, of course, towards those [observations of the condensed system] continuously: and It is necessary make this much [effort] in memory – from which [your] most essential Attention will exist for [your] situations: and then every precise Detail for [the details of] each part [of your observations] will be discovered, with the most comprehensive impressions well understood and remembered

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ gathering
κύριος (α, ον)	essential	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ critical / valid
ἡ κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολή	most essential attention	
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ doing / affair
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ state of pointed
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα τὰ ἀκριβώματα	precise detail	ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ result of pointed
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ part
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκρίβωμα	precise detail for each part	
ὀλοσχερής (ές)	comprehensive	ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΗΣ to hold the whole
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ imprinting
οἱ ὀλοσχερώτατοι τύποι	most comprehensive impressions	

We should return continually to the main principles – and memorize them to gain a solid understanding of the facts. We have a greater ability to discover details accurately once the general outlines are well understood.

36b. Elementary Mastery

ἐπεὶ καὶ, τῷ τετελεσιουργημένῳ, τοῦτο Κυριώτατον τοῦ παντὸς ἀκριβώματος γίνεται: τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὁξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι ἐκάστων πρὸς ἀπλᾶ στοιχειώματα καὶ φωνὰς συναγομένων

since, for the one who is accomplished, this is the most important Thing produced by total accuracy: to be able to quickly use [our] attentions with each thing referenced by simple component principles and statements

ὁ τετελεσιουργημένος	he who has accomplished	ΤΕΤΕΛΕΣΙΟΥΡΓΗΜΕΝΟΣ completed work
τὸ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ὁξέως δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι	the ability to quickly use attentions	
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being

ἀπλός (η, ον)	simple	ΑΠΛΟΣ <i>one fold</i>
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
ἀπλᾶ στοιχειώματα καὶ φωναί	simple elementary principle and statements	

Simplicity is a feature of a mature student. Being able to reference elementary facts with simple terms helps us keep a clear view of study mentally accessible, at least in summary form.

36c. A Structured View

οὐ γὰρ Οἶόν τε **τὸ πύκνωμα τῆς συνεχοῦς τῶν ὅλων περιοδείας εἶδέναι** – **μὴ δυνάμενον διὰ βραχεῶν φωνῶν ἅπαν ἐμπεριλαβεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ** (**τὸ καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἂν ἐξακριβωθέν**)

for It is not possible to know the concentration of a continuous full course of the whole – when [that concentration] is not able to encompass in short statements everything within it (which would also be a precise detail for each part)

ἡ πύκνωσις αἱ πυκνώσεις	a concentrating	ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ <i>action of compacting</i>
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
ἡ περιοδεία αἱ περιοδεῖαι	[making] a full course	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΕΙΑ <i>process around the path</i>
ἡ συνεχῆς τῶν ὅλων περιοδεία	[making] a continuous full course of the whole	
τὸ πύκνωμα τῆς συνεχοῦς τῶν ὅλων περιοδείας	concentration of a continuous full course of the whole	
εἶδέναι	<i>to have mentally seen ∴</i> "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
βραχύς (εἴα, ύ)	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ <i>brief</i>
αἱ βραχεῖαι φωναί	short statements	
τὸ ἐξακριβωθέν τὰ ἐξακριβωθέντα	precise detail	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΩΘΕΝ <i>fully pointed</i>
τὸ ἂν ἐξακριβωθέν	would be a precise detail precise	
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
κατὰ μέρος	for each part	

We need to be able to remember the basics of all our studies in organized and simple terms – this enables us to understand all the details more accurately.

37a. Purpose of Study

ὁθεν, δὴ **πᾶσι χρησίμης οὔσης τοῖς ὠκειωμένοις φυσιολογία τῆς τοιαύτης ὁδοῦ**,
(**παρεγγυῶν τὸ συνεχές ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἐγγαλινίζων τῷ βίῳ**) Ἐποίησά σοι καὶ **τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐπιτομήν καὶ στοιχείωσιν τῶν ὅλων δοξῶν**

therefore, certainly since such a course is useful to all who are familiar with physics, I (while recommending continuous activity in physics and pacifying myself particularly with such a life) have also made for you such a type of summary and elementary-exposition of all judgements

ὁ ὥκειωμένος	he who is familiar	ΩΙΚΕΙΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>made comfortable dwelling</i>
ἡ φυσιολογία	physics (the study of nature)	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning of producing</i>
ἡ ὁδός αἱ ὁδοί	course	ΟΔΟΣ <i>road</i>
ἡ τοιαύτη ὁδός	such a course	ΤΟΙΑΥΤΗ ΟΔΟΣ
τὸ ἐνέργημα τὰ ἐνεργήματα	activity	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of working within</i>
τὸ συνεχές ἐνέργημα	continuous activity	
ἐγγαληνίζειν	to pacify oneself	ΕΓΓΑΛΗΝΙΖΕΙΝ <i>causing calm within</i> <i>This verb is only used by Epikouros, and only used here – but we can understand the general meaning because it clearly comes from the noun:</i>
ἡ γαλήνη	peace	ΓΑΛΗΝΗ
ἡ τοιαύτη τις ἐπιτομή	such a type of summary	
ἡ στοιχείωσις τῶν ὅλων δοξῶν	elementary exposition of all judgments	

Recognizing that effort in natural philosophy provides tranquility for himself and for others, Epíkouros prepared this concise epitome of natural philosophy. Epíkouros advises that we always pursue our studies – but with a sense of tranquility.

37b. Clarity in Language

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὧ Ἡρόδοτε, Δεῖ εἰληφέναι: ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα Ἐχωμεν, εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν – καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα Πάντα ἡμῖν «ἶη» – εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν, ἢ κενοὺς φθόγγους Ἐχωμεν

first of all, Heródotos, It is necessary to understand what is assigned to expressions: in order that, We may have what is judged, investigated, or uncertain to test by referring to these [expressions] – so that Everything does not go untested by us – leading into infinity, or Us having empty expressions [i.e., using meaningless words]

τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα	what is assigned (subordinated things)	ΥΠΟΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΑ <i>having arranged under</i>
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>uttering</i>
τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις	what is assigned to expressions	
τὰ δοξαζόμενα	what is judged (our understanding of information)	ΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΑ <i>to seem</i>
τὰ ζητούμενα	what is investigated (difficulty with getting information)	ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΑ <i>to search</i>
τὰ ἀπορούμενα	what is uncertain	ΑΠΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΑ <i>to be confused</i>

We must understand the meaning of words to test opinions, inquiries, or problems – always ensuring our proofs are meaningful and not endlessly unverified.

38a. Clear Mental Images

ἀνάγκη γὰρ, τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ’ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι, καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι – εἴπερ Ἐξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ’ ὃ ἀνάξομεν

Seeing [for ourselves] the primary internal conception for each word, and in no way needing proof, is necessary – if We are to have [something] to which we will refer what is investigated, uncertain, or judged

τὸ ἐννόημα τὰ ἐννοήματα	internal conception	ENNOHMA result of seeing within
τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα	the primary thought	
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ looking
τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα βλέπειν	seeing the primary thought	
ἢ ἀπόδειξις αἱ ἀποδείξεις	proof	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ from pointing out

We need to be able to mentally visualize exactly what we are talking about. If we ensure that the primary meaning of each term is clear – then we have a solid foundation for evaluating problems, opinions, and inquiries.

38b. Tools for Interpretation

ἔτι τε, ^[A] τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντως τηρεῖν: καὶ ἀπλῶς ^[B'] τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς (εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ’ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ^[Γ] τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθῃ – ὅπως ἂν καὶ ^[O] τὸ προσμένον καὶ ^[O] τὸ ἄδηλον Ἐχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα

also, Preserving ^[A] the sensations in every way is necessary: and simply ^[B'] the present attentions (whether of [mental] perception or of any of the standards) and likewise ^[Γ] the existing experiences [i.e., our current feelings] – so that We may also have signs by which we will interpret both ^[O] what is still pending [further attestation] and ^[O] what is unclear

ἢ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ perceiving process
ἢ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ throwing upon
παρών (παρουσα, παρόν)	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ to be beside
ἢ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ seeing through
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ seeing through
ἢ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ seeing upon
αἱ παροῦσαι ἐπιβολαί διανοίας	present attentions of perception	
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard (test of truth)	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ little interpreter / small discerner
αἱ παροῦσαι ἐπιβολαί ὅτου τῶν κριτηρίων	present attentions of any of the standards	
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ beginning under (before)

<p>ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον)</p> <p>ὑπάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)</p>	<p>existing [already]</p>	<p>ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i></p>
<p>τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη</p>	<p>^[1] experience (feeling)</p>	<p>ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i></p>
<p>τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη</p>	<p>already existing experiences</p>	
<p>τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα</p>	<p>^[0] what is still pending <i>[further attestation]</i></p>	<p>ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>remaining further</i></p>
<p>τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα</p>	<p>^[0] what is unclear</p>	<p>ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i></p>

Sensations are the basis of understanding. We need to focus on our immediate senses and feelings as our basis of understanding, in order to further understand what is unclear or unseen.

38c. Foundation of Existence

ταῦτα Δεῖ διαλαβόντας συνορᾷν ἤδη ^[0] **περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων**: πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι Οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος: Πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ’ ἂν – **σπερμάτων** γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον

after [we] have grasped these things, It is now necessary to [mentally] fully see ^[0] what is unclear: first, that Nothing is produced from what does not exist: for Everything would be produced from everything – and would in no way also need seeds

ὁρᾷν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
συνορᾷν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not looking</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	^[0] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τὸ μὴ ὄν τὰ μὴ ὄντα	what does not exist	ΜΗ ΟΝ <i>not existing</i>

First and foremost: nothing can come from something that does not exist. If matter could arise from nonexistence, anything could come from nothing.

39a. Perishability

καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ Ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν: πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ Πράγματα – **οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἃ διελύετο**

and if what Disappears was also destroyed into what does not exist: all Things would have perished – without [anything] existing into which they could fully dissolve

<p>τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον τὰ ἀφανιζόμενα</p> <p><i>This refers to objects that are completely destroyed to the point that the matter composing them is no longer visible – such as sugar dissolving in water.</i></p>	<p>what disappears</p>	<p>ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of not appearing</i></p>
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Matter cannot disintegrate into nonexistence. If something disappearing were completely destroyed into nonexistence, then everything would ultimately perish

39b. Universal Consistency

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Πᾶν ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἦν – οἷον νῦν ἐστὶ – καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσται:
Οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν εἰς ὃ μεταβαλεῖ: παρὰ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν Οὐθὲν ἐστὶν (ὃ ἂν εἰσελθὼν
εἰς αὐτὸ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσαιτο)

and indeed, the Universe has always been **such** – as it is **now** – and it will
always be **such**: for there is Nothing **into which** it can transform: because
there is Nothing **outside of the universe** (which could enter **into it** and make
a transformation)

τὸ πᾶν <i>(τοῦ παντός)</i>	<i>(individually)</i> everything, <i>(collectively)</i> the universe	ΠΑΝ <i>all</i>
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in</i> <i>change</i>

The universe is consistent in its ultimate composition because there is nothing outside of everything that could enter everything and cause it to change.

39c. Atomism

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ Φησι κατ’ ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἁ Περι
Φύσεως} τὸ Πᾶν ἐστὶ σώματα καὶ κενόν: σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὥς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ
Αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ – καθ’ ἣν, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ Ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ
τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον

but indeed {He also says **this** in the *Larger Epitome* near the beginning and in
his *First Book On Nature*} the Universe exists **as bodies** and **as void**: **that**
bodies exist, Sensation itself in all [cases] testifies – using this [sensation],
the Unseen must be inferred **by reasoning**

*For what we cannot directly sense, we infer with reasoning from what we can
directly sense. Our sensations are the toolkit our reason uses to function.*
*The universe is fundamentally matter and void. Everything that exists is made up
of bodies and space. We know bodies exist because we can see and feel them, and
we must use our senses to understand things we cannot directly see, such as the
void.*

40a. Necessity of Void

Τόπος δὲ εἰ μὴ ἦν, ὃν 'κενόν' καὶ 'χώραν' καὶ 'ἀναφῇ φύσιν' Ὀνομάζομεν – οὐκ
ἂν εἶχε τὰ Σώματα ὅπου ἦν, οὐδὲ δι' οὗ ἐκινεῖτο: καθάπερ φαίνεται **κινούμενα**

but if room did not exist, **which** We call 'void' 'space' and 'intangible nature'
– Bodies would not have **anywhere** to be, or [anything] through which they
move: just as they are seen **moving**

ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	room	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	KENON <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ χώρα αἱ χώραι	space	ΧΩΡΑ <i>location</i>
ἀναφῆς <i>(ές)</i>	intangible	ΑΝΑΦΗΣ <i>not touchable</i>
ἡ ἀναφῆς φύσις	intangible nature	

40b. Qualities: Symptoms vs. Properties

παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Οὐθὲν οὐδ’ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται (οὔτε περιληπτῶς οὔτε
ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς) ὥς καθ’ ὅλας φύσεις λαμβανόμενα, καὶ μὴ ὥς τὰ
τούτων "συμπτώματα" ἢ "συμβεβηκότα" λεγόμενα

beyond these things, Nothing at all is able to be objectively conceived (either with complete comprehension or analogously to what is completely comprehensible) as being comprehend according to whole natures, and not as what are called the "symptoms" of these or "properties"

Beyond atoms and void, nothing is able to be conceived that has a wholly complete nature in-and-of-itself. Everything else is an emergent characteristic that comes to exist from arrangements of atoms and void.

The inseparable qualities (i.e., properties) of the atoms are permanent. The inseparable qualities of a compound exist as long as the compound exists. The separable qualities (i.e., symptoms) of the atoms (e.g., their location) are impermanent. The separable qualities of a compound do not even exist for as long as the compound exists.

περιληπτῶς	with complete comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ <i>taken hold around</i>
τὸ περιληπτὸν τὰ περιληπτά	what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>taken hold around</i>
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ <i>reasoning again</i>
ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς	analogously to the comprehensible	
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαμβάνόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	comprehended	ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasping</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [asking] what kind</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling together</i>
συμβεβηκῶς <i>(υῖα, ὅς)</i>	having endured	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>

40c. Atomic or Aggregate

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ' καὶ ιε' καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποιήνται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [book] On Nature and in the 14th and 15th and in the *Larger Epitome*} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [are bodies] out of which compounds are made

ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	separating	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις = ἡ σύνκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
τὰ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποιήνται	things from which the compounds are formed	

41a. Indestructible Units

Ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα: εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει Πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθαρήσεσθαι – ἀλλ’ ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων, πλήρη τὴν φύσιν ὄντα: οἷα δὴ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπη ἢ ὅπως διαλυθήσεται – ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους Ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις

These [objects] exist as indivisible and non-transformable: if Everything is not going to be destroyed into nonexistence – but to endure, prevailing in the dissolutions of compounds, while existing as full in nature: such that they indeed do not have anywhere or any way they will be fully dissolved – It is therefore necessary that the foundations exist as indivisible physical objects

ἄτομος <i>(ον)</i>	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
τὰ ἀμετάβλητα	what is non-transformable	ΑΜΕΤΑΒΛΗΤΑ <i>not thrown change</i>
ἰσχύων <i>(ισχύουσα, ισχύον)</i>	prevailing	ΙΣΧΥΩΝ <i>strength</i>
πλήρης <i>(ες)</i>	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ <i>quality of full</i>
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>through dissolve</i>
διαλυθήσεσθαι	to be about to be dissolved	
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>

There are objects that cannot be divided or changed. This must be true because everything has not been permanently destroyed and turned into nothing. These objects are strong enough to remain when objects break apart – because they are totally solid and cannot be dissolved. So, the basic building blocks of everything are physically indivisible.

41b. Space Is Infinite In Extent

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Πᾶν ἄπειρόν ἐστι: Τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει – τὸ δὲ Ἄκρον παρ’ ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται <τὸ δὲ Πᾶν οὐ παρ’ ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται> ὥστε, οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον, πέρας οὐκ ἔχει – πέρας δὲ οὐκ ἔχον: ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον

but indeed, the Universe is infinite: for What is finite has a boundary – and a Boundary is observed relative to something different, <however the Universe is not observed relative to anything different> therefore, not having an boundary, it does not have a limit – and what does not have a limit: would be infinite and not finite

ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον πᾶν	the infinite universe	
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of extremity</i>
τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	boundary	ΑΚΡΟΝ <i>highest</i>
ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾳ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἑτερος <i>other</i>
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>extremity</i>

The universe is infinite. Anything finite has an end, and an end is only recognized by comparing it to something else. Since there is nothing else to compare the universe to, it must be boundless and infinite.

41c. Matter Is Infinite In Quantity

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῷ πλήθει τῶν σωμάτων – ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ Πᾶν – καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ κενοῦ

and indeed, in the number of objects – the Universe is infinite – and in the extension of the void

πλήρης <i>(ες)</i>	full	ΠΛΗΡΗΣ <i>quality of full</i>
τὸ πλήθος τὰ πλήθη	[large] number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ <i>fullness</i>
τὸ πλήθος τῶν σωμάτων	the number of objects	
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κενοῦ	the size of the void	

42a. Limit Effects

εἴ τε γὰρ ᾗν τὸ Κενὸν ἄπειρον, τὰ δὲ Σώματα ὠρισμένα: οὐθαμοῦ ἂν ἔμενε τὰ Σώματα, ἀλλ’ ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὸ ἄπειρον κενὸν διεσπαρμένα – οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰ ὑπερείδοντα καὶ στέλλοντα κατὰ τὰς ἀνακοπὰς – εἴ τε τὸ Κενὸν ᾗν ὠρισμένον: οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ ἄπειρα Σώματα ὅπου ἐνέστη

* for if the Void were infinite, but Bodies were finite: Bodies would stay nowhere, but would be carried through the infinite void while scattered – not having [other bodies] supporting and arranging [them] through their collisions – if the Void were finite: the infinite Bodies would not have anywhere to be

τὸ ὑπερείδον τὰ ὑπερείδοντα	what supports	ΥΠΕΡΕΙΔΟΝ <i>appearing over</i>
ὑπερείδων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	supporting	
τὸ στέλλον τὰ στέλλοντα	what arranges	ΣΤΕΛΛΟΝ <i>making ready</i>
στέλλων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	arranging	

If the void were infinite and atoms were finite – the atoms would be scattered throughout the infinite void. On the other hand, if the void were finite and bodies were infinite – there would not be enough space for all the atoms to exist.

42b. Finite Variety of Atomic Shapes

πρὸς τε τούτοις, Τὰ ἄτομα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ Μεστά (ἐξ ὧν καὶ αἱ Συγκρίσεις γίνονται καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύονται) ἀπερίληπτά ἐστι ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων: οὐ γὰρ Δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τὰς τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιειλημμένων

besides these [points], the indivisible and full Things in objects (out of which Compounds are produced and into which they thoroughly dissolve) are not completely comprehensible in the [amount of] differences of their shapes: for It is not possible for so many differences to arise from what HAS been completely comprehended about their [atomic] shapes

μεστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	full	ΜΕΣΤΟΣ <i>filled</i>
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τὸ μεστόν τὰ μεστά	what is full	
γίνεσθαι = γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἀπερίληπτος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	not completely comprehensible	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>not taken hold around</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
τὰ ἀπερίληπτά ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν σχημάτων	what is incomprehensible in the differences of shapes	
τὸ περιειλημμένον τὰ περιειλημμένα	what has been completely comprehended	ΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of being grasped around</i>

The amount of different atomic shapes is indefinite (incomprehensibly large) – but not infinite. However the amount of each atomic shape is infinite.

42c. Infinite Atoms of Each Shape

καὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην δὲ σχημάτισιν: ἀπλῶς ἄπειροί εἰσιν αἱ Ὅμοιαι – ταῖς δὲ διαφοραῖς οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἄπειροι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀπερίληπτοι

and regarding each shape: the Similar [atoms] are completely infinite – but in their differences they are not completely infinite, but only incomprehensible

There is an infinite number of each shape of atom – but the number of different shapes of atoms is not infinite (though it is incalculably large).

{43a. Atomic Size Limit}

{οὐδὲ γάρ Φησιν ἐνδοτέρω εἰς ἄπειρον τὴν τομὴν τυγχάνειν, (λέγει) δὲ ἐπειδὴ αἱ Ποιότητες μεταβάλλονται – εἰ μέλλει Τις μὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἀπλῶς εἰς ἄπειρον αὐτὰς ἐκβάλλειν}

{for [Epíkouros] states that division [of atoms] does not happen further ad infinitum, even though (as he says) the Qualities are transformed – unless Someone is also going to extend those [atoms] completely ad infinitum in [terms of] size}

τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ <i>cut</i>

This scholion notes that, despite the variety that we see in qualities (including the disappearance of qualities), we should not think that objects can continue to be divided forever (although objects can be divided to the point of no longer being visible). The same line of thinking would also have us posit that atoms are infinitely large.

43b. Constant Movement

κινοῦνται τε συνεχῶς αἱ Ἄτομοι τὸν αἰῶνα {φησὶ δὲ ἐνδοτέρω καὶ ἰσοταχῶς αὐτὰς κινεῖσθαι – τοῦ κενοῦ τὴν εἷξιν ὁμοίαν παρεχομένου καὶ τῇ κουφοτάτῃ καὶ τῇ βαρυτάτῃ}

the Atoms move continuously forever {further he says that they move with equal speed – with the void offering the same yielding both to the lightest [atom] and to the heaviest [atom]}

<div> <div>ἡ τομή</div> <div>αἱ τομαί</div> </div>	division	<div> <div>TOMH</div> <div>cut</div> </div>
<div> <div>ἄτομος</div> <div>(ος, ον)</div> </div>	indivisible	<div> <div>ATOMA</div> <div>not cut</div> </div>
<div> <div>τὸ ἄτομον</div> <div>τὰ ἄτομα</div> </div>	<div> <div>atom</div> <div>("what is indivisible")</div> </div>	<div> <div>ATOMON</div> <div>not cut</div> </div>
<div> <div>ἡ ἄτομος</div> <div>αἱ ἄτομοι</div> </div>	atom	<div> <div>ATOMOS</div> <div>not cut</div> </div>
ἰσοταχῶς	with equal speed	<div> <div>ISOTACHOS</div> <div>equal fast</div> </div>
ἡ εἶξις	yielding	<div> <div>EIΞIS</div> <div>giving way</div> </div>
<div> <div>κουῦφος</div> <div>(η, ον)</div> </div>	light	<div> <div>κουῦφος</div> <div>nimble</div> </div>
<div> <div>κουφότατος</div> <div>(η, ον)</div> </div>	lightest	
<div> <div>ἡ κουφοτάτη</div> <div>[ἄτομος]</div> </div>	<div> <div>the lightest</div> <div>[atom]</div> </div>	
<div> <div>τὸ βάρος</div> <div>τὰ βάρη</div> </div>	weight	<div> <div>BAROS</div> <div>heavy</div> </div>
<div> <div>βαρύτατος</div> <div>(η, ον)</div> </div>	heaviest	<div> <div>BARYTATOS</div> <div>heaviest</div> </div>
<div> <div>ἡ βαρυτάτη</div> <div>[ἄτομος]</div> </div>	<div> <div>the heaviest</div> <div>[atom]</div> </div>	

43c. Atomic Interaction

καὶ, Αἰ μὲν εἰς μακρὰν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων διστάμεναι – Αἰ δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν παλμὸν ἴσχουσιν (ὅταν τύχῃσι τῇ περιπλοκῇ κεκλειμέναι ἢ στεγαζόμενοι παρὰ τῶν πλεκτικῶν)

* also, Some [atoms] stand apart at a distance from each other – while Others retain their vibration (when they happen to have been enclosed by intertangling or are covered by entangling [atoms])

<div> <div>ὁ παλμός</div> <div>οἱ παλμοί</div> </div>	vibration	<div> <div>ΠΑΛΜΟΣ</div> <div>pulse</div> </div>
<div> <div>ἡ περιπλοκή</div> <div>αἱ περιπλοκαί</div> </div>	intertangling	<div> <div>ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ</div> <div>weave around</div> </div>
κλεῖειν	to enclose	<div> <div>ΚΛΕΙΕΙΝ</div> <div>key / hook</div> </div>
<div> <div>κεκλειμένος</div> <div>(η, ον)</div> </div>	having been enclosed	
<div> <div>στεγαζόμενος</div> <div>(η, ον)</div> </div>	covered	<div> <div>ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ</div> <div>shelter</div> </div>
<div> <div>πλεκτικός</div> <div>(η, ον)</div> </div>	entangling	<div> <div>ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ</div> <div>characteristic of weaving</div> </div>
<div> <div>ἡ πλεκτική</div> <div>[ἄτομος]</div> </div>	tangled atom	

Atoms move at the same speed, either freely or vibrating in an aggregate. Some atoms move far apart from each other, while others just oscillate in one place when they get entangled or are enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

44a. Vibration

ἢ τε γὰρ τοῦ κενοῦ Φύσις, ἡ διορίζουσα ἐκάστην αὐτήν, τοῦτο παρασκευάζει (τὴν ὑπέρεισιν οὐχ οἷα τε οὔσα ποιεῖσθαι) – ἢ τε Στερεότης ἡ υπάρχουσα αὐταῖς κατὰ τὴν σύγκρουσιν τὸν ἀποπαλμὸν ποιεῖ (ἐφ’ ὅπόσον ἂν ἡ Περιπλοκή τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως διδῷ). Ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, αἰδίων τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσῶν καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ

firstly, the Nature of the void, which separates every single [atom], prepares this [atomic movement] (not being able to make [any] support) – secondly, the firmness which already exists in [the atoms] creates a rebound upon [their] mutual impact (to the extent that the Intertangling allows reestablishment from the mutual impact). a [beginning] Foundation of these things does not exist, since the atoms and the void are eternal

ή στερεότης αί στερεότητες	firmness	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ condition from making stiff
ή κρούσις αί κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ hitting
ή σύγκρουσις αί συγκρούσεις	mutual impact	ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ hitting together
ή υπέρεισις αί υπερέσεις	support (supportive resistance)	ΥΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ going under
ή περιπλοκή αί περιπλοκαί	intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ weave around
ὁ παλμός	vibration	ΠΑΛΜΟΣ pulse
ὁ ἀποπαλμός	rebound	ΑΠΟΠΑΛΜΟΣ pulsing off one step in the vibration (ὁ παλμός) process
ή περιπλοκή αί περιπλοκαί	intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ weave around
ή ἀποκατάστασις αί ἀποκαταστάσεις	reestablishment	ΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ placed thoroughly back another step in the vibration (ὁ παλμός) process
ἀποπαλμοί καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις	reboundings and reestablishments	 description of the vibration process

Vibration occurs because there is space between atoms in aggregates – each atom is separated by void, which cannot resist their movement. The solidity of the atom causes it to rebound after a collision (even if only a very short distance), when trapped by a mass of entangling atoms. There is no beginning to this process since both atoms and void exist forever.

44b. {Atomic Qualities}

{Φησὶ δ’ ἐνδοτέρω, μηδὲ Ποιότητά τινα περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ βάρους – τὸ δὲ Χρῶμα παρὰ τὴν θέσιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἀλλάττεσθαι, ἐν ταῖς Δώδεκα Στοιχειώσεσιν φησι – πᾶν τε Μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι περὶ αὐτάς: οὐδέποτε, γοῦν, Ἄτομος ὥφθη αἰσθῆσαι}

{He says within [his books], that no Quality at all for the atoms exists except shape, size, and weight – that Color varies with the position of the atoms, he states in the Twelve Elementary Principles – and that concerning them every Size does not exist: never, at least, has an Atom ever been perceived by sensation}

ή ποιότης αί ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ condition from [asking] what kind
αί ποιότητες περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους	qualities of the atoms	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ holding [a form]
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ largeness
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ heavy
ή θέσις αί θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ process of placing

ἡ θέσις τῶν ἀτόμων	the position of the atoms	
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ <i>skin color</i>

Atoms have no qualities except shape, size, and weight. Color varies with the arrangement of the atoms.

45a. The Basics

ἡ τοσαύτη δὴ Φωνή, τούτων πάντων μνημονευομένων, τὸν ἱκανὸν τύπον ὑποβάλλει τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπινοίας

such a Statement, along with all these things being remembered, establishes a sufficient [mental] impression for complete objective concepts about the nature of existing things

ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
τὸ μνημονeuόμενον τὰ μνημονeuόμενα	what is remembered	ΜΝΗΜONEYOMENON <i>result of "addition to" thinking</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
ὁ ἱκανὸς τύπος	a sufficient imprint	
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως ἐπινοίαι	conceptions about the nature of things	

45b. Similar & Dissimilar Cosmoi

ἀλλὰ μὲν, καὶ Κόσμοι ἄπειροί εἰσιν: οἳ θ' ὅμοιοι τούτῳ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι – αἱ τε γὰρ Ἄτομοι (ἄπειροι οὔσαι ὡς ἄρτι ἀπεδείχθη) φέρονται καὶ πορρωτάτω

but indeed, there are also infinite Cosmoi: both those similar to this one and dissimilar – for the Atoms (being infinite as has just been thoroughly shown) move even further on

ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
οἱ κόσμοι ἄπειροί	infinite cosmoi	
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
οἱ ὅμοιοι κόσμοι	similar cosmoi	
ἀνόμοιος <i>(ον)</i>	dissimilar	ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>not similar</i>
οἱ ἀνόμοιοι κόσμοι	dissimilar cosmoi	
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
αἱ ἄπειροι ἄτομοι	infinite atoms	
αἱ ὁμοίαι ἄτομοι	similar atoms	
αἱ ἀνόμοιοι ἄτομοι	dissimilar atoms	

Since the number of atoms is infinite they continue to spread out into space and form infinite worlds – some worlds are like ours and other worlds are unlike ours.

οὐ γὰρ κατανήλωνται αἱ τοιαῦται Ἄτομοι ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο κόσμος (ἢ ὑφ' ὧν ἂν ποιηθείη) – οὐτ' εἰς ἓνα οὐτ' εἰς πεπερασμένους (οὔθ' ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι οὔθ' ὅσοι διάφοροι τούτοις) – ὥστε οὐδὲν τὸ Ἐμποδοστατήσόν ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων

for such Atoms from which a cosmos could come into being (or by which it could be made) would not all been consumed – neither in one [cosmos] nor in a finite amount (whether on those alike or on those different from these) – so that in no way does an Obstacle exist for the infinity of cosmoi

καταναλίσκειν	to consume	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly spent</i>
καταναλωθῆναι	to be consumed	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΩΘΗΝΑΙ <i>pushed into being thoroughly spent</i>
τὸ ἔμποδοστατήσον τὰ ἔμποδοστατήσαντα	obstacle	ΕΜΠΟΔΟΣΤΑΤΗΣΩΝ <i>set up in (way of) foot</i>

Nothing prevents the existence of an infinite number of cosmoi.

46a. Films: A Particular Type of Impression

καὶ μὴν καὶ, Τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμονες τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἰσὶ – λεπτότησιν ἀπέχοντες μακρὰν τῶν φαινομένων: οὔτε γὰρ Συστάσεις ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι γίνεσθαι τοιαῦται – οὐτ' Ἐπιτηδειότητες πρὸς κατεργασίας τῶν κοιλωμάτων καὶ λεπτοτήτων γίνεσθαι – οὔτε Ἀπόρροιαὶ τὴν ἐξῆς θέσιν καὶ βάσιν διατηροῦσαι (ἦνπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἶχον): τούτους δὲ τοὺς τύπους 'εἶδωλα' Προσαγορεύομεν

and indeed, impressions exist in a similar shape as solid objects – although they are far different from visible things in [their] fineness: for neither are Compositions such as this unable to be produced in the surrounding [air] – nor [are] Supplies [unable] to be produced for an outflow with hollowness and subtleness – nor [are] Effluences [unable to be produced] fully preserving [their] position in succession and order (as they also had in the hard objects): these are the impressions which We refer to as 'films'

Imprints (τύποι, forms, outlines) are emitted by objects – the flow of atoms through an object creates an imprint in the air, which travels through the air, and can make an impression upon us. Imprints that maintain the same position and order of the object that emitted them are known as films (εἶδωλα, idols, phantoms).

ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασῖαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ὁμοιοσχήμων <i>(ον)</i>	similar shape	ὍΜΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ <i>similar form</i>
ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	firmness	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from making stiff</i>
στερεός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>stiff</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtleness	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being fine/thin</i>

ἀπέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	distant / different	ΑΠΕΧΩΝ <i>holding away</i>
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ <i>not powerful</i>
ἡ ἐπιτηδειότης αἱ ἐπιτηδειότητες	supply	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from being suitable towards</i>
ἡ κατεργασία αἱ κατεργασίαι	outflow	ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ <i>work thoroughly</i>
τὸ κοῖλωμα τὰ κοιλώματα	hollowness	ΚΟΙΛΩΜΑΤΑ <i>concave</i>
ἡ ἀπόρροια αἱ ἀπόρροιαί	effluence	ΑΠΟΡΡΟΙΑΙ <i>flow off</i>
ἑξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing</i>
ἡ βάσις αἱ βάσεις	order	ΒΑΣΙΣ <i>process of going</i>
τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ <i>protecting / watching</i>
διατηρεῖν	to fully preserve	διατηρεῖν <i>completely protecting / watching</i>
διατηρῶν <i>(οὔσα, ὤν)</i>	fully preserving	
αἱ διατηροῦσαι ἀπόρροιαί	the preserving effluences	
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>

Air is a mix of void and atoms. Atoms continually travel through objects and are released from their surfaces into the air. This forms patterns that persist through the air. When these physical patterns encounter our bodies, they produce various sensations. When these physical patterns produce sensations with continuity, we know they correspond to their source-object.

-46b. Total Speed

καὶ μὴν καὶ, ἡ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Φορὰ (κατὰ μηδεμίαν ἀπάντησιν τῶν ἀντικοψόντων γινομένη) πᾶν μῆκος περιληπτὸν ἐν ἀπερινοήτῳ χρόνῳ συντελεῖ: βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους Ἀντικοπή καὶ Οὐκαντικοπή ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει

and indeed, the Transmission [of something] through the void (while happening without any clash of something colliding against) completes every completely comprehensible length in a non-completely conceivable [amount of] time: for [it is] Collision and Non-collision [that] take on a similarity to slowness and speed

[Hicks] Furthermore, so long as nothing comes in the way to offer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resistance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equivalent of speed.

τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ ἀπάντησις αἱ ἀπαντήσεις	clash	ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΙΣ <i>action against all</i>
τὸ ἀντικοψόν τὰ ἀντικοψά	what collides against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΨΟΝ <i>beat against</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τό μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>length</i>
τὸ περιληπτόν τὰ περιληπτά	what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>taken hold around</i>
περιληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>taken hold around</i>
ἀπερινόητος <i>(ον)</i>	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
βραδύς <i>(εῖτα, ύ)</i>	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ <i>slow</i>
τό βράδος = ἡ βραδύτης αἱ βραδύτητες	slowness	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΗΣ <i>condition of being slow</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
ἀνतिकόπτειν	to collide against	
ἡ οὐκαντικοπή αἱ οὐκαντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>not beating against</i>
τό ὁμοίωμα τὰ ὁμοιώματα	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑ <i>result of [being] similar</i>

Without any resistance, movement through the void can cover massive distances in an instant.

-47a. Apparent Instantaneity of Films

οὐ μὴν, οὐδ’ ἄμα κατὰ τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους αὐτὸ τὸ φερόμενον Σῶμα ἐπὶ τοὺς πλείους τόπους ἀφικνεῖται – ἀδιανόητον γάρ. καὶ Τοῦτο συναφικνούμενον ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ ὅθεν δήποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου – οὐκ, ἐξ οὗ ἂν Περιλάβωμεν τὴν φοράν, τόπου Ἕσται ἀφιστάμενον: ἀντικοπῇ γὰρ ὅμοιον Ἕσται (κἂν μέχρι τοσούτου τὸ τάχος τῆς φορᾶς μὴ ἀνतिकόπτον Καταλίπωμεν) – χρήσιμον δὴ καὶ τοῦτο Κατασχεῖν τὸ στοιχεῖον

however, during the [minute] times envisionable [by us] through reasoning, a Frame [of film] that is being carried does not itself arrive at multiple locations simultaneously – for [such instantaneity] is [mentally] imperceptible. although This [frame of film] does indeed arrive as a whole in sensible time from somewhere in infinite [space] – [the frame's location] will not [really] be different from the location from which We would completely comprehend [its] transmission, *{i.e., even if a body moves so fast that it visually appears to arrive at multiple places at once, it is mentally perceivable that a body does not arrive at multiple places at once}*.

because {being in multiple locations simultaneously} will be similar to a collision (even if up to this point We fully leave the speed of [its] transmission as not colliding) – indeed, it is useful also to hold [in mind] this component [fact]

[Hicks] Not that if we consider the minute times perceptible by reason alone, the moving body itself arrives at more than one place simultaneously (for this too is inconceivable) – although in time perceptible to sense it does arrive simultaneously, however different the point of departure from that conceived by us. For if [this motion] changed its direction – that would be equivalent to its meeting with resistance (even if up to that point we allow nothing to impede the rate of its flight). This is an elementary fact which in itself is well worth bearing in mind.

[DeWitt] It certainly must not be thought, however, that the moving mass also arrives at the same time at the greater distances in units of time discernible only by reason, for it is unthinkable, and this [the moving mass], arriving suddenly at a perceptible moment out of the infinite [that is, out of the invisible], will be inseparable from the spot where we shall first discern the motion, for it [the fact of its becoming visible] will be equivalent to retardation, even if down to this point we leave the velocity of the motion unimpeded. It is worth while to grasp this principle too.

θεωρητός <i>(ῆ, όν)</i>	envisionable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
φερόμενος <i>(ῆ, όν)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
τò σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body [here, "frame"]	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
πλείστος <i>(ῆ, όν)</i>	most / greatest	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most filling</i>
πλείων <i>(όν)</i>	more / greater [here, "multiple"]	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>towards arriving</i>
τò νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἀπερινόητος <i>(όν)</i>	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
ἀδιανόητος <i>(όν)</i>	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing through</i>
διανόητος	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>seeing through</i>
συναφικνούμενος <i>(ῆ, όν)</i>	to arrive as a whole	ΣΥΝΑΦΙΚΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>towards arriving together</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τò αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>instrument of perceiving</i>
αἰσθητός <i>(ῆ, όν)</i>	^(A) sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ <i>perceiving</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(όν)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>

περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἀφιστάμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	different	ΑΦΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>standing away</i>
ἀντικοπτεῖν	to collide [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beating against</i>
ἀντικόπτων <i>(οὔσα, ον)</i>	colliding [against]	
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
ἡ οὐκἀντικοπή αἱ οὐκἀντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>not beating against</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
χρήσιμος <i>(ον)</i>	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ <i>use</i>
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>

Past a certain rate, speeds appear to be similarly instantaneous. However, moving body does not reach more than one place at the same time – this is impossible (and impossible to imagine).

Even if a frame of film moves so fast that it visually appears to arrive at multiple places at once, it is mentally perceivable that it cannot arrive at multiple places at once. Instead, we know the frame will follow a path that is physically viable – and therefore also mentally comprehensible

A moving body cannot occupy multiple places at once when we think about time rationally. However, when considering perceptible time (observable motion), the body moves continuously from some point in the infinite and remains connected to the place from which we can understand its motion. The key point is the continuity and connectedness of the moving body with the space it moves through, making its motion comprehensible. Consider a torch that is brought into a room and fills it with light – the light seems to fill the room instantly, although really it had to fill the room in a physical sequence – nevertheless the source remains the same.

47b. Thinness of Films

εἴθ’ ὅτι τὰ Εἶδωλα ταῖς λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις κέχρηται Οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τῶν φαινομένων – ὅθεν καὶ τάχη ἀνυπέρβλητα ἔχει (πάντα πόρον σύμμετρον ἔχοντα πρὸς τῷ ἀπείρῳ αὐτῶν) μηθὲν ἀνतिकόπτειν (ἢ ὀλίγα ἀνतिकόπτειν: **πολλαῖς δὲ καὶ ἀπείροις, εὐθύς ἀνतिकόπτειν τι**)

accordingly, Nothing among visible things contests [the fact] that Films are endowed with unsurpassable subtleness – from which [subtleness, Films] also have unsurpassable speeds (having every proportionate passageway in relation to [their] infinite nature) colliding against nothing (or colliding against a few things: for among many and infinite [atoms], [films] are immediately colliding against something)

ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtleness	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being fine/thin</i>
ἀνυπέρβλητος <i>(ον)</i>	unsurpassable	ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ <i>not thrown over</i>

ἡ λεπτότης ἀνυπέρβλητος	unsurpassable subtleness	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ANTIMARTYPEIN <i>testifying against</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	TACHOS <i>quickly</i>
τὸ τάχος ἀνυπέρβλητον	unsurpassable speed	
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	POROS <i>piercing</i>
σύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
πᾶς πόρος σύμμετρος	every proportionate passage	
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ANTIKOPTEIN <i>beats against</i>

The extreme subtleness of the films is not contradicted by any observed facts. Because they are so thin, they can move very quickly and easily through void spaces. Their constant flow faces little to no resistance – unlike larger groupings of atoms that encounter much more resistance to their movement.

48a. Films Move Quickly

πρός τε τούτοις, ὅτι ἡ Γένεσις τῶν εἰδώλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει

in addition to these things, the Creation of films occurs simultaneously with conception

ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ <i>action of being born</i>
ἅμα	simultaneously	ἌΜΑ
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>

48b. Films Stream Off Aggregates

καὶ γὰρ ῥεῦσις ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχῆς (οὐκ ἐπίδηλος τῇ μειώσει, διὰ τὴν ἀνταναπλήρωσιν) σῶζουσα τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεμνίου θέσιν καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἀτόμων ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον (εἰ καὶ ἐνίστε συγχεομένη ὑπάρχει)

for the Flowing [of atoms] from the surface of objects is continuous (not noticeable by shrinking, due to [its] replenishment) preserving the position and arrangement of atoms in the solid [object] for a long time (although indeed sometimes it exists as mixed)

ἡ ῥεῦσις αἱ ῥεῦσεις	flowing	ῬΕΥΣΙΣ <i>action of flowing</i>
ἡ ἐπιπολή αἱ ἐπιπολαί	surface	ΕΠΙΠΟΛΗ <i>being [πέλ] upon</i>
συνεχῆς <i>(ές)</i>	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
ἡ συνεχῆς ῥεῦσις	continuous flowing	
ἐπίδηλος <i>(ον)</i>	noticeable	ΕΠΙΔΗΛΟΣ <i>shine upon</i>
ἡ μείωσις αἱ μείωσεις	shrinking	ΜΕΙΩΣΙΣ <i>action of reducing</i>
ἡ ἀνταναπλήρωσις αἱ ἀνταναπλήρωσεις	replenishment	ΑΝΤΑΝΑΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΣ <i>action of filling again in place of</i>

σώζων <i>(σώζουσα, σώζον)</i>	preserving	ΣΩΙΖΩΝ <i>saving</i>
ἡ σώζουσα ῥεῦσις	preservative flowing	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing</i>
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ <i>ordered</i>
ἡ θέσις καὶ τάξις	position and arrangement	
συγχεόμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	mixed	ΣΥΓΧΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>together mixed</i>
ἡ συγχεομένη ῥεῦσις	mixed flowing	

Particles constantly stream off from the surface of objects, but we do not see those objects get smaller because other particles take their place. These particles mostly retain the same position and arrangement as when they were part of the solid body, although sometimes they are altered while traveling.

48c. Formation of Films

καὶ Συστάσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὀξεῖαι διὰ τὸ μὴ δεῖν κατὰ βάθος τὸ συμπλήρωμα γίνεσθαι (καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ Τρόποι τινὲς γεννητικοὶ τῶν τοιούτων φύσεων εἰσίν)

and swift Compositions [of films] are produced in the surrounding space because there is no need for deeply filling all up (and there are also some other Ways that are generative of such natures)

ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding space	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ <i>hold around</i>
ὀξύς <i>(ὀξεῖ, ὀξύ)</i>	quick	ΟΞΥΣ <i>sharp</i>
τὸ συμπλήρωμα τὰ συμπληρώματα	filling all up	ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΜΑ <i>filling together</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>

Films form very quickly in the air because they are created by streaming or reflecting off the surface of objects. Additionally, films can also be formed by passing through the entire object.

48d. Film Correspondence

Οὐθὲν γὰρ τούτων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖται ^[A] ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: ἂν βλέπη τίς τινα τρόπον ^[E] τὰς ἐναργείας (ἵνα καὶ τὰς συμπαθείας ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς) ἀνοίσει

None of these things is contested ^[A] by the sensations: if Someone sees the certain way [sensation] will bring up ^[E] detectible realities (and so also the correspondences from external sources towards us)

ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ANTIMARTYPEIN <i>testifying against</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρόμενος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contested	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>

βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
ἐναργής <i>(ές)</i>	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	^[E] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of being within clear</i>
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ <i>experience together</i>
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding space	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ <i>hold around</i>
<i>(ἡ, τὸ)</i> ὁ ἔξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
ἀνοίσειν	to bring up <i>(in the future)</i>	ΑΝΟΙΣΕΙΝ <i>[will carry] up</i>

Films preserve a general correspondence between objects and the observer – and it is through a continuity of films that we develop confidence in their accurate correspondence with their source-object.

49a. Basis Of Sight & Thought

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν – ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν – τὰς μορφὰς ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ διανοεῖσθαι

It is also necessary to think that – by something entering [us] from external sources – We see and [mentally] perceive [their] shapes

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	’ΟΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>

We are able to see and think about objects and their qualities when films streaming off of external objects contact and enter our bodies.

49b. Penetrative Impressions

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐναποσφραγίσαιτο τὰ Ἔξω τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τοῦ τε χρώματος καὶ τῆς μορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ μεταξύ ἡμῶν τε κάκείνων οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν ἀκτίνων, ἢ ὠνδήποτε ρευσμάτων ἀφ’ ἡμῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα παραγινομένων – οὕτως ὡς τύπων τινῶν ἐπεισιόντων ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὁμοχρόων τε καὶ ὁμοιομόρφων κατὰ τὸ ἐναρμόττον μέγεθος εἰς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡκέως ταῖς φοραῖς χρωμένων

for external Objects would not imprint inside [us] their own nature of both color and shape through the air that is between us and them either through rays, or through flows of any kind originating from us to them – but rather, with certain impressions entering into us from the situation, [impressions] of the same color and similarly formed [entering us] according to the size that fits into [our] vision or [mental] perception, swiftly using their transmissions

ἐναποσφραγίζειν	to imprint inside	ΕΝΑΠΟΣΦΡΑΓΙΖΕΙΝ <i>seal away within</i>
<i>(ἡ, τὸ)</i> ὁ ἔξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
τὰ ἔξω	external objects	ΕΞΩ <i>outside</i>

<p>ἡ ἀκτίς αἱ ἀκτῖνες</p>	ray	<p>ΑΚΤΙΣ <i>beam</i></p>
<p>τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα</p>	color	<p>ΧΡΩΜΑ <i>skin color</i></p>
<p>ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί</p>	shape	<p>ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i></p>
<p>ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i></p>	air	<p>ΑΗΡ <i>morning mist</i></p>
<p>ἡ ῥεῦσις αἱ ῥεῦσεις</p>	flowing	<p>ῚΡΕΥΣΙΣ <i>action of flowing</i></p>
<p>τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα</p>	flow	<p>ῚΡΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i></p>
<p>παραγινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i></p>	originating from	<p>ΠΑΡΑΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>come into being alongside</i></p>
<p>ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι</p>	impression	<p>ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i></p>
<p>ἐπεισιῶν <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i></p>	entering into	<p>ΕΠΕΙΣΙΩΝ <i>going upon</i></p>
<p>ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι</p>	effort	<p>ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ <i>state of doing / affair</i></p>
<p>τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα</p>	situation	<p>ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i></p>
<p>ὁμόχρους <i>(ον)</i></p>	same color	<p>ᾚΟΜΟΧΡΟΣ <i>same color</i></p>
<p>ὁμοιόμορφος <i>(ον)</i></p>	similarly formed	<p>ᾚΟΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ <i>similar form</i></p>
<p>ἐναρμόττων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i></p>	fitting into	<p>ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ <i>adapting into</i></p>
<p>ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις</p>	vision	<p>ΟΨΙΣ <i>eye</i></p>
<p>ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι</p>	[mental] perception	<p>ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i></p>
<p>ὠκέως</p>	swiftly	<p>ΩΚΕΩΣ <i>quick</i></p>
<p>ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι</p>	transmission	<p>ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i></p>

External things cannot stamp an impression of their color and shape on us through the air between them merely through rays or flows. Instead, we see and think when actual films from the objects themselves, which match the color and shape of the source-object, enter our senses.

50a. Proportional Impact

εἴτα, διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποδιδόντων – καὶ τὴν συμπάθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σωζόντων – κατὰ τὸν ἐκεῖθεν σύμμετρον ἐπερισμὸν, ἐκ τῆς κατὰ βάθος ἐν τῷ στερεμνίῳ τῶν ἀτόμων πάλσεως

accordingly, because of this, while the [Transmissions] are demonstrating the image of a single continuous thing – they are also preserving the correspondence [of qualities] from the original source – according to the proportionate impingement [of the transmissions on us] from that location, [coming] out of the vibration of the atoms deep in that solid object

<p>ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι</p>	cause	<p>ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i></p>
<p>ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι</p>	image	<p>ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i></p>
<p>ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί</p>	imagination [an act of imagining]	<p>ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i></p>
<p>ἀποδιδούς <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i> ἀποδιδόντες</p>	demonstrating	<p>ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΥΣ <i>giving away</i></p>

ἡ σ υμπάθεια αἱ σ υμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ <i>experience together</i>
τὸ ὑ ποκείμενον τὰ ὑ ποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of situated under</i>
ἐ κεῖθεν	from that location <i>(thence)</i>	ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ <i>from over there</i>
σ ύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
ὁ ἐ περεισμός	impingement	ΕΠΕΡΕΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action propping against</i>
ὁ σ ύμμετρος ἐ περεισμός	proportionate impingement	
ὁ π αλμός οἱ π αλμοί	vibration	ΠΑΛΜΟΣ <i>pulse</i>

Films create a continuous impression because they maintain a connection with their original object. Films move faster than the speed of sight: because these films move very fast, they look like a single continuous object and stay connected to their original object. This happens in part because the atoms inside solid object are constantly vibrating.

50b. Film Accuracy

καὶ ἦν ἂν Λάβωμεν **φ**αντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς **τῇ** διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις (εἴτε **μ**ορφῆς εἴτε **σ**υμβεβηκότων) – Μορφή ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ **ἐ**ξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου

and **that image** We receive in an objectively focusing way with [our mental] perception or with [our] sense-organs (whether **of form** or **of properties**) – is itself the Form of the hard object, coming about from concentration [of the film] in succession or [mere] residue of the film

ἡ φ αντασία αἱ φ αντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ἐ πιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
ἡ δ ιάνοια αἱ δ ιάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ αἴ σθησις αἱ αἴ σθησεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τὸ αἴ σθητήριον τὰ αἴ σθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>instrument of perceiving</i>
ἡ μ ορφή αἱ μ ορφαί	form	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>
ἡ μ ορφῆς φ αντασία	the image of form	
τὸ σ υμβεβηκός τὰ σ υμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
ἡ σ υμβεβηκότων φ αντασία	image of properties	
ἐ ξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
ἡ π ύκνωσις αἱ π υκνώσεις	a concentrating	ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ <i>action of compacting</i>
τὸ π ύκνωμα τὰ π υκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
τὸ ἐ ξῆς π ύκνωμα τοῦ εἰδώλου	concentration of the film in succession	

<p>τὸ ἐγκατάλειμμα</p> <p>τὰ ἐγκαταλείμματα</p>	<p>[mere] residue</p>	<p>ΕΓΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΜΜΑ</p> <p><i>the result of fully</i> <i>thoroughly leaving</i> <i>behind</i></p>
<p>τὸ εἶδωλον</p> <p>τὰ εἶδωλα</p>	<p>film</p>	<p>ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ</p> <p><i>object from</i> <i>appearing</i></p>
<p>τὸ ἐγκατάλειμμα</p> <p>τοῦ εἰδώλου</p>	<p>the residue of the film</p>	
<p>στερεός</p> <p>(ἄ, ὄν)</p>	<p>firm</p>	<p>ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ</p> <p><i>stiff</i></p>
<p>τὸ στερέμνιον</p> <p>τὰ στερέμνια</p>	<p>hard object</p>	<p>ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ</p> <p><i>object from</i> <i>making hard</i></p>
<p>ἡ τοῦ στερεμνίου</p> <p>μορφή</p>	<p>the form of the hard [object]</p>	

We accurately perceive the impressions of films. This is true both for concentrations of films and mere residues of films.

50c. Non-Attestation & Contestation

τὸ δὲ Ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ Διημαρτημένον ^[Δ] ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεὶ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσμένοντος ^{M} ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι ἢ ^{-W} μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι – εἴτ’ ^{-M} οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενου ἢ ^{W} ἀντιμαρτυρούμενου

Falsity and What is thoroughly mistaken always exist ^[Δ] in the addition of judgment *‘regarding what is still pending’* ^{M} to be attested or ^{-W} not to be contested – and subsequently is ^{-M} not attested *‘or* ^{W} *is contested’*

<p>τὸ ψεῦδος</p> <p>τὰ ψεύδη</p>	<p>falsity</p>	<p>ΨΕΥΔΟΣ</p> <p><i>falsehood / lie</i></p>
<p>τὸ διημαρτημένον</p> <p>τὰ διημαρτημένα</p>	<p>what is thoroughly mistaken</p>	<p>ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ</p> <p><i>fully missing the mark</i></p>
<p>ἡ δόξα</p> <p>αἱ δόξαι</p>	<p>judgment</p>	<p>ΔΟΞΑΙ</p> <p><i>seeming</i></p>
<p>τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον</p>	<p>^[Δ+] the addition of judgement</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ</p> <p><i>result of addition</i> <i>to seeming</i></p>
<p>προσμένων</p> <p>(ουσα, ον)</p>	<p>still pending</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ</p> <p><i>remaining further</i></p>
<p>τὸ προσμένον</p> <p>τὰ προσμένοντα</p>	<p>^[O] what is still pending <i>[further attestation]</i></p>	<p>ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ</p> <p><i>remaining further</i></p>
<p>ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν</p>	<p>to attest</p>	<p>ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ</p> <p><i>testifying upon</i></p>
<p>τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον</p> <p>τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα</p>	<p>^[M] what is attested</p>	<p>ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ</p> <p><i>result of</i> <i>testifying upon</i></p>
<p>ἐπιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι</p>	<p>^{M} to be attested <i>(in the future)</i></p>	
<p>τὸ οὐκ</p> <p>ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον</p>	<p>^[-M] what is not attested</p>	
<p>ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν</p>	<p>to contest</p>	<p>ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ</p> <p><i>testifying against</i></p>
<p>ἀντιμαρτυρηθῆσεσθαι</p>	<p>^{W} to be contested <i>(in the future)</i></p>	
<p>τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον</p> <p>τὰ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενα</p>	<p>^[W] what is contested</p>	

Errors and miscalculations do not come from sensation, but from judgment. When we affirm facts that need to be checked – and then these facts are later proven wrong or contradicted.

ἢ τε γὰρ Ὅμοιότης τῶν φαντασμῶν (οἶονεὶ ἐν εἰκόνι λαμβανομένων ἢ καθ’ ὕπνους γινομένων ἢ κατ’ ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων) οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὑπῆρχε τοῖς 'οὔσί' τε καὶ 'ἀληθείς' προσαγορευόμενοις – εἰ μὴ ἦν τινα καὶ Τοιαῦτα πρὸς ᾗ Παραβάλλομεν

in fact, the Similarity of [our] imagination (whether comprehend in a representation or occurring through dreams or through certain other attentions of [mental] perception or [attentions] of the rest of the standards) would never at anytime occur with the things that are referred to as 'existing' and 'true' – unless those very [films] to which We compare also existed

ἡ ὁμοιότης αἱ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being similar</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination [an act of imagining]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i>
λαμβάνόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	comprehended	ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ εἰκῶν αἱ εἰκόνες	representation	ΕΙΚΩΝ <i>portraying</i>
ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	dream	ὙΠΝΟΣ
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
τινες ἐπιβολαί τῆς διανοίας	some attentions to perception	
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
τινες ἐπιβολαί τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων	some attentions of the other standards	
ἀληθής <i>(ές)</i>	(α) true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>
προσαγορευόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being referred to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
παραβάλλειν	to compare	ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in across</i>

We know things exist because we sense them. Our thoughts and dreams come from impressions of existing objects. The impressions that we see (or dream or imagine) would never look like real and true things unless we had contact with actual objects. The similarity of mental images to real and existing things would never arise at any time unless we had those real things for direct comparison.

51b. Logical Additions

τὸ δὲ Διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν εἰ μὴ Ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς – συνημμένην μὲν τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ – διάληψιν δὲ ἔχουσιν {καθ’ ἣν τὸ Ψεῦδος γίνεται}

What is thoroughly mistaken would not exist if We did not also comprehend a certain other movement in us ourselves – connected to our image-based attention – but having a differentiation {through which Error is produced}

τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>fully missing the mark</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τις κίνησις ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς	some movement within us ourselves	
συνημμένος <i>(α, ον)</i>	connected	ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>joined together</i>

ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ state of <i>appearing</i>
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination [an act of imagining]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i>
φανταστικός (ή, όν)	image-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ φανταστική ἐπιβολή	our image-based attention	
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	differentiation	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold separation</i>

Mental impressions are necessary for thinking. Mistakes happen because we feel another kind of movement inside us (thinking) that is linked to, but different from, the impressions we receive from external sources.

-51c. Attestation & Non-Contestation

κατὰ δὲ ταύτην, ἐὰν μὲν ^[-M] μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ^[W] ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ψεῦδος γίνεται – ἐὰν δὲ ^[M] ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ^[-W] μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ Ἀληθές

and regarding this [mental activity of judgment in us], if it ^[-M] is not attested or ^[W] is contested, Falsity is produced – but if it ^[M] is attested or ^[-W] is non contested, Truth [is produced]

^[Δ] Opinions about ^[A] perceptions can be ^(-α) false, but ^[A] the perceptions themselves are always true ^(α) – they must be ^(α) real because they physically affect us. However, we need to ^{Δ} think about and judge these "honest" ^[A] reports of our sensations to figure out the extent that they do, in fact, accurately correspond to ^{Θ} external objects and circumstances.
A ^[Δα] true opinion is established by the full correspondence of that ^[Δ] opinion to ^{Θ} external objects and their circumstances. If our ^[Δ] opinion is ^{-M} not attested by evidence or is ^{W} contested by evidence, it is ^(-α) false; but if our opinion is ^{M} attested by evidence or at least is ^{-W} not contested by evidence, ^(α) it is true.
An example of something ^{-W} not contested by evidence is the existence of extraterrestrial life – which is rightfully considered ^(α) to exist, despite ^{M} not being attested by ^{Θ} direct evidence.

52a. Basis In Reality

καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν δόξαν Κατέχειν – ἵνα μήτε τὰ Κριτήρια ἀναιρῆται τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐναργείας – μήτε τὸ Δημαρτημένον, ὁμοίως βεβαιούμενον, πάντα συνταράττη

firmly Maintaining this judgment is indeed very necessary – so that the Standards according to ^{Ε} detectible reality are not taken away – and What is thoroughly mistaken would not, while being similarly affirmed, confuse everything

σφόδρα	very	ΣΦΟΔΡΑ <i>vehement</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly holding</i>
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping back</i>
ἀναιρεῖσθαι	to be taken away	
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^{Ε} detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ δημαρτημένον τὰ δημαρτημένα	what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>fully missing the mark</i>

ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
βεβαιούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>firm standing</i>
συνταράττειν	to confuse	ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>agitating together</i>

Ideas not based on sensation have no basis in reality. We must avoid rejecting the clear evidence of our senses and we must reject thoughts not based in our sense – otherwise we will confuse reality with our own ideas.

52b. Origin of Sound

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὸ Ἀκούειν γίνεται **ῥεύματος φερομένου** ἀπὸ τοῦ **φωνούντος** ἢ **ἠχοῦντος** ἢ **ψοφούντος** ἢ **ὅπωςδήποτε ἀκουστικὸν πάθος** παρασκευάζοντος

but indeed, Hearing is produced **because a flow is carried** off of what is speaking or echoing or making noise or in any way producing **an auditory experience**

ἀκούειν	to hear	ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ <i>listening</i>
τὸ ἀκούειν	hearing	
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῚΡΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
φωνῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	speaking	ΦΩΝΩΝ <i>speaking</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
ἠχῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	echoing	ΗΧΩΝ <i>sound</i>
ψοφῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	making noise	ΨΟΦΩΝ <i>noise</i>
ὅπωςδήποτε	in any way	᾽ΟΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ <i>indefinite</i> <i>in what way</i>
ἀκουστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	auditory	ΑΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>hearing</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>

Sound is a current perpetuated through air. Hearing happens when a flow of sound travels from an object to us.

52c. Sound Waves

τὸ δέ ῚΡεῦμα τοῦτο εἰς ὁμοιομερεῖς ὄγκους διασπείρεται, ἅμα ^[1] **τινὰ διασῶζοντας συμπάθειαν** πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ^[2] **ἐνότητα ιδιότροπον, διατείνουσαν** πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν καὶ **τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ’ ἐκείνου** ὥς **τὰ πολλὰ ποιοῦσαν** – εἰ δὲ μή γε, **τὸ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἔνδηλον** παρασκευάζουσαν

this Flow is dispersed into homoioméric [*i.e., similarly composed*] particles, which simultaneously preserves ^[1] **a certain correspondence** among themselves and ^[2] **a particular type of unity**, which extends [back] towards the object that sent [the flow of sound] and [this particular unity] usually **makes the focused sensation** [of specific sounds] in that [recipient of the flow] – otherwise, **it only makes** [the presence of] the external source **fully clear**

τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῚΡΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>
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<p>ἡ ὁμοιομέρεια</p> <p>αἱ ὁμοιομέραι</p>	<p>homoio^omé^ereia</p>	<p>ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ</p> <p>state of</p> <p>similar parts</p>
<p>ὁμοιομερής</p> <p>(ές)</p>	<p>"similarly composed"</p> <p>homoio^omeric</p>	<p>ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ</p> <p>similar parts</p>
<p>ὁ ὄγκος</p> <p>οἱ ὄγκοι</p>	<p>particle</p>	<p>ΟΓΚΟΣ</p> <p>bulk</p>
<p>διασπείρειν</p>	<p>to disperse</p>	<p>ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ</p> <p>scatter</p>
<p>διασπείρεσθαι</p>	<p>to be dispersed</p>	
<p>διασώζων</p> <p>(ουσα, ον)</p>	<p>preserving</p>	<p>ΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΩΝ</p> <p>fully saving</p>
<p>ἡ συμπάθεια</p> <p>αἱ συμπάθειαι</p>	<p>correspondence</p>	<p>ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ</p> <p>experience together</p>
<p>ἡ ἐνότης</p> <p>αἱ ἐνότητες</p>	<p>unity</p>	<p>ΕΝΟΤΗΣ</p> <p>condition from</p> <p>oneness</p>
<p>ιδιότροπος</p> <p>(ον)</p>	<p>particular type of</p>	<p>ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ</p> <p>particular way</p>
<p>διατείνων</p> <p>(ουσα, ον)</p>	<p>extending</p>	<p>ΔΙΑΤΕΙΝΩΝ</p> <p>stretching across</p>
<p>ἀποστέλλειν</p>	<p>to send away</p>	<p>ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ</p> <p>making ready away</p>
<p>ἀποστεῖλας</p> <p>(α, αν)</p>	<p>having sent away</p>	
<p>τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν</p> <p>τὰ ἀποστείλαντα</p>	<p>the object that</p> <p>sent</p>	<p>ΑΠΟΣΤΕΙΛΑΝ</p> <p>result of</p> <p>sending away</p>
<p>ἡ αἴσθησις</p> <p>αἱ αἰσθήσεις</p>	<p>[A] sensation</p>	<p>ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ</p> <p>perceiving process</p>
<p>ἡ ἐπαίσθησις</p> <p>αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις</p>	<p>focused</p> <p>sensation</p>	<p>ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ</p> <p>upon perceiving</p>
<p>ἡ αἴσθησις</p> <p>αἱ αἰσθήσεις</p>	<p>[A] sensation</p>	<p>ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ</p> <p>perceiving process</p>
<p>τὸ αἰσθητήριον</p> <p>τὰ αἰσθητήρια</p>	<p>sense-organ</p>	<p>ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ</p> <p>instrument of</p> <p>perceiving</p>
<p>ποιῶν</p> <p>(οὔσα, οὔν)</p>	<p>making</p>	<p>ΠΟΙΩΝ</p> <p>gathering</p>
<p>(ἡ, τὸ) ὁ ἔξωθεν</p>	<p>external source</p>	<p>ΕΞΩΘΕΝ</p> <p>outside origin</p>
<p>ἔνδηλος</p> <p>(ον)</p>	<p>(^θ) fully clear</p>	<p>ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ</p> <p>clear within</p>
<p>παρασκευάζων</p> <p>(ουσα, ον)</p>	<p>providing</p> <p>[here, "makes"]</p>	<p>ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΩΝ</p> <p>preparing alongside</p>

Sound waves are composed of particles. Currents of sound break into tiny particles that have a direct connection with the object that produced the sound. This connection allows us to understand the source of the sound or at least allows us to understand that there is something, external to us, that is making a sound.

53a. Direct Correspondence

ἄνευ γὰρ ἀναφερομένης τινὸς ἐκεῖθεν συμπαθείας οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἡ τοιαύτη Ἐπαίσθησις

for, without some correspondence being carried back from that location [that made the sound], a focused Sensation such as this would not occur

<p>ἀναφερόμενος</p> <p>(η, ον)</p>	<p>being carried</p> <p>back</p>	<p>ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ</p> <p>bringing back</p>
<p>ἐκεῖθεν</p>	<p>from that location</p> <p>(thence)</p>	<p>ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ</p> <p>from over there</p>
<p>ἡ συμπάθεια</p> <p>αἱ συμπάθειαι</p>	<p>correspondence</p>	<p>ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ</p> <p>experience</p> <p>together</p>

ἡ ἐπαίσθησις	focused	ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ
αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις	sensation	upon perceiving

Hearing is based on material transmission from object to observer. Without the transmission of a certain connection between the parts from the object, we could not have the sensation of hearing.

53b. Mechanics of Sound

οὐκ αὐτὸν οὖν Δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν Ἀέρα ὑπὸ τῆς προιεμένης φωνῆς ἢ καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν σχηματίζεσθαι – πολλὴν γὰρ ἔνδειαν ἔξει Τοῦτο πάσχων ὑπ’ ἐκείνης – ἀλλ’ εὐθύς, τὴν γινομένην πληγὴν ἐν ἡμῖν (ὅταν φωνὴν Ἀφίωμεν) τοιαύτην ἔκθλιψιν ὄγκων τινῶν ρεύματος πνευματώδους ἀποτελεστικῶν ποιεῖσθαι (Ἡ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἀκουστικὸν ἡμῖν παρασκευάζει)

therefore, It is not necessary to think that the air itself is shaped by an emitted statement and [sounds] of the same kind – for this [air] will have a great lack of being affected by that [sound] – but simply, [It is necessary to consider that] the strike produced inside us (when We emit a statement) makes such a pressure of certain particles that produce an airy flow (Which produces an auditory experience in us)

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN custom
ὁ ἀήρ (τοῦ ἀέρος)	air	AHP morning mist
προιέμενος (η, ον)	emitted	ΠΡΟΙΕΜΕΝΟΣ throw before
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ speaking
ὁ ὁμογενής οἱ ὁμογενεῖς	the same kind	ὍΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ same born
ὁμογενής (ές)	of the same kind	
σχηματίζειν	to assume a shape	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ forming
σχηματίζεσθαι	to be shaped	
ἡ ἔνδεια αἱ ἔνδειαί	lack	ΕΝΔΕΙΑ deficiency
πάσχων (ουσα, ον)	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ suffering
εὐθύς (εἴα, ύ)	simply	ΕΥΘΥΣ direct
γινόμενος (η, ον)	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ become
ἡ πληγή αἱ πληγαί	strike	ΠΛΗΓΗ to hit
ἀφιέναι	to emit	ΑΦΙΕΝΑΙ send away
ἡ ἔκθλιψις αἱ ἔκθλιψεις	pressure	ΕΚΘΛΙΨΙΣ press out
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ bulk
τὸ ρεῦμα τὰ ρεύματα	flow	ῚΡΕΥΜΑ result of flowing
πνευματώδης (ες)	airy	ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ quality of air
ἀποτελεστικός (ή, όν)	productive [here, "that produce"]	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of completing out
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ enduring
ἀκουστικός (ή, όν)	auditory	ΑΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of hearing

The void can never affect anything and the void cannot be affected by anything in any way. Air, which is a mixture of atoms and void, can affect and be affected. Nevertheless, we should not think that the air itself is shaped by the voice or sound. Instead, when we make a sound, we make a movement of particles that flow in current. This current producing the sensation of hearing when it contacts an organ that can hear.

53c. Smell

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὴν ὁσμὴν Νομιστέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀκοήν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε οὐθὲν πάθος ἐργάσασθαι, εἰ μὴ Ὅγκοι τινὲς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀποφερόμενοι, σύμμετροι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν: οἱ μὲν Τοῖοι τεταραγμένως καὶ ἄλλοτρίως – οἱ δὲ Τοῖοι ἀταράχως καὶ οἰκείως ἔχοντες

and indeed, It is not necessary to think that smell, like sound, would ever produce any experience unless certain Particles existed that are carried away from the situations [that smell or make noise], which are proportionate for moving that sense-organ: [and according to their proportions] Some [particles move the sense organ] with disturbance and incompatibly – while Others do so without disturbance or comfortably

ἡ ὁσμὴ αἱ ὁσμαί	smell	ΟΣΜΗ odor
ἡ ἀκοή αἱ ἀκοαί	sound	ΑΚΟΗ hearing
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ enduring
ἐργάζεσθαι	to be working	ΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ work
ἐργάσασθαι	to accomplish	
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ doing / affair
ἀποφερόμενος (η, ον)	being carried away	ΑΠΟΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ bringing out
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ bulk
σύμμετρος (ον)	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ measure together
τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ instrument of perceiving
τεταραγμένως	with disturbance	ΤΕΤΑΡΑΓΜΕΝΩΣ having been agitated
ἄλλοτρίως	incompatibly	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ different other
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ without agitating
ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος (ος, ον)	undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ without agitating
ἀταράχως	without disturbance	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΩΣ without agitating
οἰκείως	comfortably	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ appropriate

Smell, like sound, would not produce any sensation for us, if particles from their source-objects did not reach our nose or ears. Some particles feel strange or disruptive (when they contact a part of our body that can sense the contact), while other particles are calming and comforting (when they contact).

54a. Shape, Size, And Weight

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὰς Ἀτόμους Νομιστέον μηδεμίαν ποιότητα τῶν φαινομένων προσφέρεσθαι πλὴν σχήματος καὶ βάρους καὶ μεγέθους (καὶ Ὅσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος συμφυῇ ἐστι)

and indeed, It is not necessary to think that the Atoms also possess any qualities of visible things except shape, weight, size (and However many [qualities] that are necessarily inherent to shape)

ἄτομος <i>(ον)</i>	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
ἢ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>
ἢ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [asking] what kind</i>
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
προσφέρεσθαι	to also possess <i>[for themselves]</i>	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>bringing as well</i>
πλὴν	besides	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ἢ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	<i>[natural]</i> necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
ἐξ ἀνάγκης	necessarily	
συμφυής <i>(ές)</i>	inherent	ΣΥΜΦΥΗΣ <i>growing together</i>

Atoms do not have any of the qualities except shape, weight, and size, and the properties that come with shape.

54b. Dissolutions of Compounds

Ποιότης γὰρ πᾶσα μεταβάλλει – αἱ δὲ Ἄτομοι οὐδὲν μεταβάλλουσιν: ἐπειδήπερ, δεῖ Τι ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων στερεὸν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον (᾽Ο τὰς μεταβολὰς – οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ποιήσεται οὐδ’ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος – ἀλλὰ κατὰ μεταθέσεις ἐν πολλοῖς, τινῶν δὲ καὶ προσόδους καὶ ἀφόδους)

for every Quality transforms – but the Atoms do not transform at all: since indeed, Something must remain firm and indissoluble in the dissolutions of the compounds (Which will make transformations – not into what does not exist or from what does not exist – but mostly through rearrangements, and also through additions and removals [of the atoms])

ἢ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [asking] what kind</i>
τὰ ἀμετάβλητα	what is non-transformable	ΑΜΕΤΑΒΛΗΤΑ <i>not thrown change</i>
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
ἢ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>
ὑπομένειν	to remain	ὙΠΟΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying under</i>
ἢ λύσις αἱ λύσεις	solution	ΛΥΣΙΣ <i>loosening</i>

ἡ διάλυσ ις αἱ διαλύ σεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥ ΣΙΣ <i>fully loosening</i>
ἡ σύγκρι σις αἱ συγκρί σεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙ ΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἡ στερεό της αἱ στερεό τητες	firmness	ΣΤΕΡΕΟ ΤΗΣ <i>condition from making stiff</i>
στερεός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟ Σ <i>stiff</i>
ἀδιάλυ τος <i>(ον)</i>	indissoluble	ΑΔΙΑΛΥ ΤΟΣ <i>not fully loose</i>
ἡ μετάβα σις αἱ μεταβά σεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑ ΣΙΣ <i>stepping beyond</i>
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ <i>threw in a change</i>
ἡ μετάθε σις αἱ μεταθέ σεις	rearrangement	ΜΕΤΑΘΕ ΣΙΣ <i>placing change</i>
ἡ πρόσοδο ς αἱ προσόδο ι	addition	ΠΡΟΣΟΔΟ Σ <i>path toward</i>
ἡ ἄφοδο ς αἱ ἀφόδο ι	removal	ΑΦΟΔΟ Σ <i>path away</i>

All compositions and their qualities are fully changeable, but atoms and their qualities are not changeable. When composite bodies break apart, there must be something solid and unbreakable left behind, which allows for subsequent changes of compositions and qualities. The atoms themselves cannot transform, add or subtract anything from their form.

54c. Permanence of Atoms

ὅθεν, Ἀναγκαῖον τὰ Μετατιθέμενα ἀφθαρτα εἶναι – καί τὴν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντα – ὅγκους δὲ καὶ σχηματισμοὺς ἰδίους (Ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπομένειν)

therefore, It is necessary that the rearranged Things exist as indestructible – and do not have the nature of what transforms – but [exist as] particles and configurations of their own (for It is necessary that these remain)

ἀναγκαῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙ ΟΣ <i>necessity</i>
μετατιθέ μενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	rearranged	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕ ΜΕΝΟΣ <i>placing change</i>
τὸ μετατιθέ μενον τὰ μετατιθέ μενα	what is rearranged	
ἄφθαρτος <i>(ον)</i>	indestructible	ΑΦΘΑΡ ΤΟΣ <i>not decaying</i>
μεταβάλλ ειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛ ΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
μεταβάλλ ων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛ ΩΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
τὸ μεταβάλλ ον τὰ μεταβάλλ οντα	what transforms	
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟ Σ <i>bulk</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήμα τα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ὁ σχηματ ισμός οἱ σχηματ ισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣ ΜΟΣ <i>result of action of forming</i>
ὑπομέν ειν	to remain	ΎΠΟΜΕΝ ΕΙΝ <i>staying under</i>

Changes in the emergent qualities of matter do not come from or go into nothingness, but occur through rearranging, adding or removing atoms. These atoms are indestructible and unchangeable, each with its own permanent size and shape.

55a. Permanent Properties

καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν μετασχηματιζομένοις κατὰ τὴν περιαίρεσιν, τὸ Σχῆμα ἐνυπάρχον λαμβάνεται – αἱ δὲ Ποιότητες οὐκ ἐνυπάρχουσai ἐν τῷ μεταβάλλοντι (ὥσπερ ἐκείνο καταλείπεται) ἀλλ’ ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλύμεναι – ἱκανὰ οὖν τὰ ὑπολειπόμενα Ταῦτα τὰς τῶν συγκρίσεων διαφορὰς ποιεῖν: ἐπειδήπερ ὑπολείπεσθαι γέ Τινα Ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μὴ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεσθαι

for even in things transfigured in our presence by the stripping away [of their material], a Shape is [still] comprehended as integral – while (in comparison to the way that [a shape] is thoroughly left) the Qualities [are] not integral in what transforms but are dissolved away from the whole body – therefore These remaining [atoms] are sufficient to make the differences [of qualities] in [subsequent] compounds: since indeed, It is necessary for certain Things to remain and not to be destroyed into nonexistence

[Bailey] For even in things perceptible to us which change their shape by the withdrawal of matter it is seen that shape remains to them, whereas the qualities do not remain in the changing object, in the way in which shape is left behind, but are lost from the entire body. Now these particles which are left behind are sufficient to cause the differences in compound bodies, since it is essential that some things should be left behind and not be destroyed into the non-existent.

for even in things transfigured in our presence by the stripping away [of their material], a Shape is [still] comprehended as integral – while the Qualities [are comprehended] as not integral in what transforms (in the way that [some shape] is *able) but [the qualities] are dissolved away from the entire body – therefore These remaining [atoms] are sufficient to make the differences in the compounds: since indeed, It is necessary for certain Things to remain and not to be destroyed into nonexistence

ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ result of action of forming
τὸ μετασχηματιζόμενον τὰ μετασχηματιζόμενα	what is transfigured	ΜΕΤΑΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ change form
μετασχηματιζόμενος (η, ον)	transfiguring	
ἡ περιαίρεσις αἱ περιαιρέσεις	stripping away	ΠΕΡΙΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ taking around
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ holding [a form]
ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον) ὑπάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ beginning under (before)
ἐνυπάρχων (ουσα, ον) ἐνυπάρχοντα	integral	ΕΝΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ beginning under (before) in
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ condition from [asking] what kind
μεταβάλλων (ουσα, ον)	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ throwing in change
τὸ μεταβάλλον τὰ μεταβάλλοντα	what transforms	
καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ thoroughly leave
καταλείπεσθαι	to be thoroughly left	

διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>fully dissolve</i>
ἀπόλλυναι	to dissolve away	ΑΠΟΛΛΥΝΑΙ <i>dissolve away</i>
ἀπόλλυσθαι	to be dissolved away	
ὑπολειπόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	remaining	ὙΠΟΛΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>leave under</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ὑπολείπειν	to leave remaining	ὙΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>leave under</i>
ὑπολείπεσθαι	to be remaining	
φθείρειν	to destroy	ΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>damaging</i>
φθείρεσθαι	to be destroyed	

The ^[1] inseparable qualities (i.e., properties) of the atoms are indeed permanent, nevertheless the ^[2] inseparable qualities of a compound exist only as long as the compound exists and the ^[3] separable qualities (i.e., symptoms) of a compound do not exist for as long as the compound exists – and finally, the ^[4] separable qualities of the atoms (e.g., their location) are impermanent.

With the destruction of an object, most qualities may all disappear, but the qualities of shape, weight, and form will always remain with the matter that composed that destroyed object.

55b. Variations in Atomic Size

ἀλλὰ μὴν, οὐδὲ Δεῖ νομίζειν **πᾶν Μέγεθος ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις ὑπάρχειν** (ἵνα μὴ τὰ Φαινόμενα ἀντιμαρτυρῇ) **Παραλλαγὰς δέ τινας μεγεθῶν Νομιστέον εἶναι**: βέλτιον γὰρ καὶ **τούτου προσόντος τὰ κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις** Γινόμενα ἀποδοθήσεται

however, It is not necessary to think that every Size exists among the atoms (otherwise visible Things would contest) instead, It is necessary to think that certain Varieties of sizes do exist: for the Things that happen according to experiences and sensations will be demonstrated in a better way with this [size variation] being present

[Bailey] Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations.

ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρόμενος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contested	
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ
βέλτιον	in a better way	
προσών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	[being] present	ΠΡΟΣΩΝ <i>existing towards</i>

τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[Α] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
γινόμενος (η, ον) γινόμενοι (αι, α)	happening	ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>birthing</i>
τὸ γινόμενον τὰ γινόμενα	what happens	ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>birthing</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
ἀποδιδούς (οὔσα, όν) ἀποδιδόντες	demonstrating	
ἀποδοθήσασθαι	to about to be demonstrated	ΑΠΟΔΟΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ <i>will be fully given</i>

We should not think that atoms come in every possible size, as this would be contradicted by experience – but we must admit that atoms do have many different sizes.

56a. Limits in Atomic Size

πάν δὲ Μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν οὔτε **χρήσιμόν** ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν **ποιότητων** **διαφοράς**: **ἀφῖχθαί** τε ἅμ’ ἔδει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς **ὀρατὰς Ἄτομους** – “Ὁ οὐ θεωρεῖται γινόμενον – οὔθ’ **ὅπως ἂν γένοιτο ὀρατὴ Ἄτομος**” Ἔστιν ἐπινοῆσαι

but every Size [of atom] existing is also not **useful** for [producing] the **differences of qualities**: and It would also at the same time have been necessary for **visible Atoms to arrive among us** – Which are not considered to be produced – nor is It possible to objectively conceive **how a visible Atom would be produced**

^[Bailey] But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.

τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
χρήσιμος (ον)	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [asking] what kind</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>come towards</i>
ἀφῖχθαί	to have arrived	
ὀρατός (ή, όν)	visible	ὈΡΑΤΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be envisioned	
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	<i>[the act of mental]</i> envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of observing</i>
γινόμενος (η, ον)	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>

ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἐπινοῆσαι	to think about [already]	

Thinking that atoms exist in every and all sizes is not necessary to explain the differences in qualities of things. If atoms existed in every and all sizes, some atoms would be big enough to see – which is contrary to evidence and also inconceivable.

56b. Impossibility of Infinite Divisibility

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οὐ Δεῖ νομίζειν ἐν τῷ ὠρισμένῳ σώματι ἀπείρους Ὅγκους εἶναι – οὐδ’ ὀπηλίκους οὖν: ὥστε, οὐ μόνον ^[1] τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον Τομήν ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον Ἀναιρετέον (ἵνα μὴ πάντα ἀσθενῇ Ποιῶμεν, κὰν ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρόων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀναγκάζομεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν), ἀλλὰ καὶ ^[2] τὴν μετάβασιν μὴ Νομιστέον γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ὠρισμένοις εἰς ἄπειρον μηδ’ ἐπὶ τοῦλαττον

also regarding these [topics], It is not necessary to think that infinite Particles exist in a finite body – nor [particles] of any magnitude whatsoever: therefore, not only ^[1] is It necessary to take away the Division ad infinitum into something smaller (in order that We do not make everything weak, and in [our] complete comprehension of what is aggregated, be forced to totally expend what exists by pinching [the atoms] into non-existence), but also ^[2] It is not necessary to think that a [spatial] extension is produced within the finite [atoms] ad infinitum, not into something [ever] smaller

[Bailey] Besides this we must not suppose that in a limited body there can be infinite parts or parts of every degree of smallness. Therefore, we must not only do away with division into smaller and smaller parts to infinity, in order that we may not make all things weak, and so in the composition of aggregate bodies be compelled to crush and squander the things that exist into the non-existent, but we must not either suppose that in limited bodies there is a possibility of continuing to infinity in passing even to smaller and smaller parts.

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
ὠρισμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	finite	ΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ <i>limit</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
ὀπηλίκος <i>(η, ον)</i>	of any magnitude	ὍΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>which extent</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
εἰς ἄπειρον	ad infinitum	
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ <i>cut</i>
τοῦλαττον τούλάττα	something smaller	ΤΟ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ <i>light weight</i>
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping back</i>
ἀσθενής <i>(ές)</i>	weak	ΑΣΘΕΝΗΣ <i>not strength</i>
ποιεῖν	*to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
λήψεσθαι	to be comprehended [in the future]	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ <i>taking hold</i>
ἡ περίληψις αἱ περιλήψεις	complete comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold around</i>
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	what is aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ <i>gathered</i>

ἄθροος (α, ον)	aggregated	
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ <i>necessary</i>
ἀναγκάζεσθαι	to be forced	
θλίβειν	to pinch	ΘΛΙΒΩΝ <i>squeezing</i>
θλίβων (ουσα, ον) θλίβοντες	pinching	
καταναλίσκειν	to totally expend	ΚΑΤΑΝΑΛΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly spent</i>
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ <i>stepping beyond</i>
ἡ μετάβασις εἰς ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τοῦ λαττον	extension ad infinitum into what is smaller	
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ <i>threw in a change</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>

Infinite parts cannot exist in a finite object. We should not think that a finite body can have an infinite number of parts, no matter how small the parts. This means we must reject the idea of dividing things into smaller and smaller parts forever, as it would make everything too weak and destroy atoms, turning them into nothing. We also cannot believe that atoms can transform into nothingness.

57a. Paradox of Infinite Parts

οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως (ἐπειδὴν ἀπαξ Τίς εἶπη ὅτι ἄπειροι Ὅγκοι ἐν τινι ὑπάρχουσιν, ἢ ὀπηλικοί οὓν) ᾽Εστι νοῆσαι ὅπως ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο πεπερασμένον εἴη τὸ Μέγεθος: πηλικοί γάρ τινες δῆλον ὡς οἱ ἄπειροί εἰσιν Ὅγκοι – καὶ οὗτοι ὀπηλικοί ἂν ποτε ᾤσιν – ἄπειρον ἂν ᾗν καὶ τὸ Μέγεθος

for in no way (whenever Someone says that infinite Particles exist in something, or [particles] of any magnitude whatsoever) is It possible to conceive in what way this [thing's] Size might still be finite: for clearly these infinite Particles must be of some magnitude – and any size they may be – the Size [of something composed of them] would also be infinite

[Bailey] For if once one says that there are infinite parts in a body or parts of any degree of smallness, it is not possible to conceive how this should be, and indeed how could the body any longer be limited in size? (For it is obvious that these infinite particles must be of some size or other; and however small they may be, the size of the body too would be infinite.)

ἄπειρος (ον)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ὀπηλίκος (η, ον)	of any magnitude	ΟΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>which extent</i>
πηλίκος (η, ον)	of some magnitude	ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
ἐπινόεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>

διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινόαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of extremity</i>
πεπερασμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	finite	
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
δῆλον	clearly	
ἔνδηλος <i>(ον)</i>	^(θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear within</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>

A finite object cannot have infinite parts. If we say that there are an infinite number of tiny particles in anything, we cannot imagine how it could still be limited in size. An infinite amount of particles, no matter how small they are, would form an aggregate that would be infinitely large.

57b. Infinite Boundaries

ἄκρον **τε** ἔχοντος τοῦ πεπερασμένου **διαληπτόν**: εἰ **μὴ** καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ θεωρητόν – οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ καὶ **τὸ ἐξῆς** **τούτου** **τοιούτου** **Νοεῖν** καὶ οὕτω – **κατὰ** **τὸ ἐξῆς** εἰς **τοῦ****μπροσθεν** **βαδίζοντα** **εἰς** **τὸ ἄπειρον** **ὑπάρχειν** – καὶ **τὸ** **τοιούτου** **ἀφικνεῖσθαι** **τῇ ἐννοίᾳ**

because what is finite has a boundary that is [mentally] distinguishable: even if it is not envisionable by itself – it is impossible not to also Conceive that what is in succession to it [is] of the same kind [i.e., another boundary] and therefore – because [our conception of a boundary] proceeds to exist according what is in succession towards what is ahead ad infinitum – such a [correct view of the infinite] also arrives by internal conception

[Hicks] And, in the next place, since what is finite has an extremity which is distinguishable, even if it is not by itself observable, it is not possible to avoid thinking of another such extremity next to this. Nor can we help thinking that in this way, by proceeding forward from one to the next in order, it is possible by such a progression to arrive in thought at infinity.

[Bailey] And again, since the limited body has an extreme point, which is distinguishable, even though not perceptible by itself, you cannot conceive that the succeeding point to it is not similar in character, or that if you go on in this way from one point to another, it should be possible for you to proceed to infinity marking such points in your mind.

τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	boundary	ΑΚΡΟΝ <i>highest</i>
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of extremity</i>
πεπερασμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	finite	
τὸ περιληπτόν τὰ περιληπτὰ	what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ <i>taken hold around</i>
διαληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	[mentally] distinguishable	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>taking hold between</i>

τὸ διαληπτόν τὰ διαληπτὰ	what is distinguishable [mentally]	
θεωρητός (ή, όν)	envisionable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
ἐξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
τὸ ἐξῆς τὰ ἐξῆς	what is in succession	
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
τοὔμπροσθεν τᾶμπροσθεν	what is ahead	ΤΟΥΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ = ΤΟ ΕΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ <i>in before</i>
βαδίζων (ουσα, ον) βαδίζοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	proceeding	ΒΑΔΙΖΩΝ
εἰς ἄπειρον	ad infinitum	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>arrive from</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing in</i>

Because all finite objects have a discernible boundary, it is impossible not to conceive that whatever bounds the last object must be of a similar nature (being surrounded, in turn, by something else). Proceeding in this manner (with the mind progressing from one boundary to the next, endlessly) brings the concept of infinity to our minds.

58a. Unique Quality Of Visual Limits

τό τε ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει Δεῖ κατανοεῖν: ὅτι οὔτε τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον τὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἔχον, οὔτε πάντη πάντως ἀνόμοιον – ἀλλ’ ἔχον μὲν τινα κοινότητα τῶν μεταβατῶν, διάληψιν δὲ μερῶν οὐκ ἔχον

It is necessary to fully conceive the minimum in sensation: it is neither just like that which [we see] has [spatial] extensions, nor all-in-all dissimilar – because, although it has some general quality of what extends, it does not have differentiation of parts

[Bailey] We must notice also that the least thing in sensation is neither exactly like that which admits of progression from one part to another, nor again is it in every respect wholly unlike it, but it has a certain affinity with such bodies, yet cannot be divided into parts.

τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἐπिनοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>

<p>ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις</p>	[spatial] extension	<p>ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ <i>stepping beyond</i></p>
<p>τὸ μεταβατῶν τὰ μεταβατῶντα</p>	what extends	
<p>ἀνόμοιος <i>(ον)</i></p>	dissimilar	<p>ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>not similar</i></p>
<p>ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες</p>	general quality	<p>ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from common</i></p>
<p>ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί</p>	transformation	<p>ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ <i>threw in a change</i></p>
<p>μεταβάλλειν</p>	to transform	<p>ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i></p>
<p>ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις</p>	differentiation	<p>ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold separation</i></p>
<p>τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη</p>	part	<p>ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i></p>

In one way, that smallest thing you can see is like everything else you can see – it has extension (dimension) – but in another way that smallest thing you can see is unlike everything else that you can see because only one single part is visible in the smallest thing – and everything else we can see does have other parts.

58b. Absolute Visual Limits

ἀλλ’ ὅταν, **διὰ τὴν τῆς κοινότητος προσεμφέρειαν**, **Οἰηθῶμεν διαλήψεσθαί τι αὐτοῦ** – Τὸ μὲν **ἐπιτάδε**, Τὸ δὲ **ἐπέκεινα** – **Τὸ ἴσον ἡμῖν δεῖ προσπίπτειν**

but, due to this resemblance of this general quality, whenever We suspected we were going to distinguish something in it – This here, That there – It must be that What is equal falls upon us

but, due to this resemblance of this general quality [of spatial extension that exists between regular objects and visible minima], whenever We suspected we were going to distinguish some [other part] in it [that was considered to the smallest visible unit] – This [part] here, That [part] there – It must be [the case that] What is equal [to what was considered to be the visible minima] falls upon us

[Bailey] But when on the analogy of this resemblance we think to divide off parts of it, one on the one side and another on the other, it must needs be that another point like the first meets our view.

<p>ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες</p>	general quality	<p>ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from common</i></p>
<p>ἡ προσεμφέρεια αἱ προσεμφέρειαί</p>	resemblance	<p>ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΕΙΑ <i>bringing in toward</i></p>
<p>οἷεσθαι</p>	to suspect	<p>ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i></p>
<p>οἰήσασθαι</p>	to have suspected	
<p>ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις</p>	differentiation	<p>ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold separation</i></p>
<p>διαλήψεσθαί</p>	going to distinguish	<p>ΔΙΑΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ <i>taking hold separation</i></p>
<p>ἐπιτάδε</p>	here	<p>ΕΠΙΤΑΔΕ <i>upon these</i></p>
<p>ἐπέκεινα</p>	there	<p>ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ <i>upon those</i></p>
<p>ἴσος <i>(η, ον)</i></p>	equal	<p>ΙΣΟΣ <i>equal</i></p>

προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling toward</i>
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If you are trying to look at the smallest object you can see – and then you see another "part" of that thing – then that part (which will be half of the original object-of-focus) is now the smallest thing you can see. Ultimately, you will see something that has the common resemblance to other objects: extension (dimension) – but cannot be further divided while also staying within your vision!

58c. Minimum of Measurement

ἐξῆς τε θεωροῦμεν **ταῦτα**, ἀπὸ τοῦ **πρώτου** καταρχόμενοι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ – οὐδὲ **μέρεσι μερῶν ἀπτόμενα** – ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐν τῇ **ιδιότητι** τῇ ἐαυτῶν **τὰ μεγέθη καταμετροῦντα** – **τὰ πλείω πλείον** καὶ **τὰ ἐλάττω ἔλαττον**

and We envision **these in succession**, beginning indeed with the first, and not in the same [space] – nor **intertwining parts with [any other] part** – but **fully measuring size according to [their own] particularity** – a greater [amount measuring a] greater [size] and a lesser [amount measuring a] lesser [size]

and We envision **these [visible minima] in succession** beginning indeed with the first [visible minima], and [we do] not [observe them] in the same [space as another] – nor [do we observe them] **intertwining [any] parts with [any other] part** – but [we observe **visible minima**] **fully measuring size according to [their own] particularity [of being visibly indivisible]** – a greater [amount of visible minima measuring a] greater [size object] and a lesser [amount of visible minima measuring a] lesser [size object]

[Hicks] In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e. as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes there are more of them, if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them, if the magnitude measured is less.

[Yonge] In this way, we examine them successively, from the first to the last, not by themselves, more as composed of parts in juxtaposition, but only in their extent; in other words, we consider, the magnitudes by themselves, and in an abstract manner, inasmuch as they measure, the greater a greater extent, and the smaller a smaller extent

[Bailey] And we look at these points in succession starting from the first, not within the limits of the same point nor in contact part with part, but yet by means of their own proper characteristics measuring the size of bodies, more in a greater body and fewer in a smaller.

ἐξῆς	successive	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα	the first	ΠΡΩΤΟΝ <i>first</i>
καταρχεῖν	to begin	καταρχεῖν
καταρχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i> καταρχόμενοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	beginning	
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἄπτειν	to intertwine	ἈΠΤΕΙΝ <i>touching</i>
ἀπτόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i> ἀπτόμενοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	intertwining	
ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>
ιδιότροπος <i>(ον)</i>	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>

τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μέγεθῃ	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly measure</i>
καταμετρῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i> καταμετροῦντες <i>(οὔσαι, οὖντα)</i>	fully measuring	
τὸ πλεόν τὰ πλέω	the greater	ΠΛΕΟΝ <i>more</i>
τὸ ἐλάττον τὰ ἐλάττω	the lesser	ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ <i>less</i>

Visual limits are only visible in sequence – we see these tiny points one after another, starting from the first, not in the same space or intermixing with each other. Instead, we use their unique quality of indivisible (yet visible) extension as a basis of minute size measurements.

59a. Analogy for Atomic Limits

ταύτη τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ Νομιστέον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀτόμῳ ἐλάχιστον κεχρῆσθαι – μικρότητι γὰρ Ἐκεῖνο δῆλον ὥς διαφέρει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρουμένου – ἀναλογία δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κέχρηται: ἐπείπερ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἡ ἄτομος, κατὰ τὴν ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίαν Κατηγορήσαμεν – μικρόν τι, μόνον μακρὰν ἐκβαλόντες

It is necessary to think that the minimum in the atom also follows this analogy – although clearly in minuteness It differs from what is envisioned by sensation – but it follows the same analogy: since We have also fully indicated that the atom has size, according to the analogy from the immediate surroundings – by extending a small thing, only by a long way

[Bailey] Now we must suppose that the least part in the atom too bears the same relation to the whole; for though in smallness it is obvious that it exceeds that which is seen by sensation, yet it has the same relations. For indeed we have already declared on the ground of its relation to sensible bodies that the atom has size, only we placed it far below them in smallness.

ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
ἡ μικρότης αἱ μικρότητες	minuteness	ΜΙΚΡΟΤΗΣ <i>little</i>
δῆλος <i>(ῆ, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
δῆλον	clearly	
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing through</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρούμενος <i>(ῆ, ον)</i>	envisioned	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>observing</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μέγεθῃ	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ἐνταῦθα	from immediate surroundings	ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ <i>in this</i>

κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
κατηγορήσαι	to fully indicate [already]	
μικρόν <i>(ᾱ, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΝ <i>little</i>
μόνος <i>(η, ον)</i>	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ <i>single</i>
μόνον	only	
μακράν	by a long way	ΜΑΚΡΑΝ <i>long-reaching</i>
μικρόν τι, μόνος μακράν	a small thing, only by a long way	
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
ἐκβάλλειν	to extend	ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing out</i>
ἐκβαλῶν <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i> ἐκβαλόντες <i>(οὔσαι, όντα)</i>	extending	

The smallest part of an atom follows the same pattern as the the smallest visible units – and supplies a base unit of atomic measurement.

59b. Units of Subatomic Measurement

ἔτι τε, τὰ ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἄμιγῇ πέρατα Δεῖ νομίζειν τῶν μηκῶν – τὸ καταμέτρημα ἐξ αὐτῶν πρώτων τοῖς μείζοσι καὶ ἐλάττοσι παρασκευάζοντα – τῇ, διὰ λόγου, θεωρίᾳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀοράτων

also, It is necessary to think of [atomic] minima as pure limits of length as well – providing from themselves as primary [units] the full measurement for the larger and for the smaller [atoms] – by [an act of mental] envisioning, through reasoning, of what is unseen

[Bailey] Further, we must consider these least indivisible points as boundary-marks, providing in themselves as primary units the measure of size for the atoms, both for the smaller and the greater, in our contemplation of these unseen bodies by means of thought.

τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
ἀμιγῆς <i>(ές)</i>	pure	ΑΜΙΓΗΣ <i>not mixed</i>
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>extremity</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>
τὸ καταμέτρημα τὰ καταμετρήματα	full measurement	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΜΑ <i>thoroughly measuring</i>
πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
μείζων <i>(ον)</i>	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
ἐλάττων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>

παρασκευάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	providing	
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ <i>reasoning again</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	<i>[the act of mental]</i> envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of</i> <i>observing</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not looking</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	^[0] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>

The smallest and simplest parts of an atom serve at the fundamental units for measuring atomic lengths and sizes.

59c. Unchangeable Parts of Atoms

ἡ γὰρ Κοινότης ἡ ὑπάρχουσα **αὐτοῖς** πρὸς τὰ ἀμετάβολα **ικανὴ τὸ μέχρι τούτου** συντελέσαι – **συμφόρησιν** δὲ ἐκ τούτων **κίνησιν** ἔχόντων **οὐχ οἷόν τε** γίνεσθαι

for the general Quality [of extension] that exists **in those** [visible minima] with the untransformables [i.e., atomic minima] is **sufficient** to mutually fulfil **this** [comparison of measurement by minima] up to this [point] – but that [atomic minima] are produced **by** [their] **accumulation** from them having **[any] movement** is **not possible**

[Bailey] For the affinity which the least parts of the atom have to the homogeneous parts of sensible things is sufficient to justify our conclusion to this extent but that they should ever come together as bodies with motion is quite impossible.

ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from</i> <i>common</i>
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ <i>stepping beyond</i>
ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> ὑπάρχοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
ἡ μεταβολή αἱ μεταβολαί	transformation	ΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΗ <i>threw in</i> <i>a change</i>
τὸ ἀμετάβολον τὰ ἀμετάβολα	the untransformable	
ἰκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ἼΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
ἀποτελεσματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>completing out</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing</i> <i>together</i>
ἡ συμφόρησις αἱ συμφόρησεις	accumulation	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΗΣΙΣ <i>carrying</i> <i>together</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving</i> <i>action</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>

The parts of the atoms are unchanging and motionless. Unlike the atoms themselves, the parts of atoms (including their minima) do not have motion and cannot form by accumulation.

60a. Relative Direction

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τοῦ ἀπείρου ὥς μὲν ἀνωτάτω καὶ κατώτατω οὐ Δεῖ κατηγορεῖν τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω: Ἴσμεν, μέντοι, Τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς (ὅθεν ἂν Στῶμεν) εἰς ἄπειρον ἄγειν – ὃν μηδέποτε φανεῖσθαι Τοῦτο ἡμῖν (ἢ τὸ Ὑποκάτω τοῦ νοηθέντος εἰς ἄπειρον) ἅμα ἄνω τε εἶναι καὶ κάτω πρὸς τὸ αὐτό τοῦτο γὰρ Ἀδύνατον διανοηθῆναι

and indeed, It is not necessary to thoroughly indicate what is above or below in the infinite as highest or lowest: We know, nevertheless, that What is overhead (from wherever we may stand) leads ad infinitum – and It (just like What is below in thought ad infinitum) will never be seen by us as existing both above and below in relation to that same [spot we are standing], for [this] is impossible to perceive

[Bailey] Furthermore, in the infinite we must not speak of 'up' or 'down' as though with reference to an absolute highest or lowest — and indeed we must say that, though it is possible to proceed to infinity in the direction above our heads from wherever we take our stand, the absolute highest point will never appear to us — nor yet can that which passes beneath the point thought of to infinity be at the same time both up and down in reference to the same thing for it is impossible to think this.

[Hicks] Further, we must not assert 'up' or 'down' of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time 'up' and 'down' with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable.

[Yonge] Moreover, we must not say (while speaking of the infinite), that such or such a point is the highest point of it, or the lowest. For height and lowness must not be predicated of the infinite. We know, in reality, that if, wishing to determine the infinite, we conceive a point above our head, this point, whatever it may be, will never appear to us to have the character in question otherwise, that which would be situated above the point so conceived as the limit of the infinite, would be at the same moment, and by virtue of its relation to the same point, both high and low; and this is impossible to imagine.

[Bailey] Furthermore, in the infinite we must not speak of 'up' or 'down' as though with reference to an absolute highest or lowest — and indeed we must say that, though it is possible to proceed to infinity in the direction above our heads from wherever we take our stand, the absolute highest point will never appear to us — nor yet can that which passes beneath the point thought of to infinity be at the same time both up and down in reference to the same thing for it is impossible to think this.

ἄπειρος (ον)	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἀνωτάτος (η, ον)	highest	ΑΝΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>the most above</i>
ἀνωτάτω	highest	
κάτω	below	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
τὸ κάτω τὰ κάτω	what is below	
κατώτατος (η, ον)	lowest	ΚΑΤΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>the most below</i>
κατώτατω	lowest	
τὸ κατώτατω τὰ κατώτατω	what is lowest	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>

ἄνω	above	ΑΝΩ <i>above</i>
τὸ ἄνω τὰ ἄνω	what is above	
εἶδέναι	<i>to have mentally seen ∴</i> "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
ἴσμεν	we know	ΙΣΜΕΝ <i>knowing</i>
ἡ κεφαλὴ αἱ κεφαλαί	head	ΚΕΦΑΛΗ <i>head</i>
τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τὰ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς	what is overhead	
ἵστασθαι	to be stood up	ΊΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>standing</i>
στῆναι	to stand [already]	ΣΤΗΝΑΙ <i>standing</i>
φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
φανεῖσθαι	to be seen [in the future]	
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
ὑποκάτω	down below	
τὸ ὑποκάτω τὰ ὑποκάτω	what is [down] below	ΥΠΟΚΑΤΩ <i>under below</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
νοηθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i> νοηθέντες <i>(εἶσαι, ἐντα)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ ἐννόημα τὰ ἐννόηματα	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing within</i>
ἀδύνατος <i>(ον)</i>	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>not powerful</i>
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>saw through</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>

There is no ultimate direction because the universe has no center. We should not describe the infinite as having an ultimate "up" or "down" because these terms do not apply to something without limits. Nevertheless, relative direction does still exists in infinite space.

60b. Only Relative Direction Exists

ὥστε, ᾿Εστι **μίαν** λαβεῖν **φορὰν τὴν ἄνω**, **νοουμένην** εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ **μίαν τὴν κάτω** – ἂν καὶ μυριάκις **πρὸς τοὺς πόδας τῶν ἐπάνω** τὸ **παρ’ ἡμῶν** Φερόμενον **εἰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν τόπους** ἀφικνῆται – ἢ **ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῶν ὑποκάτω** τὸ **παρ’ ἡμῶν** κάτω Φερόμενον. ἢ γὰρ ὅλη Φορὰ: **οὐθὲν ἦττον** Ἐκατέρα **ἐκατέρῃ ἀντικειμένη ἐπ’ ἄπειρον** νοεῖται

therefore, It is possible to comprehend **one transmission that is above** and **one that is below**, **[both] conceived** ad infinitum – even if What is brought **from us** towards the feet of those above arrives innumerable times **at the locations** above our heads – and [the same for] What is being carried downward **from us** towards the head of those below. for the whole Motion: Each [direction] is conceived **no less contrary** ad infinitum **than the other**

[Bailey] So that it is possible to consider as one single motion that which is thought of as the upward motion to infinity and as another the downward motion, even though that which passes from us into the regions above our heads arrives countless times at the feet of beings above and that which passes downwards from us at the head of beings below; for none the less the whole motions are thought of as opposed, the one to the other, to infinity.

εἷς μία ἓν <i>(ένός, μιᾶς, ενός)</i>	one	ἜΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἘΝ
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	ΛΑΒΕΙΝ <i>grasped</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τὸ ἄνω τὰ ἄνω	what is above	ΑΝΩ <i>above</i>
νοούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
εἰς ἄπειρον	ad infinitum	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
τὸ κάτω τὰ κάτω	what is below	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
μυρίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	innumerable	ΜΥΡΙΟΣ <i>ants</i>
μυριάκις	innumerable times	
ὁ πούς οἱ πόδες	foot	ΠΟΥΣ <i>foot</i>
ὁ ἐπάνω οἱ ἐπάνω	someone above	ΕΠΑΝΩ <i>above upon</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>spot</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>towards arriving</i>
τὸ ὑποκάτω τὰ ὑποκάτω	what is [down] below	ΥΠΟΚΑΤΩ <i>under below</i>
ὁ ὑποκάτω οἱ ὑποκάτω	someone [down] below	
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing</i>

We can think of two arrows, one going up and one going down, moving in opposite directions forever – despite whatever other relative interactions occur – one arrow can be correctly said to be moving "up" (relative to us), and the other arrow can be correctly said to be moving "down" (relative to us).

61a. Size Variation

καὶ μὴν καὶ, **ισοταχεῖς** Ἀναγκαῖον **τὰς Ἀτόμους εἶναι** – **ὅταν** διὰ τοῦ **κενοῦ** **εἰσφέρωνται** **μηθενὸς ἀντικóπτοντος**: οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα **θᾶπτον** οἰσθήσεται **τῶν** **μικρῶν** καὶ **κούφων**, (ὅταν γε δὴ Μηδὲν ἀπαντᾷ **αὐτοῖς**) οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ **τῶν** **μεγάλων** – Πάντα **πόρον σύμμετρον** ἔχοντα (ὅταν Μηθὲν μηδὲ **ἐκείνους** ἀντικóπτῃ)

and indeed, It is necessary for the atoms to be equally fast – whenever they are carried through the void with nothing colliding against: for in no way will the heavy [Atoms] be carried swifter than the small and light [atoms], (certainly whenever Nothing encounters them) nor [will] the small [Atoms be swifter] than the large ones – All having a proportionate passageway (whenever Nothing also collides against them)

[Bailey] Moreover, the atoms must move with equal speed, when they are borne onwards through the void, nothing colliding with them. For neither will the heavy move more quickly than the small and light, when, that is, nothing meets them nor again the small more quickly than the great, having their whole course uniform, when nothing collides with them either.

ἴσοταχής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	equally fast	ΙΣΟΤΑΧΗΣ <i>equally swift</i>
ἀναγκάιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ <i>compulsion</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
εἰσφέρειν	to carry in	ΕΙΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing into</i>
εἰσοίσειν	to carry in [in the future]	ΕΙΣΟΙΣΕΙΝ <i>will carry into</i>
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing through</i>
ἀντικόπτων <i>(οὔσα, ον)</i> ἀντικόπτοντες <i>(οὔσαι, οντα)</i>	colliding against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΟΝΤΟΣ <i>strike against</i>
τὸ βαρύ τὰ βαρέα	heavy thing	ΒΑΡΥ <i>heavy</i>
θᾶπτον	more swiftly	ΘΑΤΤΟΝ <i>swift</i>
θάππων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	swifter	
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
οἴσειν	to carry [in the future]	ΟΙΣΕΙΝ <i>will carry</i>
οἰσθησθαι	to be carried [in the future]	
τὸ μικρόν τὰ μικρά	small thing	ΜΙΚΡΟΝ <i>little</i>
τὸ κοῦφον τὰ κούφα	light things	ΚΟΥΦΟΝ <i>nimble</i>
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ <i>meeting away</i>
τὸ μέγα τὰ μεγάλα	large thing	ΜΕΓΑ <i>large</i>
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
σύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>

When atoms move through empty space without any obstacles, they all travel at the same speed – regardless of their size and weight.

61b. Direction Variation

οὐθ’ ἢ ἄνω οὐθ’ ἢ εἰς τὸ πλάγιον διὰ τῶν κρούσεων Φορά, οὐθ’ ἢ κάτω διὰ τῶν ἰδίων βαρῶν: ἐφ’ ὅποσον γὰρ ἂν κατίσχη Ἑκάτερον – ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο ἅμα νοήματι τὴν φοράν σχήσει, ἕως ἄν τι ἀντικόψη ἢ ἔξωθεν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου βάρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πλήξαντος δύναμιν

neither the upward nor the sideways Transmission from impacts [is swifter], nor is the downward [transmission swifter] through those particular weights [of the atoms]: as far as Each [transmission] fully maintains itself – for so long it will maintain its transmission as quick as conception, until Something collides against [it], either from an external source or from its particular [counter] weight against the force of an impact

[Bailey] Nor is the motion upwards or sideways owing to blows quicker, nor again that downwards owing to their own weight. For as long as either of the two motions prevails, so long will it have a course as quick as thought, until something checks it either from outside or from its own weight counteracting the force of that which dealt the blow.

πλάγιος <i>(ον)</i>	sideways	ΠΛΑΓΙΟΣ <i>oblique</i>
εἰς τὸ πλάγιον	sideways	
ἢ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ <i>strike</i>
ἢ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
κάτω	below / after	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ιδιότροπος <i>(ον)</i>	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
ὅπόσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	as much as	ὍΠΟΣΟΣ <i>some / certain</i> <i>which</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>holding</i>
κατασχεῖν	to have firmly held	ΣΧΕΙΝ <i>will hold</i>
τοσοῦτος <i>(τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο)</i>	so long <i>(so great)</i>	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this so much</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
ἢ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
σχεῖν	to hold [in the future]	ΣΧΕΙΝ <i>will hold</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>
<i>(ἡ, τὸ)</i> ὁ ἔξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
ἔξωθεν	externally	
τό πλήξαν τό πλήξαν	impact	ΠΛΗΞΑΝ <i>strike</i>
ἢ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>

Atoms move at the same rate regardless of their direction. When contact occurs, the natural weight of the atoms plays a role in how they respond to collisions, offsetting the force and influencing their motion.

καὶ μὴν καὶ, ἡ διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ Φορὰ (κατὰ μηδεμίαν ἀπάντησιν τῶν ἀντικοψόντων γινομένη) πᾶν μῆκος περιληπτὸν ἐν ἀπερινώτῳ χρόνῳ συντελεῖ· βράδους γὰρ καὶ τάχους Ἀντικοπή καὶ Οὐκानτικοπή ὁμοίωμα λαμβάνει

and indeed, the Transmission [of something] through the void (while happening without any clash of something colliding against) completes every fully comprehensible length in a fully inconceivable [amount of] time: for [it is] Collision and Non-collision [that] take on a similarity to slowness and speed

^(Bailey) Moreover, their passage through the void — when it takes place without meeting any bodies which might collide — accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time: for it is collision and its absence which take the outward appearance of slowness and quickness.

τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ φορὰ αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ ἀπάντησις αἱ ἀπαντήσεις	clash	ΑΠΑΝΤΗΣΙΣ <i>action against all</i>
τὸ ἀντικοψόν τὰ ἀντικοψά	what collides against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΨΟΝ <i>beat against</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τό μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>length</i>
περιληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>taken hold around</i>
ἀπερινότης <i>(ον)</i>	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
βραδύς <i>(εῖα, ύ)</i>	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ <i>slow</i>
τό βράδος = ἡ βραδύτης αἱ βραδύτητες	slowness	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΗΣ <i>condition of being slow</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	
ἡ οὐκαντικοπή αἱ οὐκαντικοπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>not beating against</i>
τό ὁμοίωμα τὰ ὁμοιώματα	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑ <i>result of [being] similar</i>

Without any resistance, movement through the void can cover massive distances in an instant.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, κατὰ τὰς συγκρίσεις, θάπτων Ἑτέρα ἑτέρας φορηθήσεται – τῶν ἀτόμων ἰσοταχῶν οὐσῶν: τῷ ἐφ’ ἓνα τόπον φέρεσθαι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀθροίσμασιν Ἀτόμους κατὰ τὸν ἐλάχιστον συνεχῇ χρόνον – εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐφ’ ἓνα, κατὰ τοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς χρόνους, ἀλλὰ πυκνὸν Ἀντικόπτουσιν – ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸ Συνεχὲς τῆς φορᾶς γίνηται

but indeed, regarding compounds, One [compound] will be transmitted more swiftly than another [compound] – even though their atoms are equal in speed: as [a result] of the Atoms in the aggregates being carried to one location in the minimum continuous [*i.e., directly perceptible*] time – even if, in the times envisionable by reasoning, [they are] not [transmitted] to one [single location], but They collide frequently against [each other] – until a Continuity of [their] motion comes to exist within [the realm of] sensation

[Bailey] Moreover, it will be said that in compound bodies too one atom is faster than another, though as a matter of fact all are equal in speed this will be said because even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move towards one place, even though in moments of time perceptible only by thought they do not move towards one place but are constantly jostling one against another, until the continuity of their movement comes under the ken of sensation.

ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
θάπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	more swift	ΘΑΠΤΩΝ <i>swift</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	
φορεῖν	to transmit	ΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying</i>
φορηθήσεσθαι	to be transmitted [in the future]	ΦΟΡΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ <i>will be carried</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>bringing</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
τὸ ἀθρόον τὰ ἀθρόα	what is aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ <i>gathered</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
συνεχῆς <i>(ές)</i>	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῇ	continuity	
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	envisionable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
πυκνὸν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ <i>compacting</i>
ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>

<p>ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις</p>	<p>[A] sensation</p>	<p>ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i></p>
<p>γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι</p>	<p>to be produced</p>	<p>ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i></p>

Atoms move at the same rate if they are moving alone in one direction or if they are vibrating in a compound – the atoms that compose a compound are moving at equal speeds in many different directions.

However, in a compound, the atoms collide and change direction so quickly that we can only sense their group movement (or lack of movement). As we can see, compounds can move faster than other compounds (or appear still).

62b. Speed Disparity

[Δ+] τὸ γὰρ Προσδοξαζόμενον **περὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου** – ὥς ἄρα καὶ οἱ διὰ λόγου **θεωρητοὶ** Χρόνοι **τὸ συνεχές τῆς φορᾶς** ἔξουσιν – οὐκ ἀληθές ^(-α) ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν **τοιούτων**: ἐπεὶ τό γε ^{δ} **θεωρούμενον** Πᾶν ἢ ^{B'δ} **κατ’ ἐπιβολὴν** ^{δ} **λαμβάνόμενον** **τῇ διανοίᾳ** ^(α) **ἀληθές** ἔστι

for [Δ+] the Addition of judgment **concerning the unseen** – that the [minute] Times **envisionable** through reasoning will indeed also have **continuity of transmission** [*for compounds and their atoms*] – is **not true** ^(-α) in such cases: since Everything ^{δ} **envisioned** or ^{δ} **comprehended** ^{B'δ} through our **attention to [mental] perception** is ^(α) **true**

[Bailey] For the addition of opinion with regard to the unseen, that the moments perceptible only by thought will also contain continuity of motion, is not true in such cases; for we must remember that it is what we observe with the senses or grasp with the mind by an apprehension that is true.

The chief function of the ^{B'δ}"Attention To Mental Perception" (ἡ Ἐπιβολή τῆς **Διανοίας**) must be in the field of memory. If Epicurus were to regard memory as an event purely internal to the mind, the whole empirical foundation of knowledge would crumble, since our memories might be nothing more than our own inventions. The objectivity of memory is rescued by the assurance that the mind, like the sense-organs, draws its images from outside.

Of course, the ^{B'δ}"Attention To Mental Perception" (ἡ Ἐπιβολή τῆς **Διανοίας**) is not in itself sufficient to explain the phenomenon of memory, for it does not enable us to distinguish acts of memory from acts of mere imagination.

<p>ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι</p>	<p>judgment</p>	<p>ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i></p>
<p>προσμένων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i></p>	<p>still pending</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ <i>remaining further</i></p>
<p>τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα</p>	<p>^[O] what is still pending <i>[further attestation]</i></p>	<p>ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>remaining further</i></p>
<p>τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον</p>	<p>[Δ+] the addition of judgement</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition to seeming</i></p>
<p>τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα</p>	<p>the unseen</p>	<p>ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not looking</i></p>
<p>τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα</p>	<p>^[O] what is unclear</p>	<p>ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i></p>
<p>ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι</p>	<p>reasoning</p>	<p>ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i></p>
<p>θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i></p>	<p>envisionable</p>	<p>ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i></p>
<p>συνεχής <i>(ές)</i></p>	<p>continuous</p>	<p>ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i></p>
<p>τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῆ</p>	<p>continuity</p>	
<p>ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι</p>	<p>transmission</p>	<p>ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i></p>
<p>ἔχειν</p>	<p>to have</p>	<p>ΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding</i></p>

ἔξειν	to have [in the future]	ἔξειν <i>will hold</i>
ἀληθής (ές)	(α) true	ἈΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	envisioned	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>observing</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
λαμβάνόμενος (η, ον)	comprehended	ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἀληθής (ές)	(α) true	ἈΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>

[Sedley] "If what Epikouros has stated about the motion of atoms in a moving body is correct, it follows that either appearances deceive when they tell us that the parts of a moving body all move in one direction, or that appearances do not deceive but that in this particular case analogy between the visible and the invisible is invalid."

Only what we can directly observe with both our senses and mind is always true. The motions of a compound take place in observable time, and the motions of the atoms take place in mentally perceptible time.

Viewing a compound as only an aggregate of atoms is too reductionist. It is contrary to sensation to say that the motion of a compound body is only the sum of the motions of its component atoms – just as it is inconceivable that only the atomic motions in an object alone are real and the motion of the compound object itself is delusion.

The motion (or lack of motion) of compound objects is a reality – even though the compound object itself is determined by the collisions of its component atoms.

[47a.2 Compound Speed]

οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἅμα, κατὰ τοὺς διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὺς χρόνους, καὶ τὸ φερόμενον Σῶμα ἐπὶ τοὺς πλείους τόπους ἀφικνεῖται (ἀδιανόητον γάρ – καὶ, Τοῦτο συναφικνούμενον ἐν αἰσθητῷ χρόνῳ ὅθεν δήποθεν τοῦ ἀπείρου, οὐκ ἐξ οὗ ἂν Περιλάβωμεν τὴν φορὰν τόπου”Εσται ἀφιστάμενον) ἀντικοπῇ γὰρ ὅμοιον ”Εσται, κἂν μέχρι τοσούτου τὸ τάχος τῆς φορᾶς μὴ ἀντικόπτον Καταλίπωμεν – Χρήσιμον δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κατασχεῖν τὸ στοιχεῖον

nor also [is the addition of opinion true that even] during [minute] times envisionable through reasoning, the very Body being carried arrives simultaneously to more locations [to which its component atoms move] (for this is imperceptible – and when This [body does] arrive as a whole in sensible time anywhere [it is] in the infinite [void], It will not be different from which We would completely comprehend its transmission from its location) because This [movement of atoms all in one direction] will be similar to a collision, even if up to the point [of perceptible time] We leave undisputed* [the perception of] the speed of [vibrational] transmission as non-colliding [for the body as a whole] [if a body as a whole moves in all the directions of its atoms, it will have a changing transmission, even though nothing impedes its course] – indeed, It is also useful to hold [in mind] this component fact

[Bailey] Nor must it either be supposed that, in moments perceptible only by thought, the moving body too passes to the several places to which its component atoms move (for this too is unthinkable and in that case, when it arrives all together, in a sensible period of time, from any point that may be in the infinite [void], it would not be taking its departure from the place from which we apprehend its motion). For the motion of the whole body will be the outward expression of its internal collisions, even though up to the limits of perception we suppose the speed of its motion not to be retarded by collision. It is of advantage to grasp this first principle as well.

The compound is more than just an aggregate – it is a new entity per se. Similarly its motion of the compound is not just the sum of its atomic motions, but a new realty per se.

The motion of the whole body is the sum of the motions of its component atoms – but because these motions are an infinite series of tiny transmissions in all directions, it might then be supposed that the whole body preforms this entire series of motions, and arrives at the end of its journey after having followed varied course in all directions.

This conclusion is inconceivable and also contradicts our sensations (because, in this case, the whole body will have come from any of the directions from which one of its atoms started and not from the direction from which we saw the entire body come).

Compounds themselves are real objects and their motion is a reality. The motion, or lack of motion, of a compound is the sensible sum of the motions of its atoms – even though those atoms themselves are moving in many directions at total speed. The atoms are moving at the same time in their own direction and also moving as a group with the object they compose.

θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	envisionable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
πλείων <i>(ον)</i>	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
ό τόπος οί τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
άφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>towards arriving</i>
τò νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
ή διάνοια αί διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
άπερινόητος <i>(ον)</i>	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
άδιανόητος <i>(ον)</i>	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing through</i>
διανόητος	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>seeing through</i>
συναφικνούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	to arrive as a whole	ΣΥΝΑΦΙΚΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>towards arriving together</i>
ή αἴσθησις αί αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τò αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια	sense-organ	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>instrument of perceiving</i>
αἰσθητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	(A) sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ <i>perceiving</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
ή φορά αί φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
άφιστάμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	different	ΑΦΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>standing away</i>
ή άντικοπή αί άντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
άντικοπτεῖν	to collide [against]	
άνतिकόπτων <i>(αὔσα, ον)</i>	colliding [against]	

ἡ οὐκ αντικ οπή αἱ οὐκ αντικ οπαί	non-collision	ΟΥΚΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>not beating against</i>
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
χρήσιμος (ον)	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>

63a. Soul is Material

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, Δεῖ συνορᾶν (ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη – οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιοτάτη Πίστις ἔσται) ὅτι ἡ Ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερές, παρ’ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα **παρεσπαρμένον**, **προσεμφερέστατον** δὲ πνεύματι **θερμοῦ** **τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι**: καὶ, πῇ μὲν, **τούτῳ** **προσεμφερές**, πῇ δὲ, **τούτῳ**

after these things, It is necessary to [mentally] fully see (while referring to the sensations and experiences – for in this way the most affirmed Belief will exist) that the Soul is a subtle body, spread out across the whole aggregate, most closely resembling [cool] wind {i.e., pneumatic} that has a certain mixture of heat {i.e., thermal}: indeed, in one way, it is closely resembling to the one, and in another way, [it is closely resembling] to the other

[Bailey] Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings, for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief, you must consider that the soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure, and most resembling wind with a certain admixture of heat, and in some respects like to one of these and in some to the other.

ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not looking</i>
ἀναφέρων (ουσα, ον)	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing back</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[Α] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	[π] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
βεβαιοτάτος (η, ον)	most affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most certain</i>
ἡ πίστις αἱ πίστεις	belief	ΠΙΣΤΙΣ <i>trust</i>
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
λεπτομερής (ές)	subtle	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>fine part</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
παρεσπαρμένος (η, ον)	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ <i>scatter beside</i>

τό προσεμφέρειέστατον τά προσεμφέρειέστατα	what most closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΕΣΤΑΤΟΝ <i>most toward bringing resemblance</i>
προσεμφέρειέστατος <i>(η, ον)</i>	most closely resembling	
προσεμφερής	closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΗΣ <i>toward bringing resemblance</i>
τό πνεῦμα τά πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ <i>breath result</i>
θερμός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	hot	ΘΕΡΜΟΣ <i>warm</i>
ή κρᾶσις αί κράσεις	mixture	ΚΡΑΣΙΣ <i>weaving</i>
πῇ μὲν... πῇ δέ	in one way... in another way	ΠΗ <i>by which way</i>

From a reductionist angle, life is only a circumstantial characteristic of certain aggregates. However, we can use our senses and feelings to understand that the soul is a physical (and therefore real) thing made of tiny particles spread throughout the body. The soul has thermal (hot & fast) and pneumatic (cold & slow) characteristics – which can mix and form aerial (moderate) characteristics.

^[1] Thermal Element	● τό Θερμόν	Calor, Vapor
^[2] Pneumatic Element	● τό Πνευματικόν	Ventus, Aura
^[1 & 2] Aerial Mix	● τό Ἀερώδες	Aer
^[3] Unnamed Element	τό Ἀκατονόμαστον	Nominis Experts

63b. Finest Part of the Soul

ἔστι δὲ τὸ τρίτον Μέρος, **πολλήν παραλλαγὴν** εἰληφὸς **τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων** – **συμπαθὲς δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ ἄθροίσματι**: **τοῦτο δὲ πᾶν** αἱ Δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς δηλοῦσι, καὶ τὰ Πάθη, καὶ αἱ Εὐκινήσiai, καὶ αἱ Διανοήσεις – καὶ **ῶν** στερόμενοι, Θνήσκομεν

and the third Part exists, having acquired **great variety in subtleness even [compared to]** those [thermal and pneumatic elements] themselves – and **because of this [reason, the third part is] more harmonious also with the remaining aggregate**: and the Forces of the soul make **all this** clear, as well as our Experiences, Agilities, and [mental] Perceptions – and when we are deprived **of these**, We die

^[Hicks] But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death.

τρίτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	third	ΤΡΙΤΟΣ <i>third</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ή παραλλαγή αί παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
εἰληφώς <i>(υἱᾱ, ός)</i>	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ <i>grasped</i>
λεπτομερής <i>(ές)</i>	subtle	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>fine part</i>
ή λεπτομερής αί λεπτομερεῖς	subtleness	

συμπαθής <i>(ές)</i>	harmonious	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΗΣ <i>together experiencing</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining <small>[rest of + gen]</small>	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	^[ο] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>
ἐνδηλος <i>(ον)</i>	^(θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear within</i>
δηλοῦν	to make clear	ΔΗΛΟΥΝ <i>clear</i>
ἡ εὐκίνησία αἱ εὐκίνησiai	agility	ΕΥΚΙΝΗΣΙΑ <i>good movement</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	^[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
στερούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	deprived	ΣΤΕΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>deprived</i>
θνήσκειν	to die	ΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ <i>dying</i>

The finest part of the soul is highly sensitive and closely connected to the body. This is shown by our mental abilities, feelings, quick thoughts – all everything else that we lose when we die.

63c. Cause of Sensation

καὶ μὴν, ὅτι **ἔχει ἡ Ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν** Δεῖ κατέχειν

And indeed, It is necessary to firmly maintain that **the Soul is the greatest cause of sensation**

^[Bailey] Further, you must grasp that the soul possesses the chief cause of sensation.

ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[Α] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
πλεῖστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	the greatest <small>[the most]</small>	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold <small>[here, "to firmly maintain"]</small>	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly holding</i>

64a. Interrelationship of Body & Soul

οὐ μὴν εἰλήφει ἂν **ταύτην**, εἰ μὴ **ὕπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀθροίσματος** ἐστεγάζεται πως· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ᾿Αθροισμα, παρασκευάσαν **ἐκείνη τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην**, μετείληφε καὶ αὐτὸ **τοιούτου συμπτώματος παρ’ ἐκείνης** – οὐ, μέντοι, **πάντων ὧν** ἐκείνη κέκτται

nevertheless [the Soul] would not have acquired [sensation], unless it was in some way covered by the remaining aggregate: while the remaining Aggregation, having provided that cause [of protection] to that [soul], also itself partook of this same symptom with that [soul] – not, however, of all [symptoms] which that [soul] possesses

[Bailey] yet it could not have acquired sensation, unless it were in some way enclosed by the rest of the structure. And this in its turn having afforded the soul this cause of sensation acquires itself too a share in this contingent capacity from the soul. Yet it does not acquire all the capacities which the soul possesses.

εἰληφώς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ <i>grasped</i>
εἰληφέναι	to have acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ <i>grasped</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of</i> <i>action of [being]</i> <i>gathered</i>
στεγάζειν	to cover	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ <i>covering</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing</i> <i>alongside</i>
παρασκευάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	providing	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
μετέχειν	to partake	ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold among</i>
μετεἰληφέναι	to have partaken	ΜΕΤΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ <i>taken among</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΙΣΘΑΙ <i>acquired</i>

The soul can exist and operate only because it is enclosed within the body. The body also gets the ability to exist and operate from the soul.

64b. No Life Without Body

διὸ, ἀπαλλαγείσης τῆς Ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν: οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτην ἐκέκτητο τὴν δύναμιν – ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, ἅμα συγγεγεννημένον αὐτῷ παρεσκεύαζεν – Ὅ, διὰ τῆς συντελεσθείσης περὶ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως, κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν, σύμπτωμα αἰσθητικὸν εὐθὺς ἀποτελοῦν ἑαυτῷ – ἀπεδίδου κατὰ τὴν ὁμούρησιν καὶ συμπάθειαν καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καθάπερ Εἶπον

therefore, when the Soul has already been removed away [from the body], it does not have sensation: for that [soul] had not possessed this force intrinsically – but provides something different, inherent together with [the body] – Which [existence of the two together], through the force within itself which has come to completion together [with the body], in accordance with its movement, directly brought to fulfillment for itself a perceptible symptom – and fully gives [that symptom] to the [body] in accordance with [its] proximity and correspondence [of movement], just as I said

[Bailey] and therefore when the soul is released from the body, the body no longer has sensation. For it never possessed this power in itself, but used to afford opportunity for it to another existence, brought into being at the same time with itself and this existence, owing to the power now consummated within itself as a result of motion, used spontaneously to produce for itself the capacity of sensation and then to communicate it {{the capacity}} to the body as well, in virtue of its contact and correspondence of movement, as I have already said.

ἀπαλλάσσειν	to remove away	ΑΠΑΛΛΑΣΣΕΙΝ <i>other away</i>
ἀπαλλάξαι	to remove away [already]	
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΙΣΘΑΙ <i>acquired</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>
συγγεγονέναι	to have been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΟΝΕΝΑΙ <i>having been born together</i>
συγγεγενημένος <i>(ἡ, ον)</i>	having been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having been born together</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
συντελεσθείσης	having come to completion together	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΘΕΙΣΗΣ <i>completing together</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
αἰσθητικός <i>(ἡ, όν)</i>	^[directly] perceptible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of perceiving</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
ἀποτελοῦν	to bring to fulfillment	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΟΥΝ <i>completing away</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate [here, "fully gives"]	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
ἀποδιδούς <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i> ἀποδιδόντες	demonstrating	
ἡ ὁμούρησις αἱ ὁμούρησεις	proximity	ὍΜΟΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>state of being together with</i>
ἡ συμπάθεια αἱ συμπάθειαι	correspondence	ΣΥΜΠΑΘΕΙΑ <i>experience together</i>

The soul must mix with the body to produce life and sensation. When the soul leaves the body, the body and the soul both lose the ability to feel – because they never had this power on their own.

διὸ, δὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἡ Ψυχὴ οὐδέποτε ἄλλου τινὸς μέρους ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀναισθητεῖ – ἀλλ’ Ἄ ἂν καὶ ταύτης ξυναπόληται τοῦ στεγάζοντος λυθέντος (εἴθ’ ὅλου εἴτε καὶ μέρους τινός) – ἐάν περ διαμένῃ, ἔξει τὴν αἴσθησιν

therefore, while also existing within [the body], the Soul never becomes insensible even when some other part has been removed [along with that part of the body] – but Whatever [portions] of this [soul] might also perish when its [bodily] covering is loosened (whether in whole or also in part) – if [the soul] persists [in the body], it will have sensation

[Bailey] Therefore, so long as the soul remains in the body, even though some other part of the body be lost, it will never lose sensation; nay more, whatever portions of the soul may perish too, when that which enclosed it is removed either in whole or in part, if the soul continues to exist at all, it will retain sensation.

[Hicks] Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience.

ἐνυπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	integral	ENYPARCHON <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before) in</i>
ἐνυπάρχοντα		
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἀπηλλαγμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been removed	ΑΠΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ <i>removing</i> <i>away from</i>
ἀναισθητεῖν	to become insensible	ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙΝ <i>not sensing</i>
ξυναπολέσθαι	to perish together	ΞΥΝΑΠΟΛΕΣΘΑΙ <i>being destroyed</i> <i>together</i>
τὸ στεγάζον τὰ στεγάζοντα	what covers	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΝ <i>covering</i>
λυθείς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	loosened	ΛΥΘΕΙΣ <i>sever</i>
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying through</i>

Life can persist if a part of the body is injured (i.e., loosened in part) or suffers amputation (i.e., loosened in whole).

65b. Body Requires Soul

τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν Ἄθροισμα – διαμένον καὶ ὅλον καὶ κατὰ μέρος – οὐκ ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐκείνου ἀπηλλαγμένου (ὅσον ποτέ ἐστι) τὸ συντεῖνον τῶν ἀτόμων πλῆθος εἰς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν

but the remaining Aggregate – although persisting as a whole or in part – does not possess sensation, once it has lost the number of atoms also contributing towards the nature of the soul (however many there is)

[Bailey] On the other hand the rest of the structure, though it continues to exist either as a whole or in part, does not retain sensation, if it has once lost that sum of atoms, however small it be, which together goes to produce the nature of the soul.

λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + gen]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of</i> <i>action of [being]</i> <i>gathered</i>

διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying through</i>
διαμένων	persisting	
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἀπηλλαγμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been removed	ΑΠΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ <i>removing away from</i>
συντείνειν	to also contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>stretching together</i>
συντείνων	also contributing	
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ πλῆθος τὰ πλήθη	[large] number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ <i>fullness</i>
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>

The rest of the body, even if it remains whole or in part, loses all feeling once the atoms that make up the soul are gone.

65c. Death

καὶ μὴν καὶ, **λυομένου τοῦ ὅλου ἀθροίσματος**, ἡ Ψυχὴ διασπείρεται καὶ οὐκέτι ἔχει **τὰς αὐτὰς δυνάμεις**, οὐδὲ κινεῖται, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ **αἴσθησιν** κέκτηται

and indeed, **when the whole aggregate is dissolved**, the Soul is dispersed and no longer possesses **the same forces**, and no longer moves – therefore it no longer possesses **sensation**

[Bailey] Moreover, if the whole structure is dissolved, the soul is dispersed and no longer has the same powers nor performs its movements, so that it does not possess sensation either.

διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>fully dissolve</i>
λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve</i>
λυόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being dissolved	
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
διασπείρειν	to disperse	ΔΙΑΣΠΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>scatter</i>
διασπείρεσθαι	to be dispersed	
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>
κινεῖν	to move	ΚΙΝΕΙΝ <i>moving</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΣΘΑΙ <i>acquired</i>

When the entire body is broken up, the soul is scattered and loses its powers and movements, so it cannot feel anymore.

66a. No Sensation Without Body

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε Νοεῖν αὐτὸ αἰσθανόμενον, μὴ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συστήματι καὶ ταῖς κινήσεσι ταύταις χρώμενον – ὅταν τὰ στεγάζοντα καὶ Περιέχοντα μὴ τοιαῦτα ᾗ (ἐν οἷς νῦν οὔσα ἔχει ταύτας τὰς κινήσεις)

for it is not possible to Conceive of that same [soul] as sensing, while not in that structure and [not] making use of those movements – whenever the Coverings and Surroundings are not the same (in which it now exists while having these movements)

[Hicks] For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.

[Bailey] For it is impossible to imagine it with sensation, if it is not in this organism and cannot effect these movements, when what encloses and surrounds it is no longer the same as the surroundings in which it now exists and performs these movements.

νοεῖν	to conceive	NOEIN seeing
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ perceiving process
αἰσθανόμενος	sensing	
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ standing together
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ moving action
χρώμενος (η, ον)	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ necessary
στεγάζειν	to cover	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ covering
στεγάζων (ουσα, ον) στεγάζοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	covering	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΩΝ covering
στεγαζόμενος (η, ον)	covered	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ shelter
περιέχων (ουσα, ον)	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ holding around
τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιέχοντα	surrounding space	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΝ hold around

A soul cannot feel or sense anything if it is not in the same body it grew up with.

{66b. Irrational & Rational Parts}

{Λέγει, ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐξ ἀτόμων Αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων – πολλῷ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός: καὶ τὸ μὲν Τι ἄλογον αὐτῆς, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρθαι σώματι – τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τε τῶν φόβων καὶ τῆς χαρᾶς}

{He says, in other [locations], that the [Soul] is compounded from the smoothest and roundest atoms – by a large measure in a certain respect differing from those of fire: and that a Part of it is unreasoning, which is spread out through the remaining body – but the rational [part is] in the chest, as is clear both from fears and from delight}

[Hicks] [He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms – far superior in both respects to those of fire: that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame – while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our joy

τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting together</i>
λεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	smooth	ΛΕΙΟΣ <i>smooth</i>
λειότατοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	smoothest	ΛΕΙΟΤΑΤΟΙ <i>most smooth</i>
στρογγύλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	round	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΟΣ <i>droplet</i>
στρογγυλωτάτοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	roundest	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΩΤΑΤΟΙ <i>most like a droplet</i>
διαφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	differing	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing through</i>
ἀναφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing back</i>
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ <i>fire</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
ἄλογος <i>(ον)</i>	unreasoning	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
παρεσπάρθαι	to be spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΘΑΙ <i>scatter beside</i>
παρεσπαρμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	spread out	
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
λογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	rational	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of reasoning</i>
ὁ θώραξ οἱ θώρακες	chest	ΘΩΡΑΞ <i>breastplate</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
ἡ χαρά αἱ χαραί	delight	ΧΑΡΑ <i>cheer</i>

Life is part irrational (feeling) and part rational (thinking). The soul is made of the smoothest and roundest atoms. The irrational part of the soul is spread throughout the body, while the rational part is in the chest, shown by emotions like fear and joy. Sleep happens when the scattered parts of the soul either gather together or escape through the body's pores.

{66c. Sleep}

{“Υπνον τε γίνεσθαι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (τῶν παρ’ ὅλην τὴν σύγκρισιν παρεσπαρμένων, ἐγκατεχομένων ἢ διαφορουμένων) – εἴτα συμπιπτόντων τοῖς ἐπεραιομοῖς: τό τε Σπέρμα ἀφ’ ὅλων τῶν σωμάτων φέρεσθαι}

{[Epíkouros also says that] Sleep is produced when the parts of the soul (which are spread out throughout the whole compound, [either] compacted or disseminated) – accordingly fall into each other from their mutual pressing: for Seeds [of the soul] emanate from the entirety of [our] bodies}

[Hicks] that sleep occurs when the parts of the soul (which have been scattered all over the composite organism) are held fast in it or dispersed, and afterwards collide with one another by their impacts. The semen is derived from the whole of the body.]

[Yonge]... for particles emanate from all bodies

ὁ ὕπνος οἱ ὕπνοι	sleep	ὙΠΝΟΣ <i>sleep</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
παρεσπαρμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ <i>scatter beside</i>
ἐγκατεχόμενος	compacted	ΕΓΚΑΤΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>holding fully in</i>
διαφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	disseminated	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing through</i>
συμπίπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	to fall into each other	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ <i>falling together</i>
ὁ ἐπερεισμός οἱ ἐπερεισμοί	mutual pressing	ΕΠΕΡΕΙΣΜΟΣ <i>pressing upon</i>
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ <i>seed</i>

Sleep occurs when the parts of the soul, which are spread throughout the body (either gathering together or staying dispersed) eventually fall together.

67a. Incorporeal Existence

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, Τόδε γε δεῖ προσκατανοεῖν: ὅ τι "τὸ ἀσώματον" λέγομεν κατὰ τὴν πλείστην ὁμιλίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ νοηθέντος – ἂν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον, πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ

but indeed, This too must be fully conceived: **that which** We we call "**the incorporeal**" in the most common usage of the word [is] applied to what is conceived as intrinsic – while is not possible to conceive the incorporeal as intrinsic, except as void

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must clearly comprehend as well, that the incorporeal in the general acceptance of the term is applied to that which could be thought of as such as an independent existence. Now it is impossible to conceive the incorporeal as a separate existence, except the void.

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
προσκατανοεῖν	to also fully conceive	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>addition to seeing thoroughly</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>
πλεῖστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	the greatest [the most]	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most</i>
ἡ ὁμιλία αἱ ὁμιλῖαι	common usage	ὍΜΙΛΙΑ <i>association</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
νοηθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i> νοηθέντες <i>(εἶσαι, ἐντα)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ <i>seeing</i>

νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	KENON <i>emptiness</i>

It is generally agreed that the "incorporeal," although it does not have a physical existence, is something that "exists" independent from objects. However – empty space is the only thing we can think of as truly incorporeal.

67b. Soul is Material

τὸ δὲ Κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ **κίνησιν** μόνον δι’ ἑαυτοῦ **τοῖς σώμασι** παρέχεται – ὥστε Οἱ λέγοντες **ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν Ψυχὴν** **ματαῖζουσιν** – οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν **τοιαύτη**: **νῦν δ’ ἐναργῶς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα διαλαμβάνεται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ Συμπτώματα.**

But the Void neither produces nor experiences [anything], but only yields **movement through itself to bodies** – therefore, Those who claim that **the Soul is incorporeal** speak vainly – for it would be able to neither produce nor experience [anything] if it were **of that sort**: but **now both these Symptoms concerning the soul are detectibly distinguished***

**i.e., one's soul is observed to initiate its own movement and also to be affected by the environment*

[Bailey] and the void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity of motion through itself to bodies. So that those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking idly. For it would not be able to act or be acted on in any respect, if it were of this nature. But as it is, both these occurrences are clearly distinguished in respect of the soul.

τὸ κενόν	void	KENON <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	KΙNHΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	KATEXEIN <i>thoroughly holding</i>
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑPEXEIN <i>hold beside</i>
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>
ἀσώματος <i>(ον)</i>	incorporeal	
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ματαῖζειν	to speak vainly	MATAIZEIN <i>vain</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
πάσχειν	to experience	ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ <i>enduring</i>
ἐναργής <i>(ές)</i>	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	^[Ε] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of being within clear</i>
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^[Ε] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
ἐναργῶς	detectibly	ΕΝΑΡΓΩΣ
ἀμφότεροι <i>(αι, α)</i>	both	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>what is on both sides</i>

διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping separation</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>

The void can never affect anything and cannot be affected by anything in any way – it just allows objects to move through it. The soul is corporeal: because the soul can both act and be acted upon, which is impossible for empty space.

Acting and being acted upon are "symptoms" (i.e., separable qualities) of the soul, because – although the soul can act and be acted upon – such activities are not necessarily a quality of the soul at any given time.

68a. Mental Examination

ταῦτα οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλογίσματα τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάγων Τis ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, μνημονεύων τῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ ῥηθέντων: ἱκανῶς κατόψεται, τοῖς τύποις, ἐμπεριειλημμένα – εἰς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀπὸ τούτων, ἐξακριβοῦσθαι βεβαίως

therefore, Someone referring all these thorough reasonings about the soul back to [the standards of] the experiences and the sensations, while remembering what was said originally: [He] will, using these [mental] impressions, [be able to] sufficiently mentally inspect [those reasonings that are] completely comprehended within – [in order] to affirmatively be made fully precise from these [mental impressions] according to [the details of] each part

[Bailey] Now if one refers all these reasonings about the soul to the standards of feeling and sensation and remembers what was said at the outset, he will see that they are sufficiently embraced in these general formulae to enable him to work out with certainty on this basis the details of the system as well.

λογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	rational	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of reasoning</i>
τό διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of reasoning through action</i>
ή ψυχή αί ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ἀνάγων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	referring back	ΑΝΑΓΩΝ <i>leading back</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ή αἴσθησις αί αἰσθήσεις	^[Α] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ή μνήμη αί μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ <i>"addition to" thinking</i>
μνημονεύων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	remembering	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΩΝ <i>"addition to" thinking</i>
ή ἀρχή αί ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ <i>in the first order</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
ῥηθῆναι	to be said ^[already]	ῚΡΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i>
ῥηθείς <i>(είσα, έν)</i> ῥηθέντες <i>(είσαι, έντα)</i>	said	ῚΡΘΕΙΣ <i>said</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see ^[mentally]	ῚΟΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>

καθορᾶν	to inspect [mentally]	ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ <i>thoroughly looking</i>
κατόψεσθαι	to be inspected [in the future]	ΚΑΤΟΨΕΣΘΑΙ <i>thoroughly will see</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	* to completely comprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around in</i>
ἐμπεριειλημμένος (η, ον)	*completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>being grasped around in</i>
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ <i>fully pointed</i>
ἐξακριβοῦσθαι	to be made fully precise	
βεβαιωτάτος (η, ον)	most affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most certain</i>
βεβαιούμενος (η, ον)	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>firm standing</i>
βεβαίως	affirmatively	

By linking all reasoning to experiences and sensations – while recalling the foundational points about the atoms – one can examine and confirm details accurately.

68b. Dependent Existence of Qualities

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ, τὰ Σχήματα καὶ τὰ Χρώματα καὶ τὰ Μεγέθη καὶ τὰ Βάρη καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται **σώματος** (ὥσανεὶ **συμβεβηκότα** ἢ **πᾶσιν**, ἢ **τοῖς ὁρατοῖς**, καὶ **κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν γνωστά**) οὐθ’ ὥς καθ’ ἑαυτάς **εἰσι φύσεις** δοξαστέον· οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἐπινοῆσαι **τοῦτο**

but indeed, Shapes and Colors and Sizes and Weights and Whatever else are attributed **to body** (as though [those things are] **permanent properties** either **to all** [bodies], or [just] **to visible** [bodies], and **are known according to sensation itself**) cannot be judged **as intrinsically existing natures**: for it is not possible to objectively conceive **this**

[Bailey] Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, **as though they were** concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that)

τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ <i>skin color</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
κατηγορεῖσθαι	to be attributed	
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>

ὄρατός (ή, όν)	visible	ὈΡΑΤΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ ὄρατόν τὰ ὄρατά	visible thing	
αἰσθητός (ή, όν)	(A) sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ <i>perceiving</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i>
γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ <i>knowing</i> <i>process</i>
γνωστός (ή, όν)	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ <i>knowing</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
δοξαστός (ή, όν)	able to be judged	ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΣ <i>seeming</i>
δυνατός (ή, όν)	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>power</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>

Shapes, colors, sizes, weights (and other qualities that are known through our senses) do not exist independently apart from their object of origin. However they do exist – even though their physical existence is dependent.

69a. Physical Existence of Qualities

οὔτε ὅλως ὥς οὐκ εἰσίν – οὔθ’ ὥς ἕτερ’ Ἄττα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἀσώματα – οὔθ’ ὥς μόρια τούτου· ἀλλ’ ὥς τὸ ὅλον Σῶμα ^[κ] καθόλου ἐκ τούτων πάντων τήν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδίων

nor [can it be judged] that **those [qualities] entirely do not exist** – nor as if [they could be] Some different incorporeal [quality] inherent **to that [body]** – nor **as portions of that [body]**: but as the whole Body ^[κ] universally* possessing **its nature in a way that lasts** from all these things

**i.e., not only in specific cases, but in all cases*

^[Hicks] nor to be some other and **incorporeal entities cleaving to body**, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them,

^[Bailey] *Moreover, as regards shape and colour and size and weight and all other things that are predicated of body, as though they were concomitant properties either of all things or of things visible or recognizable through the sensation of these qualities, we must not suppose that they are either independent existences (for it is impossible to imagine that) nor that they absolutely do not exist. (as when, for instance, a larger structure is put together out of the parts which compose it, whether the first units of size or other parts smaller than itself, whatever it is), but only, as I say, that it owes its own permanent existence to all of them.*

ἄττα	some	ΑΤΤΑ <i>is an alternative</i>
τινά	certain	<i>form of</i> ΤΙΝΑ
ἕτερος (ἐτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)	different [other / another]	ἜΤΕΡΟΣ <i>other</i>
υὔάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
υὔάρχων (ουσα, ον) υὔάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	existing [already]	ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>

προσупάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	inherent	ΠΡΟΣΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>addition to / toward beginning under (before)</i>
προσυπάρχοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>		
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>
τὸ μόριον τὰ μόρια	portion	ΜΟΡΙΟΝ <i>dividing</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
καθόλου	^(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ <i>completely</i>
αἰδῖος <i>(αἰδία, αἰδῖον)</i>	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>
αἰδῖον	in a way that lasts	
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>

Qualities are physical manifestations of bodies. The whole body gets its enduring nature from its enduring qualities – such as a stone from weight, fire from heat, and water from liquidity. Although these qualities do not have an independent existence separate from atoms and void – they nevertheless do have an existence.

69b. Formation of Properties

οὐχ οἷον δὲ εἶναι συμπεφορημένον – ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὀγκῶν μείζον ἄθροισμα συστήῃ (ἤτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδέ τινος ἐλαττόνων) – ἀλλὰ μονον, ὡς λέγω, ἐκ τούτων ἀπάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδῖον

nor is it **such a thing** that has been put together – in the same way as when a larger Aggregate is composed from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] **of this whole particular [aggregate]**) – but only, as I say, having **its lasting nature** from all of these

nor [can a quality be judged as if] it is **such a thing** that has [come about by having] been put together *{i.e., as though "little parts of a quality" could "come together to form a full quality"}* – in the same way as when a larger Aggregation is composed from the very particles themselves (either from the first [particles] {i.e., atoms} or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] **in that particular whole [aggregation]**) – but only, as I say, having **its lasting nature** from all of these [particles that have come together]

nor [can a quality be judged as if] it is **such a thing** that has [come about by having] been put together *{i.e., as though "little parts of a quality" could "come together to form a full quality"}* – **in the same way as when a larger Aggregation is set together from** the very particles themselves (**either from the first [particles] {i.e., atoms} or [just] from smaller sizes [of particles] of this whole particular [aggregation]**) – but only, as I say, having **its enduring nature** from all of these

[Bailey] **nor that they are some other kind of incorporeal existence accompanying body, nor that they are material parts of body, rather we should suppose that the whole body in its totality owes its own permanent existence to all these, yet not in the sense that it is composed of properties brought together to form it.**

[Hicks] *nor to be some other and **incorporeal entities cleaving to body**, nor again to be parts of body. We must consider the whole body in a general way to derive its permanent nature from all of them* **Though it is not, as it were, formed by grouping them together in the same way as when from the particles themselves a larger aggregate is made up, whether these particles be primary or any magnitudes whatsoever less than the particular whole. All these qualities, I repeat, merely give the body its own permanent nature.**

φορεῖν	to transmit	ΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying</i>
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συμφορεῖν	to put together	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying together</i>
συμπεφορημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been put together	ΣΥΜΠΕΦΟΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>carried together</i>
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
μείζων <i>(ον)</i>	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα	the first	ΠΡΩΤΟΝ <i>first</i>
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
συνστῆσαι	to compose [already]	ΣΥΝΣΤΗΣΑΙ <i>stood together</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
μικρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
ἐλάττων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>
αἰδιος <i>(αἰδία, αἰδιον)</i>	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>

A compound's enduring nature comes from its inseparable qualities (qualities that are permanent to that body because they are a necessary quality of that body – such as weight to stone, heat to fire, liquidity to water).

However, these qualities are not formed by simply assembling them from "smaller pieces of other qualities." (e.g., "particles of heat" do not form fire, "particles of liquidity" do not form water). These inseparable qualities are not separate entities, or even parts of the compound – but these inseparable qualities come about when the compound is formed (e.g., when a compound of water is formed, it has the inseparable quality of liquidity).

69c. Perception of Properties

καὶ ἐπιβολὰς μὲν ἔχοντα ἰδίας πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι καὶ διαλήψεις:
 συμπαρακολουθοῦντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀθρόου καὶ οὐθαμῇ ἀποσχιζομένου – ἀλλὰ κατὰ
 τὴν ἀθρόαν ἔννοιαν τοῦ σώματος κατηγορίαν εἰληφότος

and all these [inseparable qualities] indeed have [their] own particular attention {i.e., mode of being perceived} and differentiation: as long as the Aggregate follows along together [with the qualities] and is nowhere detached – but rather having acquired a full [categorical] indication of a body according to [our] aggregated internal conception

[Hicks] They all have their own characteristic modes of being perceived and distinguished, but always along with the whole body in which they inhere and never in separation from it; and it is in virtue of this complete conception of the body as a whole that it is so designated.

[Bailey] All these properties have their own peculiar means of being perceived and distinguished, provided always that the aggregate body goes along with them and is never wrested from them, but in virtue of its comprehension as an aggregate of qualities acquires the predicate of body.

τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	differentiation	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold separation</i>

ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
συμπαρακολουθῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ <i>following alongside together</i>
ἄθροος <i>(α, ον)</i>	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>
τὸ ἄθρόον τὰ ἄθρόα	aggregate	
οὔθαμῆ = οὔθαμεῖ = οὔδαμοῦ	nowhere	ΟΥΘΑΜΗ <i>not in any place</i>
ἀποσχίζειν	to detach	ΑΠΟΣΧΙΖΕΙΝ <i>split away</i>
ἀποσχιζόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being detached	
τὸ ἄθρόον τὰ ἄθρόα	what is aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ <i>gathered</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing in</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
ἡ κατηγορία αἱ κατηγορίαι	full [categorical] indication	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
εἰληφώς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ <i>grasped</i>

Different qualities are perceived separately and through different senses. These qualities can only be perceived and identified along with the whole object they belong to, never separately. The complete idea of the object comes from the combination of all these perceptions.

70a. Formation of Symptoms

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τοῖς σώμασι συμπίπτει πολλάκις – καὶ οὐκ αἴδιον παρακολουθεῖν... οὗτ’ ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις καὶ οὔτε ἀσώματα

and indeed, [there are also separable qualities] that are often symptomatic to **bodies** – although not [always] also following along [with bodies] **as lasting...** either in the unseen *{i.e., the atoms}* or in the incorporeal *{i.e., the void}*

[Bailey] Furthermore, there often happen to bodies and yet do not permanently accompany them accidents: of which we must suppose neither that they ⁽¹⁾do not exist at all, nor that they ⁽²⁾have the nature of a whole body, nor that ⁽³⁾they can be classed among unseen things, nor as ⁽⁴⁾incorporeal.

[Hicks] Again, qualities often attach to bodies without being permanent concomitants. They are not to be classed among invisible entities nor are they incorporeal.

[Yonge] Bodies often possess other attributes which are not eternally inherent in them, but which nevertheless, cannot be ranged among the incorporeal and invisible things.

τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>

συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling together</i>
συμπίπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	to fall into each other	
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ <i>many times</i>
αίδιος <i>(αἰδία, αἰδιον)</i>	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
συμπαρακολουθῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ <i>following alongside together</i>
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
τὸ ἀόρατον τὰ ἀόρατα	the unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΝ <i>not looking</i>
τὸ ἀσώματον τὰ ἀσώματα	the incorporeal	ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ <i>not body</i>

Objects often have temporary qualities that are not permanent parts of them. These characteristics do exist, but they are not like whole bodies, invisible things, or incorporeal entities.

70b. Perception of Symptoms

ὥστε δὴ κατὰ τὴν πλείστην φορὰν τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμενοι φανερὰ Ποιοῦμεν τὰ συμπτώματα: οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν ἔχειν (ὃ συλλαβόντες κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα Προσαγορεύομεν) – οὔτε τὴν τῶν αἰδίων παρακολουθούντων (ῶν ἄνευ Σῶμα οὐ δυνατόν νοεῖσθαι) – κατ’ ἐπιβολὰς, δ’ ἂν τινὰς παρακολουθοῦντος τοῦ ἀθρόου ἕκαστα προσαγορευθεῖη

therefore, by using this word in accordance with the most extensive transmission {i.e., by using "symptoms" with its most common meaning}, We make the symptoms evident: they do not have ^[1] the nature of the whole (which We refer to while comprehending together in accordance with the aggregated body) – nor [do symptoms have] ^[2] the lasting [nature] of those [properties] that follow along together {always with that type of body} (without which a Body is not able to be conceived) – but according to our attentions, certain things could be called by this name [of "symptoms"], while the aggregate is following along [with that symptom]

^[Hicks] Hence, using the term 'accidents' in the commonest sense, we say plainly that 'accidents' have not the nature of the whole thing to which they belong, and to which, conceiving it as a whole, we give the name of body, nor that of the permanent properties without which body cannot be thought of. And in virtue of certain peculiar modes of apprehension into which the complete body always enters, each of them can be called an accident.

^[Bailey] So that when according to the most general usage we employ this name, we make it clear that accidents have neither ^[1]the nature of the whole, which we comprehend in its aggregate and call body, nor ^[2]that of the qualities which permanently accompany it, without which a given body cannot be conceived. But as the result of certain acts of apprehension, provided the aggregate body goes along with them, they might each be given this name

πλεῖστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	the greatest <i>[the most]</i>	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most</i>
ἢ φορὰ αἰ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
χρώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
ἢ φαντασία αἰ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
φανερὸς <i>(ἄ, ὀν)</i>	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ <i>appearing</i>

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality <i>(characteristic)</i>	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from</i> <i>gathering</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked</i> <i>together</i>
συλλαβεῖν	to comprehend together <i>[already]</i>	ΣΥΛΛΑΒΕΙΝ <i>grasped together</i>
συλλαβών <i>(οὔσα, ὄν)</i>	comprehending together <i>[already]</i>	
ἄθροος <i>(α, ον)</i>	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly</i> <i>toward</i>
προσαγορευθῆναι	to be referred to <i>[already]</i>	
αἰδῖος <i>(αἰδία, αἰδῖον)</i>	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>
συμπακολουθῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ <i>following alongside</i> <i>together</i>
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
παρακολουθῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	following along	
δυνατός <i>(ή, ὄν)</i>	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>power</i>
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>

Symptoms (separable qualities) are not permanent constituents an object – these temporary qualities do not have the nature of the whole body or its properties (inseparable qualities).

71a. Properties vs. Symptoms

ἀλλ’ ὅτε δήποτε ἕκαστα συμβαίνοντα θεωρεῖται – οὐκ αἰδῖον τῶν Συμπτωμάτων παρακολουθούντων: καὶ οὐκ ἔξελατέον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ^[E] ταύτην τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει ^[1] τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν (ᾧ συμβαίνει – ὃ δὴ καὶ "σῶμα" Προσαγορεύομεν) οὐδὲ ^[2] τὴν τῶν αἰδῖον παρακολουθούντων

but [only] whenever Each of those [symptoms] is envisioned **enduring** [with its compound] – **because Symptoms do not follow along in a way that lasts:** [but] It is not necessary to expel ^[E] **this detectible reality** from what exists, [just] because [the symptom] does not have ^[1] **the nature of the whole** (with which [the symptom] endures – which indeed We refer to as "a body") nor [does the symptom have] ^[2] **that [nature] of those [properties] that follow along [with the body] in a way that lasts**

^[Hicks] But only as often as they are seen actually to belong to it, since such accidents are not perpetual concomitants. There is no need to banish from reality this clear evidence that the accident has not the nature of that whole--by us called body--to which it belongs, nor of the permanent properties which accompany the whole.

^[Bailey] , but only on occasions when each one of them is seen to occur, since accidents are not permanent accompaniments. And we must not banish this clear vision from the realm of existence because it does not possess the nature of the whole to which it is joined nor that of the permanent accompaniments,

τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
συμβαίνων (ουσα, ον)	enduring [with its compound]	
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρεῖσθαι	to be envisioned	
αἰδῖος (αἰδία, αἰδίων)	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>ever</i>
αἰδῖον	in a way that lasts	
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	[temporary for its compound] symptom (separable quality)	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
παρακολουθῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	following along	
ἐξελαύνειν	to expel	ΕΞΕΛΑΥΝΕΙΝ <i>driving out of</i>
ἐναργής (ές)	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	^[E] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of being within clear</i>
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>

Symptoms (separable qualities) are not essential constituents of body – they are temporary characteristics that are only occasionally part of the body. Nevertheless, these qualities are real – as they are physically based in a body. Even though they are not permanent parts of that body or among its essential properties.

71b. Neither Intrinsic nor Extrinsic

οὐδ’ αὖ, καθ’ αὐτὰ νομιστέον – οὐδὲ γὰρ Τοῦτο διανοητὸν: οὐτ’ ἐπὶ τούτων οὐτ’ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰδίων συμβεβηκόντων – ἀλλ’ ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται, Συμπτώματα πάντα «κατὰ» τὰ σώματα νομιστέον, καὶ οὐκ αἰδίων παρακολουθοῦντα, οὐδ’ αὖ φύσεως καθ’ ἑαυτὰ τάγμα ἔχοντα: ἀλλ’ ὃν τρόπον αὐτὴ ἡ Αἴσθησις τὴν ιδιότητα ποιεῖ θεωρεῖται

nor, again, is It necessary to think that [Qualities exist] *intrinsically* – for this is *not mentally perceptible*: neither for these [symptoms] nor for the properties [existing] *in a way that lasts [with the compound]* – but just as they appear, all Symptoms must be thought of according to the bodies, and not following along [with the body] *in a way that lasts [as permanent accompaniments]*, nor having *an intrinsic arrangement of nature {i.e., having of independent existence}*: but [those Qualities] are envisioned [to exist exactly] *in the way that Sensation itself gathers [each's] particularity*

^[Bailey] nor must we suppose that such contingencies exist independently (for this is inconceivable both with regard to them and to the permanent properties), but, just as it appears in sensation, we must think of them all as accidents occurring to bodies, and that not as permanent accompaniments, or again as having in themselves a place in the ranks of material existence; rather they are seen to be just what our actual sensation shows their proper character to be.

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
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διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>saw through</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοητὸς <i>(ἡ, ὄν)</i>	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>saw through</i>
αἰδῖος <i>(αἰδία, αἰδῖον)</i>	lasting	ΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>always</i>
αἰδῖον	in a way that lasts	
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
συμβαίνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	enduring [with its compound]	
συμβεβηκώς <i>(υῖα, ὅς)</i>	having endured	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
φανεῖσθαι	to be seen [in the future]	
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
παρακολουθεῖν	to follow along	ΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ
παρακολουθῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	following along	
τὸ τάγμα τὰ τάγματα	arrangement	ΤΑΓΜΑ <i>ordering</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality <i>(characteristic)</i>	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from gathering</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>

Qualities do not have an independent existence – they do not exist independently apart from their object of origin. Separable qualities are temporary characteristics of bodies (and may not last as long as long as their source-object).

Separable qualities (symptoms) are not part of the body's essential nature – in contrast to inseparable qualities (properties) which last as long as the source-object lasts.

We can understand qualities as they appear through our senses, recognizing their role as attributes of bodies. Qualities are neither intrinsic (they do not exist in-and-of-themselves) nor extrinsic (they cannot be separated from their source-object and still exist).

καὶ μὴν καὶ, **τόδε** γε Δεῖ προσκατανοῆσαι σφοδρῶς: τὸν γὰρ δὴ Χρόνον οὐ
ζητητέον ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ (**ὅσα** ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ Ζητοῦμεν, ἀνάγοντες **ἐπὶ** τὰς
βλεπομένας παρ' ἡμῖν **αὐτοῖς** ^[•^] **προλήψεις**): ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ Ἐνάργημα, καθ' ὃ τὸν
"πολὺν" ἢ "ὀλίγον" **χρόνον** Ἀναφωνοῦμεν, **συγγενικῶς τοῦτο περιφέροντες**
ἀναλογιστέον

and indeed, It is necessary to also fully conceive **this very thing** attentively:
Time should not to be sought in the same way as the other [qualities] (**which**
We investigate in [their] original source, while referring back to the ^[•^]
anticipations seen by us for those [qualities]): but the ^[E] detectible Fact
itself, according to which We declare **time as "long"** or **"short,"** ought to be
analogized **by us similarly linking this [attribute of duration with time]**

^[Bailey] Moreover, you must firmly grasp this point as well: we must not look
for time, as we do for all other things which we look for in an object (by
referring them to the general conceptions which we perceive in our own
minds) – **but we must take the direct intuition**, in accordance with which we
speak of 'a long time' or 'a short time' **and examine it**, applying our intuition
to time as we do to other things.

^[Hicks] There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not
investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a
subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our
minds; **but we must take into account the plain fact itself**, in virtue of which
we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connection this
attribute of duration. {{linking this attribute of duration to [time] in intimate
connection}}

νοεῖν	to conceive	NOEIN <i>seeing</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	KATANOEIN <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
προσκατανοεῖν	to also fully conceive	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>addition to seeing thoroughly</i>
σφοδρός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	attentive	ΣΦΟΔΡΟΣ <i>intense</i>
σφοδρῶς	attentively	ΣΦΟΔΡΩΣ <i>intensely</i>
ζητεῖν	to seek	ZHTEIN <i>seeking</i>
ζητητός <i>(ή, ὄν)</i>	sought	ZHTHTOS <i>sought</i>
ζητητέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be sought	ZHTHTEOS <i>should be sought</i>
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of situated under</i>
ἀνάγων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	referring back	ΑΝΑΓΩΝ <i>leading back</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
βλεπόμενος	seen	ΒΛΕΠΟΜΕΝΗ <i>looking</i>
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	^[•^] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>before taking hold</i>
ἡ βλεπομένη πρόληψις	the seen anticipation	
ἐναργής <i>(ές)</i>	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	^[E] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of being within clear</i>
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long ^[of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
ὀλίγος <i>(η, ον)</i>	few, short ^[of time]	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ <i>little</i>

ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
ἡ ἀναφωνήσις αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις	declaration	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ <i>speaking up</i>
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΕΙΝ <i>speaking up</i>
συγγεγονέναι	to have been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΟΝΕΝΑΙ <i>having been born together</i>
συγγεγενημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been inherent	ΣΥΓΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having been born together</i>
συγγενής <i>(ές)</i>	similar	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ <i>born with</i>
συγγενικῶς	similarly	
διαφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	differing	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing through</i>
ἀναφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	referring	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing back</i>
περιφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	linking making known	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing around</i>
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action again</i>
ἀναλόγως	analogously	
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
ἀναλογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being reasoned again</i>
ἀναλογιστέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be reasoning action again</i>
<i>[conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>		

Time is a characteristic of movement. We cannot investigate time by perceiving it directly – therefore we cannot investigate time in the same way we investigate other qualities, which we seek in their source-object (i.e., we look for red in an object that has the quality of red), but we must investigate time as a quality of movement itself. We must realize that time is not something we can investigate in the same way we investigate other qualities that we can experience as characteristics of objects (and which we can refer to what we already know). Rather, we should pay attention to how we actually sense time in everyday life and reference these direct observations of motion as an analogy for the nature of time for use applications in scientific considerations.

72b. Indicating Time

καὶ οὐτε διαλέκτους ὥς βελτίους Μεταληπτέον, ἀλλ’ αὐταῖς ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις κατ’ αὐτοῦ Χρηστέον – οὐτε ἄλλο τι κατ’ αὐτοῦ Κατηγορητέον (ὥς τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος τῷ ἰδιώματι τούτῳ, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιοῦσί Τινες) – ἀλλὰ μόνον ᾧ Συμπλέκομεν τὸ ἴδιον τοῦτο καὶ Παραμετροῦμεν μάλιστα Ἐπιλογιστέον

and It is also not necessary to substitute ways of speaking as [though they are] better, but It is necessary to use the existing [ways of speaking] about [time] – nor is It necessary to fully indicate anything else about [time] (as though [anything else] has the same existence as this idiom {i.e., the word "time"}), for Some people indeed do this) – but It is most necessary to inductively consider only [the phenomena] with which We entangle the particular feature [of time duration] and comparatively measure it

Hicks] We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it – nor need we predicate anything else of time (as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word 'time,' for this also is done by some) – We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it.

[Bailey] Neither must we search for expressions as likely to be better, but employ just those which are in common use about it. Nor again must we predicate of time anything else as having the same essential nature as this special perception, as some people do, but we must turn our thoughts particularly to that only with which we associate this peculiar perception and by which we measure it.

ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ <i>speaking across</i>
ἀγαθός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ <i>great</i>
βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ
μεταληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	substitutable	ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>taken hold change</i>
μεταληπτέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be substituted	ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ <i>change ought to be taken hold</i>
μεταληπτέον	it is necessary to substitute	
ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> ὑπάρχοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>	existing [already]	ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
χρη̑σθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>necessary</i>
χρηστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	useful	
χρηστέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be used	
χρηστέον	it is necessary to use	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
κατηγορητέον	it is necessary to fully indicate	
ἡ οὐσία αἱ οὐσίαι	existence	ΟΥΣΙΑ <i>being</i>
ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>
τὸ ἰδίωμα τὰ ἰδιώματα	idiom	ΙΔΙΩΜΑ <i>particular</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
πλεκτικός <i>(η, ον)</i>	entangling	ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of weaving</i>
συμπλέκειν	to entangle with	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ <i>weaving together</i>
καταμετρεῖν	to fully measure	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly measure</i>
παραμετρεῖν	to comparatively measure	ΠΑΡΑΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>measuring alongside</i>
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i>

τό διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ result of <i>reasoning</i> <i>through action</i>
ἀναλογιστέος (α, ον)	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ ought to be <i>reasoning</i> <i>action again</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ process of <i>reasoning</i> <i>action upon</i>
ἐπιλογιστέος (α, ον)	out to be inductively considered	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ ought to be <i>action</i> <i>upon reasoning</i>
ἐπιλογιστέον	it is necessary to inductively consider	

We should use the common expressions for time and not invent new ones. This is because we must not attribute other qualities to time that it does not have – but focus on understanding and measuring it as it is commonly perceived. It is important to focus on the specific way we inherently understand and describe time, rather than trying to add anything else to its meaning.

73a. Considering Time

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες καθ’ ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ *Περὶ Φύσεως* καὶ ἐν τῇ *Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ*}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of inductive consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We are internalizing, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] according to which We use the word "Time" {He also says this in the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

[Bailey] For indeed this requires no demonstration, but only reflection, to show that it is with days and nights and their divisions that we associate it and likewise also with internal feelings or absence of feeling, and with movements and states of rest; in connection with these last again we think of this very perception as a peculiar kind of accident, and in virtue of this we call it time.

ἢ ἀπόδειξις αἱ ἀποδείξεις	proof	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ <i>from pointing out</i>
δεῖ	it is necessary	ΔΕΙ <i>needing</i>
δεῖσθαι	to need	
προσδεῖσθαι	to also need	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>needing in addition to</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ process of <i>reasoning action</i> <i>upon</i>
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ <i>day</i>
ἡ νύξ αἱ νύκτες	night	ΝΥΞ <i>night</i>
συμπλέκειν	to entangle	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ <i>weaving together</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>

τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience (<i>feeling</i>)	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ἡ ἀπάθεια αἱ ἀπάθειαι	absence of experience	ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ <i>not experiencing</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i>
ἴδιος (<i>α, ον</i>)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive ^[mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	ΕΝΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing within</i>
ἐννοῶν (<i>έννοοῦσα, έννοοῦν</i>) έννοοῦντες (<i>έννοοῦσαι, έννοοῦντα</i>)	internalizing	ΕΝΝΟΩΝ
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ <i>naming</i>

Only observation and reflection are needed to understand time. We recognize time by associating it with our experiences of the day progressing and by movement.

73b. Cosmoi

ἐπί τε τοῖς προειρημένοις τοὺς κόσμους Δεῖ (καὶ πᾶσαν σύγκρισιν πεπερασμένην τὸ ὁμοειδὲς τοῖς θεωρούμενοις πυκνῶς ἔχουσαν) νομίζειν γεγονέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου: πάντων τούτων ἐκ συστροφῶν ἰδίων ἀποκεκριμένων (καὶ μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων) – καὶ, πάλιν, διαλύεσθαι Πάντα (τὰ μὲν θάπτον, τὰ δὲ βραδύτερον – καὶ, τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε) τοῦτο πάσχοντα

moreover, in addition to what has been previously mentioned, It is necessary that the Cosmoi (as well as every [other] finite compound [which] has the same appearance as what is frequently envisioned) be considered to have come into being from the infinite: because all of these (both larger and smaller) had been distinguished [out of the infinite] by particular conglomerations [of atoms] – and, in turn, [It is necessary for] all [these compound] Things to be dissolved (some more swiftly, others more slowly – indeed, some things by some specific [causes], and other things by other specific [causes]) [because they are all] affected by this [dissolution]

[Bailey] And in addition to what we have already said we must believe that worlds, and indeed every limited compound body which continuously exhibits a similar appearance to the things we see, were created from the infinite, and that all such things, greater and less alike, were separated off from individual agglomerations of matter; and that all are again dissolved, some more quickly, some more slowly, some suffering from one set of causes, others from another.

λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
εἰρησθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>spoke</i>

εἰρημένος	having been said [already]	
προειρημένος (η, ον)	previously mentioned	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>spoke before</i>
τὸ προειρημένον τὰ προειρημένα	what has been previously mentioned	
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
τὸ πεπερασμένον	what is finite	ΠΕΠΕΡΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of extremity</i>
πεπερασμένος (η, ον)	finite	
προσεμφερής	closely resembling	ΠΡΟΣΕΜΦΕΡΗΣ <i>toward bringing resemblance</i>
ἀνόμοιος (ον)	dissimilar	ΑΝΟΜΟΙΟΣ <i>not similar</i>
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
ὅμοιομερής (ές)	"similarly composed" homoio meric	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>similar parts</i>
ὁμοιόμορφος (ον)	similarly formed	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ <i>similar form</i>
ὁμοειδής (ές)	appearing the same	ὍΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>appearing same</i>
τὸ ὁμοειδές	same appearance	
θεωρούμενος (η, ον)	envisioned	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>observing</i>
πυκνὸν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ <i>compacting</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τὸ ἄπειρον	the infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἡ σύστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	conglomeration	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ <i>twisting together</i>
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἀποκεκριμένος (η, ον)	had been distinguished	ΑΠΟΚΕΚΡΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>separated away from</i>
μείζων (ον)	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
ἐλάττων (ων, ον)	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>through dissolve</i>
διαλύεσθαι	to be dissolved	
ταχύς (εῖα, ύ)	swift	ΤΑΧΥΣ <i>swift</i>
θάπτων (ουσα, ον)	swifter	ΘΑΤΤΩΝ <i>swifter</i>
θάπτον	more swiftly	
βραδύς (εῖα, ύ)	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ <i>slow</i>

βραδύτερος (α, ον)	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ <i>slower</i>
βραδύτερον	more slowly	
πάσχων (ουσα, ον)	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ <i>suffering</i>

Worlds (as well as every other compound) emerge out of the indistinct infinite void and infinite amount of atoms as distinct and finite aggregates. They are formed from groups of atoms and will eventually break apart due to various different causes – some quickly and some very slowly.

73c. {Perishability of Cosmoi}

{**δῆλον**, οὖν, ὥς **καὶ φθαρτούς** Φησι **τοὺς Κόσμους** – **μεταβαλλόντων τῶν μερῶν**: **καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τήν Γῆν τῷ ἀέρι ἐποχεῖσθαι**}

{[it is] **clear**, therefore, He states that **the Cosmoi [are] also perishable** – **because [their] parts are transforming**: and in other [places in his books he says that] **the Earth is carried along by the air**}

δῆλος (η, ον)	(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
φθαρτός	perishable	ΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ <i>being destroyed</i>
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging /</i> <i>adorning</i>
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in</i> <i>change</i>
μεταβάλλων (ουσα, ον)	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ <i>throwing in</i> <i>change</i>
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	Γῆ <i>land</i>
ὁ ἀήρ (τοῦ ἀέρος)	air	ΑΗΡ <i>morning mist</i>
ὁ ὄχος οἱ ὄχοι	carriage, cart, chariot	ΟΧΟΣ <i>riding</i>
ὀχεῖν	to carry	ΟΧΕΙΝ <i>riding</i>
ἐποχεύειν	to carry upon	ΕΠΟΧΕΥΕΙΝ <i>riding upon</i>
ἐποχεῖσθαι	to be carried along	

Worlds are perishable because their parts can change. Epíkouros also mentions that our cosmos is carried through space by the air. The air in space is filled with "oceans" of atoms (and the waves and wakes that originate when objects pass through such atomic "oceans"). Our earth (as well as all the planets in our cosmos) is supported by, and carried along in, this atomic ocean.

74a. Shapes of Cosmoi

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὐτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης Δεῖ νομίζειν ἓνα σχηματισμὸν ἔχοντας – **ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφόρους αὐτοὺς {ἐν τῇ ιβ΄** *Περὶ Φύσεως* **Αὐτός φησιν: οὓς μὲν γὰρ σφαιροειδεῖς, καὶ ὥσειδεῖς ἄλλους, καὶ ἄλλοιοσχήμονας ἑτέρους – οὐ, μέντοι, πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν – οὐδὲ ζῶα εἶναι ἀποκριθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου}**

yet also, It should not necessarily be thought that **the Cosmoi have [just] one configuration** – but **they are also different** {in the 12th book *On Nature*, He himself says: **some are spherical**, **others egg-shaped**, and **others differently shaped** – **they do not**, however, **have every shape** – **nor are [the Cosmoi] living beings that are distinguished from the infinite**}

[Bailey] And further we must believe that these worlds were neither created all of necessity with one configuration nor yet with every kind of shape.

ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
ἐξ ἀνάγκης	necessarily	
νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
εἷς μία ἓν <i>(ένός, μιᾶς, ένός)</i>	one	ἜΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἘΝ
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of action of forming</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
διάφορος <i>(ον)</i>	different	
δώδεκα	twelve	ΔΩΔΕΚΑ <i>two (and) ten</i>
ιβ´	12	ΙΒ´ <i>ten (and) two</i>
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
ὁμοειδής <i>(ές)</i>	similarly formed	ὍΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>appearing same</i>
σφαιροειδής <i>(ές)</i>	spherical	ΣΦΑΙΡΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>seen sphere</i>
ὠοειδής <i>(ές)</i>	oval	ΩΙΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>seen egg</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἄλλοιοσχήμων <i>(ον)</i>	differently shaped	ΑΛΛΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ <i>holding other [form]</i>
τὸ ζῶον τὰ ζῶα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ <i>life</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις = ἡ σύνκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἀποκεκριμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	had been distinguished	ΑΠΟΚΕΚΡΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>separated away from</i>
ἀποκριθείς <i>(εἴσα, έν)</i>	distinguished [already]	ΑΠΟΚΡΙΘΕΙΣ <i>separating away from</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>

Cosmoi are spherical, oval, and very many other shapes – nevertheless they are not formed in every possible shape.

74b. Composition of Cosmoi

[...] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἀποδείξειεν Οὐδεὶς ὥς <έν> μὲν τῷ τοιούτῳ (καὶ οὐκ ἂν Ἐμπεριελήφθη) τὰ τοιαῦτα Σπέρματα ἐξ ὧν ζῶά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα <τὰ> θεωρούμενα συνίσταται – έν δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνήθη {ῶσαύτως, δὲ καὶ έντραφῆναι τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς Νομιστέον}

[furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and all the other things that we see produced in this world] for Nobody could fully prove (nor could it be completely comprehended within) that in one particular [world there are] the particular Seeds from which living beings, plants, and all other [mentally] observed things are composed – whereas in another similar [world], [similar seeds] would not have the force [to exist] {likewise, It is necessary to consider [those similar living beings, plants, and all other observed things] being nourished in the same way as on earth}

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must believe that in all worlds there are living creatures and plants and other things we see in this world; for indeed no one could prove that in a world of one kind there might or might not have been included the kinds of seeds from which living things and plants and all the rest of the things we see are composed, and that in a world of another kind they could not have been.

δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing away</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
οὐδείς <i>(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)</i>	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ <i>not even one</i>
ἐμπεριλαβεῖν	to completely comprehended within [already]	
ἐμπεριληφθῆναι	to be completely comprehended within [already]	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΦΘΗΝΑΙ <i>grasped around in</i>
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ <i>seed</i>
τὸ φυτόν τὰ φυτά	plant	ΦΥΤΟΝ <i>growing</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	[mentally] observed	
συνστῆσαι	to compose [already]	ΣΥΝΣΤΗΣΑΙ <i>stood together</i>
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
συνίστασθαι	to be composed	
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
δυνηθῆναι	to have the force [already]	
τρέφειν	to nurture	ΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ <i>raising</i>
ἐντρέφεσθαι	to be nurtured in	ΕΝΤΡΕΦΕΣΘΑΙ <i>raising in</i>
ἐντραφῆναι	to be nurtured in [already]	ΕΝΤΡΑΦΗΝΑΙ <i>raised in</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ <i>land</i>

Some worlds have a composition like ours, other worlds have a composition unlike ours. In worlds similar to ours, there are similar living creatures, plants, and everything else that exists in our world. The seeds needed for those living beings and plants to form and grow are not only found in just one world, but in all others similar to it. Those living beings and plants are nourished in the same way as they are on Earth.

ἀλλὰ μὲν, Ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν Φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι – τὸν δὲ Λογισμόν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μὲν τισὶ θάπτον, ἐν δὲ τισὶ βραδύτερον – καὶ ἐν μὲν τισὶ περιόδοις καὶ χρόνοις ᾠμίζουσ λαμβάνειν ἐπιδόσεις, ἐν δὲ τισὶ καὶ ἐλάττους

but indeed, It is also necessary to suppose that [human] Nature is taught numerous and diverse things by the situations themselves and that it is also forced [to do many things] – and that [human] Reasoning afterward further makes more precise and elaborates the things already recommended by these [situations], in some cases more swiftly, in others more slowly – and in some periods and times [human reasoning] acquires larger advancements, but also smaller [advancements] in other [periods]

[Bailey] Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times making great advances, and lesser again at others.

ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	* to completely comprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping around in
ἐμπεριειλημμένος (η, ον)	*completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ being grasped around in
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ doing / affair
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ teaching
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ necessary
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ reasoning action together
τό διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ result of reasoning through action
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ process of reasoning action upon
ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ action reasoning
παραγγέλλειν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΑΓΓΥΑΝ transmitted a message across
παρεγγυηθείς (εἶσα, ἐν)	recommended [already]	ΠΑΡΕΓΓΥΗΘΕΙΣ transmitted a message across
ὕστερον	afterward	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ next
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ fully pointed
ἐπακριβοῦν	to make more precise	ΕΠΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ pointed upon
εὕρισκειν	to discover	ἙΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ finding
προσεξευρίσκειν	to elaborate	ΠΡΟΣΕΞΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ finding in addition from
ταχύς (εἶτα, ὑ)	swift	ΤΑΧΥΣ swift
θάπτων (ουσα, ον)	swifter	ΘΑΤΤΩΝ swifter
θάπτον	more swiftly	
βραδύς (εἶτα, ὑ)	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ slow

βραδύτερος (α, ον)	slower	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΕΡΟΝ <i>slower</i>
βραδύτερον	more slowly	
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	[the completion of] a full course, [of time] period	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ <i>result around</i> <i>the path</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
μείζων (ον)	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ ἐπίδοσις αἱ ἐπιδόσεις	advancements	ΕΠΙΔΟΣΙΣ <i>giving in addition</i>
ἐλάττων (ων, ον)	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>

Human nature is shaped by events and circumstances – afterwards, reasoning fine-tunes this nature. Humans learn and adapt through experiences, with reason developing and expanding on these lessons. The speed of this progress varies over time.

75b. Natural Word Formation

ὄθεν καὶ τὰ Ὄνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι – ἀλλ’ αὐτάς τὰς Φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πάσχουσας πάθη – καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως – τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν στελλόμενον ὑφ’ ἐκάστων τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων (ὥς ἂν ποτε καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ἐθνῶν Διαφορὰ ᾗ)

and so [It is necessary to fundamentally comprehend that] Words were also not produced from the beginning by [purposeful] implementation – but rather the very Natures of people according to each ethnicity were affected by particular experiences – and comprehending particular mental image in a particular way – [human nature] emitted the air brought up by each of [their] experiences and [their] mental images (as there may also be a Difference depending on the locations of the ethnicities)

[Bailey] And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men's natures according to their different nationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well.

τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ <i>in the first order</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	implementation	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of</i> <i>placing</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ιδίως	in a particular way	

πάσχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ <i>suffering</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
λαμβάνειν	^[intellectually] to comprehend, ^[generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαμβάνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	comprehending	
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασῖαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination [an act of imagining]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i>
τὸ φάντασμα τὰ φαντάσματα	mental image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ <i>result of appearing</i>
ιδίως	particularly	ΙΔΙΩΣ <i>particular</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>air</i>
ἐκπέμπειν	to emit	ΕΚΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ <i>conveying out</i>
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>making ready away</i>
στέλλειν	to send	ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>making ready</i>
στελλόμενον	being sent	ΣΤΕΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of making ready</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>

Words and names for things were not created on purpose or by agreement but arose by natural human impulse. Primitive people made sounds based on their feelings and experiences, and these sounds varied depending on the region and culture they lived in.

76a. Purposeful Word Formation

ὕστερον, δὲ κοινῶς καθ’ ἕκαστα ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι – πρὸς τὸ τὰς Δηλώσεις ἦττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέως δηλουμένας: τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνωρώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς Συνειδότας, παρεγγυῆσαι τινὰς φθόγγους – ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι τοὺς δὲ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐλομένους – κατὰ τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν οὕτως ἐρμηνεῦσαι

next, [It is necessary to fundamentally comprehend that] particular Things were generally established according to each ethnicity – so that [their] Clarifications might become less ambiguous to one another and more concisely clear: and Those who knew well [how to clarify with their expressions] also introduced certain situations that [were] not [mentally] fully seen, while recommending certain expressions [for the situations they introduced] – they were [sometimes] compelled to declare [certain expressions] but [other times] they chose [expressions] by reasoning – interpreting [situations] in that way according to [their] greatest cause [i.e., according to their primary purpose of communicating clearly]

[Bailey] And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.

ὕστερον	afterward	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>next</i>
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from</i> <i>common</i>
κοινῶς	generally	
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
ἡ δήλωσις αἱ δηλώσεις	clarification	ΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ <i>action of making</i> <i>clear</i>
ἀμφίβολος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	ambiguous	ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΟΣ <i>throwing both</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
συντομός	concise	ΣΥΝΤΟΜΟΣ <i>cut together</i>
συντομωτέως	more concisely	
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
δηλούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	clarified	
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
συνορώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	fully seen [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seen together</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
ἀναφερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried back	ΑΝΑΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing back</i>
εἰσφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	introducing	ΕΙΣΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing into</i>
εἰδέναι	<i>to have mentally seen ∴</i> "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
συνειδώς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	knowing well	ΣΥΝΕΙΔΩΣ <i>seen</i> <i>together</i>
ὁ συνειδώς οἱ συνειδότες	he who knew well	
παρεγγυᾶν	to recommend	ΠΑΡΕΓΓΥΑΝ <i>entrust besides</i>
παρεγγυῆσαι	to recommend [already]	
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>uttering</i>
ἀναγκάζειν	to compel	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ <i>necessary again</i>
ἀναγκάσαι	to compel [already]	
ἀναγκασθεῖς <i>(εῖσα, έν)</i>	compelled	

ἡ ἀναφωνήσις αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις	declaration	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ <i>speaking up</i>
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	
ὁ λογισμός οἱ λογισμοί	reasoning	ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>action reasoning</i>
αἰρεῖν	to choose	Αἶρεῖν <i>taking</i>
ἐλόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	chosen [already]	Ἐλομενος <i>took</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	Αἰτία <i>blame</i>
ἐρμηνεύειν	to interpret	Ἑρμηνεύειν <i>Hermes nod, interpreter sign</i>
ἐρμηνεύσαι	to interpret [already]	

Although many words arose naturally, some were invented for precision, and others for newly discerned mental concepts.

Different races automatically created their specific words to make communication clearer and more concise among themselves. Afterward, educated people introduced – either instinctively or logically – new terms for things that were not previously understood.

76b. Autonomous Motion

καὶ μὴν <καὶ, τὴν> ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φορὰν καὶ τροπὴν καὶ ἔκλειψιν καὶ ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις – μήτε λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν Δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ διατάπτοντος, ἢ διατάξοντος – καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετ’ ἀφθαρσίας

and indeed, [regarding] the transmission in astronomical phenomena, and the turning, and disappearance, and rising, and setting, and components related to these – It is necessary to think that they are produced neither by someone who is administrating and who is [currently] arranging, nor [by someone] who will [in the future] be arranging [those components of astronomical phenomena] – [all] while also simultaneously possessing total contentedness in accordance with [their] indestructibility

[Bailey] Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality.

τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ <i>rising beyond</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ τροπή αἱ τροπαί	turning	ΤΡΟΠΗ <i>diverting</i>
ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ <i>leaving out</i>
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
τὸ στοιχείωμα τὰ στοιχειώματα	component [principle]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΜΑ <i>result of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component [for facts] or, element [for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>
τὸ σύστοιχον τὰ σύστοιχα	related component	ΣΥΣΤΟΙΧΟΝ <i>together in a row</i>

λειτουργεῖν	to administrate [to serve the state]	ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΕΙΝ <i>council-room</i> <i>worker</i>
λειτουργῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	administrating	
νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>came into being</i>
διατάττειν	to arrange	ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>ordering across</i>
διατάττων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	arranging	
διατάξων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	will be arranging	ΔΙΑΤΑΞΩΝ <i>will order across</i>
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	contentedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from</i> <i>[greatness]</i>
ἡ ἀφθαρσία αἱ ἀφθαρσίαι	indestructibility	ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑ <i>not destroyed</i>

Just as matter is not created – events are not controlled. All evidence demonstrates that atmospheric events like star movements, solstices, and eclipses happen naturally, without the control or command of any being. Also, it is not possible to imagine any being that, while controlling all the events in the universe, is also relaxed and at ease.

77a. Dependent Emotions

οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν ^[1ext.] Πραγματεῖαι καὶ ^[1int.] Φροντίδες καὶ ^[2] Ὅργαι καὶ ^[3] Χάριτες **μακαριότητι** – ἀλλ’ ἐν ^[1] ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ^[2] φόβῳ καὶ ^[3] προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίων Ταῦτα γίνεται – μήτε, αὖ, **πῦρ ἅμα ὄντα συνεστραμμένον, τὴν μακαριότητα κεκτημένα, κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν**

for ^[1ext.] Efforts, ^[1int.] Concerns, ^[2] Moods, and ^[3] Favors do not harmonize with **contentedness** – but these Things arise in ^[1] weakness, ^[2] fear, and ^[3] additional need from those nearby – nor, once more, as they are only **entangled fire**, [should we believe that astronomical phenomena], while possessing **contentedness**, acquire [their] movements voluntarily

[Bailey] (for trouble and care and anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessedness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and fear and dependence on neighbors). Nor again must we believe that they, which are but fire agglomerated in a mass, possess blessedness, and voluntarily take upon themselves these movements.

^[Usener] **μήτε, αὖ, πυρὸς Ἀνάμματα συνεστραμμένου**

nor, once more, [should we believe that] **Conflagrations of entangled fire**

ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ <i>speaking together</i>
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ <i>state of doing / affair</i>
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	concern	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ <i>mind</i>
ἡ ὀργή αἱ ὀργαί	mood	ΟΡΓΗ <i>reaching out</i>
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	favor	ΧΑΡΙΣ <i>cheer</i>
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	contentedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from</i> <i>[greatness]</i>

ἡ ἀσθένεια αἱ ἀσθένειαι	weakness	ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙΑ <i>not strong</i>
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
ἡ δέησις αἱ δεήσεις	a need	ΔΕΗΣΙΣ <i>to be necessary</i>
ἡ προσδεήσις αἱ προσδεήσεις	an additional need	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΗΣΙΣ <i>to be necessary in addition</i>
πλησίον	nearby	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΝ <i>near</i>
ὁ πλησίον οἱ πλησίον	someone nearby	Ο ΠΛΗΣΙΟΝ <i>one who [is] near</i>
ὁ πλησίος οἱ πλησίοι	neighbor	ΠΛΗΣΙΟΣ <i>near</i>
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ <i>fire</i>
τὸ ἀνάμμα τὰ ἀνάμματα	conflagration	ΑΝΑΜΜΑ <i>lighting up</i>
συνεστραμμένος (η, ον)	entangled	ΣΥΝΕΣΤΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having twisted together</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>acquired</i>
ἡ βούλησις αἱ βουλήσεις	intention	ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ <i>wishing</i>
κατὰ βούλησιν	voluntarily	
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>

Emotions such as concern, anxiety, anger, and kindness are signs of weakness, fear, and dependence – all such feelings do not fit with a state of contentment befitting a god.

Celestial bodies, which are just masses of fire, do not experience awareness or feelings – nor do they move by their own will.

From one possible interpretation Epíkouros is connecting: (1) external efforts with (physical) weakness as well as internal concerns with (mental) weakness – connecting (2) moods with fear – and connecting (3) Favors with additional need from those nearby.

77b. Maintaining Reverence

ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ σέμνωμα τηρεῖν κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐννοίας – ἵνα μηδ’ ὑπεναντίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν <γένωνται> τῷ σεμνώματι Δόξαι: εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτὴ ἡ Ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει

but [It is necessary] to preserve all the reverence being carried by every word toward such internal conceptions [as contentment and indestructibility] – so Judgments that are contrary to this reverence do not <arise> from those [words]: if not, the Contradiction itself will provide the greatest disturbance in [our] souls

[Bailey] But we must preserve their full majestic significance in all expressions which we apply to such conceptions, in order that there may not arise out of them opinions contrary to this notion of majesty. Otherwise this very contradiction will cause the greatest disturbance in men's souls.

σεμνοῦν	to revere	ΣΕΜΝΟΥΝ <i>august / exalted</i>
τὸ σέμνωμα τὰ σεμνώματα	reverence	

διατηρεῖν	to fully preserve	διατηρεῖν <i>completely protecting / watching</i>
τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ <i>protecting / watching</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing in</i>
ὑπεναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contrary	ὙΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>over against</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ὁ ταραχος οἱ ταραχοι	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>agitating</i>
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ἡ ὑπεναντιότης αἱ ὑπεναντιότητες	contradiction	ὙΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΤΗΣ <i>over against</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
παρασκευάσειν	to be going to provide	

We must maintain the complete profound significance of terms such as "content" and "immortality" to avoid creating conflicting conceptions – because these contradictory notions and principles can greatly trouble our minds. Holding conflicting conceptions regarding the meanings of words ruins our clear mental access to what they indicate.

77c. Systemic Planetary Mechanics

ὁθεν, δὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναπολήψεις τῶν συστροφῶν τούτων ἐν τῇ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσει Δεῖ δοξάζειν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην ταύτην καὶ περίοδον συντελεῖσθαι

therefore, certainly, It is necessary to judge that both the natural necessity [of astronomical phenomena] and a completion of a full course [of their regular movements] are mutually fulfilled according to the integrations of these [astronomical] conglomerations from the beginning during the creation of [our] cosmos

[Bailey] Therefore we must believe that it is due to the original inclusion of matter in such agglomerations during the birth-process of the world that this law of regular succession is also brought about.

ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ λῆψις αἱ λῆψεις	<i>comprehension</i>	ΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold</i>
ἡ ἐναπολήψις αἱ ἐναπολήψεις	integration	ΕΝΑΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>will grasp from within</i>
ἡ σύστροφή αἱ συστροφαί	conglomeration	ΣΥΣΤΡΟΦΗ <i>twisting together</i>
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ <i>action of being born</i>

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	[the completion of] a full course, [of time] period	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ <i>result around the path</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
συντελεῖσθαι	to be mutually fulfilled	

Astronomical phenomena occur based on the interaction of masses that were integrated during the formation of our cosmos. This initial organization established the patterns of movement in our cosmos that still govern atmospheric bodies today.

78a. Examining Causes

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τὸ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι Δεῖ νομίζειν – καὶ τὸ Μακάριον ἐνταῦθα πεπτωκέναί· καὶ ἐν τῷ τίνες Φύσεις αἱ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτί, καὶ Ὅσα συντείνει πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοῦτο ἀκρίβειαν

and indeed, It is necessary to consider that making the cause about the most essential things fully precise is the task of physics – and that Contentment has already settled here: both in regard to [understanding] what the [essential] Natures that are envisioned in these astronomical phenomena, and Whatever else also contributes towards precision in this [examination]

[Bailey] Furthermore, we must believe that to discover accurately the cause of the most essential facts is the function of the science of nature, and that blessedness for us in the knowledge of celestial phenomena lies in this and in the understanding of the nature of the existences seen in these celestial phenomena, and of all else that is akin to the exact knowledge requisite for our happiness.

κύριος (α, ον)	essential	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ <i>critical / valid</i>
κυριώτατος (κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most critical / valid</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ <i>fully pointed</i>
ἐξακριβῶσαι	to make fully precise [already]	
ἡ φυσιολογία	physics (the study of nature)	ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning of producing</i>
τὸ ἐνέργημα τὰ ἐνεργήματα	activity	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of working within</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	contentedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [greatness]</i>
μακάριος (α, ον)	content	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ <i>[greatness]</i>
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	contentment	

τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
πεπτωκέναι	to have settled	ΠΕΠΤΩΚΕΝΑΙ <i>fallen</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	<i>[the act of mental]</i> envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of</i> <i>observing</i>
θεωρητός <i>(ῆ, όν)</i>	envisionable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
θεωρούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	envisioned	ΘΕΩΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>observing</i>
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ <i>rising beyond</i>
συντείνειν	to also contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>stretching</i> <i>together</i>
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα τὰ ἀκριβώματα	precise detail	ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ <i>result of pointed</i>
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ <i>state of pointed</i>

The role of natural philosophy should be to thoroughly understand the fundamental causes of natural phenomena (the atoms and the void). We have a basis of contentment and security in our knowledge of these fundamental causes.

*We must differentiate between fundamental and general **essential causes** verses particular **specific causes** for all phenomena we see. While we investigate how a particular phenomenon can occur with various **specific causes**, it is most important that we understand the **essential causes** behind such a phenomenon.*

78b. Certainty for Essential Causes

ἔτι τε, οὐ τὸ Πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ Ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν – ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρία φύσει τῶν διάκρισιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μηθέν· καὶ Τοῦτο Καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς εἶναι

also, [It is necessary to consider that] Plurality does not exist in such [essential] things nor the Possibility of also being in some other way – but that nothing of what suggests [any] separating apart or [any] disturbance is included at all in an indestructible and content nature: and to thoroughly Comprehend with the mind that This [reality] exists is absolutely possible

[Bailey] in knowing too that what occurs in several ways or is capable of being otherwise has no place here but that nothing which suggests doubt or alarm can be included at all in that which is naturally immortal and blessed. Now this we can ascertain by our mind is absolutely the case.

πολύς <i>(ῆ, ύ)</i>	many, long <i>[of time]</i>	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
πλέων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	more	ΠΛΕΩΝ <i>flowing</i>
πλεοναχῶς	in more ways	
τὸ πλεοναχῶς τὰ πλεοναχῶς	plurality	
ἐνδεχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>accepting in</i>
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα	possibility [of]	
ἡ ἀφθαρσία αἱ ἀφθαρσίαι	indestructibility	ΑΦΘΑΡΣΙΑ <i>not destroyed</i>
ἀφθαρτός <i>(ός, όν)</i>	indestructible	
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	contentment	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝ <i>[greatness]</i>
μακάριος <i>(α, ον)</i>	content	

ἡ διάλυσις αἱ διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ <i>fully loosening</i>
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	differentiation	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold separation</i>
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	separating	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἡ διάκρισις αἱ διακρίσεις	separating apart	ΔΙΑΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating apart</i>
βάλλειν	to throw	ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing</i>
μεταβάλλειν	to transform	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
παραβάλλειν	to compare	ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in across</i>
ὑποβάλλειν	to suggest	ὙΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing under</i>
ὑποβάλλων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	suggesting	
ὁ τάραχος οἱ τάραχοι	disturbance	τάραχος <i>agitating</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly grasping</i>
καταλαβεῖν	to thoroughly comprehend [already]	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἔστιν ἀπλῶς εἶναι	it is absolutely possible	<i>"absolutely it is [possible] to exist"</i>

Specific astronomical phenomena can have multiple possible explanations because their general causes vary – in contrast, the most fundamental causes (the atoms and the void) are consistent and certain.

Similarly, the essential natures of contentment and indestructibility are consistent and certain – they cannot allow for the inclusion or mixing of anything foreign while still existing as those essential natures .

79a. Uncertainly for Particular Causes

τὸ δ’ ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκός τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἐκλείψεως – καὶ Ὅσα συγγενῇ τούτοις – μὴθὲν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τὰς γνώσεις συντείνειν

but [It is necessary to consider that] What has fallen within the examination of a setting, rising, turning, or an eclipse – or Whatever else is similar to these – contributes nothing further to contented knowledge

[Bailey] But what falls within the investigation of risings and settings and turnings and eclipses, and all that is akin to this, is no longer of any value for the happiness which knowledge brings.

ἡ ἱστορία αἱ ἱστορίαι	examination	ἹΣΤΟΡΙΑ <i>inquiring</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
πεπτωκός <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	having fallen	ΠΕΠΤΩΚΩΣ <i>fell</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>

ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	a rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ τροπή αἱ τροπαί	turning	ΤΡΟΠΗ <i>diverting</i>
ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ <i>leaving out</i>
συγγενής (ές)	similar	ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗΣ <i>born with</i>
μακάριος (α, ον)	content	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ <i>[greatness]</i>
γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ <i>knowing process</i>
γνωστός (ή, όν)	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ <i>knowing</i>
ἡ γνώσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	ΓΝΩΣΙΣ <i>knowing</i>
συντείνειν	to also contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>stretching together</i>

Studying the movement of specific astronomical phenomena does not further contribute to the contentment already gained from studying the essential atomic causes of such phenomena.

79b. Precision for Essential Causes

ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν, τοὺς ταῦτα Κατειδότας, τίνες δ’ αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοοῦντας καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι – καὶ εἰ μὴ Προσήδεισαν ταῦτα – τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους: ὅταν τὸ Θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προσκατανοήσεως μὴ δύνηται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν

but likewise, [It is necessary to consider that] People who understand these [specific astronomical phenomena], but do not also know what their [fundamental] natures are as well as what their most essential causes are, [still] have those fears in the same way – just as if They were not already familiar with these [specific astronomical phenomena] – perhaps even greater [fears]: when [their] Amazement from the additional full conception of these things is not able to comprehend the solution and operation of the most essential things

[Bailey] but persons who have perceived all this, but yet do not know what are the natures of these things and what are the essential causes, are still in fear, just as if they did not know these things at all indeed, their fear may be even greater, since the wonder which arises out of the observation of these things cannot discover any solution or realize the regulation of the essentials.

ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ΏΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
καθορᾶν	to inspect [mentally]	ΚΑΘΟΡΑΝ <i>thoroughly looking</i>
εἰδέναι	to have mentally seen ∴ "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>seen</i>
κατειδέναι	"to have mentally inspected" ∴ to understand	ΚΑΤΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>thoroughly seen</i>
κατειδώς (υῖα, ός)	"having mentally inspected" ∴ understanding	
ὁ κατειδώς οἱ κατειδότες	he who understands	
προσειδέναι	"to also have mentally seen" ∴ to also be familiar with	ΠΡΟΣΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing in addition</i>
γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ <i>knowing process</i>

γνωστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ <i>knowing</i>
ή γνῶσις αί γνώσεις	knowledge	
άγνοεῖν	to not know	ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ <i>not knowing</i>
άγνοῶν <i>(άγνοοῦσα, άγνοοῦν)</i>	not knowing	
τό νόημα τά νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
τό έννόημα τά έννοήματα	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing within</i>
ή κατανόησης αί κατανοήσεις	full conception	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>thoroughly seeing</i>
ή προσκατανόησης αί προσκατανοήσεις	additional full conception	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>addition to thoroughly seeing</i>
κυριώτατος <i>(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)</i>	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most critical / valid</i>
ή αίτία αί αίτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
τάχα	perhaps	ΤΑΧΑ <i>quickly</i>
πλείων <i>(ον)</i>	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
τό θάμβος τά θάμβη	amazement	ΘΑΜΒΟΣ <i>astonishing</i>
ή διάλυσις αί διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ <i>fully loosening</i>
ή λύσις αί λύσεις	solution	ΛΥΣΙΣ <i>loosening</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ή οίκονομία αί οίκονομίαι	operation	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ <i>managing the home</i>

People who know about (and even those who can predict) risings, settings, eclipses and other atmospheric events – but do not understand the fundamental workings of nature (*the essential causes*) – may feel as much fearful uncertainty as those who do not even consider such investigations. Unless their investigations also explain the underlying reasons for these phenomena, their fearful uncertainty might even be greater. They may, for example, instead consider these events to be the work of gods.

79c, 80a. Imprecision for Specific Causes

διό δὴ κἂν πλείους αίτίας Εὕρίσκωμεν τροπῶν καὶ δύσεων καὶ ἀνατολῶν καὶ ἐκλείψεων καὶ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων – ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος γινομένοις: ἦν οὐ Δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων Χρείαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ἀπειληφέναι (Ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνει)

therefore indeed, We may even discover **more causes of turnings, settings, risings, eclipses,** and **such things** – just as [we find] **in the [writings we] produced** for [the details of] **each part:** [nevertheless] It was not necessary to think that **[our familiar] use regarding these things has not partially comprehended precision** (as Much as contributes to our undisturbed and content [state])

[[Bailey] And for this very reason, even if we discover several causes for turnings and settings and risings and eclipses and the like, as has been the case already in our investigation of detail. we must not suppose that our inquiry into these things has not reached sufficient accuracy to contribute to our peace of mind and happiness.

ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
εὕρισκειν	to discover	ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>finding</i>
ἡ τροπή αἱ τροπαί	turning	ΤΡΟΠΗ <i>diverting</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	a rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ <i>leaving out</i>
τὸ τοιοῦτοτρόπος τὰ τοιοῦτοτρόπα	such a thing	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>such a kind of way</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
γινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
νομίζειν	to think	NΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
χρήσιμος <i>(ον)</i>	useful	ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρεῖαι	use	ΧΡΕΙΑ <i>necessary</i>
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ <i>state of pointed</i>
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to partially comprehend	ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping away</i>
ἀπειληφέναι	to have partially comprehended	ΑΠΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ <i>grasped away</i>
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ <i>without agitating</i>
ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ <i>without agitating</i>
τὸ ἀτάραχον τὰ ἀτάραχα	what is undisturbed	
ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	contentedness	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [greatness]</i>
μακάριος <i>(α, ον)</i>	content	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ <i>[greatness]</i>
τὸ μακάριον τὰ μακάρια	what is content	
συντείνειν	to also contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>stretching together</i>

We can give (1) *essential explanations* for *a specific cause*, but in some cases we cannot give (2) *specific explanations* for *a specific cause*. Even when the *specific causes* for a phenomenon remain uncertain, the *essential causes* for that phenomenon can be fully understood.

80b. Essential vs. Specific Causes

ὥστε, παραθεωροῦντας ποσαχῶς παρ’ ἡμῖν τὸ Ὅμοιον γίνεται – Αἰτιολογητέον ὑπέρ τε τῶν μετεώρων καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ἀδήλου: καταφρονοῦντας τῶν οὔτε ^[1a] τὸ μοναχῶς ἔχον ἢ γινόμενον γνωρίζοντων, οὔτε ^[1b] τὸ πλεοναχῶς συμβαῖνον – ^[2] τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἀποστημάτων φαντασίαν παριδόντων – ἔτι τε ἀγνοούντων καὶ ^[3a] ἐν ποίοις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀταρακτῆσαι <καὶ ^[3b] ἐν ποίοις ὁμοίως ἀταρακτῆσαι>

thus, while we are investigating how a Similar [specific phenomenon] among us occurs in several ways – It is necessary to reason into the [essential] causes regarding [such] astronomical phenomena as well as ^[0] everything unclear: while we disregard those who do not acknowledge [the difference between] ^[1a] what exists or is produced in only one way, versus ^[1b] what endures in several ways – while they [also] overlook ^[2] [the fact that] the image [of such astrological phenomena] arises out of the distance [between the phenomena and ourselves] – and also [those who] do not know ^[3a] in which things It is *not* possible to be undisturbed <and ^[3b] in which things similarly [it is possible] to be undisturbed>

[Bailey] So we must carefully consider in how many ways a similar phenomenon is produced on earth, when we reason about the causes of celestial phenomena and all that is imperceptible to the senses; and we must despise those persons who do not recognize either what exists or comes into being in one way only, or that which may occur in several ways in the case of things which can only be seen by us from a distance, and further are not aware under what conditions it is impossible to have peace of mind.

παραβάλλειν	to compare	ΠΑΡΑΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing in across</i>
ζητεῖν	to seek	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seeking</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
παραθεωρεῖν	to investigate	ΠΑΡΑΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing alongside</i>
ποσαχῶς	in various ways	ΠΟΣΑΧΩΣ <i>how many ways</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
αἰτιολογεῖν	to reason into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>collecting blame</i>
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ <i>rising beyond</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
ἐνδῆλος <i>(ον)</i>	^(θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear within</i>
ἄδῆλος <i>(ον)</i>	⁽⁰⁾ unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΣ
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	^[0] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	concern	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ <i>mind</i>
φρονεῖν	to regard	
καταφρονεῖν <i>+ gen</i>	to disregard	ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ <i>mind down / against</i>
μοναχῶς	in only one way	ΜΟΝΑΧΩΣ <i>one manner</i>
γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ <i>knowing process</i>
γνωστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	known	
ἡ γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	

γνωρίζειν	to acknowledge	ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>causing knowing</i>
πλέων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	more	ΠΛΕΩΝ <i>flowing</i>
πλεοναχῶς	in several ways	
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
συμβαίνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	enduring [with its compound]	
τὸ συμβαῖνον τὰ συμβαίνοντα	what endures	
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing together</i>
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing away</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασῖαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ιδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	ΙΔΕΙΝ <i>saw</i>
παριδεῖν	to overlook [already]	ΠΑΡΙΔΕΙΝ <i>saw across</i>
παριδών <i>(οῦσα, όν)</i>	overlooking [already]	
ὁ παριδών οἱ παριδόντες	those who overlook [already]	
ἀγνοεῖν	to not know	ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ <i>not knowing</i>
ἀγνοῶν <i>(ἀγνοοῦσα, ἀγνοοῦν)</i>	not knowing	
ὁ ἀγνοῶν οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες	those who do not know	
ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ <i>without agitating</i>
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξῖαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ <i>without agitating</i>
[ἀταρακτεῖν]	to be undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΕΙΝ
ἀταρακτῆσαι	to be undisturbed [already]	

When investigating the causes of atmospheric phenomena, we should consider how similar events happen on Earth. We should disregard people who cannot distinguish between events with multiple possible causes and events with only one cause – as we should disregard people who do not appreciate the nuances of viewing objects from a distance – just as we should also disregard people who do not understand what investigations provide a basis for fostering peace of mind.

80c. Accepting Imprecision for Specific Causes

ἂν, οὖν, Οἰώμεθα καὶ ὡδί πως ἐνδεχόμενον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι ^{καὶ ἐν οἷοις ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀταρακτῆσαι} – αὐτὸ τὸ ὅτι πλεοναχῶς γίνεται γνωρίζοντες: ὥσπερ κἂν ὅτι ὡδί πως γίνεται εἵδωμεν, ἀταρακτῆσομεν

therefore, even if We suspect that [a specific phenomenon] is possible to be produced in some particular way ‹and [it is] among the things where it is equally possible to be untroubled› — then when we acknowledge that it is produced in more ways: we will be untroubled, just as if we were to see that it is produced in some particular way

[Hicks] If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way ... out of several, we shall be as tranquil when we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
ὥδι πως	in some particular way	ΩΔΙ ΠΩΣ <i>manner like somehow</i>
ένδεχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>accepting in</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
πλέων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	more	ΠΛΕΩΝ <i>flowing</i>
πλεοναχῶς	in more ways	
γνωρίζειν	to acknowledge	ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>causing knowing</i>
γνωρίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	acknowledging	
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ιδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	ΙΔΕΙΝ <i>saw</i>
[ἀταρακτεῖν]	to be untroubled	ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΕΙΝ
ἀταρακτῆσειν	to be untroubled [in the future]	

We need to accept the reality that there are varied possibilities for causes of a specific phenomenon. If we understand that a phenomenon can happen in multiple ways, and that any of these ways do not cause us fear, we will be just as calm as if we knew the exact cause of a particular phenomenon.
Accepting this uncertainty for specific causes promotes mental well-being just as much as our foundational certainty for essential causes.

81a. The Gods

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις, ὅλως ἅπασιν ἐκεῖνο Δεῖ κατανοεῖν: ὅτι Τάραχος ὁ κυριώτατος ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις ψυχαῖς γίνεται ἐν τῷ ταῦτά τε μακάρια δοξάζειν ‹εἶναι› καὶ ἄφθαρτα – καὶ ὑπεναντίας ἔχειν τούτῳ βουλήσεις ἅμα καὶ πράξεις καὶ αἰτίας

and in addition to these things, It is entirely necessary for all to fully conceive this: that the most essential Disturbance in human souls is produced by [people] judging these [astrological phenomena themselves] to be contented and indestructible – and at the same time [thinking that these astrological phenomena] have intentions, activities, and causes contrary to this

[Bailey] And besides all these matters in general we must grasp this point, that the principal disturbance in the minds of men arises because they think that these celestial bodies are blessed and immortal, and yet have wills and actions and motives inconsistent with these attributes.

νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
ὁ τάραχος οἱ τάραχοι	disturbance	τάραχος <i>agitating</i>

κυριώτατος <i>(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)</i>	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most critical / valid</i>
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
άνθρώπινος <i>(η, ον)</i>	human (adj.)	
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
μακάριος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contented	ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ <i>[greatness]</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	
ἄφθαρτος <i>(ον)</i>	indestructible	ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ <i>not decaying</i>
ὑπεναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contrary	ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>over against</i>
ἡ βούλησις αἱ βουλήσεις	intention	ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ <i>wishing</i>
ἡ πράξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ <i>action</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>

Humans feel the greatest anxiety by not understanding how natural phenomena relate to fundamental questions, such as question regarding the gods – often incorrectly believing that astronomical phenomena are gods, or are signs from gods.

Many people mix up their concepts by incorrectly assigning other thoughts and actions to the gods that contradict their divine natures of total contentedness and indestructibility.

81b. Natural Limits to what is Terrible

καὶ ἐν τῷ ^[1] αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν ἀεὶ προσδοκᾶν ἢ ὑποπεύειν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους – εἴ τε καὶ ^[2] αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὴν ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι φοβουμένους, ὥσπερ οὔσαν κατ’ αὐτούς – καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ δόξαις ταῦτα πάσχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀλόγῳ γέ τι παραστάσει: ὅθεν, μὴ ὀρίζοντας τὸ δεινὸν – τὴν ἴσῃν ἢ καὶ ἐπιτεταμένην ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν τῷ εἰκαίως δοξάζοντι ταῦτα

and [the most essential Disturbance in human souls is produced] in always expecting or being concerned by ^[1] some perpetual terrible thing according to the myths – even if they also fear ^[2] the very lack of sensation in having died, as if [sensation] existed for them [when dead] – and by [them] experiencing these things not through judgement, but rather through a certain unreasoning substitution: therefore, because they do not set a limit to what is terrible – they acquire the same or even more extended trouble [compared] to someone who is randomly judging these things

[Bailey] and because they are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends – or even fear the loss of feeling in death as though it would concern them themselves – and, again, because they are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational **representation** (and therefore, as they do not know the limits of pain – they suffer a disturbance equally great or even more extensive than if they had reached this belief by opinion.

αἰώνιος <i>(αἰωνιᾶ, αἰώνιον)</i>	perpetual <i>(moving, multiple)</i>	ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ <i>characterized by being forever</i>
δεινός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	terrible	ΔΕΙΝΟΣ <i>terrifying</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
προσδοκᾶν	to expect	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΑΝ <i>seeming</i>

ὑποπτεύειν	to be concerned [by]	ὕΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ <i>looking</i> <i>[suspiciously]</i> <i>under</i>
ὁ μῦθος οἱ μῦθοι	myth	ΜΥΘΟΣ <i>speech / word</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i>
ἡ ἀναισθησία αἱ ἀναισθησίαι	lack of sensation	ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΑ
θνήσκειν	to die	ΘΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ <i>dying</i>
τεθνάναι	to have died ^[already]	ΤΕΘΝΑΝΑΙ <i>died</i>
φοβεῖν	to fear	ΦΟΒΕΙΝ <i>fleeing</i>
φοβούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	fearing	ΦΟΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ἄλογος <i>(ον)</i>	unreasoning	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i> <i>together</i>
ἡ ἀποκατάστασις αἱ ἀποκαταστάσεις	reestablishment	ΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>placed</i> <i>thoroughly back</i>
ἡ παράστασις αἱ παραστάσεις	"substitution"	ΠΑΡΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>placed next to</i>
ὀρίζειν	to set a limit	ὈΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
ὀρίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	setting a limit	
δεινός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	terrible	ΔΕΙΝΟΣ <i>terrifying</i>
τὸ δεινόν τὰ δεινά	what is terrible	
ἴσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	equal	ΙΣΟΣ <i>equal</i>
τείνειν	to extend	ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extending</i>
ἐπιτεταμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	[more] extended	ΕΠΙΤΕΤΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>toward stretched</i>
ὁ τάραχος = ἡ ταραχή	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>agitating</i>
λαμβάνειν	^[intellectually] to comprehend, ^[generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
εἰκαῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	random	ΕΙΚΑΙΟΣ <i>haphazardly</i>
εἰκαίως	randomly	
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
δοξαστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	able to be judged	ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΣ <i>seeming</i>
δοξάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	judging	ΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ

Great anxiety is caused by [1] the fear of an eternally terrible existence (as some religions and myths predict) and [2] the fear of nonexistence. These fears arise from irrational and conflicting beliefs rather than reasoned understanding – but looking into such topics without a conviction in *essential causes* may result in more anxiety than never looking into the causes and explanations of astronomical phenomena at all.

82a. Tranquility Grounded in Essentials

ἡ δὲ Ἀταραξία ^[1] τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῇ μνήμην ἔχειν ^[2a] τῶν ὅλων καὶ ^[2b] κυριωτάτων

Undisturbedness is ^[1] being released away from all those [fears of unending terrible experiences] and having a continuous memory ^[2a] of the whole and ^[2b] of most essential things

^[Yonge] And the real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being emancipated from all these things, and in preserving the recollection of all the principles which we have established, especially of the most essential of them.

^[Bailey] But peace of mind is being delivered from all this, and having a constant memory of the general and most essential principles.

ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ <i>without agitating</i>
λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve</i>
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>fully dissolve</i>
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve away</i>
ἀπολελύσθαι	to have been released away	ΑΠΟΛΕΛΥΣΘΑΙ <i>dissolved away</i>
συνεχῆς (ές)	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
κυριώτατος (κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most critical / valid</i>

Mental tranquillity comes from being free from such fears as endless suffering and ceasing to exist (as well as being from the need to explain *specific explanations* for *specific causes*) – through always being mindful of our *essential explanations* of the general operation of the entire universe as a whole as well as through our general understanding of the universe's fundamental *essential causes*.

82b. Adhering to Sensations

ὄθεν, ^[Γ] τοῖς πάθεσι Προσεκτέον τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ ^[Α] ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι – κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς κοιναῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ταῖς ἰδίαις – καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παρουσίᾳ καθ’ ἕκαστον ^[Κ] τῶν κριτηρίων ^[Ε] ἐναργείᾳ, ἂν γὰρ τούτοις Προσέχωμεν: τὸ ὅθεν ὁ τάραχος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐγένετο Ἐξαιτιολογήσομεν ὀρθῶς – καὶ Ἀπολύσομεν (ὑπέρ τε μετεώρων αἰτιολογοῦντες καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἀεὶ παρεμπιπτόντων) ὅσα φοβεῖ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐσχάτως

therefore, It is necessary to pay attention ^[Γ] to the experiences that are present and ^[Α] to the sensations – [paying attention] to general [experiences and sensations] for general [causes], and to [our] particular [experiences and sensations] for [our] particular [causes] – indeed [it is necessary to pay attention] to all present ^[Ε] detectible reality according to each ^[Κ] of the standards, for if We pay attention to these: We will fully reason correctly into the causes from where disturbance and fear were being produced – and (by us reasoning into the causes concerning astronomical phenomena and the remaining things that are always creeping in) We will release away whatever extremely frightens the rest [of the public]

therefore, it is necessary to pay attention ^[N] to the experiences that are present and ^[A] to the sensations – to general for the general, and to the particular for the particular – and indeed to all present ^[E] detectible reality according to each ^[K] of the standards, for if We pay attention to these: We will fully reason correctly into the causes from where disturbance and fear were being produced – and (by us reasoning into the causes concerning astronomical phenomena and the remaining things that are always creeping in) We will release away whatever extremely frightens the rest

[Bailey] Wherefore we must pay attention to internal feelings and to external sensations in general and in particular, according as the subject is general or particular, and to every immediate intuition in accordance with each of the standards of judgment. For if we pay attention to these, we shall rightly trace the causes whence arose our mental disturbance and fear, and, by learning the true causes of celestial phenomena and all other occurrences that come to pass from time to time, we shall free ourselves from all which produces the utmost fear in other men.

τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[N] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly holding</i>
μετέχειν	to partake	ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold among</i>
προσέχειν	to pay attention	ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold towards</i>
παρών <i>(παρουσα, παρόν)</i>	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ <i>to be beside</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from common</i>
κοινῶς	generally	
κοινός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	general	
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
ἐναργής <i>(ές)</i>	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	^[E] detectible fact	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of being within clear</i>
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ὅθεν	where from	
ὁ τάραχος οἱ τάραχοι	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>agitating</i>
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
φοβεῖν	to fear	ΦΟΒΕΙΝ <i>fleeing</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
αἰτιολογεῖν	^{Δ} to reason into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>collecting blame</i>

αἰτιολογῶν	reasoning into the [essential] causes	
ἐξαιτιολογεῖν	^{Δ} to fully reason into the [essential] causes	ΕΞΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>fully collecting blame</i>
ἐξαιτιολογήσειν	^{Δ} to fully reason into the [essential] causes [in the future]	ΕΞΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΕΙΝ <i>will be fully collecting blame</i>
ὀρθῶς	^{α} correctly	ΟΡΘΩΣ <i>straight upright</i>
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve away</i>
ἀπολελύσθαι	to have been released away	ΑΠΟΛΕΛΥΘΑΙ <i>dissolved away</i>
ἀπολύσειν	to release away [in the future]	ΑΠΟΛΥΣΕΙΝ <i>will dissolve away</i>
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ <i>rising beyond</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
ἐμπίπτειν	to fall in	ΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling in</i>
παρεμπίπτειν	to creep in	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling in beside</i>
παρεμπίπτων	creeping in	
ἔσχατος <i>(έσχάτη, έσχατον)</i>	extreme	ΕΣΧΑΤΟΣ <i>last</i>
ἐσχάτως	extremely	

We must pay close attention to our ^[Γ]feelings and ^[Α]sense perceptions – both general and individual – and consider all ^[Ε]clear evidence from our ^[Κ]standards of truth. By doing this, we can ^{α}correctly ^{Δ}identify and eliminate the causes of disturbance and fear, understand celestial phenomena, and free ourselves from the fears that trouble most people.

CANON

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82c. Goodbye Heródotos

Ταῦτά, σοι ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἔστι κεφαλαιωδέστατα ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως: ἐπιτετμημένα – ὥστ’ ἐὰν γένηται δυνατός ὁ Λόγος οὗτος κατασχεθεῖς μετ’ ἀκριβείας

These things are, for you Heródotos, the most pivotal concerning the nature of the whole: although they are cut short – so that this Reasoning is made able to be firmly maintained with precision

[Bailey] Here, Heródotos, is my treatise on the chief points concerning the nature of the general principles, abridged so that my account would be easy to grasp with accuracy.

κεφαλαιώδης	pivotal	ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΔΗΣ <i>quality of being head-like</i>
κεφαλαιωδέστατος	most pivotal	ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΩΔΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most related to head-like</i>
τὸ κεφαλαιωδέστατον τὰ κεφαλαιωδέστατα	what is most pivotal	
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>

ἐπιτέμνειν	to cut short	ΕΠΙΤΕΜΝΕΙΝ <i>cutting upon</i>
ἐπιτετμημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	cut short	
τὸ ἐπιτετμημένον τὰ ἐπιτετμημένα	what has been cut short	
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>came into being</i>
δυνατός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>power</i>
γενέσθαι δυνατός	to be made able [already]	
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly holding</i>
κατασχεθῆναι	to be firmly maintained [already]	ΚΑΤΑΣΧΕΘΗΝΑΙ <i>thoroughly held</i>
κατασχεθείς <i>[εἶσα, έν]</i>	firmly maintained [already]	
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ <i>state of pointed</i>

83a. Clear View

Οἶμαι, ἐάν μὴ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα βαδίσῃ Τίς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβωμάτων – ἀσύμβλητον αὐτὸν πρὸς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀδρότητα Λήψεσθαι: καὶ γὰρ καὶ καθαρὰ ἀφ’ ἐαυτοῦ Ποιήσῃ πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐξακριβουμένων (κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πραγματείαν ἡμῖν) – καὶ αὐτὰ Ταῦτα, ἐν μνήμῃ τιθέμενα, συνεχῶς βοηθήσει

I suspect, even if Someone is not proceeding towards all these [most pivotal topics] through the precise details according to each part – He will [nevertheless] acquire unmatched fullness in comparison to the rest of humanity: for indeed He will also by himself make many of the fully precise details clear according to each part (in accordance with our whole effort) – and these [Topics] themselves, when they are placed in memory, will continuously provide support

[Bailey] I think that, even if one were unable to proceed to all the detailed particulars of the system, he would from this obtain an unrivaled strength compared with other men. For indeed he will clear up for himself many of the detailed points by reference to our general system, and these very principles, if he stores them in his mind, will constantly aid him.

οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ <i>walking</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ <i>state of pointed</i>
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα τὰ ἀκριβώματα	precise detail	ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ <i>result of pointed</i>
ἐξακριβούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	[made] fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>fully pointed</i>
τὸ ἐξακριβωθέν τὰ ἐξακριβωθέντα	fully precise detail	

ἀσύμβλητος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	unmatched	ΑΣΥΜΒΛΗΤΟΣ <i>not thrown in together</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
ό άνθρωπος οι άνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
ή αδρότης αι αδρότητες	fullness	ΑΔΡΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from fullness</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λήψεσθαι	to be acquired	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ <i>will grasp</i>
καθαρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	clear	ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ <i>cleaning</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ποιήσειν	going to make	
τò πράγμα τά πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ή πραγματεία αι πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ <i>state of doing / affair</i>
ή μνήμη αι μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
βοηθεῖν	to provide support	ΒΟΗΘΕΙΝ <i>helping</i>
βοηθήσειν	going to provide support	

Even if someone is not exploring every exact detail relating to the topics mentioned in this letter – just by keeping the general ideas above in mind, one nevertheless can understand these topics better than most people. Although Epicurus explained these ideas more fully in his books, students can also figure out many further details on their own just from the basis of this letter.

83b. Comprehensive Insight

τοιαῦτα γάρ Ἔστιν, ὥστε καί τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἤδη ἐξακριβοῦντας ἱκανῶς ἢ καὶ τελείως· εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀναλύοντας ἐπιβολάς τὰς πλείστας τῶν περιοδειῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ποιεῖσθαι – Ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἰσὶν· ἐκ τούτων καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄνευ φθόγγων τρόπον – τὴν, ἅμα νοήματι, περίοδον τῶν κυριωτάτων πρὸς γαληνισμόν ποιοῦνται

for these [Topics] are like this, that even those who are already sufficiently or even completely making each part fully precise: in such resolving attentions, they make for themselves many full-courses into the whole of nature – but Those who are not absolutely completely among those who are fully completed: from these things and in this way without [verbal] expressions – they make for themselves, along with [their] conception, the full-courses of what is most essential in regards to pacification

for these [most pivotal topics] are such, that even those [students] who are already sufficiently or even completely making each part fully precise: in such resolving attentions [i.e., by their problem-solving focus on these topics], they make for themselves more full-courses into the whole of nature – but Those [students] who are not absolutely completely among those who are fully produced [as a mature student]: from these things [that are covered in this letter] and in this way without [verbal] expressions [i.e., through personal reading and not through lectures] – they [still] make for themselves, along with [their] conception, the [completion of] full-courses of what is most essential in regards to pacification

[Bailey] For such is their character that even those who are at present engaged in working out the details to a considerable degree, or even completely, will be able to carry out the greater part of their investigations into the nature of the whole by conducting their analysis in reference to such a survey as this. And as for all who are not fully among those on the way to being perfected, ~~some of them~~ can from this summary obtain a hasty view of the most important matters without oral instruction so as to secure peace of mind.

τὸ τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα	what is like this <i>(such a thing)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ <i>this of this sort</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ἡ ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ <i>state of pointed</i>
ἐξακριβοῦν	to make fully precise	ΕΞΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ <i>fully pointed</i>
ἐξακριβῶν <i>(ῶσα, οῦν)</i>	making fully precise	
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ <i>goal</i>
τελείως	completely	
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ <i>all completing</i>
τελεῖν	to complete	
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>[turning, completing] away</i>
ἀποτελούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being fully produced	
ὁ ἀποτελούμενος οἱ ἀποτελούμενοι	he who is fully completed	
λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve</i>
διαλύειν	to fully dissolve	ΔΙΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>fully dissolve</i>
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve away</i>
ἀναλύειν	to resolve	ΑΝΑΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve again</i>
ἀναλύων	resolving	
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
πλείων <i>(ον)</i>	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
ἡ ὁδός αἱ ὁδοί	course	ΟΔΟΣ <i>road</i>
ἡ περιοδεία αἱ περιοδεῖαι	^[making] a full course	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΕΙΑ <i>process around the path</i>
ἡ περίοδος αἱ περίοδοι	^[the completion of] a full course, ^[of time] period	ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΣ <i>result around the path</i>
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	^[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>uttering</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
κυριώτατος <i>(κυριωτάτη, κυριώτατον)</i>	most essential	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most critical / valid</i>

τὸ κυριώτατον τὰ κυριώτατα	what is most essential	
ἐγγαληνίζειν	to pacify oneself	ΕΓΓΑΛΗΝΙΖΕΙΝ <i>causing stillness within</i>
ἡ γαλήνη αἱ γαληναί	peace	ΓΑΛΗΝΗ <i>stillness [of the sea]</i>
ὁ γαληνισμός οἱ γαληνισμοί	pacification	ΓΑΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of stillness [of the sea]</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>

Our tranquility is supported upon the confident foundation that is our understanding of the fundamental realities of nature. The principles of these fundamental truths, which are contained in this letter, are useful for everyone: those who are already well-versed in the details can use this survey of the principles to review their understanding of physical science – while those less experienced can quickly grasp the main ideas in this survey to form this foundation of peace of mind for themselves.

The topics of natural science in this letter are so crucial that even those who are already very precise (or even completely accurate) in every necessary detail still use their problem-solving focus to make many full journeys into the entire universe using their understanding of the fundamental realities of nature. However, even those who are not fully complete in their studies can still make the same journey – through personal reading (rather than group lectures).

Through these readings – and through our understanding of these readings – we can achieve the confidence and security that is the foundation for peace of mind.

ESSENTIAL JUDGMENTS

Κύρια Δόξαι

ΚΔ 1. Contentment & Autonomy

τὸ Μακάριον καὶ Ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει – οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει:
ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται, ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον

* being Content and Indestructible is itself neither holding onto affairs – nor pouring [affairs] onto another: and therefore it is not wrapped up in moods or favors, because every thing like that is in [a state of] weakness

x	v v v	x

Whatever fits our conception of being content and indestructible must have the nature of something that cannot add any improvement to its fully content and totally independent nature.

A happy and immortal being has no problems and does not cause problems for others – it is not affected by anger or gratitude because those feelings come from weakness. Any being that feels anger or obligation is not fit to be labeled a god.

Seneca, Ἀποκολοκύντῳσις Divi Claudii, 8

Ἐπικούρειος Θεὸς non potest esse: οὔτε Αὐτὸς πράγμα ἔχει τι – οὔτε ἄλλοις παρέχει

an Epicurean God he cannot be: for He himself neither holds onto any situation nor pours [a situation] onto others

τὸ πράγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ doing / affair
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Seneca partially preserves an alternative version of this Κύρια Δόξα, while speaking mockingly of Claudius.

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.48

ómnis énim per sē dívum Nātúra necésest

indeed, it must be by its own ability that the entire Nature of the gods

immortálĭ ávnō súmmā cum páce fruátur

enjoys unending time with the greatest peace,

sēmót^a ab nóstrīs rébus sēiúnc^taque lóngē;

removed from our issues and far separated

nam, prīvāta dolór^e ómnĭ, prīvāta perícĭlis,

for, deprived from all pain, deprived from risks,

ípsa súis póllēns ópibus, níhil índiga nóstrī,

itself powerful in its own resources, wanting nothing from us,

nec béne prōméritīs cápitur nec tángitur írā

it is neither agreeably captured by good deeds, nor touched by anger

* Philodemus, On The Gods, Book 3, P.Herc. 26, fr. 87

* ...ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῶν ἀσθενῶν καὶ προσδεομένων πρὸς τὰ χρειώδη τῆς φιλίας...

...but certainly indeed for us, who have weakness and have further need also for the necessary things of friendship...

Regarding imperfection, Philódēmos directly connects human weakness with our need for friendship. While discussing the importance of mutual friendship (ἡ συμφυλία) he says that generosity is necessary.

ΚΔ 2. The Limit of Life

ὁ Θάνατος οὐδέν πρὸς ἡμᾶς – τὸ γὰρ Διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ – τὸ δ’ Ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδέν πρὸς ἡμᾶς

* Death is nothing to us – because the Dissolved is insensible – and the Insensible is nothing to us

x	v v v	x

x

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 3.830

nīl ἰγίτur Mors est ad nos néque pértinet ἥlulm

therefore Death is nothing to us and it does not pertain to us at all

Cicero, De Finibus 2.100

Mortem nihil ad nos pertinere: Quod enim dissolutum sit – Id esse sine sensu. Quod, autem, sine sensu sit – Id nihil ad nos pertinere omnino

Death in no way concerns us: What has been dissolved – That is without sensation. What, however, is without sensation – That pertains to us in no way at all

ΚΔ 3. The Limit of Pleasure

ὄρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος Ὑπεξαίρεσις: ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ Ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ – καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾗ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ Ἀλγοῦν ἢ Λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ Συναμφότερον

* the limit of the amount of pleasures is the Removal of all pain: wherever the Pleasing is present – during that time it exists, there is neither the Painful or the Distressing or Both together.

x	v v v	x

Epíkouros is, in part, responding to the teachings of the Cyrenaics, who viewed the removal of pain as a state of calm to which pleasure could then be added. Epíkouros is also responding to Plato who argued for the existence of mixed pleasures (μικταὶ ἡδοναί) – which Plato imagined contained an aspect of pain. However, in reality, pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive at any particular point in the body.

It is common for people to consider the elimination of pain as the onset of pleasure. In fact, the absence of pain, and the resulting state of painlessness, is precisely what constitutes pleasure. Full physical contentment is often and naturally achieved through our body's internal processes when we have the necessary provisions of food and shelter. Similarly, full mental contentment can be attained just as naturally and frequently by recognizing the ease with which physical contentment can be obtained and by cultivating gratitude for this success.

Mētródoros, quoted by Plutarch, Non Posse 1091 A

Τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ· τὸ Φυγεῖν τὸ κακὸν – ἔνθα γὰρ τεθήσεται τἀγαθόν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅταν Μηθὲν ἔτι ὑπεξίῃ μήτε ἀλγεινὸν μήτε λυπηρόν

This very thing is the good: Escaping the bad – because it is not possible for the good to be placed anywhere, when Nothing further painful or distressing is withdrawing.

ΚΔ 4. The Limit of Pain

οὐ χρονίζει τὸ Ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί – ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμβαίνει, αἱ δὲ Πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἥπερ τὸ ἀλγοῦν

* the Painful does not last continuously in the body – but that which is extreme lasts for the shortest time, and that which merely exceeds pleasure in the body does not occur for many days, and the Chronic symptoms of illnesses have the pleasing in the body exceeding over the painful

x	v v v	x

The significance of pain in life is often overestimated. Our body's sensory areas generally experience natural pleasure when free from disturbance. While of course not mutually exclusive within the entire body – pain and pleasure are mutually exclusive at any specific point in the body. While some parts of the body may experience pain, other parts may simultaneously experience pleasure.

ΚΔ 5. Practical Virtues

οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως Ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως· ὅτω δὲ Τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐχ ἔστι Τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν

* Living pleasantly is not possible without living sensibly and honorably and balanced, nor sensibly and honorably and balanced without living pleasantly: when This is not happening for someone, it is not possible that He is living pleasantly

x	v v v	x

The manuscripts have the second instance of φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως moved towards the end of the sentence. Most editors keep this as a third instance of φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως and also add it back to its original position in brackets.

ΚΔ 6 Self-Defense

ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων· Ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ὧν ἂν ποτε τοῦθ' Οἷός τ' ἦ παρασκευάζεσθαι

* for the sake of security from men: [Anything] is [able to be] according to nature a good by which at any time Anyone may be able to arrange for themselves this [security]

x	v v v	x

Any means of obtaining protection is a natural good.

ΚΔ 7. Respect & Popularity

ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί Τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι – **τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω** νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι, ὥστε, εἰ μὲν **ἀσφαλὴς** ὁ τῶν τοιούτων Βίος: ἀπέλαβον **τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν** – εἰ δὲ **μὴ ἀσφαλὴς**: οὐκ ἔχουσιν **οὐ ἔνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς**, κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον, ὠρέχθησαν

✱ Some wanted to become **respected** and **popular** – thinking to preserve for themselves **safety from men in this way**, so that, if the Life of such people is **safe**: they receive **the good of nature** – but if it is **not safe**: they do not possess [that] **for the sake of which** they craved **from the start**, **according to what is naturally comfortable**

x	v v v	x

Wealth benefits only as much as it can be used to provide natural and necessary resources. Having wealth harms mental and bodily health to the extent that gaining or having wealth causes one to be exposed to stress and dangers. Similarly, power benefits only as much as it can be used to provide security. Having power harms mental and personal health to the extent that gaining or having power causes one to be exposed to stress and dangers.

ΚΔ 8. Practical Consequences

οὐδεμία Ἡδονὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν – ἀλλὰ τὰ **τινῶν ἡδονῶν** Ποιητικὰ **πολλαπλασίους** ἐπιφέρει **τὰς οχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν**

✱ no Pleasure **in itself** is **bad** – but the Sources **of some pleasures** bring **many more troubles than pleasures**

x	v v v	x

x

ΚΔ 9. Variance of Pleasures

εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα Ἡδονὴ καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν (ἢ **τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως**) – οὐκ ἂν ποτε διέφερον **ἀλλήλων** αἱ Ἡδοναί

✱ If every Pleasure was fully condensed both **in time** and existed **in the whole organism** (or **in the most important parts of its nature**) – then Pleasures would never differ **from one another**

x	v v v	x

*Another argument using negative assumptions, showing that the opposite is true. This statement is in part a response to the view of the **Cyrenaics** – a general grouping of philosophers following **Arístippos** ("**the best-horse**") of **Kyrénē** (an ancient city in what is now **Libya**). **Arístippos**, who himself was originally a follower of Socrates, thought that (1) pleasures do not differ from one another, (2) one pleasure is not more or less pleasant than another, and (3) any particular pleasure is momentary, unable to be prolonged. This incorrect understanding leads to **indiscrimination in choosing pleasures**.
In reality, even though pleasure cannot be increased beyond the absence of pain, pleasures are variable in duration (from momentary to continuous) and location (affecting different parts of the body, including the mind) and have different qualities. Therefore, discrimination is required in choosing pleasures.*

ΚΔ 10. Practical Benefits

εἰ τὰ Ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας – τοὺς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων – ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων ἐδίδασκεν: οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἶχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν – καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν

* if the Sources of pleasures among degenerates released the fears of the mind – those about the heavens and death and pains – further if they taught the limit of desires and of pains: then we would never have had any thing we would hold against them, filling themselves from all places with pleasures – and they would not have what pains or what saddens from any place, the very thing which is the bad

x	v v v	x

x

ΚΔ 11. The Reason for Study

εἰ μὴθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων Ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν – καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου (μήποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἦ τι) – ἔτι τε τὸ Μὴ Κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν: οὐκ ἄν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας

* if in no way Suspicions of heavenly occurrences disturbed us – and those regarding death (although it would never be anything to us) – and Not Understanding the limits of pains and of desires: then we would not be in need of physics

x	v v v	x

x

ΚΔ 12. The Benefit of Study

οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον Λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἢ τοῦ σύμπαντος Φύσις – ἀλλ’ ὑποπτεύοντά τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους: ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς Ἀπολαμβάνειν

* Dispelling what causes fear about the most important issues was not possible while not understanding what the Nature of the universe is – but suspecting some of those things according to the myths: therefore, Receiving undiluted pleasures is not possible without physics

[Saint-Andre] It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural.

[Bailey] A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

x	v v v	x

Epikouros emphasizes that a fundamental understanding of how the universe operates is essential to avoid living in uncertainty and fear.

ΚΔ 13. Mental Security

οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν Παρασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστῶτων – καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς – καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

✱ Preparing for oneself safety from people was in no way beneficial while the things above us are feared – and the things under the earth – and in general, the things in the infinite

[Bailey] There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above, and things beneath the earth, and indeed all in the boundless universe, remain matters of suspicion.

x	vvv	x

We get nothing by getting protection from others if we still fear the general operations of the universe. The things above (τὰ ἄνωθεν) and things under the earth (τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς) are all things in our cosmos (κόσμος) that are difficult for us to closely observe and study, whereas the things in the infinite (τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ) are the things in other cosmoi (κόσμοι) and in the spaces between (οἱ κόσμοι).

ΚΔ 14. Personal Security

τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ – εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν Ἀσφάλεια

✱ although security from other people to some extent comes from agency, resistance, and skill – the purest is the Security that comes out of tranquility and withdrawal from the many

[Bailey] The most unalloyed source of protection from men, which is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life, and retirement from the world.

x	vvv	x

ΚΔ 15. The Limit of Needs

ὁ τῆς φύσεως Πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν – ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει

✱ the Wealth of nature is limited and easy to acquire – but that of empty judgments falls ad infinitum

[Bailey] The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity.

x	vvv	x

To achieve complete and full satisfaction, our nature only requires a finite and specific set of accommodations. The needs of our bodies and minds are limited and easily attainable, but the requirements to satisfy desires not grounded in nature have no inherent limits.

Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος	The wealth of nature
Ὁ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν πλοῦτος	The wealth of empty judgements

ΚΔ 16. The Limit of Chance

βραχέα σοφῷ Τύχη παρεμπίπτει: τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ Λογισμὸς διώκηκε – καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικῆσει.

* Chance falls upon the wise man briefly: for Reasoning has managed the greatest and most critical things – and for the whole time of life manages and will manage

[Bailey] In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

x	v v v	x

ΚΔ 17. Social & Personal Wellbeing

ὁ Δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος – ὁ δ’ Ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γήμων

* the Equitable person is the most undisturbed – but the Inequitable is filled with the greatest disruption

x	v v v	x

ΚΔ 18. Practical Satisfaction

οὐκ ἀπαύξετι ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ Ἥδονή ἐπειδὴν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ’ ἔνδειαν Ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ – ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται: τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἢ τε (τούτων αὐτῶν) Ἐκλόγισις καὶ (τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις) ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ

* Pleasure is not increased in the body as soon as what Hurts due to deficiency is removed – but only varies: and the mind's limit in regards to pleasure is fully produced by an Examination (of these issues and of things similar to them which used to arrange the greatest fears for the mind)

x	v v v	x

Wealth can only vary the means by which we can achieve the very same natural pleasure that a non-wealthy life achieves. It a common misconception to think that wealth and luxury increase pleasure. Wealth does not increase pleasure. The point where the amount of pleasure is at its maximum in the body is the painless state reached by removing the pains of natural and necessary needs. Attempts to increase pleasure beyond this maximum point will always fail, and will often involve the introduction of unnecessary pain and troubles.

ἢ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγισις	the rational examination of these things
The study of the pains arising from the limited natural needs of our body and the corresponding complete pleasures after these needs are met	

ΚΔ 19. Fulfillment of Time

ὁ ἄπειρος Χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος – ἐάν Τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ

* infinite Time has the same pleasure as finite – if One measures its limits by reasoning

x	v v v	x

Because no pleasure is greater than the absence of bodily and mental pain, complete pleasure is attained by our natural state when not in pain. More time cannot produce a greater pleasure than this complete pleasure.

ΚΔ 20. The Experience of Time

ή μὲν Σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν Χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν – ἡ δὲ Διάνοια, τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα: τὸν παντελεῖ βίον παρεσκεύασε, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη – ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐδ’ (ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγήν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν) ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεψεν

* the Body takes the limit of pleasure as infinite, and the Time as infinite that arranges for it – but the Mind, grasping the full reasoning of the body's fulfillment and limit, and dispelling the fears about eternity: arranges for the complete life, and in no way do we still have further need of infinite time – yet it does not flee pleasure, nor (when circumstances begin to produce the departure from life) does it come to its end as though it were missing something of the best life

x	v v v	x

The complete pleasure of being pain free has been frequently achieved throughout our lives, and having a longer life does not allow us to increase the complete pleasure that we have already experienced. Understanding this, we are pleased to continue living our full and complete life. But because our life is full and complete, we understand that continuing to live cannot improve our lives.

ΚΔ 21. Competition

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου Κατειδῶς οἶδεν ὥς: εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν Ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελεῖ Καθιστάν – ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων

* the Observer of the limits of life knows: what Removes pain due to need and Makes [our] whole life complete is easy to get – so that he has no further need of things that produce conflicts

x	v v v	x

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου Κατειδῶς	He who knows life's limits well
τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἐνδειαν Ἐξαιροῦν	What removes pain due to need

As long as we are not in an environment hostile to human life, we do not need to engage in competitive struggles against other men in order gain all our natural needs.

ΚΔ 22. Managing Evidence

τὸ ὑφেষτηκὸς δεῖ τέλος Ἐπιλογίζεσθαι – καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν (ἐφ’ ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν) – εἰ δὲ μὴ, Πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστά

* Reasoning fully about the complete fulfilment is necessary – and about all detectible reality (to which we refer the things that judged) – otherwise, Everything will be full of bad judgment and disruption

x	v v v	x
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ within clear

τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς τέλος Ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	To rationally consider the fundamental goal
πᾶσα ἡ Ἐνάργεια (ἐφ’ ἣν τὰ Δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν)	All perceivable reality (to which we refer the things that are believed)

Epíkouros transitions from ethics to epistemology in this κύρια δόξα. Unless our conclusions (τὰ δοξαζόμενα) are tested in reference to external sensations (αἰσθήσεις) and internal sensations (τὰ πάθη) we will go about our lives with added opinions (προσδοξαζόμενα) that do not correspond to reality.

ΚΔ 23. Doubting All Sensations

εἰ Μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν: οὐχ’Ἐξεις οὐδ’ (ἄς ἂν Φῆς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι)
πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀγωγὴν Κρίνης

- * if You contend against all sensations: You will have nothing (which You could say fully disprove themselves) while bringing up a reference to something You could judge
- * if You contend against all sensations: You will have nothing which You could judge while bringing up a reference to something (which you could say fully disprove themselves)
- [Saint-Andre] If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you declare to be false.
- [Bailey] If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.

x	v v v	x

To address the extreme position of some skeptics that all sensations are untrustworthy, Epíkouros argues that if one rejects all sensations, there is no other standard of judgment to rely on. He contends that any skeptic who claims to use logic as a standard for judgment fails to recognize that the relationship between their logic and reality is inherently based on their own observations.

ΚΔ 24. Judging Sensations

εἰ τιν’Ἐκβαλεῖς ἀπλῶς αἴσθησιν (καὶ μὴ Διαιρήσεις ^[Δ]τὸ δοξαζόμενον ^[Ο]κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ ^[Θ]τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ ^[Α]τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ ^[Γ]τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν ^[Β’δ’]φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας) συνταράξεις καὶ ^[Α]τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε ^[Κ]τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν’Ἐκβαλεῖς

- * if You will simply reject any one sensation (and You will not separate ^[Δ]a theory ^[Ο]about what is still pending versus ^[Θ]what is actually present according to ^[Α]sensation, ^[Γ]experiences, and the whole ^[Β’δ’]visual focus of the mind) then you will also disturb ^[Α]the remaining sensations with empty thought, so that You will throw out ^[Κ]all the criteria

εἰ δὲ Βεβαιώσεις καὶ ^[Ο]τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ ^[Ο]τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν: οὐκ’Ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον – ὡς τετηρηκῶς’Ἐση πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς

also, if You accept ^[O] all that is still pending [attestation] in concepts to be judged along with ^[O] what is not [still pending] attestation: You will not avoid error – since You will have guarded all doubt regarding all separation of what is true or not true

[Bailey] If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

x	v v v	x

τὸ Δοξαζόμενον κατὰ	that which is theoretical in regards to, a speculation regarding
τὸ Προσμένον	that which is still pending [confirmation], what what awaits [a proof]
τὸ Προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς Ἑννοίαις	all that which is still pending in theoretical concepts

τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ:	what is actually present according to:	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας	our mental attention	
πᾶσα φανταστική ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας	the whole visual attention of the mind	

ἡ πάσα φανταστική ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας	our complete visual attention of the mind
<i>Because all true thought is based upon impressions from external sources, the use of ‘graphic’ (φανταστική) here is only further explaining the process of mental focus; the whole phrase is therefore equivalent to ‘the focus of the mind’ (ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας) alone, which Lucretius translates (2.740) as ‘a casting of mental energy’ or ‘a throwing out of the attention’ (animī iniectus). The paraphrases animī iniectus and ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας therefore are equivalent to our modern use of ‘attention.’</i>	

We need to distinguish between sensations and ideas. If you do not distinguish between your ideas and your sensations and you reject even one sensation as false, you are rejecting the criteria you have to understand the world because you are confusing your senses with your ideas. Sensations are true per se, but ideas are only true if they accurately reflect our repeated sensations. If we accept any idea as true per se, without demanding any evidence, we have undermined our sensations which are the only foundation we have to accurately understand our environment.

The fact that the tower appears to have rounded edges when viewed from various distances is accurately demonstrated by the senses. The sensation of a round tower is a real sensation. However, after seeing the tower more closely and from other angles, the issue of its shape changes from what is pending confirmation (τὸ προσμένον τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν) to what is not pending confirmation (τὸ μὴ προσμένον τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν).

ΚΔ 25. Remember the Goal

εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν Ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως – ἀλλὰ Προκαταστρέψεις (εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος) εἰς ἄλλο τι: οὐκ ἔσονται σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ Πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι

× if You will not on every occasion refer each of the things you are doing to the goal of your nature – but instead You stop short (when choosing an avoidance or pursuit) at something else: [your] Actions will not be consistent with your understanding

[Bailey] If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.

x	v v v	x

If you stop short and turn to some other goal (τέλος) before considering the goal of nature (τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως). In such a case, the natural goal of bodily comfort and mental calmness is forgotten and is replaced by some other goal that is either natural but not necessary (φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι) or neither natural or necessary (οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖαι).

ΚΔ 26. Unnecessary Desires

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν Ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ' ἄλγοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρῶσιν: οὐκ εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλ' εὐδιάχυτον τὴν ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν (ὅταν δυσπορίστων ἢ βλάβης ἀπεργαστικαὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι)

× However many of the desires that do not lead back to pain if they are not fulfilled: they do not exist as necessary, instead they have a craving that is easy to dismiss (whenever they will be judged to be unattainable or cause harm)

[Bailey] Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

x	v v v	x

ΚΔ 27. Benefit of Friendship

ὧν ἡ Σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας Κτῆσις

× of the things that Wisdom arranges for the contentedness of one's whole life, by far the greatest is the Possession of friendship

[Bailey] Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.

x	v v v	x

ἡ μακαριότης αἱ μακαριότητες	contentedness
ἡ τῆς φιλίας Κτῆσις	the possession of friendship

ΚΔ 28. Security of Friendship

ή αὐτὴ Γνώμη **θαρρεῖν** τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν **αἰώνιον** εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ **πολυχρόνιον**, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὠρισμένοις **ἀσφάλειαν** **φιλίας** **μάλιστα** κατεῖδε **συντελουμένην**

✱ the same Understanding that made [us] **confident** regarding nothing terrible being **eternal** or even **long-lasting**, also sees that **security** regarding those same limited things is **mostly attained by friendships**

[Bailey] The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts for ever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life.

[White] The same insight that made us confident that nothing terrible is either everlasting or long-lasting also noticed security within these boundaries resulting especially in friendship.

x	v v v	x

Our spirit does not survive death and while alive we only require nature's finite list of necessary desires. The ability to maintain access to what satisfies this finite list is more secure while maintaining positive social relationships.

ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὠρισμένοις “those limited things themselves”—referring to what is terrible (**τὸ δεινόν**) which is limited by being neither eternal (**αἰώνιον**) nor even long-lasting (**πολυχρόνιον**) and therefore meaning "in the midst of life's limited evils." In contrast, Cicero understood it as a reference to life in general (which is limited by death).

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.68

"eadem" inquit "Scientia confirmavit **animum ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum**, quae perspexit **in hoc ipso vitae spatio** amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum."

"it is the same Knowledge" [Epikouros] says "that strengthened **the mind so that it did not fear eternal or prolonged evil**, which understood that **within this very span of life**, the support of friendship is the strongest."

ΚΔ 29. Desire Classification

τῶν Ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἱ μὲν εἰσι **φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι** – αἱ δὲ **φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι** – αἱ δὲ **οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι**.

✱ of the Desires, some are **natural and necessary** – some are **natural and not necessary** – and some are **neither natural nor necessary** but **created from empty judgement**

[Saint-Andre] Among desires, some are **natural and necessary** – some are natural and unnecessary, and some are **unnatural and unnecessary**, arising instead from groundless opinion.

x	v v v	x

Φυσικαὶ καὶ Ἀναγκαῖαι	Natural and Necessary
Φυσικαὶ καὶ Οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι	Natural and Not necessary
Οὔτε φυσικαὶ, Οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι	Neither natural, Nor necessary

φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαίᾳς ἡγεῖται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἀπολυούσας (ὥς ποτὸν ἐπὶ δίψους) – φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίᾳς δὲ τὰς ποικιλοῦσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ ὑπεξαίρουμένης δὲ τὸ ἄλγημα (ὥς πολυτελῆ σιτία) – οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ' ἀναγκαίᾳς (ὥς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις)

Epíkouros pointed out that natural and necessary [are] those [desires] which liberate from pain (such as drink for thirst) – natural but not necessary [are] those which merely diversify pleasure without removing pain (such as very expensive foods) – but neither natural nor necessary (such as crowns and the dedication of statues)

ΚΔ 30. Natural & Unnecessary Desires

ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν μὴ ἐπ' ἄλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν ὑπάρχει ἡ Σπουδὴ σύντονος – παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὗται γίνονται – καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν

* when intense Pursuit arises in those natural desires not leading back to pain if not fulfilled – these [desires] arise from empty judgement – and not because of their own nature do they fail to be dispelled, but because of man's empty judgment

[Saint-Andre] Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind.

[Bailey] Wherever, in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination; and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man.

x	v v v	x

Οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν "not due to their own nature" – when we develop intense desires for that which is unnecessary (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι) and also not easy to get (οὐκ εὐπόριστος), we have a problem that arises completely from our thoughts and not from any actual need.

In ΚΔ 26, Epíkouros pointed out that all desires that do not bring pain when unfulfilled, are unnecessary, and in ΚΔ 29, he distinguished between desires that are natural and unnecessary (φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι) versus those that are neither natural nor necessary (οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ' ἀναγκαῖαι). Now he reminds us that it is foolish to pursue even natural desires if they are unnecessary and also difficult to attain.

ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου Κενοδοξία	The groundless-notions of man
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ΚΔ 31. Natural Justice

τὸ τῆς φύσεως Δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι

* the Justice of nature is a mutual agreement of mutual benefit in not harming each other or being harmed

[Bailey] The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

x	v v v	x

ΚΔ 32. Nonaggression Agreements

ὅσα τῶν Ζώων μὴ ἐδύνατο **συνθήκας** ποιεῖσθαι **τὰς** ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν **ἄλληλα** μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι: πρὸς ταῦτα, **οὐθὲν** ἦν **δίκαιον** οὐδὲ **ἄδικον** – **ὥσαύτως** δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἑθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἐδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο **τὰς συνθήκας** ποιεῖσθαι **τὰς** ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι

* all of the Beings not able to compose **agreements** regarding not harming **each other** and not being harmed: for them, **in no way** [is anything able] to be **just** or **unjust** – **in this same situation** also are all of those Races who were not able or did not want to form **agreements** regarding not harming and not being harmed

[Saint-Andre] With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.

[Bailey] For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, or unwilling, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

x	v v v	x

Justice does not exist among animals because they make no mutual agreements. Similarly, justice does not exist among humans who do not establish agreements regarding their interactions. Justice does not exist between tribes that do not maintain a mutual agreement to not harm or be harmed.

ΚΔ 33. Practical Justice

οὐκ ἦν **τι** καθ’ ἑαυτὸ Δικαιοσύνη – ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς μετ’ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ’ **ὀπηλίκους**: **δήποτε** ἀεὶ **τόπους** Συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι

* Justice does not exist **as anything** by itself – but instead **in the** associations **with each other**: **in whatever place** there is ever continually some Agreement **regarding not harming and not being harmed**

[Saint-Andre] Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place.

[Bailey] Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.

x	v v v	x

Justice does not exist per se and is not metaphysical or universal. Rather, it exists only among those who are both able and willing to establish and uphold agreements that serve mutual interests.

ΚΔ 34. Practical Injustice

ἡ Ἀδικία οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν **κακόν** – ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν **φόβῳ** εἰ μὴ Λήσει **τούς** ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων **ἐφεστηκότας** **κολαστάς**.

* Injustice is not **by itself bad** – but **in the fear from** **anxiety** that One will not evade **those appointed as punishers** regarding such things

x	v v v	x

Injustice is not inherently bad; but it is bad due to the fear and anxiety of being caught and punished by those appointed to enforce justice. The true harm of injustice lies in the constant worry about facing retribution.

ΚΔ 35. Consequence of Secrecy

οὐκ ᾿Εστι **τὸν λάθρη τι ποιοῦντα** (**ᾧν** συνέθεντο **πρὸς ἀλλήλους** εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι) **πιστεύειν ὅτι Λήσει** – κᾶν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος **Λαθάνη** – **μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον** εἰ καὶ Λήσει

* It is not possible that **he who secretly does something** (among those things agreed **with each other** for not harming and not being harmed) **to believe that He will evade** [notice] – even if He evades thousands of times up to now – for **until his death** it is **unclear** if He will evade notice

[Saint-Andre] It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.

[Bailey] It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

παρών <i>(παρουσα, παρόν)</i>	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ <i>to be beside</i>
ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος	up to the present	

It is impossible for someone who secretly breaks an agreement not to harm or be harmed to be confident they will avoid detection. Even if they have escaped detection many times, they can never be sure they will not be caught.
This state of anxiety persists until death, so the moral and psychological consequences of breaking such a compact are significant.
The underlying message is that the fear of potential exposure serves as a deterrent to engaging in harmful actions, underscoring the importance of trust and accountability in social agreements.

ΚΔ 36. General Uniformity of Justice

κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινόν, πᾶσι τὸ Δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό: **συμφέρον** γάρ **Τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ** – **κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δήποτε αἰτίων** – **οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ Δίκαιον εἶναι**

* in a general sense, Justice is **the same for everyone**: because Something is **mutually beneficial** in the association with each other – but due to the peculiarity of a region or of whatsoever reasons – Justice happens not to be **the same thing for all**

[Bailey] In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

x	v v v	x

Justice, in general, is the same for everyone because it is based on what is mutually beneficial in our interactions. However, due to specific regional characteristics and various other reasons, what is considered just may differ from one place to another. Consequently, while the general principle of justice aims for mutual benefit and fairness – the actual application of justice varies – in order to accommodate the unique circumstances and needs of different communities.

ΚΔ 37. Pragmatic Justice

τὸ μὲν Ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει (ἐν ταῖς χρεῖαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων) ἔχει τοῦ δικαίου χαρακτῆρα – ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό

* what is Confirmed to be mutually beneficial (among those things considered to be just for the requirements of mutual interaction) has the character of justice – whether it is the same for all or not the same

[Bailey] Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not.

ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῇται τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνει δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας: οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει

then if Someone establishes a law, but it does not result in a mutual benefit of interaction with each other: it no longer has the nature of justice

But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice.

κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον Συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ: οὐδὲν ἦπτον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν – ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν

if the mutual Benefit in regards to justice declines, yet for some time conforms within the preapprehension: nevertheless for that time it was just to those not confusing themselves with empty words – but aware of the circumstances

And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

x	v v v	x

Laws are just when they are beneficial, and they are unjust when they are not beneficial. The same law may be beneficial and just in one place and time, yet not beneficial in another place and time. No ordinance or decree makes a law just, but only the fact that it results in a practical benefit. If a law or action brings mutual benefit, it is just, regardless of uniformity – if it does not bring mutual benefit, it loses its justice. Even if mutual benefit changes over time, as long as it aligns with the general understanding of justice for that period, it remains just to those who focus on practical outcomes.

ΚΔ 38. Contextual Justice

ἐνθα, μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιστάσεων πραγμάτων, ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἀρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων: οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια

* whenever, without surrounding things becoming new, those [laws] considered just in the actions themselves are shown not to fit with the preapprehension: it is not possible that they are just

ἔνθα δὲ, **καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων** – οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ **δίκαια** **κείμενα** – **ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια** (ὅτε σενέφερεν **εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων**), **ὕστερον δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια** (ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν)

but whenever, **with things becoming new** – when the same [laws] established **as just** were no longer be mutually beneficial – **in that case** then they were **just** (when it was mutually beneficial **for the interaction of fellow-citizens with each other**), while **afterwards** it is not possible that they were **still just** (when it was not mutually beneficial)

[Bailey] Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

x	v v v	x

μὴ ἀρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν	not corresponding with the preapprehension
ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων	in the actions themselves, in actual practice, in reality

If circumstances have not changed and actions once thought just no longer fit the basic idea of justice – they are not truly just. If nothing changes and actions no longer seem fair they are not fair.
When circumstances do change – actions that were once beneficial and just can become unjust if they no longer provide mutual benefit. When things change, actions that were once fair can become unfair if they stop helping people.

ΚΔ 39. Relationship Management

Ὅ **τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος**: Οὗτος **τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα** κατεσκευάσατο – **τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ, οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά** – **γε ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο** δυνατὸς ἦν, **ἀνεπίμεικτος** ἐγένετο (**καὶ ἐξηρείσατο ὅσα τοῦτ’ ἐλυσιτέλει πράττειν**)

* He who best manages **the lack of confidence** regarding the outside world: is He who fully arranges **what he can** as familiar – but **what he cannot**, not as foreign – and [for] **however many** he was not even able to do **this**, he makes himself **estranged** (and expels **however many it was beneficial to accomplish this**)

[Saint-Andre] The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that is not advantageous.

[Bailey] The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.

x	v v v	x

τὰ Ὅμόφυλα	things that are similar to us, elements that align with our nature
οἱ Ὅμόφυλοι	people like ourselves, our friends with whom we interact for mutual benefit

οἱ Οὐκ ἀλλόφυλοι	things that are not alien, elements we engage with for our own benefit
οἱ Οὐκ ἀλλόφυλοι	people who are not alien, the general public with whom we interact for our own benefit
τὰ Ἀνεπίμεικτα	things that are estranged, elements that may cause harm and with which we refuse to engage
οἱ Ἀνεπίμεικτοι	people who are estranged, people who may cause us harm and with whom we refuse to interact

He who best handles uncertainty in the outside world is he who strives to make as much of his environment familiar and manageable as possible. For aspects that cannot be controlled, he does not see them as entirely foreign or threatening but accepts them. When there are elements or individuals that he cannot manage at all, he distances himself from them and removes those that are beneficial to expel. This approach helps him maintain a sense of control and security by maximizing familiarity and minimizing the impact of unmanageable external threats.

ΚΔ 40. The Complete Life

”Ὅσοι **τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορρούντων παρασκευάσασθαι** (οὕτω καὶ ἐβίωσαν **μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἥδιστα**) **τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα ἔχοντες** – καὶ **πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες** – οὐκ ὠδύραντο, **ὥς πρὸς ἕλεον, τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφὴν**

✱ all Those possessing **the power of arranging the greatest security from those around** (and so also live **most pleasantly among other**) have **the most consistent assurance** – and because they receive **the fullest familiarity** – they do not mourn, as though **with pity, the prior demise of a deceased friend**

[Saint-Andre] All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away.

[Bailey] As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.

x	v v v	x

Those who are able to create and maintain secure and pleasant relationships with others live more contentedly. They find reassurance and comfort in the familiarity and reliability of their bonds. As a result, they do not experience deep mourning or regret when a friend passes away, because the strength and joy of their relationship provide lasting fulfillment that outweighs the sorrow of loss.

Testimonials Concerning the Books of Epíkouros

Laértios , Lives, 10.26

Diogénēs Laértios (fl. probably around 230 AD) was the compiler of the "Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers" and a poet.

Γέγονε δὲ πολυγραφώτατος ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, πάντας ὑπερβαλλόμενος πλήθει βιβλίων: κύλινδροι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους εἰσί. γέγραπται δὲ μαρτύριον ἔξωθεν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ εἰσὶν Ἐπικούρου φωναί. ἐζήλου δὲ αὐτὸν Χρύσιππος ἐν πολυγραφίᾳ, καθά φησι καὶ Καρνεάδης παράσιτον αὐτὸν τῶν βιβλίων ἀποκαλῶν: εἰ γάρ τι γράψαι ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, φιλονεικεῖ τοσοῦτον γράψαι ὁ Χρύσιππος.

Epíkouros became the most prolific writer, surpassing all in the number of books; for there are indeed about three hundred scrolls. And there is no external testimony written in them, but they are the very words of Epíkouros. Chrysippus envied him in prolific writing, as Carneades also says, calling him a bookish parasite: for if Epíkouros wrote something, Chrysippus contested to write just as much.

Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ πολλάκις ταύτᾱ γέγραφε καὶ τὸ ἐπελθόν, καὶ ἀδιόρθωτα εἶακε τῷ ἐπείγεσθαι: καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὥς ἐκείνων μόνων γέμειν τὰ βιβλία, καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Ζήνωνι ἔστιν εὔρεῖν καὶ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει. καὶ τὰ συγγράμματα μὲν Ἐπικούρῳ τοσαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα, ὧν τὰ βέλτιστά ἐστι τάδε:

And for this reason, he often wrote the same things again and left them uncorrected in his haste: and the testimonies are so numerous that the books seem to be filled with them alone, as can be found with Zénō and Aristotle. And the writings of Epíkouros are so many and of such a kind, of which these are considered the best:

- **Περὶ Φύσεως, ΛΖ** On Nature, in thirty-seven books
- **Περὶ Ἀτόμων Καὶ Κενοῦ** On the Atoms and the Void
- **Περὶ Ἔρωτος** On Love
- **Ἐπιτομή τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς** Summary of Objections to the Physicists
- **Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς** Against the Megarians
- **Διαπορίαι** Uncertainties
- **Κύριαι Δόξαι** Principal Doctrines
- **Περὶ Αἰρέσεων Καὶ Φυγῶν** On Choices and Avoidances
- **Περὶ Τέλους** On the End Goal
- **Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανῶν** On the Criterion, or The Canon
- **Χαιρέδημος** Chairédēmos
- **Περὶ Θεῶν** On the Gods
- **Περὶ Ὁσιότητος** On Holiness
- **Ἥγησιάναξ** Hēgēsíanax
- **Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα** On Lifecourses, in four books
- **Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας** On Fair Dealing
- **Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίстан** Neoklēs, Dedicated to Themísta
- **Συμπόσιον** Symposium
- **Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον** Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros
- **Περὶ τοῦ Ὁραῖν** On Vision
- **Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας** On the Angle of the Atom
- **Περὶ Ἀφῆς** On the Sensation of Touch
- **Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης** On Destiny
- **Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι Πρὸς Τιμοκράτην** On Theories about Feelings
- **Προγνωστικόν** Prognostication
- **Προτρεπτικός** Exhortation to Study Philosophy
- **Περὶ Εἰδώλων** On Films
- **Περὶ Φαντασίας** On Sensory Presentation
- **Ἀριστόβουλος** Aristóbuolos
- **Περὶ Μουσικῆς** On Music
- **Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν** On Justice and Other Virtues
- **Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος** On Gifts and Gratitude
- **Πολυμήδης** Polymédēs
- **Τιμοκράτης γ΄** Timokrátēs, in three books
- **Μητρόδωρος ε΄** Mētródōros, in five books
- **Ἀντίδωρος β΄** Antídōros, in two books
- **Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην** Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs
- **Καλλιστόλας** Kallistólas

- **Περὶ Βασιλείας** On Kingship
- **Ἀναξιμένης** Anaximénēs
- **Ἐπιστολαί** Letters

Πολλὰ δὲ Ζήνων, πλείω Ξενοφάνης, πλείω Δημόκριτος, πλείω Ἀριστοτέλης, πλείω Ἐπίκουρος, πλείω Χρυσίππος.

Many books were written by Zénō, even more by Xenophanes, even more by Dēmókritos, even more by Aristotle, even more by Epíkouros, and even more by Chrysippus.

Laértios 7.181 (Chrysippus)

Καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἐν τῇ Συναγωγῇ τῶν δογμάτων, βουλόμενος παριστάνειν ὅτι τὰ Ἐπικούρου οἰκεία δυνάμει γεγραμμένα καὶ ἀπαράθετα ὄντα μυρίῳ πλείω ἐστὶ τῶν Χρυσίππου βιβλίων, φησὶν οὕτως αὐτῇ τῇ λέξει "εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφέλοι τῶν Χρυσίππου βιβλίων ὅς' ἀλλότρια παρατέθεται, κενὸς αὐτῷ ὁ χάρτης καταλείψεται."

Apollodorus of Athens, in his "Collection of Philosophical Doctrines" wanting to show that the works of Epíkouros (written by his own efforts rather than propped up with citations) were infinitely more numerous than those of Chrysippus, said in the precise terms "Indeed if one were to remove from Chrysippus' books all the citations taken from elsewhere, nothing but a blank page would remain."

Souda (epsilon 2404)

The Souda is a large encyclopedia, probably written in the 900's AD.

Συγγράμματα δ' αὐτοῦ **πλεῖστα**

His writings are the **most numerous**

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 1.20.19

Arrian of Nicomedia (fl. 130 AD) is known for his historical works, particularly those on Alexander the Great. He was also a devoted student of the Epictetus.

Τί δὲ καὶ λύχνον ἄπτεις (Ἐπίκουρε) καὶ πονεῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ τηλικαῦτα βιβλία γράφεις; idem

Why, Epíkouros, do you even light a lamp and labor for our sake, and write so many books?

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.9

Ἄνθρωπε, τί ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν φροντίζεις; τί δι' ἡμᾶς ἀγρυπνεῖς; τί λύχνον ἄπτεις; τί ἐπανίστασαι; τί τηλικαῦτα βιβλία συγγράφεις; μὴ τις ἡμῶν ἐξαπατηθῇ περὶ θεῶν ὥς ἐπιμελουμένων ἀνθρώπων ἢ μὴ τις ἄλλην οὐσίαν ὑπολάβῃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδονῇ; εἰ γὰρ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχει, βαλὼν κάθευδε κτλ.

Dear fellow, why do you bother yourself about us? Why do you keep up a vigil on our account, for which you light a lamp? Why do you get up? Why do you write so many big books? Is it to keep one or another of us from being tricked into believing that the gods care for men, or is it to keep one or another of us from supposing that the nature of good is other than pleasure? If this is indeed so, then back to your bed and go to sleep!

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 46.1

Lucius Seneca the Younger (fl. 35 AD) was a Roman statesman, Stoic philosopher, playwright, and advisor to Emperor Nero. He quotes Epíkouros frequently in his "Moral Letters to Lucilius."

Librum tuum quem mihi promiseras accepi qui quam disertus fuerit, ex hoc intellegas licet: levis mihi uisus est, cum esset nec mei nec tui corporis sed qui primo aspectu aut Titi Liui aut Epicuri posset uideri. tanta autem dulcedine me tenuit et traxit ut illum sine ulla dilatione perlegerim.

I received your book that you had promised me... how well I find it written, you can know this much: it strikes me as light and elegant, though bulkier than we are accustomed to, so that at first glance it seems to resemble Livy or Epíkouros. However, it caught and charmed me so much that I read it from beginning to end in one sitting.

Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 3.1129A

Lucius Plutarchus (fl. 85 AD) was a Greek historian, Platonist philosopher, and biographer known for his work "Parallel Lives." He lived in Chaeronea (Boeotia), where he was also involved in local political and priestly duties.

Μηδὲ διάπεμπε βίβλους πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν σοφίαν... τί δὲ αἰτοῦσθαι μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον, ἐπὶ Ἀριστόβουλον, ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον γραφόμεναι καὶ συνταπτόμεναι φιλοπόνως; ἵνα μηδ' ἀποθανόντες λάθωσιν; (ἢ) ἵν' ἀμνησίαν νομοθετῆς ἀρετῇ καὶ ἀπραξίαν τέχνη καὶ σιωπὴν φιλοσοφία καὶ λήθην εὐπραγία;

(Rhetorically addressing Epíkouros) Don't send books everywhere to advertise your wisdom to every man and woman... What sense is there in so many tens of thousands of lines honoring Mētródōros, Aristóbuolos, and Chairédēmos, and published with so much industry that they cannot remain unknown even after they're dead? Who are you to call for the obliteration of virtue, the uselessness of skills, silence to philosophy, and forgetfulness of good deeds?

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.3,8

Marcus Cicero (fl. 65 BC) was a Roman statesman who often mentions Epíkouros.

Platonem reliquosque Socraticos et deinceps eos qui ab his profecti sunt legunt omnes, etiam qui illa aut non adprobant aut non studiosissime consecantur, Epicurum autem et Metrodorum non fere praeter suos quisquam in manus sumit.

Everyone reads Plato and the rest of the Socratic school even those who do not accept their teaching or are not enthusiastic disciples, and after them their followers, while scarcely anyone beyond their own adherents takes up the works of Epíkouros and Mētródōros.

On the Language & Style of Epíkouros

Laértios 10.13

Κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἣν ὅτι ιδιωτάτη ἐστίν, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς αἰτιᾶται. σαφὴς δ' ἦν οὕτως, ὥς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν.

He uses plain language in his works throughout, which is unusual, and Aristophanes, the grammarian, reproaches him for it. He was so intent on clarity that even in his treatise On Rhetoric, he didn't bother demanding anything else but clarity.

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.5.14

(Torquatus ad M. Ciceronem) sed existimo te sicut nostrum Triarium minus ab eo (Epicuro) delectari, quod ista Platonis Aristoteli Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. nam illud quidem adduci uix possum, ut ea quae senserit ille tibi non uera uideantur. Vide quantum, inquam, fallare, Torquate. oratio me istius philosophi non offendit: nam et complectitur uerbis quod uult et dicit plane quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat eloquentiam, non asperner; si non habeat, non admodum flagitem. re mihi non aequae satis facit, et quidem locis pluribus.

(Torquatus to Cicero) "I think that you, like our friend Triarius, are displeased

with Epíkouros because he neglected the rhetorical embellishments of Plato, Aristotle, and Θεόφραστος. I find it hard indeed to figure out why you think his opinions untrue." (Cicero to Torquatus): "You will see, Torquatus" said I, "how mistaken you are. I am not annoyed by this philosopher's style. He is straightforward, expressing simple and plain concepts in a way that is easy to understand; though I do not despise eloquence in a philosopher either – but if he doesn't have it, I do not insist on it. It's in the contents where he does not satisfy me, and in many places."

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 2.9.1

Aulus Gellius (fl. 165 AD) was a Roman politician and the compiler of the "Attic Nights" which has many quotes from lost works.

Quod idem Plutarchus evidenti calumnia verbum ab Epicuro dictum insectatus sit: In eodem libro idem Plutarchus eundem Epicurum reprehendit, quod verbo usus sit parum proprio et alienae significationis. Ita enim scripsit Epíkouros 'Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις.' Non inquit 'παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος' sed 'παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ' dicere oportuit – detractio enim significandi est doloris, non, inquit, dolentis. Nimis minute ac prope etiam subfrigide Plutarchus in Epicuro accusando λεξιθηρεῖ – has enim curas vocum verborumque elegantias non modo non sectatur Epíkouros, sed etiam insectatur.

How the same Plutarch, with obvious captiousness, criticized the use of a word by Epíkouros: In the same book [of Homer], Plutarch also finds fault a second time with Epíkouros for using an inappropriate word and giving it an incorrect meaning. Now Epíkouros wrote as follows: "The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of everything that pains." [Plutarch] declares that [Epíkouros] ought not to have said "of everything that pains (ἀλγοῦντος)" but "of everything that is painful (ἀλγεινοῦ)" – for it is the removal of pain (*doloris*), he explains, that should be indicated, not of that which causes pain (*dolentis*). Plutarch, in his accusation against Epíkouros, is overly meticulous and rather cold, practicing text-hunting (λεξιθηρεῖ) – for these concerns of eloquence in words and phrases Epíkouros not only does not seek out (*sectatur*) but actually attacks (*insectatur*).

ἢ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις	detractio dolentis	centers on the individual who is experiencing pain
ἢ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὑπεξαίρεσις	detractio doloris	centers on the experience of pain itself (Plutarch prefers this)

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.4.12

Itaque hoc frequenter dici solet a uobis non intellegere nos quam dicat Epíkouros uoluptatem...

You Epicureans frequently say to us that we do not correctly understand what pleasure might be which Epíkouros refers to...

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.5.15

Et tamen uide ne si ego non intellegam quid Epíkouros loquatur... sit aliqua culpa eius qui ita loquatur ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias ut Heraclitus... aut cum rerum obscuritas, non uerborum facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in *Timaeo* Platonis. Epíkouros autem, ut opinor, nec non uolt, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici – sed de illustri et facili et iam in uolgus peruagata loquitur.

Nevertheless, supposing that I don't understand Epíkouros' intended meaning... then he himself might possibly be at fault, for speaking in such a way that defies understanding. Obscurity may be excused for two reasons: it might be intentional, like with Heraclitus... or it may reflect the difficulty of the material, rather than the rhetoric, as, for example, in Plato's *Timaeus*. But Epíkouros, as far as I can tell, neither refuses to speak in a simple and explicit manner whenever he can, nor does he speak here about an obscure subject, such as physics, or an artificial and technical subject, like mathematics – but he speaks of something evident, easy, and already widespread among the commoners.

In hac ita exposita sententia, sunt qui existiment quod ille **inscitia plane loquendi** fecerat – fecisse consulto: de homine, minime uafro, male existimant.

(Cotta speaking about Epíkouros' first Principal Doctrine) In this statement presented, there are those who believe that what he wrote **from ignorance in clearly speaking** – he said deliberately: They regard the man, who is not at all clever, unfavorably.

Now there are people who think that the wording of this maxim was intentional: though really it was due to the author's **inability to express himself clearly**: their suspicion does an injustice to the most guileless of mankind.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.6.18

Dum dialecticam contemnit Epíkouros: quae una continet omnem et perspiciendi, quid in quaque re sit, scientiam et iudicandi, quale sit quidque, et ratione ac uia disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem uidetur, nec ea quae docere uolt ulla arte distinguit.

Epíkouros, by despising the dialectic: which encompasses the whole science of discovering the nature of things, judging their qualities, and how to do it with methodic rationality, stumbles, I say. He fails to even half-way distinguish what he desires to convey.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.9.27

Contemnit enim disserendi elegantiam, confuse loquitur.

For he despises the elegance of discourse, he speaks in disorder.

Cicero, On Divination, 2.50.18

Epicurum, quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici

Epíkouros, whom the Stoics usually describe as stupid and crude.

Aelius Theon, Preliminary Exercises, 2.168,169

Aelius Theon (fl. probably around 75 AD) wrote "Preliminary Exercises" (Progymnasmata), a training manual for orators.

Ἐπιμελητέον δὲ καὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων, πάντα διδάσκοντα ἐξ ὧν διαφεύχονται **τὸ κακῶς συντιθέναι**, καὶ μάλιστα δὲ τὴν ἔμμετρον καὶ ἔνρυθμον λέξιν, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Ἡγησίου τοῦ ῥήτορος, καὶ τῶν Ἀσιανῶν καλουμένων ῥητόρων, καὶ τινὰ τῶν Ἐπικούρου, οἷά που καὶ πρὸς Ἰδομενέα γράφει 'ὧ πάντα τὰμὰ κινήματα τερπνὰ νομίσας ἐκ νέου' καὶ τῶν περιφερομένων δ' ὡς ἐκείνου (ἡμεῖς δ' οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν αὐτὰ εὐρίσκομεν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν αὐτοῦ) 'λέγε δὴ μοι Πολύαινε συναπέριμεν μεγάλην χαρὰ γένηται.' τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα καὶ **τελέως ἐστὶν ἐπίμεμπτα** καὶ **πρόδηλον ἔχει τὴν κακίαν τῆς συνθέσεως**, συγγνώμης δ' ἄξιον, ὅταν εἰς ἐκεῖνά τις ἐμπέσῃ ποτὲ τὰ μέτρα, ἅπερ ἔχει ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ πεζόν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἱαμβικόν·

Attention must also be given to the composition of words, teaching everything from which one will escape **bad construction**, and especially the metrical and rhythmic expression, as is mostly the case with the works of Hegesias the rhetorician, and those called Asian rhetoricians, and some of Epíkouros, such as he writes to Idomeneús "O you, who perceived all my doings delightful from youth" and of those circulating as his (we have not yet even now found these in his writings) "tell me, Polýainos, if great joy would result from waiting together." Such things therefore **must be completely condemned**, and **evidently possess the badness of composition**, yet are pardonable when one occasionally falls into those measures which have a similarity to prose, such as the iambic.

Writers preferring the older Attic style (which they viewed as more concise and pure) often labeled other writers using a later style as being too ornate, elaborate, effeminate and Eastern (the East was generally associated with wealth and easy living). Note that Theon admits he does not have a citation for what he quotes.

Athēnaïos of Naucratis (fl. around 190 AD), wrote *Deipnosophistai* "*The Dinner Experts*" or "The Learned Banqueters" a long comedic dialogue filled with many literary references.

Πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ ζητεῖ περὶ δυσπεψίας ὥστ' οἰωνίσασθαι, εἴθ' ἐξῆς περὶ πυρετῶν. **τὴν** μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρέχουσιν τῇ λέξει **ἄρρυθμίαν** τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;

Epikouros poses questions in his Symposium about indigestion as a means of obtaining omens, and then immediately after this discusses fevers. Why should I even mention **the rhythmlessness** that permeates his style?

Cleomedes, *Lectures on Astronomy*, 2.1

Cleomedes (fl. perhaps around 200 AD) was a Stoic philosopher and astronomer who wrote *Kyklikē Theōria Meteōrōn* "*The Cyclical Theory of Meteors*," which is also known as "Lectures on Astronomy" or "The Heavens."

Οὕτω καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὡς δὴ τις ὦν ἀλαζονεύεται, ἑαυτὸν γε ἐν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καταριθμεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν – καὶ οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φέρεσθαι διαβεβαιούμενος καὶ ταύτῃ γε καὶ τοῦ Θερσίτου θρασύτερον ἑαυτὸν ἀποφαίνων. Ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ μόνον ὡς ἀριστεύς καὶ ἴσος τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἀλαζονεύεται, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα ἀπονέμει ἑαυτῷ, οὗτος δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῆς τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης μόνος ἀνευρηκέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν διαβεβαιοῦται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φέρεσθαι ἀξιοῖ.

So Epikouros boasts as if he were someone significant, trying to count himself among the philosophers – and not only that, but he insists on taking the lead, showing himself to be even bolder than Thersites. For the latter boasted only of being the best and equal to kings, not claiming the foremost place for himself, but this man, under the pretense of great wisdom and knowledge, asserts that he alone has discovered the truth and therefore deserves the leading position.

Ὅστε πολὺ ἂν τις δικαιότερόν μοι ἐδόκει πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν "Θερσίτ' ἀκριτόμυθε, λιγὺς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής, ἴσχεο!" (Homer, *Iliad* 2.246-247) Οὐδὲ γὰρ "λιγὺν" ἔγωγε τοῦτον ἂν τὸν *Θερσίτην* (*Episcyrum*) καθάπερ ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐκεῖνον, εἵποίμι. ἐπεὶ γε πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν αὐτῷ διεφθορότα ἐστί, σαρκὸς εὐσταθῆ καταστήματα λέγοντι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτης πιστὰ ἐλπίσματα, καὶ λίπασμα ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ δάκρυον ὀνομάζοντι καὶ ἱερὰ ἀνακραυγάσματα καὶ γαργαλισμούς σώματος καὶ ληκήματα καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας κακὰς ἄτας. ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐκ χαμαιτυπείων ἂν τις εἶναι φήσειε, τὰ δὲ ὅμοια τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐν τοῖς Δημητρίοις **ὑπὸ τῶν θεσμοφοριαζουσῶν γυναικῶν**, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέσης τῆς προσευχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐπ' αὐταῖς προσαιτούντων Ἰουδαϊκά τινα καὶ παρακεχαραγμένα καὶ κατὰ πολὺ τῶν ἐρπετῶν ταπεινότερα.

That is why I would believe it to be quite wrong for someone to say to *him*: "Babbling Thersites, clear orator though you are, be silent!" For I would not also call *this Thersites* (*Epikouros*) "clear" as Odysseus does the Homeric one, when on top of everything else his mode of expression is also elaborately corrupt. He speaks of "tranquil conditions of flesh" and "the confident expectations regarding it" and describes a tear as a "glistening of the eyes" and speaks of "sacred ululations" and "titillations of the body" and "debaucheries" and other such dreadful horrors. Some of these expressions might be said to be from the brothels, others similar to the things being said at the Demetria **by the Thesmophoria-observing women**, still others, from the middle of the prayers and from those begging in them, are both distinctly something Jewish and much lower than the reptiles.

All the criticized phrases include a "-ματα" superlative (and a "-ματος") whose usage rose in later Greek. This feature that is present in the quotes might be, in part, what Cleomedes critiques.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 1.1-5

Sextus Empiricus, (fl. probably around 170 AD), was a Pyrrhonist philosopher, who accordingly wrote about many other philosophers with skepticism.

Τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀντίρρησιν κοινότερον μὲν διατεθεῖσθαι δοκοῦσιν οἷ τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πύρρωνος – οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δέ διαθέσεως: ἀλλ’ **οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον** ὡς τῶν μαθημάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν – ἥ, ὥς τινες εἰκάζουσι, τοῦτο προκάλυμμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀταιδευσίας εἶναι νομίζοντες (ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθῆς Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καθαρεύων). τάχα δέ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν πολυμαθεῖς γεγονότας· οὐκ ἀπέοικε δέ καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ναυσιφάνην τὸν Πύρρωνος ἀκουστὴν ἔχθραν· πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν νέων συνέιχε καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως ἐπεμελεῖτο, μάλιστα δέ ῥητορικῆς·

The case against the Mathematici (or Professors of Arts and Sciences) has been set forth in a general way, it would seem, both by Epikouros and by the School of Pyrrho – although the standpoints they adopt are different. **Those around Epikouros** [think] that the subjects taught are of no help in perfecting wisdom – or, as some conjecture, they thought this merely as pretext for their own ignorance (for in many matters Epikouros stands convicted of ignorance, and even in ordinary converse his speech was not correct). Another reason may have been his hostility towards Plato and Aristotle and their like who were men of wide learning. It is not unlikely, too, that he was moved by his enmity against Nausiphánēs, the disciple of Pyrrho, who kept his hold on many of the young men and devoted himself earnestly to the Arts and Sciences, especially Rhetoric.

[Sextus Empiricus] **Γενόμενος οὖν τούτου μαθητῆς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδίδακτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυῆς φιλόσοφος ἠρνεῖτο ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, τὴν τε περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐξαλείφειν ἔσπευδε, πολὺς τε ἐγένετο τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος, ἐν οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐσεμνύετο. φησὶ γοῦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ 'οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε τοὺς Βαρυστόνους καὶ μαθητὴν με δόξειν τοῦ Πλεύμονος εἶναι, μετὰ μειρακίων τινῶν κραιπαλόντων ἀκούσαντα ’ νῦν πλεύμονα καλῶν τὸν Ναυσιφάνην ὡς ἀναίσθητον· καὶ πάλιν προβάς πολλά τε κατειπὼν τάνδρὸς ὑπεμφαίνει τὴν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν αὐτοῦ προκοπὴν λέγων 'καὶ γὰρ πονηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἦν καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκῶς τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ δυνατόν εἰς σοφίαν ἐλθεῖν,' αἰνισσόμενος τὰ μαθήματα. πλὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος, ὡς ἂν τις εἰκοβολῶν εἴποι, ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν πολεμεῖν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἤξιον**

Epikouros, then, though he had been one of this man's disciples, did his best to deny the fact in order that he might be thought to be a self-taught and original philosopher, and tried hard to blot out the reputation of Nausiphánēs, and became a violent opponent of the Arts and Sciences wherein Nausiphánēs prided himself. Thus, in his Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilenê, Epikouros says, "I quite suppose that 'the bellowers' will fancy that I am even a disciple of 'the Oyster' having sat under him in the company of some intoxicated young men" where he calls Nausiphánēs a "Stockfish" as being without sense. And again, after proceeding further and abusing the man at length, he hints at his proficiency in Arts and Sciences when he says "In fact he was a sorry fellow and exercised himself on matters which cannot possibly lead to wisdom" alluding thereby to Arts and Sciences. Such, in fact, as we may conjecture were the sort of motives which Epikouros decided to make war on the Arts and Science.

“I suspect the loudmouths might think I've been a student of the Oyster, simply because I was around him along with some drunken youths.”

ὁ βαρύστονος	the deep-voiced one	ΒΑΡΥΣΤΟΝΟΣ <i>heavy tone</i>
ὁ πλεύμων	lungs	ΠΛΕΥΜΩΝ <i>sides</i>
τὸ μειράκιον	lad	ΜΕΙΡΑΚΙΟΝ <i>little young man</i>
κραιπαλῶν (ῶσα)	drunk	ΚΡΑΙΠΑΛΩΝ <i>achieve struggle</i>

Plato, Philebus 21c

(Σωκράτης) καὶ μὴν, ὡσαύτως, μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δήπου μὴδ’ ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνήσθαι – τῆς τ’ ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μὴδ’ ἠντινοῦν **μνήμην** ὑπομένειν! **δόξαν** δ’ αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον **ἀληθῆ** μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα. λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μὴδ’ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαιρήσεις δυνατόν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι – ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλὰ τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετ’ ὀστρεῖνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων.

(Socrates) And surely, in the same way, not possessing memory, you could not even recall that at some point you were glad – with no **memory** whatever of pleasure occurring in the moment remaining! If you did not have a **true opinion** you could not think you were in enjoyment while in enjoyment. If you were without power of calculation you would not be able to calculate that you would enjoy it in the future – your life would not be that of a man, but of some mollusk or some other shell-fish like the oyster.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2.17.46

Hic quam volet Epíkouros iocetur, homo non aptissimus ad iocandum – minimeque resipiens patriam.

(Balbus) Epíkouros may make a joke of this if he likes, although humor was never his strong point – an Athenian without the "Attic salt!"

Here Epíkouros may joke as much as he likes, a man not very apt at jesting – and seeming least like a Greek.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.44.123

(Cotta) **At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate? Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. quae enim potest esse sanctitas si dii humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans?**

(Cotta) There is even a book by Epíkouros On Holiness? We are played by a man not so much witty as free with the license to write. How can holiness exist if the gods do not care for humans? What is a living nature that cares about nothing?

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On the Composition of Words, 24.188

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (fl. 20 BC) was a historian, classicist, and teacher of rhetoric.

Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χορόν, οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει τούτων, παραιτούμεθα. 'τὸ γὰρ ἐπίπονον τοῦ γράφειν ὄντως' ὡς αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος λέγει 'τοῖς μὴ στοχαζομένοις τοῦ πυκνὰ μεταπίπτοντος κριτηρίου' πολλῆς ἀργίας ἦν καὶ σκαιότητος ἀλεξιφάρμακον.

The chorus of Epicureans, for whom these things are of no concern, we reject. "The laboriousness of writing exists in fact" as Epíkouros himself says "for those not considering **the frequently shifting criterion**" was a remedy **of [his] much idleness and awkwardness.**

(alternative) **τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίπονον τοῦ γράφειν ὄντος τοῖς μὴ στοχαζομένοις τοῦ πυκνὰ μεταπίπτοντος κριτηρίου**

(alternative) "The laboriousness of writing does **not** exist for those not considering the frequently shifting criterion"

Cicero, Brutus, 1.44.123

(T. Albucius) fuit Athenis adulescens, perfectus Epicureus euaserat: minime aptum ad dicendum genus.

Titus Albucius grew up in Athens and left there a perfect Epicurean: typically lacking the capacity for eloquence.

Titus Albucius (fl. around 100 BC) was a Roman orator and Praetor who was educated in Athens. He faced multiple legal challenges in Rome, ultimately being convicted of extortion (Repetundae Pecuniae). Following his conviction, he went into exile and settled in Athens.

FRAGMENTS OF KNOWN WORKS

Fragments from Known Works

1.
- Περὶ Αἰρέσεων
- On Choices

*	καὶ Φυγῶν Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας	and Avoidances On Ambiguity	
2.	Ἀναξιμένης	Anaximénēs	"Kingly Power"
3.	Ἀναφωνήσεις	Declarations	
4.	Ἀντίδωρος, Α Β	Antídōros, in 2 Books	"Given in return"
5.	Ἀριστόβουλος	Aristóbuolos	"Best Counsel"
6.	Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ	On the Atoms and the Void	
7.	Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ ῚΑτομῷ Γωνίας	On the Angle of the Atom	
8.	Περὶ Ἀφῆς	On the Sensation of Touch	
9.	Περὶ Βασιλείας	On Kingship	
10.	Περὶ Βίων, Δ	On Lifecourses, in 4 Books	
11.	Πρὸς Δημόκριτον	Against Dēmókritos	"Chosen by the People"
12.	Διαπορίαι	Uncertainties	
13.	Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας	On Fair Dealing	
14.	Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν	On Justice and the Other Virtues	
15.	Περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος	On Gifts and Gratitude	
16.	Περὶ Εἰδώλων	On Films	
17.	Περὶ Εἵμαρμένης	On Destiny	
18.	Μεγάλη Ἐπιτομή	The Big Summary	
19.	Μικρά Ἐπιτομή	The Small Summary	
20.	Περὶ ῚΕρωτος	On Love	
21.	Εὐρύλοχος πρὸς Μητρόδωρον	Eurýlochos, for Mētródōros	
22.	Περὶ Εὐσεβείας	On Piety	
23.	Ἡγησιάναξ	Hēgēsíanax	"Leader of Kings"
24.	Περὶ Ἡδονῆς	On Pleasure	
25.	Θεμίστα	Themísta	"Order-keeper"
26.	Πρὸς Θεόφραστον	Against Theóphrastos	"Godly Phrased"
27.	Περὶ Θεῶν	On the Gods	
28.	Καλλιστόλας	Kallistólas	"Beautiful Armament"
29.	Περὶ Κριτηρίου ἢ Κανῶν	On the Criterion or The Canon	
30.	Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικούς	Against the Megarians	
31.	Μητρόδωρος, Ε	Mētródōros, in 5 Books	"Mother's Gift"
32.	Περὶ Μουσικῆς	On Music	
33.	Νεοκλῆς πρὸς Θεμίσταν	Neoklēs, for Themísta	"New Glory"
34.	Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην	Theories about Diseases, for Míthrēs	
35.	Περὶ τοῦ Ὁρᾶν	On Vision	
36.	Περὶ Ὁσιότητος	On Holiness	
37.	Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην	On Theories about Feelings, against Timokrátēs	
38.	Περὶ Πλούτου	On Wealth	
39.	Πολυμήδης	Polymédēs	"Abundant in Thought"
40.	Προγνωστικόν	Prognostication	
41.	Προτρεπτικός	Exhortation	
42.	Περὶ ῚΡητορικῆς	On Rhetoric	
43.	Στοιχειώσεις Δώδεκα	Twelve Elementary Principles	
44.	Συμπόσιον	Symposium	
45.	Περὶ Τέλους	On the End Goal	

46.	Τιμοκράτης, Γ	Timokrátēs, in 3 Books	<i>"Honorable Authority"</i>
47.	Περὶ Φαντασίας	On Sensory Presentation	
48.	Περὶ Φύσεως, ΑΖ	On Nature, in 37 Books	
49.	Ἐπιτομή τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς	Summary of Objections to the Physicists	
50.	Χαιρέδημος	Chairédēmos	<i>"People's Joy"</i>

1.	Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγάλους	To Important Persons
2.	Epistulae Spuriae	Spurious Letters
3.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Φίλους	To Friends Living In Egypt
4.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Φίλους	To Friends Living In Asia
5.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ Φίλους	To Friends Living In Lampsacus
6.	Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους	To The Philosophers Of Mytilene
7.	Πρὸς Ἀθηναῖον	To Athēnaîos <i>"Of Athena"</i>
8.	Πρὸς Ἀναξάρχον	To Anaxárkhos <i>"Ruler of Kings"</i>
9.	Πρὸς Ἀπελλῆν	To Apellês
10.	Πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην	To Apollōnídēs <i>"Son of Apollo"</i>
11.	Πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον	To Aristóboulos <i>"Best Counsel"</i>
12.	Πρὸς Δωσίθεον	To Dōsítheos <i>"God's Gift"</i>
13.	Πρὸς Ἑρμάρχον	To Hermárchos <i>"Leader guided by Hermes"</i>
14.	[Πρὸς Ἑταίρας]	[To A Companion]
15.	Πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον	To Eurýlochos <i>"Far-Reaching Defender"</i>
16.	Πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον	To Hēródotos <i>"Given by Hera"</i>
17.	Πρὸς Θεμιστᾶν	To Themísta <i>"Order-keeper" "Of Themis"</i>
18.	Πρὸς Ἴδομενέα	To Idomeneús <i>"Strength of Ida"</i>
19.	Πρὸς Κράτερον	To Kráteros <i>"Powerful"</i>
20.	Πρὸς Κωλώτην	To Kōlótēs
21.	Πρὸς Λεόντιον	To Leóntion <i>"Little Lion"</i>
22.	Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον	To Mētródōros <i>"Mother's Gift"</i>
23.	Πρὸς Μίθρην	To Míthrēs
24.	Πρὸς Μῦν	To Mŷs <i>"Mouse"</i>
25.	Πρὸς Πολύαινον	To Polýainos <i>"Much Praised"</i>
26.	Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα	To Pythoklês <i>"Glory of Apollo"</i>
27.	Πρὸς Τιμοκράτη	To Timokrátēs <i>"Power of Honor"</i>
28.	Πρὸς Θυρσῶνα	To Thyrsōn <i>"Thyrus Bearer"</i>
29.	Πρὸς Χαρμίδην	To Charmídēs <i>"Grace"</i>
30.	Περὶ Ἐπιτηδευμάτων	On Vocations
31.	De Stilpone	On Stilpo
32.	Ad Puerum aut Puellam Epistula	Letter To A Young Boy Or Girl
33.	Epistula Supremorum Dierum	Letter From His Last Days

Fragments From Uncertain Letters

1. Epíkouros' remarks on private problems
2. Regarding Epíkouros' Disciples
3. Regarding the Stoics
4. Sayings

Last Will

Laërtios 10.27

...Κύριαι Δόξαι. Περὶ Αἱρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν. Περὶ Τέλους...

...Principal Doctrines. On Choices and Avoidances. On the End Goal...

Static & Kinetic Pleasure

Laërtios 10.136

Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναῖκούς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει – Ὅ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Αἱρέσεως καὶ Φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ

[Epíkouros] differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure: [the Cyrenaics] do not include [that] which is a state of rest [*i.e., static*], but only that which consists in motion [*i.e., kinetic*] – [Epíkouros] admits both: [pleasure] of mind and of body, as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End* and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene

[U2]

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἐπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω "...νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς." ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικά ἐῖσιν ἡδοναί – ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

* So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his *Epilecta*, and Mētródōros in his *Timokrátēs*, whose actual words are "...with pleasure considered both according to motion and as static." The words of Epíkouros in his work *On Choice* are "the lack of disturbance and the lack of pain are static pleasures – joy and delight are made apparent according to motion through activity."

ἡ κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονή	pleasure according to motion, pleasure in movement, kinetic pleasure
for example joy (ἡ χαρὰ) and delight (ἡ εὐφροσύνη)	
ἡ καταστηματικὴ ἡδονή	static pleasure, pleasure of condition
for example lack of disturbance (ἡ ἀταραξία) and lack of pain (ἡ ἀπονία)	

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.16

Sin autem voluptatem putat adiungendam eam quae sit "in motu" — sic enim appellat hanc dulcem: "in motu" illam nihil dolentis "in stabilitate"— quid tendit?

Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure – for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it "in motion" in contrast with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is pleasure "in stability" – what is he really aiming at?

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.31

Quam multa vitiosa! summum enim bonum et malum vagiens puer utra voluptate diiudicabit? 'stante' an 'movente'? (quoniam, si dis placet, ab Epicuro loqui discimus.)

What a mass of fallacies! Indeed, how will a crying newborn judge the highest good and evil? 'static' or 'in movement'? (Inasmuch as, heaven help us, we learn our language from Epíkouros.)

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.75

Tum enim eam ipsam vis, quam modo ego dixi, et nomen inponis "in motu" ut sit et faciat aliquam varietatem – tum aliam quandam summam voluptatem, quo addi nihil possit, eam tum adesse, cum dolor omnis absit: eam 'stabilem' appellas.

For at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I have just defined, and this you entitle "in motion" as it produces a definite change of feeling – but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, to which nothing can be added, when all pain is gone: this you call 'stable' pleasure.

Aristotle, Eudêmeian Ethics, 8.1249a

Καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ’ εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει – διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαίμων καὶ ἡδιστα ζήσει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τις ὁρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μὴ – καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλεον, οὐκέτι: οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ **τινα** εἶναι **ὅρον** καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ **τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυγῆς**.

We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure and the manner in which it is a good, and have said that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that things good absolutely are also pleasant. Pleasure does not occur **except in action** – on this account the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not without reason that people think this. But since a doctor has a certain standard by referring to which he judges the body healthy or not – and in relation to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be wholesome, so in regard to actions and choices of things good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man ought to have **a certain standard** both of character and **of choice and avoidance**.

*** On Ambiguity**
Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 5 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 6 sup.)

καταγέλαστον γὰρ [δὴ] τι καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅταμ... ...ψε[ῦδος]... ...μ[ὴ] ἕτερο[ν]... ...μεταφορὰς ποι[εῖν φωνῶ]ν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνω[στα]
ὕ[πὸ τῶν γν]ωστῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς αὐ[τῶ]μ πλάνας ἃς λέγ[ο]μεν ἐν το[ῖς] Περὶ Ἀμ[φ]ιβολίας ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμ[μ]ένοις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
τί τούτων ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διώρισται μέχρι πόσου φροντιστέον αὐτῶν ἃς ποτ' ἂν ἔχωσι καθ' ἡμῶν δόξας,
καὶ μέχρι πόσου τε καὶ ἐμ ποιῶι λόγον οὐδένα ἐκτέον. αἰ[εῖ] δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἕνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν
κατασκευαζομένων τούς λόγους π[οι]εῖν, ἐπειδὴ π[ερ]... ...τόμ β[ι]ογ...

**καταγέλαστον γὰρ δὴ τι καὶ Τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅταμ... ...Ψεῦδος... ...μὴ ἕτερον...
...μεταφορὰς ποιεῖν φωνῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνωστα ὑπὸ τῶν γνωστῶν – ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς
αὐτῶν πλάνας ἃς λέγομεν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμμένους.**

for This too is indeed something thoroughly ridiculous, whenever...
...Falsity... ...not different... ...[not because other people are] making transfers
of statements onto unknown [objects of thought] from known [objects] – but
because of their own mistakes, which we discuss in the [books] that have
been written by us [entitled] On Ambiguity...

[Sedley] For another absurdity is when... [not because] others transfer words
from the class of that which is knowable to denote that which is
unknowable, but because of their own errors, which we point out in our
work On Ambiguity.

2. Anaximénēs Ἀναξιμένης

Laértios 10.28

...*Περὶ βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένης. Ἐπιστολαί...*

...*On Kingship. Anaximénēs. Letters...*

Usener: Perhaps the title was 'Anaximénēs On Kingship.' You might believe that the book was thus titled Anaximénēs' 'Changes of Kings.' Plentiful and favorable subject matter was provided for debating the miserable life of kings.

Athēnaïos, The Learned Banqueters, 12.531D

Ἀναξιμένης δ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Βασιλέων Μεταλλαγαὶ περὶ τοῦ Στράτωνος τὰ αὐτὰ ἱστορήσας διημιλλῆσθαί φησιν αὐτὸν Νικοκλεῖ τῷ τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Σαλαμῖνος βασιλεύσαντι ἐσπουδακότι περὶ τρυφὴν καὶ ἀσέλγειαν, ἀποθανεῖν τ' ἀμφοτέρους βιαίως.

'And Anaximénēs, in his book entitled the Reverses of Kings, giving the same account of Strátonos, says that he was always endeavouring to rival Nicocles, who was the king of Salamis in Cyprus, and who was exceedingly devoted to luxury and debauchery, and that they both came to a violent end.'

Both Strátonos and Nicocles probably died during the revolt of satraps around 361 BC, twenty years before Epíkouros was born. The author of this book Reverses of Kings would be Anaximénēs of Lampsacus (fl. 340 BC, about 40 years before Epíkouros). Anaximénēs studied under Diogenes the Cynic, joined Alexander's Persian campaigns, and wrote about Homer, history, and rhetoric.

Pausanias, Description of Greece, 6.18.3,4

Pausanias (fl. 150 AD) was a Greek geographer archaeologist. He wrote that Anaximénēs stopped Alexander from attacking Lampsacus.

Λαμψακηνῶν τὰ βασιλέως τοῦ Περσῶν φρονησάντων ἢ καὶ αἰτίαν φρονῆσαι λαβόντων, ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἄτε ὑπερζέων ἐς αὐτοὺς τῇ ὀργῇ κακῶν ἠπεῖλει τὰ μέγιστα ἐργάσασθαι: οἱ δὲ ἄτε θεόντες περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων καὶ αὐτῆς πατρίδος ἀποστέλλουσιν Ἀναξιμένην ἱκετεύειν, Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τε αὐτῷ καὶ ἔτι Φιλίππῳ πρότερον γεγονότα ἐν γνώσει.

The people of Lampsacus favored the cause of the Persian king, or were suspected of doing so, and Alexander, boiling over with rage against them, threatened to treat them with utmost rigor. As their wives, their children, and their country itself were in great danger, they sent Anaximénēs to intercede for them, because he was known to Alexander himself and had been known to Philip before him.

[Pausanias] **Προσῆει τε ὁ Ἀναξιμένης, καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, πεπυσμένον καθ' ἣντινα αἰτίαν ἦκοι, κατομόσασθαί φασιν ἐπονομάζοντα θεοὺς τοὺς Ἑλλήνων ἢ μὴν αὐτοῦ ταῖς δεήσεσιν ὅποσα ἐστὶν ἐναντία ἐργάσασθαι. ἔνθα δὲ εἶπεν Ἀναξιμένης 'χαρίσασθαι μοι τήνδε ὦ βασιλεῦ τὴν χάριν, ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τέκνα Λαμψακηνῶν, καταβαλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐς ἔδαφος τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν, τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ τῶν θεῶν σφισιν ἐμπρῆσαι'. ὁ μὲν ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ σόφισμα ἀντιμηχανήσασθαι τι εὕρισκων καὶ ἐνεχόμενος τῇ ἀνάγκῃ τοῦ ὅρκου συγγνώμην ἔνεμεν οὐκ ἐθέλων Λαμψακηνοῖς.**

Anaximénēs approached, and when Alexander learned for what cause he had come, they say that he swore by the gods of Greece, whom he named, that he would verily do the opposite of what Anaximénēs asked. Thereupon Anaximénēs said, "Grant me, O king, this favour. Enslave the women and children of the people of Lampsacus, raze the whole city even to the ground, and burn the sanctuaries of their gods." Such were his words; and Alexander, finding no way to counter the trick, and bound by the compulsion of his oath, unwillingly pardoned the people of Lampsacus.

Darius III was defeated by Alexander the same year Mētródōros of Lampsacus was born (when Epíkouros was 15). So this event would have occurred a little earlier – before the birth of Mētródōros, when Polýainos of Lampsacus was a child.

Perhaps instead Epíkouros' work was a polemic against Anaximénēs of Miletus and his monism. Anaximénēs of Miletus (flourished 545 BCE, about 250 years before Epíkouros) believed that air (ἀήρ) can change into water, earth, and fire – and into everything else – by getting thicker or thinner.

Laértios 2.3

Ἀναξιμένης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος ἤκουσεν Ἀναξιμάνδρου. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ Παρμενίδου φασὶν ἀκοῦσαι αὐτόν. οὗτος **ἀρχὴν ἀέρα** εἶπε καὶ **τὸ ἄπειρον**. κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ἄστρο οὐχ ὑπὸ γῆν, ἀλλὰ περὶ γῆν. κέχρηταί τε λέξει ἰάδι ἀπλῇ καὶ ἀπερίττω. Καὶ γεγένηται μέν, καθά φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος, περὶ τὴν Σάρδεων ἄλωσιν, ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τῇ ἐξηκοστῇ τρίτῃ Ὀλυμπιάδι. Γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι δύο Λαμψακηνοί, ῥήτωρ καὶ ἱστορικός, ὃς ἀδελφῆς υἱὸς ἦν τοῦ ῥήτορος τοῦ τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις γεγραφότος.

Anaximénēs, the son of Eurystratus, a native of Miletus, was a pupil of Anaximander. According to some, he was also a pupil of Parmenides. He took for his **first principle, air** or **that which is unlimited**. He held that the stars move round the earth but do not go under it. He writes simply and unaffectedly in the Ionic dialect. According to Apollodorus he was contemporary with the taking of Sardis and died in the 63rd Olympiad. There have been two other men named Anaximénēs, both of Lampsacus, the one a rhetorician who wrote on the achievements of Alexander, the other, the nephew of the rhetorician, who was a historian.

[U3]

3. Declarations
Αἱ Ἀναφωνήσεις

ἡ ἀναφωνήσις

αἱ ἀναφωνήσεις

declaration

ΑΝΑΦΩΝΗΣΙΣ

speaking up

The Latin verb “**Declamare**” was probably invented as a translation

Anger & Moderation

Philódēmos, On Anger, P.Herc. 182, col. 44 fin. – col. 45

Philódēmos of Gádara (fl. 70 BC) was a student of Zénō of Sidon.

Ὁ τε ἐπιθυμῶν τῆς κολάσεως οὕτω[ι] παρίσταθ' ὥς πρὸς αἰρετὸν δι' αὐτὸ τὴν τιμωρίαν – εἴ γε καὶ συνκαταδύνειν προαιρεῖται, σοφὸν δὲ μανία καὶ διανοεῖσθαι παριστάμενον ὥς πρὸς τοιοῦτο τὴν κόλασιν... ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς Καθηγεμόσιν οὐ τὸ κατ[ὰ] τὴν πρόληψιν [τ]αύτην θυμωθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφ[όν], ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοι[ν]οτέραν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἐπίκου[ρος] ἐν ταῖς Ἀναφωνήσεσιν [δ]ιασαφεῖ [τό] τε θυμωθήσεσθαι καὶ [τό] μετρίως· καὶ ὁ Μητρόδω[ρος], εἰ κυρίως λέγει, τὸ [τοῦ] σοφοῦ θυμὸς συνεμφα[ίνε]ι τὸ λίαν βραχέως.

Ὁ τε ἐπιθυμῶν **τῆς κολάσεως** οὕτωι παρίσταθ' ὥς πρὸς αἰρετὸν δι' αὐτὸ τὴν **τιμωρίαν** – εἴ γε καὶ συνκαταδύνειν προαιρεῖται, **Σοφὸν** δὲ **μανία** καὶ διανοεῖσθαι **παριστάμενον** ὥς πρὸς τοιοῦτο τὴν **κόλασιν**... Ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ **τοῖς Καθηγεμόσιν** οὐ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρόληψιν ταύτην **θυμωθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν**, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν **κοινοτέραν**. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς Ἀναφωνήσεσιν διασαφεῖ "**τό τε θυμωθήσεσθαι**" καὶ "**τὸ μετρίως**" καὶ ὁ Μητρόδωρος, εἰ κυρίως λέγει, "τὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ θυμὸς" συνεμφαίνει "**τὸ λίαν βραχέως**."

He who is desirous of punishment is inclined towards vengeance chosen for its own sake – if indeed he also chooses to completely sink down together [along with the object of his vengeance], but it is madness to even consider a wise man being inclined towards such a punishment... and It is acceptable to our Founders not that the wise man gets angry according to this anticipation [of "rage"], but (that he gets angry) according to the more general [anticipation of "anger"]. For Epíkouros, in the *Declarations* clarifies both "getting angry" and "moderation." And Metrodorus, if he speaks with authority, also shows "the anger of the wise man" to be "very brief."

[McOsker] And the person who desires punishment is thus inclined toward vengeance, as if toward a thing choice-worthy in itself, even if he is choosing to drown himself together with (his victim), but it is insanity even to imagine a sage being inclined to punishment as if it were such a thing... But also the Founders accept the idea that the wise man will be enraged not according to that preconception, but according to the more general one. In fact, Epíkouros makes clear in his *First Appellations* both that the sage "will experience rage" and (will experience it) "in moderation" and Metrodorus, if he says "the rage of the wise man" in its proper sense, shows also that he feels it "very briefly."

[McOsker] "*Philódēmos means that the Founders understood thymos not in the sense in which Philódēmos' opponents use it, 'rage,' but in a more general one, as a synonym for 'anger' generally. The Anaphōnéseis is mentioned only here, and this is its only fragment. Sedley argued that these Anaphōnéseis should be identified with the 'natural' and primal meanings of words*"

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 4)

...φύσις ἐνταῦθα κατὰ γε τήν δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτου οἰομένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὕτως οὖν, καὶ τοῦτο νοεῖται ἐν ἐκίναις ταῖς λέξεσιν ἃς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν πρώτων γινωσκόντων αὐτοὺς Γεγράφαμεν· εἴτα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὐθις τὸ βιβλίον ἤκριβώσαμεν... ..καὶ μακροτέρως...

...Φύσις, ἐνταῦθα, κατὰ γε τὴν δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτου οἰομένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὕτως οὖν, καὶ τοῦτο νοεῖται ἐν ἐκίναις ταῖς λέξεσιν ἃς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν πρώτων γινωσκόντων αὐτοὺς Γεγράφαμεν· εἴτα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὐθις τὸ βιβλίον – ἤκριβώσαμεν... ..καὶ μακροτέρως...

...the Nature [of the void exists], from immediate surroundings, according to the judgment of the one who was originally suspecting at once, at some time and from immediate surroundings that the void [exists]. thus, This [nature of the void] too is conceived in those terms which We have composed in the work concerning those first [men] knowing those [words]. but then, [when we] took up [our] book again – We have made precise... ..and more extensively...

Dēmétrios Laco, On Textual Criticism, P.Herc. 1012, col. 67, lines 7 – 9

Dēmétrios Laco (fl. about 90 BC) was an Epicurean who wrote about geometry, poetry, music, meteorology, and the nature of the gods.

Φύσει τὰς πρώτας τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀναφωνήσεις γεγονέναι λέγομεν.

We say that the first declarations of words came into being by nature.

[U4]

4. Antídōros
in two books
Ἀντίδωρος β΄

Laértios 10.28

...Μητρόδωρος ε΄. Ἀντίδωρος β΄. Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην...

...Mētródōros, in five books. Antídōros, in two books. Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs...

Εἰ γὰρ Πρὸς Ἀντίδωρον ἢ Βίωνα τὸν σοφιστὴν γράφων (Kōlōtēs) ἐμνήσθη νόμων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ διατάξεως, οὐκ ἂν τις εἶπεν αὐτῷ "μέν', ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις περιστέλλων τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείωσαν." [Euripides, Orestes, 258] εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι πάντες οἷς Κωλώτης λελοιδόρηκεν.

If, (Kōlōtēs) had directed a book against Antídōros or the sophist Bíon, regarding laws and government and ordinances, no one would have retorted, "*Oh poor wretch, lie still in your blankets, and cover your miserable flesh; accuse me of these things only after having real-life experience managing a household and political service.*" But such are exactly whom Kōlōtēs has insulted.

Antídōros of Cumae was an Ancient Greek grammarian who lived during the time of Epíkouros. His work in grammar was influenced by Eratosthénēs.

Laértios 10.8

...[Ἐκάλει] καὶ Ἀντίδωρον Σαννίδωρον...

...[Epíkouros used to call him] Antídōros Sannídōros ("Antídōros, the Provider of Absurdities")...

σαννυρίζειν	to mock	ΣΑΝΝΥΡΙΖΕΙΝ to poke repeatedly
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5. Aristóbuolos
Ἀριστόβουλος

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Φαντασίας. Ἀριστόβουλος. Περὶ Μουσικῆς...

...On Sensory Presentation. Aristóbuolos. On Music...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 22.1103A

Ἐπικούρω καὶ Μητρόδωρος καὶ Πολύαινος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος "ἐκθάρσημα" καὶ "γῆθος" ἦσαν – ὧν τοὺς πλείστους θεραπεύων νοσοῦντας ἢ καταθρηνῶν ἀποθνήσκοντας διετέλεσε.

To Epíkouros, Mētródōros, Polýainos, and Aristóbuolos were [sources of] "security" and "gaiety" – indeed he continually cared for them when they were ill and mourned them when they died.

τό γῆθος τοῦ γήθεος	gaiety	ΓΗΘΟΣ joy
This is an uncommon word and it is associated with Epíkouros. It seems to be a shortened version of the more common:		
ἡ γηθοσύνη τῆς γηθοσύνης	gladness	ΓΗΘΟΣΥΝΗ condition of joy

Laértios 10.3

Συνεφιλοσόφουν δ' αὐτῷ προτρεψαμένῳ καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τρεῖς ὄντες, Νεοκλῆς Χαιρέδημος Ἀριστόβουλος, καθά φησι Φιλόδημος ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων συντάξεως.

At his instigation his three brothers, Neoklês, Chairédēmos, and Aristóbuolos, joined in his studies, according to Philódēmos the Epicurean in the tenth book of his comprehensive work On Philosophers.

Epikouros titles many of his book with the name of an individual. He dedicated books to his brothers, Neoklēs, Chairédēmos, and Aristóboulos, and wrote other books that contained the praise of his friends, such as Eurýlochos, Hēgēsíanax, Themísta, and Mētródōros. In contrast, he also wrote books that contained criticism of others, such as Antídōros and Timokrátes.

It seems to be along these lines that the Epicurean Karneîskos, wrote a book about Philísta (Φιλίστα), of which some tattered remains were preserved in the Herculaneum papyrus. Along with the title Καρνείσκου Φιλίστα, this work reveals that a certain Philísta was presented as a model for wisely regulating life, giving instructions on how to live, discussing questions, and refuting the opinions of others. If you follow these traces of imitation, you will understand how it could happen that praises of Mētródōros or Themísta by Epíkouros could grow into both numerous and large volumes.

Karneîskos, Philísta (P.Herc. 1027, fr. 192, col. 11, 12)

Karneîskos (fl. around 285 BC) was an Epicurean philosopher and disciple of Epíkouros.

...Ἀλλὰ γόη[τες πάν]τε[ς ε]υρίσκοντα[ι] κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρό[πον] ἀποθεω[ρο]ύ[μ]ενοι, μακρὰν ἀ[πέ]χοντες τοῦ τῶν δεόντων λέγειν περὶ φιλίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν ὅσα συντεί[ν]ει πρὸς τὸ βιώσαι μακαρίως. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ Φιλίσταν καλῶς ἐκ μειρακίου κατακοσμηθένθ' ὑπὸ τοιοῦτου [ε]ἶ[δ]ον λόγ[ο]υ μέχρι τε[λευτῆς, ὥσπερ] καὶ δ[εό]ν[τ]ως τὸν οὐ]δεμίαν πω [κακίαν λα]βόντα... καὶ αἰεὶ μεμνημένον, καθ' ὃν ἔζη χρόνον, τοῦ φυσικοῦ τέλους καὶ οὐθὲν ἐλλιπόντα τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου παρὰ τὸ μὴ τυχεῖ[ν] τῷ[ν] παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖ[ς] περιβλέπτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος οὐθὲν ἔχοντα δυσχερὲς οὐδ' εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν αἰῶνα σχ[ή]σοντα...

...Ἀλλὰ γόητες πάντες εὐρίσκονται κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον ἀποθεωρούμενοι, μακρὰν ἀπέχοντες τοῦ τῶν δεόντων λέγειν περὶ φιλίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν ὅσα συντείνει πρὸς τὸ βιώσαι μακαρίως. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ Φιλίσταν καλῶς ἐκ μειρακίου κατακοσμηθένθ' ὑπὸ τοιοῦτου εἶδον λόγου μέχρι τελευτῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ δεόντως τὸν οὐδεμίαν πω κακίαν λαβόντα... καὶ αἰεὶ μεμνημένον, καθ' ὃν ἔζη χρόνον, τοῦ φυσικοῦ τέλους καὶ οὐθὲν ἐλλιπόντα τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου παρὰ τὸ μὴ τυχεῖν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς περιβλέπτων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος οὐθὲν ἔχοντα δυσχερὲς οὐδ' εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν αἰῶνα σχήσοντα...

* ...However, all charlatans, perceiving things from a distance in a prescribed way, distance themselves from discussing the essentials of friendship or other matters that aid in leading a blissful life. Therefore certainly even Philísta was rightly groomed from her youth by teachings until her death, as one who embraced no wrongdoing... always mindful, during her life, of the natural goal and never missing the best of life except for not achieving what is esteemed by the many. And in the present, she is facing nothing troublesome nor will in her remaining years.

6. On the Atoms & the Void Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ

Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Φύσεως ΛΖ. Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ. Περὶ Ἔρωτος...

...On Nature in thirty-seven books. On the Atoms and the Void. On Love...

7. On the Angle of the Atom Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ τοῦ Ὅραϊν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας. Περὶ Ἀφῆς...

...On Vision. On the Angle of the Atom. On the Sensation of Touch...

8. On the Sensation of Touch Περὶ Ἀφῆς

...*Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας. Περὶ Ἀφῆς. Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης...*

...*On the Angle of the Atom. On the Sensation of Touch. On Destiny...*

Plato, Republic, 7.523E

Τί δὲ δὴ; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἢ ὅψις ἄρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἢ ἀφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν;

But what then? Does sight adequately perceive their size and smallness, and does it make no difference to it whether some of them are in the middle or at the extreme? And similarly, does touch perceive thickness and thinness, or softness and hardness? And do not the other senses also indicate such things inadequately?

But now, what about the bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our vision's view of them adequate, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is situated outside or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And are not the other senses also defective in their reports of such things?

Aristotle, Nikomacheian Ethics, 1118b.1

Κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία: καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἄνθρωποι ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα – τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾷν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηνται: οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι – οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινὰ μέρη.

Indeed, [it is] the most common of the sensations through which lack of self-control [exists]: and there appears to be good ground for the disrepute in which it is held, because it does not exist [for us] in so far as we are humans, but to the extent [that we are] animals – therefore to enjoy and love these things most of all is bestial. We do not refer to the most refined of the pleasures through touch: such as the enjoyment of a massage and warm baths in the gymnasia – for the touch of the unrestrained [is] not about the entire body, but certain only parts.

9. On Kingship Περὶ Βασιλείας

Laértios 10.28

...*Καλλιστόλας. Περὶ Βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένης...*

...*Kallistólas. On Kingship. Anaximénēs...*

[U5]

Entertainment

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1095C

Ἐπίκουρος... προβλήμασι μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺς χῶραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλέων παραινῶν στρατηγικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν προβλημάτων περαινομένους. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Βασιλείας*.

Epikouros.: does not allow room for musical problems or critical philological inquiries [even] with a drink, but actually advises a cultivated monarch to put up with recitals of stratagems and with vulgar buffooneries at his drinking parties sooner than with the discussion of problems in music and poetry. Such is what he is presumed to have written in his book *On Kingship*.

[U6]*

Vanity of Political Awareness

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 33.1127A

Καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινόν ἐστι, ὅτι τοσοῦτων ὄντων φιλοσόφων μόνοι σχεδὸν ἀσύμβολοι τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀγαθῶν κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ τραγωδιῶν ποιηταὶ καὶ κωμωδιῶν ἀεὶ τι πειρῶνται χρήσιμον παρέχεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας: οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα – καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν – καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι

And it is not the greatest indignity, that, of so many sects of philosophers as have been extant, they alone should enjoy the benefits that are in cities, without having ever contributed to them any thing of their own; but far worse is it that, while there are not even any tragical or comical poets who do not always endeavor to do or say some good thing or other in defense of the laws and policy, these men, if peradventure they write, write of policy, that we may not concern ourselves in the government of the commonweal — of rhetoric, that we may not perform an act of eloquence — and of royalty, that we may shun living with kings.

What is grave is not so much that among so many philosophers these alone (one might say) enjoy the advantages of civilized life without paying their share; it is that poets, both tragic and comic, are always trying to convey some useful lesson and take the side of law and government; whereas these men, if they write about such matters at all, write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Epameinōndas (fl. 375 BC) was an elite Theban, statesman, and general whose victories notably weakened Spartan dominance and led to the brief period of Theban hegemony. Despite his significant impact, the effects of his reforms were short-lived and helped set the stage for the rise of Macedonian power under Alexander the Great.

Τοὺς δὲ πολιτικούς ἄνδρας ἐπὶ γέλῳτι καὶ καταλύσει τῆς δόξης ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν "ἐσχικέναι τι" λέγοντες ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦτο δὲ "μικκόν" – οὕτωςι τῷ ῥήματι φράζοντες! αὐτὸν δὲ "Σιδηροῦν Σπλάγχχνον" ἀποκαλοῦντες καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τί παθῶν ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μέσης καὶ οὐ πιλίδιον ἔχων οἴκοι καθῆτο δηλαδὴ περὶ τὴν τῆς γαστροῦς ἐπιμέλειαν ὅλος καθεστώς. ἃ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ περὶ Φιλοσοφίας ἐξορχούμενος πολιτείαν γέγραφεν οὐκ ᾧμην δεῖν παρεῖναι λέγει δέ, ὅτι "τῶν σοφῶν τινες ὑπὸ δαψιλείας τύφου οὕτω καλῶς συνέιδον τοῦργον αὐτῆς, ὥστ’ οἷχονται φερόμενοι πρὸς τὰς αὐτάς Λυκούργῳ καὶ Σόλῳ ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ βίων λόγους καὶ ἀρετῆς."

Nor do they ever name any of those great personages who have intermeddled in civil affairs, but only to scoff at them and abolish their glory. Thus they say that Epameinōndas had "something of good" but "very little" – for that is the very word they use! They moreover call him "iron-hearted," and ask what ailed him that he went marching his army through all Peloponnesus, and why he did not rather keep himself quiet at home with a night-cap on his head, employed only in cherishing and making much of his belly. But methinks I ought not in this place to omit what Mētródōros writes in his book of Philosophy, when, utterly abjuring all meddling in the management of the state, he said thus "Some, through an abundance of vanity and arrogance, have so deep an insight into the business of it, that in treating about the precepts of good life and virtue, they suffer themselves to be carried away with the very same desires as were Lycurgus and Solon."

They mention statesmen only to deride them and belittle their fame, for instance Epameinóndas, who they say had but "one good thing about him," and even that "small" (for this is their expression), and dubbing the man himself "iron-guts" and asking what possessed him to go walking across the Peloponnese and not sit at home with a nice felt cap on his head, wholly concerned (we must suppose) with the care and feeding of his belly. And Mētródōros' frivolous dismissal of the state in his work *On Philosophy* should not, I believe, be allowed to pass unnoticed. "Certain sages," he says, "in their prodigality of conceit, have been so well able to detect the function of the state that in their discourse about ways of life and about virtue they go flying off after the same desires as Lycurgus and Solon."

σιδηροῦς <i>–οῦν</i>	made of iron	ΣΙΔΗΡΟΥΣ <i>iron</i>
τὸ σπλάγχνον	guts	ΣΠΛΑΓΧΝΟΝ <i>entrails of a sacrifice</i>
σιδηροῦς σπλάγχνος	iron guts	ΣΙΔΗΡΟΥΣ ΣΠΛΑΓΧΝΟΣ

10. On Lifecourses

in four Books

Περὶ Βίων Δ

Laértios 10.27

...Ἡγησιάναξ. Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα. Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας...

...Hēgēsíanax. On Lifecourses, in four books. On Fair Dealing...

Laértios 10.30

Τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν (ἔχει) τὰ περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς Περὶ Βίων βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ Περὶ Τέλους.

His ethical doctrine deals with choice and avoidance, which may be found in the books *On Lifecourses*, in the letters, and in the book *On the End-Goal*.

[U7]

Book 1

Pleasures of Body & Mind

Laértios 10.136

...Ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Αἰρέσεως καὶ Φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ...

...[Epíkouros] admits both: [pleasure] of mind and of body, as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End*, and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene...

[U8]

Avoid Politics

Laértios 10.119

Οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεται [ὁ σοφός], ὥς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Βίων. οὐδὲ τυραννεύσειν.

Nor will [the wise man] take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant.

[The Sage] will not get involved in politics, as he relates in his first book On Lifecourses, nor will he make himself a tyrant.

Cicero, Letters to Atticus, 14.20,5

Epicuri mentionem facis et audes dicere "μή πολιτεύεσθαι."

You mention Epíkouros and dare to say "stay out of politics."

Cicero, Letters to Friends, 7.12 (February, 53 BC)

Mirabar quid esset, quod tu mihi litteras mittere intermisisses: indicavit mihi Pansa meus Epicureum te esse factum. O castra praeclara! quid tu fecisses, si te Tarentum et non Samarobrivam misissem? iam tum mihi non placebas, cum idem tuebare quod Zeius, familiaris meus. sed quonam modo ius civile defendes, cum omnia tua causa facias, non civium? Ubi porro illa erit formula fiduciae 'UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET?'

I was wondering what had made you [Caius Trebatius Testa] cease writing to me. My friend Pansa [Caius Vibius Pansa] has informed me that you have become an Epicurean! What a wonderful camp yours must be! What would you have done if I had sent you to Tarentum instead of Samobriva? I was already a little doubtful about you, when I found you supporting the same doctrine as my friend Selius! But on what ground will you support the principles of civil law, if you act always in your own interest and not in that of your fellow citizens? What, too, is to become of the legal formula in cases of trust, "as should be done among honest men"?

Quis enim est, qui facit nihil nisi sua causa? quod ius statues 'COMMVNI DIVIDVNDQ,' quom commune nihil possit esse apud eos, qui omnia voluptate sua metiuntur? quo modo autem tibi placebit 'IOVEM LAPIDEM IVRARE,' cum scias Iovem iratum esse nemini posse? quid fiet porro populo Ulubrano, si tu statueris πολιτεύεσθαι non oportere? qua re si plane a nobis deficiis, moleste fero, sin Pansae adsentari commodumst, ignosco; modo scribe aliquando ad nos quid agas et a nobis quid fieri aut curari velis.

For who can be called honest who does nothing except on his own behalf? What principle will you lay down "in dividing a common property" when nothing can be "common" among men who measure all things by their own pleasure? How, again, can you ever think it right to swear by Jupiter lapis, when you know that Jupiter cannot be angry with anyone? What is to become of the people of Ulubrae, if you have decided that it is not right to take part in civic business? Wherefore, if you are really and truly a pervert from our faith, I am much annoyed; but if you merely find it convenient to humor Pansa, I forgive you. Only do write and tell us how you are, and what you want me to do or to look after for you.

Cicero, On the Laws, 1.13.39

Sibi autem indulgentes et corpori deseruientes, atque omnia quae sequantur in uita quaeque fugiant uoluptatibus et doloribus ponderantes, etiam si uera dicant — nihil enim opus est hoc loco litibus — in hortulis suis iubeamus dicere, atque etiam ab omni societate rei publicae (cuius partem nec norunt ullam neque umquam nosse uoluerunt) paulisper facessant rogemus.

To those, however, indulgent and subservient to the body, and weighing all things that follow in life and that they seek or avoid according to pleasures and pains, even if they speak truths — for there is no need for disputes here — in their small gardens let us allow them to speak, and even from all association with the state (of which part they neither know any nor ever wished to know) let us ask that they withdraw for a while.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1127D

Εἵπερ οὖν οἱ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας ἀναιροῦντες τὸν βίον ἀναιροῦσι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ καὶ Μητρόδωρος τοῦτο ποιοῦσι, τοὺς μὲν συνήθεις ἀποτρέποντες τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν – τοῖς δὲ πράττουσιν ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοὺς δὲ πρώτους καὶ σοφωτάτους τῶν νομοθετῶν κακῶς λέγοντες τῶν δὲ νόμων παρακελευόμενοι περιφρονεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ προσῇ φόβος πληγῆς καὶ κολάσεως: οὐκ οἶδα τί τηλικοῦτο κατέψευσται τῶν ἄλλων ὁ Κωλώτης – ἡλίκον ἀληθῶς τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ δογμάτων κατηγόρηκεν.

If then those who abolish the laws, governments, and policies of men subvert and destroy human life, and if Mētródōros and Epíkouros do this, dissuading their friends from doing common things – being hostile to those who are actively engaged, and speaking ill of the foremost and wisest lawmakers, urging to despise the laws, unless there is present a fear of strike and chastisement: I do not see that Kōlōtēs has falsely attributed against the other philosophers – as much as he has alleged true ones against the writings and doctrines of Epíkouros.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1127A

Οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι.

...But these men, if they write about such matters at all, write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to deter us from public speaking, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 31.1125C

Οὐδεὶς οὖν ἔπαινος ἄξιος ἂν γένοιτο τῶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη τὰ θηριώδη νόμους θεμένων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ νόμων διάταξιν. ἀλλὰ τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ταῦτα συγγέοντες καὶ καταλύοντες καὶ ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες; οὐχ οἱ **πολιτείας** ἀφιστάντες **αὐτούς** καὶ **τοὺς πλησιάζοντας**; οὐχ οἱ "τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις" λέγοντες;

No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw **themselves** and **their followers** from the government? Are they not those who say that "the crown of tranquility is incompatible with great positions of leadership"?

Plutarch, Advice about Keeping Well, 135B

Οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλές οὐδὲ ῥᾶδιον οὐδὲ πολιτικὸν οὐδ' ἀνθρωπικὸν ἀλλ' ὀστρέου τινὸς ζωῇ προσεικὸς ἢ στελέχους τὸ ἀμετάστατον τοῦτο καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἐν τροφαῖς καὶ ἀποχαῖς καὶ κινήσει καὶ ἡσυχίαις εἰς ἐπίσκιόν τινα βίον καὶ σχολαστὴν καὶ μονότροπόν τινα καὶ ἄφιλον καὶ ἄδοξον ἀπωτάτω πολιτείας καθίσασιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ συστείλασιν· οὐ "κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμήν" ἔφη, "γνώμην."

For it is not safe, nor easy, nor befitting a citizen or a man, but like the life of an oyster or the trunk of a tree—this immutability and forced compliance in the matter of food and abstinence, movement and rest; it is fitting only for men who have reduced and restricted themselves to a retired, idle, solitary, friendless, and inglorious life, far removed from the duties of citizenship. 'No,' said he 'it fits not with my opinion.'

For it is a life neither safe, easy, politic, nor like a man, but more like the life of an oyster or the trunk of a tree, to live so without any variety, and in restraint as to our meat, abstinence, motion, and rest; casting ourselves into a gloomy, idle, solitary, unsociable, and inglorious way of living, far remote from the administration of the state, at least (I may say) in my opinion.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀργίας ὦνιον ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀπραξίας, ἃ γε δὴ μέγιστα κακῶν ταῖς νόσοις πρόσεστι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ τὰ ὄμματα τῷ μὴ διαβλέπειν καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τῷ μὴ φθέγγεσθαι φυλάττοντος ὁ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀχρηστία καὶ ἡσυχία σώζειν οἴόμενος·

For health is not to be purchased by idleness and inactivity, which are the greatest evils attendant on sickness, and the man who thinks to conserve his health by uselessness and ease does not differ from him who guards his eyes by not seeing, and his voice by not speaking.

For health is not to be purchased by sloth and idleness, for those are chief inconveniences of sickness; and there is no difference between him who thinks to enjoy his health by idleness and quiet, and him who thinks to preserve his eyes by not using them, and his voice by not speaking.

Avoid Public Service

Plutarch, Advice about Keeping Well, 135C

Πρὸς οὐδὲν γὰρ ἑαυτῷ χρήσαιτ' ἂν τις ὑγιαίνουντι κρεῖττον ἢ πρὸς πολλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους πράξεις. ἥκιστα δὴ τὴν ἀργίαν ὑγιεινὸν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ τὸ τῆς ὑγείας τέλος ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ οὐδ' ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ μᾶλλον ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας·

For a man in good health could not devote himself to any better object than to numerous humane activities. Least of all is it to be assumed that laziness is healthful, if it destroys what health aims at; and it is not true either that inactive people are more healthy.

For such a man's health will not be any advantage to him in the performance of many things he is obliged to do as a man. Idleness can never be said to conduce to health, for it destroys the very end of it. Nor is it true that they are the most healthful that do least.

Οὔτε γὰρ Ξενοκράτης μᾶλλον διυγίαινε Φωκίωνος οὔτε Δημητρίου Θεόφραστος, Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ὤνησε πρὸς τὴν ὕμνουμένην "σαρκὸς εὐστάθειαν" ἢ πάσης φιλοτιμίαν ἐχούσης πράξεως ἀπόδρασις. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέραις ἐπιμελείαις διασωστέον ἐστὶ τῷ σώματι τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἔξιν, ὥς παντὸς βίου καὶ νόσον δεχομένου καὶ ὑγίειαν.

For Xenocrátēs did not keep in better health than Phōkíōnos, nor Theóphrastos than Dēmétrios, and the running away from every activity that smacked of ambition did not help Epíkouros and his followers at all to attain their much-talked-of condition of "perfect bodily health." But we ought, by attention to other details, to preserve the natural constitution of our bodies, recognizing that every life has room for both disease and health.

For Xenocrátēs was not more healthful than Phōkíōnos, or Theóphrastos than Dēmétrios. It signified nothing to Epíkouros or his followers, as to that so much talked of "good habit of body" that they declined all business, though it were never so honorable. We ought to preserve the natural constitution of our bodies by other means, knowing every part of our life is capable of sickness and health.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 90.35

Non de ea philosophia loquor, quae ciuem extra patriam posuit, extra mundum deos, quae uirtutem donauit uoluptati.

The philosophy I speak of is not the one which takes the citizen out of public life and the gods out of [our] world, and hands virtue over to pleasure.

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), 2.380

Epíkouros cum dicat propter uoluptatem omnia esse facienda, excludit ab officiis actuque ciuili sapientem et sibi tantum oportere uiuere adfirmat.

Epíkouros, saying that everything is done for the sake of pleasure, dissuades the Sage from duty and political activity, and asserts that he need only live for himself.

[U9]

Seneca, On Leisure (to Serenus), 3.2

Duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae Epicureorum et Stoicorum sed utraque ad otium diuersa uia mittit, Epíkouros ait "non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens nisi si quid interuenerit·" Zénōn ait "accedet ad rem publicam nisi si quid inpedierit." alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa.

The two most prominent sects, the Epicureans and the Stoics, disagree especially in this matter, but each sends [its followers] to leisure by a different path, Epíkouros says "The Sage will not engage in public affairs except in an emergency." Zénō says "He will engage in public affairs unless something prevents him." One seeks leisure purposefully, the other as a consequence.

[U10]

Politics is not a Science

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 27 (32)

Κα[τ'] οὐδ[έτερο]ν γὰρ τ[ρό]πον τῶν ἐ[κ]κειμένων τέχνην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικὴν: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχε[ι] τὴν μεθοδικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ τὴν τὸ ἐστηκὸς προσφερομένην, ὁμολογοῦσιν – ὅτι [δ'] οὐδὲ τὴν παρατήρησιν (τῇ[ν τοῦ] ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ κα[τὰ] τὸ εὐλογον στοχαζομένην) – Ἐπίκουρ[ος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Π[ερὶ] Βίων καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορ[ικῆς] ποιεῖ φα[νερὸν] καὶ Μ[ητροδόω]ρ[ος ἐν] τῷ Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυσ[ιολογί]ας Λέγο[ν]τ[ας] Ἀγα[θούς] εἶ[ναι] Ῥήτορας

Κατ' οὐδέτερον γὰρ τρόπον τῶν ἐκκειμένων τέχνην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικὴν: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὴν μεθοδικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ τὴν τὸ ἐστηκὸς προσφερομένην, ὁμολογοῦσιν – ὅτι δ' οὐδὲ τὴν παρατήρησιν (τὴν τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐλογον στοχαζομένην) – Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Βίων καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ποιεῖ φανερόν καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ Φυσιολογίας Λέγοντας Ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι Ῥήτορας

[Chandler] For in neither one of the two senses which have been set out is it possible to say that **political rhetoric** is an **art**: for they are in agreement that it does not possess methodical transmission which contributes to stable knowledge – but that it doesn't [even possess] **observation** (which aims to achieve its goal most of the time with a reasonable chance of success) – Epíkouros makes clear **in the first book of *On Ways of Living*** and in his *On Rhetoric*, as does Metrodorus in his *Against Those Who Say That From The Study Of Nature Come Good Orators*.

[U11]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 57

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολλ[ῶν] αὐ[τ]οῦς Ἀνα[πα]ύσωμεν ἐρ[ε]ύνης κα[ὶ] ἐρωτήσεως: οὐκ ἐν τῷ Συμποσίω[ι] λέγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Βίων – οὐδὲ Κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμέν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστ[ικ]ὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κ[ρί]σιν, ἀλλὰ χρεῖαν γ' ἔχει λ[ό]γου τυχεῖν

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν αὐτοῦς Ἀναπαύσωμεν ἐρεύνης καὶ ἐρωτήσεως: οὐκ ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ λέγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Περὶ Βίων – οὐδὲ κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐν πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμέν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστικὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κρίσιν, ἀλλὰ χρεῖαν γ' ἔχει λόγου τυχεῖν

* however, We relieve **them** from **much** questioning and from many **inquires**: We do not say that [a direct quote on the topic] is in the *Symposium* nor in *[the works] On Lives* – nor do We order **him** to seek a **pebble** in the sea – but through what [we have cited] and through what we claim, We [already] have set forth that *Sophistic Rhetoric* is shown to exist as an art – **[general quotes] which, even though they can be shown to enlarge our judgment, nevertheless still require having a reasoning {i.e., giving an explanation}**

[Chandler] However, in order to relieve them from having to ask a lot of questions from a lot of people, we say that it is not in the Symposium nor in the On Ways of Life, nor are we telling them to look for a needle in a haystack. But we have already cited where and on what grounds we say that the fact that sophistic rhetoric is an art is revealed – even if the (citations) are shown to strengthen our own judgement, yet they require an argument for all the members of our philosophical school.

[U12]

Book 2

Observe Customs

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.31.877-898

...Φύ[σιν τήν κατὰ] τὸ κρ[ιτήριον ποι]ουμένη[ν ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ]νοιαν ὡ[φελείας νομί]ζεσθαι. [ἵνα δὲ μὴ] ἐκτείνω [τὸν λόγον,] πάλιν· "ἡμ[εῖς θεοῖς] θύωμέν" φησιν "ὅσ[ι]ως καὶ καλῶς οὐ [καθ]ήκει κα[ὶ κ]αλῶς· πάντα πράττωμεν [κα]τὰ τοὺς νόμους, μ[η]θὲ[ν] ταῖς δόξαις α[ὐ]τοῦς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων κ[αί] σεμοντάτων διαταράττοντε[ς]. ἔτι] δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι θύω]μεν ἀφ' ἧς ἔλε[γον δό]ξης. οὕτω γὰρ [ἐν]δέχεται φύσ[ιν θνη]τὴν ὁμοίω[ς τῷ Δι]ὶ νῆ Δία [διά]γειν, [ὥς φαί]νεται." κὰν [τοῖς Πε]ρὶ Βίων δὲ π[ερὶ τῆς] προσκυνή[σεως...]

...Φύσιν τήν κατὰ τὸ κριτήριοι ποιουμένην ὀρθῶς ἐπίνοιαν ὠφελείας νομίζεσθαι. ἵνα δὲ μὴ ἐκτείνω τὸν λόγον, πάλιν· "ἡμεῖς θεοῖς θύωμέν" φησιν "ὀσίως καὶ καλῶς οὐ καθήκει καὶ καλῶς πάντα πράττωμεν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, μηθὲν ταῖς δόξαις αὐτοῦς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ σεμοντάτων διαταράττοντες. ἔτι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι θύωμεν ἀφ' ἧς ἔλεγον δόξης. οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φύσιν θνητὴν ὁμοίως τῷ Διὶ νῆ Δία διάγειν, ὡς φαίνεται." κὰν τοῖς Περὶ Βίων δὲ περὶ τῆς προσκυνήσεως...

[Obbink] ...To conceive of their nature as accurately constituting the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard. And, lest I extend my discussion, again "Let us sacrifice to the [gods]" [Epíkouros] says "devoutly, and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings. Moreover, let us sacrifice justly, on the view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature, by Zeus, to live [like Zeus], as it seems." And concerning obeisance in *On Lifecourses*...

[U13]*

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.26.730-751

[Ὁ δ'] Ἐπίκουρος φανή[σεται] καὶ τετηρηκῶς [ἅπαν]τα καὶ τοῖς φί[λοις τ]ηρεῖν παρεν[γνηκ]ῶς, οὐ μόνον [διὰ τ]οὺς νόμους – ἀλλὰ διὰ φυσικὰς [αἰτίας,] προσεύχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ [Βίων] οἰκεῖον εἶναι [ἡμεῖ]ν φησιν, οὐχ ὡς [δυσ]μενῶν τῶν [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιή[σομεν], ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν ὑπερβαλλουσῶν [δυνά]μει καὶ σπου[δαί]οτι ητὶ φύσεων [ἵνα τὰς] τε τελ[α]ε[ιότη]τας γινώσκω[μεν καί] τοῖς νόμοις [συμπερι]φοράς.

Ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος φανήσεται καὶ τετηρηκῶς ἅπαντα καὶ τοῖς φίλοις τηρεῖν παρεγγνηκῶς, οὐ μόνον διὰ τοὺς νόμους – ἀλλὰ διὰ φυσικὰς αἰτίας. προσεύχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Βίων οἰκεῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν φησιν, οὐχ ὡς δυσμενῶν τῶν θεῶν εἰ μὴ ποιήσομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν ὑπερβαλλουσῶν δυνάμει καὶ σπουδαιότητι φύσεων ἵνα τὰς τε τελειότητας γινώσκωμεν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις συμπεριφοράς.

[Obbink] Furthermore, it will appear that Epíkouros loyally observed all the forms of worship and enjoined his friends to observe them, not only because of the laws – but for physical [causes] as well. For in *On Lifecourses* he says that to pray is natural for us, not because the gods would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we may realize our fulfillments and social conformity with the laws.

[U14]

Laërtios 10.119

Οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν, ὡς ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ βίων, οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν.

[The Sage] does not behave like a Cynic, [As Epíkouros says] in the second book *On Lifecourses*, nor becomes a beggar.

[U15]

Ἀλλὰ καὶ πηρωθέντα **τὰς ὄψεις** μὴ ἐξάξειν **αὐτὸν** τοῦ βίου, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φησι.

Even if one's eyes are blinded, he should not remove himself from life, as stated in the same [source].

* But also, one who has lost **their sight** should not take **themselves** out of life, as he says in the same place.

11. Against Dēmókritos **Πρὸς Δημόκριτον**

This may not have been stand-alone work, but only a section of On Nature.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1100A

Τί δ' οὐκ ἔμελλεν αὐτὸς οὕτω σπαργῶν περιμανῶς καὶ σφαδάζων **πρὸς δόξαν**, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀπολέγεσθαι τοὺς καθηγητὰς μηδὲ Δημοκρίτῳ τῷ τὰ δόγματα ῥήμασιν αὐτοῖς ἀφαιρουμένῳ ζυγομαχεῖν περὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ κεραιῶν, σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν...

Why should he not, when he himself had such a furious lechery and wriggling **after glory** as made him not only to disown his masters and scuffle about syllables and accents with his fellow-pedant Dēmókritos (whose doctrines he stole verbatim), and to tell his disciples there never was a wise man in the world besides himself...

Would not he himself, thus violently thrashing and eagerly wriggling towards glory, so as not only to disavow his teachers and to quarrel over syllables and letters with Dēmókritos, while pilfering his doctrines of their very words, and to claim no one else but himself and his students as wise...

...Ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφειν ὡς Κωλώτης μὲν **αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα** προσκυνήσειε γονάτων ἀψάμενος – Νεοκλῆς δ' ὁ ἀδελφὸς, **εὐθύς ἐκ παιδῶν**, ἀποφαίνοιτο "**μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου γεγονέναι** μηδ' εἶναι" ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν; ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοσαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν ἂν ἐγέννησαν;

...But also to put it in writing how Kōlótēs performed adoration to **him**, **as he was** one day **philosophizing about nature**, by touching his knees – and that his own brother Neoklēs used, **directly from a childhood**, to say "**no one has been** or is **wiser than Epíkouros**" and that his mother had just so many atoms within her as, when they came together, must have produced a complete wise man?

...But also to write how Kōlótēs, while he was philosophizing, would worship him by touching his knees – and Neoklēs, his brother, would declare from childhood that "there was no one wiser than Epíkouros" and that his mother had in herself so many atoms, which coming together would have produced a wise man?

[U16]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 20, col. 123

...Φωναῖ[ς μετρίαις θεραπ]εύω, διὰ δὲ τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν καὶ τήν, εἴ γ' ἐδυνήθησαν, ὠφελίαν ἡμῶν, ἔτι δὲ τή[ν] μεριζομένην συνγ[ν]ώ[μ]ην ἐν οἷς διέπεσον, ὡς ἐν τ[ε] τοῖς **πρὸς Δημόκρ[ι]τον** ἴσταται διὰ τέλους ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κ[αὶ πρὸς] Ἡρακ[λ]είδην...

...[Admonishing] with [moderate] words, because of their [eagerness] and their benefit to us [if] they were able, and further because of the pardon meted out for the things in which they slipped up, as Epíkouros consistently maintains both in his book *Against Dēmókritos* and *Against Hērakleídēs*...

Hērakleídēs of Pontus (fl. 350 BC) was a pupil of Plato, playwright, and astronomer.

[U17]*

Fac enim sic animum interire ut corpus: num igitur aliquis dolor aut omnino post mortem sensus in corpore est? nemo id quidem dicit, etsi Democritum insimulat Epíkouros, Democritii negant.

For let the soul perish as the body: is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all in the body after death? No one, indeed, asserts that; though Epíkouros charges Dēmókritos with saying so; but the disciples of Dēmókritos deny it.

Ne in animo quidem igitur sensus remanet; ipse enim nusquam est – ubi igitur malum est, quoniam nihil tertium est? an quod ipse animi discessus a corpore non fit sine dolore? ut credam ita esse, quam est id exiguum! sed falsum esse arbitror, et fit plerumque sine sensu, non numquam etiam cum voluptate, totumque hoc leve est, qualecumque est; fit enim ad punctum temporis.

No sense, therefore, remains in the soul; for the soul is nowhere – where, then, is the evil? for there is nothing but these two things. Is it because the mere separation of the soul and body cannot be effected without pain? but even should that be granted, how small a pain must that be! Yet I think that it is false; and that it is very often unaccompanied by any sensation at all, and sometimes even attended with pleasure: but certainly the whole must be very trifling, whatever it is, for it is instantaneous.

12. Uncertainties **Διαπορίαι**

Laértios 10.27:

...Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. Διαπορίαι. Κύριαι Δόξαι...

...Against the Megarians. Uncertainties. Principal Doctrines...

[U18]

Laws

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 34 sup., 1127D

“Οτι δ’ οὐ νομοθέταις ἀλλὰ νόμοις ἐπολέμουν, ἔξεστιν ἀκούειν Ἐπικούρου: ἐρωτᾷ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις "εἰ πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφός, ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει" καὶ ἀποκρίνεται "οὐκ εὖοδον τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστι κατηγόρημα" – τουτέστι 'πράξω μὲν οὐ βούλομαι δ’ ὁμολογεῖν.' πάλιν δέ, οἶμαι, γράφων πρὸς Ἰδομενέα διακελεύεται "μὴ νόμοις καὶ δόξαις δουλεύοντα ζῆν – ἐφ’ ὅσον ἂν μὴ τήν διὰ τοῦ πέλας ἐκ πληγῆς ὄχλησιν παρασκευάζωσιν."

* "The simple (minded) set-up is not easy (to navigate)"

* "to live without being enslaved to laws and opinions – insofar as they do not cause disturbance by a strike from another person ."

But that they made war not against the lawgivers but against the laws themselves, one may hear and understand from Epíkouros. For in his *Uncertainties*, he asks himself "whether a wise man, will do any thing that the laws forbid, being assured that it will not be known." and he answers "that is not so easy to determine simply" – which means 'I will do it indeed, but I am not willing to confess it.' And again, I suppose, writing to Idomeneús, he exhorts him "not to make his life a slave to the laws or to the opinions of men – unless it be to avoid the trouble they prepare, by scourge and chastisement, so near at hand."

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.9.28

Ex eo quod eam uoluptatem, quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant, uidetur amplexari saepe uehementius, in magnis interdum uersatur angustiis – ut hominum conscientia remota nihil tam turpe sit quod uoluptatis causa non uideatur esse facturus.

Because he seems often **more vehement in embracing the pleasure** which all people call **by that name**, he sometimes finds himself in great difficulties – so that, with human conscience set aside, there seems to be nothing so disgraceful that he would not appear to do it for the sake of pleasure.

He often seems unduly eager to approve of pleasure in the common definition of term, and this occasionally lands him in a very awkward position – it conveys the impression that that no action is so base that he wouldn't do it for the sake of pleasure, as long as a guarantee of secrecy was provided.

[U19]

Marriage

[=U94] *Laértios 10.119*

καὶ μὴ{δὲ} καὶ γαμήσειν καὶ τεκνοποιήσῃν τὸν Σοφόν, ὥς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς **Διαπορίαις** – καὶ ἐν τοῖς **Περὶ Φύσεως**, κατὰ περίστασιν δέ ποτε βίου **γαμήσειν καὶ διατραπήσεσθαι Τίνας**

and the wise Man is not even going to marry and sire children, as Epíkouros says in his "*Uncertainties*" – and [he says] in "*On Nature*" that [some wise men] will marry at some point according to circumstance in [their] life and some will refuse [to marry]

γαμεῖν	to marry	ΓΑΜΕΙΝ <i>marriage</i>
γαμήσειν	going to marry	
τεκνοποιεῖν	to sire children	ΤΕΚΝΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>child gathering</i>
τεκνοποιήσῃν	going to sire children	
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
ἡ διαπορία αἱ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ <i>doubting across</i>
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epíkouros	
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ἡ περίστασις αἱ περιστάσεις	circumstance	ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>around together</i>
διατρέπειν	to refuse	ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>turning thoroughly</i>

Children

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, Πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον 1 - 10

Ἐπινοεῖ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ὅτι φύσει ἐσμὲν κοινωνικοί, ἀλλ’ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ **κελύφει** θεὶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν. πάλιν γὰρ ἐκείνου λίαν κρατεῖ ὅτι "οὐ δεῖ **ἀπεσπασμένον οὐδὲν τῆς** τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ **οὐσίας** οὔτε θαυμάζειν οὔτ’ ἀποδέχεσθαι" καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ.

Even Epíkouros perceives that we are by nature social, but having once placed our good in the husk [in the body] he is no longer able to say anything else. For again, he strongly says that "it is necessary to not marvel at nor accept **anything apart from the property** of the good" and he is right in maintaining this.

Even Epíkouros is sensible that we are by nature sociable beings; but having once placed our good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing afterwards inconsistent with that; for again, he strenuously maintains that "we ought not to admire or accept anything separated from the nature of good" and he is in the right to maintain it.

Πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσικὴ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία; διὰ τί ἀποσυμβουλευεῖς τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; διὰ γὰρ τὸν μῦν τὸν ἔσω τρεφόμενον ἐμπίπτει; τί οὖν αὐτῷ μέλει, ἂν μυΐδιον μικρὸν ἔσω κατακλαίῃ αὐτοῦ;

How then are we concerned [for them], if we have no natural affection to our children? Why then do you advise the wise man not to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may thus fall into trouble? For does he fall into trouble on account of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What does he care if a tiny little mouse **inside** [the house] cries out to him?

But how, then, arise any affectionate anxieties, unless there be such a thing as natural affection towards our offspring? Then why do you, Epíkouros, dissuade a wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid that upon their account he may fall into anxieties? Does he fall into any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What is it to him, if a little mouse bewails itself there?

Ἄλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι, ἂν ἅπαξ γένηται παιδίον, οὐκέτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι μὴ στέργειν μηδὲ φροντίζειν ἐπ' αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα: οἶδεν γὰρ τίνα δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν πολιτευόμενον: ἐπεῖτοι εἰ ὥς ἐν μυΐαις μέλλεις ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τί κωλύει;

But [Epíkouros] knows that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care about it. For this reason, Epíkouros says, that a man who has any sense also does not engage in political matters; for he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such things; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as you would **among a swarm of flies**, what hinders you?

But Epíkouros knew that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for it. On the same grounds he says that a wise man will not engage himself in public business, knowing very well what must follow. If men are only so many flies, why should he not engage in it?

Ἄλλ' ὅμως εἰδὼς ταῦτα τολμᾷ λέγειν ὅτι "μὴ ἀναιρώμεθα τέκνα." ἀλλὰ πρόβατον μὲν οὐκ ἀπολείπει τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔγγονον οὐδὲ λύκος, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἀπολείπει; τί θέλεις; μωρούς ἡμᾶς εἶναι ὥς τὰ πρόβατα; οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα ἀπολείπει. θηριώδεις ὥς τοὺς λύκους; οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι ἀπολ εἰπousιν.

But Epíkouros, who knows this, ventures to say that "we should not bring up **children**." But a sheep does not desert its own offspring, nor yet a wolf; and shall a man desert his child? What do you mean? that we should be as silly as sheep? but not even do they desert their offspring: or as savage as wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young.

And does he, who knows all this, dare to say "we should not raise **children**"? Not even a sheep, or a wolf, deserts its offspring; and shall man? What would you have, that we should be as silly as sheep? Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them.

Ἄγε, τίς δέ σοι πείθεται ἰδὼν παιδίον αὐτοῦ κλαῖον ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πεπτωκός; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐμαντεύσατο ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτι μέλλεις ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν σε ἔρριψαν.

Well, who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping after falling on the ground? For my part I think that even if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle that you would say what you have said, they still would not have cast you away.

Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his child fallen upon the ground and crying? For my part, I am of opinion that your father and mother, even if they could have foreseen that you would have been the author of such doctrines, would not have thrown you away.

Epicurus uoluptatis assertor, quamquam Mētródōros discipulus eius Leóntion habuerit uxorem, raro dicit sapienti ineunda coniugia, quia multa incommoda admixta sunt nuptiis.

Epíkouros, champion of pleasure, though his disciple Mētródōros had Leóntion as his wife, he said the wise rarely enter into marriage, seeing that marriage entails many nuisances.

Et quomodo diuitiae et honores et corporum sanitates et cetera quae indifferentia nominamus, nec bona nec mala sunt sed uelut in meditullio posita usu et euentu uel bona uel mala fiunt – ita et uxores sitas in bonorum malorumque confinio.

And just as riches, honors, bodily health, and other things which we call indifferent, are neither good nor bad, but stand "midway" so to speak, and become good and bad according to the use and issue – in this way, wives stand on the borderline of good and bad.

Graue autem esse uiro sapienti uenire in dubium, utrum bonam an malam ducturus sit.

It is, moreover, a serious matter for a Sage to ponder whether he is going to marry a good or a bad woman.

[U20]

Poetry

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1095C

Καίτοι τᾶλλα μὲν ἡμῖν ὥς ἐπῆλθεν εἴρηται μουσικὴν δ’ ὅσας ἡδονὰς καὶ χάριτας οἷας φέρουσιν ἀποστρέφονται καὶ φεύγουσι, βουλόμενος οὐκ ἂν τις ἐκλάθοιτο, δι’ ἀτοπίαν ὧν Ἐπίκουρος λέγει.

So far I have mentioned their views just as they happened to occur to me, but no one could forget, even if he wished, their rejection and avoidance of music with the great pleasures and exquisite delight it brings; the absurd discrepancy of Epíkouros' statements sees to that.

Φιλοθέωρον μὲν ἀποφαίνων τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις καὶ χαίροντα παρ’ ὄντινοῦν ἕτερον ἀκροάμασι καὶ θεάμασι Διονυσιακοῖς, προβλήμασι μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺς χώραν.

On the one hand, he declares in his *Uncertainties* that the Sage is a lover of spectacles and yields to none in the enjoyment of theatrical recitals and shows; but on the other, he does not allow room for musical problems or critical philological inquiries [even] with a drink.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλέων παραινῶν στρατιωτικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν προβλημάτων περαιομένους. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Βασιλείας*.

But he actually advises a cultivated monarch to put up with recitals of stratagems and with vulgar buffooneries at his drinking parties sooner than with the discussion of problems in music and poetry. Such is what he is presumed to have written in his book *On Kingship*.

[U21]*

Plutarch, Non Posse 1094E

“Ὅτι τοίνυν αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἐτησῖαι μαραίνονται μετὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ ἀπολήγουσιν, οὐ λέληθε τὸν Ἐπίκουρον:

Now it has not escaped Epíkouros that bodily pleasures, like the Etesian winds, after reaching their full force, slacken and fail.

Διαπορεῖ γοῦν, εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὦν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν καλῶν ἀφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσειν. οὐ ταῦτά μὲν τῷ Σοφοκλεῖ διανοούμενος, ἀσμένως ἐκφυγόντι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην, ὥσπερ ἄγριον καὶ λυττῶντα δεσπότην.

Thus he raises the problem, if the old wise man, not being able to have intercourse, still enjoys the touches and caresses of the beautiful. In this he is not of the same mind as Sophocles, who was as glad to have got beyond reach of this pleasure as of a savage and furious master.

13. On Fair Dealing **Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας**

Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα. Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας. Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν...

...On Lifecourses, in four books. On Fair Dealing. Neoklēs, Dedicated to Themísta...

14. On Justice & the Other Virtues **Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν**

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Μουσικῆς. Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν. Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος...

...On Music. On Justice and Other Virtues. On Gifts and Gratitude...

Cicero, de finibus 2.16, 51

Istorum uerborum, quae perraro appellantur ab Epicuro: sapientiae fortitudinis iustitiae temperantiae.

Those words, which are very rarely used by Epíkouros: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance.

15. On Gifts and Gratitude **Περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος**

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν. Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος. Πολυμήδης...

...On Justice and Other Virtues. On Gifts and Gratitude. Polymédēs...

[U22]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 1.49

Πλὴν διττῆς οὔσης γραμματικῆς ^[1] τῆς μὲν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς τούτων συμπλοκάς διδάξειν ἐπαγγελλομένης καὶ καθόλου τέχνης τινὸς οὔσης τοῦ γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν ^[2] τῆς δὲ βαθυτέρας παρὰ ταύτην δυνάμεως· οὐκ ἐν ψιλῇ γραμμάτων γνώσει κειμένης, ἀλλὰ κὰν τῷ ἐξετάζειν τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα λόγου μέρη καὶ εἴ τι τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας θεωρεῖται, πρόκειται – νῦν ἀντιλέγειν οὐ τῇ προτέρᾳ. συμφώνως γὰρ κατὰ πάντας ἐστὶ χρειώδης.

However, with the study of grammar being twofold ^[1] the one promising to teach the elements and their combinations and being in general an art of writing and reading, and ^[2] the other being, in comparison, a deeper ability: not consisting merely in the bare knowledge of letters but also in the investigation of their discovery and their nature, and in addition the parts of speech composed of letters and all other matters of the same kind – it is not our purpose now to invalidate the first; for that it is useful is agreed by all men.

Ἐν οἷς θετέον καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, εἰ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διεχθραίνειν· ἐν γοῦν τῷ περὶ Δώρων καὶ Χάριτος ἱκανῶς πειρᾶται διδάσκειν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τοῖς σοφοῖς μανθάνειν γράμματα. καὶ ἄλλως, εἵπαιμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς, οὐ σοφοῖς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις.

And amongst them we must place Epikouros, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the Professors of Arts and Sciences; in his book *On Gifts and Gratitude* he definitely tries to prove that it is necessary for the wise to learn grammar. Necessary, as we should say, not for the wise only but for all men.

16. On Films Περὶ Εἰδώλων

Laértios 10.28

...Προτρεπτικός. Περὶ Εἰδώλων. Περὶ Φαντασίας...

...Exhortation to Study Philosophy. On Films. On Sensory Presentation...

17. On Destiny Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Ἀφῆς. Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης. Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην...

...On the Sensation of Touch. On Destiny. On Theories about Feelings, against Timokrátēs...

[U23]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.37.1061

...Κὰν τ[ὼι γε Π]ερὶ τῆς Εἰμ[αρμέ]νης ὑπὲρ τ[ῆς] ἐκ[εῖ]νων συνεργί[ας] ἀποφαίνεται.

...Κὰν τ[ὼι γε Π]ερὶ τῆς Εἰμ[αρμέ]νης ὑπὲρ τ[ῆς] ἐκ[εῖ]νων συνεργί[ας] ἀποφαίνεται.

And in his book *On Destiny* there is an exposition concerning the assistance provided by them.

18. The Big Summary

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.39

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ Φησι κατ' ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ᾧ Περί Φύσεως} τὸ Πᾶν ἐστι σώματα καὶ κενόν: σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὥς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ Αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ – καθ' ἣν, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ Ἄδηλον τῷ λογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον

but indeed {He also says this in the *Larger Epitome* near the beginning and in his First Book *On Nature*} the Universe exists as bodies and as void: that bodies exist, Sensation itself in all [cases] testifies – using this [sensation], the Unseen must be inferred by reasoning

τεκμαίρεσθαι	to judge [from indications]	ΤΕΚΜΑΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ definitive sign [of boundary]
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Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.40

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περί Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ' καὶ ιε' καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μὲν ἐστι συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [book] *On Nature* and in the 14th and 15th and in the *Larger Epitome*} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [are bodies] out of which compounds are made

[=U79] Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.73

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἰδίον τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες – καθ' ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περί Φύσεως καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We internalize, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] – according to which We use the word "Time" {He says this in both the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

[Hicks] "No further proof is required we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts – and likewise to feelings [of pleasure and pain] and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word 'time.'"

[Bailey] "For indeed this requires no demonstration, but only reflection, to show that it is with days and nights and their divisions that we associate it – and likewise also with internal feelings or absence of feeling, and with movements and states of rest; in connection with these last again we think of this very perception as a peculiar kind of accident, and in virtue of this we call it time."

The Minor Abridgment is usually considered to be the letter to Hēródotos, but the quote below is not preserved in the letter to Hēródotos.

Laértios 10.135

μαντικήν δ' ἅπασαν ἐν ἄλλοις Ἀναιρεῖ, ὥς καὶ ἐν τῇ Μικρᾷ Ἐπιτομῇ, καί φησι "μαντική οὐσα ἀνύπαρκτος – εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτή: οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡγητέα Γινόμενα"

in other [writings], [Epíkouros] rejects all divination, as in the Short Epitome, and says "divination is non-existent – but even if existent: What comes from it ought to be considered nothing to us"

In other places, he refutes every type of prognostication, as in The Small Summary, saying that "prognostication does not exist, and if even if it did, we must regard whatever it predicts as nothing to us."

ἀνύπαρκτος (ov)	non-existent	ΑΝΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ without existing
ὑπαρκτός (ή, όν)	existent	ΥΠΑΡΚΤΟΣ

Divination does not exist. However, even if the predictions of diviners were real and sufficiently unambiguous to be actionable – those predictions still could not add anything to our life: because they cannot add to our already existing state of total pleasure (which we already easily achieve by fulfilling our natural and necessary needs).
Consider Torquatus (De Finibus 1.72) "Should [Epíkouros], like Plato, have wasted his days studying music, geometry, arithmetic and astronomy? Those subjects start from false premises and so cannot be true. And even if they were true, they have no bearing on whether we live more pleasantly."

20. On Love
Περὶ Ἔρωτος

Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Ἀτόμων καὶ Κενοῦ. Περὶ Ἔρωτος. Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικοὺς...

...On the Atoms and the Void. On Love. Summary of Objections to the Physicists...

21. Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros
Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον

Laértios 10.28

...Συμπόσιον. Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον. Περὶ τοῦ Ὅραν...

...Symposium. Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros. On Vision...

22. On Piety
Περὶ Εὐσεβείας

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.14.115

(Cotta) At etiam De Sanctitate, De Pietate aduersus deos libros scripsit Epíkouros. at quo modo in his loquitur? ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaeuolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas, non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem – nec manibus, ut Xerxes, sed rationibus – deorum immortalium templa et aras euerterit.

(Cotta) It is true that Epíkouros wrote books *On Sanctity* and *On Reverence* towards the gods. But what does he actually say? You would imagine that you were listening to the high priests such as Coruncianus or Scaevola and not to the man who destroyed the whole foundation of religious faith – not by **by force**, as Xerxes did, but **by deliberation** – and overturned the altars and the temples of the gods.

Quid est enim cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dei non modo homines non colant – sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant?

How can you say that mankind should revere the gods, if the gods **not only** have no care for **man** – but they care for **nothing whatsoever**, doing **nothing**?

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.14.123

(Cotta) **At etiam liber est Epicuri *De Sanctitate*. Iudimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero! quae enim potest esse sanctitas – si di humana non curant?**

(Cotta) But there even is a book by Epíkouros *On Sanctity*. In this book the reader is fooled by a man who wrote not so much with irony as with wild abandon! For how is holiness able to exist – if the gods do not care **for humans**?

23. Hēgēsíanax **Ἡγησιάνναξ**

Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Ὁσιότητος. Ἡγησιάνναξ. Περὶ Βίων, Τέσσαρα...

...On Holiness. Hēgēsíanax. On Lifecourses, in four books...

[=U120] Plutarch, Non Posse, 1101A

(ὅτι) τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμούς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς, μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι

To those who remove griefs and tears and sighs over the deaths of friends, and they oppose and say that

"τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ' ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης – διὸ, πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ, νῆ Δία, λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς καὶ τήκεσθαι"

"the painlessness which is established in impassivity exists because of another greater evil of harshness or of excessive pride and madness – therefore, to suffer something is better, and to grieve and, by god, to moisten the eyes and to melt into tears"

καὶ ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες ὑγροὶ τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἶρηκε καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἡγησιάννακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Δωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Φύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολὰς διήλθον αὐτοῦ...

and indeed they seem to be moist ^[tipsy] and friendly, both experiencing and writing such things. For Epíkouros has said these things in many other contexts and also in writing about the death of Hēgēsíanax to Dōsítheos, the father, and Phyrson, the brother of the deceased; for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

24. On Pleasure **Περὶ Ἡδονῆς**

Nos autem ita leues atque inconsiderati sumus, ut si mures corroserint aliquid, quorum est opus hoc unum, monstrum putemus?... nam si ista sequimur, quod Platonis Politian, nuper apud me, mures corroserunt de re publica debui pertimescere? aut si Epicuri *De Voluptate* liber rosus esset – putarem **annonam** in macello **cariorem** fore?

But are we simple and thoughtless enough to think it a portent for mice to gnaw something, when gnawing is their one business in life?... Hence, if one follows this type of reasoning, the fact that, recently at my house, mice gnawed my Plato's Republic, should I have been terrified about the [Roman] state? Or what if my book by Epíkouros *On Pleasure* had been eaten – should I have thought that **the yearly produce** in the market will be **more expensive**?

25. Themísta Θεμίστα

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.21.67

In uestris disputationibus historia muta est, numquam audiui in Epicuri schola Lycurgum Solonem Miltiadem Themistoclem Epaminondam nominari, qui in ore sunt ceterorum omnium philosophorum... nonne melius est de his aliquid quam tantis uoluminibus de Themísta loqui?

In your discourses, history is mute. In the school of Epíkouros, I never heard one mention of Lycurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Epaminondas, who are always on the lips of the other philosophers... Would it not be better to talk of these than to devote those bulky volumes to Themísta?

[U28]*

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 26.62

Inrisa est **abs te** paulo ante M. Pisonis cupiditas **triumphandi**... ea contemnis quae "illi idiotae" ut tu appellas, **praeclara** duxerunt... tu tantis nationibus subactis, tantis rebus gestis minime fructum laborum tuorum, praemia periculorum, uirtutis insignia contemnere debuisti. neque uero contempsisti, sis licet **Themísta** sapientior...

A short while ago Marcus Piso's desire **for a triumph** was **absurd to you**... and you despise the things which "those idiots" as you are pleased to call them, deemed **glorious**... You, who have conquered nations so mighty, and done deeds so spirited, ought to have been the last to despise the fruit of your labors, the rewards of your risks, and the decoration due to your heroism. Nor indeed did you despise them, even if [you are] wiser **than Themísta**...

After his praetorship, Marcus Pupius Piso Frugi Calpurnianus was assigned the province of Spain as proconsul, and when he returned to Rome in 69 BC, he was given a triumph. Lucretius was around 30 years old at the time.

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 25.60

Vertes te ad alteram scholam; disseres de triumpho "quid tandem habet iste currus, quid vincti ante currum duces, quid simulacra oppidorum, quid aurum, quid argentum, quid legati in equis et tribuni, quid clamor militum, quid tota illa pompa? **inania** sunt ista, mihi crede, delectamenta paene puerorum, captare plausus, vehi per urbem, conspici velle. quibus ex rebus nihil est quod **solidum** tenere, nihil quod referre **ad voluptatem corporis** possis."

Turn to another school, and then speak thus of a triumph "What is the meaning of that chariot? What is the use of those generals bound in front of the chariot? and of the images of towns? and of the gold? and of the silver? and of the lieutenants on horseback? and of the tribunes? What avail all the shouts of the soldiery? and all that procession? To hunt for applause, to be carried through the city, to wish to be gazed upon? Those are mere trifles, believe me, things to please children. There is nothing in all those things which you can grasp as solid, nothing which you can refer to [as causing] pleasure to the body."

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.65

Fac huius odi tanti ac tam universi periculum, si audes. instant post hominum memoriam apparatissimi magnificentissimique ludi, quales non modo numquam fuerunt, sed ne quo modo fieri quidem posthac possint possum ullo pacto suspicari. da te populo, committe ludis. sibilum metuis? ubi sunt vestrae scholae?

Make an experiment of this excessive and universal hatred if you dare. The most carefully prepared and magnificent games within the memory of man are just at hand, games such as not only never have been exhibited, but such that we cannot form a conception how it will be possible for any like them ever to be exhibited for the future. Trust yourself to the people, join in the games. Are you afraid of hisses? Where are all the precepts of your schools?

Ne acclametur times? ne id quidem est curare philosophi. manus tibi ne adferantur? "dolor enim est malum" ut tu disputas; existimatio, dedecus, infamia, turpitudine verba atque ineptiae! sed de hoc non dubito: non audebit accedere ad ludos. convivium publicum non dignitatis causa inibit, nisi forte ut cum P. Clodio, hoc est cum amoribus suis, cenet, sed plane animi sui causa – ludos nobis 'idiotis' relinquet.

Are you afraid that there will be no acclamations raised in your honor? Surely it does not become a philosopher to regard even such a thing as that. You are afraid that violent hands may be laid on you? "Indeed, pain is evil" as you assert. The opinion which men entertain of you, disgrace, infamy, baseness – these are all empty words, mere trifles! But about this I have no question: he will never dare to come near the games. He will attend the public banquet not out of regard for his dignity (unless, perchance, for the purpose of supping with Publius Clodius, that is to say, with those men who love him) but merely for the sake of gratifying his appetite – the games he will leave to us 'idiots.'

26. Against Theóphrastos

in at least two books

Πρὸς Θεόφραστον

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.93

(Cotta) ...Quando quidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem voltis. Istisne fidentes somniis – non modo Epikouros et Mētródōros et Hermárchos contra Pythagoram Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt – sed meretricula etiam Leóntion contra Theophrastum scribere ausast? scito, illa quidem sermone et Attico – sed tamen, tantum Epicūri hortus habuit licentiae! (et soletis queri; Zēnō quidem etiam litigabat) quid dicam Albutium?

(Cotta) ...Since indeed you want these [parts of the body] to exist in god because of beauty. Believing in these dreams [of anthropomorphic gods] – not only Epikouros, Mētródōros, and Hērmarchos spoke against Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles – but even that little harlot Leóntion dared to write against Theóphrastos? Mind you, she indeed [wrote] even in the Attic diction – nevertheless, so much did the garden of Epikouros have of these liberties! (as you all are accustomed to complain; indeed, Zēnō even used to litigate.) Why need I mention Albutius?

[Rackham] ...Since your school holds that god possesses bodily parts because of their beauty. Was it dreams like these that not only encouraged Epíkouros and Metrodorus and Hérmarchos to contradict Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but actually emboldened a loose woman like Leóntion to write a book refuting Theophrastus? Her style no doubt is the neatest of Attic, but all the same! such was the license that prevailed in the Garden of Epíkouros. And yet you are touchy yourselves, indeed Zeno actually used to invoke the law. I need not mention Albucius.

Titus Albucius (praetor c. 105 BC) studied in Athens and was well known in Rome for his interest in Greek literature generally, and Epicurus specifically. Cicero remarked that he was "nearly a Greek."
He unsuccessfully accused Mucius Scaevola, the augur, of maladministration in his province. In turn, he was accused of the same offense by Gaius Julius Caesar (the elder) in 103 BC and was condemned.
Although he faced satire from Lucilius and criticism from Cicero, Albucius' commitment to the Greek language and philosophy was present throughout his life. He continued his philosophical endeavors during his exile in Athens.

Nam **Phaedro** nihil elegantius nihil humanius, sed stomachabatur senex si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epíkouros **Aristotelem** vexarit **contumeliosissime**, Phaedoni Socratico **turpissime** male dixerit. **Metrodori sodalis sui fratrem Timocraten**, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, **totis voluminibus** conciderit. **in Democritum ipsum** quem secutus est fuerit ingratus – **Nausiphanem magistrum suum (a quo non nihil didicerat)** tam male acceperit.

Nothing could be more elegant or humane **than Phaedrus**, but the old man was offended if I said something rather harsh. Epíkouros treated **Aristotle with the most contempt**. Phaedo, the disciple of Socrates, he **fouly** slandered. He also pelted **Timokrátēs, the brother of his companion Mētródōros, with whole volumes** because he disagreed with him in some trifling point of philosophy. He was ungrateful even **to Dēmókritos himself**, whose follower he was; **Nausiphánēs, his teacher (from whom he had learned something)** he treated very badly.

As for Phaedrus, though he was the most refined and courteous of old gentlemen, he used to lose his temper if I spoke too coarsely; although Epíkouros attacked Aristotle in the most insulting manner, abused Socrates' pupil Phaedo quite outrageously, devoted whole volumes to an onslaught on Timokrátēs, the brother of his own associate Metrodorus, for differing from him on some point or other of philosophy, showed no gratitude toward Dēmókritos himself, whose system he adopted, and treated so badly his own master Nausiphánēs, from whom he learned something.

Pliny, Inquiry on Nature, Preface 28 - 30

Ego, plane **meis adici posse multa** confiteor, nec **his solis**, sed et **omnibus quos** edidi, ut obiter caveam '**istos Homeromastigas**' (ita enim verius dixerim) quoniam audio et **Stoicos et dialecticos, Epicureos** quoque (nam **de grammaticis** semper expectavi) **parturire adversus libellos quos de grammatica** edidi, et subinde **abortus facere iam decem annis** – cum celerius etiam elephantī pariant!

I plainly confess that **many things can be added to my works**, not only **to these alone**, but also **to all that** I have published, so that in passing I may insure myself against '**those scourges of Homer**' (that would be the more correct term) as I am informed that both the **Stoics** and the **dialecticians**, and even **Epicureans** (for I have always expected [this] **regarding the grammarians**) **they are laboring against the booklets** I published on **grammar**, and **for ten years now they've had miscarriages** – while even elephants give birth more quickly!

Homēromastix		HOMEROMASTIX
Homēromastīgēs		ΟΜΗΡΟΜΑΣΤΙΞ
	an editor	<i>Homer whipper</i>
Ὁμηρομάστιξ		
οἱ Ὀμηρομάστιγες		

Ceu vero nesciam **adversus Theophrastum (hominem in eloquentia tantum ut nomen 'divinum' inde invenerit)** **scripsisse etiam feminam et proverbium inde natum "suspensio arborem eligendi."**

As if indeed I did not know that against Theóphrastos (a man so distinguished in eloquence he derived the name 'divine' from it) a woman even did the writing and from there a proverb was born "choosing a tree for hanging."

This proverb can probably be interpreted that Theóphrastos is the tree, and Leóntion, by choosing to write against (from Pliny's perspective) such an eloquent man as Theóphrastos, was "choosing a tree to hang herself on." That is, she was "destroying her reputation" specifically, and the garden generally, by writing her book.

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 5/6

...τῶν βαθυτέρων ὡς ἐν [δέ]χεται φανότατα πέφρασ[θαι] καὶ νοεῖ ταυτό παν[ταχῇ]. ὥδε ποῦ δυνησό[μεθ' ἐκ βυβλί]ων σοφώ[τατ' ἐ]ξενεγκεῖν; ἐ[πι]ιδεῖ[κνυ]ται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν [ὅλων ἐν το]ῖς βυβλίοις, τα[ράττων καὶ] θρυλῶν ὅτι Λε[όν]τιον καὶ ἑτέρα «ἐταῖρα» τις ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ μνημονεύεται – καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἐρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαρμά[ρι]ον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημη[τρ]ία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθο[κλ]έους πι[αιδ]αγωγὸς Πολύ[αινος]...

...τῶν βαθυτέρων, ὡς Ἐνδέχεται φανότατα πέφρασθαι – καὶ Νοεῖ ταυτό πανταχῇ: ὥδε, ποῦ Δυνησόμεθ' ἐκ βυβλίων σοφώτατ' ἐξενεγκεῖν; Ἐπιδείκνυται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν ὅλων ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις, ταραττων καὶ θρυλῶν ὅτι Λεόντιον καὶ ἑτέρα Ἐταῖρα τις ἐν τῇ πραγματεία μνημονεύεται, καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἐρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαρμάριον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημητρία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθοκλέους παιδαγωγὸς Πολύαινος...

...regarding deeper matters, how They are able to have been expressed most clearly – He also perceives this everywhere: so, where will We be able to extract the wisest [insights] from books? while He displays [his mental] retention of everything within the books, he [also] stirs up and chatters that Leóntion and some other Courtesan are mentioned in the work, and that the lover of Idomeneús was Nikíðion, and of Leonteús was Mammáριον, and of Hérmarchos was Dēmētría – and such a kind also was Pythoclês' tutor Polýaenus...

The "other companion" is probably Themísta. Nikíðion was the lover of Idomeneus, Mammáριον was the lover of Leonteús, Demetria was the lover of Hérmarchos, and Polyaenus was the tutor of Pythoclês.

Pliny, Inquiry on Nature, 35.144

Theorus *Se Inungentem*, idem *Ab Oreste Matrem et Aegisthum Interfici*, *Bellumque Iliacum pluribus tabulis*, quod est *Romae in Philippi Porticibus*, et *Cassandram*, quae est in *Concordiae Delubro*, *Leontium* (Epicuri) *Cogitantem*, *Demetrium Regem*...

[The painter] Theorus [painted] a "*Man Anointing Himself*," and also "*Mother and Aegisthus killed by Orestes*," and the "*Trojan War*" in a series of pictures which is now in Philippus' Portico at Rome and a "*Cassandra*," which is in the Shrine of Concordia, a "*Leóntion* (of Epíkouros) *Contemplating*," "*Demetrius the King*" [more paintings are listed]...

The Temple of Concord (Concordiae Delubrum) was a Roman temple at the western end of the Forum, near the Capitoline Hill, dedicated to Concordia, the goddess of harmony. It symbolized reconciliation between the patricians and plebeians.

The Demetrius mentioned as "Demetrium regem" (King Demetrius) in this passage is most likely Demetrius I Poliorcetes, Epíkouros' contemporary.

[U29]

Book 2

Aetius, Doxography, 1.15,9

Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος τὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ σώματα χροάν οὐκ ἔχειν.

* Epíkouros and Arístarchos [say] that objects in the dark do not have color.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1110B - D

Ὅτι δὲ **τούτοις** **πρὸς πᾶν** ἔστι χρῆσθαι τὸ καλούμενον καὶ νομιζόμενον πικρὸν, γλυκὺ, καθαρτικὸν, ὑπνωτικὸν, φωτεινόν: ὥς οὐδενὸς ἔχοντος **αὐτοτελῆ ποιότητα** καὶ **δύναμιν**, οὐδὲ δρῶντος μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχοντος, ὅταν ἐγγένηται **τοῖς σώμασιν**, **ἄλλην** δ' **ἐν ἄλλοις** **διαφορὰν** καὶ **κρᾶσιν** λαμβάνοντος – οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν.

Because it is possible to use **these** [arguments in support of relative impressions of the senses] **for everything** that is called and considered bitter, sweet, cathartic, soporific, and illuminating: as none of these have any **self-sufficient quality** and **power** or are active rather than passive when they enter **into** [our] **bodies**, but takes on **other forms** and **mixtures** in different [bodies] – this is not obscure.

Αὐτὸς γὰρ οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος **ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Πρὸς Θεόφραστον** "οὐκ εἶναι" λέγων **"τὰ χρώματα συμφυῇ τοῖς σώμασιν – ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιᾶς τινος τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν"** οὐ μᾶλλον φησι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀχρωμάτιστον σῶμα εἶναι ἢ χρῶμα ἔχον.

Epíkouros himself in the second book of his *Reply to Theóphrastos* says that "colors are not **intrinsic to bodies** – but a result of certain arrangements and positions relative **to the eye**" is asserting by this reasoning that body is no more colorless than colored.

× "colors are not **inherent in objects** – but are generated according to some specific orders and positions in relation to sight."

Ἀνωτέρῳ δὲ **κατὰ λέξιν** ταῦτα γέγραφεν "ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τούτου τοῦ μέρους, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως δεῖ **τὰ ἐν τῷ σκοτεῖ ταῦτ' ὄντα** φῆσαι **χρώματα** ἔχειν – καίτοι πολλάκις **ἀέρος ὁμοίως σκοτώδους περιεχυμένου**: οἱ μὲν αἰσθάνονται **χρωμάτων διαφορᾶς**, οἱ δ' οὐκ αἰσθάνονται **δι' ἀμβλύτητα τῆς ὀψεως**! ἔτι δ' εἰσελθόντες **εἰς σκοτεινὸν οἶκον**, **οὐδεμίαν ὄψιν χρώματος** ὁρῶμεν – ἀναμείναντες δὲ μικρὸν, ὁρῶμεν."

× Previously, however, he has written these things **verbatim** "But even without this part, I do not know how it is necessary to say that **those things which are in the dark** have colors – and yet, often, **with similarly dark air surrounding**: some people have perception of **differences of colors**, while others do not have a perception **due to the dimness of vision**! Moreover, having entered **into a dark room**, we see **no sight of color** – but having waited a little, we see."

Οὐ, μᾶλλον οὖν, **ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα** ῥηθήσεται **τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον**. εἰ δὲ τὸ χρῶμα **πρὸς τι**, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἔσται **πρὸς τι** καὶ τὸ κυανοῦν – εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν: ὥστε, **κατὰ πάσης ποιότητος, ἀληθῶς τὸ "μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι"** **κατηγορεῖσθαι** – **τοῖς γὰρ οὕτω πάσχουσιν** ἔσται **τοιοῦτον**, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ **τοῖς μὴ πάσχουσι**.

Therefore, it will not be said that **each of the objects has** or **does not have color**. But if color exists with respect **to something**, then both white and blue will exist with respect **to something** – and if these, then also sweet and bitter: therefore, **according to every quality, it is truly said** that "it is no more to be than not to be" – for it will be **like this for those affected in this way**, but it will not be **for those not affected**.

Therefore no body will any more be said to have colour than not. If colour is relative, white and blue will be relative – and if these, then also sweet and bitter: so that of every characteristic we can truly say "It is no more this than it is not this" for to those affected in a certain way the thing will be this, but not to those not so affected.

...Χαιρέδημος. Περὶ Θεῶν. Περὶ Ὁσιότητος...

...Chairédēmos. On the Gods. On Holiness...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1102 B - D

...Μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως ἀτερπὲς αὐτῷ καὶ λυπηρόν: ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις (οὐδὲν δεόμενος) διὰ τὸν φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ: καὶ θύων – μὲν ὡς μαγεῖρω – παρέστηκε τῷ ἱερεῖ σφάττοντι. θύσας δ', ἅπεισι λέγων τὸ Μενάνδρειον "ἔθουον οὐ προσέχουσιν οὐδὲν μοι θεοῖς."

Rather, [a festival] is entirely unpleasant and painful to [Epíkouros]: (although needing nothing) he feigns prayers and acts of worship because of the fear of the many, and he speaks words contrary to what he philosophizes: and while sacrificing – as if by a cook – he stands by the slaughtering priest. And, having sacrificed, he goes away while quoting the Menandrian line "I sacrifice to gods who pay no attention to me at all."

Οὕτω γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἶεται δεῖν σχηματίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ φθονεῖν μηδ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἷς χαίρουσιν ἕτεροι πράττοντες, αὐτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας. "πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον Πρᾶγμ' ἀνιηρόν ἔφυ" κατὰ τὸν Εὐήνον – ἧ καὶ τοὺς Δεισιδαίμονας, οὐ χαίροντας ἀλλὰ φοβουμένους, οἶονται θυσίαις καὶ τελεταῖς ὁμιλεῖν.

For in this way Epíkouros thinks that it is necessary to conform oneself and not to envy nor to be hostile to the many things which others rejoice when practicing, while they find it troublesome themselves. "every necessary Thing is difficult" according to Eúēnos [Páros] – whereby they also think that the Superstitious, not while rejoicing but while fearing, engage with sacrifices and rituals.

μηδὲν ἐκείνων Αὐτοὶ διαφέροντες, εἴ γε δὴ διὰ φόβον ταῦτά δρῶσιν, οὐδ' ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς ὅσον ἐκείνοι μεταλαγχάνοντες – ἀλλὰ μόνον δεδιότες καὶ ταραπτόμενοι μὴ φανεροὶ γένωνται, τοὺς πολλοὺς παραλογιζόμενοι καὶ φενακίζοντες – ἐφ' οὗς καὶ τὰ Περὶ Θεῶν καὶ Ὁσιότητος αὐτοῖς Βιβλία συντέτακται "ἐλικτὰ κούδεν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ πᾶν περίξ" ἐπαμπεχομένοις καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένοις διὰ φόβον ἃς ἔχουσι δόξας.

Themselves [the Epicureans] differing in no way from the others, if indeed they do the same things because of fear, while not sharing as much good hope as those [the rest of the public] – but only fearing and being troubled lest they become exposed, while deceiving and cheating the many – for whom also the Books *About the Gods* and *Piety* have been composed by them, "twisted and nothing sound, but everything around" who cover up and conceal in fear the opinions they hold.

[Euripides, *Andromeda*, 448] "ἐλικτὰ κούδεν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ πᾶν περίξ φρονοῦντες."

× "Twisted and unsound [thoughts] – but thinking everything around."

[U31]

Philódēmos, *On the Gods*, Book 3, P.Herc. 152 fr. 5

...Διαστέλλεται δὲ καὶ [πε]ρὶ τούτων ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Θεῶν – διό περ καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ σάρκινον φθορᾶς εἶναι δεκτικὸν λέγει...

...Epíkouros makes a distinction for these [the gods] in the book *On the Gods* – In which he also affirms that what is made of flesh is susceptible to decay...

[U32]

Philódēmos defends our school against charges of impiety by citing a passage from Epíkouros' On the Gods about how, although all flesh is susceptible to decay, the gods can exist as material compounds.

[Επι]κούρωι δ' ἐν [τῷ Περι Θεῶν "τὸ μὴ [τῇ φύσει τὴν α[ι]σ[θ]ανομένην σύγκρισιν ἔχον, σύμφω[νον τῷ θείῳ] – καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆς [φύσεως ὄν] μετεχού[σης τῶ]ν ἀλγηδό[νων, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀν]άγκης μα[λακίας πολ]λὰς ποῆσαι. [ἡ θεία φύ]σις οὕσα, [φαίνεται] καὶ τις [δαιμόνιος]

Ἐπικούρωι δ' ἐν τῷ Περι Θεῶν "τὸ μὴ τῇ φύσει τὴν αἰσθανομένην σύγκρισιν ἔχον, σύμφωνον τῷ θείῳ – καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆς φύσεως ὄν μετεχούσης τῶν ἀλγηδόνων, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης μαλακίας πολλὰς ποῆσαι. ἡ θεία φύσις οὕσα, φαίνεται καὶ τις δαιμόνιος"

and according to Epíkouros in *On the Gods* "that which does not have in its nature a sensitive constitution is consistent with divinity – and [divine nature appears to be] that which is not of the nature that partakes of pains, so that it necessarily creates many weaknesses – and to be a kind of divinity."

Oratio obliqua with the neuter article and participle is common in Epíkouros and Philódēmos.

[U33]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.44.1255

...Καὶ τὸ [ἀλλότρι]ον δι[α]λῦ[σαι, τε] καὶ [κο]σμή[σαι τὸ] κ[ατι]σχῶν [πᾶν – οὐ]δ[ὲ κ]ωλυόμε[νον] ταῦτα πράτ[τειν ἐν] τῷ Περι Θεῶν [φησιν.]

...Καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον διαλῦσαι, τε καὶ κοσμήσαι τὸ κατισχῶν πᾶν – οὐδὲ κωλυόμενον ταῦτα πράττειν ἐν τῷ Περι Θεῶν φησιν

※ ...And [the gods] dissolve the unfamiliar, and organize all that prevails – not being hindered in doing these things, [he mentions] in *On the Gods*.

[Obbink] ...And to dispel what is foreign to its nature, and to marshal all [its] overpowering strength – nor in *On the Gods* [does he say] anything conflicting with one's doing these things.

[U34]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.14.381

...[Εν] τῷ Περι Θε[ῶν ἀν]αμφιλέκτως τίθεται τὸ τὴν...

...Ἐν τῷ Περι Θεῶν ἀναμφιλέκτως τίθεται τὸ τὴν...

[Obbink] ...In his book *On the Gods* it is indisputably set forth that the...

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.36.1043

ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ Περι Θεῶν ποία [τίς ἐσ]τιν αἰτία ν[εμέσεως] καὶ σωτηρία[ς ανθρώ]ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ κα]ταλειπτέον ὑπ[ογρ]άφει διὰ πλεό[νων]. "Ἐν τε τῷ τρε[ισκαι]δεκάτῳ, περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἥ[ν πρὸς] τινὰς ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος]

ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ Περι Θεῶν ποία τίς ἐστιν Αἰτία νεμέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλειπτέον, Ὑπογράφει διὰ πλειόνων – ἐν τε τῷ τρεισκαιδεκάτῳ, περὶ τῆς οἰκειότητος ἦν πρὸς τινὰς ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος

[Epíkouros] writes with many [words] in the [book] *Concerning the Gods*, what kind of Cause for vengeance and security exists that must be thoroughly left behind for men through a god – and in the 13th [book, Epíkouros writes] about the familiarity and the alienation that a God has with certain [people]

...Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην. Καλλιστόλας. Περὶ Βασιλείας...

...Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs. Kallistólas. On Kingship...

29. On Criterion, or Canon Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανών

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Τέλους. Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανών. Χαιρέδημος...

...On the End Goal. On the Criterion, or The Canon. Chairédēmos...

Athēnaïos, Deipnosophists, 3.102B (Damoxenes, The Cook)

A. Ἐπικούρου δέ με ὀρᾷς μαθητὴν ὄντα τοῦ σοφοῦν – παρ’ ᾧ ἐν δὺ ἔτεσιν καὶ μηνσὶν οὐχ ὅλοις δέκα τάλαντ’ ἐγώ σοι κατεπύκνωσα τέτταρα.

A. You see me here as a pupil of the wise Epíkouros – from whom in two years and ten months or less, I condensed for you four talents.

B. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστίν; εἰπέ μοι.

B. What is this? tell me.

A. καθήγισα. μάγειρος ἦν κάκεϊνος – οὐκ ᾔδει, θεοί, ποῖος μάγειρος: "ἡ φύσις πάσης τέχνης ἀρχέγονον ἐστ’, ἀρχέγονον, ὦλιθήριε! οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν νοεῖν σοφώτερον! πᾶν τ’ εὐχερὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦ λόγου τριβὴν ἔχοντι τούτου – πολλὰ γὰρ συμβάλλεται!"

I have initiated. And that one was a cook – he did not know, oh gods, what kind of a cook: "Nature is the origin of every art, the origin, wretched man! There is not even one thing wiser to think of! Every act is easy for the one having experience of this reasoning – then many things come together!"

A. διόπερ μάγειρον ὅταν ἴδῃς ἀγράμματον μὴ Δημόκριτόν τε πάντα διανεγνωκότα (μᾶλλον δὲ κατέχοντα!) καταγέλα ὥς κενοῦ – καὶ τὸν Ἐπικούρου Κανόνα? μινθώσας, ἄφες! ὥς ἐκ διατριβῆς τοῦτο δεῖ γὰρ εἰδέναι: τίν’ ἔχει διαφορὰν πρῶτον (ὧ βέλτιστε σύ) γλαυκίσκος ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ θέρει πάλιν ποῖος περὶ δύσιν Πλειάδος συνειδέναι ἰχθὺς ὑπὸ τροπᾶς τ’ ἐστὶ χρησιμώτατος!

And therefore, when you see a cook who is illiterate, not understanding everything by Dēmókritos (he must remember him as well!) laugh at him as empty – and [he does not understand] the Canon of Epíkouros? Having scrutinized [the cook], discharge [him]! For it is necessary to know this from practice: first, how great the difference (my friend) the glaukískos has in winter and again in summer – what kind of fish is most useful to recognize around the setting of the Pleiades and under the solstices!

ὁ γλαυκίσκος

"little gleaming fish"
(possibly) anchovy

ΓΛΑΥΚΙΣΚΟΣ
gleaming little

Laértios 10.30

Ἀρκτέον δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ὀλίγα προειπόντα περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως τῆς κατ’ αὐτὸν φιλοσοφίας. Διαιρεῖται τοίνυν εἰς τρία: τό τε Κανονικόν, καὶ Φυσικόν, καὶ Ἠθικόν – τὸ μὲν οὖν Κανονικόν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Κανών.

We ought to begin at first **with a few things said beforehand** concerning the division philosophy **according to him**. It is divided into three: the Canon, Physics, and Ethics – the Canon forms **the introduction**, and is contained in the one book titled *Canon*.

Laértios 10.14

Ἀρίστων δέ φησιν **ἐν τῷ Ἐπικούρου Βίῳ τὸν Κανόνα γράψαι αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ναυσιφάνους Τρίποδος – οὗ καὶ ἀκοῦσαί φησιν αὐτόν** – ἀλλὰ καὶ Παμφίλου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ **ἐν Σάμῳ**.

Aríston says in his Life of Epíkouros that [Epíkouros] wrote *The Canon* from the Tripod of Nausiphánēs – to whom [Aríston] says [Epíkouros] even **listened** – but also to Pamphílos the Platonist in Samos.

Peripatetic Aríston of Khîos (fl. c. 225 BC) or Stoic Aríston of Khîos (fl. c. 260 BC) or Aristo of Alexandria?

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 1.19.63

(Torquatus) **Tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa – quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium – regula ad quam omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur: numquam ullius oratione victi, sententia desistemus.**

(Torquatus) Indeed **if** we will hold a **stable knowledge of things**, with that being **preserved** – which has fallen **as though** from heaven for the knowledge of all – **the rule to which** all judgments of things will be directed: **then never**, having been convinced **by anyone's speech**, will we abandon **our knowledge**

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 1.16.43

(Velleius) **Ea qui consideret (quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur) venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero (de quibus haec quaestio est) habere debeat!**

(Velleius) Whoever considers **these things** (how rashly and recklessly they are said) ought to revere Epíkouros and hold him in the number of those themselves (about whom this question exists)!

Solus enim vidit, primum, **esse deos quod in omnium animis eorum notionem inpressisset ipsa natura. Quae est, enim, gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat, sine doctrina, anticipationem quandam deorum?**

For he alone saw, first, that **gods exist** because **into the minds of all [men]** nature herself had impressed **a notion of them**. In fact, what nation or race of men exists that does not have, **without teaching**, **some anticipation of the gods?**

ea nōtiō nōtiōnēs	notion	NOTIO <i>the result of becoming familiar</i>
ea anticipātiō anticipātiōnēs	anticipation	ANTICIPATIO <i>the result of taking before</i>

Quam appellat "**πρόληψιν**" Epicurus – id est, **anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem** – **sine qua** nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. **quoius rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de Regula et Iudicio volumine accepimus.**

Such [a notion] Epíkouros calls "**prólēpsis**" – that is, **some information in the mind obtained before [thinking]** – without which nothing is able to be understood, questioned or disputed. We have received **the strength and benefit of this reasoning** from that celestial volume of Epíkouros *on the Rule and Judgment*.

ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•^] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>before taking hold</i>
------------------------------------	-------------------	--

anteceptus <i>(a, um)</i>	obtained before <i>[thinking]</i>	ANTECEPTUS <i>taken before</i>
ea ĩnfōrmātiō ĩnfōrmātiōnēs	information	INFORMATIO <i>making into shape</i>
antecepta ĩnfōrmātiō	information obtained before <i>[thinking]</i>	

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 1118A

Οὐ γὰρ **Κωλώτῃ** μὲν ὁ ἄρτος **ἄρτος** ἐφαίνετο καὶ **χόρτος** ὁ χόρτος ὅτι **τοὺς** 'διοπετεῖς' ἀνεγνώκει **Κανόνας** (ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ὑπὸ ἀλαζονείας **ἄρτου** μὲν ὡς **χόρτου**, **χόρτου** δὲ ὡς **ἄρτου** **φαντασίαν** ἐλάμβανε). **δόγμασι** γὰρ **ἡμῶν** καὶ **λόγοις** οὗτοι χρῶνται **βελτίοσιν** οἱ σοφοί – ὁ δ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τυποῦσθαι **πρὸς** τὰ φαινόμενα **κοινόν** ἐστὶ **πάθος** **ἀλόγοις** περαινόμενον **αἰτίαις**.

Bread did not appear **to Kōlōtēs** **as bread** and grass **as grass** because he had studied **the** 'heaven-sent' **Canons** (Socrates **by false pretense** perceived **an image of bread as grass** and **grass as bread**). For these wise men use **teachings** and **arguments superior to ours** – but perceiving and being affected **by appearances** is **a common experience** that is determined **by irrational causes**.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 1123F

Εἰ γὰρ οὐ **κραιπαλῶντες** οὐδὲ **φαρμακῶντες** ἄνθρωποι καὶ **παρακόπτοντες** – ἀλλὰ **νήφοντες** καὶ **ὕγιαίνοντες** καὶ **γράφοντες** **περὶ ἀληθείας** καὶ **Κανόνων** καὶ **Κριτηρίων** **ἐν τοῖς ἐναργεστάτοις πάθεσι** καὶ **κινήμασι** **τῆς αἰσθήσεως**, ἥ 'τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον **ἀληθές**' ἢ 'ψεῦδος καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον' ἡγοῦνται '**τὸ ἀληθές**' – οὐκ εἰ **περὶ πάντων** ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀλλ’ εἴ **τισιν ὅλως** ἄνθρωποι συγκατατίθενται, θαυμάζειν ἄξιον!

For if men are neither **intoxicated** nor **on drugs** and **raving** – but rather are **sober** and **healthy** and **writing about truth** and **Standards and Measurements in the clearest experiences** and **movements of sensations**, if [such sober men] consider either 'the non-existent is **true**' or 'the false and non-existent is **the truth**' – then not if they are at peace **about everything**, but if the men agree **in entirely anything**, is worthy of wonder!

Alciphron, *Letters*, 17.2.2

(Leóntion scribentem ad Lamiam facit) **Μέχρι τίνος ὑπομενεῖ τις τὸν φιλόσοφον τοῦτον; ἐχέτω τὰ "Περὶ Φύσεως" καὶ τὰς Κυρίας Δόξας** καὶ τοὺς διεστραμμένους **Κανόνας** – ἐμὲ δὲ ἀφέτω **τὴν φυσικῶς κυρίαν ἐμαυτῆς, ἀστομάχητον καὶ ἀνύβριστον**.

(Leóntion depicted as writing to Lamia) How long can one suffer **this philosopher?** Let him keep **that "On Nature," the Principal Judgements**, those twisted **Canons** – let me retain **my natural mastery over myself, unchallenged** and **uninsulted**.

Alciphron, *Letters*, 17.2.7

...Κολακεύειν **αὐτὸν** καὶ καθυμνεῖν **τὰς ὑπηνέμους αὐτοῦ Δόξας**...

...To flatter **him** and to sing the praises of **the sheltered Judgements of his**...

Arrian, *Discourses on Epictetus*, 2.23.21

εἴτα **τηλικάυτῃ** Δύναμις οὔσα καὶ **πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη**, παρελθοῦσα **ἡμῖν** λεγέτω **κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα** – οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ Σὰρξ **ἑαυτὴν** ἔλεγεν **εἶναι κράτιστον**, ἡνέσχετο ἂν τις **αὐτῆς**

then, being **so great** a Power and **set over all the rest**, let [the power of the will] come forward and let it say **to us** that **the most excellent of all things is the flesh** – not even if the Flesh itself declared that **it itself is the most excellent**, would anyone be tolerant **of this**

νῦν δὲ τί ἐστίν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ **ταῦτα** ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ **περὶ Τέλους** συγγεγραφός, τὸ **τὰς Φυσικάς**; τὸ **περὶ Κανόνος**; τὸ **τὸν πώγωνα** καθεικός; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνησκεν, ὅτι "**τὴν τελευταίαν** ἄγοντες, **ἅμα, καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν**;" ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; εἴτα **τούτου τι κρεῖσσον** ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς! καὶ οὐ μαῖνη; οὕτως **τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις** καὶ **κωφὸς εἶ**;

but now which is it, Epikouros, which declares **these things**? Which one wrote **about The End**, which one wrote **on Nature**? Which one wrote **about the Canon**? Which one let grow **the beard**? Which one wrote when it was dying that it was "spending the **last and, at the same time, also happy day**?" Was it the flesh or the will? And then you agree to having **something superior to this** [the will]! Are you not insane? Are you so **blind** and **deaf to the truths**?

[U35]

Diogénēs Laértios 10.31 sup.

Τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὡς **παρέλκουσαν** ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν, ἀρκεῖν γὰρ **τοὺς Φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους**. **ἐν**, τοίνυν, **τῷ Κανόνι**, λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος **κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς** ^[1]**αἰσθήσεις** καὶ ^[2]**προλήψεις** καὶ **τὰ** ^[3]**πάθη**, οἱ δ' Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ ^[4]**τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας**

* [Epicureans] reject **dialectic** as **misleading**, [saying that] it is sufficient for **the Physicists to proceed** according to the [common] words **for things**. Therefore, In *The Canon*, Epikouros affirms **the standards of truth** are **the** ^[1]**sensations** and **the** ^[2]**preconceptions** and **the** ^[3]**feelings**, and the Epicureans [also affirm] **the** ^[4]**image-based focus of the mind**

[U36]

Laértios 10.31 fin.

Λέγει δὲ καὶ **ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον Ἐπιτομῇ** καὶ **ἐν ταῖς Κυρίαις Δόξαις**, "πᾶσα γάρ" φησὶν "αἴσθησις **ἄλογός** ἐστὶ καὶ **μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτικὴ** – οὔτε γὰρ **ὑφ' αὐτῆς** οὔτε **ὑφ' ἑτέρου** κινηθεῖσα, δύναται **τι** προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν."

As he also says in the *Letter to Hēródotos* and in the *Primary Judgements*, he says "Every sensation is **devoid of reason** and **capable of no memory** – for neither when moved **by itself** nor **by another**, is [a sensation] able to add **anything** or take [anything] away."

Laértios 10.32

οὐδὲ ἔστι Τὸ δυνάμενον **αὐτὰς** διελέγξαι: οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμογένεια Αἴσθησις **τὴν ὁμογενῇ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν** – οὔθ' ἡ ἀνομογένεια **τὴν ἀνομογένειαν** – **οὐ** γὰρ **τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικά**

nor is there Anything able refute **them**: for neither does the like Sensation [refute] **the like [sensation]** through equal force – nor the unlike [sense refute] **the unlike** – for they are **not critical of the same things**

οὔτε, μὴν, Λόγος – πᾶς γὰρ Λόγος **ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων** ἡρτηται! οὔθ' ἡ ἑτέρα **τὴν ἑτέραν, πάσαις** γὰρ προσέχομεν – καὶ Τὸ **τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ' ὑφεστάναι**, πιστοῦται **τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν**

* indeed, neither [can] Reason [refute the senses] – for all Reason has been held up **by the sensations**! Nor [does] one [sense refute] **another**, for we cling **to all** – and the Fact that **the impressions are established**, confirms **the truth of the senses**

ὑφίστάναι	to be established, to subsist	ΥΦΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>to set up under</i>
<i>consistent sense impressions show that these impressions match their source accurately</i>		

ὕφέστηκε δὲ τό τε Ὅρᾱν ἡμᾶς καὶ Ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλγεῖν, ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινόμενων χρή Σημειοῦσθαι: καὶ γὰρ καὶ Ἐπίνοιαί πᾶσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνاسι – κατὰ τε ^[1]περίπτωσιν καὶ ^[2]ἀναλογίαν καὶ ^[3]ὁμοιότητα καὶ ^[4]σύνθεσιν – συμβαλλομένου τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ

✱ Seeing and Hearing have been established for us, just like feeling pain, where Taking signs from what is visible is also necessary for unseen things: for indeed, all Thoughts have arisen from the sensations – according to ^[1]circumstance, ^[2]analogy, ^[3]similarity, and ^[4]synthesis – with reasoning also throwing in something

ἡ περίπτωσις αἱ περιπτώσεις	circumstance	ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΙΣ <i>fall around</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
ἡ ὁμοιότης αἱ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being similar</i>
ἡ σύνθεσις αἱ συνθέσεις	synthesis	ΣΥΝΘΕΣΙΣ <i>to put together</i>

τά τε τῶν μαινομένων Φαντάσματα καὶ τὰ κατ’ ὄναρ ἀληθῆ – κινεῖ γάρ – Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, οὐ κινεῖ

the Mental Images of maniacs and [the Mental Images] in dreams are real – because they move [the mind] – and What does not exist, does not move

30. Against the Megarians
Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς

Laértios 10.27

...Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς. Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς. Διαπορίαι...

...Summary of Objections to the Physicists. Against the Megarians.
Uncertainties...

After the death of his teacher Sōkrátēs, Eukleídēs of Mégara founded a school in Mégara (a city 25 miles west of Athens and 30 miles east of Corinth), where many students of Sōkrátēs took refuge with him.
The school formed into a group of thinkers known for studying logical puzzles and paradoxes (such as 'the Horns,' 'the Sorites,' and 'the Covered Father'). Eukleídēs was interested in the dilemmas of logic and criticized the use of analogy.
According to Diogénēs Laértios, Eukleídēs declared that "the good is one – though it is called by many names: sometimes wisdom, sometimes god, sometimes mind, and so forth." Eventually the Stoics would take much inspiration from this school.

31. Mētródōros
in five books
Μητρόδωρος ε΄

Laértios 10.28

...Τιμοκράτης γ΄. Μητρόδωρος ε΄. Αντίδωρος θ΄...

...Timokrátēs, in three books. Mētródōros, in five books. Antídōros, in two books...

Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129A

αἱ τοσαῦται Μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον, ἐπὶ Ἀριστόβουλον, ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον γραφόμεναι καὶ συνταττόμεναι φιλοπόνως...

These so many Myriads of lines on Mētródōros, on Aristóbuolos, and on Chairédēmos, written and composed diligently...

Book 1

[U37]

Laértios 10.23

ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος πρὸς τε τὰς ὀχλήσεις καὶ τὸν θάνατον, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Μητροδώρῳ φησί

[Mētródōros] also was not struck down by troubles and death, as Epíkouros says in the first book of his Mētródōros memoirs

32. On Music
Περὶ Μουσικῆς

Laértios 10.28

...Ἀριστόβουλος. Περὶ Μουσικῆς. Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀρετῶν...

...Aristóbuolos. On Music. On Justice and Other Virtues...

33. Neoklēs
Dedicated to Themísta
Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίстан

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Δικαιοπραγίας. Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίстан. Συμπόσιον...

...On Fair Dealing. Neoklēs, Dedicated to Themísta. Symposium...

34. Theories about Diseases
Dedicated to Míthrēs
Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι, πρὸς Μίθρην

Laértios 10.28

...Ἀντίδωρος β'. Περὶ Νόσων Δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην. Καλλιστόλας...

...Antídōros, in two books. Theories about Diseases, Dedicated to Míthrēs. Kallistólas...

35. On Vision
Περὶ τοῦ Ὁραῖν

Laértios 10.28

...Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον. Περὶ τοῦ Ὁραῖν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἄτομῳ Γωνίας...

...Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros. On Vision. On the Angle of the Atom...

36. On Holiness

Laértios 10.27

...*Περὶ Θεῶν. Περὶ Ὁσιότητος. Ἠγησιάναξ*...

...*On the Gods. On Holiness. Hēgēsíanax*...

[=U30] *Plutarch, Non Posse, 1102C*

...τὰ *Περὶ Θεῶν* καὶ *Ὁσιότητος* αὐτοῖς βιβλία συντέτακται "*ἐλικτὰ κούδὲν ὑγιές, ἀλλὰ Πᾶν πέριξ*" *ἐπαμπεχομένοις* καὶ *ἀποκρυπτομένοις* διὰ φόβον ἃς ἔχουσι *δόξας*

...the Books *About the Gods* and *Piety* have been composed by them "twisting and in no way sound, but Everything around" who cover up and conceal in fear the judgements they hold

[=U27] *Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.41.115*

(Cotta) at etiam *De Sanctitate, De Pietate* aduersus deos libros scripsit Epicurus – at quo modo in his loquitur? ut Ti. Coruncanium aut P. Scaeuolam pontifices maximos te audire Dicas...

(Cotta) indeed Epíkouros wrote books *On Sanctity* and *On Reverence* towards the gods – but in what manner does he actually speak in them? so that You might say that you were listening to the high priests Coruncianus or Scaevola...

[U38]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.44.1258

Κα[λεῖ] δὲ καὶ τὸν τ[ελειό]τητος [βίον "ἢ]διστον καὶ μακαριώτατον" ἐν τῷι Περὶ Ὁσιότητ[ος – καὶ Κ]αταξιοῖ πᾶ[ν τὸ μι]αρόν φυλάτ[τεσθαι νοήσ]εως συ[νορω]μένης τὰς καλὰς διαθέσεις – [τοῦ πάν]τα γ' οἶκε[ιοῦν τὰ] γιν[ό]μεν[α ἡμῖν] πρ[ὸς] μακ[ηριότητα καὶ ἀπηρτισμένα] γ' ἔ]χε[ιν] xxx

Καλεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν τελειότητος βίον "ἡδιστον καὶ μακαριώτατον" ἐν τῷι *Περὶ Ὁσιότητος* – καὶ Καταξιοῖ πᾶν τὸ μιαρόν φυλάττεσθαι νοήσεως συνορωμένης τὰς καλὰς διαθέσεις – τοῦ πάντα γ' οἰκείοῦν τὰ γινόμενα ἡμῖν πρὸς μακαριότητα καὶ ἀπηρτισμένα γ' ἔχειν

He also calls the life of integrity "the most pleasant and most happy" in the work *On Holiness* – and He considers it necessary that all that is base is guarded by our mind paying attention to good attitudes – for making suitable all that happens to us for having happiness and particularly for having [it be] adequate

[Obbink] And in *On Holiness* he calls the life of perfection "the most pleasant and most blessed" – and instructs us to guard against all defilement, with our intellect comprehensively viewing the best psychosomatic dispositions – for the sake of fitting all that happens to us to blessedness and especially having it in good order.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.40.1127

[Ἐγὼ] δὲ τούναντίον – οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἀνοσίως ἐξελέσθαι τὴν πᾶσαν ὀσιότητα σὺν τῷι τὰ κοινὰ φυλάττειν (ὥς] δ' Οἱ λεγόμε[νοι δει]σιδαίμονες) εἰς ἀνυπέρβλητον ἀσέβειαν ἐκβάλλειν

Ἐγὼ δὲ τούναντίον – οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἀνοσίως ἐξελέσθαι τὴν πᾶσαν ὀσιότητα σὺν τῷι τὰ κοινὰ φυλάττειν (ὥς δ' Οἱ λεγόμενοι δεισιδαίμονες) εἰς ἀνυπέρβλητον ἀσέβειαν ἐκβάλλειν

[I think] the opposite – I do not consider this manner [of thinking] regarding these things unlawfully eliminates all holiness along with the protection of the state and (as Those called superstitious think) extends [us] into unparalleled impiety

[Obbink] But I by contrast – do not think that **this manner** on account of these things **impiously does away with** the whole [notion of] holiness **together with the preservation of common beliefs** and that (as those who are said to be religious think) it hurls us into unsurpassable impiety.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.40.1138

[ὁσιος] γὰρ Ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[ασίαν] κα[ὶ] τὴν ἄκραν μακα[ριότητ]α τοῦ θε[οῦ] σῶ[ζων] (σὺν) ἅπασι[ν] τοῖς συναπτομένοις ἡμῖν) – α]σεβῆς δὲ περ[ὶ] θε[οῦ]ν Ὃς ἐκά[τε]ρον [ἐξορ]ίζει

ὁσιος γὰρ Ὁ τὴν ἀθανασίαν καὶ τὴν ἄκραν μακαριότητα τοῦ θεοῦ σῶζων (σὺν ἅπασιν τοῖς συναπτομένοις ἡμῖν) – ασεβὴς δὲ περὶ θεόν Ὃς ἐκάτερον ἐξορίζει

pious is the He who preserves the immortality and the supreme blessedness of god (along with all those things connected to us) – but impious towards god [is he] Who banishes either one

[Obbink] For pious is the person who preserves the immortality and consummate blessedness of God (together with all the things included by us) – but impious is the person who banishes either [blessedness or immortality] where God is concerned.

Ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν χωρὶς ὀργῆ[ς καὶ] χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρασκε[υὰς] τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ] τῶν κακ]ῶν ἀπο[φαί]νεται' [αὐτὸν τ]ῶν ἀνθρ[ω]πείων μηδ[ε]νὸς [προ]δεῖσθαι...

Ὁ δ' ἐπινοῶν χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρασκευὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀποφαίνεται' αὐτὸν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων μηδενὸς προδεῖσθαι...

He who deliberates without anger and without weakening of favor on the procurement from [god] for both benefits and harms shows [god] to be in need of nothing from humans...

[Obbink] And the person who sees also that the good and ill [sent us by God] come without any unhealthy anger or benevolence – declares that God has no need of human things...

[U39]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.8.205

Γράψας [δέ] καὶ Περί Ὀσιότητος ἄλλο βιβλίον, κἀν τούτῳ διασαφεῖ τὸ (μὴ μόνον ἀφθάρτως, ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ] κατὰ συντέλειαν) ἔ[ν] καὶ ταύ[τ]ον συνεχῶ[ς] ὑπάρχον) καθ' "ὁμιλ[ί]αν ἐνότη[τ]ας" προσαγορεύε[σθαι] – τὰς μὲν ἐκ [τῶν ὄντων] τῶν αὐτῶ[ν] ἀποτε[λεῖ]σθαι, τὰς δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων

Γράψας δὲ καὶ Περί Ὀσιότητος ἄλλο βιβλίον, κἀν τούτῳ διασαφεῖ τὸ (μὴ μόνον ἀφθάρτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ συντέλειαν ἐν καὶ ταυτόν συνεχῶς ὑπάρχον) καθ' "ὁμιλίαν ἐνότητας" προσαγορεύεσθαι – τὰς μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, τὰς δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων

[Epíkouros] also wrote another book *On Holiness*, an in it he makes clear that it [the nature of the gods] (which exists continuously as one and the same, not merely in an imperishable manner, but also according to an influx of provisions) is called "an association [of unity]" – both those [unities] composed from the same things, and those from the similar things

[Obbink] And having written another book *On Holiness*, in it too he makes clear that not only that thing which exists indestructibly, but also (that which) continually exists in perfection as one and the same entity: are termed in the common usage "[unified] entities" – some of which [entities] are perfected out of the same elements, and others from similar elements.

εἷς μία ἓν <i>(ἐνός, μιᾶς, ἐνός)</i>	one	ἜΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἘΝ
ἡ ἐνότης αἱ ἐνότητες	unity	ΕΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of oneness</i>
ἡ ὁμοιότης αἱ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being similar</i>

[U40]

στοιχ[εῖω]σις ὁ[μοίων οὐσα], φαίνο[ιτ'] ἅ[ν'Εν]ότης, δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ὑπάρχουσι διαιώνιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν – ἐπειδὴ περ οὐχ ἦττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων στοιχείων Ἐνότητες ὑποτελεῖσθαι δύνανται (καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου καταλείπονται, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ὁσιότητος, αὐτότατα)

στοιχεῖωσις ὁμοίων οὐσα, φαίνοιτ' ἂν Ἐνότης, δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ὑπάρχουσι διαιώνιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν – ἐπειδὴ περ οὐχ ἦττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων στοιχείων Ἐνότητες ὑποτελεῖσθαι δύνανται (καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου καταλείπονται, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ὁσιότητος, αὐτότατα)

with the composition of similar [elements] that exist, a Unity emerges, for it is able to possess out of similarities eternal perfect happiness – since no less from the same or similar elements can Unities be composed (and are left undisputed by Epíkouros as the same things, just as [he says] in *On Holiness*)

[Obbink] Its constitution out of things similar would obviously be a unified entity: for it is possible [for beings constituted] out of similarity for ever to have perfect happiness – since [unified] entities can be formed no less out of identical than out of similar elements ([and both kinds of entity] are recognized by Epíkouros as [being] exactly the same things, for example in his book *On Holiness*.)

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.364

τ[ὸ δ]ὲ μηδεμίαν ὑπε[ναν]τιολογίαν εἶναι παρα[ιτη]τέον Ὑποδεικνύειν: Εἴωθε, τοίνυν, [πά]νθ' ὁμῶς Ταῦτα φύ[σι]ν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγειν – τὰ Πολλὰ [μέ]ν ἐπειδὴν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοίων [καὶ ἄλ]λων [ἐπι]συνκρί[σεως ἀ]τόμ[ων γέ]νηται...

τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ὑπεναντιολογίαν εἶναι παραιτητέον Ὑποδεικνύειν: Εἴωθε, τοίνυν, πάνθ' ὁμῶς Ταῦτα φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγειν – τὰ Πολλὰ μὲν ἐπειδὴν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοίων καὶ ἄλλων ἐπισυνκρίσεως ἀτόμων γένηται...

Proving that there is no logical contradiction must be declined: accordingly, [Epíkouros] used to say that all These things are equally brought to completion by nature – indeed many Things come into existence from the aggregation of similar and different atoms...

[Obbink] The demonstration that this involves no contradiction may be passed over: Therefore he was wont to say that nature brought all these things to completion alike – and that for the most part many things come about [when they are formed] from an aggregation of various similar particles...

[U41]

⌘ [=U88] Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111

...[Καὶ ἄλ]λην κἀν [τῷ Περὶ Ὁ]σιότητ[ος, κἀν τῷ] δωδεκά[τῳ καὶ] τρεῖσκα[ιδεκάτῳ] Περὶ Φύσε[ως, κἀν τῷ] πρώτῳ[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκράτους.

...Καὶ ἄλλῃ κἀν τῷ Περὶ Ὁσιότητος, κἀν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ καὶ τρεῖσκαιδεκάτῳ Περὶ Φύσεως, κἀν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ Τιμοκράτους.

...In other places, such as in *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th [books] *On Nature*, and in the first of [his books] *On Timokrátēs*.

37. On Theories about Feelings
against Timokrátēs

Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι, πρὸς Τιμοκράτην

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Εἰμαρμένης. Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι πρὸς Τιμοκράτην. Προγνωστικόν...

...On Destiny. On Theories about Feelings, against Timokrátēs.
Prognostication...

38. On Wealth
Περὶ Πλούτου

Philódēmos, On Vices and the Opposite Virtues, Book 9, On Property Management, P.Herc. 1424, col. 12, line 5 -17

Διαλεξόμεθα, τοίνυν, οὐχ ὥς ἐν οἴκῳ καλῶ[ς] ἔστιν βιοῦν – ἀλλ' ὥς ἵστασθαι δεῖ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς·
περὶ [ᾗ], τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν οἰκονομικὸν ἰδίως νοεῖσθαι Συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲν διαφερόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς
ὄν[ό]μασιν ὑποτάττειν προαιρ[ο]ύμενους, καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλοσόφῳ δεούσης κτήσεως, [οὐ] τῆς ὅτῳ[δῆ]ποτε

Διαλεξόμεθα, τοίνυν, οὐχ ὥς ἐν οἴκῳ καλῶς ἔστιν βιοῦν – ἀλλ' ὥς ἵστασθαι δεῖ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς: περὶ ᾗ, τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸν οἰκονομικὸν ἰδίως νοεῖσθαι Συμβέβηκεν, οὐδὲν διαφερόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὑποτάττειν προαιρούμενους, καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλοσόφῳ δεούσης κτήσεως, οὐ τῆς ὅτῳιδέποτε

We will explore, therefore, not **how to live well** at home – but **how it is necessary to be positioned** in regards to gaining and guarding of what we need: regarding which, It has come to be that **economic [management]** and **economical [principles]** are **perceived distinctly** – making no distinction towards those who choose to submit **different things to these names**, and concerning the possession required **by philosophy**, not just of any sort [of possession]

[Tsouna] We shall discuss, then, not **how one can live well** at home – but what attitude one must take up both with regard to the acquisition and the preservation of wealth, concerning which **property management** and the **property-management expert** are in fact conceived specifically, (and we shall do so) without contending at all with those who prefer to make other meaning underlie the terms and, moreover, discussing the acquisition (of property) that is appropriate for the philosopher, [not] for just anyone.

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Book 1, P.Herc. 163, col. 19/50, lines 29 - 36

...κα[ὶ τ]ὸ πάντως κα[τ'] ἐναντιό[τ]ητα τῷ πλού[τ]ωι τ[ῇ]ν πενίαν τίθεσθαι: καὶ τὸ μὴν [ἐνί]στε ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον
καὶ μ[έ]γα – σὺν ταῖς καὶ πρὸς π[ε]ν[ί]αν... Ἐπικούρου λέγοντος ἀδρὰν...

...καὶ τὸ πάντως κατ' ἐναντιότητα τῷ πλούτῳ τὴν πενίαν τίθεσθαι: καὶ τὸ μὴν ἐνίστε ἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ μέγα – σὺν ταῖς καὶ πρὸς πενίαν... Ἐπικούρου λέγοντος ἀδρὰν...

...and always Placing **poverty** in opposition to **wealth**: and Saying that **wealth [is] sometimes good** and **significant** – particularly in the [context] of **poverty**... Epikouros asserts strongly...

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.17.55

(Cicero ad Torquatum) **tenuit permagnam Sextilius hereditatem, unde, si secutus esset eorum sententiam Qui honesta et recta emolumentis omnibus et commodis anteponerent, nummum nullum attigisset. num igitur Eum postea Censes anxio animo aut sollicito fuisse? nihil minus. contraque, illa hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus**

(Cicero to Torquatus) Sextilius held **a very large inheritance**, from which, if he had followed **the opinion of those Who place honorable** and **upright things above all benefits** and **advantages**, he would not have touched **a single coin**. Do You think, then, that he was later **with an anxious** or **worried mind**? Not at all. On the contrary, he was **wealthy from that inheritance** and **happy because of it**

magni enim Aestimabat pecuniam, non modo non contra leges, sed etiam legibus partam – quae quidem vel cum periculo est quaerenda vobis – est enim Effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum

For he valued **money** highly, **not only not contrary to the laws**, but even **acquired by the laws** – Which **according to you all** ought to be sought indeed even with **danger** – for it is **the Producer of many** and **great pleasures**

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 47/16, lines 9 - 12

...[Ἐπ]ίκου[ρος τή]ν φι[λοσο]φ[ία][ν ἐ]ν τῇ τῶν [ἀγαθῶ]ν [ἀ]να[πλ]ώσει – τήν γὰρ πε[νί]αν [τ]ο[ῦ] Καθηγ[ε]μόνος ἀγαθὸν [ε]ἶναι νομίζοντ[ος] ἐ[ν τῶι] δευτέρ[ωι]...

...Ἐπίκουρος τήν φιλοσοφίαν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναπλώσει – τήν γὰρ πενίαν τοῦ Καθηγεμόνος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζοντος ἐν τῶι δευτέρωι...

...Epíkouros [considers] philosophy in [the context of] the fulfillment of goods – with [our] Leader considering poverty to be good in a secondary [role]...

[U44]*

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 40/9, lines 7 - 14

...καὶ θαρ[ρ]ούντως Εἶ[π]ε, δὴ καὶ καθάπερ ἔφησε Πολύαινος "σ[υμμ]έτρως ἐθεράπευεν τὸ ἄλ[γος] – καὶ το[ῦ]το ποεῖ, κ[αθ]άπερ εἶπεν Ἐπίκουρος, [ὅτ]α[ν] παρῇ ποτὲ πεσώ[ν... ὁ Σο]φὸς εἰς πενίαν, μόνον [τρέ]πεται...

...καὶ θαρρούντως Εἶπε, δὴ καὶ καθάπερ ἔφησε Πολύαινος "συμμέτρως ἐθεράπευεν τὸ ἄλγος" – καὶ τοῦτο ποεῖ, καθάπερ εἶπεν Ἐπίκουρος, ὅταν παρῇ ποτὲ πεσών... ὁ Σοφὸς εἰς πενίαν, μόνον τρέπεται...

...and indeed He confidently said, and just as Polýainos declared "he was suitably treating [the pain]" – and this occurs, just as Epíkouros said, whenever the Wiseman sometimes happens to fall into poverty, he only is turned...

(alternative) "ὅπερ ἔτρωσε θεραπεύει [ὁ λό]γος "

(alternative) "the same [reasoning which] wounded, heals"

[U45]*

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 45/14, lines 31 - 40

...διὰ ταῦτα τῶν Ἐπικουρείων λέγονται τινες ὑπὲρ τοῦ κακὸν εἶναι τήν πενίαν ἐπιλογισμοῖς χρῆσθαι τοιούτοις. ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τε ἄλλοις πολλοῖς φησι τήν πενίαν κακὸν εἶναι – καὶ ἐν τύχαις δ' ἐτέραις συναφθεῖσαν, μὴ φέρεσθαι...

...διὰ ταῦτα τῶν Ἐπικουρείων λέγονται τινες ὑπὲρ τοῦ κακὸν εἶναι τήν πενίαν ἐπιλογισμοῖς χρῆσθαι τοιούτοις. ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τε ἄλλοις πολλοῖς φησι τήν πενίαν κακὸν εἶναι – καὶ ἐν τύχαις δ' ἐτέραις συναφθεῖσαν, μὴ φέρεσθαι...

...Because of these [reasons], some of the Epicureans say for the [purpose of arguing that] poverty is an evil, using such types of reasoning. Epíkouros says in many other [contexts] that poverty is an evil – and when combined with different [circumstances], it is not endured [well].

39. Polymédēs Πολυμήδης

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Δώρων Καὶ Χάριτος. Πολυμήδης. Τιμοκράτης γ'...

...On Gifts and Gratitude. Polymédēs. Timokrátēs, in three books...

40. Prognostication Προγνωστικόν

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Παθῶν Δόξαι Πρὸς Τιμοκράτην. Προγνωστικόν. Προτρεπτικός...

...On Theories about Feelings, against Timokrátēs. Prognostication. Exhortation to Study Philosophy...

41. Exhortation to Study Philosophy

Προτρεπτικός

Laértios 10.28:

...Προγνωστικόν. Προτρεπτικός. Περί Ειδώλων...

...Prognostication. Exhortation to Study Philosophy. On Films...

42. On Rhetoric

Περί Ῥητορικῆς

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1127A

Οὔτοι δέ, κἄν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα **μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν**, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι.

...But these men, if they write [about such matters at all], write on government to deter us from taking part in it, on oratory to **deter us from public speaking**, and about kingship to make us shun the company of kings.

Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (fl. 75 AD) was a Roman orator and politician, who wrote "Institutio Oratoria" or "The Institutes of Oratory," a detailed twelve-volume treatise on rhetoric crafted around 95 AD. The work extensively discusses rhetorical methods and the training of orators. His notable pupils included Pliny the Younger, and Emperor Vespasian honored him with a consulship.

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, 2.15 - 17

Agnon quidem detraxit **sibi** inscriptione ipsa **fidem**, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est. nam de Epicuro, qui **disciplinas omnes** fugit, nihil miror! hi complura dicunt sed ex paucis locis ducta; itaque potentissimis eorum breviter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio evadat.

Agnon renders himself suspect by the very title of his book in which he proclaims that he is going to indict rhetoric. As to [the statements of] Epíkouros, who flees **all training**, they cause me no surprise! These gentlemen talk a great deal, but the arguments on which they base their statements are few. I will therefore select the most important of them and will deal with them briefly, to prevent the discussion lasting to all eternity.

Prima iis argumentatio ex materia est: omnes enim artes aiunt habere materiam, quod est verum; rhetorices nullam esse propriam, quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo.

Their first contention is based on the subject-matter: for they assert that all arts have their own subject-matter (which is true) and go on to say that rhetoric has none, which I shall show in what follows to be false.

[U46]*

Art has a definite set of external principles which can be imparted from teacher to student. Ability, in contrast, is the result of personal practice and experience.

Keeping in mind that rhetors called their own instruction books "technai" "technical [manuals]" – questioning to what extent rhetoric is an "art / techne" cuts to the base of the whole profession because it asks: to what extent do these "technical manuals" actually have any repeatable and teachable technique ("art / techne") at all?

Philódēmos informs us that some Epicureans in Rhodes argued that Epíkouros thought that no form of rhetoric was an art. However, most of the students in Athens, following Zeno of Sidon, disagreed and argued that Epíkouros thought that the study of the principles of composition is in fact an art (but they all agreed that Epíkouros thought that forensic and deliberative oratory, as well as political science, are not arts).

Below, Philódēmos argues that when the verb "estí" is combined with the genitive in order to indicate the method by which something is achieved, it doesn't necessarily suggest exclusivity of the method. Additional clarification would be required from the author to unambiguously state that it is the sole method used. Philódēmos notes that since Epíkouros does not include an adjective such as "only," it should not be implicitly assumed by the reader. Philódēmos references normal usage of Greek as a guide to understand Epíkouros' intent.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 18

οὕτως τοίνυν, εἰπόντος Ἐπικούρου διότι "πολλῆς ἐστ[τι]ν ἡ ῥητορικὴ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας" οὐχ ὑπ[α]κουστέο[ν] τὸ "μόνης" – ἀλλὰ μό[von τ]ὸ "[δεῖ]ται πολλῆς τριβῆς κα[ὶ] συν[η]θείας." τὸ γὰρ "ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ "δεῖται" τίθησιν, ὅταν οὕτως ὁμειλῶμεν – ἡ συνηθ[ε]ία τό γε μετριώτατ[ο]ν ὑπὸ [τ]ῶν λέξεων σημαίνεται, καὶ οὐχ[ὶ] θάτερον μόνον ἀεὶ [συ]νόλω[ς σ]ημαίνεσθ[αι] ῥητέον... ...ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἢ καὶ διὰ τέχνης καὶ τριβῆς (καὶ) οὐδ' ὅλως ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας...

οὕτως τοίνυν, εἰπόντος Ἐπικούρου διότι "πολλῆς ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας" οὐχ ὑπακουστέον τὸ "μόνης" – ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ "δεῖται πολλῆς τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας." τὸ γὰρ "ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ "δεῖται" τίθησιν, ὅταν οὕτως ὁμειλῶμεν – ἡ συνηθεία τό γε μετριώτατον ὑπὸ τῶν λέξεων σημαίνεται, καὶ οὐχὶ θάτερον μόνον ἀεὶ συνόλως σημαίνεσθαι ῥητέον... ...ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἢ καὶ διὰ τέχνης καὶ τριβῆς (καὶ) οὐδ' ὅλως ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας...

[Chandler] So in this way, when Epíkouros said that "rhetoric is (the result) of much practice and familiarity" one should not understand the word "*alone*," but only the meaning "*requires much practice and familiarity*." For he writes the word "is" in place of "*requires*," just as we do when we speak in ordinary conversation, where by the standards of common parlance the most normal (meaning) is meant by the words; and one should not insist that the other meaning only is all the time meant in general... ✱ ...*for the sake of the expression which this man has used, I say that it is unclear whether Epíkouros means [that ⁽¹⁾rhetoric comes about] from familiarity and practice alone [or ⁽²⁾rhetoric comes about] not entirely from practice and familiarity [but also art]*

Therefore, given that Epíkouros said "rhetoric is of much practice and habit" this should not be considered to mean "[*rhetoric*] **only** [*requires much practice and habit*]" – but only that "[*rhetoric*] does require much practice and habit." For "is" means "requires," when we speak **in this way** – habit indicates **the most regular** [usage] **by these words**, and it must not be said that **it signifies** only **the other** [meaning of exclusivity] altogether... ✱ ...*Epíkouros, whether through skill and effort, or not at all from habitual practice...*

Philódēmos advocates for an interpretation of "estí" which he asserts is the most common in this specific context. While Philódēmos acknowledges the potential for the sentence to be understood in the manner preferred by "the Rhodian," he contends that in cases of ambiguity like these, ordinary language stands as the only reliable criterion.

Another question to consider is whether requiring "practice" (tribé) and "habit" (synéatheia) inherently exclude sophistic rhetoric (composing arguments together and conducting lectures) from being considered an art. Philódēmos says that they do not, as the founders recognized that some arts demand significant practice.

[U47]*

Mētródōros, On Poems Book 1, quoted by Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672 col. 22

Πότερον οὖν (1) τὴν [ῥη]τορικὴν δύναμιν λέγει[ν] τις βλέπων ἐπὶ τὴν διάγνωσιν τοῦ ὁ πρακτέον ἐστὶν τῷ μέλλοντι εὐδαίμον[ε]ι εἶναι τε καὶ ἔσεσθαι – καὶ ἃ [ου πρ]ακτέον, καὶ ταύτην φησὶν ἀ[πὸ] τοῦ φ[υσι]ολογίας παραγείνεσθαι, [ἢ κ]αὶ (2) τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐμπειρ[ί]αν καθ' ἣν ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ ἱστορίας τῶν πόλεως πραγμάτων συνωρίη ἂν τις οὐ κακῶς τὰ πλήθει συμφέροντα;

Πότερον οὖν ⁽¹⁾ τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύναμιν λέγειν τις βλέπων ἐπὶ τὴν διάγνωσιν τοῦ ὁ πρακτέον ἐστὶν τῷ μέλλοντι εὐδαίμονει εἶναι τε καὶ ἔσεσθαι – καὶ ἃ ου πρακτέον, καὶ ταύτην φησὶν ἀπὸ φυσιολογίας παραγείνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ ⁽²⁾ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν καθ' ἣν ἐκ τριβῆς καὶ ἱστορίας τῶν πόλεως πραγμάτων συνωρίη ἂν τις οὐ κακῶς τὰ πλήθει συμφέροντα;

Is one then to speak of ⁽¹⁾ **rhetorical power** by being aware of the **discernment** of what ought to be done for the one intending to be and to continue being fortunate – and what should not be done, and say that this comes from natural philosophy, or [is one to speak of] the ⁽²⁾ **political experience** through which a man, from the practice and history of city affairs, could not badly [*i.e., well*] observe **what is beneficial for the masses**?

[Chandler] So does one speak of ⁽¹⁾ rhetorical capability by looking to the distinction of what must be done and must [not] be done by the man who intends to be, and to continue to be, successful, and say that this (capability) derives from the science of nature, or does one speak of ⁽²⁾ political experience in accordance with which one is likely to observe from practice and research in the affairs of a city that which is advantageous to the people?

Philódēmos cites Metrodorus' statements from the first book of "De Poematis," where he says that Metrodorus states clearly that civic rhetoric is not a science but rather grounded in experience and observation. It seems Metrodorus is addressing a certain vagueness about what is meant by "rhetorical advances."

Philódēmos appears mainly focused on how Metrodorus highlights the empirical and practical elements crucial for success in politics. The term "political experience (politikè empeiría)" and its definition as deriving "from the experience and history of the city's affairs" strongly imply that Metrodorus does not view political activity as an art, but as practical knowledge gained through active political engagement.

[U48]*

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672 col. 12

Οὐδὲ πολειτικ[κόν] καὶ δικανικὸν ἐρε[ῖν] ἑαυτὸν λαμβάνειν μέρος. ὥ[δε] γὰρ ῥητῶς "τὴν ῥητορικὴν" λέγει κα[ὶ] πρὸς τὸν ἐπαγγελλόμεν[ο]ν σοφιστὴν πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. διόπερ οὐκ ἀπόχωρήσαντος, γελοίως ὁ Ἐπίκουρός ἐστ[ι] τῇ μεταβάσει κεχρημένος

Οὐδὲ πολειτικὸν καὶ δικανικὸν ἐρεῖν ἑαυτὸν λαμβάνειν μέρος. ὥδε γὰρ ῥητῶς "τὴν ῥητορικὴν" λέγει καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἐπαγγελλόμενον σοφιστὴν πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. διόπερ οὐκ ἀπόχωρήσαντος, γελοίως ὁ Ἐπίκουρός ἐστι τῇ μεταβάσει κεχρημένος

[Chandler] For one will say that [Epíkouros] does not accept a political and judicial branch. For he **explicitly** says "rhetoric" when replying to the sophist who claims he possess all the branches. Therefore since he does not retract, Epíkouros has made use of the analogy in a humorous fashion.

Neither in politics nor in law does he claim a role for himself. He declares **unequivocally** "rhetoric" when directed at the sophist who avowed that he encompasses all elements. Therefore, not having retreated, Epíkouros employs the shift humorously.

Philódēmos reminds us that the speaker in Epíkouros' Symposium used the term "rhetoric" and meant by that all the categories which the youth claimed to possess. The claim is erroneous, so Epíkouros has used a metabasis (shift from one point to another) with ironic intent.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 16, line 10

Φ[ήσ]ει δὲ πρὸς τὸ συστῆσαι, διότ[ι] δῆ[ρ], τέχνη κατ' Ἐπίκουρόν [ἐ]στιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ – τοῦθ ἡμεῖς παρετίθεμεν, λέγ[ο]ντες· εἰ μὲν [δῆ] τε[]ιβὴν αὐτὴν ἐνόμι[ζεν] εἶναι καὶ συν[ή]θε[]ε[]α[]ν [οὐκ] ἂν τὸ "δοκεῖ" προσέ[θηκεν]. οἱ δὲ ἔφησαν οὐ δηλοῦ[σθαι] τὸ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, [ῆ][τοι] μὴ τοῦτο δηλοῦσθ[αι] μ[όν]ον. εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ συν[ί]εμ[εν] ἡμεῖς Ἑλληνιστὶ ο[]ιαλεγομένων· εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτεχ[ο]ν, δι[ὰ] τίν αἰτίφ[ι] αὐτοὶ χρῶν[ται] ἀμφιβόλοις λέξεσιν [ἐν τοῖς πρὸς] ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχουσιν;

Φήσει δὲ πρὸς τὸ συστῆσαι, διότι δὲ, τέχνη κατ' Ἐπίκουρόν ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ – τοῦθ ἡμεῖς παρετίθεμεν, λέγοντες· εἰ μὲν δὲ τε[]ιβὴν αὐτὴν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι καὶ συνήθειαν οὐκ ἂν τὸ "δοκεῖ" προσέθηκεν. οἱ δὲ ἔφησαν οὐ δηλοῦσθαι τὸ λεγόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἥτοι μὴ τοῦτο δηλοῦσθαι μόνον. εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, οὐ συνίεμεν ἡμεῖς Ἑλληνιστὶ ο[]ιαλεγομένων· εἰ δὲ τὸ δεύτεχ[ο]ν, διὰ τίν αἰτίφ[ι] αὐτοὶ χρῶνται ἀμφιβόλοις λέξεσιν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχουσιν;

[Chandler] He [will speak] for the purpose of organizing (an argument), because [if] rhetoric is [not] an art according to Epíkouros – then we have shown it is by saying if he considered it to be a practice and familiarity he would [not have added] the word "seems." But they said that our argument was not made clear by us, or at least this point alone is not made clear. If the former is the case, then we do not understand people who speak Greek; if the latter, then why do they themselves use ambiguous terms in their refutations [in response to] us?

[U49]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 23, line 34 – col. 24, line 7

τῶν τε περὶ τὸ [ν'Ε]πίκουρ[ον] ἀποφ[αι]νομένων τέχνην [εἶν]αι τὴν σοφιστικὴν τ[οῦ λ]όγου[ς] [σ]υγγράφειν καὶ ἐ[πιδ]εῖξις
π[οι]εῖσθαι, [τοῦ δέ] δίκας λέγειν καὶ δ[ημη]γορεῖν οὐκ εἶναι τέ[χνη]ν

τῶν τε περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἀποφαινομένων "τέχνην" εἶναι "τὴν σοφιστικὴν" τοῦ λόγου συγγράφειν καὶ ἐπιδείξεις ποιεῖσθαι, τοῦ δὲ δίκας λέγειν καὶ δημηγορεῖν οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην

[Chandler] Since Epíkouros and his followers reveal that sophistic is an art of writing speeches and composing display pieces, and is not an art of pleading cases and addressing the people.

...while those around Epíkouros show that "the wise art" is composing together arguments and conducting lectures, whereas pleading in courts and demagoguery is not an art.

ἡ τέχνη αἱ τέχναι	art	ΤΕΧΝΗ <i>technique</i>
σοφιστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	"wise"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of "wisdom"</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
συγγράφειν	to compose together	ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ <i>writing together</i>
ἡ ἐπίδειξις αἱ ἐπιδείξεις	lecture	ΕΠΙΔΕΙΞΙΣ <i>upon pointing out</i>

Above, Philódēmos has quoted Epíkouros as saying "rhetoric is of much practice and habit."

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, P.Herc. 1427, col. 7, line 9

Τοῖς δ' ἡμετέροις μεμπτέον ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττότερον τοῖς γέ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὅσοι καὶ τὴν σοφισ[τ]ικὴν ῥητορικὴν οὐκ εἶναι τέχνην διεληήφασι καὶ τούτου συστατικούς λόγους πεποιήκασι. εἰ γὰρ Ἐπ[ί]κουρος καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἔτι δ' Ἑρμαρχος ἀποφαίνονται τέχνην ὑπάρχειν τὴν τ[οι]αύτη[ν] (ὥς ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ὑπομνήσομεν) οἱ τούτοις ἀντιγράφοντες οὐ πάνυ τι μακρὰν τῆς τῶν πατραλοίων καταδίκης ἀφεστήκασιν.

For our own people, it would indeed be necessary to censure even more those of such a kind as have decided that sophistic rhetoric is not an art – and have made arguments supporting this. If indeed Epíkouros, Metrodorus, and also Hérmarchos declare that such is indeed an art (as we will remind in what follows) those who write against them are not far removed from condemnation as patricides.

[Chandler] Our people might have to be censured and particularly all those sort of people who assume that sophistic rhetoric too is not an art – and have composed confirmatory arguments of this view. For if Epíkouros and Metrodorus and moreover Hérmarchos declare such a practice to be an art (as we shall record in what comes next) then those who write against them are not very from being condemned as parricides.

[Hubbell] Those Epicureans are to be censured who assume that sophistic is not an art, and thus run counter to the teachings of Epíkouros, Metrodorus and Hérmarchos, as we shall show later. Such Epicureans are almost guilty of parricide.

κἂν ἔχη[ι] τις καθ' ὑπόθεσι[ν] διὰ παντὸς πείθο[υ]σαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δύναμι[ιν] – οὐκ ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ κα[κῶν] μεγάλων αἰτίαν εἶ[ναι] ταύτην. καὶ τοῦ[των ἔ]καστον [κα]τας[κευάσας] (ὥς νομίζει) ποικί[λως], οἶεται κατ' ἄκρας ἀποδεδειχέναι τὸ: παρ' Ἐπίκουρον [ἵ]στασ[θαι] το[ύς] [ἦ] πᾶσαν τὴν ῥη[το]ρικ[ήν] [ἦ] μέρος αὐτῆς ἔν τε[ι] [χν]ον ἀ[πο]φαινο[μένους].

κἂν ἔχη τις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν διὰ παντὸς πείθουσαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δύναμιν – οὐκ ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ κακῶν μεγάλων αἰτίαν εἶναι ταύτην. καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον κατασκευάσας (ὥς νομίζει) ποικίλως, οἶεται κατ' ἄκρας ἀποδεδειχέναι τὸ: παρ' Ἐπίκουρον ἵστασθαι τοὺς ἢ πᾶσαν τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἢ μέρος αὐτῆς ἔν τεχνον ἀποφαινομένους.

[Chandler] ...And that even if someone, for the sake of argument, has an ability to persuade the majority on every occasion – this is a cause not of good things but great evils. And having constructed each one of these [arguments] in an artful way (so he thinks), he supposes he has shown thoroughly that: those who demonstrate that either the whole of rhetoric or a branch of it is technical are adopting a position contrary to Epíkouros.

Under a certain assumption, if someone has a power at all times persuasive over many – this [is] the cause not of goods things of great harms, and having fully crafted in various ways each of these [arguments] (as he believes), he presumes to have shown extensively that: those who are revealing either all rhetoric or a part of it to be art stand [contrary] to Epíkouros.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 18

[Ἐγ]ὼ δ' [ἀ]μέλει κα[ὶ] τῷ[ν] ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγαμ[αι] τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνησιν ἀ[ν]δρός· ὦ[ν] Ὁ μὲ[ν] [ἐ]ν τῷ[ν] Συμ[πο]σι[ω] Π[ε]ρὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ἔφη [συ]γγεγράφθαι – π[ιστε]ύ[ει]ν [ε]ἰ Χρῆ τοῖς λέγουσιν, οὐ[δ'] δ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περ[ὶ] [φι]λοσόφων πιστε[ύ]ε[ιν] – Ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη γινώσκειν ὅπου λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

Ἐγὼ δ' ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγαμαι τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνησιν ἀνδρός· ὦν Ὁ μὲν ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ἔφη συγγεγράφθαι – πιστεύειν εἰ Χρῆ τοῖς λέγουσιν, οὐδ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περὶ φιλοσόφων πιστεύειν – Ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη γινώσκειν ὅπου λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

* Yet I certainly wonder at what is heard from the man who [currently] has leisure in Athens. One of them says [it] was written in [Epíkouros'] Symposium on Rhetoric – if It is necessary to trust in the speakers, or [it is] not [necessary] to believe the philosophers about philosophers – yet He denies knowing where those [originally] around Epíkouros said [this]

[Chandler] I, of course, am amazed at the students of the man who lectures at Athens. One of them said that he believed that Epíkouros wrote about rhetoric in the *Symposium*, if one should trust those who speak – not perhaps as philosophers, about philosophers – the other said he did not know where Epíkouros and his followers say (this).

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col. 15, line 3

Ὁ δ' ἐπαγγελ[ό]μενος ῥητὰς παρατε[θ]ή[σε]σθαι διαλέκτους οὐ λιπαρεῖν ὀφείλει τοῦτ' ἐγδέχ[ε]σθαι τοὺς ἀκο[ύ]οντας ὃ βούλεται – καὶ ἄλλων δηλουμένων. καὶ δὴ γὰρ [δ]η οὐ φησι τῇ [ι] "ὑπο[σ]τελ[λ]όμενον τὸν" Ἐ[πί]κουρον λέγειν διαλέκτῳ συνκατατίθεσθαι τέχνην εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν: α[ὐ]τοῦ [τοῦ] τό τε δὴ καὶ σαφῶς λ[έ]γοντος κ[αὶ] ἐν ἄλλοις – τέχνην εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν[ν]. ὃ σ[ι]ε[ι]()ασμὸν τοῦ ῥήτορος καμ[ι] εἶν[ο] μανικόν;

Ὁ δ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος ῥητὰς παρατεθήσεσθαι διαλέκτους οὐ λιπαρεῖν ὀφείλει τοῦτ' ἐγδέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὃ βούλεται – καὶ ἄλλων δηλουμένων. καὶ δὴ γὰρ δη οὐ φησι τῇ "ὑποστελλόμενον τὸν" Ἐπίκουρον λέγειν διαλέκτῳ συνκατατίθεσθαι τέχνην εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν: αὐτοῦ τοῦτό τε δὴ καὶ σαφῶς λέγοντος καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις – τέχνην εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὃ σ[ι]ε[ι]()ασμὸν τοῦ ῥήτορος καμ[ι] εἶν[ο] μανικόν;

[Chandler] The man who claims he is going to quote arguments word for word must not insist that his audience accept (the meaning) that he wants – if other (interpretations) are revealed too. For in fact, he says that with the term "hesitating" Epíkouros does not mean by the term that he agrees with those who say that rhetoric is without method, especially since in other places it is clearly revealed to be an art in reality. Is it not madness to call this an allusion to the rhetor?

The Rhodesian must have made the argument that Epíkouros' use of the term "hesitating" in his Symposium supported the conclusion that no part of rhetoric is an art, even sophistic rhetoric (composing arguments together and conducting lectures).

[U50]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 43, line 25

νῦν ἐπ'ἑκείνῳ βαδίζωμεν, ὅτι τέχνην οὐχ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὴν σοφιστικὴν – οἱ δὲ τὴν αἵ[ρ]εσιν κτίσαντες ἡμῶν ἀντιφωνοῦσιν· καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἱστορίαν τινὰ καὶ παρατήρησιν συνησκημένην οὐχ ἡμεῖς. ἀλλὰ κάκεῖνο παραθήσομ[εν]α[ὶ] ὅπου καὶ δι' ὧν ἐφα[ίνον]το τῶν [Z]ήνων ταῦτα διασαφεῖσθαι.

νῦν ἐπ'ἐκεῖνο βαδίζωμεν, ὅτι τέχνην οὐχ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὴν σοφιστικὴν – οἱ δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν Κτίσαντες ἡμῶν ἀντιφωνοῦσιν: καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἱστορίαν τινὰ καὶ παρατήρησιν συνησκημένην οὐχ ἡμεῖς. ἀλλὰ κάκεῖνο παραθήσομεναι ὅπου καὶ δι' ὧν ἐφαίνον το Ζήνων ταῦτα διασαφεῖσθαι.

[Chandler] [But] Now let us proceed to the claim that it is not we who say that sophistic is an art, but that the Founders of our School stated it in the course of their polemics, and (they who said) that political rhetoric is a certain research and practiced observation, not we. But I shall also set out **where** and **how** Zeno said **these things were made clear**.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 44

Ὁ τοίνυν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ὅτι μὲν διατελεῖ[τ] λέγων "τὰ διδα[σ]καλεῖα τῶν ῥητορικῶν" καὶ "το[ύς] ἐκ τῶν διδα[σ]καλείων" [κ]αὶ "τὰς δυνάμεις τῶ[ς] ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλ[ε]ῖων" – πρὸς δὲ τούτοις "τ[ὰς] ἐκ τῶν δ[ι]δασκαλείων [εὐ]μορφίας", καὶ διότι κ[αὶ] "πρα[γ]ματεῖαν αὐτῶν" καὶ "τὰς παρ[α]δόσεις καὶ παραγγελίας περὶ τε λόγου καὶ ἐνθ[υ]μημάτων [κα]ὶ τῶν ἄλλων," καὶ τάν[α]λ[ο]γα πάντα το[ύ]τοις τί ἂν λέγοι [τις]; [ἀ]λλὰ μὴν καὶ Ἑρμα[ρ]χος ἐπὶ Μενεκλέου[ς] [ἐ]ν τινὶ πρὸς Θεοφείδην ἐπιστολῇ[ι] τὴν αὐτῇ[ν] ἔχε[ι] γνώμην.

Ὁ τοίνυν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ὅτι μὲν διατελεῖ λέγων "τὰ διδασκαλεῖα τῶν ῥητορικῶν" καὶ "τοὺς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων" καὶ "τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων" – πρὸς δὲ τούτοις "τὰς ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων εὐμορφίας", καὶ διότι καὶ "πραγματεῖαν αὐτῶν" καὶ "τὰς παραδόσεις καὶ παραγγελίας περὶ τε λόγου καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων," καὶ τάνάλογα πάντα τούτοις τί ἂν λέγοι τις; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Ἑρμαρχος ἐπὶ Μενεκλέους ἐν τινὶ πρὸς Θεοφείδην ἐπιστολῇ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει γνώμην.

[Chandler] Well then, what could one say of the fact that Epíkouros in his *On Rhetoric* continually mentions "those who come from the schools," and "the capabilities that come from the schools" – and in addition "the symmetries that come from the schools," and "the teachings of the rhetoricians," and "their business," and "the teaching and instruction concerning both speech and enthymemes and the rest," and everything analogous to these things? Furthermore Hérmarchos too, in a letter addressed to Theopheidēs in the archonship of Menekleús, has the same opinion.

[U51]*

Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, 30.4, 3

Ammianós Markellínos (fl. 370 AD) was a Greek, an officer in the army of Emperor Julian, and author of Res Gestae, a history of Rome from 100 AD to 378 AD.

Hanc professionem oratorum forensium "πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον" id est civilitatis particulae umbram vel adulationis partem quartam esse definit amplitudo Platonis – Epíkouros autem "κακοτεχνίαν" nominans inter artes numerat malas.

This forensic oratory profession the rich genius of Plato defines as "politikês moríou eídōlon (an image of a part of politics)" that is, the shadow of a small part of the science of government or as the fourth part of flattery – but Epíkouros counts it among evil arts, calling it "kakotechnía (a vile technique)."

ἡ κακοτεχνία αἱ κακοτεχνίαι	harmful art	KAKOTEXNIA <i>bad technique</i>
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Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 28

{[Πολλὰ δ' ἔστι τε τεκμήρια τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν ῥητορικὴν στοχάζεσθαι το]ῦ} ...ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ [πολὺ] καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐλογον, καὶ δῆτα καὶ φέρεται πρὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον. λέγω δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀόριστον καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅτε μὲν πειθόμενον ὅτε δὲ προσκόπτον.

...ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐλογον, καὶ δῆτα καὶ φέρεται πρὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον. λέγω δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀόριστον καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὅτε μὲν πειθόμενον ὅτε δὲ προσκόπτον.

[Chandler] { *too fragmentary* } ...for the most part and with a reasonable chance of success and it is certainly taken from Epíkouros and his followers. I mean the uncertainty of many (in that) it is sometimes believed by, and sometimes gives offence to, the same people...

[U53]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 50, line 16 - line 32

[Ἀλλὰ μ]ὴν οὐχ ἔνε[κα] τοῦ κοινοποιῆσαι μόνον τὸ τεκμήριον εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο νομιστέον πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις – καὶ πλανῶνται πάντες οἱ σοφισταῖς ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκοντες. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσωσι[ν αὐ]τῶν ἐν ταῖς δεῖξεσι[ι] καὶ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι, [φησ]ὶν [ὅ] Ἐπίκουρος, κα[ὶ ψυ]χαγωγηθῶσι διὰ τ[ὸ μ]ὴ [εἶ]ναι περὶ συ[μ]βολ[αί]ου τινὸς τὸν λόγον[ν μὴδὲ τῶ]ν συμφερόν[των] – ὃ ἐ[ν] τ[αῖς] ἐκκλη[σι]αῖς [κ]αὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις [γ]ίνεται.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἔνεκα τοῦ κοινοποιῆσαι μόνον τὸ τεκμήριον εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο νομιστέον πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις – καὶ πλανῶνται πάντες οἱ σοφισταῖς ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκοντες. Ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσωσιν αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς δεῖξεσι καὶ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι, φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ψυχαγωγηθῶσι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι περὶ συμβολαίου τινὸς τὸν λόγον μὴδὲ τῶν συμφερόντων – ὃ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις καὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις γίνεται.

But one should not consider that this was said merely to make the argument common knowledge to us, but rather for the sake of truths – all those who spend money on sophists are in error. For whenever they listen to [sophistic orators] at displays and festivals, Epíkouros says, they are entertained because the speech is not about a treaty or agreements – as happens in the assemblies and law courts...

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 50, line 33 – col. 51, line 21

Ἐν μὲν γὰρ [ρ τούταις] ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνκειμέ[νου] διαλεγόμενοι κινδ[υ]νεύοντες ὅταν ἐκκλησιάζωσιν, ὅταν δὲ δι[κάζωσιν,] τὸν ὄρκον φοβο[ύ]μενοι προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι καὶ δεῖξεσι τῶν σοφιστῶν οὐθὲν οὐθ' ὑπὲρ [ὄρ]κου φ[ρο]ντίζον[τες - οὐ γὰρ ὁ]μωμόκασιν ὁ [ρθῶς] κ[ριν]εῖν. οὐθ' ὑπὲρ τῶ[ν λεγομ]ένων, εἰ συμφέρει [τῇ πόλει] ἢ μὴ - οὐ γάρ ἐστι[ν] ὑπ[ὲρ πο]λέμου καὶ [εἰρ]ήνης ὁ λόγος, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀτταδήποτε ψηφίσασθαι· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ἦ γ' ἢ καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλη[σι]αῖς [β]ουλευόνται, οὐ περὶ κατεπε[ύγον]τός τινος [ἦ] οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁ λόγος.

Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τούταις ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνκειμένου διαλεγόμενοι κινδυνεύοντες ὅταν ἐκκλησιάζωσιν, ὅταν δὲ δικάζωσιν, τὸν ὄρκον φοβούμενοι προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις – ἐν δὲ ταῖς πανηγύρεσι καὶ δεῖξεσι τῶν σοφιστῶν οὐθὲν οὐθ' ὑπὲρ ὄρκου φροντίζοντες, οὐ γὰρ ὁμωμόκασιν ὀρθῶς κρινεῖν. οὐθ' ὑπὲρ τῶν λεγομένων, εἰ συμφέρει τῇ πόλει ἢ μὴ, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὑπὲρ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ὁ λόγος, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀτταδήποτε ψηφίσασθαι· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ἦ γ' ἢ καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ὧν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις βουλευόνται, οὐ περὶ κατεπείγοντός τινος ἢ οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁ λόγος.

...For in [law courts], as the saying goes, they risk their neck whenever they serve as assemblymen, and whenever they judge cases, they pay attention to what's being said because they fear their oath – but in the assemblies and displays of the sophists, they do not care at all, either about an oath (because they have not sworn to judge correctly) nor about whether what's being said is beneficial to the city or not (because the speech is not about war and peace, about which we must sometimes vote, or if it does happen to be about war and peace or some other thing that they deliberate in their assemblies, the speech at that moment is not about anything pressing at all).

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 51, line 25 – col. 52, line 7

Ὡστε σφ[ό]δρα ἔξωι ὄντες τοῦ ἀγω[νιᾶν ἀκούουσιν ἐν [ταί]ς πανηγύρεσιν – ὅταν δ' οὐ[τ]ως ἀκού[ω]σι, τοῖς μὲν λεγομένοι[ς] οὐ[πρ]οσέχ[ο]υ[ς]ιν, [πότε]ρα συμ[φ]έροντα ἢ [ο]ύ συμ[φ]έροντα καὶ τὸ σύνολον [ἀ]ληθῆ ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἤχου καὶ τῶν περιόδων καὶ τῶν παρίσων καὶ ἀντιθέτων καὶ ὁμοιοτελεῦτων ψυχαγωγούμενοι ἤδη προσεδόκησαν, εἰ οὕτωι λά[λο]ι ἦσαν, καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίοις εἰ[ὺ ἀπὶ] ἀλλάττειν οὐ συνορῶ[ν]τες, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἡ[ν]έ[σχο]ντ[ο], εἰ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις κ[αὶ] δικαστηρίωι [οὔ]τωι λαλοῦντος ἤκουον· ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναλίσκειν μισθὸν τοῖς σοφισταῖς. [Εἴ]τ' εὐθύς γινώσκουσ[ιν] ὅτι ἀπολωλέκασι τὸ ἀργύριον.

Ὡστε σφόδρα ἔξωι ὄντες τοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν ἀκούουσιν ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν – ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἀκούωσι, τοῖς μὲν λεγομένοις οὐ προσέχουσιν, πότερα συμφέροντα ἢ οὐ συμφέροντα καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἀληθῆ ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἤχου καὶ τῶν περιόδων καὶ τῶν παρίσων καὶ ἀντιθέτων καὶ ὁμοιοτελεῦτων ψυχαγωγούμενοι ἤδη προσεδόκησαν, εἰ οὕτωι λάλοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίοις εὖ ἀπαλλάττειν οὐ συνορῶντες, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἡνέσχοντο, εἰ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις καὶ δικαστηρίωι οὕτωι λαλοῦντος ἤκουον· ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναλίσκειν μισθὸν τοῖς σοφισταῖς. Εἴτ' εὐθύς γινώσκουσιν ὅτι ἀπολωλέκασι τὸ ἀργύριον.

Therefore, they are entirely outside of competition while they listen at the festivals – but whenever they listen in this way [sc. to a display oration at a panegyris (national assembly or festival)], they do not pay attention to whether what is being said is beneficial or not, and, on the whole, true or not, but, entertained by the sound itself, the periods, balanced clauses, antitheses, and rhymes, they already expect to acquit themselves well, if they should speak like that, both in assemblies and in courtrooms, because they do not understand that they would not tolerate it if they heard someone speaking like that in an assembly or courtroom, on which grounds they came to hire sophists. Then they immediately recognize that they have wasted their money.

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 3, P.Herc. 1506, col. 52, line 8

Οὐθὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοῖς συντελεῖται πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλ' ἢ διαβολή καὶ ἀγωνία· διαβολή μὲν ὥς γεγυμνασμένοις ῥητορεύειν, καὶ κατὰ τρόπον μὲν ἀπαλλάττοντας κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ λέγειν ιδέαν δοκεῖν παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς, μὴ κατὰ τρόπον δὲ ἀποχωροῦντας διὰ κενῆς ἀργύριον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι σοφιστὶ ἀνηλωκέναι· ἀγωνία δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐνθυμουμένοις καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ δόξει ἀπαλλάττειν ἥπερ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δόξη παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς. Ταῦτά τε δὴ αὐτοῖς περίεστιν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἅμα συνδέσμοις ἔπεσθαι προσεχῶς καὶ πτώσεσιν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις μῆτε τοῖς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναγγελλομένοις παρακολουθεῖν μῆτε τοῖς ὑφ' ἐτέρων.

Οὐθὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοῖς συντελεῖται πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀλλ' ἢ διαβολή καὶ ἀγωνία· διαβολή μὲν ὥς γεγυμνασμένοις ῥητορεύειν, καὶ κατὰ τρόπον μὲν ἀπαλλάττοντας κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ λέγειν ιδέαν δοκεῖν παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς, μὴ κατὰ τρόπον δὲ ἀποχωροῦντας διὰ κενῆς ἀργύριον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι σοφιστὶ ἀνηλωκέναι· ἀγωνία δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐνθυμουμένοις καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ δόξει ἀπαλλάττειν ἥπερ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δόξη παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς δικαστάς. Ταῦτά τε δὴ αὐτοῖς περίεστιν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ ἅμα συνδέσμοις ἔπεσθαι προσεχῶς καὶ πτώσεσιν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις μῆτε τοῖς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναγγελλομένοις παρακολουθεῖν μῆτε τοῖς ὑφ' ἐτέρων.

** { Indeed, I believe, nothing is achieved by them in the matter but only defamation and anxiety; defamation insofar as trained to speak rhetorically, and in a manner, they seem to alienate the judges through their way of speaking, not properly withdrawing, thinking they have wasted money on sophistry; [they have] anxiety, however, concerning these considerations, and more so about how they might seem convincing in their speech rather than appearing not to convince the judges. These very issues are beset upon them by the situation, and they must meticulously follow the connections and downfalls in the statements, neither adhering to reports by themselves nor by others. }

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 10, line 24

Φησὶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς Ἐπίκουρος, ὅτι τοῖς διατριβικοῖς οἱ προϊόντες ἀπατῶντα[ι] κ[αὶ] οὐκ ἀπεικόντως διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν – ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούωσιν ἐν ταῖς δεῖξι[ν] καὶ πανηγύρεσιν τῶν [μὴ] ἢτε π[ερὶ] συμβουλῆς [μῆτε] περὶ τίνος τῶν τῆι πόλει ὀλεῖ συμφ[ε]ρόντων[ν]...

Φησὶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς Ἐπίκουρος, ὅτι τοῖς διατριβικοῖς οἱ προϊόντες ἀπατῶνται καὶ οὐκ ἀπεικόντως διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν – ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούωσιν ἐν ταῖς δεῖξεσιν καὶ πανηγύρεσιν τῶν μῆτε περὶ συμβουλῆς μῆτε περὶ τίνος τῶν τῇ πόλει συμφερόντων...

[Chandler] Epíkouros in his *On Rhetoric* says that those who attend the professors of the schools are deceived, and **not unreasonably for the following reason** – for whenever they listen to speeches at displays and panegyrics, because [the speech] is neither concerned with deliberation [or] anything which is of advantage to the state...

* Epíkouros states in *On Rhetoric* that those engaging in academic exercises, the participants deceive [themselves] and **not without justification for such a reason** – whenever they hear [speeches] at demonstrations and festivals that are neither about advice nor about anything of benefit to the city...

[U54]

Laértios 10.13

Κέχρηται δὲ **λέξει κυρία κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων** – ἦν ὅτι ἰδιωτάτη ἐστίν, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς αἰτιᾶται. **σαφὲς δ'** ἦν οὕτως, ὥς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ **σαφήνειαν** ἀπαιτεῖν.

He makes use of **the principal term regarding subjects** – which, because it is extremely idiosyncratic, Aristophanes the grammarian criticizes. He was so **clear** a writer that in the work *On Rhetoric* he considers **clearness** the sole requisite.

[U55]

Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, Book 2, P.Herc. 1672, col 21, line 22

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ Ἑρμαρχος, δι' ὧν παρεθέμε[θ]α, μετὰ δὲ τῆς πάσης ἐξεργασίας Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς τελείοθ[ι]ς ἀνεπιμείκτους [δ]ιδάσκων τὰς δυ[ν]άμεις κ[αί] συνεργούσας μὲν οὐθὲ[ν] εἷς γε τὴν ἕξιν τὴν πολ[ι]τικὴν τὰς διατριβάς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ μεταβαλλού[σ]αται(), ἃ προφέρεσθαι νῦν ἐμὲ μέσῳ κείμενα πᾶσιν μά[τα]ρ[ο]ν ησα[ν] [νετ]αι καὶ [περ]ιττόν.

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ Ἑρμαρχος, δι' ὧν παρεθέμεθα, μετὰ δὲ τῆς πάσης ἐξεργασίας Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς τελείοθ[ι]ς ἀνεπιμείκτους διδάσκων τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ συνεργούσας μὲν οὐθὲν εἷς γε τὴν ἕξιν τὴν πολιτικὴν τὰς διατριβάς, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ μεταβαλλού[σ]αται(), ἃ προφέρεσθαι νῦν ἐμὲ μέσῳ κείμενα πᾶσιν **μάταρ[ο]ν** ησα[ν] **νεται καὶ περιττόν**. ✱

[Chandler] Hérmarchos too, by what we have cited, shows this, as does Epíkouros with his entire treatment in *On Rhetoric* by teaching that the capabilities are completely independent of one another and that the schools contain nothing for the political faculty, but often even change it, things which it seems **pointless** and **superfluous** to offer now when they lie exposed for everyone.

Maximus Planoúdēs, Commentary for Hermogenes On Stasis:

Máximos Planoúdēs (fl. 1300) was a Byzantine monk and translator.

Ὁ δὲ γε Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς αὐθαδέστερον οἶμαι λέγων φησὶν αὐτὸς μόνος εὐρηκέναι τέχνην πολιτικῶν λόγων. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀποσκορακίζων ῥήτορας ἑαυτῷ πως μαχόμενα λέγει. φύσις γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατορθοῦσα λόγους, τέχνη δὲ οὐδεμία.

Epíkouros, in his treatise *On Rhetoric* is seen to speak quite arrogantly, stating that he alone has discovered the art of political speeches. He ridicules the other orators, claiming that they are only contesting against him. According to him, it is nature that succeeds in creating speeches, not any craft.

Philódēmos frequently mentions Plato's Gorgias, where rhetoric is portrayed mainly as a tool for persuasion, disconnected from genuine truth. Epicureans who agree with Philodemus' interpretation of Epíkouros might see Plato's critical stance on rhetoric in this work as suggestive that that Epíkouros held a more nuanced view – and was less adversarial toward certain educational facets falling under the realm of "rhetoric" – specifically the study of the principles of composition.

43. Twelve Elementary Principles
Στοιχειώσεις Δώδεκα

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.44b

Φησὶ δ, ἔνδοτέρω, **μηδὲ ποιότητά τινα** περὶ τὰς **ἀτόμους** εἶναι **πλὴν σχήματος** καὶ **μεγέθους** καὶ **βάρους** – **τὸ δὲ Χρῶμα** παρὰ τὴν θέσιν τῶν **ἀτόμων** **ἀλλάττεσθαι**, **ἐν ταῖς Δώδεκα Στοιχειώσεσιν** φησι.

He says, moreover, that there is **no quality at all** for the atoms except for shape, dimension, and weight – that **Color varies** with the position of the atoms, he states in the *Twelve Elementary Principles*.

44. Symposium **Συμπόσιον**

Laértios 10.28

...Νεοκλῆς Πρὸς Θεμίσταν. Συμπόσιον. Εὐρύλοχος Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον...

...Neoklês, Dedicated to Themísta. Symposium. Eurýlochos, Dedicated to Mētródōros...

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 1.0.1

Τὸ δ' ὅλως ἀμνημονεῖν τῶν ἐν οἴνῳ μὴ μόνον τῷ φιλοποιῷ λεγομένῳ μάχεσθαι τῆς τραπέζης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ἐλλογιμωτάτους ἀντιμαρτυροῦντας ἔχειν (Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοφῶντα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Σπεύσιππον, Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ Πρύτανιν καὶ Ἱερώνυμον καὶ Δίωνα τὸν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ὡς ἄξιόν τινος σπουδῆς πεποιημένους ἔργον ἀναγράψασθαι **λόγους παρὰ πότον** γενομένους).

But to deliver over to oblivion all sort of discourse that merry meetings do usually produce is not only repugnant to that endearing quality that most allow to an entertainment, but against the known practice of the greatest philosophers (for Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epíkouros, Prytanis, Hieronymus, Dion the Academic, have thought it a worthy and noble employment to deliver down to us those **discourses** they had **over drinks**).

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 186E

Ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν **περὶ τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν συμποσίων** λέξομεν. ἀφορίζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ ποιητὴς **χρόνους**, πρόσωπα, αἰτίας. τοῦτο δὲ ὀρθῶς ἀπεμάξατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν καὶ Πλάτων, οἱ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐκτίθενται τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ συμποσίου καὶ τίνες οἱ παρόντες. Ἐπίκουρος δὲ **οὐ τόπον, οὐ χρόνον** ἀφορίζει, **οὐ προλέγει οὐδέν**. δεῖ οὖν μαντεύσασθαι πῶς ποτ' ἄνθρωπος ἐξαπίνης ἔχων κύλικα προβάλλει ζητήματα καθάπερ ἐν διατριβῇ λέγων.

We will now talk **about the Homeric symposia**. In these, namely, the poet distinguishes **times**, persons, and occasions. This feature Xenophon and Plato rightly copied, for at the beginning of their treatises they explain the occasion of the symposium, and who are present. But Epíkouros specifies **no place, no time**; he has **no introduction whatsoever**. One has to guess, therefore, how it comes about that a man with cup in hand suddenly propounds questions as though he were lecturing before a class.

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 187B

Ἦτι δὲ ὁ μὲν Ὀμηρος ἡλικίαις εἰσάγει διαφέροντας καὶ ταῖς προαιρέσεσι τοὺς κεκλημένους – Νέστορα καὶ Αἴαντα καὶ Ὀδυσσεά – τὸ μὲν καθόλου σύμπαντας τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντεχομένους, εἶδει δὲ διαφόροις ὁδοῖς ὠρμηκότας ἐπ' αὐτήν. ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἅπαντας εἰσήγαγε **προφήτας ἀτόμων**, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔχων παραδείγματα τήν τε τοῦ Ποιητοῦ τῶν συμποσίων ποικιλίαν καὶ **τὴν Πλάτωνός** τε καὶ Ξενοφώντος **χάριν**.

Homer introduces guests who differ in their ages and views of life – Nestor, Ajax, Odysseus – all of whom, speaking generally, strive after excellence, but have set out in specifically diverse paths to find it. Epíkouros on the other hand, introduced none but **prophets of atoms**, although he had before him these as his models, such as the variety of symposia of the Poet, and the **charm of Plato** and Xenophon as well.

ὁ προφήτης οἱ προφῆται	prophet	ΠΡΟΦΗΤΗΣ <i>to say before</i>
οἱ προφῆται ἀτόμων	prophets of atoms	

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 177B

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ **συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων μόνων** πεποιήται.

Epíkouros, however, portrayed **a symposium of only philosophers**.

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 179D

Καὶ πρὸ τοῦ **θoinᾶσθαι** δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς διδάσκει πάλιν Ὅμηρος, **ἀπαρχὰς τῶν βρωμάτων** νέμειν τοῖς θεοῖς... ἅπερ καὶ Πλάτων φυλάσσει κατὰ τὸ συμπόσιον... παρὰ δ’ Ἐπικούρῳ οὐ σπονδή, **οὐκ ἀπαρχή** θεοῖς – ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ Σημωνίδης ἔφη περὶ τῆς ἀκόσμου γυναικός: "ἄθυστα δ’ ἱρὰ πολλάκις κατεσθίει."

Again, Homer tells us what we are to do **before we begin to eat**, namely, we are to offer as **first portions of the food** to the gods... all of which Plato also retains in his symposium... But with Epíkouros there is no libation, **no preliminary offering** to the gods – on the contrary, it is like what Simonides says of the lawless woman: "Oftentimes she eats up the offerings before they are consecrated."

Simonides of Ceos (fl. c. 515 BC) was a lyric poet. He is credited for introducing Ω, Η, Ξ, and Ψ as new letters for the revised Greek alphabet.

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 182A

Ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἐπικούρου Συμποσίῳ **κολάκων** ἐστὶν ἄγυρις **ἀλλήλους ἐπαινούντων** – τὸ δὲ Πλάτωνος πληρὲς ἐστὶ **μυκτηριστῶν ἀλλήλους τωθαζόντων**... παρὰ δ’ Ὀμήρῳ κεκρότηται τὰ **σώφρονα** συμπόσια.

In the Symposium of Epíkouros there is an assemblage **of flatterers praising one another** – while the symposium of Plato is full of men who turn their noses up in jeers at one another... In Homer, on the other hand, only **sober** symposia are organized.

[U57]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 187C

Πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ ζητεῖ περὶ δυσπεψίας ὥστ' οἰωνίσασθαι, εἴθ' ἐξῆς περὶ πυρετῶν. **τῇν** μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρέχουσαν τῇ λέξει **ἄρρυθμίαν** τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;

Epíkouros poses questions in his Symposium about indigestion as a means of obtaining omens, and then immediately after this discusses fevers. Why should I even mention **the rhythmlessness** that permeates his style?

[U58]

Effects of Wine

Plutarch, Against Kōlôtēs, 1109E

“Ὅρα δ’ ἃ, **περὶ τοῦ οἴνου τῆς θερμότητος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ, Πολύαινον** αὐτῷ **διαλεγόμενον** Ἐπίκουρος πεποίηκε, λέγοντος γάρ "οὐ φησ εἶναι, ὥ Ἐπίκουρε, **τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου διαθερμασίας;**" (ὑπέλαβέ τις) "οὐ τὸ καθόλου **θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον** εἶναι." (καὶ μετὰ σμικρὸν) "φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου οὐκ εἶναι 'θερμαντικὸς ὁ οἶνος' – τοῦδε δέ τινος ὁ τοσοῦτος εἶναι **θερμαντικὸς ἂν ῥηθείη.**"

Observe **what, regarding the heat of the wine in the Symposium, Epíkouros** has [portrayed] **Polýainos conversing** with him, as he says "**Do you deny, Epíkouros, the absolute heating effect caused by wine?**" (Someone interrupts) "**it is not a universal fact that wine seems fully warming.**" (And a little later) "**For the universal fact does not seem to be that 'wine is warming' – but that a certain quantity for a certain person may be said to be warming.**"

Consider the discussion that Epíkouros holds in his Symposium with Polýainos about the heat in wine, when Polýainos says "Do you, Epíkouros, deny the existence of the warmth produced by wine?" (Some one interrupted) "It does not appear that wine is unconditionally productive of heat." (And a little later) "It seems that wine is not unconditionally productive of heat, but wine of a certain quantity might be said to produce heat for a given person."

[Alternative] (ὑπέλαβε) "**τί δεῖ τὸ καθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι;**"

[Alternative] (he replies) "what need is there to generalize that wine is warming?"

[U59]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1109F – 1110A

Καὶ πάλιν, **αἰτίαν** ὑπειπὼν – **θλίψεις** τε καὶ **διασποράς** ἀτόμων, **ἐτέρων** δὲ **συμμίξεις** καὶ **παραζεύξεις** αἰτιασάμενος – **ἐν τῇ** πρὸς τὸ σῶμα **καταμίξει** τοῦ οἴνου, ἐπιλέγει "διὸ δὴ καθόλου μὲν οὐ ῥητέον **τὸν οἶνον** εἶναι **θερμαντικόν** – **τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φύσεως** καὶ **τῆς οὕτω διακειμένης: θερμαντικὸν** τὸν τοσοῦτον – ἢ (τῆσδε) τὸν τοσοῦτον εἶναι **ψυκτικόν!**"

× And again, having hinted at **a cause** – he attributes ^[1] **compressions** and **dispersals** of [some] atoms and **of others their** ^[2] **mixings** and **joinings** – in the blending of the wine with the body, he states "**therefore it should generally not be said that wine is warming – but of such a nature and of an arrangement in such a way that: this much is warming – but (in another case) this much is cooling!**"

Again, after assigning **as one cause** ^[1] **the crowding** and **dispersal** of atoms, and as another, the ^[2] **mixture** and **alignment** of these with others, when the wine is mingled with the body, he adds in conclusion "**Thus, one should not generalize that wine is productive of heat – but only say that a particular amount produces heat for a particular body in a particular condition, or that such an amount results in chilling for another!**"

"Ἐνεῖσι γὰρ καὶ τοιαῦται **ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἀθροίσματι** φύσεις, **ἐξ ὧν** ἂν ψυχρὸν συσταίῃ – **εἰς δέον** τε **ἐτέραις** παραζυγεῖσαι: **ψυχρασίας φύσιν** ἀποτελέσειαν – ὅθεν ἐξαπατῶμενοι οἱ μὲν **ψυκτικὸν τὸ καθόλου** φασὶν εἶναι **τὸν οἶνον**, οἱ δὲ **θερμαντικόν**"

× "For there are such natures **in such a conglomerate [as wine], from which** coldness might be composed – and if **in proper measure** yoked **with other [elements]:** they would achieve **a nature of cooling** – therefore, while some are deceived and say that **the universal fact** is that **wine** is generally **cooling**, others [say it is] **warming.**"

"For in an aggregate such as wine there are also certain natural substances of such a sort that coolness might be formed of them, or such that, when aligned with others, they would produce a real coolness. Hence, deceived by this, some generalize that wine is cooling, others, that it is heating."

[U60]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1110A

Ὁ δὴ λέγων ἐξηπατῆσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς, τὸ θερμαῖνον θερμαντικὸν ἢ τὸ ψῦχον ψυκτικὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντας, εἰ μὴ νομίζοι "τὸ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον" ἕκαστον ἀκολουθεῖν οἷς εἴρηκεν, αὐτὸς ἐξηπάτηται.

If then the man who asserts that the majority are deceived in supposing that what heats is heating or what cools is cooling should refuse to recognize "Everything is no more this than that" as a conclusion from his premises, he is himself deceived.

Προστίθῃσι δ’ ὅτι "πολλάκις οὐδ’ ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σῶμα **θερμαντικὴν** ἐπιφέρων ἢ **ψυκτικὴν δύναμιν** ὁ οἶνος – ἀλλὰ **κινήθέντος τοῦ ὄγκου** καὶ **γενομένης** τῶν σωμάτων **μεταστάσεως**: αἱ ποιοῦσαι **τὸ θερμὸν** ἄτομοι νῦν μὲν συνῆλθον εἰς ταῦτό καὶ παρέσχον **ὑπὸ πλήθους θερμότητα** καὶ **πύρωσιν** τῷ σώματι – νῦν δ’ ἐκπεσοῦσαι κατέψυξαν."

✱ He adds that "Often the wine did not come **into the body** bringing either a **heating** or **cooling power** – but **with the mass having been moved** and a **displacement** of the objects **having occurred**: the atoms that produce **heat** now indeed came together and **by the multitude** provided **heat** and **inflammation** to the body – but now having fallen out, they cooled."

He proceeds to add "And often the wine does not even possess the property of heating or cooling as it enters the body – rather, the bodily mass is so set in motion that the corpuscles shift their position: the **heat**-producing atoms are at one time concentrated, becoming numerous enough to impart warmth and heat to the body, but at another time are driven out, producing a chill."

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 3.5, 652A

Διείλεκται δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ **Συμποσίῳ πολλοὺς λόγους**, ὧν τὸ Κεφάλαιόν ἐστιν, ὡς Ἐγὼμαι, τοιόνδε: Φησὶ γὰρ **οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν Οἶνον: ἀλλ’ ἔχειν τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὐτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεσματικὰς – ἐτέρας δ’ αὖ ψυχρότητος**

Epíkouros also discussed **in the Symposium many arguments**, the main point of them, as I understand it, as follows: for He says that **Wine is not hot in itself: but has certain atoms in itself productive of heat** – and **others again of coldness**

ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀποβάλλειν ὅταν εἰς τὸ σῶμα παραγένηται – τὰς δὲ προσλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ἂν ἔχῃσι **κράσεως ἡμῖν ἢ φύσεως ὁμιλῆσαι**: ὡς **Τοὺς μὲν ἐκθερμαίνεσθαι, Τοὺς δὲ τούναντίον πάσχειν μεθυσκομένους**

[Epíkouros says that] **some of these [atoms of wine] are shed whenever [wine] is in the body** – but **other [atoms] are taken along from the body in addition [to the wine]**, depending on how they may be suited to interact **with our constitution or nature**: so that **Some [people] are warmed** – but **Others experience the opposite while they are intoxicated**

[U61]

Appropriate Time for Intercourse

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 653B

περὶ καιροῦ συνουσίας: Νεανίσκοι τινὲς, οὐ πάλαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λόγοις προσπεφοιτηκότες – ἐσπάραττον τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ὡς οὐ καλὸν οὐδ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἐμβεβληκότα λόγον περὶ καιροῦ συνουσίας εἰς τὸ Συμπόσιον

about the proper time for intercourse: some Youngsters, not long acquainted **with the ancient discussions**, were tearing apart **Epíkouros**, as **though he had introduced a discussion that was neither good nor necessary** about proper time for intercourse in the *Symposium*

ἡ οὐσία αἱ οὐσίαι	existence	ΟΥΣΙΑ <i>being</i>
ἡ συνουσία αἱ συνουσίαι	intercourse	ΣΥΝΟΥΣΙΑ <i>being together</i>

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning [here, "discussion"]	ΛΟΓΟΣ collecting
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μιμνήσκεσθαι γὰρ Ἀφροδισίων Ἄνδρα πρεσβύτερον ἐν δείπνῳ μειρακίων παρόντων – καὶ διαπορεῖν πότερον μετὰ δεῖπνον ἢ πρὸ δείπνου Χρηστέον, ἐσχάτης ἀκολασίας εἶναι

for an older man to make mention of Aphrodisian activities at a dinner-party with youths present – and to be in doubt whether It is necessary before dinner or after dinner is [they said] the extreme of licentiousness

πρὸς ταῦθ' οἱ μὲν τὸν Ξενοφῶντα παρέλαβον ὡς ἀπάγοντα τοὺς συμπότας μετὰ δεῖπνον οὐχὶ πεζοὺς ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἵππων ἐπὶ συνουσίας πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας. Ζώπυρος δ' ὁ ἰατρός, εὖ μάλα τοῖς Ἐπικούρου λόγοις ἐνωμιληκῶς, οὐκ ἔφη προσέχοντας αὐτοὺς ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ Ἐπικούρου Συμπόσιον

at this, some among our company brought up Xenophon, who, so to speak, took his guests home after dinner, not on foot, but on horseback, for intercourse with their wives. And Zopyrus the Physician, who was very well acquainted with the works of Epíkouros, did not say that that they were attentively reading the *Symposium* of Epicurus

οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος καὶ καταστάσεως τοῦτο πρόβλημα ποιησάμενον εἴτα λόγους ἐπ' αὐτῷ περαίνειν – ἀλλὰ τοὺς νέους ἀνιστάντα μετὰ δεῖπνον εἰς περίπατον ἐπὶ σωφρονισμῷ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἀνακρούειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν – ὡς αἰεὶ μὲν ἐπισφαλοῦς εἰς βλάβην τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος (κάκιστα δὲ τοὺς παρὰ πότον καὶ ἐδωδὴν χρωμένους) αὐτῷ διατιθέντος

for it is not as if, from some principle and foundation, [Epíkouros] made this problem and then completed arguments upon it – but rather he made the young men rise after dinner for a walk to converse regarding moderation, and to push back away from desires – with [the discussion] being arranged by him that it is always risky regarding the harm of the circumstance (but especially for those engaging during drinking and eating)

"εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ προηγουμένως" εἶπεν "ἐζητεῖτο περὶ τούτου – πότερον οὐδ' ὅλως ἐσκέφθαι καλῶς εἶχε τὸν φιλόσοφον περὶ συνουσίας καιροῦ καὶ ὥρας; ἢ βέλτιον μὲν ἐν καιρῷ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν; τὸν δὲ καιρὸν ἄλλως μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν οὐκ ἄτοπον – ἐν δὲ συμποσίῳ καὶ περὶ τράπεζαν αἰσχρόν;"

"indeed, even if previously" he said "the inquiry had been about this – would it not be entirely proper that the philosopher considered the proportion and time for intercourse? is it not better to do such things at the right time and with reason? or is it not inappropriate to examine the right occasion [for intercourse] at another [event] – but shameful to do so during a symposium or around the table?"

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 653F

πρὸς τοῦτο πληγέντες, οἱ Νεανίσκοι σιωπῇ κατέκειντο: τῶν δ' ἄλλων τὸν Ζώπυρον ἀξιούντων τοὺς περὶ τούτου λόγους Ἐπικούρου διελθεῖν, ἔφη τῶν μὲν κατὰ μέρος οὐκ ἀκριβῶς μνημονεύειν, οἶεσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τὰς ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας πληγὰς δεδιέναι – διὰ τὸν τῶν σωμάτων παλμὸν εἰς ταραχὴν καὶ σάλον ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ βαδιζόντων

struck by this, the young men sat down in silence. with the rest of the company asking Zopyrus to go through the reasonings of Epíkouros about this, and he replied that he did not remember accurately in detail, but thought that [Epíkouros] feared the afflictions resulting from intercourse – due to the pulsation of the bodies moving in the disturbance and agitation in such a state of movement

καθόλου μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἔδρας τὰ σώματα μεθιστάναι – πλήκτην ὄντα καὶ κινητικὸν ταραχῆς τὸν ἄκρατον: ἂν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα τὸν ὄγκον ἡμῶν γαλήνη μὴ παραλάβῃ καὶ ὕπνος], ἀλλ' ἕτεραι διὰ τῶν Ἀφροδισίων κινήσεις – ἐκθλιβομένων καὶ μοχλευομένων τῶν μάλιστα συνδεῖν καὶ κολλᾶν τὸ σῶμα πεφυκότων: Κίνδυνός ἐστιν ἀνέδραστον γίγνεσθαι τὸν ὄγκον, ὥσπερ ἐκ θεμελίων γιγνόμενον

for generally [wine] moves our body from its position – because it is impactful and the extreme of kinetic disturbances: and if tranquility and sleep do not take possession of our body when it is in this condition [of being full of wine or food], but instead different movements in line with Aphrodisian activities – then those things which are especially natural for connecting and joining together the body are pressed out and dislodged: there is a Danger that the mass will be become unsupported, as though becoming [shifted] from its foundation

οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖ ρεῖν, τηνικαῦτα, τὴν γονὴν, σφηνώσεως διὰ τὴν πλησμονὴν οὕσης, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ καὶ συμπεφυρμένην ἀποσπᾶσθαι: διὸ, χρῆναί φησιν ὁ Ἀνὴρ ὅταν Ἕσυχία γένηται περὶ τὸ σῶμα (καὶ λωφήσωσιν αἱ τῆς τροφῆς Ἀναδόσεις καὶ τὰ Ῥεύματα διεξιούσης καὶ φευγούσης) τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν – πρὶν ἑτέρας αὖ πάλιν τροφῆς ἐνδεὲς γενέσθαι τὸ Σῶμα)

for, at that time [of being full of wine or food], our seed does not flow well, due to the [internal] constriction from the fullness, but rather it is pulled out with difficulty while being mixed together: consequently, [Epíkouros] says it is necessary to perform such actions [only] when Tranquility comes about for the body (and the Assimilation of nourishment and the Flows of processing and removal have ceased) – before the Body again becomes in need of [more] nourishment

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 654B

Σκοπῶμεν οὖν εἰ δοκεῖ πότερον ἐμμελῶς καὶ προσηκόντως ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἢ παρὰ πᾶν δίκαιον ἀφαιρεῖ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην τῆς νυκτός

Let us then examine if it seems appropriate whether Epíkouros fittingly and property, or contrary to all justice, removes Aphrodite from the night

Plutarch, Quaestiones Convivales, 655A

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ Σῶμα βλάπτειτ' ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς συνουσίας μᾶλλον, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος οἶεται, μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον – ἂν γε μὴ (μεθύων Τις ἢ ῥηγνύμενος ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς) ἄπτηται καὶ βεβαρημένος: ἀμέλει γὰρ, οὕτως, ἐπισφαλὲς τὸ Πρᾶγμα καὶ βλαβερόν

surely the Body would not suffer greater harm by intercourse, as Epíkouros thinks, after dinner – provided that Someone is not (while drunk or bursting from overindulgence) engaged and weighed down: for certainly, in that case, the Circumstance is precarious and harmful

αὐτοῦ μαλακοῦ γεγονότος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς παρεστῶσης διὰ χρόνου ποιῆται τὴν ἔντευξιν: οὔτε ταραχὴν ἀπεργάζεται μεγάλην διὰ τὸν ὄγκον, οὔτ' ἄλλο τι ὧν ἐπήγαγεν – ἢ Ψῦξις ἢ Μετάθεσις ἐξ ἔδρας ἀτόμων – φησιν Ἐπίκουρος.

[as long as] he arranges the encounter after some time while the [body] has become relaxed and the soul remains present: he neither causes a great disturbance because of the mass, nor [does he cause] anything else that would have come about – neither a Chilling nor a Change from the position of the atoms – as Epíkouros claims

[U62]

Laértios 10.118 fin

[Usener]

Συνουσίῃ ὦνησε μὲν οὐδέποτε – ἀγαπητὸν δ' εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψε

Intercourse never is advantageous – but it is welcome if it has not harmed

[Henderson]

Συνουσίαν δέ Φασιν ὀνῆσαι μὲν οὐδέποτε – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ καὶ ἔβλαψε

They say that although Intercourse never is advantageous – but it is desirable if it has not also harmed

ἀγαπητός (ή, όν)	desirable	ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΣ <i>love worthy</i>
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Clement of Alexandria, Instructor, 2.10

Titus Flavius Clemens "Klēmēs of Alexandria" (fl. 190 AD) was a Christian theologian who wrote the Paedagogus. Although a Christian work, it also includes elements of ancient philosophy and references to Homer.

εἷ γοῦν Τις εἰρηκέναι φέρεται "Συνουσία ὤνησε μὲν οὐδένα – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν"

at least Someone is reported to have well said that "Intercourse has benefited **no one** – but **it is welcome** if it has not harmed"

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.52

Porphyry of Tyre (fl. 275 AD) was a native speaker of Aramaic, student of Plotinus, and one of the founders of Neoplatonism. He is known of his anti-Christian polemics and books on logic.

Οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστὸν τοὺς πολλοὺς οἶεσθαι εἰς ὑγίειαν συντελεῖν τὴν κρεοφαγίαν – τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἦν καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις οἶεσθαι ὑγείας εἶναι τηρητικὰς καὶ τὰ Ἀφροδίσια, ὄνῃσαι μὲν οὐδένα τινά – ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν.

It is not surprising that **the public thinks meat-eating contributes** to health – for they are just people who think that **enjoyment** and **Aphrodisian activities** preserve **health**, whereas these things have never profited anyone – but one must be content if it has not harmed

Galen, Art of Medicine 24.1

Claudius Galenus of Pergamon (fl. 170 AD) was a Greek physician, surgeon, and philosopher.

...Ἀφροδισίων δὲ, κατὰ μὲν Ἐπίκουρον: οὐδεμία Χρῆσις ὑγιεινὴ

...but **regarding Aphrodisian activities**, **according to Epíkouros**: no Use is **healthy**

Galen, comment on The Epidemics of Hippocrates 3.1.4, Art of Medicine 17

Τίς γὰρ ἦν ἀνάγκη γράφειν... εἰρηκέναι... Ἐπίκουρον, μηδέποτε μὲν ὥφελειν Ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν, ἀγαπητὸν δ’ εἰ μὴ βλάψειεν;

* Why then was there a need to write... what Epíkouros has said, that the use of Aphrodisian activities has never been beneficial – but one must be content if it did not harm?

[U63]

Laértios 10.119

[Usener] οὐδὲ μὴν τηρήσειν ἐν μέθῃ [τὸν Σοφόν] φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ

in fact, Epíkouros says in the *Symposium* that **[the wise man]** will not stay **guarded** in drunkenness

[Henderson, Dorandi] οὐδὲ μὴν ληρήσειν ἐν μέθῃ [τὸν Σοφόν] φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ

in fact, Epíkouros says in the *Symposium* that **[the wise man]** will not be **foolish** in drunkenness

τηρεῖν	to preserve (here, "to stay guarded")	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ <i>protecting / watching</i>
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ληρεῖν	to be foolish	ΛΗΡΕΙΝ <i>trash / trifle</i>
ἡ μέθη αἱ μέθαι	drunkenness	ΜΕΘΗ <i>mead</i>
τό μέθυ τά μέθυα	wine	

[U64]

The Telos

** Philódēmos, On Rhetoric, VH² VII 184*

...καὶ ζῶιον ἔμψυ[χον διὰ] ζωγραφίας ἀπο[τελεῖν ἐσ]ται. Ταῦτα μὲν ο[ὖν τοῦ]τον ὠικονομήθ[η τὸν] τρόπον – παρ’ Ἐπικούρ[ωι] δὲ τῶν λόγων ὁ Τύπ[ος] ἐστὶν ὡς ἐκ διαλόγου[υ] συνθεῖναι τοιοῦτος: "[πρῶ]τον, Διομολογησώ[με]θα τί ἐστὶν οὗ χάριν [ἅπαν]τα Πράττο[μεν]..."

⟨...καὶ **ζῶιον** ἔμψυχον **διὰ ζωγραφίας** ἀποτελεῖν ἐσται.⟩ Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον ὠικονομήθη **τὸν τρόπον** – παρ’ Ἐπικούρ^ωι δὲ **τῶν λόγων ὁ** Τύπος ἐστὶν **ὡς ἐκ διαλόγου** συνθεῖναι **τοιοῦτος**: "**πρῶτον**, Διομολογησώμεθα **τί ἐστὶν οὗ** χάριν **ἅπαντα** Πράττομεν..."

⟨...and to create **a living being** through realistic writing will be possible.⟩
These things, therefore, were arranged **in that way** – while for Epíkouros the Impression **from his discourse** is constructed **like this** by means of a dialogue: "first, let Us agree on **what it is** for the sake of which We do **everything**..."

ἡ ζωγραφία αἱ ζωγραφαί	[*] realistic writing	ΖΩΓΡΑΦΙΑ <i>life writing</i>
<i>this is an uncommon term, and is typically associated with painting</i>		
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>

[U65]

[=U49] Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674, col. 56, line 18

[Ἐγ]ὼ δ' [ἀ]μέλει κα[ὶ τ]ῷ[ν] ἀκουστῶν μὲν ἄγ[α]μ[αι] τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνησιν ἀ[ν]δρός· ὦ[ν]᾽Ο μέ[ν] [ἐ]ν τῷ[ι Συμ]πο[σίωι Π]ε[ρ]ι[τῆς] Ῥητορικῆ[ς ἔ]φη [συ]γγεγράφθαι – π[ιστε]ύ[ε]ι[ν] [ε]ἰ Χρὴ τοῖς λέγουσιν, ο[ὐ]δ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περ[ὶ] [φ]ιλοσόφων πιστεύε[ιν] – ᾽Ο δ' οὐκ ἔ[φη] γινώσκειν [ὅ]που λέγουσιν ο[ἱ περὶ] τὸν Ἐπίκουρον

Ἐγὼ δ' ἀμέλει καὶ **τῶν ἀκουστῶν** μὲν ἄγαμαι **τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνησιν ἀνδρός· ὦν** ᾽Ο μὲν **ἐν τῷι Συμποσίωι Περὶ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς ἔφη συγγεγράφθαι** – πιστεύειν εἰ Χρὴ **τοῖς λέγουσιν, οὐδ' ἴσως φιλοσόφοις περὶ φιλοσόφων** πιστεύειν – ᾽Ο δ' οὐκ ἔφη γινώσκειν **ὅπου λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον**

^{*} Yet I certainly wonder at **what is heard** from the man who [currently] has **leisure in Athens**. One of them says [it] **was written** in [Epíkouros'] Symposium on Rhetoric – if It is necessary to trust in the speakers, or [it is] not [necessary] to believe **the philosophers** about philosophers – yet He denies knowing **where those [originally] around Epíkouros said [this]**

[Chandler] I, of course, am amazed at the students of the man who lectures at Athens. One of them said that he believed that Epíkouros wrote about rhetoric in the *Symposium*, if one should trust those who speak – not perhaps as philosophers, about philosophers – the other said he did not know where Epíkouros and his followers say (this).

[= U11] Philódēmos, On Rhetoric Book 2, P.Herc. 1674 col. 57

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολ[λ]ῶν α[ὐτοῦς] Ἀνα[πα]ύσωμεν ἐρ[ε]ύνης κα[ὶ] ἐρωτήσεως· οὐκ ἐν τῷ[ι] Συμποσίω[ι] ἄ[λ] ἐγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς Πε[ρὶ Βί]ων → οὐδὲ Κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμέν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστ[η]κὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κ[ρ]ί[σιν], ἀλλὰ χρεῖαν γ' ἔχει λ[όγου τ]υχεῖν

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἵνα τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν αὐτοῦς Ἀναπαύσωμεν ἐρεύνης καὶ ἐρωτήσεως· οὐκ ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ Λέγομεν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Βίων* – οὐδὲ Κελεύομεν αὐτὸν ψῆφον ἐμ πελάγει ζητεῖν – ἀλλ' ὅπου φαμέν καὶ δι' ὧν φαμεν, δηλοῦσθαι τὸ τὴν Σοφιστικὴν Ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ὑπάρχειν Παρατεθείκαμεν – ἃ κἂν δεικνύηται μηκύνοντα τὴν ἡμετέραν κρίσιν, ἀλλὰ χρεῖαν γ' ἔχει λόγου τυχεῖν

* however, We relieve them from much questioning and from many inquires: We do not say that [a direct quote on the topic] is in the *Symposium* nor in [the works] *On Lives* – nor do We order him to seek a pebble in the sea – but through what [we have cited] and through what we claim, We [already] have set forth that *Sophistic Rhetoric* is shown to exist as an art – [with the quotations given above] which, even though they can be shown to enlarge our judgment, nevertheless still require having a reasoning {i.e., giving an explanation}

Above [U49] Philódēmos shows that *Sophistic Rhetoric* is the practice of composing arguments together and conducting lectures.

45. On the End-Goal Περὶ Τέλους

Laértios 10.27...*Περὶ Αἰρέσεων καὶ Φυγῶν. Περὶ Τέλους. Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἥ Κανῶν...*

...*On Choices and Avoidances. On the End Goal. On the Criterion, or The Canon...*

[=U6] Laértios 10.30

τὸ δὲ Ἠθικὸν [ἔχει] τὰ περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς – ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς *Περὶ Βίων βίβλοις* καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους*

but the ethical Part [concerns] things relating to choice and avoidance – and it is in the books *On Lifecourses*, in the letters, and in the book *On the End-Goal*

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.18.41

in eo quidem libro qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam... totusque liber, qui est *De Summo Bono*, refertus et uerbis et sentiis talibus.

indeed in that book which contains all your teaching... and the entire book, which is about *On the Highest Good*, is filled with such words and sentiments

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.19.44

haec Epicuro confitenda sunt, aut ea quae modo expressa ad verbum dixi, tollenda de libro – vel totus liber potius abiciendus – est enim confertus voluptatibus

these things must be admitted by Epikouros, or what I just expressed verbatim must be removed from the book – or rather the whole book should be thrown out – for it is packed with pleasures

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.7 [20]

duae sunt enim Res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes: unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate. Vos, ex his tam dissimilibus rebus, non modo nomen unum — nam id facilius paterer — sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamini, quod fieri nullo modo potest! hic, qui utrumque probat, ambobus debuit uti: sicut facit re, neque tamen dividit verbis

for there are indeed two Things, lest you think there are only [two] words: One is to be without pain, the other is to be with pleasure. You all, from such dissimilar things as these, try not only to make one name – for that I might more easily tolerate – but also to make one thing out of two, which in no way can be done! He, who approves of both [circumstances], ought to use each [description]: as he does in fact, and yet he does not divide them with words

cum, enim, eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine Omnes appellamus, Laudat locis plurimis: audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis – atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est Oratio De Summo Bono

indeed, when in many places He praises that very pleasure, which We all call by the same name: he dares to say that he does not even suspect that there is any good separate from that kind of pleasure characteristic of Aristippos – and he says this there, where all of his Discourse is about the Highest Good

[=U34] Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.23.21

εἶτα τηλικαύτη Δύναμις οὔσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη, παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα – οὐδὲ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ Σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον, ἠνέσχετο ἂν Τις αὐτῆς

then, being so great a Power and set over all the rest, let [the power of the will] come forward and let it say to us that the most excellent of all things is the flesh – not even if the Flesh itself declared that it itself is the most excellent, would Anyone be tolerant of this

νῦν δὲ τί ἐστίν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ Τέλους συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰς Φυσικάς; τὸ περὶ Κανόνος; τὸ τὸν πώγωνα καθεικός; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνησκεν, ὅτι "τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες, ἅμα, καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;" ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; εἶτα τούτου τι κρείσσον ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς! καὶ οὐ μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς εἶ;

but now which is it, Epikouros, which declares these things? Which one wrote about The End, which one wrote On Nature? Which one wrote about the Canon? Which one let grow the beard? Which one wrote when it was dying that it was "spending the last and, at the same time, also happy day?" Was it the flesh or the will? And then you agree to having something superior to this [the will]! Are you not insane? Are you so blind and deaf to the truths?

[U66]

Laértios 10.137 fin

ἀποδείξει δὲ χρήται τοῦ τέλος εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν: τῷ τὰ ζῶα, ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι, τῇ μὲν εὐαρεστεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ πόνῳ προσκρούειν, φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου. αὐτοπαθῶς οὖν Φεύγομεν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα: ἵνα καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς – καταβιβρωσκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ χιτῶνος – βοᾷ, δάκνων, ἰύζων:

ἀμφὶ δ, ἔστενον Πέτραι: Λοκρῶν τ' ὄρειοι Πρῶνες, Εὐβοίας τ' Ἄκραι

and he uses the proof that pleasure is the complete fulfilment: through the fact that that living beings, starting right when they are born, either [act] by being satisfied or by recoiling from pain, naturally and without reasoning: therefore, We flee from pain instinctively: so even Heracles – being dissolved by his robe – cries out, while gnawing and wailing:

and around, the Rocks lamented: both the Locrian mountainous Headlands, and the Euboean Heights

Sophocles, Trachiniae (The Women of Trachis), 786-87

In myth, Heracles was burned to death by putting on a tunic ("the shirt of Nessus") which his confused second wife Deianeira coated with the blood of the centaur Nessus. Nessus, in turn, had been poisoned by Heracles with an arrow coated with the poisonous blood of the Lernaean Hydra.

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 12.67, 546E

οὐ μόνος δ' Ἀρίστιππος καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ **τὴν κατὰ κίνησιν ἡδονὴν** ἡσπάζοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ **τούτου** – καὶ ἵνα μὴ "**τοὺς καταιγισμούς**" λέγω καὶ "**τὰ ἐπεντρώματα**" (**ἅπερ** πολλάκις προφέρεται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος) καὶ "**τοὺς γαργαλισμούς**" καὶ "**τὰ νύγματα**" – **ἃ ἐν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους*** εἶρηκεν, **τούτων** μνησθήσομαι

not only Arístippos and those around him embraced pleasure from motion, but also Epíkouros and those around him – and lest I mention "the excitements" and "the delicacies" (the very things which Epíkouros often brings up) and "the titillations" and "the pinches" – which he has spoken about in *On the Goal*, I will make mention of these

ἡ αἰγίς αἱ αἰγίδες	hurricane, the Aegis (of Athena)	ΑΙΓΙΣ <i>shaking / goat</i>
ὁ καταιγισμός	excitement <i>(gust of passion)</i>	ΚΑΤΑΙΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>full shaking action</i>
τὸ ἐπέντρωμα τὰ ἐπεντρώματα	delicacy <i>(dessert)</i>	ΕΠΕΝΤΡΩΜΑ <i>over nibble in</i>
ὁ γαργαλισμός	titillation <i>(tickling)</i>	ΓΑΡΓΑΛΙΣΜΟΣ <i>tickle action</i>
τὸ νύγμα τὰ νύγματα	pinch <i>(nibble)</i>	ΝΥΓΜΑ <i>a sting</i>

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 7.11, 280A

κάν, **τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους*** δέ Φησιν οὕτω πως "οὐ γὰρ Ἐγωγε δύναμαι νοῆσαι **τάγαθόν** – ἀφαιρῶν μὲν **τάς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς**, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ **τάς δι' Ἀφροδισίων**, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ **τάς δι' ἀκροαμάτων**, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ **τάς διὰ μορφῆς κατ' ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις**."

again, in the work *On the End-Goal*, He speaks in such a way "for I myself am not able to conceive the good – removing the pleasures from flavor, or removing those from Aphrodisian activities, or removing those from auditory experiences, or removing pleasurable movements through form through appearance"

BASIC PLEASURES CHART

ὁ χυλός	flavor	sapor	"tasting"	ΧΥΛΟΣ <i>juice</i>
τὰ Ἀφροδίσια	Aphrodisian activities	res Veneriae	"touching"	ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΑ <i>foam of god</i>
τὸ ἄκροαμα τὰ ἀκροάματα	listening	audītus	"hearing"	ΑΚΡΟΑΜΑ <i>hearing</i>
ἡ μορφή	figure	fōrma	"seeing"	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 7.8, 278F

καὶ γὰρ, οὐκ ἐγκαλυπτόμενος, ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει, ἀλλὰ μεγάλη τῇ φωνῇ "οὐ γὰρ Ἐγωγε δύναμαι νοῆσαι **τάγαθόν** – ἀφελῶν μὲν **τὴν διὰ χυλῶν**, ἀφελῶν δὲ **τὴν δι' Ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὴν**." οἶται γὰρ οὕτως ὁ Σοφὸς καὶ τὸν ἀσώτων βίον ἀνεπίληπτον εἶναι – εἴπερ αὐτῷ Προσγένοιτο τὸ ἀδέες καὶ ἴλεων! διὸ καὶ οἱ τῆς κωμωδίας Ποιηταὶ, κατατρέχοντές που **τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀκρασίας**, Ἐπικούρους καὶ βοηθοὺς βοῶσιν

and indeed Epíkouros, while not hiding himself, says loudly "I myself am not able to conceive the good – if I removed the pleasure from flavor, and removed the pleasure from Aphrodisian activities." For this wise man believes that even the life of profligates can be irreproachable – if It should be safe and favorable for one of them! Therefore, the Poets of comedy, who are perhaps disdainful of pleasure and intemperance, call out the Epicureans and [their] followers

Laértios 10.6

Ἔν τε τῷ Περί Τέλους γράφειν οὕτως: "οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τάγαθόν – ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' Ἀφροδισίων, καὶ τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων, καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς"

[Epíkouros] writes in this way in *On The End-Goal*: "for I myself do not possess what I would consider to be the good – if I remove the pleasures from flavor, and remove those from Aphrodisian activities, and those from auditory experiences, and those from form"

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.41

quid Tergiversamur, Epicure, nec fatemur eam nos dicere voluptatem – quam Tu idem, cum os perfricuisti, soles dicere? sunt haec tua verba necne? in eo quidem libro qui continet omnem disciplinam tuam (Fungar enim iam interpretis munere, ne Quis me putet fingere)

why do We hesitate, Epíkouros, and not admit that we are talking about that pleasure – which You yourself, when you have wiped your mouth,* are accustomed to talk about? Are these your words or not? Indeed, in that book which contains all your teachings (I will now perform the duty of an interpreter, lest Anyone may think I am inventing)

*In Roman rhetoric, *perfricare os* or *perfricare frontem* (to wipe one’s mouth or forehead) symbolized wiping away a blush – and wiping away any embarrassment or restraint – allowing one to speak boldly or shamelessly.

Dicis haec "nec equidem Habeo quod intellegam bonum illud – detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiuntur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiuntur Veneriis, detrahens eas quae auditu e cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiuntur oculis suavis motiones – sive quae aliae voluptates in toto homine gignuntur quolibet sensu..."

You say this "nor indeed do I have that which I might understand as good – removing those pleasures that are perceived by taste, removing those that are perceived in Venereal activities, removing those from listening to songs, and even removing those that are perceived from forms by the eyes as sweet movements – or whatever other pleasures are generated in the entire person by any sense..."

"...nec vero ita dici potest mentis laetitiam solam esse in bonis – laetantem enim mentem ita Novi: spe eorum omnium quae supra dixi – fore ut natura Is potiens dolore careat" atque Haec quidem his verbis, Quivis ut intellegat quam voluptatem norit Epicurus

"...nor, in truth, can it be said that joy of the mind alone exists among the good things – for I know the mind rejoices in this way: by the hope of [enjoying] all those things that I mentioned above – so that it will happen that He is naturally able to be free from pain" and indeed these things [he-said] in these words, so that Anyone may understand what pleasure Epicurus knows

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.46

non enim verbo solum Posuit voluptatem, sed explanavit quid diceret: "saporem" inquit "et corporum complexum et ludos atque cantus et formas eas quibus oculi iucunde moveantur"

for He did not define pleasure merely in a word, but explained what he meant: "taste" he said "and the embrace of bodies, games and music, and those forms by which the eyes are pleasantly moved"

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.7

(Torquatus) "istam voluptatem" inquit "Epicurus ignorat?"

(Cicero) "Non semper" inquam "nam interdum nimis etiam novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullum bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur – an Haec ab eo non dicuntur?"

(Torquatus) "this pleasure" he asked "Epíkouros does not know?"

(Cicero) "Not always" I said "for sometimes he knows all too well, since he testifies that he cannot even understand where or what any good is, except that which is found in food, drink, in pleasure of the ears, and in obscene pleasure – or is This not said by him?"

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.20

cum, enim, eam ipsam voluptatem, quam eodem nomine Omnes appellamus, Laudat locis plurimis: audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ullum bonum seiunctum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis – atque ibi hoc dicit, ubi omnis eius est Oratio De Summo Bono

indeed, when in many places He praises that very pleasure, which We all call by the same name: he dares to say that he does not even suspect that there is any good separate from that kind of pleasure characteristic of Arístippos – and he says this there, where all of his Discourse is about the Highest Good

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.23

Nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere – mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis – vitantes cruditatem "quibus Vinum defusum e pleno sit chrysizon" ut ait Lucilius "cui Nihil dum sit, Vis et Sacculus abstulerit" – adhibentis ludos et quae sequuntur, illa, quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum

None of us thinks that debauched people of that kind live pleasantly – [but instead] clean, elegant people, with the best cooks, bakers, fish, fowl, hunting-games, with all these exquisite things – avoiding rawness, "for whom Wine poured from a full vessel is golden" as Lucilius says "for whom there is Nothing, if Strength and Money are taken away" – employing games and those things which follow, those things, when removed, Epíkouros shouts that he does not know what the good is

Cicero seems to be paraphrasing Lucilius here and adapts the poet's language to support his own argument and setting.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.29

hoc vero non videre, maximo argumento esse: voluptatem illam – qua sublata neget Se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum (eam autem ita persequitur: Quae palato percipiatur, Quae auribus; cetera Addit, quae si Appelles, Honos praefandus sit) – hoc igitur, quod "solum bonum," severus et gravis Philosophus novit, idem non videt ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non Desideremus, cum dolore Careamus

he truly does not see the greatest argument is: that this [kinetic] pleasure – which, when removed, He denies that he understands at all what the good is (but he nevertheless pursues it in this way: That which is perceived by the palate, That [which is perceived] by the ears; He adds other things, which, if You mention, Honor must [also] be proclaimed) – this [kinetic pleasure], therefore, which the severe and serious Philosopher knows to be "the sole good," he likewise does not see that it should not even be sought, because, according to this same author, We do not long for that pleasure when We are free from pain

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.30

hanc in motu voluptatem – sic enim has suaves et quasi dulces voluptates Appellat... interdum ita laudat ut quid praeterea sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem

this pleasure in motion – for in this way indeed He calls these pleasant and almost sweet pleasures... sometimes he praises in such a way that he denies he can even understand what else might be good

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.64

cetera illa adhibebat – quibus demptis negat Se Epicurus intellegere quid sit Bonum

[Thorius] added those other things – without which Epíkouros denies that He understands what the Good is

Lucius Thorius Balbus was a moneyer who hailed from Lanuvium (20 miles southeast of Rome), where there was a cult of Juno Sospita.



Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.111

nullam enim Novistis nisi profectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem. non Arbitror te velle similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum – quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum – quibus Ille testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum quod sit seiunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus: quas, quidem, non erubescens, persequitur omnis nominatim!

(Cotta) for You know no pleasure of the soul except what originates from the body and returns to the body. I do not think you wish to be like the rest of the Epicureans – who may be shamed by certain words of Epíkouros – in which He declares that he does not even understand any good that is separated from [both] refined and obscene pleasures: which, indeed, without feeling shame, he pursues them all with precise identification!

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 28.69

Epicurum diserte dicere existimare: Dicit autem, Opinor, se nullum bonum intellegere posse demptis corporis voluptatibus. quid multa?

[Piso] thinks that Epíkouros speaks eloquently: indeed, He says, I believe, that he cannot understand any good if bodily pleasures are removed – why [say] more?

[U68]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 1089D

ὁθεν Αὐτοί μοι δοκοῦσι τούτων αἰσθόμενοι τῶν ἀτοπιῶν, εἰς "τὴν ἀπονίαν" καὶ "τὴν εὐστάθειαν" ὑποφεύγειν "τῆς σαρκός" – ὥς ἐν τῷ ταύτην ἐπινοεῖν περί τινος ^[1] ἐσομένην καὶ ^[2] γεγεννημένην τοῦ ἡδέως ζῆν ὄντος: "τὸ" γὰρ "εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς Κατάστημα" καὶ "τὸ" περὶ ταύτης "πιστὸν Ἑλπισμα" τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχειν τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις

because They seem to me to be aware of these absurdities, they retreat to "painlessness" and "health of the body" – as in conceiving this [state] about certain things in relation to living pleasantly both ^[1] existing in the future and ^[2] having already been: because the "stable Condition of the body" and "the sure Expectation" regarding [this stable condition] holds the greatest and most certain joy for those capable of considering

“Ὅρα δὴ, πρῶτον, μὲν, οἷα Ποιοῦσι: "τὴν" εἶθ' "ἡδονὴν" ταύτην εἶτ' "ἀπονίαν" ἢ "εὐστάθειαν" ἄνω καὶ κάτω μετερῶντες ἐκ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν – εἶτα πάλιν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς ἐκεῖνο!

See then, first of all, **what** They are doing: **transferring either this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stability" back and forth** from the body to the soul – then back again **from the [soul] into the [body]!**

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 9.5.2

Epicurus **uoluptatem summum bonum esse** ponit – eam tamen ita definit **"σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς Κατάστημα"**

Epicurus places **pleasure as the highest good** – yet he defines it in this way: "the stable Condition of the body"

[U69]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.42

atque **haec quidem his verbis**, Quivis ut intellegat **quam voluptatem norit Epicurus, deinde paulo infra**: "saepe Quaesivi" inquit "**ex is** Qui appellabantur **sapientes, quid** haberent **quod in bonis relinquerent** – si **illa** detraxissent – nisi si vellent **voces inanis** fundere"

and **this indeed [is] in [his] words, just a little below**, so that Anyone may understand **what kind of pleasure Epíkouros recognizes**: "I often asked" he says "from those Who were called **wise men, what would** they have **that they could leave remaining** among the good things – if they had taken **those [physical pleasures]** away – unless they just wanted to pour out **empty words**"

"**nihil ab is** potui cognoscere – Qui, si **virtutes** ēbullīre volent et **sapientias, nihil aliud** dicent **nisi eam viam qua efficiantur eae Voluptates quas supra dixi**." Quae secuntur **in eadem sententia** sunt, totusque Liber, qui est **de summo bono**, refertus est et **verbis et sententiis talibus**

"I could learn **nothing from them** – Who, if they want to babble on about **virtues and wisdoms, will say nothing other than that way by which those Pleasures I mentioned above are achieved**." What follows is **in the same opinion**, and the whole Book, which is **about the highest good**, is full of **such words and ideas**

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.48

hanc se tuus Epicurus **omnino ignorare** dicit: **quam** aut **qualem esse** velint Qui **honestate** summum bonum metiantur – si enim **ad honestatem omnia** referant neque **in ea voluptatem** dicant **inesse**, Ait "**eos voce inani sonāre**" – **his enim ipsis verbis** utitur – **neque intellegere nec videre** sub hanc vocem "**honestatis**" **quae sit subicienda sententia**

Your Epíkouros says that **he completely does not understand this**: what thing or **what quality it is that** Those who measure the highest good **by honor** want – for if they refer **everything to honor** and do not say that **pleasure is contained within it**, He says that "**they are making a sound with an empty word**" – for he uses **those exact words** – and **[Epíkouros says that he] neither understands nor sees what concept should be placed under this word "honor"**

ut enim **consuetudo** Loquitur: Id solum dicitur **honestum** Quod est **populari fama gloriosum** – "Quod" inquit "**quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem**"

indeed It is said, **according to common usage**: only That is called **honorable** which is **glorious according to popular opinion** – "which" [Epíkouros] says "although it is **often more pleasant than certain pleasures**, is nevertheless sought **for the sake of pleasure**"

[U70]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 546F

κάν τῷ *Περὶ Τέλους* δὲ πάλιν Φησὶν "Τιμητέον τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰ τοιουτότροπα – ἐὰν ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζῃ – ἐὰν δὲ μὴ παρασκευάζῃ, 'χαίρειν' Ἐατέον" – σαφῶς ὑπουργὸν ἐν τούτοις ποιῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ θεραπαίνης τάξιν ἐπέχουσιν

and in the work *On the End-Goal* he again says "It is necessary to honor the noble and the virtues and such things – if they provide pleasure – but if they do not, It is necessary to tell them 'goodbye'" – clearly making virtue a servant to pleasure in these matters and holding the rank of an attendant

[U71]

46. Timokrátēs
in three books
Τιμοκράτης, Γ

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.93

cum Epicurus **Aristotelem** vexarit contumeliosissime – **Phaedoni Socratico** turpissime male dixerit – **Metrodori sodalis sui fratrem, Timocraten** (quia **nescioquid in philosophia** dissentiret) **totis voluminibus** conciderit

(Cotta) while Epíkouros insulted **Aristotle** in the most shameful manner – he was slanderous toward **Socrates' pupil Phaedo** in the most disgraceful way – the brother of his own companion **Mētródōros, Timokrátēs** (because he disagreed with him about something in philosophy) he attacked in entire volumes

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1126C

Ἐπίκουρος, μὲν γὰρ, εἰς Ἀσίαν ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς Τιμοκράτει λοιδορησομένους, καὶ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐξελῶντας αὐλῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι Μητροδώρῳ προσέκρουσεν, ἀδελφὸς ὢν – καὶ Ταῦτ' ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται τοῖς ἐκείνων!

Epíkouros, in fact, sent men into Asia to rail at Timokrátēs, and to expel the man from the royal court – because he had clashed with Metrodorus, despite being his brother – and This is written in those books of theirs!

If the event with Timokrátēs occurred before the year 301 BC, the "royal court in Asia" was probably the court of **Antigonus I Monophthalmus**.

Lysimachus, Séleucus I, and Ptolemy I Soter allied against and defeated **Antigonus I** (in the Battle of Ipsus in 301 BC – when Epíkouros was 40 years old). **Lysimachus** married **Arsinoe II** as his second wife – the daughter of **Ptolemy I Soter**.

Therefore, if the event with Timokrátēs occurred after the year 301 BC, the "royal court in Asia" was probably the court of court of **Lysimachus**. Laértios records that Epíkouros had positive correspondence with **Lysimachus' minister**. **Lysimachus** ended up killing his own son Agathocles in 284 BC (from his first marriage to Nicaea – the daughter of Antipater).

In response, **Séleucus I** killed his former ally **Lysimachus** (in the battle of Corupedium in 281 BC – when Epíkouros was 60 years old). Therefore, by then, the "royal court in Asia" was the court of **Séleucus I**.

Ptolemy II Philadelphus, married his sister **Arsinoe II** after **Lysimachus' death**. Later on, around 268 BC (after Epíkouros had passed away) Kōlōtēs would dedicate to the treatise "On the Point that Conformity to the Views of the Other Philosophers Actually Makes It Impossible to Live" to **Ptolemy II**.

[U72]

Book 1

Uncertain Author, VH² 10.201, fr. 44

...[κάν τῷ] πρώτῳ[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκρ[άτους]...

...κάν τῷι πρώτῳι τῶν *Περὶ Τιμοκράτους*...

Book 3

Laértios 10.23

Γέγονε δὲ ἀγαθὸς πάντα – καθὰ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν προηγουμέναις γραφαῖς μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ *Τιμοκράτους*

and [Mētródōros] became good in all respects – just as Epíkouros also testifies in his previous writings and in the third [book] *On Timokrátēs*

47. On Sensory Presentation
Περὶ Φαντασίας

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Εἰδώλων. Περὶ Φαντασίας. Ἀριστόβουλος...

...*On Films. On Sensory Presentation. Aristóbuolos*...

48. On Nature
in 37 Books
Περὶ Φύσεως ΑΖ

Laértios 10.27

...*Περὶ Φύσεως ΑΖ. Περὶ Ἀτόμων Καὶ Κενοῦ*...

...*On Nature, in thirty-seven books, On the Atoms and the Void*...

Laértios 10.30

...διαιρεῖται, τοίνυν, εἰς τρία: τό τε Κανονικόν, καὶ Φυσικόν, καὶ Ἠθικόν... τὸ δὲ Φυσικόν τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* βίβλοις ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς κατὰ στοιχεῖον

...[Epíkouros' Philosophy], therefore, is divided into three: the Canonical, the Physical, and the Ethical.... The Physical [part is] the entire theory about nature, and exists in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* and in the letters according to [their] basic components [*i.e., in an abridged form*]

Laértios 10.7

...ἐν ταῖς ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα βίβλοις ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* τὰ πλεῖστα ταῦτά λέγειν καὶ ἀντιγράφειν, ἐν αὐταῖς, ἄλλοις τε – καὶ Ναυσιφάνει τὰ πλεῖστα

[Timokrátēs also says that Epíkouros] in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* says mostly the same things and that he writes, in them, against others – and for the most part against Nausiphánēs

Nausiphánēs supported "science-based political rhetoric" as well as reductionist skepticism.
In support of science-based political rhetoric, Philódēmos quotes him as saying, "honor depends on winning a reputation for cleverness in politics... the wise man is he who can persuade his hearers – and this power of persuasion belongs to the man of science."
In support of reductionist skepticism, Philódēmos quotes Nausiphánēs as saying, "of those things which appear to exist, nothing exists more than it does not exist."

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὧς Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν
ἐξακριβοῦν – μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν...

for those who are not able, Heródotos, to examine each of the things
written by us about nature – nor inspect the larger books of what has been
organized...

Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklês, Laértios 10.84

Ἐδέου τε σεαυτῷ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων σύντομον καὶ εὐπερίγραφον διαλογισμὸν
ἀποστεῖλαι – ἵνα ῥαδίως μνημονεύης: τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις ἡμῖν γεγραμμένα
δυσμνημόνευτα εἶναι, καί τοι, ὡς ἔφης, συνεχῶς αὐτὰ βαστάζεις

You needed a brief and easily described discourse about celestial
phenomena sent to you – so that you might easily remember: for the things
that have been written by us in other works are difficult to remember, and
indeed, just as you said, you continuously carry them

Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklês, Laértios 91

καὶ πᾶν δὲ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος Ἔνστημα ῥαδίως διαλυθήσεται – ἐάν τις τοῖς
ἐναργήμασι προσέχη – ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως* βιβλίοις Δείκνυμεν

and every Objection to this part easily will be resolved – if one attends to
what is evident – which We demonstrate in the books *On Nature*

Galen, On Hippocrates' Nature of Man 1.1, note 15

Τινὲς δ' οὐχ ἔν, ἀλλὰ πλείονα βιβλία τῆς θεωρίας ἐποιήσαντο ταύτης [τῆς περὶ
φύσεως], Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ πάνυ πολλά – καθά περ Ἐπίκουρος: ἄρχεται γὰρ καὶ
Αὐτός, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἄλλοι πάντες, ἀπὸ τοῦ ζητῆσαι πότερον ἔν τι καὶ
ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν, οὗ τὴν φύσιν εὐρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦμεν – ἢ σύνθετον ἔκ τινων ἑαυτοῦ
προτέρων ἀπλῶν, ἃ περ Οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς παλαιοὺς εἰθίσθησαν ὀνομάζειν
"στοιχεῖα"

Some people have written not [just] one, but several books on this theory
[concerning nature], and Some even [wrote] very many [books] – just like
Epíkouros: for even He himself begins, just as all the others, from the
question whether [it is] a single and simple thing, whose nature we attempt
to discover – or composed from certain prior simple [parts] of itself, which
indeed Those after the ancient philosophers were accustomed to call
"components"

τὸ στοιχεῖον	component ^[for facts]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ
τὰ στοιχεῖα	or, element ^[for things]	<i>instance of a row</i> <i>(in a series)</i>

[U74]

Book 1

1.1 Atoms & Void

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1114A

ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ τῆς πραγματείας Ὑπειπὼν "τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν σώματα εἶναι καὶ
κενὸν" – ὡς, μιᾶς οὐσῆς εἰς δύο Πεποίηται τὴν διαίρεσιν: ὧν Θάτερον ὄντως μὲν
οὐδέν ἔστιν – ὀνομάζεται δ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν "ἀναφές" καὶ "κενὸν" καὶ "ἄσώματον"

while He proposes in the beginning of [his] treatise that "the nature of
existence is bodies and void" – so that, while it is [actually] one He has made
the division it into two [parts]: One of them is actually nothing – but termed
by your company "intangible" and "void" and "incorporeal"

[U75]*

ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἀδιαφόρως τὴν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὴν τοῦ κενοῦ φύσιν "ὅλον" τε καὶ "πᾶν" προσαγορεύειν εἴωθεν – ὅτε μὲν γάρ φησιν ὅτι "ἡ τῶν ὅλων Φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ κενόν"

But Epíkouros is accustomed to indifferently call [the nature] of bodies and the nature of the void "whole" and "all" – For sometimes he says that "the Nature of the whole is bodies and void"

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2.82

(Cotta) Sunt, autem, Qui omnia naturae nomine appellant – ut Epicurus, qui ita diuidit "omnium quae sint naturam esse corpora et inane, quaeque his accident"

(Cotta) There are, however, Those who call everything by the name of nature – like Epíkouros, who divides it like this "the nature of all things that exist is bodies and void, and whatever happens to these"

[U76]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1112E

Ἐπικούρου δὲ λέγοντος "ἡ τῶν ὄντων Φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ τόπος" – πότερον οὕτως ἀκούομεν, ὡς ἄλλο τι "τὴν φύσιν" παρὰ "τὰ ὄντα" βουλομένου λέγειν – ἢ "τὰ ὄντα" δηλοῦντος ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν; ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ "κενοῦ φύσιν" αὐτὸ "τὸ κενόν" καὶ νῆ Δία "τὸ πᾶν" "παντὸς φύσιν" ὀνομάζειν εἴωθε;

When Epíkouros says "the Nature of things is bodies and location" – do we understand this as him meaning something other than "nature" apart from "existing things" – or [is he] explaining "existing things" and nothing different? Just as he customarily names "the nature of the void" as "the void" itself and indeed, by Zeus, "the all" as "the nature of all"?

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.39

τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ Φησι κατ' ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ἁ Περι Φύσεως "τὸ Πᾶν ἐστι σώματα καὶ κενόν"

He also says this in the *Larger Epitome* near the beginning and in his First Book *On Nature* "the Universe exists as bodies and as void"

[U77]

1.2 Composites

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.40

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περι Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ' καὶ ιε' καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μὲν ἐστι συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [book] On Nature and in the 14th and 15th and in the *Larger Epitome*} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [are bodies] out of which compounds are made

[U78]

1.3 Collisions

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431 col. 16 (column 23)

Ἀναγκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται – οὐθὲν ἦττον, παρὰ τὰς [ἐξ] ἡμῶ[ν], τ[ις] Σ[υμ]μετρ[ί]α αὐτ[α]ῖς γίνε[σθαι]...

Ἀναγκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας κρούσεις — ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται — οὐθὲν ἦττον, παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἡμῶν, τις Συμμετρία αὐταῖς γίνεσθαι...

It is necessary for [atoms] to exist with collisions with each other – as it has been said in the first writing – nonetheless, for those [atoms] that come from us, a certain Symmetry with them occurs...'

consider 49b "for external Objects would not imprint inside [us] their own nature of both color and shape through the air that is between us and them – or through rays, or through flows of any kind originating from us to them"

[U79]

Book 2

2.1 On Time

[=U26] Scholion on Epikouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.73

καὶ γὰρ Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογισμοῦ: ὅτι ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ Συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν – ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις (καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν): ἴδιόν τι σύμπτωμα περὶ ταῦτα, πάλιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐννοοῦντες – καθ' ὃ "Χρόνον" Ὀνομάζομεν {Φησὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ}

for This also is not in need of proof, but [only] of consideration: that We entangle [the quality of time] with days and with nights and with their parts – and likewise also with experiences and with absence of experiences (with both movements and stationary positions): because We internalize, in turn, that particular symptom [of duration] regarding these [circumstances] as this very [quality] – according to which We use the word "Time" {He says this in both the second book *On Nature* and in the *Larger Epitome*}

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.137

Ἐπίκουρος δέ, καθὼς Δημήτριος ὁ Λάκων, φησὶ [χρόνον εἶναι] "σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων – παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι, καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς."

Epikouros, according to Demetrius the Lacedaemonian, claims [that time is] "a symptoms of symptoms [i.e., a separable characteristic of a separable characteristic] – accompanying days and nights and hours and experiences, as well as non-experiences and movements and stillness."

2.2 On Films

Plato, Timaeus "The first of the organs fabricated were light-bearing eyes which [the gods] fixed in place for the following reason: they contrived to create a body from fire which does not burn but provides a gentle light kindred to the light of each day. So they caused the pure fire within us which is brother of this light of day, to flow through the eyes, and they compressed the whole eye, but especially the center, to be smooth and dense, so as to retain all the coarser fire, and filter through only this kind of pure fire by itself. Then if ever there is daylight surrounding this stream of vision, like meets with like, joins together and establishes a single kindred body along a straight line from the eyes to wherever the stream from within is obstructed by the outside objects on which it impinges." [45B-C]

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 14

...οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδωλα, καθάπερ λέγω· οὐ γὰρ μοναχαὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ, λέγω δὲ τῷ προειρημένῳ[ι, ᾧ] ποστ[άσεις] [ἐν] τοῖς σ[ώμασιν, ὡς] εἴρητ[αι]...

...οὐκ ἔστιν Εἶδωλα, καθάπερ λέγω – οὐ γὰρ μοναχαὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ. Λέγω δὲ τῷ προειρημένῳ: Ἀποστάσεις ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ὡς εἴρηται...

...[they say] the Films do not exist, as I say [they do] – nor [are these emanations] **unique** in this manner. but I speak **concerning what was previously mentioned**: that [there are] Emanations in bodies, as has been said...

μόνος <i>(η, ον)</i>	only	ΜΟΝΟΣ <i>single</i>
μοναχός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	unique	ΜΟΝΑΧΟΣ <i>pertaining to being single</i>
ή στάσις αί στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i>
ή σύστασις αί συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ή απόστασις αί αποστάσεις	emanation	ΑΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>placed away</i>

2.3 Flow of Films

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 37

...άφ' ὅλης ρε[ύσ]ηι πρὸ[ς στε]ρέμνιά τ[ινα] σώ[μματα] [τὰ] εἶδωλ[α]...

...άφ' ὅλης ρεύση πρὸς στερέμνιά τινα Σώματα τὰ εἶδωλα...

...certain Bodies would flow from the whole towards hard objects as films...

τὸ ρεῦμα τὰ ρεύματα	flow	ῥΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>
ρεῖν	to flow	ῥΕΙΝ <i>flowing</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 38

...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ὁμοιομορφίαν τοῦ σώματος διασώζουσιν[ιν] ἕως ἂν ἀπαντήσά[ν τι] [σ]τρέψῃι τινὰς ἄ[ς] ὁ διασπασμ[ὸς κ]αταστήσῃ εἰς ἄλλο[ν] [φ]ορᾶς εἶδος...

...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ὁμοιομορφίαν τοῦ σώματος διασώζουσιν – ἕως ἂν ἀπαντήσῃ Τι στρέψῃ τινὰς ἄς ὁ Διασπασμὸς καταστήσῃ εἰς ἄλλο φορᾶς εἶδος...

...and [the films] thoroughly preserve a similar shape of [their source] body on its surface – until Something encounters and turns aside some [of its emanations] which the Dispersal might establish into another form of transmission...

τὸ πρόσωπον τὰ πρόσωπα	Surface	ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΝ <i>towards the eye</i>
ὁμοιόμορφος <i>(ον)</i>	similarly formed	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ <i>similar form</i>
ή ὁμοιομορφία αί ὁμοιομορφίαι	similar shape	
διασώζειν	to thoroughly preserve	ΔΙΑΣΩΖΕΙΝ <i>saving through</i>
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ <i>meeting away</i>
ὁ διασπασμός οἱ διασπασμοί	dispersal	ΔΙΑΣΠΑΣΜΟΣ <i>pulling through</i>
ή φορά αί φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>

...[τ]ήν τοια[ύ]την φύ[σι]ν εἶναι, ἀπείρων [δ]ύτω[ν οὐθέ]ν πω τῶν σ[χημάτων]... τῇ σ[υμμετρίαι πρὸς τὰ φαινό]με[να ἢ δέ] ἀπειρία – ὥστ[ε μα]κρὰν ἀπ[όστα]σι[ν ἅ]πέχειν τῇ [ἀλληλο]υχία[ι] τῆς...

...τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν εἶναι, ἀπείρων ὄντων Οὐθέν πω τῶν σχημάτων... τῇ συμμετρίᾳ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα: ἡ δὲ Ἀπειρία – ὥστε μακρὰν ἀπόστασιν ἀπέχειν τῇ ἀλληλουχίᾳ τῆς...

...such a nature exists, yet Nothing of the infinite existing shapes... in proportion to visible things: but the Infiniteness [of the emanations] – in as much as a great emanation is restricted due to the interconnectedness of the...

τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
σύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
ἡ συμμετρία αἱ συμμετρίαι	proportion	
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of action of forming</i>
ἡ ἀπόστασις αἱ ἀποστάσεις	emanation	ΑΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>placed away</i>
ἀπέχειν	to restrict	ΑΠΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding away</i>
ἡ ἀλληλουχία αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι	interconnectedness	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ <i>holding each other</i>

2.4 Formation of Films

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 80

...χύ[σ]εως συ[στέ]ι, ὥστ[ε] καὶ στε[ρ]έμνιό[ν] τι συστήναι τὸ ἄ[λλο] δήποτε ὅπ[ου] δήποτε [τό]που· ποῦ [γὰρ] το[σ]ούτου πλήθους ὁμοιον οἷς γ' ἄλ[λ]ως [συστ]ι[αί]η τ[ὸ] πλ[ῆθ]ος...

...χύσεως συστή, ὥστε καὶ Στερέμνιόν Τι συστήναι τὸ ἄλλο δήποτε, ὅπου δήποτε τόπου – ποῦ γὰρ τοσοῦτου πλήθους ὅμοιον οἷς γ' ἄλλως συσταίη τὸ Πλήθος...

...[in that case anything] may compose itself by the flow [of atoms], so that even some hard Object could form as any thing whatsoever, in any place whatsoever – for, where [is there] something similar in such a large number [of atoms] with which the large Number [of films] could otherwise be composed...?

ἡ χύσις αἱ χύσεις	flow	ΧΥΣΙΣ <i>pouring</i>
συνιστά ναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
τὸ πλήθος τὰ πλήθη	[large] number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ <i>fullness</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 92sup

...[ἐ]ν παρόδωι προ[σθεω]ρήσασμεν· καὶ [ἔστι] [κ]αὶ κατὰ τὸ[ν] ἑκτο[πι]στικὸν τρό[πον] τῇ[ς γε]νέσεως [αὐ]τῶν εὖ [δη]λόνως – ἡ [δ]ὲ ἀπειρ[ί]α ἡ [πυ]ροειρη[μ]ένη π[ο]νᾷ[ται] ἅμα νοήμ[α]τ[ι] – θεωρεῖν ὅτι σ[υνίστα]ιτ' ἂν εἰδ[ω]λα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀ[πειρίαν αὐτῶ]ν οὐκ ἀδύ[νατόν ἐστι]ν...

...έν παρόδῳ Προσθεωρήσαιμεν· καὶ Ἦστι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκτοπιστικὸν τρόπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν εὖ δηλώνως – ἡ δὲ Ἀπειρία ἡ προειρημένη πονᾶται ἅμα νοήματι. Θεωρεῖν ὅτι συνίσταίτ' ἂν Εἶδωλα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν...

...We may also envision in [their] passage. and It is also clearly evident according to the expelling way of their creation – indeed, the previously mentioned Infinity may be worked through [i.e., understood] along with [our] conception [of it]. Envisioning that the Films would be composed even according to their infinity is not impossible...

ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
ἡ ἄφοδος αἱ ἀφόδοι	removal	ΑΦΟΔΟΣ <i>course away</i>
ἡ πάροδος αἱ πάροδοι	passage	ΠΑΡΟΔΟΣ <i>course beside</i>
προσθεωρεῖν	to also envision	ΠΡΟΣΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing further</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
ἐξωστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	ejecting	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of pushing out</i>
ἐκτοπιστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	expelling	ΕΚΤΟΠΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of out of place</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ <i>action of being born</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἡ ἀπειρία αἱ ἀπειρίαι	infinity	
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
ἀδύνατος <i>(ον)</i>	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>not powerful</i>

2.5 Speed of Films

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 1 (column 93sup)

...περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ὑπαρχούσης ταχυτῆ[τ[ος] νῦν λέγειν ἐπιχ[ειρ]ήσομεν· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ λεπτότης, μακρὰν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λεπτότητος ἀπέ[χο]υσα, ταχυτῆτα τῶν εἰδώλων κατὰ τ[ῆ]ν [φ]ο[ρ]ὰν ἀνυπέρβλ[η]τον [έ]νδε[ι]κνυται...

...περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ὑπαρχούσης ταχυτῆτος νῦν λέγειν Ἐπιχειρήσομεν: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ Λεπτότης – μακρὰν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λεπτότητος ἀπέχουσα – ταχυτῆτα τῶν εἰδώλων κατὰ τὴν φορὰν ἀνυπέρβλητον ἐνδείκνυται...

...but We will venture to speak now about the speed that exists in the transmission [of the films]: first, their Subtleness – because it is far different than the subtleness [derived] from the senses – is indicated in the unsurpassable speed of the films in regards to their transmission...

ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
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ὑπάρχων (ουσα, ον)	existing	ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
ὑπάρχοντες (ουσαι, οντα)	[already]	
ἐγχειρεῖν	to attempt	ΕΓΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>in hand</i>
ἐπιχειρεῖν	to venture	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>upon hand</i>
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtleness	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being</i> <i>fine/thin</i>
ἀπέχων (ουσα, ον)	distant / different	ΑΠΕΧΩΝ <i>holding away</i>
ἀνυπέρβλητος (ον)	unsurpassable	ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ <i>not thrown over</i>
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing away</i>
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ <i>showing in</i>

2.6 Dispersal of Films

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 2 (column 94sup)

...πολλά καὶ ἅ[πειρα] ἦν φορούμεν[α πάν]τως κοῦφα· εἰ δ' [ὕ]περ βαλλόντως [κοῦ]φα, δηλόνως καὶ υπερβαλλόντως ταχεῖα κατὰ τὴν φοράν· εἴτ[α] εἰ τὸ μὲν ὄ[λο]ν ἰσοταχεῖς εἰσιν αἱ ἄτομοι, λέγειν ἔδει ῥο[ῦ]ν ἕτερον [ἐ]τέρου τῷ ἐφ' ἓνα τόπον φ[έρεσθαι] περαιοῦν συνεχέστερο[ν], καὶ μὴ πυκνὸν εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους [τό] πι[ο]υ[ς] ἀναφερόμενον...

...πολλά, καὶ ἅπειρα ἦν φορούμενα, **πάντως κοῦφα** – εἰ δ' **ὕπερβαλλόντως κοῦφα** – δηλόνως **καὶ υπερβαλλόντως ταχεῖα** **κατὰ τὴν φοράν**: εἴτα, εἰ **τὸ μὲν ὄλον ἰσοταχεῖς** εἰσιν αἱ ᾿Ατομοι, λέγειν ᾿Εδει ᾿Ροῦν **ἕτερον ἐτέρου**, **τῷ ἐφ' ἓνα τόπον φέρεσθαι**, **περαιοῦν συνεχέστερον**, **καὶ μὴ πυκνὸν εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους**, **τοὺς ἀναφερόμενον...**

...many, even infinite [Films] are carried, [being] absolutely lightweight – but if [being] exceedingly lightweight – clearly also [they are] exceedingly swift in their transmission: then, if the Atoms as a whole are equally fast, It would have been necessary to say that, in being carried to one place, a different Stream comes over more continuously than another, and not frequently into those opposing, which... what is carried back...

κοῦφος (η, ον)	lightweight	κοῦφος <i>nimble</i>
ἰσοταχής (ής, ές)	equally fast	ΙΣΟΤΑΧΗΣ <i>equally swift</i>
τὸ ρεῦμα τὰ ρεύματα	flow	ῚΡΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>
ὁ ῥόος οἱ ῥόοι	stream	ῚΡΟΟΣ <i>current</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
περαιοῦν	to come over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ <i>boundary</i>
συνεχής (ές)	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
πυκνὸν = πυκνῶς	frequently	ΠΥΚΝΩΣ <i>compacting</i>
ἐναντίος (α, ον)	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>

The atoms that compose the films move at the same rate, but some are obstructed in their path.

...δέ τις σύνκρι[σις] τοῦτο πράττω[υσα,] τ[ᾶ]ς καλουμένας κλάσει[ς] τῶν μερῶν...

...δέ τις Σύγκρισις, τοῦτο πράττουσα, τὰς καλουμένας κλάσεις τῶν μερῶν...

...yet a certain Compound, performing this [action, arranges] the classes of parts being called...

ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ <i>crying out</i>
καλούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being called	ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>crying out</i>
ἡ κλάσις αἱ κλάσεις	class	ΚΛΑΣΙΣ <i>dividing</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 101sup

...ὥστε μὴ [δια]βα[ί]νειν ταχέως [καί] τὰ μόρια τοῦ[του αὐ]τὰς παρασκευ[άζειν] τινὰς του[τ]...

...ὥστε μὴ διαβαίνειν ταχέως, καὶ τὰ Μόρια τούτου αὐτὰς παρασκευάζειν τινὰς τούτ[ων]...

...so that [they do] not pass through quickly, and the Portions of this [instead] prepare certain ones of them...

συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
διαβαίνειν	pass through	ΔΙΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking through</i>
τὸ μόριον τὰ μόρια	portion	ΜΟΡΙΟΝ <i>dividing</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 1 (column 102in)

...ὥστ[ε τῇ φύσει τῇν] ἀλληλουχίαν τοῦ ἐξωτάτου χιτῶνος εἶναι τοιαύτην, τῶν ἐν τ[ῷ] ἐναπειλημμένῳ ἔνδοθεν...

...ὥστε τῇ φύσει, τὴν Ἀλληλουχίαν τοῦ ἐξωτάτου χιτῶνος εἶναι τοιαύτην, τῶν ἐν τῷ ἐναπειλημμένῳ ἔνδοθεν...

...so that by nature, the Interconnectedness of the outermost covering is such that, with [atoms] in the enveloped [layers] from inside...

ἡ ἀλληλουχία αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι	interconnectedness	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ <i>holding each other</i>
ἐξώτατος <i>(η, ον)</i>	outermost	ΕΞΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>the most out of</i>
ὁ χιτῶν οἱ χιτῶνες	covering	ΧΙΤΩΝ <i>tunic</i>
ἐναπειλημμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	enveloped	ΕΝΑΠΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasped away in</i>

...[οὐθέν πω ἀπ]είρων, ὥστε μὴ ν[ομ]ίζειν κατὰ τὴν σ[ύστ]ασιν τοῦ εἰδ[ώ]λου ἐκ [σ]υνκλάσ[εως τινὸς α]ὐτὰ τ[οὺς σκεδασμοὺς] λαμβ[άνειν] ἀλ[λ'] ὅτ[αν] καὶ πρ[ὸ]ς στερέμνιον [τι προ]σκ[ρ]οῦ[σα]ν τὴν σ[κέδ]ασιν λ[αμβάν]ειν...

...οὐθέν πω ἀπείρων – ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν, κατὰ τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ εἰδώλου, ἐκ συνκλάσεως τινὸς αὐτὰ τοὺς σκεδασμοὺς λαμβάνειν – ἀλλ', ὅταν καὶ πρὸς στερέμνιον τι προσκρούσαν, τὴν σκέδασιν λαμβάνειν...

...in no way yet of the infinite [shapes] – so as not to think that, according to the composition of the film, [the films] themselves receive dispersions from some fragmentation – but rather, whenever [the films] also strike against some firm object, they receive the dispersement...

Films do not fragment because of their composition but only disperse when they collide with firm objects. This dispersion is caused by external impacts, not internal flaws.

ἄπειρος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΩΝ <i>not limited</i>
νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
ἡ σύνκλασις αἱ συνκλάσεις	fragmentation	ΣΥΓΚΛΑΣΙΣ <i>breaking together</i>
ὁ σκεδασμός οἱ σκεδασμοί	dispersion	ΣΚΕΔΑΣΜΟΣ <i>an act of scattering</i>
ἡ σκέδασις αἱ σκέδασεις	dispersement	ΣΚΕΔΑΣΙΣ <i>general process of scattering</i>
στερεός <i>(ἄ, όν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>stiff</i>
ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	firmness	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from making stiff</i>
στερεός <i>(ἄ, όν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>stiff</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
προσκρούσας <i>(α, αν)</i>	striking against	ΠΡΟΣΚΡΟΥΣΑΣ <i>hitting upon</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 2 (column 103inf)

...[ἀ]λλὰ μᾶλλον ὥ[σ]τε μὴ ἀντικόπτει[ν] ἢ [ι] ἀρτίως ἀντικ[ό]πτοντα εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους ἢ οὖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐφέρετο τὴν ἀναχώ[ρη]σιν ποιεῖν...

...ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴ ἀντικόπτειν, ἢ ἀρτίως ἀντικόπτοντα, εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους ἢ οὖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐφέρετο, τὴν ἀναχώρησιν ποιεῖν...

...but rather, given that [the flows] do not collide against, or are only just colliding against, the opposing locations or [those locations] which [the Film] was heading from the beginning, making a withdrawal [i.e., naturally shifting toward a path with less resistance]...

ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>
ἀντικόπτων <i>(οὔσα, ον)</i>	colliding [against]	
ἐναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>

ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ ἀναχώρησις αἱ ἀναχωρήσεις	withdrawal	ΑΝΑΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ <i>place / location</i> <i>back</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 3 (column 104inf)

...νυνὶ μηκέτι **τῷ** τούτῳ μὴ ἔχειν ἄ**λλ**α σύνεγγυς ἐληλυθέναι, μὴ οἷον καταλιποῦσαι τήν παρ’ ἄλ**λ**ή**λ**ω)ν...

...νυνὶ μηκέτι τῷ **Τοῦτο μὴ ἔχειν Ἔλλα σύνεγγυς ἐληλυθέναι** – **μὴ οἷον καταλιποῦσαι τήν παρ' ἀλλήλων...**

...now, no longer in regard to that, this [Film] does not have other [Atoms] that have come nearby – not as if [the Fragmentations] leave behind a [connection] for one another...

σύνεγγυς	nearby	ΣΥΝΕΓΓΥΣ <i>near together</i>
καταλιπών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	leaving behind	ΚΑΤΑΛΙΠΩΝ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>leaving</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 3 (column 105sup)

...[θ]έσιν καὶ τάξιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ταύταις προσχωρήσασαι ὧν **πρ**ότερον διαστήματα εἶ**χ**ον, καὶ οἰονεὶ ἐκ τοῦ κατεναντίον αὐταῖς ἔχειν τὸ σῶ**μ**α ἐ**ν** τῇ φύσει τι σχετ**ι**κόν καὶ οὐπῶ προσκροῦσας... ...τῷ στερεμνίῳ **λ**αβεῖν τ**ι**να συνί**ζ**ησι)ν· καὶ ὅ**τ**αν οὖν **δ**ή, φημί, πρὸς στερέμν**ι**όν τ**ι** προ**σ**κροῦσα**ν**...

...θέσιν καὶ τάξιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ταύταις προσχωρήσασαι ὧν πρότερον διαστήματα Εἶχον – καὶ οἰονεὶ, ἐκ τοῦ κατεναντίον αὐταῖς, ἔχειν τὸ Σῶμα ἐν τῇ φύσει τι σχετικόν καὶ οὐπῶ προσκρούσας... **...τῷ στερεμνίῳ λαβεῖν τινὰ συνίζησιν**: καὶ ὅταν, οὖν δὴ, Φημί, πρὸς στερέμνιόν τι προσκροῦσαν...

...position and arrangement, but [because the Compounds of the films] have already advanced only towards those [positions and arrangements] whose separation They previously held – and as if, from what is opposing them, the Body has something stable in nature and [the Stream] is not yet striking against... ...acquiring a certain settlement for the hard object: and whenever, therefore, I say, [a Film] strikes against a certain hard object...

ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of</i> <i>placing</i>
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ <i>ordered</i>
ἡ θέσις καὶ τάξις	position and arrangement	
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	<i>compound</i>	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating</i> <i>together</i>
χωρεῖν	to advance	ΧΩΡΕΙΝ <i>place / location</i>
προσχωρεῖν	to advance toward	ΠΡΟΣΧΩΡΕΙΝ
προσχωρήσας <i>(ήσασα, ήσαν)</i>	advanced toward [already]	
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing</i> <i>together</i>
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing away</i>

τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing between</i>
τὸ κατεναντίον τὰ κατεναντία	what is opposing	κατεναντίον <i>against down in</i>
κατεναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	opposing	
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
σχετικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	stable	ΣΧΕΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being retentive</i>
ὁ ῥόος οἱ ῥόοι	<i>stream</i>	ῬΟΟΣ <i>current</i>
προσκρούσας <i>(α, αν)</i>	striking against	ΠΡΟΣΚΡΟΥΣΑΣ <i>hitting upon</i>
στερεός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>stiff</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
λαβεῖν	[generally] to acquire [already]	ΛΑΒΕΙΝ <i>grasped</i>
ἡ συνίζησις αἱ συνιζήσεις	settlement	ΣΥΝΙΖΗΣΙΣ <i>sitting together</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	<i>film</i>	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 4 (column 105inf)

...ἡ σύν[κρ]ιαις ἐγ[έ]νετο τοῦ π[ερα]ίνουñ ταχέως εἰς [μα]κρ[ο]ύς τόπους· ὥστ[ε,] φημί, καὶ περὶ τὰ εἶδ[ωλ]α ἀναγκαῖον τ[ο]ιαύτην...

...ἡ Σύγκρισις ἐγένετο τοῦ περανοῦñ ταχέως εἰς μακροὺς τόπους: ὥστε, Φημί καὶ περὶ τὰ εἶδωλα Ἀναγκαῖον τοιαύτην...

...the Compound is made with it quickly accomplishing [its course] into distant locations: therefore, I also say regarding the films that It is necessary for such a [compound]...

ἡ σύγκρισις = ἡ σύνκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>extremity</i>
περαίνειν	to accomplish	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extremity</i>
μακρὰν	by a long way	ΜΑΚΡΑΝ <i>long-reaching</i>
μακρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	distant	ΜΑΚΡΟΣ <i>long-reaching</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
ἀναγκαῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ <i>necessity</i>

2.8 Generation of Films

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 5 (column 106inf)

...ὥσ[τε μ]ῃ [εἶναι τὰ στε]ρ[έ]μν[ια] οἷς ἂν [μ]εγίστη ἐπιτ[ολῇ]ς ἀλληλουχία ὑπάρχη[ι ο] ὅμμετρ[α] εἰς ὃ λέγω εἶδος, τάπε[()]ντῶντα πολλὰ κ[αί] παντοῖα οὐκ ὀλίγα [ῆ]σαν δι' αὐτό...

...ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τὰ Στερέμνια οἷς ἂν μεγίστη ἐπιτολῆς Ἀλληλουχία ὑπάρχη
σύμμετρα εἰς ὃ Λέγω εἶδος: Τάπελθόντα πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα – οὐκ ὀλίγα ἦσαν δι' αὐτό...

...therefore the hard Objects in which the greatest Interconnectedness superficially exists do not exist as proportionate to the form I speak of: the many and varied kinds of [films] that went away – there were not [just] a few [films] because of the...

στερεός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>stiff</i>
ἡ στερεότης αἱ στερεότητες	firmness	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from making stiff</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
πέλεσθαι	to take place	ΠΕΛΕΣΘΑΙ <i>taking place</i>
ἡ ἐπιπολή αἱ ἐπιπολαί	surface	ΕΠΙΠΟΛΗ <i>taken place upon</i>
ἐπιπολῆς	superficially	
ἡ ἀλληλουχία αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι	interconnectedness	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ <i>holding each other</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
σύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
εἰδέναι	<i>to have mentally seen ∴</i> "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ἀπιέναι	to go way	ΑΠΙΕΝΑΙ <i>going away</i>
τὸ ἀπελθόν = τᾶπελθόν τὰ ἀπελθόντα = τᾶπελθόντα	what went away	ΑΠΕΛΘΟΝ <i>went away</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	<i>film</i>	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
τοῖος <i>(τοιᾶ, τοῖον)</i>	like this <i>(of such a kind)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
παντοῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	all kinds	ΠΑΝΤΟΙΟΣ <i>all of this sort</i>
ὀλίγος <i>(η, ον)</i>	few	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ <i>small</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 6 (column 107inf)

...[μᾶλλον]ν [τῇ αὐτῇ]ῃι θέσ[ει] κ[αί] τάξ[ει] ἥπερ τὰ στερέμνια διὰ τὴν ἀφθονίαν· πολλάκις γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀπαντᾷ σώματα ἃ τὴν...

...μᾶλλον τῇ αὐτῇ θέσει καὶ τάξει ἥπερ τὰ Στερέμνια διὰ τὴν ἀφθονίαν –
πολλάκις γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀπαντᾷ Σώματα ἃ τὴν...

...[regarding transmission over a distance, the films maintain] with the same position and arrangement more so than hard Objects, due to the abundance [of the films] – for often such Bodies encounter those things which the...

ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing</i>
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ <i>ordered</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making <i>hard</i></i>
ἡ ἀφθονία αἱ ἀφθονίαι	abundance	ΑΦΘΟΝΙΑ <i>not scarcity</i>
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ <i>many times</i>
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ <i>meeting away</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 7 (column 108inf)

...μηχανᾶ]σθαι, ἔ[τι τε τὴν συν]κρίσει ἀναλ[ογίαν] ἔχοντος οἷαν [ε]ἴρηκα· τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μηχανηθεῖη μορφῆς εἶδος ὁ τὴν...

...**μηχανᾶσθαι**, ἔτι τε, **τὴν συγκρίσει ἀναλογίαν**, **ἔχοντος οἷαν** Εἴρηκα – **τί** γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μηχανηθεῖη μορφῆς Εἶδος, ὃ **τὴν**...

※...moreover, **to construct an analogy for the compound**, of **[a compound]** **having the kind [] which** I have mentioned – for **what** Form of shape could not be constructed, which [...] **the**...

μηχανᾶσθαι	to construct	ΜΗΧΑΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>device</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
εἰδέναι	<i>to have mentally seen ∴</i> "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 8 (column 109inf)

...προειρημένην [ν τα]χυτῆτα ἔχουσα[ν] συσ[σώ]ζεσθαι· αἱ γὰρ ἔν[δο]θεν θέσ[εις] καὶ τάξεις, καθ' ἃς [ἐμ]ψυχον τόδε τι...

...**προειρημένην**, **ταχυτῆτα ἔχουσαν συσσώζεσθαι**. γὰρ ἔνδοθεν **Θέσεις** καὶ **Τάξεις**, **καθ' ἃς ἔμψυχον Τόδε τι**...

...the previously mentioned [interconnectedness], having high speeds [that are] **preserved together**. indeed, the inner Positions and Arrangements, according to which this particular animate Thing...

λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
εἰρῆσθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>spoke</i>
εἰρημένος	having been said [already]	
προειρημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	previously mentioned	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>spoke before</i>

τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	TAXOS <i>quickly</i>
ἡ ταχύτης αἱ ταχύτητες	high speed	TAXYTHS <i>condition from</i> <i>quickly</i>
σώζειν	to preserve	ΣΩZEIN <i>saving</i>
συσσώζειν	to preserve together	ΣΥΣΣΩZEIN <i>saving together</i>
συσσώζεσθαι	to be preserved together	
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕSIS <i>process of</i> <i>placing</i>
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞIS <i>ordered</i>
ἔμψυχος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	animate	ΕΜΨΥΧΟΣ <i>in soul</i>

2.9 Mechanics of the Films

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 9 (column 110inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 4 (column 111sup)

...[οὐδ]ὲ κωλυόμε[να] [δ]ηλ[ό]νως ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς [βά]θος παραλλαγῆς· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ εἶδωλα οὕτως ἔχειν φάσκειν [ο]ύθὲν | ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ [το]ῖς φαινομένοις· [κατ]αφὰ νὲς οἷν πάλιν γί[νετ]αι ὅτι τὰ εἶδωλα ταχυτῆτά τινα ἀνυπέρβλητον κέκτηται κατὰ τὴν [φο]ράν· καὶ ἐν τοιού τωι δέ τινι τρόπῳ ἔσται περὶ τῆς ταχυτήτος τῶν εἰδώλων[ν] [ἀπ]όδειξιν ποιήσας[θαι·] ἐπειδὴ γὰ[ρ]... [τα]χὺν οὐ μόν[ον καὶ] κουφότητα...

...οὐδὲ κωλυόμενα δηλόνως ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς βάθος παραλλαγῆς – Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ εἶδωλα, οὕτως, ἔχειν φάσκειν οὐθὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις: καταφανές, οὔν, πάλιν Γίνεται ὅτι τὰ Εἶδωλα ταχυτῆτά τινα ἀνυπέρβλητον κέκτηται κατὰ τὴν φοράν – καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ δέ τινι τρόπῳ, Ἔσται περὶ τῆς ταχυτήτος τῶν εἰδώλων ἀπόδειξιν ποιήσασθαι – ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ταχὺν οὐ μόνον, καὶ κουφότητα...

...nor are they clearly hindered by the variety in depth – therefore, This [explanation] regarding the films has nothing to allege that contests visible things: thus, It again becomes fully evident that the Films possess a certain unsurpassable high speed in their transmission – and in such a specific way, that It will be possible to provide a demonstration concerning the swiftness of the films – since not only the high speed [of the films], but also [their] lightness...

κωλύειν	to hinder	ΚΩΛΥEIN <i>preventing</i>
κωλυόμενος <i>(ομένη, όμενον)</i>	being hindered	
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
τὸ βάθος τὰ βάθη	depth	ΒΑΘΟΣ <i>deep</i>
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from</i> <i>appearing</i>
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚEIN <i>affirming</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡEIN <i>testifying against</i>
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of</i> <i>appearing</i>
φανερὸς <i>(ά, όν)</i>	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ <i>appearing</i>

τὸ καταφανές τὰ καταφανῆ	what is fully evident	ΚΑΤΑΦΑΝΕΣ <i>thoroughly appearing</i>
καταφανής <i>(ές)</i>	fully evident	
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ ταχύτης αἱ ταχύτητες	high speed	ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ <i>condition from quickly</i>
ἀνυπέρβλητος <i>(ον)</i>	unsurpassable	ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ <i>not thrown over</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἡ ἀπόδειξις αἱ ἀποδείξεις	demonstration	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ <i>from pointing out</i>
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to provide"]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ταχύς <i>(εἶα, ύ)</i>	swift	ΤΑΧΥΣ <i>swift</i>
τὸ κοῦφον τὰ κούφα	light things	ΚΟΥΦΟΝ <i>nimble</i>
ἡ κουφότης αἱ κουφότητες	lightness	ΚΟΥΦΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from nimble</i>

2.10 Films Generated from Films

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 17

...[φ]α[ν]ερ[όν] ὡς κα[ί] το[ίς] εἰδώλοις ὑπά[ρχει καί] αὕτη ἡ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στερέμνιον μόνον ἡδύνατο τὰς ἐξώσεις πο[ιεῖν,] [τὸ δ'] ἐ[δω]λ[ον] μ[ή,] ἦν ἂν κατὰ | τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ στερέμνια μ[ό]νον ταχέω[ς] [δ]ύγασθα[ι] φέρεσθαι, [τ]ὰ δ' εἶδωλα μή, κα[τά] γε τὸν ἐξωστ[ι]κόν, κατὰ μέ[ν]τ[οι]οι τὸ ἐπιλαμ[β]ανόμε[ν]ον εὐθύς ἐ[τοίμου] κεν[οῦ] διὰ τὰς συνι[ζ]ήσεις τὰς ἐ[ίς σ]τε[ν]ότητα καὶ [λ]επτότη[τα] καὶ μικρότ[η]τα.

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 10 (column 111inf) | P.Herc. 1149 col. 5 (column 112sup)

...[ἀέ]ρα ἐξω[θεῖ]ν [δυνα]τὸν περαιοῖ, φα[ν]ερὸν ὡς καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ [α]ὕτη ἡ δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ στερέμνιον μόνον ἡδύνατο τὰς | ἐξώσεις πι[οιεῖσθαι], τὸ δ' εἶδωλο[ν μή], ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐ[ξ]ωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ στερέμνια μόνον ταχέως δύνασθαι φέρεσ[θαι], [τ]ὰ δὲ εἶδωλα μή, κατὰ γε τὸν ἐξωστ[ι]κό[ν], κα[τὰ] μέντοι τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον εὐθύ[ς ἐξ] ἐτ[οίμου] κενοῦ διὰ τ[ὰς] συνιζήσεις τὰς ἐ[ίς σ]τενότητα καὶ λεπτ[ό]τητα καὶ μι[κρο]ότη[τα]α...

...**ἀέρα** ἐξωθεῖν Δυνατὸν, περαιοῖ – Φανερόν ὡς καὶ τοῖς εἰδώλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ αὕτη ἡ Δύναμις· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ Στερέμνιον μόνον ἡδύνατο **τὰς ἐξώσεις** ποιεῖσθαι – τὸ δ' Εἶδωλον μή – ἦν ἂν κατὰ τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τρόπον τὰ Στερέμνια μόνον ταχέως δύνασθαι φέρεσθαι – τὰ δὲ εἶδωλα μή, κατὰ γε τὸν ἐξωστικόν: κατὰ, μέντοι, τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον εὐθύς ἐξ ἐτοίμου κενοῦ διὰ τὰς συνιζήσεις τὰς εἰς στενότητα καὶ λεπτότητα καὶ μικρότητα...

...It has the force to eject **air**, [while] carrying [the air] over – and It is evident that this same Force also exists **even in the films**: for if only a hard Object had the force to produce **ejections** – but a Film did not [have the force to produce ejections] – then only hard Objects would have the force to be quickly carried **in the ejecting way** – but the films would not [have the force to be quickly carried], at least [not] in the ejecting [way]: however, in what is completely encompassed around immediately from the ready void, through the settlements into narrowness, subtleness, and minuteness...

ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>morning mist</i>
ἐξωθεῖν	to eject	ΕΞΘΕΙΝ <i>pushing out</i>
ἡ ἔξωσις αἱ ἐξώσεις	ejections	ΕΞΩΣΙΣ <i>pushing out</i>
τὸ ἐξωστικόν τὰ ἐξωστικά	what is ejected	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΝ <i>pushing out</i>
ἐξωστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	ejecting	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of pushing out</i>
δυνατός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>power</i>
περαιοῦν	to carry over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ <i>boundary</i>
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
φανερὸς <i>(ά, όν)</i>	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἡ ἔξωσις αἱ ἐξώσεις	ejections	ΕΞΩΣΙΣ <i>pushing out</i>
ἐξωστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	ejecting	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of pushing out</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
ταχέως	quickly	ΤΑΧΕΩΣ <i>quickly</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>bringing</i>
τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον τὰ περιλαμβανόμενα	[generally] what is completely encompassed	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>grasping around</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
ἐτοιμάζειν	to make ready	ΕΤΟΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing</i>
έτοιμος <i>(ίμη, ἱμον)</i>	made ready	
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ συνίησις αἱ συνιζήσεις	settlement	ΣΥΝΙΖΗΣΙΣ <i>sitting together</i>
ἡ στενότης αἱ στενότητες	narrowness	ΣΤΕΝΟΤΗΣ <i>narrow</i>

<p>ή λεπτότης αί λεπτότητες</p>	subtleness	<p>ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being fine/thin</i></p>
<p>ή μικρότης αί μικρότητες</p>	minuteness	<p>ΜΙΚΡΟΤΗΣ <i>little</i></p>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 11 (column 112inf)

...πῶς οὐχί· ἐπεὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τῆς ταχυτήτος, Νομιστέον αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ...

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 18 | column 19 sup.

...ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδωλον δυνατὸν ἐστὶν ἐξίωθεῖν πολλὰ σώματα, [ἔτι] μᾶλλον ἢ[περ κ]α[ὶ] α[ὐ]τὰ στερέμν[ια τ]οῦτο πράττ[ειν], πῶς οὐχί, ἐπειδὴ καὶ [τ]οῦτον ἔχ[ε]ι τὸν τ[ρό]πον τῆ[ς] ταχυτήτος, νομ[ισ]τέο[ν] αὐτοῖς ὑπ[ι]άρχ[ειν] καὶ τοῦ[τον τὸν τρόπον;] εἰ καὶ τιν[α] κατ[ὰ] [τὰ σώμ]ατ[α ἔχει] [τὸν τ]ρόπον το[ῦτο]ν [ότα]ν περα[ι]ῶ[ν]τα[ι], καὶ ἡ τῶν ε[ἰ]δώλων φύσις, [ώσ]π[ερ] λέγω, κατὰ | τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τῶν ἀπαντῶντων[ν] σωματῶ[ν] [τ]ρόπον φέρεσθαι [δ]ύ[ναται·] ὁ τρόπος [δ' ἐστὶ] κ[αὶ τῶν οὐ]ρίων π[ο]υ· ἐπε[ιδὴ δὲ] περι[φο]ρούμενα...

...ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ Εἶδωλον δυνατὸν ἐστὶν ἐξωθεῖν **πολλὰ σώματα**, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἦπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ Στερέμνια **τοῦτο** πράττειν – πῶς οὐχί; ἐπειδὴ καὶ **τοῦτον** ἔχει **τὸν τρόπον τῆς ταχυτήτος**, Νομιστέον **αὐτοῖς** ὑπάρχειν καὶ **τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον**. εἰ καὶ **τινα κατὰ τὰ σώματα ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον** ὅταν περαιῶνται – καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδώλων Φύσις, ὥσπερ Λέγω, **κατὰ τὸν ἐξωστικὸν τῶν ἀπαντῶντων σωμάτων τρόπον** φέρεσθαι δύναται – ὁ Τρόπος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ **τῶν ὀρίων που**· ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιφορούμενα...

...since Film also has the force to eject **many bodies**, even more so than hard Objects themselves can do **this** – how [could it] not [be this way]? since [the films] indeed possesses **this way of high speed**, It must be considered that **this way [of ejection]** also exists **for the [films]**. indeed, if **certain [examples] among bodies have this way [of movement]** when they are being carried over [through the void] – then the Nature of the films, as I say, is also able to be carried **according to the ejecting way of the encountering bodies** – this Way [of ejection from encountering another body] is also, **in a sense, of boundaries [i.e., concerning their surfaces]**. And since [the films] are being transmitted around...

<p>τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα</p>	film	<p>ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i></p>
<p>ἐξωθεῖν</p>	to eject	<p>ΕΞΩΘΕΙΝ <i>pushing out</i></p>
<p>τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα</p>	body	<p>ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i></p>
<p>τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια</p>	hard object	<p>ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i></p>
<p>ή πρᾶξις αί πράξεις</p>	activity	<p>ΠΡΑΞΙΣ <i>action</i></p>
<p>πράττειν</p>	to accomplish	<p>ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i></p>
<p>ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι</p>	way	<p>ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i></p>
<p>ή ταχύτης αί ταχύτητες</p>	high speed	<p>ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ <i>condition from quickly</i></p>
<p>νομίζειν</p>	to think	<p>ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i></p>
<p>ὑπάρχειν</p>	to exist	<p>ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i></p>
<p>περαιοῦν</p>	to come over	<p>ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ <i>boundary</i></p>
<p>ή ἐξωσις αί ἐξώσεις</p>	ejections	<p>ΕΞΩΣΙΣ <i>pushing out</i></p>

ἐξωστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	ejecting	ΕΞΩΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of pushing out</i>
ἀπαντᾶν	to encounter	ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ <i>meeting away</i>
ἀπαντῶν <i>(ῶσα, ῶν)</i>	encountering	
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
φέρεσθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>bringing</i>
δύνασθαι	to be able	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>having power</i>
ὀρίζειν	to set a limit	ὈΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
ὀρίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	setting a limit	
τὸ ὄριον τὰ ὅρια	boundaries	ὈΡΙΟΝ <i>border</i>
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ <i>goal</i>
φορεῖν	to transmit	ΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying</i>
φορούμενος	being transmitted	
περιφορούμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	being transmitted around	ΠΕΡΙΦΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>carrying around</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 12 (column 113inf)

...κρίσεις ἢ τὰς σφό[δρα] μικράς ἐξωθεῖ[ν] δυνάμενα αὐτ[αῖς] καὶ αὐτοῖς εὐοδί[αν] παρασκευάζειν, π[ῶς] οὐκ εὐοδον τὸ λ[έ]γε[ι]ν...

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 19 fin. | column 20 sup.

...προσκρο[ύ]σ[αντα] πρ[ὸς] τὰς ἐλαχίστας συγκρ[ί]σεις ἢ τὰ[ς] σφόδ[ρ]α μικρὰ[ς] ἐξωθεῖν [δ]υ[ν]άμ[ε]να αὐτ[αῖς] καὶ ἐα[υτοῖς] εὐδ[ί]αν παρα[σ]κευά[ζ]ειν, π[ῶς] οὐκ εὐοδογ τὸ λέγειν ὥς καὶ ταῖς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεσιν ἐγ[ε]ν[ε]σ[ι]ν τινε[ς] συμμέτρως ἔχουσαι στερεμ[ν]ίους δυνάμεις;

...προσκρούσαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐλαχίστας συγκρίσεις ἢ τὰς σφόδρα μικράς, ἐξωθεῖν δυνάμενα, αὐταῖς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς εὐδῖαν παρασκευάζειν. πῶς οὐκ εὐοδον τὸ Λέγειν ὥς καὶ ταῖς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεσιν ἔνεισὶ τινες συμμέτρως ἔχουσαι στερεμνίοις Δυνάμεις;

...[because the films are] striking against the most minuscule compounds or [at least] the very small [ones, the films] have the force to eject [these compounds], to provide a good situation [for movement] for other [compounds] and for themselves. how is it not good progress [for this topic] to Say that certain Forces are also proportionally present within [their] hard [source] objects for the nature of the films [to generate]?

κρούειν	to strike	ΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ <i>bumping</i>
προσκρούειν	to strike against	ΠΡΟΣΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ <i>bumping towards</i>
προσκρούων <i>(ούουσα, ούον)</i>	striking against	
τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὰ ἐλάχιστα	the minimum <i>(the smallest thing)</i>	ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΝ <i>small</i>
ἐλαχύς	minuscule	ΕΛΑΧΥΣ <i>small</i>
ἐλάχιστος <i>(ἐλαχίστη, ἐλάχιστον)</i>	most minuscule	

ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
σφόδρα	very	ΣΦΟΔΡΑ <i>vehement</i>
μικκός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΚΟΣ
έξωθεΐν	to eject	ΕΞΩΘΕΙΝ <i>pushing out</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
δυνάμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>power</i>
ἡ εὐδία αἱ εὐδαί	good progress	ΕΥΔΙΑ <i>good day</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
ἡ εὐοδία αἱ εὐοδαί	good progress	ΕΥΟΔΙΑ <i>good path</i>
εὖοδος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	progressing well	
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
τὸ λέγειν	[the] saying	
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
σύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measure together</i>
συμμέτρως	proportionally	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΩΣ
στερεός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>stiff</i>
τὸ στερεμνίον τὰ στερεμνία	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>hard</i>
στερεμνῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	hard	
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 13 (column 114inf)

...[μήκος περιλαμβάνο]υσαι έν ταῖς έξώφεσιν καί ού δυγ[ά]μεναι έν τρόπωι τινί πρός τὰς μικράς προσπίπτειν· καθ' ἄ...

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 6 (column 115sup)

...{[πι]αντας οὐ[ν] τοὺς [τρό]πους οὓς θεωροῦ[με]ν τὰς ταχυτήτας [ὕπ]αρχούσας σώμα[σί τιοι]ν εὖ ἐπι[β]λέ[πομε]ν ὅτι καί τὰ
εἴ[δωλ]α δύν[αται] τα[χέω]ς εἰς μακροὺς [τόπ]ους περαιοῦν· [δεῖ δ' ἐ]πιβλέ[πε]ιν [ὅτι κατὰ] τήν αὐτήν [έμ]πτω[σι]ν ῥαιδίως
[διά π]α[ν]τὸς π[όρου] τοῖς εἰδώλοις διέκδυσιν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔ[χ]ει}

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 columns 20 fin., 21, 22 sup.

γῇ [ν δὲ προσα]σπά[ζον]τ[αί] πο[υ.] καί [τήν] μετα[λλ]αγήν έκ τῆς έξ [άρ]χῆς [ά]πορρυείσης μορ[φ]ῆς λαμβάνουσης(*)
[έ]ξώ[σε]ις αὐτῶν ποιοῦντα[ι διαδ]ύγ[τ]α μ[έν] π[ρὸς σ]υγκρίσεις, [εἰ] καί... [three lines missing] ...[σ]τερέμνι[α, μάλλ]ον ἤπερ
[αὐτὰ τὰ] στερέμνι[α] μέγα μήκος περιλαμβάνουσαι έν ταῖς έξώσεσιν καί ο[ὐ δ]υν[ά]μεναι ἐ[ν τρώ]πω[ι τινὶ πρ]ὸς [τὰς μ]ικράς
προσ[πι]πτειν· καθ' ἅ[π]τας οὔν τοῦ[ς] τ[ρόπ]ου[ς] ο[ὐδ] [ς θε]ωροῦ[μεν τ]ῆς [τα]χυ[τήτας ὕπ]αρχού[σα]ς σώμα[σί τ]ισιν [εὖ
ἐπι]βλέπ[ομεν] ὅ[τι καί τὰ] εἶδωλ[α δύνα]τ[ται τ]αχ[έ]ω[ς εἰς μα]κ[ρο]ὺ[ς τ]ό[πους] π[ερ]αιοῦν· δεῖ δ' [έ]πι[β]λέπε[ι]ν ὅτ[ι]
κ[ατὰ] τήν αὐ[τή]ν ἔμπτωσ[ι]ν ῥαιδί[ως] διά παντὸς πόρου τοῖς εἰδώλοις διέκδυσιν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔ[χ]ει} [έν]ε[τι]να[ι]...

γῆν δὲ προσασπάζονται που, καὶ τὴν μεταλλαγὴν ἐκ τῆς, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπορρυείσης, μορφῆς λαμβάνουσης ἐξώσεις αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται – διαδύνα μὲν πρὸς συγκρίσεις, εἰ καὶ...

[because certain forces] are somehow cleaving onto the earth, and they make an alteration from the shape [of the film] that, flowing out from the beginning, encompasses the ejections of these [objects] – [with the films] thoroughly having the force for [moving other] compounds, if indeed...

...στερέμνια, μᾶλλον ἤπερ αὐτά τὰ στερέμνια μέγα μῆκος περιλαμβάνουσαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξώσεσιν – καὶ οὐ δυνάμεναι, ἐν τρόπῳ τινί, πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς προσπίπτειν; καθ' ἅπαντας οὖν τοὺς τρόπους οὓς Θεωροῦμεν τὰς ταχύτητας ὑπαρχούσας σώμασί τισιν, εὖ Ἐπιβλέπομεν ὅτι καὶ τὰ Εἶδωλα δύναται ταχέως εἰς μακροὺς τόπους περαιοῦν· Δεῖ δ' ἐπιβλέπειν ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔμπτωσιν, ῥαιδίως διὰ παντὸς πόρου τοῖς εἰδώλοις Διέκδυσιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως, ἔχει ἐνεῖναι...

...hard objects, even more than [the compounds of the films] encompass in their ejections the hard objects themselves at great length – and [yet] they do not have the force, in any way, to fall upon [other] small [compounds]? therefore, in all the ways that We envision high speeds existing for certain bodies, We fully and easily see that even the Films are able to quickly come over to distant locations. It is necessary fully see how, in accordance with the same collision, the Emergence through every passageway easily has, not unreasonably, to exist for the films within...

ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ land
ἀσπάζεσθαι	to cleave	ΑΣΠΑΖΟΜΑΙ [welcoming eagerly]
προσασπάζεσθαι	to cleave onto	ΠΡΟΣΑΣΠΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ [welcoming eagerly] further/toward
ἀλλάσσω	to alter	ΑΛΛΑΣΣΩ changing
ἡ μεταλλαγή αἱ μεταλλαγαί	alteration	ΜΕΤΑΛΛΑΓΗ changing change
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ first order
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀπορρεῖν	to flowing out	ΑΠΟΡΡΕΙΝ flow away
ἀπορρυεῖς (υεῖσα, υέν)	flowing out	
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ form
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ power
διαδύνασθαι	to thoroughly have the force	ΔΙΑΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ fully power
δυνάμενος (μένη, μενον)	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ power
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ separating together
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ object from making hard
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ length
περιλαμβάνειν	to completely comprehend	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping around

περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
ἡ ἔξωσις αἱ ἐξώσεις	ejections	ΕΞΩΣΙΣ <i>pushing out</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
μικρός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling toward</i>
ἅπας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	all together	ἌΠΑΣ <i>all together</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
ἡ ταχύτης αἱ ταχύτητες	high speed	ΤΑΧΥΤΗΣ <i>condition from quickly</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking upon</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
ταχέως	quickly	ΤΑΧΕΩΣ <i>quickly</i>
μακρός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	distant	ΜΑΚΡΟΣ <i>long-reaching</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
περαιοῦν	to come over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ <i>boundary</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
ἡ ἔμπτωσις αἱ ἐμπτώσεις	collision	ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ <i>falling into</i>
ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ <i>strike</i>
ῥαδίως ῥαιδίως	easily	ῬΑΙΔΙΩΣ <i>easily</i>
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
ἡ διέκδυσις αἱ διεκδύσεις	emergence	ΔΙΕΚΔΥΣΙΣ <i>action of escaping through</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
ἄλογος <i>(ον)</i>	(of things) unreasoning, (of men) unreasonable	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>
ἄλόγως	unreasonably	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 7 (column 116sup)

...πρ[ὸς τοῖς στε]ρεμνίοις καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς διαστάσεις εἰς βάθος εἰληφός, πλὴν οὐχὶ τῷ ἐκ σωμάτων πολλῶν ε[ἰς] βάθος πε[ποι]ῆσθα[ι, ἀλλ]ὰ τῷ [τὴν] τοῦ [ἐνδ]οθεν [κενο]ῦ διὰ[στ]ασιν τὴν [α]ὐτὴν ἔχειν, λέγειν τολμῶσιν ἀλόγως πως ὡς διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα ῥαδίως δι[ὰ π]αντ[ὸς] πόρου [περ]αι[οῦν ἔδει], οὐδ' ἐν[θ]υ[μούμενοι]...

...πρὸς τοῖς στερεμνίοις καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς διαστάσεις εἰς βάθος εἰληφός – πλὴν οὐχὶ τῷ ἐκ σωμάτων πολλῶν εἰς βάθος πεποιῆσθαι – ἀλλὰ τῷ τὴν τοῦ ἔνδοθεν κενοῦ διάστασιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν. λέγειν Τολμῶσιν ἀλόγως, πως, ὡς διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα ῥαδίως διὰ παντὸς πόρου περαιοῦν ἔδει, οὐδ' ἐνθυμούμενοι...

...while [the film] even acquired the same dimensions in depth in relation to the hard objects [that were its source] – except with [the film] having been made deeply not by many bodies – but by having the same dimensions of the inner void. They unreasonably dare to say that, somehow, because of the subtleness [of the films], it would be necessary [for the films] to easily pass through every passageway, without [those who say this] reflecting that...

τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i>
ἡ διάστασις αἱ διαστάσεις	dimension	ΔΙΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing across</i>
τὸ βάθος τὰ βάθη	depth	ΒΑΘΟΣ <i>deep</i>
εἰληφέναι	to have comprehended	ΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ <i>grasped</i>
εἰληφώς (υῖα, ός)	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ <i>grasped</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
τὸ ἔνδοθεν τὰ ἔνδοθεν	the inner part "what is from within"	ΕΝΔΟΘΕΝ
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
τολμᾶν	to dare	ΤΟΛΜΑΝ <i>courage</i>
ἀλόγως	unreasonably	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtleness	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being fine/thin</i>
ῥάδιος ῥαίδιος (α, ον)	easy	ῥΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>easily</i>
ῥαδίως ῥαίδίως	easily	ῥΑΙΔΙΩΣ <i>easily</i>
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
περαιοῦν	to come over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ <i>boundary</i>
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμιαί	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ <i>toward spirit</i>
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>spirit in</i>
ἐνθυμούμενος (ουμένη, ούμενον)	reflecting upon	

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 24

...{συνίζησιν ἰσχυράν, περαιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρο(*)σεων} [τῶ]ν ε(*)τερ[εμνί]ων· τ[οῦ]το [δ' αὐ]ταὶ αἰ αἰσθήσει[ς ἐ]πι[ι]μαρτυροῦσ[ιν·] [οὐθ]έν γάρ ἄ[ν μᾶλλον] ἔνδοθεν τ[ι] πολ[ύ]κενον, [δὲ] μ[οι]ον δὲ φ[ύ]σει τῷδε μὴ πολυκένωι δύν[αι]το, διὰ τῷ[ν] τ[οίχ]ων [περ]αιοῦ[ν,] τ[ὴν] ἐξῆς θέσιν] [δι]ασώζει[ν] [πρὸς] [στ]ερέ[μνι]ο[ν]·

{added to fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 col. 8 (column 117sup)

.....{συνίζησιν ἰσχυράν, περαιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρο(*)σεων} τῶν στερεμνίων· τοῦτο δ' αὐταὶ αἰ αἰσθήσεις ἐπιμαρτυροῦσιν· οὐδέν γάρ ἂν μᾶλλον ἔνδοθεν τι πολύκενον, ὅμοιον [δὲ] φύσει [ι τῷδε] μὴ πο[λύ]κένωι, δύναιτο, [διὰ τῶν τοίχ]ων [περ]αιοῦν, τή[ν] ἐξῆς θέσιν διασώζει[ν] [πρ]ὸς στερέμνιον.

...συνίζησιν ἰσχυράν, περαιοῦν διὰ τῶν τοίχων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν συγκρίσεων τῶν στερεμνίων – τοῦτο δ' αὐταὶ αἰ Αἰσθήσεις ἐπιμαρτυροῦσιν: οὐδέν γάρ ἂν μᾶλλον ἔνδοθεν Τι πολύκενον, ὅμοιον δὲ φύσει τῷδε μὴ πολυκένω, δύναιτο, διὰ τῶν τοίχων περαιοῦν, τὴν ἐξῆς θέσιν διασώζειν πρὸς στερέμνιον

...[films are not able to form] a settlement that prevails [i.e., maintain a stable form], and carry over through the walls and through the remaining compounds of hard objects – this is further attested by the Sensations themselves: for in no way would Something [that is] more internally porous, but similar in nature to [something] non-porous, have the force to come over through the walls, to thoroughly preserve its successive position against a hard object [and be seen on the other side]

ἡ συνίζησις αἱ συνιζήσεις	settlement	ΣΥΝΙΖΗΣΙΣ <i>sitting together</i>
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ
ἰσχύων <i>(ισχύουσα, ισχύον)</i>	prevailing	ΙΣΧΥΩΝ <i>strength</i>
ἰσχυρός <i>(ἄ, όν)</i>	prevails	
περαιοῦν	to carry over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ <i>boundary</i>
ὁ τοῖχος οἱ τοῖχοι	wall	ΤΟΙΧΟΣ <i>mound</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + gen]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to further attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying upon</i>
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα	^[M] what is attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of testifying upon</i>
τὸ ἔνδοθεν τὰ ἔνδοθεν	the inner part "what is from within"	ΕΝΔΟΘΕΝ
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long ^[of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
πολύκενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	porous "containing much void"	ΠΟΛΥΚΕΝΟΣ <i>much void</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
περαιοῦν	to come over	ΠΕΡΑΙΟΥΝ <i>boundary</i>

ἐξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
ἢ θέσεις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of</i> <i>placing</i>
σώζειν	to preserve	ΣΩΖΕΙΝ <i>saving</i>
διασώζειν	to thoroughly preserve	ΔΙΑΣΩΖΕΙΝ <i>saving through</i>

2.13 False Analogy of Permeability

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 columns 24 fin., 25

{οὐ[κ ἔστι] συμ[φυῆ] τα[ῦτα] δῆ, φημί, τού[του, ἀ]λλὰ [μόν]ον τ[ῶν] **ἐ**πιτηδ[ε]ίων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα
τ[ῶν]ὰ φύσε[ι], ἀλλὰ π[οι]λοὺς καὶ **ἄλ**λο[υ]ς ἄλλως,} λέγω δ' οἷον πυρὸς, καὶ πνεύματος καὶ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων· ταῦτα γάρ,
ἐν ἄλλωι τρόπωι τῇ[ν] λεπτομέρειαν ἔχοντ[α] ἥπερ ἐν ᾧ αἱ **ἐ**ξ[ω]θεν μ[ε]ν ἄλληλοῦ[χο]ι **φύσεις**, ἔνδοθ[ε]ν[ε] **δὲ**
π[οι]κε[νο]ί, δύνα[νται τὰς] διεκδύσεις **διὰ τῶν** στερεμ[νίων] φύ[σ]εω[ν] λαμβ[άνε]ιν· οἷς δ[ε]

{added to the expanded fragment below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2

P.Herc. 1010 (columns 24fin, 25),

P.Herc. 993 col. 14 (column 117inf), P.Herc. 1149 col. 9 (column 118sup),

P.Herc. 1010 (columns 26, 27sup), P.Herc. 1149 col. 10 (column 119sup)

{οὐ[κ ἔστι] συμ[φυῆ] τα[ῦτα] δῆ, φημί, τού[του, ἀ]λλὰ [μόν]ον τ[ῶν] **ἐ**πιτηδ[ε]ίων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα
τ[ῶν]ὰ φύσε[ι], ἀλλὰ π[οι]λοὺς καὶ **ἄλ**λο[υ]ς ἄλλως,} **λ**έγω δ' οἷον **π**υρὸς καὶ πνεύμα[τος καὶ τῶν] τοιουτο[τρόπων]· ταῦτα
γάρ, ἐν ἄλλωι τρόπωι | τὴν λεπτομέρειαν ἔχ[ο]ντα ἥπερ ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἔξωθεν μὲν **ἀ**λλη[λοῦ]χοι φύσεις, **ἐ**νδοθε[ν] **δὲ** πολύκενοι,
δύ[να]νται τὰς **διεκδύσεις** διὰ τῶν στερεμνί[ων] φύσε[ω]ν λαμβάνειν· οἷς δῆ, φημί, βλ[έ]ποντες **ἐ**τι τῶν εἰδώλων αὐτὸ
τοῦτ[ο] **ἐ**γγχει[ρο]ῦσιν κατ[ὰ] δοξά[ζε]ιν διὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμ[ί]α[ν τὴν δὴ] τῆς λε[πτότητος] {τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ
προσθεωρ[ο]ῦντες **[missing word]** μ[ή]τε αὐτὰ μᾶλλον[ν] τὰς διαδύσει[ς] δύνασθαι ποιεῖσ[θα]ι διὰ τῶν στε[ρεμν]ίων[ων]
φύσε[ω]ν} συνβέβη[κ]εν ἥπ[ερ] τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς διὰ τῶν **χειρῶν** συγκρίσεις, ἂν μὴ **τ**ις τὸν τρόπον **τ**ῆς δ[ια]δύσεω[ς], **ὄν**
ἡμ[εῖς] εἰρήκαμεν, δ[ε]ικνύη **δ**υνάτ[ων] αὐτοῖς **ὑπάρχ**ειν **ὄντα**}. {δεῖ οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρη[κα], καὶ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος
γεγονυῖ[αν] οἰκονομίαν ἡμῖν ἐπιβλέπειν· ἔστι γάρ τι σύντομ[ον] πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι[αι] καὶ τ[ὴν] **παραλλαγήν**}
οὐκ ἔστι συμφυῆ Ταῦτα δῆ, Φημί, τούτου, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μὴ ἐχόντων μορφοειδῆ σχηματισμὸν ἕνα τινὰ φύσει – ἀλλὰ, πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλως, λέγω δ' οἷον πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος καὶ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων: Ταῦτα γάρ, ἐν ἄλλω τρόπω τὴν λεπτομέρειαν ἔχοντα ἥπερ ἐν ᾧ αἱ ἔξωθεν μὲν ἄλληλοῦχοι Φύσεις, ἔνδοθεν δὲ πολύκενοι, Δύνανται τὰς διεκδύσεις διὰ τῶν στερεμνίων φύσεων λαμβάνειν· οἷς δῆ, Φημί: βλέποντες ἔτι τῶν εἰδώλων αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἐγχειροῦσιν καταδοξάζειν διὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν – τὴν δὴ τῆς λεπτότητος τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ Προσθεωροῦντες

I say, These [abilities of traveling through hard objects] are not **inherent to** [film], but only **[inherent] to suitable things not having a certain singular shaped configuration by nature – rather, [these abilities are inherent to things having] many other [shapes] also**. I mean, for instance, **[particles] of fire and of [cool] wind and such types of things**: for These [hot and cold particles], because they have **a subtle composition** in a **different manner than that in which** [their] external interconnected Natures [exist], but **[with their nature also being] porous within**, have the force to acquire **their emergence** through the **natures of hard objects**. indeed, I say **to these [people]**: while they are still observing the films, they attempt to thoroughly judge **this very thing [i.e., transfer of temperature]** through the sameness of names – in fact, They are not also envisioning **the difference in the subtleness of these things**

μήτε Αὐτὰ **μᾶλλον τὰς διαδύσεις** δύνασθαι ποιεῖσθαι **διὰ τῶν στερεμνίων φύσεων** συνβέβηκεν **ἥπερ τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς διὰ τῶν χειρῶν συγκρίσεις**. ἂν μὴ **Τις τὸν τρόπον τῆς διαδύσεως, ὄν** Ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν, δεικνύη **δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ὄντα**. Δεῖ οὖν, ὥσπερ Εἴρηκα, καὶ **τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος γεγονυῖαν οἰκονομίαν ἡμῖν** ἐπιβλέπειν: ἔστι γάρ **Τι σύντομον** πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι **καὶ τὴν παραλλαγήν...**

These [hot and cold particles] are not **more** able to make **penetrations** through the nature of hard objects **than** they [are able to] endure **their** **rebounding** through the compounds of [our] hands. unless Someone proves that **this way of penetration**, **which** We ourselves have described, **is able to exist for** [films], then It is necessary, just as I have said, **for us** to also fully see the operation [in ways of movement] that is produced in this form: for there is Something **concise** for understanding **even the variety**...

συμφυής <i>(ές)</i>	inherent	ΣΥΜΦΥΗΣ <i>growing together</i>
τὸ ἐπιτήδειον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια	suitable things	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΝ <i>suitable upon</i>
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>
μορφοειδής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	shaped	ΜΟΡΦΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>seen form</i>
ὁ σχηματισμός οἱ σχηματισμοί	configuration	ΣΧΗΜΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of action of forming</i>
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ <i>fire</i>
τό πνεῦμα τὰ πνεύματα	[cool] wind	ΠΝΕΥΜΑ <i>breath result</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
τὸ τοιοῦτο τρόπος τὰ τοιούτοτρόπα	such a type of thing	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>such a kind of way</i>
ἡ λεπτότης αἱ λεπτότητες	subtleness	ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being fine/thin</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἡ λεπτομέρεια αἱ λεπτομέρειαι	subtle composition	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ <i>fine/thin part</i>
<i>(ή, τὸ)</i> ὁ ἔξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
ἡ ἀλληλουχία αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι	interconnectedness	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ <i>holding each other</i>
ἀλληλοῦχος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	interconnected	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΟΣ
πολύκενος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	porous "containing much void"	ΠΟΛΥΚΕΝΟΣ <i>many void</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
δυνατός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>power</i>
ἡ διέκδυσις αἱ διεκδύσεις	emergence	ΔΙΕΚΔΥΣΙΣ <i>action of escaping through</i>
τὸ στερέμνιον τὰ στερέμνια	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>object from making hard</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	Film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
ἡ χεῖρ αἱ χεῖρες	hand	ΧΕΙΡ <i>hand</i>

ἐγχειρεῖν	to attempt	ΕΓΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>in hand</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
καταδοξάζειν	to thoroughly judge	ΚΑΤΑΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly seeming</i>
ἡ ὁμωνυμία αἱ ὁμωνυμῖαι	the same name	ὍΜΩΝΥΜΙΑ <i>same name</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
προσθεωρεῖν	to also envision	ΠΡΟΣΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing further</i>
συνβαίνειν = συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
ἡ ἀντιτυπία αἱ ἀντιτυπῖαι	rebounding	ΑΝΤΙΤΥΠΙΑ <i>to imprint against</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
ἡ διαδύσις αἱ διαδύσεις	penetration	ΔΙΑΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking through</i>
δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
γεγονώς <i>(υἱᾶ, ὅς)</i>	having been produced	ΓΕΓΟΝΩΣ <i>came into being</i>
ἡ οἰκονομία αἱ οἰκονομῖαι	operation	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ <i>managing the home</i>
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking upon</i>
σύντομος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	concise	ΣΥΝΤΟΜΟΣ <i>cutting together</i>
γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ <i>knowing process</i>
γνωστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ <i>knowing</i>
γνῶναι	to know [already]	
τὸ γνῶναι	understanding	
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγῖαι	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 columns 26, 27sup

...δή, φημί, β[λ]έ[π]οντες καὶ τῶν εἰδώλ[ω]ν ταυτό τοῦτο ἐγχειροῦσιν [κ]ατ[α]δο[ξ]άζε[ιν] [διὰ τὴν ὁμ]ων[υ]μίαν τὴν δὴ τῆς
λεπτότητος, {τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν οὐ προσθεωρ[ο]ῦντες [missing word] μ[ή]τε αὐτὰ μάλλο[ν] τὰς διαδύσει[ς] δ[ι]ύνασθαι
ποιεῖσ[θα]ι διὰ τῶν στε[ρεμ]ν[ι]ῶν φύσε[ω]ν συνβέβη[κ]εν ἢ π[ερ] τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς διὰ τῶν [χειρῶν] συγκρίσεις, ἂν μὴ [τ]ις τὸν
τρόπον [τ]ῆς δ[ια]δύσεω[ς], [ὄν] ἡμ[εῖς] εἰρήκαμεν, δ[ευ]κνύη δυ[νατὸ]ν αὐτοῖς [ὑπάρ]χ[ειν ὄντα]. }

{added to expanded fragment above}

...[προσθε]ω[ροῦντες· ἢ δὲ γὰρ] αἰ[σθησας [missing word] μ]ῆτε αὐ[τ]ὰ μ[ἄλλον τ]ὰς δι[αδύσεις] δύ[ν]ασθαι [πο]ι[εῖ]σθαι διὰ τῶν [σ]τερεμνίων φύσεων συμβέβηκεν ἥπερ τὰς ἀντιτυπεῖς | διὰ τῶν χειρῶν συνκρίσεις, ἐὰν μή τις τὸν τρόπον τῆς διαδύσεως, ὃν ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν, δεικνύηι δυνατόν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ὄντ[α·] {δεῖ οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρη[κ]α, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος γεγонуτ[α]ν οἰκονομίαν ἡμ[ῖν] ἐπιβλέπειν· ἔστι γάρ τι σύντομ[ον] πρὸς τὸ γνῶν[αι] καὶ τ[ῇ]ν [παραλλαγήν]}...

{also added to the same expanded fragment above}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 27fin

{δε[ῖ] οὐ[ν], ὥσ[πε]ρ εἴρηκα, καὶ τὴν [εἰς] τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος [γ]εγονυῖα[ν] ο[ἱ]κονομ[ία]ν ἡμῖν [έ]πιβλ[έπει]ν· ἔστι [γάρ] ρ [τι σύντομ]ον [π]ρὸς τὸ γνῶν[αι] αἰ[κ]αί [τὴν παραλ]λαγήν}...

{expanded fragment above}

2.14 Summary

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 column 28

...{τ[ῇ] τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμα νοήματι συμβέβηκεν [ἀπ]οτελεῖσθαι καὶ ὃ[τι τ]ὰς φοράς ἀνυ[π]ερβλήτους τοῖς τά[χε]σιν [κε]κτῆσθαι· τ[ὰ] δ' ἄρμόττοντα ἐξῆς τούτ[ου]ς ῥηθῇ[ν]αι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα διέξ[ιμε]ν}...

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 993 col. 16 (column 119inf) | 1149 col. 11 (column 120)

...τρόπ[.] ὥστ[ε] π[α]ραθεωρ[εῖ]ν· ἀποδ[έ]δεικτα[ι] οὖν ἡμῖν καὶ ὅτι ἔστι <τι[νὰ] εἰ>ἱδωλα καὶ ὃ[τι τ]ὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμανοήματι | συμβέβηκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι καὶ ἔτι τὰς φοράς ἀνυπερβλήτους τοῖς τάχεσιν κεκτῆσθαι· τὰ δ' ἄρμόττοντα [έ]ξῆς τούτοις ῥηθῆναι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα διέξιμεν}

...τῷ τρόπῳ ὥστε παραθεωρεῖν· Ἀποδέδεικται, οὖν, ἡμῖν καὶ ὅτι ⁽¹⁾ ἔστι τινὰ Εἶδωλα, καὶ ὅτι ⁽²⁾ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἅμα νοήματι συμβέβηκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ⁽³⁾ τὰς φοράς ἀνυπερβλήτους τοῖς τάχεσιν κεκτῆσθαι· τὰ δ' ἄρμόττοντα ἐξῆς τούτοις ῥηθῆναι ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα Διέξιμεν

...so as to investigate in this way. therefore, It has already been fully proved to us that ⁽¹⁾ certain Films exist, and that ⁽²⁾ their creation is produced simultaneously enduring with conception, and also that ⁽³⁾ [the films] possess transmissions unsurpassable in speed. in those [books] after these, We will fully go through those [topics] fitting in succession to these [topics] that were spoken...

[Sedley] Thus we have proved ⁽¹⁾ that images (εἶδωλα) exist, ⁽²⁾ that they have the property of being generated as quick as thought, and ⁽³⁾ that they have motions unsurpassed in speed. In what follows ['in the following books'] we will go through the topics which belong in sequence after these ones.

ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
παραθεωρεῖν	to investigate	ΠΑΡΑΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing alongside</i>
δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing away</i>
ἀποδεδεῖχθαι	to have been fully proved [already]	ΑΠΟΔΕΔΕΙΚΤΑΙ <i>fully shown</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>

ἡ γέν εσις αἱ γεν έσεις	creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ <i>action of being born</i>
τὸ νόη μα τὰ νόη ματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
συμβ αίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
τελ εῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing</i>
ἀποτελε στικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of completing out</i>
ἀποτελ εῖσθαι	to be produced	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>completing out</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόρ αι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἀνυπέρβλη τος <i>(ον)</i>	unsurpassable	ΑΝΥΠΕΡΒΛΗΤΟΣ <i>not thrown over</i>
τὸ τάχ ος τὰ τάχ η	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>
κτᾶ σθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
ἐναρμότ των <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	fitting into	ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ <i>adapting into</i>
ἀρμότ των <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	fitting	ΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ
ἐξῆ ς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
διεξ εῖναι	to fully go through	ΔΙΕΞΕΙΝΑΙ <i>to go across out of</i>

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1149 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως Β*

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2, P.Herc. 1010 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρο[υ] *Περὶ Φύσεως Β*

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 2

[Book 3 - Vision, Truth And Falsity]

[U80]

[Book 4 - Sensations & Thought]

Philódēmos, Περὶ θανάτου, P.Herc. 807

...οὐτ'Ε[πίκο]υ[ρος λέ]γει γέν *ἐν τῷι* τετάρωι Περὶ Φ[ύσεως]...

οὐτ'Επίκουρος λέγει γέν *ἐν τῷι τετάρωι Περὶ Φύσεως*

...nor does Επίκουρος say, in Book 4 of *On Nature*...

[Book 5 - Secondary Qualities]

Book 6

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.38.1077

...[ὁμοί]ως καὶ [ἐν τῷ] ἔκτω[ι π]ερὶ [τοῦ δι]κάζεσ[θαι]... ...[κ]αὶ εὐόρκους [καὶ δι]καίους ταῖς ἀ[ρ]ίσταις διαδόσε[σι] κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους...

...ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔκτῳ περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι... ...καὶ εὐόρκους καὶ δικαίους ταῖς ἀρίσταις διαδόσεσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους...

[Obbink] ...similarly in Book 6 concerning adjudication... ...and that those who are oath-keeping and just are moved by the most virtuous influences both from their own selves and from those...

[Obbink] ...similarly in Book 6 [On Nature] concerning forensic speaking... ...and [he says] that oath-keeping and just people are moved by the best transmissions both from their own selves and from [the gods]...

δίκαιος <i>(ᾱ, ον)</i>	fair	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ <i>custom / right</i>
δικάζειν	to judge	ΔΙΚΑΖΕΙΝ
δικάζεσθαι	to legally plead one's cause	ΔΙΚΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ
περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι	concerning legally defending oneself	
ἡ διάδοσις αἱ διάδοσεις	influence, transmission, [exchange]	ΔΙΑΔΟΣΙΣ <i>portion/dose through</i>

[Book 7 - Direction and Speed]

Book 8

Benefit of Virtue

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.38.1082

[κ]αὶ εὐόρκους [καὶ δι]καίους ταῖς ἀ[ρ]ίσταις διαδόσε[σι] κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους. [κ]αὶ παρα[π]λησίως ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ. καὶ τὴν ὠφελίαν τ[ῆ]θενται [τὸν αὐ]τὸν τ[ρ]όπον, [ὄνπερ] Πολύ[αι]ος ἐ[ν τῷ] πρώ[τῳ] Πρ[ὸς Τὸ Πε]ρὶ Φιλοσοφί[ας Ἀρισ]τοτ[ο]τ[ῆ]λους [τὴν τοῦ]των [τ]ῶν ἀ[γαθῶν] αἰτίαν ἡμε[ῖν ἀπε]φήν[α]τ' εἶνα[ι] τ[ῆν] θείαν φύσιν

...καὶ εὐόρκους καὶ δικαίους ταῖς ἀρίσταις διαδόσεσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦς καὶ παρ' ἐκείνους. καὶ παραπλησίως ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ. καὶ τὴν ὠφελίαν τίθενται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὄνπερ Πολύαιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Πρὸς Τὸ Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν ἡμῖν ἀπεφήνατ' εἶναι τὴν θεῖαν Φύσιν

[Obbink] ...and that those who are oath-keeping and just are moved by the most virtuous influences both from their own selves and from those. And similarly in book 8; and they define the notion of benefit in the same way as Polyaeus in the first book of his Against Aristotle's On Philosophy declared [his opinion] that divine Nature is the cause for us of these goods.

[Obbink] ...and [he says] that oath-keeping and just people are moved by the most virtuous repercussions both from their own selves and from [the gods]. And similarly in book 8 [On Nature]; and [the kathēgemónes] define the notion of benefit [for humans] in the same way as Polyaeus in the first book of his Against Aristotle's On Philosophy declared [his opinion] that divine Nature is the cause for us of these goods.

Book 10

10.1 Time Not Existing Is Inconceivable

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 2 & 3

...οὐ[τοι]οῦτον [εἶναι] οὐδ' οἷον ὅλως [τῶ]ν ὄντων τις ἓνια. [οὐ δεῖ], φημί, ζητεῖν [ταῦτα] διάνοιαν, ἀλ[λὰ μόν]ον τις, ἐπεὶ...
...[αὐ]τὸν οὐδ[ὲ δυνά]μενον νοεῖσθαι[ι ὅτι] χρόνος οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐπιβλεπόμενον ὅτι τ[οῦ]τό τι νοεῖ ἐξ
ἀν[άγκ]ης...

...οὐΤοιοῦτον εἶναι – οὐδ' οἷον ὅλως τῶν ὄντων τις᾽Ἐνια. οὐ Δεῖ, Φημί, ζητεῖν ταῦτα Διάνοιαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τις, ἐπεὶ... ...αὐτὸν οὐδὲ δυνάμενον νοεῖσθαι ὅτι Χρόνος οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐπιβλεπόμενον ὅτι τοῦτό τι Νοεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης...

...Such a thing does not exist – nor [is such an incorrect idea] entirely like some of the things that do exist. I say, it is not necessary for [mental] Perception to seek these things, but only some... since... ...[he] himself is not even able to conceive that Time would never exist, but [with him] directly fully seeing that He conceives this particular thing out of [natural] necessity...

τοῖος <i>(τοιᾶ, τοῖον)</i>	like this <i>(of such a kind)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
οὗτος <i>(αὕτη, τοῦτο)</i>	this	’ΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this</i>
τό τοιοῦτον τά τοιαῦτα	such a thing	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ <i>self of this sort</i>
οὐτοιοῦτον = οὔτοι οὔτον	not such a thing	ΟΥΤΟΙ ’ΟΥΤΟΝ <i>not of this sort self</i>
οἷος <i>(οἶα, οἶον)</i>	such as	’ΟΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
ὅλως	entirely	’ΟΛΩΣ <i>whole</i>
ζητεῖν	to seek	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seeking</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
δυνάμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	(of men) able (of objects) having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>power</i>
νοεῖσθαι	to be conceived	ΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking upon</i>
ἐπιβλέπων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	fully seeing	
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 5

...{μν}μνη διὰ λέξε[ως έθισ]μούς, ὧ πρὸς θε[ῶν, ὅ]τι ταῦθ' ὀραῖς θη..[μ...] κατὰ δόξας ἰών· [πα]ντοδαπῶς {πως} γινομένων
πραγμάτ[ων τί]ς ταραττοὶ [ᾄ]ν ἀεὶ γὰ[ρ] ὄν[τ]α κεν[ᾷ]...

...μνήμη διὰ λέξεως έθισμούς – ὦ, πρὸς θεῶν! – ὅτι ταῦθ' Ὀραῖς θῆμα... κατὰ
δόξας ἰών παντοδαπῶς πως γινομένων πραγμάτων: Τίς ταραττοὶ ᾄν – ἀεὶ γὰρ
ὄντα κενᾷ...

...[to such an extent produces *linguistic*] conventions by [your] memory
through [the use of] a term – oh, by gods! – that You see these [conventions]
as an established thing... [with you] proceeding according to [your]
judgements as [practical] situations arise in various ways: Anyone could
disturb [those practical situations] – for they are always empty...

ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ὁ έθισμός οἱ έθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of being accustomed</i>
ὁ θεός οἱ θεοί	god	ΘΕΟΣ <i>[divine entity]</i>
ὀρᾷν	to see [mentally]	ὈΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
τό θῆμα τά θήματα	the established thing	ΘΗΜΑ <i>putting</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
παντοδαπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	varied	ΠΑΝΤΟΔΑΠΟΣ <i>all countries</i>
παντοδαπῶς	variously	
γινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
συνταράττειν	to confuse	ΣΥΝΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>agitating together</i>
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>agitating</i>

10.3 Correspondence

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 11

...οὐ γὰρ τοιοῦ[τοις τισίν] έγχειρήμασι π[ρὸς διά]νοιαν λόγοι γίνοντ[αι], ἀλλ' ὅταν τόδε τ[ὸ] προειλημμένον δεικνύη τις κατὰ
τὸ ἴδι[ον] ὄνομα, εἴτα έξ ἀποστή[μ]ατος κάτ[ω] προσυ[πο]μένοντο[ς]...

...οὐ γὰρ ^[1] τοιούτοις τισίν έγχειρήμασι πρὸς διάνοιαν Λόγοι γίνονται – ἀλλ' ^[2]
ὅταν ^[•^] τόδε τὸ προειλημμένον δεικνύη Τις κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον ὄνομα – εἴτα, έξ
ἀποστήματος κάτω προσυπομένοντος...

...for Reasonings do not come to exist ^[1] from such attempts directed toward
thought – but rather ^[2] whenever Someone demonstrates ^[•^] that
anticipated thing according to a particular word – then, with it further
enduring afterwards from a distance...

ἡ χεῖρ αἱ χεῖρες	hand	ΧΕΙΡ <i>hand</i>
ἐγχειρεῖν	to attempt	ΕΓΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>in hand</i>
τὸ ἐγχείρημα τὰ ἐγχειρήματα	attempt	ΕΓΧΕΙΡΗΜΑ <i>result of being in hand</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τὸ προειλημμένον τὰ προειλημμένα	[*^] what is anticipated	ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ <i>being grasped before</i>
δεικνύναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
τὸ ὄνομα τὰ ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing away</i>
κάτω	below / after	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
προσυπομένων <i>(α, ον)</i>	further enduring	ΠΡΟΣΥΠΟΜΕΝΩΝ <i>toward enduring</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 12

...[οὐ]δέ τις [έσ]τι τόδε τι ἄλλο νομίζειν δίκαιος· καὶ μά[λ]α εὖ, ἔφη, μοι δο[κ]εῖς ἅπαντα τὰ προ[ειρη]μένα διειλέχθαι, [καὶ οὐ]κ ἀνυπόπτει...

...οὐδέ Τίς ἐστι **τόδε τι ἄλλο** νομίζειν δίκαιος – καὶ **"μάλα εὖ"** Ἐφη **"μοὶ Δοκεῖς ἅπαντα τὰ προειρημένα** διειλέχθαι, καὶ **οὐκ ἀνυπόπτει[τος]..."**

...nor is Anyone [being] fair in thinking of *this [i.e., "time"]* as something else – and, He said "You seem *to me* to have discussed *all that has been previously mentioned very well*, and [you are] not unconcerned [regarding]..."

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
δίκαιος <i>(ᾱ, ον)</i>	fair	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ <i>custom / right</i>
εἰρήσθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>spoke</i>
τὸ προειρημένον τὰ προειρημένα	what has been previously mentioned	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>spoke before</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
διειλέχθαι	to discuss [already]	ΔΙΕΙΛΕΧΘΑΙ <i>had spoken through</i>
ἀνύποπτος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	not concerning	ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΟΣ <i>not looking [suspiciously] under</i>
ἀνυπόπτειτος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	not concerned	ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΕΥΤΟΣ <i>not looking [suspiciously] under</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 15

...[μ]ατος τεκμα[ι]ρόμενοι, τὰς δὲ γινομ[ε]νάς φαντασίας ἡμῶν περὶ μεγέθους χρόνου μὴ συμφώνους τῷ πλήθει τοῦ [παν]τὸς ὡς ψευδε[ι]ς, μηδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο μέγε[θ]ος προστυ[που]μένας· τουτ[ο]νὶ ἐφη...

...[σχήμ]ατος τεκμαιρόμενοι – τὰς δὲ γινομένας φαντασίας ἡμῶν περὶ μεγέθους χρόνου μὴ συμφώνους τῷ πλήθει τοῦ παντός ὡς ψευδεῖς – μηδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο μέγεθος προστυπουμένας· τουτονὶ Ἔφη...

...because they are judging [from] the shape – but [they are judging] the image produced in us as false regarding the extension of time not in harmony with the [large] number of all [things] – but [they are] not [judging the images that] are making a further impression in relation to the other extension [of time]. He said that that this [*masc. sg.*] here...

τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τεκμαίρεσθαι	to judge [from indications]	ΤΕΚΜΑΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>definitive sign [of boundary]</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τὸ γινόμενον τὰ γινόμενα	what is produced	
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ <i>speaking together</i>
σύμφωνος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	in harmony	
τὸ πλήθος τὰ πλήθη	[large] number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ <i>fullness</i>
τὸ πᾶν <i>(τοῦ παντός)</i>	<i>(individually)</i> everything, <i>(collectively)</i> the universe	ΠΑΝ <i>all</i>
ψευδής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ <i>deceiving</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
προστυπεῖν	to make a further impression	ΠΡΟΣΤΥΠΕΙΝ <i>toward/further imprinting</i>
οὗτοσί <i>(αὐτῇί, τουτί)</i>	this here	’ΟΥΤΟΝΙ <i>this here</i>

10.5 Practical Experience of Time

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 17

...[ἐ]χομέν [τινα φαν]τα[σ]ίαν τ[ῶ]ν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν, καθ' ἣμ μήκος τι νο[ο]ῦμεν περὶ αὐτάς [κατα]μετρητικὸν [πασ]ῆς κεινήσεως· οὐ [γὰρ] θέλομεν αὐτο[ῖ] ταῖς αὐταῖς μετ[ρεῖσθαι] τὸ [ν χρό]νον ὡς [ἡμερῶ]ν [καί] νυκ[τῶν]...

...Ἔχομέν τινα φαντασίαν τῶν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν, καθ' ἣν μήκος τι Νοοῦμεν περὶ αὐτάς καταμετρητικὸν πάσης κινήσεως – οὐ γὰρ Θέλομεν αὐτοὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς μετρεῖσθαι τὸν χρόνον ὡς ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτῶν...

...[their argument is that] We possess a certain image of days and nights, according to which [image] We conceive a certain length [of time] that fully measures all movement relating to those [days and nights] – for We ourselves do not want to measure time by those same [standards] as days and nights...

ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἭΜΕΡΑ <i>day</i>
ἡ νύξ αἱ νύκτες	night	ΝΥΞ <i>night</i>
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ καταμέτρημα τὰ καταμετρήματα	full measurement	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΜΑ <i>thoroughly measuring</i>
καταμετρητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	fully measuring	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>pertaining to thoroughly measuring</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
θέλειν	to want	ΘΕΛΕΙΝ <i>wanting</i>
μετρεῖν	to measure	ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>measuring</i>
μετρεῖσθαι	to be measured	

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 19 & 20

...[τῷ] χρόνῳ(*) πῶς ἅμα [λαμβάνε]σθαι τ[ὰ] συ[να]μφότερα, τὸν πολὺν χρόνον μετρεῖ[σθαι καὶ τὸ]ν δια... | **κον καὶ το...** εἰ ἄρα σοι [περὶ] τα[ῦτα] ἐκ τῆς ἐκκειμ[ένης] λέξεως ὁ λόγος ἦι, οὐδ' ἂν ὀκνήσαιμι οὐ χρόνον εἶναι τὰς ἡμέρας φῆσαι καὶ τὰς νύ[κτας οὐ]δ' ἄμετρον...

...τῷ χρόνῳ πῶς ἅμα λαμβάνεσθαι τὰ συναμφότερα, τὸν πολὺν χρόνον μετρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν δια... | ...εἰ, ἄρα, σοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς ἐκκειμένης λέξεως ὁ Λόγος ἦ – οὐδ' ἂν ὀκνήσαιμι οὐ χρόνον εἶναι τὰς ἡμέρας φῆσαι καὶ τὰς νύκτας, οὐδ' ἄμετρον...

...[it is necessary to understand] how both together may be comprehended in time at once, [and how] a long time is measured and [how] a [short time is measured] through... | ...if, indeed, your Reasoning about these things is from this term [of "time" that has been] set forth – I would not hesitate at all to declare that time is the days and the nights, nor [is time] immeasurable...

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἀμφοτέρος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	both	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>what is on both sides</i>
τὰ συναμφότερα	both together	ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ <i>both of the two together</i>
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long [of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
μετρεῖσθαι	to be measured	ΜΕΤΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>measuring</i>
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>
ἐκκείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	set forth	ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated out</i>

ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> (<i>reasoning</i>)
ὀκνεῖν	to hesitate	ΟΚΝΕΙΝ <i>hesitating</i>
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἭΜΕΡΑ <i>day</i>
ἡ νύξ αἱ νύκτες	night	ΝΥΞ <i>night</i>
ἄμετρος (ος, ον)	immeasurable	ΑΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>without measure</i>

10.6 Thought Experiment

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 22, 23

...τοῦτο μὲν [ὁμολογοῦ]μεν, τὸ δ' ἓναν[τί]ον κατασκευάζομεν ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν ἀμφότεροι οἱ λόγοι περὶ [ἔ]καστον ὑπάρχωσιν· ἀλλὰ προφά[σει]ς οἰόμεθ[α εἶναι] τῶ[ν] τάσ[δε τὰς] | [τὸ]ν οὐ νοούμεν[ον χρό]νον δὴ ὁπότεν [ὑμ]ᾶς εἵπωμεν νοεῖν, τὸν χρόνον ὡσαν[εἰ συ]μβεβηκός τινι [φαντ]ασία[ι τι] ᾗι τῶν...

...τοῦτο μὲν Ὅμολογοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ἔναντίον Κατασκευάζομεν ἵνα δὴ **ἡμῖν** ἀμφότεροι οἱ Λόγοι **περὶ ἕκαστον** ὑπάρχωσιν. ἀλλὰ **προφάσεις** Οἰόμεθα **εἶναι τῶν**: **τάσδε τὰς τὸν οὐ νοούμενον χρόνον** – δὴ, ὁπότεν **Ὑμᾶς** Εἵπωμεν **νοεῖν τὸν χρόνον** ὡσανεὶ **συμβεβηκός τινι φαντασίᾳ τῇ τῶν...**

...We agree on **this**, but We construct **what is opposing** [*i.e., a contrary argument*] so that indeed both Reasonings may exist **for us** concerning each [topic]. but We suspect [*these reasonings*] exist as presumptions of those [people]: **these particular** [*presumptions in which*] time is not correctly conceived – indeed, whenever We say **You all conceive** time as if [*it was*] a property [*inseparably linked*] **with a certain image** of those...

ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>
ἐναντίος (α, ον)	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>
τὸ ἐναντίον τὰ ἐναντία	what is opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing</i> <i>alongside</i>
κατασκευάζειν	to construct	ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>preparing</i>
ἀμφότερος (ος, ον)	both	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>what is</i> <i>on both sides</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> (<i>reasoning</i>)
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>affirming</i>
ἡ πρόφασις αἱ προφάσεις	presumption	ΠΡΟΦΑΣΙΣ <i>before affirming</i>
οἷεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
νοούμενος (η, ον)	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>

<p>τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα</p>	<p>"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)</p>	<p>ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i></p>
<p>ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασῖαι</p>	<p>image</p>	<p>ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i></p>

10.7 Planetary Movements

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 25

...κάκείνων [οὐχὶ ο]ύθὲν τοδὶ πρ[οσμ]ετρεῖς ἐπειδάν τις λέγη, τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου κίνησιν παραθεωρῶν πλε[ί]ω ἢ ἐλάττω χρόνον γιγνομένην, καταδοξάζειν [αὐ]τὸ καὶ τὸν χρό[νον] διὰ το[ύ]ς...

...**κάκείνων**, οὐχὶ οὐθὲν **τοδὶ** Προσμετρεῖς – ἐπειδάν Τις λέγη **τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου κίνησιν** παραθεωρῶν **πλεῖω ἢ ἐλάττω χρόνον γιγνομένην**, καταδοξάζειν **αὐτὸ καὶ τὸν χρόνον διὰ τοὺς**...

...and of those, You do not in any way further measure [time] – whenever Someone claims, while investigating the movement of the sun which occurs with greater or smaller [amounts of] time, to thoroughly judge that [motion of the sun] and time itself through those...

<p>κάκεῖνος = καὶ ἐκεῖνος <i>(η, ο)</i></p>	<p>and that</p>	<p>καὶ ἐκεῖνος <i>and that</i></p>
<p>μετρεῖν</p>	<p>to measure</p>	<p>ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>measuring</i></p>
<p>προσμετρεῖν</p>	<p>to further measure</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΣΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ <i>further measuring</i></p>
<p>ὁ ἥλιος</p>	<p>the sun</p>	<p>ΗΛΙΟΣ <i>sun</i></p>
<p>ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις</p>	<p>movement</p>	<p>ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i></p>
<p>παραθεωρεῖν</p>	<p>to investigate</p>	<p>ΠΑΡΑΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing alongside</i></p>
<p>πλείων <i>(ον)</i></p>	<p>more / greater</p>	<p>ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i></p>
<p>ἐλάττων <i>(ων, ον)</i></p>	<p>smaller</p>	<p>ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i></p>
<p>γινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i> γινόμενοι <i>(αι, α)</i></p>	<p>happening</p>	<p>ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>birthing</i></p>
<p>καταδοξάζειν</p>	<p>to thoroughly judge</p>	<p>ΚΑΤΑΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly seeming</i></p>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 27

...ταύτου πλέον[ος] αὐτῶν ὄντος, ἕτερον δὲ καὶ οὐ ταυτό πάλιν, ὅτι τὸ περὶ [τ]ῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ νοῦν συμπτ[υπτ]όντων αὐ...

...**ταύτου** **πλέονός αὐτῶν ὄντος** – **ἕτερον** **δὲ**, καὶ οὐ **ταυτό** **πάλιν**, ὅτι **Τὸ περὶ τῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ νοῦν συμπιπτόντων**...

...with the same thing existing in a greater amount [of time compared to] them – but different [amount of time], and not the same [amount] again, because [it is] What concerns those [qualities that are] not symptomatic to the intellect ["things that do temporarily occur under the scope of the mind"]

<p>πλείων <i>(ον)</i></p>	<p>more / greater</p>	<p>ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i></p>
<p>ὁ νοῦς οἱ νοῖ</p>	<p>intellect</p>	<p>ΝΟΥΣ <i>mind</i></p>

<p>τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα</p>	<p><i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i></p>	<p>ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i></p>
<p>συμπίπτειν</p>	<p>to be symptomatic</p>	<p>ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling together</i></p>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 29

...καὶ τ[ῶ]ν λοιπῶν πραγμάτων ἀτάρακτα [ἐ]πὶ τοῦ χρ[όνου ο]ὐχ ὅτι ἦ[ρ]ξαν[το]...

...καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πραγμάτων, **ἀτάρακτα ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου**, οὐχ ὅτι ᾿Ηρξαντο...

...and of the rest of the situations, **undisturbed** in regard to time, not that They had begun [for themselves]...

<p>λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i></p>	<p>remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]</p>	<p>ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i></p>
<p>τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα</p>	<p>situation</p>	<p>ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i></p>
<p>ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι</p>	<p>undisturbedness</p>	<p>ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ <i>without agitating</i></p>
<p>ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος <i>(ας, ον)</i></p>	<p>undisturbed</p>	<p>ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ <i>without agitating</i></p>
<p>ὑπάρχειν</p>	<p>to exist</p>	<p>ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i></p>
<p>ᾶρχειν</p>	<p>to begin</p>	<p>ΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i></p>
<p>ᾶρξασθαι</p>	<p>to begin for oneself [already]</p>	<p>ΑΡΞΑΣΘΑΙ <i>beginning</i></p>

10.8 Against Time as a "Measurable Image"

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 31

...καὶ φαντασ[ία τ]ίς ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος [κ]ι[ν]ήσεως πάσης κα[τα]μετρικὴ καὶ [οὐ τ]ῇ(*) κειν[ή]σει συμ[μ]ετρουμένη [μέ]γεθος...

...καὶ **φαντασία τίς ἐστὶν ὁ Χρόνος – κινήσεως πάσης καταμετρικὴ καὶ οὐ τῇ κεινήσει συμμετρουμένη μέγεθος...**

...[their argument is that] Time also is a certain image – [an image that is] fully measurable for every movement and not measured together with movement as an extension...

<p>ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι</p>	<p>image</p>	<p>ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i></p>
<p>ἡ κείνησις = ἡ κίνησις</p>	<p>movement</p>	<p>ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i></p>
<p>καταμετρητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i></p>	<p>fully measurable</p>	<p>ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of thoroughly measuring</i></p>
<p>συμμετρούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i></p>	<p>measured together</p>	<p>ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ</p>
<p>τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη</p>	<p>size / extension</p>	<p>ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i></p>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 32

...τοῦτο [θ]έλου[σιν] κατη[γο]ροῦ[ντες] ταῖσδέ τισιν ἐρ[μηνε]ίαις· κ[αί] π[άλι]ν [πρὸ]ς ὅλον [τρ]έποντος...

...**τοῦτο** θέλουσιν, κατηγοροῦντες **ταῖσδέ τιςιν ἑρμηνείαις** – καὶ πάλιν, **πρὸς ὅλον τρέποντος**...

...They want [to maintain] **this [account]**, because they are fully indicating [it] by means of these specific interpretations – and again, with **[this account]** directed **toward the whole**...

θέλειν	to want	ΘΕΛΕΙΝ <i>wanting</i>
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speak</i>
κατηγορῶν	fully indicating	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΩΝ
ἡ ἑρμηνεία αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ <i>explaining</i>
διατρέπειν	to refuse	ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>turning thoroughly</i>
τρέπων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	turning	ΤΡΕΠΩΝ <i>turning</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 34

...[ἐρ]μηνεῖαις χρῶ[νται·] ἀλλὰ γοῦν οὐ[δεπώ]ποτε οἱ τόδ' ἡμ[ῶν] γενεᾶς [τὸ κ]ῦδο[ς ἐ]πὶ τοῦτο τὸ παράλλαγμα φέροντες...

...**ἑρμηνείαις** Χρῶνται – ἀλλὰ γοῦν, οὐδεπώποτε **Οἱ τόδ' ἡμῶν γενεᾶς τὸ κῦδος ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ παράλλαγμα** φέροντες...

...They use **interpretations** – but at any rate, never yet have the Men bearing **this glory of our generation into that variation**...

ἡ ἑρμηνεία αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ <i>explaining</i>
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>necessary</i>
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ <i>action of being born</i>
ἡ γενεά αἱ γενεαί	generation <i>(group of contemporaries)</i>	ΓΕΝΕΑ <i>being born</i>
τὸ κῦδος τὰ κύδεα	glory	ΚΥΔΟΣ <i>paying attention</i>
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
τὸ παράλλαγμα τὰ παραλλάγματα	variation	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ <i>changing across</i>
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
φέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	carrying	ΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing</i>

10.9 Man-Made Measurements

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 35 & 36

..[τῶν νυκτ]ῶν ἅμα τ[ε καὶ τῶν ἡ]μερ[ῶν] βλέπων [παραλλαγὰς ἱκα]ναῖς λέξεσιν ὀκνεῖς χρῆσ[θ]αι· εἰ δὴ ἐμ φύσει μ[έτρον] μὴ ἔστι, κ[αθὰ ὕ]με[τ]ις ὑμν[εῖτε, οὐ δέ] χρόνον εἶ[ναι δεῖ νομίζειν]... | ...κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ τήν ἡμέραν ἔχοντες, κατ' αὐτῶν τοιαύτην τ[ήνδε] φαντασίαν, ἥτε [ὡς μὴ] κός τι {ν} ἄλλο, [κα]ὶ ὁμοία[ν τῶι] πλή[θει], εἰ ὕφ' ἡμ[ῶν]...

...**τῶν νυκτῶν ἅμα τε καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν βλέπων παραλλαγὰς, ἱκαναῖς λέξεσιν** Ὅκνεῖς χρῆσθαι· εἰ δὴ ἐμ φύσει Μέτρον μὴ ἔστι, καθὰ Ὑμεῖς ὑμνεῖτε, **οὐ δέ χρόνον εἶναι** Δεῖ νομίζειν;... ...Κατηγοροῦμεν καὶ **τὴν ἡμέραν**, ἔχοντες **κατ' αὐτῶν τοιαύτην τήνδε φαντασίαν** – **ἥ**, ὡς Μῆκός τι ἄλλο, καὶ **ὁμοίαν** τῷ πλήθει, εἰ ὕφ' ἡμῶν...

...seeing the varieties of the nights and the days as well You hesitate to use sufficient terms. If indeed a [standard of] Measurement does not exist by nature, just as You all [always] chant, [then] It is necessary to think that time does not exist...? ...We even fully indicate [the length of] the day, while we have such an image as this contrary to those [people] – which [image], just as some certain Length, [is] also similar to a [large] number... if by us...

ή νύξ αί νύκτες	night	ΝΥΞ night
ή ημέρα αί ημέραι	day	ἩΜΕΡΑ day
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ looking
βλέπων (ουσα, ον)	seeing	
τὸ παράλλαγμα τὰ παραλλάγματα	variation	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ changing across
ή παραλλαγή αί παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ changing across
ἱκανός (ή, όν)	sufficient	ἼΚΑΝΟΣ fitting / proper
ή λέξις αί λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ speaking
ὀκνεῖν	to hesitate	ΟΚΝΕΙΝ hesitating
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ necessary
μετρεῖν	to measure	ΜΕΤΡΕΙΝ measuring
τό μέτρον τά μέτρα	(standard of) measurement	
ὕμνεῖν	to chant	ὙΜΝΕΙΝ singing
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ custom
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ thoroughly speaking publicly
ή φαντασία αί φαντασάι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ state of appearing
τὸ μήκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ extent
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ similar
τὸ πλῆθος τὰ πλήθη	[large] number	ΠΛΗΘΟΣ fullness

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 37

...[εἰ δ]έ ποτ' ἐκ πρ[οτέρων] θεωρ[ιῶν τοῦ]τό μο[ι λεί]πει ἐξ ἀνάγκ[η]ς, [ἀλλ'] ὁμω[ς λέγομε]ν ὅτι, ὅταν ὁ λό[γος περὶ τὸν] [χ]ρόνον πρὸς α[ὐτὰς ἀνέλθῃ], ταύταις δέ [τ]οι δοκοῦσιν αἶ τε [ἐρμην]εῖται καὶ αἰ φαν[τασ]αί[αι ἐνδιαμέ]ν[ινως ἀπ]ὸ τοῦ ὅλου κα[τὰ ταῦτα]ς τὰς ἐνχη...

...εἰ δέ ποτ', ἐκ προτέρων θεωριῶν Τοῦτό μοι λείπει ἐξ ἀνάγκης – ἀλλ' ὁμως Λέγομεν ὅτι ὅταν ὁ Λόγος περὶ τὸν χρόνον πρὸς αὐτὰς ἀνέλθῃ, ταύταις δέ τοι δοκοῦσιν αἶ τε Ἑρμηνεῖται καὶ αἰ Φαντασάι ἐνδιαμένειν – ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ἐνχή[σεις]...

...If ever, due to [natural] necessity, this leaves me out of [my] former [mental] envisioning* – yet still We say that whenever Reasoning about time ascends toward those [words], both the Interpretations and the Images seem to you to persist within those [words] – as according to those impositions from the whole...

*i.e., "I do not think what I thought then" ?

πρότερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	former	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>further [contrast]</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	<i>[the act of mental]</i> envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of</i> <i>observing</i>
καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leaving</i>
λείπειν	to leave	ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>leaving</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	<i>[natural]</i> necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against</i> <i>constraint</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
ἀνέρχεται	ascends	ΑΝΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>moving toward</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
προσδοκᾶν	to expect	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΑΝ <i>seeming</i>
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
ἡ ἑρμηνεία αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ <i>explaining</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying through</i>
ἐνδιαμένειν	to persist within	ΕΝΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying in through</i>
ὅλως	entirely	ὍΛΩΣ <i>whole</i>
τὸ ὅλον τὰ ὅλα	the whole	ὍΛΟΝ <i>whole</i>
ἐγχεῖν	to pour in	ΕΓΧΕΙΝ
τὸ ἐνχῆμα τὰ ἐνχήματα	what is poured in <i>[here, "imposition"]</i>	ΕΝΧΗΜΑ <i>pouring in</i>
I can find no other possible good options for completing ἐνχη-		

10.10 The Nature of Time

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 38

...[οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν]διαμέ[νει] σώματι τὸ [κ]αθ' ἐ[αυ]τὸ μὲν καὶ τὸ [κα]τὰ [τῆ]ν ἰδιότροπον [πρόλ]ηψιν νοοῦμε[νον καὶ] οὐκ ἔχον δ[ί] αὐ[τὸ οὐδέ]ν τοῦτο ἄλλο[ν], ὡς μία ἡμέ[ρ]α διαφορᾷ καλεῖ[ται, κ]α[ὶ] ο[ὐ] μὴ[νον λέγομεν ἐν αὐτῇ] ταύ[την διαφο]ράν ἐν[υπάρ]χειν· ὁ θεωρῶ[ν καὶ] τὸ ὑπὸ ταύ[της]...

...οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐνδιαμένει **σώματι** **Τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ** – μὲν καὶ τὸ **κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότροπον πρόληψιν νοοῦμενον**. καὶ, οὐκ ἔχον **δι' αὐτὸ οὐδὲν**, **Τοῦτο ἄλλον**: ὡς μία Ἡμέρα **διαφορᾷ** καλεῖται. καὶ οὐ μόνον **Λέγομεν ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτην διαφορὰν ἐνυπάρχειν**: **ὁ** θεωρῶν καὶ **τὸ ὑπὸ ταύτης**...

...[time] does not persist in the same way [as] What exists per se with a body – but [time persists] as What is conceived according to a particular type of anticipation. and [time, because it] does not have anything in-and-of-itself, it [relies on] something else: as one [specific] Day is called [by a specific term] according to [its] difference. and We do not only say that difference exists within the [conception of that specific day]: envisioning [time] and what is subject to it...

ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
ἐνδιαμένειν	to persist within	ΕΝΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying in through</i>

τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
ιδιότροπος <i>(ον)</i>	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>before taking hold</i>
νοούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἡμέρα αἱ ἡμέραι	day	ἭΜΕΡΑ <i>day</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ <i>crying out</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
υὑάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ένυπάρχειν	to exist within	ΕΝΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before) in</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	<i>[the act of mental]</i> envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of observing</i>
θεωρῶν <i>(ῶσα, οῶν)</i>	envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΩΝ

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 39 & 40

...εἰ ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἔ[τερον] εἶν[αι κατ’] ἐ[γ]α[ν]τίαν [θεωρίαν πεπλεγ]μένον [λέγομεν, ὁμως] ζητεῖ[ται]... ...φωνᾷς [περὶ] τοιαύ[την φ]ύσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄν[τως εἶ]ναι τὸν χρό[νον] παρὰ τὸ μηθὲν εἶ[ναι μ]ῆκος τοιοῦτο [μᾶλλον ἢ ἐ]κείνο· οὕτως...

...εἰ, ἄρα, καὶ **τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι κατ’ ἐναντίαν θεωρίαν πεπλεγμένον** **Λέγομεν, ὁμως ζητεῖται...** **...φωνᾷς περὶ τοιαύτην φύσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντως εἶναι τὸν χρόνον παρὰ τὸ μηθὲν – εἶναι μῆκος τοιοῦτο μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνο οὕτως...**

...if, therefore, We also say that **a different [conception of time] exists as entangled** in an opposing [act of mental] envisioning, nevertheless, it is sought... **...statements concerning such a nature from the reality that time exists** rather than [being] nothing [at all – time] exists as a length such as this or **that [thing which]** in this way...

ἐναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	<i>[the act of mental]</i> envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of observing</i>
πλεκτικός <i>(η, ον)</i>	entangling	ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of weaving</i>
πεπλεγμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	entangled	ΠΕΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΟΣ <i>wove</i>
ζητεῖν	to seek	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seeking</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
τὸ μῆκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>

10.11 Conceiving Time

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 41 & 42

...τάς λα[μβ]α[νο]μέν[ας] ὑφ’ ἐκα[τε]έρων [των] ἑρμην[ειών] καν... ...ἅμα καὶ κα[τα]τήν ἑτέραν βρα[χύ] τι νο[ῆ]σαι τοῦ [δλ]ου [πρ]άγματος γεν[ομέ]νου· ὥστε [καὶ ἄλ]λο πως πα[ρ’ ἐτέ]ραν ὄνο[μασίαν ᾗ]μα τι ἴδιον...

...τάς λαμβανόμενας ὑφ’ ἐκατέρων τῶν ἐρμηνειῶν κάν... ...ἅμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν βραχύ τι Νοῆσαι τοῦ ὅλου πράγματος γενομένου – ὥστε καὶ ἄλλο, πως, παρ’ ἑτέραν ὀνομασίαν ἅμα Τι ἴδιον...

...the [differences] comprehended by each of the interpretations and also...
...to briefly Conceive something of the whole situation [once] it has been produced together and according to the other [explanation] – so that, in some way, even some other particular [situation exists] at the same time with another designation...

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ ἐρμηνεία αἱ ἐρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ <i>explaining</i>
βραχύς <i>(εἷα, ὑ)</i>	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ <i>brief</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ἡ ὀνομασία αἱ ὀνομασίαι	designation	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ <i>state of name</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 43 & 44

...τὸ ἄλλο ὑφ’ ἐκατέρων τῶν ἐρμηνειῶν φάσμα... ...ζητοῦσιν ἅμα ποσάκις μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποτεύσειν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐπὶ νοούμενον [κα]τα[ρ]επεπόμενον διαλαμβάνειν χρόνον...

...τὸ ἄλλο ὑφ’ ἐκατέρων τῶν ἐρμηνειῶν φάσμα... ...Ζητοῦσιν ἅμα ποσάκις μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποτεύσειν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐπινοούμενον καὶ παρεπόμενον διαλαμβάνειν χρόνον...

** ...the other appearance under each of the interpretations... ...They simultaneously seek how often [it is] necessary to distinguish the time that is objectively conceived and [the time] follows along upon the outcome...

ἡ ἐρμηνεία αἱ ἐρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ <i>explaining</i>
φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ φάσμα τὰ φάσματα	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ <i>appearing</i>
ζητεῖν	to seek	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seeking</i>
ἡ ἀποτεύσεις αἱ ἀποτεύσεις	outcome	ΑΠΟΤΕΥΣΙΣ <i>action of finishing away</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
νοούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
ἐπινοούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	objectively conceived	ΕΠΙΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing upon</i>
παρεπόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	following along	ΠΑΡΕΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>following beside</i>

		ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	grasping separation

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 47 & 48

...[τ]ὸν συνκείμε[νον] χρόνον [ἐξ ἀπ]άν[των μερῶν]... ...[χρ]όνο[ι]... ...νοοῦ[μεν τε καὶ] προσεπινο[οῦμεν] ἀφήσομεν [οὔν
ἡ]με[τε]ς τὸ ἐπινοη[θέν] ἐ[ῖ]ναι χρόνον, χρό[νον δὲ] κατὰ τι... | ...τοῦτο [γὰρ οὐ μόνον] νοοῦμεν θεω[ροῦντες] ἐπὶ τ[ῶνδε τῶν]
κι[νη]τῶν, ἀλλὰ πᾶ[ς] ὁ διειλημμένος [ἡμῖν] χρόν[ος] ἄλλος...

...τὸν συνκείμενον χρόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων μερῶν... Χρόνοι... Νοοῦμεν τε καὶ
προσεπινοοῦμεν. ἀφήσομεν οὖν ἡμεῖς τὸ ἐπινοηθὲν εἶναι χρόνον – χρόνον δὲ
κατὰ τι... τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον Νοοῦμεν θεωροῦντες ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν κινήτων,
ἀλλὰ πᾶς ὁ διειλημμένος ἡμῖν Χρόνος ἄλλος...

...the time composed together from all parts... Times... We conceive and we
also objectively conceive additionally. therefore, we Ourselves will let go of
what is objectively conceived about existing as time – but as time according
to a certain... for not only do We conceive this while we are envisioning
these moving things, but all Time that has been distinguished by us is
another...

ἀντικείμενος (η, ον)	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ situated against
ἐκκείμενος (η, ον)	set forth	ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ situated out
συνκείμενος	composed together	ΣΥΝΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ situated together
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ part
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ seeing
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ seeing
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ seeing upon
προσεπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive additionally	ΠΡΟΣΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ
ἐπινοηθεῖς (α, ἐν)	[objectively] conceived [already]	ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ seeing upon
τὸ ἐπινοηθὲν τὰ ἐπινοηθέντα	what is objectively conceived	ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΝ seeing upon
ἀφίεναι	to let go of	ΑΦΙΕΝΑΙ going away
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	[the act of mental] envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ act of observing
θεωρῶν (ῶσα, οῦν)	envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΩΝ
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις (ή, όν)	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ moving action
κινήτός (ή, όν)	moving	
διειλημμένος	having been distinguished	ΔΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ grasped through

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 49 & 51

...ταῦτο σημειουμένη] οὐ τὸν μικρὸν χρόνον] διαλαβοῦσα]... ...μόνον λέγει]σμεν ὅ[τι μέ]νηται ο τῶν[δ’ ἀλλὰ τ]οῦ λοιποῦ...

...ταῦτο σημειουμένη – οὐ τὸν μικρὸν χρόνον διαλαβοῦσα... ...μόνον λέγομεν ὅτι
μένηται ὁ τῶνδ’, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λοιποῦ...

...[with the interpretation] being indicated **as this** – not having distinguished the **small time**... We only say that he was reminded of **this, among these things [topics]** – but **of the remaining**...

σημειούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being indicated	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>sign</i>
μικρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping separation</i>
διαλαβών	having distinguished	ΔΙΑΛΑΒΩΝ <i>grasped through</i>
ή μνήμη αί μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
μιμνήσκειν	to recall	ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thinking "again"</i>
μιμνήσκεσθαι	to be reminded	ΜΙΜΝΗΙΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ <i>thinking "again"</i>
μέμνηται	he was reminded	
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>

10.12 Speed of Time

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 59 & 60

...[έπ]ελθόν ἂν [οὐδέν] ἀντιμαρ[τυρεῖ, οὐδέ τι ἄλ]λο τῶν [τοιουτοτρόπων] ἀναλ[όγως] τῇ χ[ρό]νου β[ρα]δυτῇ ἢ ταχυτῇ, ἂν μόνον] τά[δ]ε [διαμέ]νη[ι τὰ σ]υμπι[πτοντα ὡς έ]ν τῇ(*) ἄλ[ληι]... ...[δι]α[φ]ορά τοιαύ[τη τὸ γ]ιγνόμεν[ο]ν [πρᾶγμα] τάδε καὶ τὰ [ἄλλα] τινά...

...έπελθόν ἂν Οὐδέν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ, οὐδέ Τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων ἀναλόγως τῇ χρόνου βραδυτῇ ἢ ταχυτῇ. ἂν μόνον Τάδε διαμένη τὰ συμπίπτοντα ὡς έν τῇ ἄλλῃ... ...Διαφορὰ τοιαύτη τὸ γινόμενον πρᾶγμα τάδε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τινά...

...Nothing **that might have occurred** contests [this conclusion], nor Anything **else like it** in a way that is analogous **to a slow speed or high speed of time**. if only These things **that are a symptom [i.e., a separable quality]** persist, as **in the other**... ...a Difference of this sort [is] **the situation that arises [for] these things and certain other**...

τὸ ἀπελθόν τὰ ἀπελθόντα	what went away	ΑΠΕΛΘΟΝ <i>went away</i>
έπελθών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	having occurred	ΕΠΕΛΘΩΝ <i>went upon</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
τό τοιοῦτον τά τοιαῦτα	such a thing	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ <i>self of this sort</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
τοιουτότροπος	of such a manner [here, “like that”]	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>self of this sort of way</i>
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ <i>reasoning again</i>
βραδύς <i>(εἶτα, ύ)</i>	slow	ΒΡΑΔΥΣ <i>slow</i>
τό βράδος = ή βραδύτης αί βραδύτητες	slow speed	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΗΣ <i>condition of being slow</i>
τὸ τάχος τὰ τάχη	speed	ΤΑΧΟΣ <i>quickly</i>

ἡ ταχύτης αἱ ταχύτητες	high speed	TAXYTHS <i>condition from quickly</i>
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying through</i>
συμπίπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	to fall into each other	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ <i>falling together</i>
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling together</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
γινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 67 & 69

...τὸ πρᾶγμ[α πρὸς] τὸ τήμ ψυχή[ν]... ...[δ]υνάμεσιν εἶτε [έν] οἷς δήποτε πα[λαι]οῖς εἶτε ἢ[ι] διὰ...

...τὸ Πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὸ **τὴν ψυχὴν**... ...**δυνάμεσιν**, εἶτε **έν οἷς** δήποτε **παλαιοῖς** εἶτε **ἢ** **διὰ**...

...the Situation regarding what... **the soul**... ...**with forces**, whether in whatever ancient [things] or **in that**... because of...

τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>
παλαιός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	old / ancient	ΠΑΛΑΙΟΣ <i>long ago</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 70

...[ι]καναί ε[ίε]ν ἅπαντα τ[ῆ]ς [β]ρα[δυτῆ]τ[ος πι]αρ[ά τι]ή[ν πε]ποι[ημέ]νην...

...ίκαναί εἶεν ἅπαντα **τρόπον τῆς βραδυτῆτος** **παρά τὴν πεποιημένην**...

...sufficient [*forces*] would [...] in all respects **in [their] way of slowness** beyond what was made...

ἰκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ΊΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
τό βράδος = ἡ βραδύτης αἱ βραδύτητες	slowness	ΒΡΑΔΥΤΗΣ <i>condition of being slow</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
πεποιημένος	having been made	ΠΕΠΟΙΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>gathered</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10, P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 74 & 75

...[εἰ γὰρ ό] χρόνος, φήσai [ι τις, έστί] τὸ αὐτὸ εἶν[αι]... ...[ώ] φίλτα[τε]... [ώσ]περ εἰ γὰ[ρ τῶι ύπα]ρχθέντι... ...περὶ χρόν[ου]...

...εἰ γὰρ ὁ Χρόνος, φήσai Τις, έστί **τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι**... ὦ, Φίλτατε... ὥσπερ εἰ γὰρ **τῷ** **ύπαρχθέντι**... **περὶ χρόνου**...

...for if Time, Someone will say, is the same thing that exists... oh, Dearest one... just as if with what has already been set forth... concerning time...

ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
ὑπαρχθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	has come to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΘΕΙΣ

[U81]

Book 11

11.1 Size of the Sun

Scholion to Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklês, Laértios 10.91

Τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ ια΄ *Περὶ Φύσεως*, "εἰ γάρ" Φησί "τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὸ διάστημα ἀπεβεβλήκει: πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν χρόαν – ἄλλο γὰρ τούτῳ συμμετρότερον Διάστημα οὐθέν ἐστι"

This is also in the 11th book of *On Nature*, He says "if [the sun] had lost its size due to the space in-between: then [it would have lost] its appearance [of brightness] even more – for [some] other [larger or smaller] Space in-between is in no way more proportional in this [diminishment in brightness and size]"

βάλλειν	to throw	ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing</i>
ἐκβάλλειν	to extend	ΕΚΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing out</i>
ἀποβάλλειν	to throw off [here, "to lose"]	ΑΠΟΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing away</i>
τὸ χρῶμα τὰ χρώματα	color	ΧΡΩΜΑ <i>skin color</i>
ἡ χροά αἱ χροαί	appearance	ΧΡΟΑ <i>skin color</i>
σύμμετρος <i>(ον)</i>	proportionate	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΟΣ <i>measuring</i> <i>together</i>
συμμετρικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	proportional	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>measuring</i> <i>together</i>

The apparent size and intensity of a light source both diminish as the distance from the source increases: a nearby fire appears larger and brighter than one farther away, just as stars seem smaller and dimmer compared to the Sun.
Consider the Pyrrhonian teaching that "things that are thought to be large appear small, square things round, flat things bumpy, straight things bent, and pale things colorful. The sun, at any rate, owing to its distance, appears small... moreover, the sun has a certain appearance at its rising, another at the zenith... since, therefore, one cannot observe these things apart from [specific] places and positions, their nature remains unknown." (Laértios 9.85)

Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklês, Laértios 10.91 **Scholion above*

τὸ δὲ Μέγεθος ἡλίου, τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρον,^[1] κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τηλικοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡλίκον φαίνεται... * ...^[2] κατὰ δὲ τὸ καθ’ αὐτό: ἤτοι^[2a] μεῖζον τοῦ ὀρωμένου ἢ^[2b] μικρῷ ἔλαττον ἢ^[2c] τηλικοῦτον τυγχάνει. οὕτῳ, γὰρ καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν, Πυρὰ, ἐξ ἀποστήματος, θεωρούμενα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρεῖται

the Size of the sun, and the remaining stars, is **as big as** it appears to be **in magnitude** ^[1] according to what relates to us... * ...but ^[2] according to what it is in-and-of-itself: [the Size of the sun] happens to be either ^[2a] **larger** than what is seen, or ^[2b] **slightly smaller**, or ^[2c] **of the magnitude** [it appears].
Fires, **when they are considered** according to perception from a distance, are observed **in the same way** for us

τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ΗΛΙΟΣ <i>sun</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining <i>[rest of + gen]</i>	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
τὸ ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	star	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ <i>star</i>
πηλίκος <i>(η, ον)</i>	of some magnitude	ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>
ὀπηλίκος <i>(η, ον)</i>	of any magnitude	ὍΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ <i>which extent</i>
τηλικοῦτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	of [such a] magnitude	ΤΗΛΙΚΟΥΤΟΣ <i>extent</i>
ἡλίκος	as big as	ἩΛΙΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing between</i>
τὸ ἀπόστημα τὰ ἀποστήματα	distance	ΑΠΟΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing away</i>
μείζων <i>(ον)</i>	larger	ΜΕΙΖΩΝ <i>greater</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see <i>[mentally]</i>	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
μικρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
ἐλάττων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	envisioned	

11.2 [Cosmology]

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 18

...[βεβ]αιώσασθ[α]ι δ[ι]να[τ]όν· τὸ γὰρ κ[ατ'] αὐτὸ τοῦτο ο[ὐ] πότερον ἐν[δέ]χεται ἢ [ο]ὐκ ἐνδέχ[ε]ται πα[ντελ]ῶς γίνε[σθαι]...

...βεβαιώσασθαι Δυνατόν: τὸ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ Τοῦτο **πότερον** ἐνδέχεται – ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται **παντελῶς** – γίνεσθαι...

...[It is] able to affirm [itself]: for **whether** This very thing itself can – or [whether] it **absolutely** cannot – be produced...

βεβαιούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>firm standing</i>
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ <i>firm standing</i>
δυνατός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	able	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>power</i>
ἐνδεχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>accepting in</i>

τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα	possibility [of]	
ἐνδέχ εσθαι	to be possible [here, “can”]	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>accepting in</i>
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ <i>all completing</i>
γίν εσθαι = γίγν εσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 19

...αι λαμ[**βάνει**]**ν** παραλ[**λαγ**]ῆ**ν** [**δ**]**ι'** ἀπειρία[**ν**], εἰ πρὸς [**ἐ**]κεῖνο περὶ μυρία...

...λαμβάνειν **παραλλαγὴν δι' ἀπειρίαν, εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο περὶ μυρία...**

...to comprehend **a variety** through the infinity, if concerning that regarding the innumerable...

λαμβάνειν	<div>[intellectually]</div> to comprehend, <div>[generally]</div> to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ἡ ἀπειρία αἱ ἀπειρίαι	infinity	
μυρίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	innumerable	ΜΥΡΙΟΣ <i>ants</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 23

...τα παρ' ἡμῖ**ν** τὰ τι ὀχεῖσθ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀ[**έρος**] δυνάμενα καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι κα[**ι**]...

...Τὰ **παρ' ἡμῖν** – Τὰ **τι ὀχεῖσθ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος** – δυνάμενα καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι καὶ...

...the Things **among us** – those certain Things that are carried **over the air** – which have the force both to be suspended and [*to move*]...

ὁ ὄχος οἱ ὄχοι	carriage, cart, chariot	ΟΧΟΣ <i>riding</i>
ὀχεῖν	to carry	ΟΧΕΙΝ <i>riding</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>morning mist</i>
δυνάμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>power</i>
μετεωρίζειν	to suspend	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>suspended</i>
μετεωρίζεσθαι	to be suspended	

11.3 Walled Earths

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 column 27

...[δ**ια**]τηρητ[**ι**]κοὶ ε[**ἶ**]**ν**[α]**ι** [τ**οῦ**] ὠμοιωμ[**ένου** τῶι τοῦ τυμ]πά[**ν**]ου [ἐ**κ**τ]μή[**μ**α]τι. οἷ μ[**ἐ**]**ν** γὰρ οἷο[**ν**]ε[**ἰ**] τοῖ[**ι**]χους το[**ὺς** κύκλ]ω[**ι** **ἐ**πε]νόησαν [ὑ]πάρχον[**τας** τῇ]**ι** γῆι [τ**οι**]αύτης...

...**διατηρητικοὶ εἶναι τοῦ ὠμοιωμένου τῷ τοῦ τυμπάνου ἐκτμήματι** – **Οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἷονεὶ τοίχους τοὺς κύκλω ἐπενόησαν ὑπάρχοντας τῇ γῇ τοιαύτης...**

...existing **as fully preserving what has been formed similar to a section of a drum** – indeed, Some people objectively conceived that **in a certain way walls existed in a sphere for an earth of such a kind...**

τηρεῖν	to preserve	ΤΗΡΕΙΝ <i>protecting</i>
διατηρητικός	fully preserving	ΔΙΑΤΗΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of completely protecting</i>
ἡ ὁμοιότης αἱ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being similar</i>
ὁμοιοῦν	to make similar	
ὠμοιωμένος	having been formed similar	
τὸ τύμπανον τὰ τύμπανα	drum	ΤΥΜΠΑΝΟΝ <i>beating</i>
τὸ ἐκτμήμα τὰ ἐκτμήματα	section	ΕΚΤΜΗΜΑ <i>cutting out of</i>
οἷονεῖ	as if [here "in a certain way"]	
ὁ τοῖχος οἱ τοῖχοι	wall	ΤΟΙΧΟΣ <i>mound</i>
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ <i>wheel</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> ὑπάρχοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ <i>land</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 3 (column 20)

...δους ταύτης, τιμ[ήν] ὁ[ρ]ατὴν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῆσδε δυγ[άμεν]αι ἢ πρότερον [ἢ ὕστε]ρον ὥστε οὐ τὸ... ...ἀ[π]ειρίαι ἀκό[λ]ου[θ]ον τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὴ τὴν μέν...

...τιμὴν ὁρατὴν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τῆσδε δυνάμεναι – ἢ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον, ὥστε οὐ τὸ... ...ἀπειρίαι ἀκόλουθον τοῦ παντός...

...to make honor visible, and [the act of mental envisioning] has the force of this – either before or afterward, so that it is not... ...consistent with the infinity of the whole...

ἡ τιμή αἱ τιμαί	reverence	ΤΙΜΗ <i>value</i>
ὄρατός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	visible	ὍΡΑΤΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
ποιεῖν	to make [here, “to produce”]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	[the act of mental] envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of observing</i>
δυνάμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>power</i>
ὕστερον	afterward	ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>next</i>
ἡ ἀπειρία αἱ ἀπειρίαι	infinity	ΑΠΕΙΡΙΑ <i>not limited</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
ἀκόλουθος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	consistent	

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 4 (column 21)

...ἀπαντᾷν ἢ μὴ λ[ή]ρους ἀπαντᾷν, ἀπείρου δὲ μὴ ἀπαν[τᾷν]... ...ἀπαντᾷν ὥσ[τε τὸ ᾧ]πε[ῖρον]ν τὰς ὁμο[ί]ας φ[ύ]σει[ς] ἔχει καὶ μὴ...

...ἀπαντᾷν ἢ μὴ **λήρους** ἀπαντᾷν, **ἀπείρου** δὲ μὴ ἀπαντᾷν... ...ἀπαντᾷν ὥστε **τὸ ἄπειρον τὰς ὁμοίας φύσεις ἔχει**, καὶ μὴ...

...encountering or not encountering **trifles**, but not encountering [explanations] of the infinite... ...encountering **the infinite having similar natures**, and not.....

ἀπαντᾷν	to encounter	ΑΠΑΝΤΑΝ <i>meeting away</i>
ληρεῖν	to be foolish	
ὁ λῆρος οἱ λῆροι	trifle	ΛΗΡΟΣ <i>trash / trifle</i>
ἡ ἐρμηνεία αἱ ἐρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ <i>explaining</i>
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
ἡ ὁμοία αἱ ὁμοῖαι	similarity	

11.4 Weight of Earth

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 5 (column 22)

...ἐκεῖνο, τὸ δὲ ὅτ[ι μὴ] ἡ φοβητέον τὸ βαρ[ύ τῆ]ς γῆς πρὸς τὸν μ[ε]τε[ω]ρισμὸν ὅταν...

...Τὸ δὲ ὅτι μὴ **φοβητέον τὸ βαρὺ τῆς γῆς πρὸς τὸν μετεωρισμὸν ὅταν...**

...and [the fact] That **the weight of the earth is not to be feared** in relation to [its] **suspension** whenever...

φοβεῖσθαι	to fear	ΦΟΒΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>fear</i>
ὁ βαρύστονος	the deep-voiced one	ΒΑΡΥΣΤΟΝΟΣ <i>heavy tone</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
τὸ βαρὺ τὰ βαρέα	what is weighty [here, “the weight”]	
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	Γῆ <i>land</i>
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ <i>rising beyond</i>
ὁ μετεωρισμός οἱ μετεωρισμοί	suspension	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of rising beyond</i>

11.5 Thought Experiment

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 2 (column 28)

...καὶ διὰ τοῦτ[ο πα]νταχόθεν πρὸ ὁμ[ά]των τιθέμενοι τὰς περιφερείας ὥς τοῦ α[ὐτ]οῦ πράγματο[ς]...

...καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, **πανταχόθεν πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενοι τὰς περιφερείας ὥς τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος...**

...and **because of this**, placing **the circumferences** before the eyes from all **sides** as though [they belong to] **the same situation...**

πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΘΕΝ <i>from all places</i>
τὸ ὄμμα τὰ ὄμματα	eye	ΟΜΜΑ <i>eye</i>
μετατιθέμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	rearranged	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ <i>placing change</i>
τιθέμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	placing	ΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ <i>placing</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
ἡ περιφέρεια αἱ περιφέρειαι	circumference	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ <i>bringing around</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 fr. 6 (column 30)

...νομί[ζοιμ]εν, ἐν ταῖς μεταβάσε[σ]ιν, ὁμ[ο]ιον εἶπεῖν, ταῖ[ς ἐ]πὶ τὸ ἄν[ω, καὶ] ὃ ὑπ[ἐ]ρ κεφαλῆς ἀρτίως εἶχε το[ῦτ' ἄ]ν ὑπὸ π[οσ]ῖν ἰσχύνοι[μ]εν κα[τὰ] τὴν μ[ε]τάβασιν φα[ί]νε[σθ]α[ι] κάτω...

...**Νομίζοιμεν ἐν ταῖς μεταβάσεσιν ὁμοιον εἶπεῖν ταῖς ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω – καὶ ὃ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀρτίως εἶχε, τοῦτ' ἄν ὑπὸ ποσὶν ἰσχύνοιμεν, κατὰ τὴν μετάβασιν φαίνεσθαι κάτω...**

...We might think to say [that it is] **similar** in [spatial] extensions **for those** towards the upper part – and what was **just now** [positioned] **overhead**, [we might think to say that] we would ourselves hinder **this** under our feet, appearing **below** according to [its spatial] extension...

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
ἡ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ <i>stepping beyond</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
ἡ κεφαλὴ αἱ κεφαλαί	head	ΚΕΦΑΛΗ <i>head</i>
ὁ πούς οἱ πόδες	foot	ΠΟΥΣ <i>foot</i>
ισχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ <i>strength</i>
ισχάνειν	to hinder	ΙΣΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>hindering</i>
ισχάνεσθαι	to be hindered	
φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appearing</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 1 (column 32)

...ποσὶν αὐτῷ φαινομένου κατωτέρω τ[οῦ]το οὐ νοήσει, ὃ νῦν ἀναβάς ὑπὸ ποσὶν ἔλαβεν, πρότερον ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἔχ[ο]ν [ἐ]δυ... παρὰ τὸ οὔν, φημί, ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν γῆν τ[οῦ]ς τόποις... ...στρ[ογ]γύλον ποιοῖ γε[γε]νησθ[αί] κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν [ἐ]ν μέσῳ ὥς [ἄν]...

...**ποσὶν, αὐτῷ φαινομένου κατωτέρω, τοῦτο οὐ Νοήσει: ὃ, νῦν ἀναβάς, ὑπὸ ποσὶν ἔλαβεν – πρότερον ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἔχον – ἔδυ... ...παρὰ τὸ, οὔν, Φημί, ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν γῆν τοῖς τόποις... ...στρογγύλον Ποιοῖ γεγενῆσθαι κόσμον – καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐν μέσῳ, ὥς ἄν...**

...to [his] feet, as it appears lower to him, He will not conceive **this**: **what** he, having now already gone up, took under [his] feet – while **earlier** he was holding [it] **above** [his] head – he sank... ...**beside this**, therefore, I say [*that his theory amounts to saying that*] **the earth is in the middle of** [all] **locations**... He would make **the cosmos round** – and **the earth in the middle**, as if...

ὁ πούς οἱ πόδες	foot	ΠΟΥΣ <i>foot</i>
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ἀποφαινόμενος <i>(ομένη, όμενον)</i>	representing	ΑΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing away</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
κάτω	below	ΚΑΤΩ <i>below</i>
κατωτέρος <i>(α, ον)</i>	lower	ΚΑΤΩΤΕΡΟΣ <i>more down</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
ἀναβάς <i>(ἄσα, άν)</i>	gone up [already]	ΑΝΑΒΑΣ <i>walked up</i>
ή κεφαλή αί κεφαλαί	head	ΚΕΦΑΛΗ <i>head</i>
ή δύσις αί δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
δύειν	to sink	ΔΥΕΙΝ <i>sinking</i>
μέσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	middle	ΜΕΣΟΣ <i>in between</i>
ή γῆ αί γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ <i>land</i>
ό τόπος οί τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
στρογγύλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	round	ΣΤΡΟΓΓΥΛΟΣ <i>droplet</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ό κόσμος οί κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging /</i> <i>adorning</i>

11.6 Atmospheric Boundary

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 2 (column 33)

...τοιίχους έν [κύκλ]ωι ποιήσαντες ἵ[να φρά]ξωσιν ήμάς πρ[ός τ]ήν δῖναν, ώς έξωθεν αύτῆς περιφερομέ[ν]ης, πᾶ[σ]ιν [ύ]π[ἐρ]
[κε]φα[λ]ῆς τὰ ἄ[σ]τ[ρα] περιάγου[σιν]γ...

...τοιίχους έν κύκλῳ Ποιήσαντες, ἵνα Φράξωσιν ήμάς πρὸς τήν δῖναν – ώς έξωθεν
αύτῆς περιφερομένης, πᾶσιν ὑπέρ κεφαλῆς τὰ Ἄστρα περιάγουσιν...

...[because these men, in their theory, have] made walls into a circle, so that
[these Walls] would block us from the whirlwind [i.e., shield us from the
vortex] – since [the whirlwind] is carried around externally, the Stars revolve
for all [people] above [their] heads...

ό τοῖχος οί τοῖχοι	wall	ΤΟΙΧΟΣ <i>mound</i>
ό κύκλος οί κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ <i>wheel</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
φράσσειν	to block	ΦΡΑΣΣΕΙΝ <i>fencing in</i>
ή δῖνα αί δῖναι	whirlwind	ΔΙΝΑ <i>no etymology</i>
<i>(ή, τὸ)</i> ό έξωθεν	external source	ΕΞΩΘΕΝ <i>outside origin</i>
έξωθεν	externally	

φέρóμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
περιφέρóμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried around	ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing around</i>
ή κεφαλή αί κεφαλαί	head	ΚΕΦΑΛΗ <i>head</i>
τò ἄστρον τὰ ἄστρα	star	ΑΣΤΡΟΝ <i>star</i>
περιάγειν	to revolve	ΠΕΡΙΓΕΙΝ <i>going around</i>

11.7 Relative Observations of the Sun

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 5 (column 37)

...ἀνατέλλων, ἀνατείνοντες εἰς τò μέρος τῆς πάσης γῆς, οὗ μετέβημεν, ἐκ τούτου ἡμῖν δυόμενος φαίνεται, οὐδὲ πολλήν ἐνίστε πάνυ γῆν με[ταβ]εβηκόσιν· [ἀ]λ[λὰ τού]του οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ τ[ο]ύς πλαγιασμούς α[ἰ]τιάσασθαι· τ[ἰ] γὰρ τὴν ἐν[θ]ἐνδε κ[α]ταστάθμη[σ]ιν {[ῆ]} τῇ[ν] ἐνθἐνδε} {καταστάθμησιν} ἢ τὴν ἐνθἐνδε τινὰ... ...καταστά[θμησιν] τῶν ἀνα[τ]ολῶν [ῆ δ]ύσεων...

...ἀνατέλλων, ἀνατείνοντες εἰς τò μέρος τῆς πάσης γῆς: οὗ Μετέβημεν ἐκ τούτου ἡμῖν δυόμενος Φαίνεται, οὐδὲ πολλήν ἐνίστε πάνυ γῆν μετεβηκόσιν – ἀλλὰ τούτου οὐκ”Ἔστιν αὖ τοὺς πλαγιασμούς αἰτιάσασθαι: τί γὰρ τὴν ἐνθἐνδε καταστάθμησιν ἢ τὴν ἐνθἐνδε τινὰ... ...καταστάθμησιν τῶν ἀνατολῶν ἢ δύσεων...

...[the sun] when rising up, and while we are extending up [our attention] to that part [out] of all the land: [the Sun] appears to us as setting from that [place] from where We had moved, and sometimes [this occurs] for those who truly have not traveled across much land – but It is not possible again to blame the deviations [*i.e., the changing angles of the sun's course*] for this: for what [about] an accurate measurement from here or an [accurate measurement] from some other [location]... ...an accurate measurement of the risings or settings...?

[Sedley] [*The sun, if we walk towards the place from which it appeared to us*] to rise, directing ourselves up into the mainland zone, appears to us to set where we previously passed by, sometimes even when we have moved in all only a short distance. And this time we cannot blame it on the latitudinal movements. Why after all should you declare the measurement from here, or the one from here, or the one from here, or this one a more reliable guide of the risings and settings [of the sun]?

ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ΗΛΙΟΣ <i>sun</i>
ἀποστέλλειν	to send away	ΑΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>making ready away</i>
ἀνατέλλειν	to rise	ΑΝΑΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>making ready up</i>
τείνειν	to extend	ΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extending</i>
ἀνατείνειν	to extend up	ΑΝΑΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extending up</i>
τò μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ή γῆ αί γαῖ	earth [here, “land”]	ΓΗ <i>land</i>
διαβαίνειν	pass through	ΔΙΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking through</i>
μεταβαίνειν	to move [to another place]	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking change</i>
ή δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
δύειν	to sink	ΔΥΕΙΝ <i>sinking</i>
δυόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	setting	

φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
ὁ πλαγιασμός οἱ πλαγιασμοί	deviation	ΠΛΑΓΙΑΣΜΟΣ <i>an act of turning sideways</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ <i>blame</i>
ἡ καταστάθμεις αἱ καταστάθμεις	accurate measurement	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΘΜΗΣΙΣ <i>thoroughly measuring</i>
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>

Epikouros may be describing the experience of walking east at sunset, where, upon looking back at the sun, it appears to set at the spot you had recently passed.

11.8 Use of Instruments

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 6 (column 38)

...[ὁ]μοίωμά τι λαβόντες συλλογίζεσθαι τι περὶ τούτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ περινοοῦντες, οἶμαι, λέγω δὲ τὰ [ὄρ]γανα, ἐν δ[ἐ] τοῖς κυ[λιν]δοῦντες αὐτούς, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰς [παρεμ]ποδείας, τὰς ὑπὸ τ[ῶν] διν[ευ]μάτων αὐτ[οῖς] παρα[γιν]ομένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν φασμάτων τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου ἀοριστείας ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεω[ν] εἰκότω[ς δια]νοίᾳ [οὐ δύ]ννται, [δι]ὰ τῶν ὀργάνων ο[ὐ]θὲν ἀπαρτίζοντες; {[δ]ιανοίαι} ὁμοιω[μα] λαβεῖν...

...**ὁμοίωμα τι** λαβόντες συλλογίζεσθαι **τι περὶ τούτων**· **τὰ** μὲν γὰρ Περινοοῦντες, **Οἶμαι** – **Λέγω δὲ τὰ ὄργανα** – **ἐν δὲ τοῖς** κυλινδοῦντες **αὐτούς**. οὐ μόνον **κατὰ τὰς παρεμποδείας τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν δινευμάτων αὐτοῖς παραγιγνομένας** – **ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κατὰ τῶν φασμάτων τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου ἀοριστείας ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεων**, εἰκότως **διανοίᾳ** οὐ Δύνανται. **διὰ τῶν ὀργάνων οὐθὲν** Ἀπαρτίζοντες? **διανοίᾳ ὁμοιωμα** λαβεῖν...

...because they comprehended **some similarity** to infer **something** about these *[risings and settings]*. for, I suspect, while They are cunningly conceiving **these things** – I mean **the instruments** – they are also rolling **themselves** *[into a confusion]* with them. not only due to the hindrances that attend along with the whirling motions of those *[instruments]* – but also *[due to]* those *[hinderances that occur]* from the lack of definition **in the appearances of the sun's risings and settings**, They are not reasonably able by mental perception *[to produce an accurate measurement]*. Do they, **in any way**, produce an even result **with the instruments**? to *[already]* comprehend **a similarity by mental perception**...

τό ὁμοίωμα τὰ ὁμοιώματα	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑ <i>result of [being]</i> <i>similar</i>
λαβών <i>(οὔσα, ὄν)</i>	<i>[intellectually]</i> comprehended, <i>[generally]</i> acquired	ΛΑΒΩΝ <i>grasped</i>
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action</i> <i>again</i>
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action</i> <i>together</i>
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action</i> <i>together</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
περινοῶν <i>(ῶσα, ὦν)</i>	to cunningly conceive	ΠΕΡΙΝΟΩΝ <i>seeing around</i>

οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
τὸ ὄργανον τὰ ὄργανα	instrument	ΟΡΓΑΝΟΝ <i>tool</i>
κυλινδεῖν	to roll	ΚΥΛΙΝΔΕΙΝ <i>turning over</i>
κυλινδῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	rolling	
τὸ ἐμποδοστατῆσον τὰ ἐμποδοστατῆσαντα	obstacle	ΕΜΠΟΔΟΣΤΑΤΗΣΟΝ <i>set up</i> <i>in (way of) foot</i>
ἡ παρεμπόδεια αἱ παρεμπόδειαί	hinderance	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΟΔΕΙΑ <i>beside</i> <i>in (way of) foot</i>
ἡ δῖνα αἱ δῖναι	whirlwind	ΔΙΝΑ <i>no etymology</i>
τὸ δινεῦμα τὰ δινεύματα	whirling [motion]	ΔΙΝΕΥΜΑ
παραγινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	attending along with	ΠΑΡΑΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>come into</i> <i>being alongside</i>
τὸ φάσμα τὰ φάσματα	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ <i>appearing</i>
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ΗΛΙΟΣ <i>sun</i>
ὀρίζειν	to set a limit	ὈΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
ἡ ἀοριστεία αἱ ἀοριστεῖαι	lack of definition	ΑΟΡΙΣΤΕΙΑ <i>no border</i>
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	a rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
ἀπαρτίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	to produce an even result	ΑΠΑΡΤΙΖΩΝ <i>[alpha-intensive]</i> <i>part</i>
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	ΛΑΒΕΙΝ <i>grasped</i>

11.9 Shallow Implications of Local Predictions

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 7 (column 39)

...[ὄρ]γα[να] προσποίημα καταλείπει καὶ παραβίασιν τοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄργανου δείγματα τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν κατασκευάζειν το[ῖ]ς κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα φ[α]ῖνομένοις. διοριστέ[ο]ν γάρ, οἶμαι, πρῶτ[ο]ν [μ]ῆ[ν] τὸν εὐφρο[ν]οῦν[τ]α ὃ τι διαλέγεται, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ [κ]όσμ[ου] διαλέγηται καὶ τῶν ἐ[ν] τῷ κόσμῳι φ[α]ῖνομένων, περὶ φάσμα[τό]ς τινος ἐκ... ...τινῶν τῶν κατ' ὄψιν ἀναπεμπο[μέ]νων πρὸς ἐπίνο[ια]ν ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ ψ[υχ]ῇ ἐ[ν]σεσωσμέ[νη]ν...

...**ὄργανα προσποίημα** Καταλείπει καὶ **παραβίασιν** – **τοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄργανου δείγματα τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν κατασκευάζειν τοῖς κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα φαινομένοις**. Διοριστέον γάρ, **Οἶμαι**, πρῶτον μὲν **τὸν εὐφρονοῦντα** – **ὃ τι Διαλέγεται**, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ **κόσμου Διαλέγεται καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φαινομένων**, περὶ **φάσματος τινος ἐκ... ...τινῶν τῶν κατ' ὄψιν ἀναπεμπομένων πρὸς ἐπίνοιαν** – **ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνσεσωσμένην...**

...This thoroughly leaves instruments [that are] fabrications and a distortion – by constructing the examples on [the dial of] the instrument in the same analogy as what appears in relation to the astronomical phenomena. It is necessary, I suspect, first to differentiate a well-minded person – [and to differentiate] what He examines, whenever He gives a discourse on the cosmos and the phenomena appearing within the cosmos, regarding some appearance from... ...with certain things sent through vision up towards an objective concept – or [with a conception] preserved in the soul itself...

ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
τὸ προσποιήμα τὰ προσποιήματα	fabrication	ΠΡΟΣΠΟΙΗΜΑ <i>result of gathering</i> <i>in addition</i>
καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
ὁ βιασμός οἱ βιασμοί	forcing	ΒΙΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of violence</i>
ἡ παραβίασις αἱ παραβιάσεις	distortion	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ <i>violence alongside</i>
τὸ ὄργανον τὰ ὄργανα	instrument	ΟΡΓΑΝΟΝ <i>tool</i>
δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
τὸ δεῖγμα τὰ δείγματα	example	ΔΕΙΓΜΑ <i>a showing</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning</i> <i>back/again</i>
κατασκευάζειν	to construct	ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>preparing</i>
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ <i>rising beyond</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ὀρίζειν	to set a limit	ὈΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>between the border</i>
οἷεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	concern	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ <i>mind</i>
ὁ εὐφρονοῦν οἱ εὐφρονοῦντες	he who is well-minded	ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ <i>good mind</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
διαλέγειν	to give a discourse	ΔΙΑΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>speaking / choosing</i>
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging /</i> <i>adorning</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ φάσμα τὰ φάσματα	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ <i>appearing</i>
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὀψεις	vision	ΟΨΙΣ <i>eye</i>
ἐκπέμπειν	to emit	ΕΚΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ <i>conveying out</i>
ἀναπεμπόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being sent up	ΑΝΑΠΕΜΠΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>conveying up</i>

<p>ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι</p>	<p>[objective] concept</p>	<p>ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i></p>
<p>ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί</p>	<p>soul</p>	<p>ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i></p>
<p>σώζων (σώζουσα, σώζον)</p>	<p>preserving</p>	<p>ΣΩΙΖΩΝ <i>saving</i></p>
<p>ἐνσεσωσμένος (η, ον)</p>	<p>preserved in</p>	<p>ΕΝΣΕΣΩΣΜΕΝΟΣ <i>saved in</i></p>

The nature of the void and of atoms is the same everywhere. In contrast, the movement of the stars in our sky is specific to place (our earth) and time (during the existence of our earth).

Therefore, the ability to predict the local movements of these temporary bodies does not explain the fundamental mechanisms of nature. Those who think these temporary and local predictions show that all movement is fundamentally deterministic are in error.

11.10 Differentiating Sources

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 8 (column 40)

...[μη]δ' ὅταν, οἶμαι, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέπων τύχη κα[ι] μὴ διορῶν τό τε κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον λ[ε]γόμεν[ο]ν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον [ὑπὸ] τοῦ ὑποκειμέ[νου, κᾶν] πολλαὶ δὲ [ἀ]πὸ [το]ῦ ὑποκειμένου [φαντ]ασίαι γίνωντα[ι τ]οῦ μικροτάτ[ου, μ]ὴ ὅτι τοῦ κόσμ[ου, εἰ]κότως ἀδημονεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀ[ρ]τίως ῥηθέντων ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεων. ἄ[τοπ]ον μὲν γὰρ καὶ τά[χα ἐ]στὶν ἕκαστα...

...μηδ' ὅταν, Οἶμαι, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέπων Τύχη καὶ μὴ διορῶν ^[ο]τό τε κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον λεγόμενον καὶ ^[ο]τὸ κατὰ τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου – κᾶν πολλαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου Φαντασίαι γίνωνται τοῦ μικροτάτου, μὴ ὅτι τοῦ κόσμου. εἰκότως Ἀδημονεῖ ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀρτίως ῥηθέντων ἀνατολῶν καὶ δύσεων. ἄτοπον, μὲν, γὰρ καὶ τάχα ἕκαστα...

...nor even, I think, when He happens to see the original source and does not differentiate ^[ο]what is spoken about regarding that original source versus ^[ο]that which relates to what is completely comprehended [directly] from the original source – ^[ομ]even if many Images are produced from an original source that is most minute, let alone ^[οκ][from an original source the size] of the cosmos. He fittingly feels distressed by these risings and settings of the sun [that have been] suitably discussed [here by us]: absurdly, for perhaps even each...

οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of situated under</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
βλέπων (ουσα, ον)	seeing	
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>between the border</i>
τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον τὰ περιλαμβανόμενα	^[intellectually] what is completely comprehended	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>grasping around</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ μικρότης αἱ μικρότητες	minuteness	ΜΙΚΡΟΤΗΣ <i>little</i>
μικρότατος	most minute	ΜΙΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΣ <i>most little</i>

ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἡ εἰκὼν αἱ εἰκόνες	representation	ΕΙΚΩΝ <i>portraying</i>
εἰκότως	fittingly	
ἀδημονεῖν	to be distressed	ΑΔΗΜΟΝΕΙΝ <i>without community</i>
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ΗΛΙΟΣ <i>sun</i>
ἀρτίως	suitably	ΑΡΤΙΩΣ <i>fitting / timely</i>
ῥηθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i> ῥηθέντες <i>(εἶσαι, ἐντα)</i>	said [here, “discussed”]	ῬΗΘΕΙΣ <i>said</i>
ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>a place</i>
ἄτοπος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	absurd	ΑΤΟΠΟΣ <i>without a place</i>
τάχα	perhaps	ΤΑΧΑ <i>quickly</i>

11.11 Empiricism, Against Geocentrism

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 11 (column 41)

...τάξεις [τ]ούτων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου τοῦ μέρους οὕτω διαληπτέον. τὰς δ' ὑπερεῖ[ο]εις τὰς κάτωθεν τῆς γῆς, ἅς φα[μ]εν τὴν [ἀρ]αῖαν φύσ[ιν ὃ]πὸ...

{added to fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 9 (column 41)
& P.Herc. 154 fr. 11

...ἡμῶν μὴ ἐναντίας ἀνατολῆς καὶ δύσεως βουλόμεθά τι συνάψαι φάσμα τούτοις ἐνπερινενοημένο[ν], ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμ[έ]νου ληπτέον φοράν τινα τῇ διαν[οί]αι ἢ λ[ί]ου καὶ σελή[ν]ης [εἰς] ἀνατολή[ν] κα[ὶ] δύσιν, καὶ τὴν [α]ὐτ[ή]ν, *φᾶσ[ε], γιγνομένην [έ]να[ν]τίως φατέον ἔχειν. κατὰ γε δὴ τὸ ὑπο[κεί]μενον καθ' ἐα[υτὸ] καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐτέρωθι μέντ[οι ἄλλ]ας κ[αί] ἄλ[λ]ας [εἶναι] {τάξεις [τ]ούτων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου «τοῦ» μέρους οὕτω διαληπτέον. τὰς δ' ὑπερεί[ς]εις τὰς κάτωθεν τῆς γῆς, ἅς φα[μ]εν [τ]ὴν [ἀρ]αῖαν φύσ[ιν ὃ]πὸ}...

** Emendavi φᾶσί pro φημί*

...ἡμῶν μὴ ἐναντίας. ἀνατολῆς καὶ δύσεως Βουλόμεθά τι συνάψαι φάσμα τούτοις ἐνπερινενοημένον. ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου Ληπτέον φοράν τινα – τῇ διανοίᾳ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης εἰς ἀνατολὴν καὶ δύσιν. καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν, *Φημί, γιγνομένην ἐναντίως Φατέον ἔχειν: κατὰ, γε δὴ, τὸ ὑποκείμενον καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐτέρωθι μέντοι ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι τάξεις τούτων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου τοῦ μέρους, οὕτω Διαληπτέον. τὰς δ' ὑπερείσεις τὰς κάτωθεν τῆς γῆς, ἅς Φαμεν τὴν ἀραιὰν φύσιν ὑπὸ...

...[the forces] of our [Earth that are] not opposing. We desire to connect to these [original sources] any certain appearance of the rising and setting [that is] completely conceived within [us]. It is necessary to comprehend some transmission from an original source – in [our mental] perception of the sun and moon in [their] rising and setting [*i.e., some direct observation is necessary*]. I even say* It is necessary to declare that the same [rising and setting] happen to occur in an opposing way: indeed, according to the original source per se and not [relative] to us – elsewhere indeed various and different arrangements of these things exist. and even concerning this particular part, It is necessary to distinguish in this way. but the projections beneath the earth, which We say are of a rarefied nature under...

ἐναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>
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ἡ ἀνατολή αἱ ἀνατολαί	rising	ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ <i>lifting up</i>
ἡ δύσις αἱ δύσεις	a setting	ΔΥΣΙΣ <i>sinking</i>
ἡ βούλησις αἱ βουλήσεις	intention	ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ <i>wishing</i>
βούλεσθαι	to want	
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>fastening together</i>
τὸ φάσμα τὰ φάσματα	appearance	ΦΑΣΜΑ <i>appearing</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἀπερινόητος (ον)	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
ἐνπερινενοημένος (η, ον)	completely conceived within	ΕΝΠΕΡΙΝΕΝΟΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having seen around in</i>
μεταληπτέος (α, ον)	ought to be substituted	ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ <i>change ought to be taken hold</i>
ληπτέος (α, ον)	ought to be comprehended	ΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ <i>taking hold</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ σελήνη αἱ σελήναι	moon	ΣΕΛΗΝΗ <i>shining light</i>
γινόμενος (η, ον) γινόμενοι (αι, α)	happening	ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>birthing</i>
ἐναντίος (α, ον)	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>
ἐναντίως	opposingly	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ <i>in against</i>
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of situated under</i>
ἐτέρωθι	elsewhere	ἜΤΕΡΩΘΙ <i>different [location]</i>
ἡ τάξις αἱ τάξεις	arrangement	ΤΑΞΙΣ <i>ordered</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
διαληπτός (ή, όν)	[mentally] distinguishable	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>taking hold between</i>
διαληπτέος	out to be distinguished	
ἡ ὑπερείσις αἱ ὑπερείσεις	projection	ΥΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ <i>going beyond</i>
κάτωθεν	beneath	ΚΑΤΩΘΕΝ <i>below</i>
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ <i>land</i>
ἀραιός (ά, όν)	rarefied	ΑΡΑΙΟΣ <i>spread out thin</i>

It is incorrect to think that the earth is the center of the universe – and it is therefore also incorrect to think that predictions of the rising and setting in our sky explain the entire working of the infinite universe (τὸ ἄπειρον πᾶν).

...τούτων, Δύναται γίνεσθαι συνθεωρῶμεν – τῶν δὲ τὰς ἰσότητας αὐτὰς αἰτίας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ κοινωνεῖν...

...We envision together, of these things, It is able to be produced – while their equalities themselves exist as the causes of [their] not taking part...

δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
συνθεωρεῖν	to envision together	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing together</i>
ἴσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	equal	ΙΣΟΣ <i>equal</i>
ἡ ἰσότης αἱ ἰσότητες	equality	ΙΣΟΤΗΣ <i>equal</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from common</i>
κοινωνεῖν	to take part in	ΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙΝ <i>common</i>

11.12 Planetary Balance

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 10 (column 42)

...[ὁ] πὸ τιν[ος] διαστήματος ὀριζομένης· οὕτωι γὰρ ἀσφαλέστερον ἡ διάνοια τὴν μονὴν τῇ γῇ λήψεται – κα[ὶ] συμφωνότερον τοῖς κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις φαινομένοις· πυκνότητα [δὲ] τὴν κάτω [π]αρὰ [συνέ]χειαν αὐτῇ νοητ[έ]ον τῆς ἄνωθ[ε]ν, ἴνα, ἐσθλαὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄ[ν]τι[ε]ρεῖσιν, τοῦ μὴ φ[έ]ρ[ε]σθαι τὴν γῆν τὴν π[ρ]έπ[ο]υσαν ἀναλ[ογί]αν [ῥ]ῶσι[ν] κεκτημ[έναι]. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡμ[ῖν] [ἡ τοῦ ἡ]λίου περιφορὰ [διὰ ταῦ]τα ἐνοχλή[σει ἂν τὸ] πο[σ]α[χ]ῶς [ἑ]κασ[τα] τούτων δύναται γίνεσθαι συνθεωρῶμεν, τῶν δ[ὲ] τὰς ἰσότητας [α]ὐτὰς [αἰτί]ας εἶναι [τοῦ] μὴ κο[ιν]ωνε[ῖν τ]ὴν γ[ῆν] | δεήσεσθαι.

...ὕπο τινος διαστήματος ὀριζομένης – οὕτω γὰρ, ἀσφαλέστερον ἡ Διάνοια τὴν μονὴν τῇ γῇ λήψεται – καὶ συμφωνότερον τοῖς κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις φαινομένοις. πυκνότητα δὲ τὴν κάτω παρὰ συνέχειαν αὐτῇ Νοητέον τῆς ἄνωθεν· ἵνα, ἐσθλαὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀντέρεισιν, τοῦ μὴ φέρεσθαι τὴν γῆν τὴν πρέπουσαν ἀναλογίαν ᾧσιν κεκτημένοι. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου Περιφορὰ διὰ ταῦτα ἐνοχλήσει – ἂν τὸ ποσαχῶς ἑκαστα τούτων δύναται γίνεσθαι Συνθεωρῶμεν: τῶν δὲ τὰς ἰσότητας αὐτὰς αἰτίας εἶναι τοῦ μὴ κοινωνεῖν τὴν γῆν δεήσεσθαι

...being limited by a certain separation – for in this way, [our mental] Perception will more unfailingly comprehend the position of the earth – and more harmoniously with what appears according to [our] sensations. but It is necessary to conceive the concentration below [the Earth to be] in coherence with the [concentration] above [the earth]: so that, [Forces], being effective for resistance, may possess a suitable proportion for the earth not to be carried away. for the Orbit of the sun concerning these [issues] will not at all be disturbing to us – if We envision together that Each of these things is able to be produced in various ways: then the balances themselves need to be recognized to exist as the causes of the earth not taking a part [in apparent motion]

τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing between</i>
ὀρίζειν	to set a limit	ὈΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
ὀριζόμενος	being limited	ὈΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ
ἀσφαλής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	unfailing	ΑΣΦΑΛΗΣ <i>not stumbling</i>
ἀσφαλέστερον	more unfailingly	

ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ μονή αἱ μονα	position	ΜΟΝΗ <i>staying</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
σύνφωνος (ος, ον)	in harmony	ΣΥΝΦΩΝΟΣ <i>speaking together</i>
συνφωνότερον	more harmoniously	
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
φαινόμενος (η, ον)	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ἡ πύκνωσις αἱ πυκνώσεις	a concentrating	ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ <i>action of compacting</i>
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
ἡ πυκνότης αἱ πυκνότητες	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from compacting</i>
συνεχής (ές)	continuous	ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ <i>holding together</i>
τὸ συνεχές τὰ συνεχῇ	continuity	
ἡ συνέχεια αἱ συνέχειαι	coherence	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΑ <i>state of holding</i>
ὁ ἐπάνω οἱ ἐπάνω	someone above	ΕΠΑΝΩ <i>above upon</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
νοῆσαι	to conceive [already]	ΝΟΗΣΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
ἄνωθεν	from above	ΑΝΩΘΕΝ <i>above origin</i>
ἐσθλός (ή, όν)	effective	ΕΣΘΛΟΣ <i>good</i>
ἡ ἔρις αἱ ἐριδες	strife	ΕΡΙΣ <i>striving</i>
ἡ ἀντέρσις αἱ ἀντερίσει	resistance	ΑΝΤΕΡΙΣΙΣ <i>striving against</i>
φέρεισθαι	to be carried	ΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>bringing</i>
πρέπειν	to be suitable	ΠΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>fitting</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy [here, "proportion"]	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured already} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΙΣΘΑΙ <i>acquired</i>
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	possessing	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>acquired</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ περιφορά αἱ περιφοραί	orbit	ΠΕΡΙΦΟΡΑ
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ <i>crowd of people</i>

ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ <i>in a crowd of people</i>
ποσαχῶς	in various ways	ΠΟΣΑΧΩΣ <i>how many ways</i>
δύνασθαι	to be able	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>having power</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
συνθεωρεῖν	to envision together	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing together</i>
ἡ ἰσότης αἱ ἰσότητες	balance	ΙΣΟΤΗΣ <i>equal</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
κοινωνεῖν	to take part in	ΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΙΝ <i>common</i>

11.13 Against "A Cosmic Center"

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 11 (column 43)

...δεήσασθαι. | πανταχόθεν γάρ ἴσον [ἀ]πέχουσαν οὐθαμῇ βρίθειν δυνήσεσθαι· ὁ γάρ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος φύσεως αὐτῇ
 ὑπάρ[χ]ει, τὸ [δ]ὴ παγταχόθεν ὁμοί[ω]ς στελλομένην ἴσον [ἀ]πέχε[ι]ν ἀπὸ τοῦ τρ[οχ]οῦ πανταχόθεν, ὥσπερὶ τοιαύτη[ν]
 λ[έ]γε[ι] ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθ[αι] τοῦ κόσ[μ]ου ὅπερ οὐκ [ἀ]δύνατον εἶναι καὶ τοι[α]ύ[τ]ην – τοῦτο ἄ[ρα] τὸ τῆς μονῆς αἰ[τιον κ]αὶ
 οὐ τὸ τούτου παπαρασκευαστικόν· τ[ῇ]ν γάρ ἰσότητα ἢ το[ῦ] ἀέ[ρ]ος στολ[ῇ] πανταχό[θε]νv...

πανταχόθεν γὰρ ἴσον ἀπέχουσαν, οὐθαμῇ βρίθειν δυνήσεσθαι. Ὁ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος φύσεως αὐτῇ ὑπάρχει. Τὸ δὴ **πανταχόθεν ὁμοίως** στελλομένην ἴσον ἀπέχειν ἀπὸ τοῦ τροχοῦ **πανταχόθεν** – ὥσπερὶ **τοιαύτην**, **Λέγει, ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι τοῦ κόσμου: ὅπερ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτην – τοῦτο, ἄρα, τὸ τῆς μονῆς αἷτιον καὶ οὐ τὸ τούτου παρασκευαστικόν· τὴν γὰρ ἰσότητα** ἢ τοῦ ἀέρος **Στολὴ πανταχόθεν...**

[*He says that, because the Earth*] is equally distant on all sides, it will be able to be heavy in no place. This exists for [Earth] from the nature of air: That, of course, [because] it is positioned similarly on all sides, it restricts equally from the circumference from all sides – just as if, He says, *such a thing lies at the center of the cosmos: which* [he says] *is not impossible that even such a thing exists* – therefore, [he says] *this is the [actual] cause of [Earth's] stationary position and not [merely] instrumental [for it].* the Pressure of the air on all sides... *an equality...*

πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΘΕΝ <i>from all places</i>
ἴσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	equal	ΙΣΟΣ <i>equal</i>
ἀπέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	different /distant	ΑΠΕΧΩΝ <i>holding away</i>
οὐθαμῇ = οὐθαμεῖ = οὐδαμοῦ	nowhere	ΟΥΘΑΜΗΙ <i>not in any place</i>
βρίθειν	to be heavy	ΒΡΙΘΕΙΝ <i>weighed down</i>
ἀδυνατεῖν	to be unable	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ <i>not powerful</i>
δυνατεῖν	to be able	ΔΥΝΑΤΕΙΝ <i>powerful</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>morning mist</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>

στέλλειν	to send	ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>making ready</i>
στελλόμενος (η, ον)	being sent [here, “being positioned”]	
ἀπέχειν	to restrict	ΑΠΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding away</i>
ὁ τροχός οἱ τροχοί	circumference	ΤΡΟΧΟΣ <i>wheel</i>
μέσος (η, ον)	middle	ΜΕΣΟΣ <i>in between</i>
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting together</i>
κεῖσθαι	to lie [down]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting</i>
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
ἀδύνατος (ον)	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>not powerful</i>
ἡ μονή αἱ μονα	[stationary] position	ΜΟΝΗ <i>staying</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
τὸ αἴτιον τὰ αἴτια	what is the cause	ΑΙΤΙΟΝ <i>blame</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
παρασκευάζων (ουσα, ον)	providing	
παρασκευαστικός (ή, όν)	instrumental	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of preparing alongside</i>
ἡ ἰσότης αἱ ἰσότητες	equality	ΙΣΟΤΗΣ <i>equal</i>
στέλλειν	to send	ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>making ready</i>
ἡ στολή αἱ στολαί	pressure	ΣΤΟΛΗ <i>equipping</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 13 (column 43)

...ὁμοία οὔσα, παρεσκε[ύ]ακεν, ὡς [ἔ]φη] τις τ[ῶ]ν δίων: τὸ δὴ παρασκευάσας ἐν [μέ]σῳ τοῦ τρ[οχ]οῦ παντα[χόθ]εν ὁμ[οί]ω[ς] στ[ε]λλο[μέ]νην μέν[ειν] ἐν τῷ [κόσμῳ] κ[α]τ[ὰ]...

...ὁμοία οὔσα, παρεσκεύακεν, ὡς ἔφη Τis τῶν δίων: Τὸ, δὴ, παρασκευάσας ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τροχοῦ, πανταχόθεν ὁμοίως στελλομένην μένειν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κατὰ...

...[because the Earth] is similar, it has prepared, as Someone among "the divine ones" said: That [situation of] being placed in the middle of the circumference, while being made similarly ready on all sides to remain in the cosmos according to...

ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide [here, “to prepare”]	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
δῖος (α, ον)	divine	ΔΙΟΣ <i>heavenly</i>
μέσος (η, ον)	middle	ΜΕΣΟΣ <i>in between</i>
ὁ τροχός οἱ τροχοί	circumference	ΤΡΟΧΟΣ <i>wheel</i>

πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΘΕΝ <i>from all places</i>
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
στέλλειν	to send	ΣΤΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>making ready</i>
στελλόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being sent [here, “being placed”]	
διαμένειν	to persist	ΔΙΑΜΕΝΕΙΝ <i>staying through</i>
μένειν	to remain	
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging /</i> <i>adorning</i>

For 'Someone among the divine ones' consider: "***si Plato de rebus ab civilibus controversiis remotissimis divinitus est locutus, quod Ego concedo...***" (Cicero de Orat. 1.49)

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 154 fr. 14 (column 44)

...νομίζειν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν πολλοῖς, ἐν πολλοῖς [δὲ κ]αὶ μάλιστα τῷ ὅλῳ τρόπῳ πολλῶι βελτίους, τινὰς δ[ὲ] καὶ παντελῶς ἄπλατ[ο]ν...

...νομίζειν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν πολλοῖς, ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ μάλιστα τῷ ὅλῳ τρόπῳ πολλῶ βελτίους – τινὰς δὲ καὶ παντελῶς ἄπλατον...

... to think of the men in many [], while especially [to think of the men] in many [] as much better in their whole way [of interpretation] – but also some [men are] absolutely unapproachable [regarding their interpretations]...

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
ὁ ἀνὴρ οἱ ἄνδρες	man	ΑΝΗΡ <i>man</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ <i>all completing</i>
ἄπлатος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	unapproachable	ΑΠΛΑΤΟΣ <i>not drawing near</i>
LSJ states that Epíkouros uses ἄπλα <u>τ</u> ος here as an equivalent to ἄπλε <u>τ</u> ος		
ἄπλετος	immense	ΑΠΛΕΤΟΣ <i>not filling</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 12 (column 44)

...ἦν τοῦτο εἰπεῖν αἴτι[ο]ν εἶναι, τὴν δὴ ἰσότητ[α], ἥπερ αὐτὸ τό, ὅτ[ι] τ[ὸ] μένειν αὐτῇ[ν ἐν τ]ῷ μέσῳ τοῦ κόσμ[ου] αἰτιόν ἐστ[ιν] τοῦ [μέ]νειν καὶ... ...κα[ὶ] ὄντ[ω]ν τ[ὸ]ύ[τω]ι συ[μφ]ώνων [πο]τέ, τὰς τῶν ἀέρων ὑπερεῖσεις πεποηκότας, διὰ τὰς τῶν [συν]ημμέ[νω]ν ἀλ[λοτρι]ότητας· [οἷ]ς ἂν [καὶ ἀ]πὸ τύ[χ]ης ὀρθῶς ἐπ[ενε]χθῶσιν, [ο]ύ[θ]εν δεῖ βελτεῖους τούτων εἶναι...

...ἦν Τοῦτο εἰπεῖν αἴτιον εἶναι: τὴν δὴ ἰσότητα, ἥπερ αὐτὸ τό, ὅτι Τὸ μένειν Αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τοῦ κόσμου αἰτιόν ἐστιν τοῦ μένειν, καὶ... ...καὶ ὄντων τούτῳ συμφώνων ποτέ, τὰς τῶν ἀέρων ὑπερεῖσεις πεποηκότας διὰ τὰς τῶν συνημμένων ἀλλοτριότητας· οἷς ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης ὀρθῶς Ἐπeneχθῶσιν, οὐθὲν δεῖ βελτεῖους τούτων εἶναι...

...This was to say that **a cause exists**: indeed, **the equality**, rather than the very thing itself – That **the [Earth] remaining** in the middle of the cosmos is **the cause of [its] remaining [motionless to us]**... ...and while they are in harmony **with this at some point [...]** **the projections of the air that have been produced** through the incompatibilities of the connected [parts]. **to those** Who, **even by chance**, might correctly be applied, It is not necessary to be **better than these**...

τὸ αἶτιον τὰ αἷτια	what is the cause	AITION
ἡ ἰσότης αἱ ἰσότητες	equality	ΙΣΟΤΗΣ <i>equal</i>
μένειν	to remain	MENEIN <i>staying</i>
μέσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	middle	ΜΕΣΟΣ <i>in between</i>
ὁ κόσμος οἱ κόσμοι	cosmos	ΚΟΣΜΟΣ <i>arranging / adorning</i>
φωνῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	speaking	ΦΩΝΩΝ <i>speaking</i>
συμφωνῶν	agreeing [here, "in harmony"]	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΩΝ <i>speaking together</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>morning mist</i>
ἡ ὑπερείσις αἱ ὑπερεΐσεις	projection	ΥΠΕΡΕΙΣΙΣ <i>going beyond</i>
πεποιηκώς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	having made	ΠΕΠΟΙΗΚΩΣ <i>having gathered</i>
συνημμένος <i>(α, ον)</i>	connected	ΣΥΝΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>joined together</i>
ἄλλοτρίως	incompatibly	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ <i>different other</i>
ἡ ἄλλοτριότης αἱ ἄλλοτριότητες	incompatibility	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from other</i>
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ <i>happening</i>
ὀρθῶς	^{α} correctly	ΟΡΘΩΣ <i>straight upright</i>
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing upon</i>
βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ

11.14 Incompatible Forms

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 col. 13 (column 45)

...πάντα γὰρ τιθέμενα παρ' ἄλλ[ό]τ[ρ]οπον αὐτῶν συνα[φ]ῆς εἶδο[ς] διέφθαρτα[ι]... ...μὲν ο[ὖν] τα[ύ]τηι τῇ βίβλω[ι] τοσαυθ' ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεως εἰρήσθ[ω.] ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐχο[μέ]νοις ἔ[τι] περὶ τῶν [με]τεώρων τουτῶνε[ι] τι προσεκκα[θ]αροῦμεν...

...Πάντα γὰρ **τιθέμενα παρ' ἀλλότροπον αὐτῶν συναφῆς εἶδος** διέφθαρται...
...μὲν οὖν, **ταύτη τῇ βίβλω, Τοσαυθ' ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεως εἰρήσθω**
– **ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐχομένοις, ἔτι περὶ τῶν μετεώρων τούτων, εἴ τι**
Προσεκκαθαροῦμεν...

...for all Things **that are set** in a form [*that is*] incompatible **for their union** have been thoroughly destroyed... ...therefore, **in this book**, let This much be said **by us concerning** the hypothesis from the beginning – but **in the subsequent [parts]**, still concerning these astronomical phenomena, if We further clarify **anything** out...

τιθέμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being set	ΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΟΣ <i>placing</i>
άλλοτρίως	incompatibly	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ <i>different other</i>
άλλότριος <i>(ία, ιον)</i>	incompatible	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ <i>different other</i>
άλλότροπος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>other turn / way</i>
ἡ συναφή αἱ συναφαί	union	ΣΥΝΑΦΗ <i>joining together</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
φθείρειν	to destroy	ΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>damaging</i>
διαφθείρειν	to thoroughly destroy	ΔΙΑΦΘΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>damaging through</i>
ἡ βίβλος αἱ βίβλοι	book	ΒΙΒΛΟΣ <i>papyrus</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἡ ὑπόθεσις αἱ ὑποθέσεις	hypothesis	ΥΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ <i>placing under</i>
ἐχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	subsequent	ΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>holding</i>
τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	ΜΕΤΕΩΡΟΝ <i>rising beyond</i>
καθαρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	clear	ΚΑΘΑΡΟΣ <i>cleaning</i>
προσεκκαθαίρειν	to further clarify out	ΠΡΟΣΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleaning further out</i>

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 11, P.Herc. 1042 subscriptio

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΑ*

Επίκουρος' Peri Phýseōs, 11

[U82]

Book 12

12.1 Shapes of Worlds

Scholion with Επίκουρος, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.74

ἐν τῇ ιβ΄ *Περὶ Φύσεως* Αὐτός φησιν "**οὔς** μὲν γὰρ **σφαιροειδεῖς**, καὶ **ῥοειδεῖς ἄλλους**, καὶ **ἀλλοιοσχήμονας** ἐτέρους – **οὐ**, μέντοι, **πᾶν σχῆμα ἔχειν** – **οὐδὲ ζῶα εἶναι ἀποκριθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου**"

in the 12th book *On Nature*, He himself says "**some** [Cosmoi] are **spherical**, **others** egg-shaped, and **others** differently shaped – **they do not**, however, **have every shape** – **nor are** [the Cosmoi] living beings that are distinguished from the infinite"

Επίκουρος, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.74

ἔτι δὲ καὶ **τοὺς κόσμους** οὔτε **ἐξ ἀνάγκης** **Δεῖ** νομίζειν **ἓνα** **σηματισμὸν ἔχοντας** – **ἀλλὰ καὶ** **διαφόρους** αὐτοὺς

It should not **necessarily** be thought that **the** Cosmoi have [just] one configuration – **they are also different**

12.2 Eclipses

Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklês, Laértios 10.96

Ἔκλειψις ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης δύναται μὲν γίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ σβένσιν, καθάπερ καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν Τοῦτο θεωρεῖται γινόμενον – καὶ ἤδη καὶ κατ’ ἐπιπροσθέτησιν ἄλλων τινῶν, ἢ γῆς ἢ ἀοράτου τινὸς ἐτέρου τοιούτου: καὶ ὧδε τοὺς οἰκείους ἀλλήλοις τρόπους Συνθεωρητέον καὶ τὰς ἅμα συγκυρήσεις τινῶν – ὅτι οὐκ Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι

an Eclipse of the sun and moon can also occur due to extinguishing, just as This is envisioned occurring among us – indeed, it can also happen by the interposition of certain other things, either of the Earth or of something unseen and similar to it: thus, It is necessary to envision together the ways that belong to each and their simultaneous concurrences – [understanding] that It is not impossible [for those concurrences] to happen

ἡ ἔκλειψις αἱ ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ <i>leaving out</i>
ὁ ἥλιος	the sun	ΗΛΙΟΣ <i>sun</i>
ἡ σελήνη αἱ σεληῖναι	moon	ΣΕΛΗΝΗ <i>shining light</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced [here, "to happen"]	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ σβένσιν = ἡ σβέσιν	extinguishing	ΣΒΕΝΣΙΣ <i>quenching</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
ἡ ἐπιπροσθέτησις αἱ ἐπιπροσθετήσεις	interposition	ΕΠΙΠΡΟΣΘΕΤΗΣΙΣ <i>setting upon in addition</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ἀόρατος (ος, ον)	unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ <i>not looking</i>
οἰκείως	comfortably	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ <i>appropriate</i>
οἰκεῖος (α, ον)	belonging	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
συνθεωρεῖν	to envision together	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing together</i>
τὸ κυριώτατον τὰ κυριώτατα	most essential thing	ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ <i>most critical</i>
κύριος (α, ον)	essential	ΚΥΡΙΟΣ <i>critical</i>
ἡ συγκύρησις αἱ συγκυρήσεις	concurrence	ΣΥΓΚΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>critical together</i>
ἀδύνατος (ον)	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>not powerful</i>

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklês, Laértios 10.96

ἐν δὲ τῇ ιβ’ *Περὶ Φύσεως* ταῦτα λέγει καὶ πρὸς "ἥλιον ἐκλείπειν σελήνης ἐπισκοτούσης, σελήνην δὲ τοῦ τῆς γῆς σκιάσματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ’ ἀναχώρησιν."

In the 12th book *On Nature* He says **these things** and additionally "the sun is eclipsed by the occulting moon, and the moon [is eclipsed] by the Earth's shadow, but also according to a withdrawal [of the moon]"

<div>ή ἔκλειψις</div> <div>αἱ ἐκλείψεις</div>	<div>a disappearance</div> <div>[or, of the sun & moon]</div> <div>an eclipse</div>	<div>ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ</div> <div>leaving out</div>
<div>ἐγλείπειν =</div> <div>ἐκλείπειν</div>	<div>to disappear</div> <div>[or, of the sun & moon]</div> <div>to be eclipsed</div>	<div>ΕΓΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ</div> <div>ΕΚΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ</div> <div>leaving out</div>
<div>ή σελήνη</div> <div>αἱ σεληῖναι</div>	<div>moon</div>	<div>ΣΕΛΗΝΗ</div> <div>shining light</div>
<div>ἐπισκοτῶν</div> <div>(οὔσα, οὖν)</div>	<div>occulting</div>	<div>ΕΠΙΣΚΟΤΩΝ</div> <div>darkness upon</div>
<div>ή σελήνη</div> <div>αἱ σεληῖναι</div>	<div>moon</div>	<div>ΣΕΛΗΝΗ</div> <div>shining light</div>
<div>τὸ σκίασμα</div> <div>τὰ σκιάσματα</div>	<div>shadow</div>	<div>ΣΚΙΑΣΜΑ</div> <div>reflected image</div>
<div>ή ἀναχώρησις</div> <div>αἱ ἀναχωρήσεις</div>	<div>withdrawal</div>	<div>ΑΝΑΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ</div> <div>place / location</div> <div>back</div>

[U84]

12.3 Conceptions of Gods

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.8.225

κάν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ Περί Φύσεως τοὺς πρώτους φησὶν ἄνθρώπους ἐπὶ νοήματα ἔξω βαίνειν ἀφθάρτων φύσεων

κάν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ Περί Φύσεως τοὺς πρώτους Φησὶν Ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ νοήματα τῶν ἔξω βαίνειν ἀφθάρτων φύσεων

and in the 12th book of *On Nature* He says **that the first People [in human history] arrived** at conceptions of indestructible external natures

<div>τὸ νόημα</div> <div>τὰ νόηματα</div>	<div>conception</div>	<div>ΝΟΗΜΑ</div> <div>seeing</div>
<div>ἄφθαρτος</div> <div>(ον)</div>	<div>indestructible</div>	<div>ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ</div> <div>not decaying</div>

[U85]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.106 [p. 124.1 Gomperz]

[Anderson] *The rendering of this fragment in Usener (as virtually the same as U88, but attributed to Book 12) has been abandoned by subsequent scholarship*

[=U88] *Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111*

...[καὶ ἄλ]ληι κάν τῷ Περί Ὅσιότητι[ος, κάν τῷ] δωδεκάτῳ[καὶ] τρεῖσκα[ιδεκάτῳ] Περί Φύσε[ως, κάν τῷ] πρώτῳ[ι τῶν Περί] Τιμοκράτους...

...καὶ ἄλλη κάν τῷ Περί Ὅσιότητος, κάν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ καὶ τρεῖσκαιδεκάτῳ Περί Φύσεως, κάν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περί Τιμοκράτους...

...in other places, such as in his work *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th books *On Nature*, and in the first of the books *On Timokrátēs*...

[U86]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.3.60

εἴ γ' εὐ[σκοποῦσίν] φησιν φύσιν τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιστῶτων δοξ[άζειν ἀξεῖναι] καὶ πολ[λοῖς αἰ]δίους [θεοῖς κάθα]νάτο[ις εἶναι]

εἴ γ' Εὐσκοποῦσιν, Φησιν, φύσιν τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιστῶτων Δοξάζειν ἀξεῖναι καὶ πολλοῖς αἰδίους θεοῖς κάθανάτοις εἶναι

If, indeed, They examine carefully, [Epíkouros] says, the nature of these situations and the many things [that relate to] this [nature], They will judge [this nature] to rise up and to exist for many eternal and immortal gods

τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ deed / affair
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ seeming
δοξάζειν	to judge	

[U87]

12.5 Madness of Atheists

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.18.514 – 1.19.541

[Π]αρασ[τήσας] ὥς τοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ τ[ῶν] ἄν[δρ]ῶν αὐ[τῶν γε]γραμμέν[οις ἡ]μ[ᾶς] προσέχε[ιν, αὐτ]οῖς δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν μ[ανίαν] Ἐπίκουρος ἐμέμψατο τοῖς τὸ θεῖον ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἄναιροῦσιν, ὥς κἀν τῶι δωδεκάτῳ Προδίκῳ καὶ Διαγόρῳ καὶ Κριτίᾳ καὶ ἄλλοις μέμφ[εται] φᾶς πα[ρα]κόπτ[ειν] καὶ μ[αίνεσθ]αι, καὶ βακχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς εἰ[κ]άζ[ει, κε]λεύσ[ας μὴ] ἡμῶν παρέχειν οὐδ' ἐνοχλεῖν

παραστήσας ὥς τοῖς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὐτῶν γεγραμμένοις ἡμᾶς προσέχειν, αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν μανίαν Ἐπίκουρος ἐμέμψατο τοῖς τὸ θεῖον ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἀναιροῦσιν – ὥς κἀν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ: Προδίκῳ καὶ Διαγόρῳ καὶ Κριτίᾳ, κἄλλοις Μέμφεται – φᾶς παρακόπτειν καὶ μαίνεσθαι. καὶ Βακχεύουσιν αὐτοὺς Εἰκάζει, κελεύσας μὴ πρᾶγμα ἡμεῖν, παρέχειν οὐδ' ἐνοχλεῖν

...having proposed that we pay attention to the writings of [our] own men – Epíkouros reproached all the madness of those who abolish the divine from existing things – just as, in the 12th [book]: He finds fault with Prodíkos, Diagóras, Kritías, and others – saying that they are deranged and insane. He even likens them [to] Those [who] go bacchating, commanding [them] to cause no trouble for us, and to not be irritating

κα[ὶ γὰρ] παραγραμμίζ[ουσι] τὰ τ[ῶν] θεῶν ὀνόμα[τα], [κα]θάπερ Ἀν[τι]σθέ[νης] τὸ κοινό[τατον] ὑποτείνων ἀν[α]φέρε[ι] τὰ κατὰ μέρος [τῇ] θέσει καὶ διὰ τι[νος ἀπά]της ἔτι πρότ[ερον].

καὶ γὰρ Παραγραμμίζουνσι τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα – καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης, τὸ κοινότατον ὑποτείνων, ἀναφέρει τὰ κατὰ μέρος τῇ θέσει – καὶ διὰ τίνος ἀπάτης ἔτι πρότερον

for They erase* the names of the gods – just as Antisthénēs, insisting on the most general [conception of the gods], attributes the particular [conceptions and names] to an establishment [by human convention] – and even earlier [by cynical people] through some deception

τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ written again
παραγραμμίζειν	to erase	ΠΑΡΑΓΡΑΜΜΙΖΕΙΝ writing across
*this is a rare verb that may mean either "to erase" or "to rewrite"		

Prodíkos, Diagóras, and Kritías were well known atheists.
Antisthénēs (fl. 406 BCE) learned rhetoric under Gorgias, developed a group of his own followers. Then, he became a student of Socrates and encouraged his students to do the same. He later feuded with Plato and "began the Cynic way of life." He was known for saying "I would rather be insane than feel pleasure" (Laértios 6.3)

Book 13

Divine Neutrality

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.36.1023 – 1.37.1054

τὸ δὲ περ[αίνεσθαι ὦ]φελίας ἐκ [θεῶν τοῖς] ἀγαθοῖς κα[ὶ βλάβας] τοῖς κακ[οῖς, κατα]λείπουσι[ν. καὶ τοῖς] μὲν φρον[ίμοις καὶ] δικαίοις τ[ὸ τελει]οῦσθαι νοη[τέον] καὶ τὰς ὠφ[ελίας καὶ] τὰς βλάβας[ς οὐ κατα]δεεστέρα[ς ἢ καὶ] μείζους ὧ[ν ἄνθρω]ποι συνάπ[τουσιν, ο]ὐ κατ' ἀσθέ[νειαν οὐ]δὲ καθάπερ [ἡμεῖν ἐκ] τοῦ θεοῦ τι[νος δέ]ον κἀν ἐπα[ναχω]ρήσει τῆς [ὀνήσευς] αὐτοῦ, καὶ τ[αὐτά φ]ασι σεμνό[τατα]

τὸ δὲ περαίνεσθαι ὠφελίας ἐκ θεῶν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ βλάβας τοῖς κακοῖς Καταλείπουσιν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν φρονίμοις καὶ δικαίοις τὸ τελειοῦσθαι Νοητέον καὶ τὰς ὠφελίας καὶ τὰς βλάβας οὐ καταδεεστέρας ἢ καὶ μείζους ὧν Ἄνθρωποι συνάπτουσιν – οὐ κατ' ἀσθένειαν, οὐδὲ καθάπερ ἡμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τινος Δέον, κἀν ἐπαναχωρήσει τῆς ὀνήσεως αὐτοῦ – καὶ ταῦτά Φασι σεμνότατα

The [Kathēgemónes] thoroughly leave [alone, the idea of] the achieving benefits out of the gods for good [people] and harms for bad [people] – as It is necessary for the wise and just to conceive the fulfillment of both benefits and harms [to be] neither inferior nor greater than those which Men [themselves] connect [to the gods] – [with wise people leaving alone the idea of fulfillment of benefits from a god] not out of weakness, nor as though for us There is a need from some god, even in stepping back from that benefit – and these things They say most solemnly

καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave [alone]	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
<i>for this passage, Obbink translates καταλείπειν as "allow" and "accept"</i>		
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>fastening together</i>

ἔν τε γὰρ τ[ῶι Περὶ] Θεῶν ποία [τίς ἐστίν] αἰτία ν[εμέσεως] καὶ σωτηρία[ς ἀνθρώ]ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ κα]ταλειπτέον ὑπ[ογράφ]φει διὰ πλεό[νων]. “Ἐν τε τῷ τρε[ῖσκα]ι δεκάτῳ, περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἣ[ν πρὸς] τινὰς ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος]

ἔν τε γὰρ τῷ Περὶ Θεῶν ποία τίς ἐστίν Αἰτία νεμέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας ἀνθρώποις διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλειπτέον, Ὑπογράφει διὰ πλειόνων – ἔν τε τῷ τρεῖσκαιδεκάτῳ, περὶ τῆς οἰκειότητος ἣν πρὸς τινὰς ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος

[Epíkouros] writes with many [words] in the [book] *Concerning the Gods*, what kind of Cause for vengeance and security exists that must be thoroughly left behind for men through a god – and in the 13th [book, Epíkouros writes] about the familiarity and the alienation that a God has with certain [people]

The "familiarity and the alienation that a god has with certain people" may be explained by Epíkouros largely along the lines of "It is necessary for the wise and just to conceive the fulfillment of both benefits and harms to be neither inferior nor greater than those which men themselves connect to the gods," (as just stated above).

[=U87] *Uncertain Author, P.Herc. 1111*

...[καὶ ἄλ]λη κἀν τ[ῶι Περὶ Ὀ]σιότητ[ος, κἀν τῷ] δωδεκά[τῳ καὶ] τρεῖσκα[ιδεκάτῳ] Περὶ Φύσε[ως, κἀν τῷ] πρώτῳ[ι τῶν Περὶ] Τιμοκράτους...

...καὶ ἄλλη κἀν τῷ Περὶ Ὀσιότητος, κἀν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ καὶ τρεῖσκαιδεκάτῳ Περὶ Φύσεως, κἀν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ Τιμοκράτους...

...in other places, such as in his work *On Holiness*, and in the 12th and 13th books *On Nature*, and in the first of the books *On Timocrátēs*...

In Book 14, Epíkouros critiques inconsistent explanations of natural phenomena.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 3

...καθὸ τὰς μ[ε]ταβάσεις ἐν αὐταῖς ἂν νο[ή]σωμεν διὰ λόγου...

...καθὸ τὰς μεταβάσεις ἐν αὐταῖς ἂν Νοήσωμεν διὰ λόγου...

...whereby We might conceive the [spatial] extensions in them through [our] reasoning...

ἢ μετάβασις αἱ μεταβάσεις	[spatial] extension	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ <i>stepping beyond</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>

14.1 Unnecessary Burden of Endless Inquiry

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 24

...[ἀ]γαπητ[ὸν] καὶ τοῦτ[ο], τὸ δὴ πάντα τὸν συνε[χό]μενον [ταῖς] τοιαύταις περιερν[ε]ίαις ἔχειν οἰονὶ φάρμακον δι' οὗ καταστάσεις ἀπλ[ᾶς ἔστι]ν ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσε[ως θεωρί]αι ἀπαλλαγῇσε[σθαι τῆς σ]υμφύτου ἑαυταῖς[ς] ταραχ[ῆς] ἥ καὶ ὕστερον...

...ἀγαπητὸν καὶ Τοῦτο: Τὸ δὴ πάντα τὸν συνεχόμενον ταῖς τοιαύταις περιεργείαις ἔχειν οἰονὶ φάρμακον – δι' οὗ Καταστάσεις ἀπλᾶς Ἔστιν ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως θεωρίᾳ ἀπαλλαγῇσεσθαι τῆς συμφύτου ἑαυταῖς ταραχῆς. Ἡ καὶ ὕστερον...

...This is also desirable: That one who is entirely afflicted by such over-questionings has a kind of remedy – through which It is possible that a simple Condition [of life, focused] in the [mental] observation of nature will set free their innate trouble. Which [remedy] afterward also...

ἀγαπητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	desirable	ΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΣ <i>love worthy</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly holding</i>
συνέχειν	to keep united	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding together</i>
συνέχεσθαι	to be kept united [here, "to be afflicted"]	ΣΥΝΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>being held together</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
ἢ περιεργεία = ἢ περιεργία	over-questioning	ΠΕΡΙΕΡΓΕΙΑ <i>work around</i>
οἰονὶ	of what sort [here, "a kind of"]	ΟΙΟΣ + ΝΙ <i>such as</i>
τὸ φάρμακον τὰ φάρμακα	remedy	ΦΑΡΜΑΚΟΝ <i>drug</i>
ἢ ἀποκατάστασις αἱ ἀποκαταστάσεις	reestablishment	ΑΠΟΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>placed thoroughly back</i>
ἢ κατάστασις αἱ καταστάσεις	condition	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>thoroughly placed</i>
ἀπλόος <i>(η, ον)</i>	simple	ΑΠΛΟΟΣ <i>one fold</i>

<p>ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι</p>	<p>[the act of mental] observation</p>	<p>ΘΕΩΡΙΑ act of <i>observing</i></p>
<p>ἀπαλλάσσειν</p>	<p>to remove away</p>	<p>ΑΠΑΛΛΑΣΣΕΙΝ <i>other away</i></p>
<p>ἀπαλλαγῆσθαι</p>	<p>to remove away [in the future]</p>	
<p>τὸ φυτόν τὰ φυτά</p>	<p>plant</p>	<p>ΦΥΤΟΝ <i>growing</i></p>
<p>σύμφυτος <i>(ος, ον)</i></p>	<p>innate</p>	<p>ΣΥΜΦΥΤΟΣ <i>growing together</i></p>
<p>ὁ τάραχος = ἡ ταραχή</p>	<p>disturbance</p>	<p>ΤΑΡΑΧΗ ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>agitating</i></p>
<p>ὕστερον</p>	<p>afterward</p>	<p>ΎΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>later</i></p>

14.2 Anaximénēs

Anaximénēs of Miletus (flourished 545 BCE, about 250 years before Epíkouros) believed that air (ἀήρ) can change into water, earth, and fire – and into everything else – by getting thicker or thinner.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 6 (column 27)

...πρὸς τ[ο]ῦς ἐ[κ τ]ῶν νεφῶν [φ]άσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, καὶ νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖ[ον εἶ]ναι ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσε[ως ᾗ]παντᾶ γίνεται πυ[κνώ]σει καὶ ἀ[ρ]αιώσει παρ[εξ]αλλαττούσης τὸν [ἀέ]ρα...

...πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν νεφῶν **φάσκοντας πυκνουμένων τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος Φύσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι** – καὶ **νομίζοντας καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον εἶναι** ὡς ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως **Ἄπαντα γίνεται πυκνώσει καὶ ἀραιώσει παρεξαλλαττούσης τὸν ἀέρα...**

...to those alleging that, the Nature of water is fully produced out of the clouds concentrating – and thinking that this too is a sign that Everything is produced from one nature slightly modifying the air by concentrating and dispersing...

<p>τὸ νέφος τὰ νέφη</p>	<p>cloud</p>	<p>ΝΕΦΟΣ <i>fog</i></p>
<p>φάσκειν</p>	<p>to allege</p>	<p>ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>affirming</i></p>
<p>τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα</p>	<p>a concentration</p>	<p>ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i></p>
<p>ἡ πυκνότης αἱ πυκνότητες</p>	<p>concentration</p>	<p>ΠΥΚΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from compacting</i></p>
<p>πυκνούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i></p>	<p>concentrating</p>	<p>ΠΥΚΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ</p>
<p>ἡ πύκνωσις αἱ πυκνώσεις</p>	<p>a concentrating</p>	<p>ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ <i>action of compacting</i></p>
<p>τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα</p>	<p>water</p>	<p>ὙΔΩΡ <i>rain</i></p>
<p>ἀποτελεῖν</p>	<p>to fully produce</p>	<p>ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>[turning, completing] away</i></p>
<p>νομίζειν</p>	<p>to think</p>	<p>NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i></p>
<p>νομίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i></p>	<p>thinking</p>	<p>NOMIZON <i>custom</i></p>
<p>σημειούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i></p>	<p>being indicated</p>	<p>ΣΗΜΕΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>sign</i></p>
<p>τὸ σημεῖον τὰ σημεῖα</p>	<p>sign</p>	<p>ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ <i>indication</i></p>

γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ ἄραιῳσις αἱ ἄραιώσεις	dispersing	ΑΡΑΙΩΣΙΣ <i>action of thinning</i>
ἀπαλλάσσειν	to remove away	ΑΠΑΛΛΑΣΣΕΙΝ <i>other away</i>
παρεξαλλάττων	to [slightly] modify	ΠΑΡΕΞΑΛΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>out of other beside</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 8 (column 29)

...[παρά] τὰς ὁμοίας [φα]ντασ[ί]ας [αὐ]τοὺς παραλο[γί]ζονται...

...παρὰ τὰς ὁμοίας φαντασίας, αὐτοὺς Παραλογίζονται...

...beyond the similar images, They deceive themselves...

ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
παραλογίζομαι	to deceive	ΠΑΡΑΛΟΓΙΖΟΜΑΙ <i>beside reason</i>

14.3 Dēmókritos

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 9 (column 30)

...[βελτίο]νες ἄνδρες πράτ[τουσιν, ἀλ]λὰ καὶ τῶν προσα[γ]ορευομ[έ]νων φιλοσόφων, οὓς, ναὶ μὰ τό[ν], ἔλπ[ο]μαι, εἰ δεῖ, καὶ
 Δημόκριτο[ν] ὥς ὀνομάσαι· ἄρ' ἂν ἐ[νι]σταῖμεν πρ[ὸ]ς... ...ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις...

...βελτίονες Ἄνδρες πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν προσαγορευομένων
 "φιλοσόφων" – οὓς, ναὶ μὰ τόν, Ἐλπομαι, εἰ Δεῖ, καὶ Δημόκριτον ὥς ὀνομάσαι·
 ἄρ' ἂν Ἐνισταῖμεν πρὸς... ...ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις...?

...better Men do, but even those being referred to as "philosophers" –
 [among] whom, yes by [god], I suppose, if It is necessary, to also bring up the
 name of Dēmókritos in this way. would We resist against... ...in the
 astronomical phenomena...?

βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ
πράττειν	to do	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
προσαγορευόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being referred to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
ὁ φιλόσοφος οἱ φιλόσοφοι	philosopher	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ <i>loving knowledge</i>
ἐλπειν	to suppose	ΕΛΠΕΙΝ <i>hoping</i>
ὁ Δημόκριτος	Dēmókritos	ΔΗΜΟΚΡΙΤΟΣ <i>judging community</i>
ὀνομάζειν [here, "to bring up the name"]	to use the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ <i>naming</i>
συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
ἐνιστάναι	to resist	ΕΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing in[stead]</i>

τὸ μετέωρον τὰ μετέωρα	astronomical phenomenon	METEOPON <i>rising beyond</i>
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Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 10 (column 31)

...[κατὰ μι]κρὸν πολλοὺς ὄγκ[ους δε]ξομένης, καὶ ἄλλ[ων συγ]κρίσεων...

...κατὰ μικρὸν πολλοὺς ὄγκους δεξομένης, καὶ ἄλλων συγκρίσεων...

...while receiving many particles little by little, and other compounds...

μικρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
κατὰ μικρὸν	little by little	
ὁ ὄγκος οἱ ὄγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
δεξόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	recieving	ΔΕΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>accepting</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>

14.4 Monism

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 fr. 11 (column 33)

...[οὐ γάρ] πα[ρὰ τούτου πι]ύκνωσιν ἢ ἀρα[ί]ωσιν τὰ πράγματα γεν[ν]ᾷται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ [σ]χημάτ[ω]ν διαφορὰς τὸ ἰσχυρὸ[ν τῶ]ν παραλλαγῶν [έκγί]νεται...

...οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τούτου πύκνωσιν ἢ αραίωσιν τὰ Πράγματα γεννᾶται – ἀλλὰ, παρὰ σχημάτων διαφορὰς Τὸ ἰσχυρὸν τῶν παραλλαγῶν ἐκγίνεται...

...for these Situations are not created from this [one single underlying substance] by [its] concentrating or by [its] dispersing – but rather, What prevails is produced out of the differences in the variety of the shapes...

τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
ἡ πύκνωσις αἱ πυκνώσεις	a concentrating	ΠΥΚΝΩΣΙΣ <i>action of compacting</i>
ἡ ἀραίωσις αἱ ἀραιώσεις	dispersing	ΑΡΑΙΩΣΙΣ <i>action of thinning</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>deed / affair</i>
ἡ γένεσις αἱ γενέσεις	creation	ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ <i>action of being born</i>
γεννᾶσθαι	to be created	ΓΕΝΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>being born</i>
γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἐκγίνεσθαι	to be produce out of	ΕΚΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being out of</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ <i>strength</i>
ἰσχύων <i>(ἰσχύουσα, ἰσχύον)</i>	prevailing	ΙΣΧΥΩΝ <i>strength</i>

ἰσχυρός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	prevails	ΙΣΧΥΡΟΣ <i>strength</i>
τὸ ἰσχυρόν τὰ ἰσχυρά	what prevails	
ἡ παραλλαγὴ αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>

14.5 Platonic "Solids"

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 1 (column 34)

...[πρὸς τοὺς] ὀρίζοντας σχῆμα π[ι]υρὸς ἴδιον ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ [ἀ]έρος, ὅτι γελοιότεροί εἰσι τῶν οὐχ ὀριζόντων μέν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς παραθέσεις ὁμολογησάν[τε]ων ἂν ἢ ἐκουσίως ἢ ἀκου[σῖ]ως γίνεσθαί τινα σχημά[τε]ων ἴδια εἶδη καθ' ἐκάστην [οὐ]σιώδη ῥηθεῖσαν ἂν σύγ[κρ]ισιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς μέν [στ]οιχείο[ις] ἀμαρτάνουσιν, [ἀ]κόλουθον δέ τι τούτοις [μ]ᾶλλον, οὕτω λέγοντες, [λέ]γοιεν ἄν, καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὴν [τα]ῖς μείξεσι[ν] παραλλαγὴν· [οἱ] δὲ πρὸς τὴν...

...πρὸς τοὺς ὀρίζοντας **σχῆμα πυρὸς ἴδιον ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος**: ὅτι **γελοιότεροί** Εἰσι **τῶν οὐχ ὀριζόντων** μέν – **κατὰ δὲ τὰς παραθέσεις**, **ὁμολογησάντων ἂν**, **ἢ ἐκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως**, γίνεσθαί τινα σχημάτων ἴδια Εἶδη **καθ' ἐκάστην οὐσιώδη ῥηθεῖσαν ἂν σύγκρισιν**: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ **τοῖς** μέν **στοιχείοις** ἀμαρτάνουσιν, **ἀκόλουθον** δέ **Τι τούτοις μᾶλλον** – οὕτω λέγοντες, **Λέγοιεν ἂν** καὶ ὅλως δὲ **τὴν ταῖς μείξεσιν παραλλαγὴν** – Οἱ δὲ **πρὸς τὴν...**

...[such is the case] for those who define [one] particular shape for fire, or earth, or water, or air: since They are more ridiculous than those who do not define [any type of shape for each element] – given that, in [their comparative] juxtapositions, those [who define a specific shape for each element] should have agreed, either willingly or unwillingly, that certain [multiple] particular Forms of shapes are produced which can [affirmatively] be said to be substantial [*i.e., really existing*] in accordance with each compound: but Some [people] make a mistake regarding these component [elements], and there is Something more consistent [to be said that pertains] to these [elements] – speaking in this way, Those [who define one particular shape for each element] could also entirely refer to the variety in the mixtures – but Those [people who...] for the...

ὀρίζειν	to set a limit	ὍΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
ὀρίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	setting a limit [defining]	ὍΡΙΖΩΝ <i>separating</i>
τὰ ὀρίζοντα τὸ ὀρίζον	what sets a limit	
ὁ ὀρίζων οἱ ὀρίζοντες	he who defines	
ὁ οὐχ ὀρίζων οἱ οὐχ ὀρίζοντες	he who does not define	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ <i>fire</i>
τὸ ἰδίωμα τὰ ιδιώματα	idiom	ΙΔΙΩΜΑ <i>particular</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	Γῆ <i>land</i>
τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water	ὙΔΩΡ <i>rain</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	Αἰὴρ <i>morning mist</i>
γελοιότερος <i>(οτέρα, ότερον)</i>	more ridiculous	ΓΕΛΟΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>more laughing</i>
ἡ θέσις αἱ θέσεις	position	ΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing</i>

<p>ἡ παράθεσις αἱ παραθέσεις</p>	juxtaposition	<p>ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing alongside</i></p>
<p>ὁμολογεῖν</p>	to agree	<p>ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i></p>
<p>ὁ ὁμολογήσας οἱ ὁμολογήσαντες</p>	he who has agreed	<p>ὍΜΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ <i>same reasoning</i></p>
<p>ἐκὼν <i>(ἐκοῦσα, ἐκόν)</i></p>	willing	<p>ἘΚΩΝ <i>voluntary</i></p>
<p>ἐκουσίως</p>	willingly	<p>ἘΚΟΥΣΙΩΣ <i>voluntarily</i></p>
<p>ἄκων <i>(ἄκουσα, ἄκον)</i></p>	unwilling	<p>ΑΚΩΝ <i>not voluntary</i></p>
<p>ἀκουσίως</p>	unwillingly	<p>ΑΚΟΥΣΙΩΣ <i>not voluntarily</i></p>
<p>γίνεσθαι</p>	to be produced	<p>ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i></p>
<p>τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα</p>	shape	<p>ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i></p>
<p>ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i></p>	particular	<p>ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i></p>
<p>τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη</p>	form	<p>ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i></p>
<p>οὔσιώδης <i>(ώδης, ῶδες)</i></p>	substantial	<p>ΟΥΣΙΩΔΗΣ <i>quality of being</i></p>
<p>λέγειν</p>	to say	<p>ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i></p>
<p>ῥηθῆναι</p>	to be said [already]	<p>ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i></p>
<p>ῥηθεῖς <i>(εῖσα, ἐν)</i> ῥηθέντες <i>(εῖσαι, ἐντα)</i></p>	said	<p>ῬΘΕΙΣ <i>said</i></p>
<p>ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις</p>	compound	<p>ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i></p>
<p>τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα</p>	component [fact or thing]	<p>ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i></p>
<p>ἁμαρτάνειν</p>	to make a mistake	<p>ἌΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ <i>missing the mark</i></p>
<p>ἀκολουθεῖν</p>	to follow	<p>ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i></p>
<p>ἀκόλουθος <i>(ος, ον)</i></p>	consistent	
<p>ἡ μείξις αἱ μείξεις</p>	a mixing	<p>ΜΕΙΞΙΣ</p>
<p>ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί</p>	variety	<p>ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i></p>

*Epíkouros appears to be criticizing the theory of elements in Plato’s Timaeus, where Plato assigns the shape of **tetrahedron** (four triangular faces) to **fire**, **hexahedron** (six square faces) to **earth**, **octahedron** (eight triangular faces) to **air**, **icosahedron** (twenty triangular faces) to **water** – as well as the **dodecahedron** (twelve pentagonal faces) to the **cosmos as a whole**.*

*Epíkouros disagrees with Plato that elements have one specific shape. For example, the element of **water is not necessarily the specific shape of an icosahedron**, the aggregates of atoms that are the element of water can only be said to be within a class of multiple similar shapes.*

14.6 Shapes of the Elements

...πῶς ἂν τις ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέ[ρ]α διανοηθείη ἢ πῦρ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν γῆν στερεὰν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον διανοηθείη τις, μὴ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενοι τέμνουσιν; εἰ γὰρ μὴ στερεὸν ἕκαστον τούτων νοηθήσεται, πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας κατ[ά] τὰς τομὰς φαντασίας παρασκευαῖ σχημάτων, καὶ ο[ὕ] τ[ρ]ίγωνα [ο]ὐδὲ πυραμίδας οὐδὲ κύβους οὐδ' ἀλλ' οὐθὲν ὠ[ρ]ισμένον σχῆμα· ο[ὕ]θὲν γ[ὰ]ρ πιθανὸν ἔχοιεν [ἅ]ν λέγειν ὡς μᾶλλον τι τὰ ὀρώμενα ταῦτα [τὰ] τ[έτ]ταρα [εἰ]δη ἔ[σ]τι [νομίζειν κατὰ τὰς τομὰς λαμβάνειν ἢ παντοδαπά]...

...πῶς ἂν Τις ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα διανοηθείη ἢ πῦρ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν γῆν στερεὰν καὶ ἀδιάλυτον διανοηθείη Τις; μὴ ὅτι ταῦτα Ἀποφαινόμενοι τέμνουσιν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ στερεὸν Ἑκαστον τούτων νοηθήσεται, πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας κατὰ τὰς τομὰς φαντασίας Παρασκευᾷ σχημάτων – καὶ οὐ τρίγωνα οὐδὲ πυραμίδας οὐδὲ κύβους οὐδ' ἀλλ' οὐθὲν ὠρισμένον σχῆμα – Οὐθὲν γὰρ πιθανὸν Ἑχοιεν ἂν λέγειν ὡς μᾶλλον τι τὰ ὀρώμενα ταῦτα τὰ τέτταρα Εἶδη Ἔστι νομίζειν κατὰ τὰς τομὰς λαμβάνειν ἢ παντοδαπά...

...how could Someone [mentally] perceive water or air or fire [as solid and indissoluble], when One cannot even [mentally] perceive earth as solid and indissoluble? not [to mention the fact] that Those [people] representing these [ideas of indissoluble elements do in reality] divide [them]: given that Each of these [elements] is not conceived as firm, [then] One could provide many and varied images of shapes according to the divisions [of elements] – and [there will] not be [just] triangles, or pyramids, or cubes, or any other finite shape [specific to each element] – for Those [people who define a particular shape for each element] would have Nothing persuasive to say [to convince us that] that It is more [fitting] to think that these four visible Forms are comprehended [by us] according to [their] divisions [of a specific shape for each element] rather [than the elements being] varied [in their specific class of shapes]...

τὸ ὕδωρ τὰ ὕδατα	water	ῥΥΔΩΡ <i>rain</i>
ὁ ἀήρ <i>(τοῦ ἀέρος)</i>	air	ΑΗΡ <i>morning mist</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ <i>fire</i>
ἡ γῆ αἱ γαῖ	earth	ΓΗ <i>land</i>
στερεός <i>(ἄ, ὀν)</i>	firm	ΣΤΕΡΕΟΣ <i>stiff</i>
ἡ λύσις αἱ λύσεις	solution	ΛΥΣΙΣ <i>loosening</i>
ἡ διάλυσις αἱ διαλύσεις	dissolution	ΔΙΑΛΥΣΙΣ <i>fully loosening</i>
ἀδιάλυτος <i>(ον)</i>	indissoluble	ΑΔΙΑΛΥΤΟΣ <i>not fully loose</i>
τὸ φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
ἀποφαινόμενος <i>(ομένη, ὄμενον)</i>	representing	ΑΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing away</i>
ὁ ἀποφαινόμενος οἱ ἀποφαινόμενοι	he who represents	
ἐπιτέμνειν	to cut short	ΕΠΙΤΕΜΝΕΙΝ <i>cutting upon</i>
τέμνειν	to divide	
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
παντοῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	all kinds	ΠΑΝΤΟΙΟΣ <i>all of this sort</i>
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ <i>cut</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>

τὸ τρίγωνον τὰ τρίγωνα	triangle	ΤΡΙΓΩΝΟΝ <i>three corner</i>
ἡ πυραμὶς αἱ πυραμίδες	pyramid	ΠΥΡΑΜΙΣ <i>fire-shaped</i>
ὁ κύβος οἱ κύβοι	cube	ΚΥΒΟΣ <i>dice</i>
ὥρισμένος <i>(ἡ, ον)</i>	finite	ΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ <i>limit</i>
πιθανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	persuasive	ΠΙΘΑΝΟΣ <i>probable</i>
ὁρώμενος <i>(ὁρωμένη, ὁρώμενον)</i>	being seen	ὈΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>perceiving</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
ἡ τομή αἱ τομαί	division	ΤΟΜΗ <i>cut</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
παντοδαπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	varied	ΠΑΝΤΟΔΑΠΟΣ <i>all countries</i>

*Epíkouros explains that Plato's theory of the elements being composed of distinct geometric shapes is flawed: because even **earth** – which is usually the most solid of "the four elements" – is not permanently solid or indissoluble.*

*Given that this is the case, it is absurd to assign **solid** and **fixed** shapes to the even **less solid** elements of **water**, **fire**, or **air**.*

14.7 Shape of Fire

The word "pyramid" comes from the Greek word for "fire." The assumption was that fire had this basic fundamental shape due to its being "pointed" and causing pain when touched. Epíkouros points out that this argument is insufficient to conclude that fire is always composed of pyramid shaped components.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 3 (column 36)

...[συγχωρῶμεν δὲ τό γε νῦν τῷ πυρὶ τὴν πυραμίδα ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἐκείνων τῶν σ]χημάτω[ν] τοῖ[ς] λοιποῖς στοιχείοις κατὰ τὰ φαινόμεν' αὐτῶν εἶδη ταυτεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐχ[ι] μόνον, εἰ ἄρα, ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἂν τοιαύτη τις φαντασία σχήματος οἶαν ἐκεῖνος ἀποδίδωσίν ποτε δόξαι γίνεσθαι, οὐδ' αὖ[τε] αἰεὶ, οὐ δὲ περὶ πᾶσαν φύσιν πυρὸς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν αὐτῆς φλ[ο]γός, κα[ὶ] ταύτην ἐμ ποιᾶ[ν] τ[ι]νι τοῦ [πε]ριέ[χοντο]ς καταστάσει· ἐπὶ [δ'] εἶδη ταυτ[ι] φερόμενος [έν]ίστε ἔοικε[ν] ἀποδ[ι]δ[ού]ς τ[ῷ] πυρὶ σχ[ῆ]μα [διάφορον κ]αί...

...[Συγχωρῶμεν, δὲ τό γε νῦν, τῷ πυρὶ τὴν Πυραμίδα ὑπάρχειν: καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἐκείνων τῶν] σχημάτων τοῖς λοιποῖς στοιχείοις κατὰ τὰ φαινόμεν' αὐτῶν εἶδη ταυτεῖ – ἀλλ' οὐχὶ μόνον. εἰ ἄρα, ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἂν τοιαύτη τις Φαντασία σχήματος οἶαν Ἐκεῖνος ἀποδίδωσίν ποτε δόξαι γίνεσθαι – οὐδ', Αὕτη αἰεὶ – οὐ δὲ περὶ πᾶσαν φύσιν πυρὸς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν αὐτῆς φλογός, καὶ ταύτην ἐν ποιᾶ τινι τοῦ περιέχοντος καταστάσει· ἐπὶ δ' εἶδη ταυτὶ φερόμενος, ἐνίστε Ἔοικεν ἀποδιδούς τῷ πυρὶ σχῆμα διάφορον καί...

...[let Us agree, for now, that a Pyramid-shape exists in fire: nevertheless, certain other] shapes also [exist] among those in the remaining components [of fire] according to the very forms of [those components] that appear – not just one [shape]. if indeed, [there] might [be] in fire such a certain Image of the shape as that which This person [i.e., Plátōn] sometimes demonstrates seems to be produced – nevertheless, [it is] not always This [image] – nor [does this image of a specific shape] encompass the entire nature of fire, but rather [only] encompasses the [nature] of the flame itself, and this [is only produced] in a certain type of condition of the surrounding [environment]. but being carried along in these forms sometimes demonstrates for fire that It resembles a differing shape and...

ἡ χώρα αἱ χώραι	space	ΧΩΡΑ <i>location</i>
συγχωρεῖν	to agree	ΣΥΓΧΩΡΕΙΝ <i>place / location together</i>
τὸ πῦρ	fire	ΠΥΡ <i>fire</i>
ἡ πυραμῖς αἱ πυραμίδες	pyramid	ΠΥΡΑΜΙΣ <i>fire-shaped</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining <i>[rest of + gen]</i>	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component <i>[for facts]</i> or, element <i>[for things]</i>	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ταυτεῖ = ταυτὶ	<i>[here, "the very"]</i>	
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ φλόξ αἱ φλόγες	flame	ΦΛΟΞ <i>burning</i>
περιέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ <i>holding around</i>
ἡ κατάστασις αἱ καταστάσεις	condition	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>thoroughly placed</i>
φερόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being carried	ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>bringing</i>
ἔοικεν	it resembles	
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
ἀποδιδούς <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	demonstrating	
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
διάφορος <i>(ον)</i>	differing	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ <i>carrying apart</i>

14.8 Air Pressure & Fire

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 4 (column 37)

...ἐξέφευ[γε] τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος στο[λ]ήν, λεπτομερές πα[ν]τελῶς αὐτὸ ὄν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐν ἀθροισμῷ λαμβάνεσθαι συναγωγὴν ἐπιδεχομένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐμβρεῖθαι ποσὴ τις στολήν ἐπιδέχεται οὔτ[ε] λεπτομέρεια, ἀλλὰ συμμετρία τις ποσὴ καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτου συντελεστικὴ γί[ν]εται· ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο γελοιῶς ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας ἀναλελόγισται καὶ οὐκ ἐπισταμένως τάφανές διὰ τοῦ φαινομένου συλλογί[ζ]εσθαι· καὶ ἡ γῆ δὲ π[ι]λιν οὐ[κ] ἐ[κ τοῦ] αὐτ[οῦ τ]ρόπου δύν[αται]...

...Ἐξέφευγε **τὴν** ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος **στολὴν**, **λεπτομερές** παντελῶς Αὐτὸ δὲν, καὶ οὐ δυνάμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος **ἐν ἄθροισμῷ** λαμβάνεσθαι **συναγωγὴν** ἐπιδεχομένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ Ἐμβρεΐθεια ποσὴ τις **στολὴν** ἐπιδέχεται – οὔτε Λεπτομέρεια: ἀλλὰ Συμμετρία τις ποσὴ καὶ **τοῦ τοιούτου συντελεστικὴ** γίνεται· ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ Τοῦτο ^[1] γελοίως **ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας** ἀναλελόγισται – καὶ οὐκ ^[2] **ἐπισταμένως** **τάφανές** **διὰ τοῦ φαινομένου** συλλογίζεσθαι· καὶ ἡ Γῆ δὲ πάλιν οὐκ **ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου** δύναται...

...[flowing upwards, the Form of flames] flows out from the pressure beneath the air, being absolutely subtle Itself, and not having the force beneath the air to be taken into an aggregation that permits a gathering. for neither does any measurable Density [on its own] permit pressure [to form] – nor does Subtlety [on its own, permit pressure to form]: but some measurable Proportion [between density and subtlety] does become contributive to such a [formation of pressure as seen in flames]. but even This has been ^[1] ridiculously analogized from an image – and not ^[2] by them inferring in an understandable way the invisible thing through the visible thing [i.e., the shape of fire on a fundamental level through observing fire and flames]. and again, the Earth is not capable from the same way...

τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ἡ φλόξ αἱ φλόγες	flame	ΦΛΟΞ <i>burning</i>
ἐκφεύγειν	to flow out from	ΕΚΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ <i>fleeing out</i>
ἡ στολή αἱ στολαί	pressure	ΣΤΟΛΗ <i>equipping</i>
λεπτομερές <i>(ές)</i>	subtle	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>fine part</i>
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ <i>all completing</i>
δυνάμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>power</i>
ἄθροος <i>(α, ον)</i>	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
ὁ ἄθροισμός οἱ ἄθροισμοί	aggregation	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
λαμβάνειν	[generally] to acquire [here, "to be taken"]	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ συναγωγὴ αἱ συναγωγαί	gathering	ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ <i>going together</i>
ἐνδεχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	possible [here, "permitting"]	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>accepting in</i>
τὸ πύκνωμα τὰ πυκνώματα	a concentration	ΠΥΚΝΩΜΑ <i>the result of compacting</i>
ἡ πυκνότης αἱ πυκνότητες	concentration	ΠΥΚΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from compacting</i>
ἡ ἔμβρεΐθεια = ἡ ἔμβρίθεια	density	ΕΜΒΡΕΙΘΕΙΑ <i>heaviness within</i>
ποσός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	how many / measurable	ΠΟΣΟΣ <i>some / certain</i>
ἡ λεπτομέρεια αἱ λεπτομέρειαι	subtlety	ΛΕΠΤΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ <i>fine/thin part</i>
ἡ συμμετρία αἱ συμμετρίαι	proportion	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΙΑ <i>measure together</i>
ἀποτελεστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	productive	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of completing out</i>

συντελεστικός	contributive	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of completing together</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
γελοιότερος <i>(οτέρα, ότερον)</i>	more ridiculous	ΓΕΛΟΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>more laughing</i>
γελοίως	ridiculously	ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ <i>laughing</i>
ή φαντασία αί φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
άναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action again</i>
ή σύστασις αί συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
έπισταμένως	in an understandable way	ΕΠΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΩΣ <i>standing upon</i>
τò άφανιζόμενον τὰ άφανιζόμενα	what disappears	ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of not appearing</i>
τάφανές = τò άφανες τὰ άφανη	invisible thing	ΑΦΑΝΗ <i>not appearing</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
τò φαινόμενον τὰ φαινόμενα	visible thing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of appearing</i>
ò συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i>
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action together</i>
ò τρόπος οί τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>

14.9 Critique of Triangle Theory

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 5 (column 38)

...τα αύτῳι τρίγωνα έξ ῶν καί τὰ λοιπά συμπλέκει σχήματα· εἰ μὲν ἄτομα ὑφείληπτο εἶναι, τί οὐχί ἐποίησατό τινα ἀπόδειξιν ὡς ἔστιν ἄτομα [σ]ώματα; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄτομα, τ[ι] ἂν ἐκ τούτων νομίζοι τις συνίστασθαι τὰ λοιπὰ ἃ συμπηγνύει έξ ἄλλων ὠνδήποτε; ἀλλὰ γάρ αὐθίς που ταῦτα μηκυνθήσεται· νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἰ[κ]ανὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτ[ι] συνέβαι[ν]ε γελοίως τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦ[τον ἅμ]α μὲν ὅμοιον εἶ[π]αί πως τᾶ[λλα] καταζημ[ιοῦν]... ...ἅμα δὲ κατα[λέγειν π]άθη μὴθὲν δυ[ν]η[σ]όμενον λογί[ζε]σθαι [κα]τὰ τὸ...

...τὰ αὐτῳι τρίγωνα έξ ῶν καί τὰ λοιπὰ Συμπλέκει σχήματα· εἰ μὲν ἄτομα Ὑφείληπτο εἶναι, τί οὐχί Ἐποίησατό τινα ἀπόδειξιν ὡς ἔστιν ἄτομα σώματα; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄτομα, τί ἂν ἐκ τούτων νομίζοι Τις συνίστασθαι τὰ λοιπὰ – ἃ Συμπηγνύει έξ ἄλλων ὠνδήποτε; ἀλλὰ γάρ αὐθίς που ταῦτα μηκυνθήσεται: νῦν δὲ Ἐκεῖνο ἰκανὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι Συνέβαινε γελοίως τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ἅμα μὲν ὅμοιον εἶπαί, πως τᾶλλα καταζημιοῦν... ...ἅμα δὲ καταλέγειν πάθη μὴθὲν δυνησόμενον λογίζεσθαι κατὰ τὸ...

...the triangles of his from which He also entangles the remaining shapes. if He supposed that [indivisible] atoms exist, why did He not make any proof that bodies exist as indivisible [*i.e., atomic*]? but if [his shapes are] not indivisible [*and therefore can be divided further*], what would One think the remaining [*shapes that result from this further dividing*] are composed of – which He puts together out of anything whatsoever? however, these [topics] will again, I suppose, be lengthened out: but for now, It is sufficient to say that It ridiculously occurred that this man [*i.e., Plátōn*] simultaneously called [his basic shapes] similar, [while] somehow fully depriving other [shapes]...
...simultaneously describing experiences, while being unable to reason at all in accordance with...

τὸ τρίγωνον τὰ τρίγωνα	triangle	ΤΡΙΓΩΝΟΝ <i>three corner</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
πλεκτικός <i>(η, ον)</i>	entangling	ΠΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of weaving</i>
συμπλέκειν	to entangle with	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ <i>weaving together</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
ὑπολαμβάνειν	to suppose	ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping under</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ποιεῖσθαι	to be made	ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>gathering</i>
ἡ ἀπόδειξις αἱ ἀποδείξεις	proof	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ <i>from pointing out</i>
ἄτομος <i>(ον)</i>	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
συνίστασθαι	to be composed	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
συμπηγνύναι	to put together	ΣΥΜΠΗΓΝΥΝΑΙ <i>securing together</i>
αὖθίς	again	
τὸ μήκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>extent</i>
μηκύνειν	to lengthen out	ΜΗΚΥΝΕΙΝ <i>extent</i>
ἱκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ΊΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure [here, "to occur"]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
γελοίως	ridiculously	ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ <i>laughing</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
καταζημιοῦν	to fully deprive	ΚΑΤΑΖΗΜΙΟΥΝ <i>thoroughly damaging</i>
καταλέγειν	to describe	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking thoroughly</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>

δυνάμενος <i>(μένη, μενον)</i>	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>power</i>
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action again</i>
ἀναλογιστέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be reasoning action again</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	^[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action</i>

14.10 Sophistry of Homoeomeria

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 6 (column 39)

...[ὅμοι]ον τ[ο]ῖς πάθεσίν ἐστιν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τεττάρων τούτων στοιχείων γινόμενοις ὁ ἀποδίδωσιν σχῆμα, μάλ[ι]στα μὲν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκότερον, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε ἤδη τὴν ὁμοιομέρειαν τῷ φαινομένῳ κεκτημένον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν αὐτοῦ κατεστρέφθω· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰομένους καταζηλοῦν, ὅταν οὐσίαν τις ὀνομάζηι, τοὺς ταύταις ταῖς φωναῖς χρωμένους, [καὶ π]άλιν, ὅ[τ]αν λέξεως ἀναγκαίαν τινὰ διάθεσιν ποιήσεται, τοὺς σοφιστεύοντας ἀπὸ τούτων τῷ[ν] μερῶν, μικρὰ βούλομαι διαλεχθῆναι· φασὶ γ[ὰ]ρ δὴ τοὺς μ[ε]τα[δ]οξάζοντ[ας]...

...**ὅμοιον τοῖς πάθεσίν** Ἔστιν **τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τεττάρων τούτων στοιχείων γινόμενοις** – Ὁ ἀποδίδωσιν **σχῆμα** μάλιστα μὲν καὶ **τὸ πρῶτον ἐκότερον** – **εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε ἤδη τὴν ὁμοιομέρειαν τῷ φαινομένῳ κεκτημένον**. ἀλλὰ γὰρ **ταῦτα μὲν αὐτοῦ** Κατεστρέφθω. **πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰομένους καταζηλοῦν** ὅταν "**οὐσίαν**" Τις ὀνομάζη – **τοὺς ταύταις ταῖς φωναῖς χρωμένους, καὶ** **πάλιν, ὅταν λέξεως ἀναγκαίαν τινὰ διάθεσιν** Ποιήσεται – **τοὺς σοφιστεύοντας ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν μερῶν, μικρὰ** **Βούλομαι διαλεχθῆναι**· Φασὶ γὰρ δὴ **τοὺς μεταδοξάζοντας**...

...[He suggests that] It is similar to [our] experiences [that are] produced by these four elements – [and it is our experiences] Which most of all demonstrates a shape and also [suggests] each [of the four as] primary [elements] – but if not, at least as what already possesses homoioméreia in what appears. but Let these [shapes] of his be overturned. as for those believing [themselves] to zealously emulate* [Plátōn] when Someone uses the word "existence" – and again, [as for those who] use these very statements, when They make a certain arrangement of a term necessary – I wish to converse [only] briefly with those engaging in "wisdom" derived from these very [particular] details [of grammar]. for They say that those who are changing their opinions...

[Alternative] * as for those thinking to create prejudice against Someone using the word "existence"

ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
τέτταρες <i>(ες, α)</i>	four	ΤΕΤΤΑΡΕΣ <i>four</i>
τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα	component ^[for facts] or, element ^[for things]	ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i>
γινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>

ὁμοιομερής <i>(ἑς)</i>	"similarly composed" homoio io meric	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>similar parts</i>
ἡ ὁμοιομέρεια αἱ ὁμοιομέρειαι	homoio io méreia	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ <i>state of similar parts</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
κεκτημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>acquired</i>
καταστρέφειν	to overturn	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly turning</i>
οἷεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
οιόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	suspecting [here, "believing"]	ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>perceive</i>
καταζηλοῦν <i>addition of -κατα forms a hapax legomenon, which LSJ translates for this passage as "to create prejudice against," but Epíkouros uses ζηλοῦν, with the sense of "to strive after"</i>	✖ to zealously emulate	ΚΑΤΑΖΗΛΟΥΝ <i>thoroughly envying</i>
ἡ οὐσία αἱ οὐσίαι	existence	ΟΥΣΙΑ <i>being</i>
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ <i>naming</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
χρώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
ἀναγκαῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ <i>necessity</i>
ἡ διάθεσις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing through</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
σοφιστεύων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	engaging in "wisdom"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΩΝ <i>"wisdom"</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part [here "detail"]	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
μικρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ <i>council</i>
διαλεχθῆναι	to converse [already]	ΔΙΑΛΕΧΘΗΝΑΙ <i>spoke across</i>
μεταδοξάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	changing one's opinion	ΜΕΤΑΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ <i>change seeming</i>

An obscure critique of certain forms of eclecticism in physics. The critique may have been sparked by Plato’s combination of Empedoclean and Pythagorean principles in his theory of elements.

14.11 Empedoklēs

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 7 (column 40)

...[οἰκεῖον εἶ]ναι, τοῦ συνάψαντος τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῷ καὶ ἀκόλουθον, ἐκείνου δὲ ἀλλότριον, τοῦ κυκήσαντος μετὰ τῶν οὐκ οἰκείων δογμάτων τὸδε τι ὀρθὸν δόγμα, κἂν πρότερος ἐπιτεσὼν αὐτῷ τύχη· συμπεφορημένος γάρ ἐστι[ς] οὐχ ὅς ἂν τὸ δι[ε]σπαρμένον δόγμα μεθ' ἐτέρω[ς] ἀλλοτρίων ἑαυτοῦ δογμάτων εἰς [τ]αὐτὸ συγάγη, ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν ἀν(ι)ομολ[ογ]οῦμεν' ἀλλ[ή]λοις τινά, [εἴ]τε παρ' αὐ[τοῦ] εἴτε παρ' ἄ[λλ]ων συντιθῇ· κἂν [τις] τὸ[δε] μὲν Ἐμπεδο[κ]λέους λέ[γῃ] πρὸς νοῦν, τὸ[δ]ε δ' ἂν[ε]υ [νοῦ] τύχηι...

...οἰκεῖον εἶναι τοῦ συνάψαντος τὸ Σύμφωνον αὐτῷ καὶ ἀκόλουθον – ἐκείνου δὲ ἀλλότριον, τοῦ κυκήσαντος, μετὰ τῶν οὐκ οἰκείων δογμάτων, τὸδε τι ὀρθὸν δόγμα, κἂν πρότερος ἐπιτεσὼν αὐτῷ Τύχη: συμπεφορημένος γάρ, ἐστὶν οὐχ ὅς ἂν τὸ διεσπαρμένον δόγμα μεθ' ἐτέρων ἀλλοτρίων ἑαυτοῦ δογμάτων εἰς ταὐτὸ συνάγη – ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν ἀνομολογούμεν' ἀλλήλοις τινά, εἴτε παρ' αὐτοῦ εἴτε παρ' ἄλλων συντίθῃ· κἂν Τίς τὸδε μὲν Ἐμπεδοκλέους λέγῃ πρὸς νοῦν, τὸδε δ' ἄνευ νοῦ, Τύχη...

...the Agreement of someone who has connected with that [teaching] as a consistent [follower, is] appropriate – but [the Agreement] of another who has mixed up this or that correct teaching with teachings that do not belong is incompatible, even if He initially happens to have fallen upon that [teaching]: for, having joined [the teachings] together, He is not one who would gather the scattered teaching along with other teachings incompatible with his own into the same [compatible] thing – but [he is] one Who would compose something disagreeing with itself, whether from himself or from others. and even if Someone says something from Empedoklēs [is said] with reason but something else [from him is said] without reason, It may happen that...

οἰκεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	belonging	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>fastening together</i>
συνάψας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	having connected	ΣΥΝΑΨΑΣ <i>fastening together</i>
συμφωνεῖν	to harmonize	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΕΙΝ <i>speaking together</i>
τὸ σύμφωνον τά σύμφωνα	agreement [with]	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΝ <i>speaking together</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
ἀκόλουθος <i>(ας, ον)</i>	consistent	
ἀλλοτριῶς	incompatibly	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ <i>different other</i>
ἡ ἀλλοτριότης αἱ ἀλλοτριότητες	incompatibility	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from different other</i>
ἀλλότριος <i>(ια, ιον)</i>	incompatible	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ <i>different other</i>
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ <i>wheel</i>
κυκήσας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	mixed up	ΚΥΚΗΣΑΣ <i>wheel</i>
ὀρθῶς	{α} correctly	ΟΡΘΩΣ <i>straight upright</i>
ὀρθός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	correct	ΟΡΘΟΣ <i>straight upright</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
τὸ δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching	ΔΟΓΜΑ <i>seeming</i>
πρότερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	former [here, "initially"]	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>further [contrast]</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
ἐπιτεσὼν <i>(οῦσα, όν)</i>	having fallen upon	ΕΠΙΠΕΣΩΝ <i>falling (upon)</i>
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ <i>happening</i>

τύχη	it may happen	ΤΥΧΗ <i>happening</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
συμφορεῖν	to put together	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΕΙΝ <i>carrying together</i>
συμπεφορημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been joined together	ΣΥΜΠΕΦΟΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>carried together</i>
παρεσπαρμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ <i>scatter beside</i>
διεσπαρμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	spread through	ΔΙΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ
ἀλλότριος <i>(ία, ιον)</i>	incompatible	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΣ <i>different other</i>
συνάγειν	to gather	ΣΥΝΑΓΕΙΝ <i>going together</i>
ἀνομολογούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	disagreeing	ΑΝΟΜΟΛΟΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>not same reasoning</i>
συντιθέναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing together</i>
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς	Empedoklês	ΕΜΠΕΔΟΚΛΗΣ <i>steadfast glory</i>
ὁ νοῦς οἱ νοῖ	intellect	ΝΟΥΣ <i>mind</i>

14.12 Concession

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 8 (column 41)

...[συντί]θῃσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπαινεῖ ἑξαπίνης τονδεῖ τινα, [εἰ]τὰ πάλιν τὸν ἀντιδοξάζοντα τούτῳ, οὔτε τοδί τι ἐγκωμιάζει ὃ ὀδε
τις λέγει, εἴτα πάλιν τὸ ἀντ[ι]κείμενον τούτῳ ὃ ἄλλος τις λέγει, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐπαινῇ τὸ τοῦδὲ τινος ἐπιφορᾶς ὀρθῆς εἶδος, εἴτα
πάλιν τὸ τοῦδε, οὐ τὸ ὑπεναντίον τῷ τοῦδε ἐπαινεῖ, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν σύμφωνον ᾗ, καὶ οὕτως [ἐ]πὶ πάντων πράττει· ἀρχὴν δέ,
ὥσπερ ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἐκείνων οἷετα[ι] δίκαιον νομίζειν [τι]γά, τούτων οὐθέν, ὥστε ο[ὐ]κ ἐπάγετ[αι ποιεῖ]τάς καὶ σοφ[ι]στά[ς καὶ
ῥήτο]ρας, οἳ γ[ε] πᾶν [τό] τῇν ὀρθὴν ἔχον ἐπιφο[ρά]ν...

...συντίθῃσιν. οὔτε γὰρ Ἐπαινεῖ ἑξαπίνης τονδεῖ τινα, εἴτα πάλιν τὸν ἀντιδοξάζοντα τούτῳ – οὔτε τοδί τι Ἐγκωμιάζει ὃ ὀδε Τις λέγει, εἴτα πάλιν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τούτῳ, ὃ ἄλλος Τις λέγει: ἀλλ', ὅταν Ἐπαινῇ τὸ τοῦδὲ τινος ἐπιφορᾶς "ὀρθῆς" εἶδος – εἴτα πάλιν τὸ τοῦδε – οὐ τὸ ὑπεναντίον τῷ τοῦδε Ἐπαινεῖ – ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν σύμφωνον ᾗ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων Πράττει· ἀρχὴν δέ, ὥσπερ Ἐλεγον, οὐδ' ἐκείνων Οἷεται δίκαιον νομίζειν τινὰ τούτων οὐθέν. ὥστε οὐκ Ἐπάγεται ποιητάς καὶ "σοφιστάς" καὶ ῥήτορας, Οἳ γε πᾶν τὸ τῇν "ὀρθὴν" ἔχον ἐπιφοράν...

...composes. neither does [Empedoklês] suddenly praise a certain person, and then next [praise] someone else who argues against him – nor does He extol something that Someone says, and then next [extol] something contrary to it, that Someone else says: instead, when [Empedoklês] praises the form of someone's "correct" application – and then next, the [form] of another's [application] – He does not praise what is contrary to his [view] – but what would be in harmony with it, and He acts this way in all things. but, as I was saying in the beginning, He thinks it is not fair to consider any of these [views], nor any of those [views]. therefore, He does not bring in poets and "wise men" and rhetors – Who indeed promote everything holding a "correct" application...

συντιθέναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing together</i>
ἐπαινεῖν	to praise	ΕΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>praising upon</i>
ἑξαπίνης	suddenly	ΕΞΑΠΙΝΗΣ <i>unexpectedly out of</i>
εἴτα	next	ΕΙΤΑ <i>hereafter</i>
πάλιν	again	ΠΑΛΙΝ <i>back</i>

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ἀντιδοξάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	arguing against	ΑΝΤΙΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ <i>seeming against</i>
ἐγκωμιάζειν	to extoll	ΕΓΚΩΜΙΑΖΕΙΝ <i>[to speak]</i> <i>in celebration</i>
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying upon</i>
ὀρθός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	correct	ΟΡΘΟΣ <i>straight upright</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ὑπεναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contrary	ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>over against</i>
σύμφωνος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	in harmony	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΣ <i>speaking together</i>
πράττειν	to do	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀρχήν	in the beginning	
οὔεσθαι	to suspect [here "to think"]	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
δίκαιος <i>(ᾱ, ον)</i>	fair	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ <i>custom / right</i>
νομίζειν	to think [here, "to consider"]	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality <i>(characteristic)</i>	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from</i> <i>gathering</i>
ὁ ποιητής οἱ ποιηταί	poet	ΠΟΙΗΤΗΣ <i>gathering</i>
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
ὁ σοφιστής οἱ σοφισταί	"wise man"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ <i>"wisdom"</i>
ὁ ῥήτωρ οἱ ῥήτορες	rhetor	ῬΗΤΩΡ <i>speaking</i>

14.13 Enthymematic Uproars

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 9 (column 42)

...[τῶν τοῖς προσέ]χουσι **θορύβους ἐνθυμηματικούς** καὶ ἀποφθε[γ]ματικούς παρασκευα ζόντων· σολοικίζει[ν] τ' ἐν δόξαις τὸ μὲν ὅλ[ον ὁ] μὴθὲν ἀκόλο[υ]θον συναρτῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ] ὁ ἐπιβαλόμενος μὲν **κατὰ τουτονί**τινα βαδ[ίξει]ν, ἐξαπίν[η]ς δ' ἀ[ρχό]με[νος καθ'] ἕτερον, ἓνα καθ' ἑ[ν', ἀλλ'] οὐχ ὅς ἂν τῶι μὲν ὅλω[ι τρό]πῳ | μὴ ἐπιβάλληται τῷ[ι λό]γῳ[ι] τῶι τούτου χρῆ[σθ]αι, αὐτ[ὸν δ]ὲ μόνον τ[ι παρ]αποῖ[ι ἐ]πι[τεδ]εύ[σας ἅμα] καὶ [π]ρὸς τὸ οἰ[κεῖ]ον δόγμα ἀποκαταστήσῃ[ι] | [τινὸς τὰ] τυχόντ' ἀ[να]μά[ρτητα] μικρὸν τ' [ἀπέ]χον[τα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ αὐτοῦ]ο[ῦ]...

...τῶν τοῖς προσέχουσι **θορύβους ἐνθυμηματικούς** καὶ **ἀποφθεγματικούς** παρασκευαζόντων – **σολοικίζειν τ' ἐν δόξαις** – **τὸ μὲν ὅλον Ὁ μὴθὲν ἀκόλουθον** συναρτῶν· οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁ ἐπιβαλόμενος μὲν **κατὰ τουτονί**τινα βαδίζειν, ἐξαπίνης δ' ἀρχόμενος **καθ' ἕτερον, ἓνα καθ' ἑν' – ἀλλ' οὐχ Ὅς ἂν τῷ μὲν ὅλω** **τρόπῳ** μὴ ἐπιβάλληται, **τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τούτου** χρῆσθαι. **αὐτὸν δὲ μόνον τι** Παραποῖ – ἐπιτηδεύσας ἅμα – καὶ, **πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον δόγμα**, Ἀποκαταστήσῃ **τινὸς τὰ τυχόντ' ἀναμάρτητα, μικρὸν τ' ἀπέχοντα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ αὐτοῦ...**

...while they also provide **enthymematic** and **apophthegmatic uproars** [i.e., **implicit and proverbial arguments**] for [those people who] pay attention – [while they are] committing **solecisms** also in [their] judgments – [particularly someone] Who joins together **nothing consistent as a whole**. not only this, but even [Someone] who focuses on proceeding according to this certain [teaching], and then suddenly begins according to a different [teaching], **one by one**, [he can nevertheless be considered consistent] – but not Someone who does not objectively focus **in the entire way**, [and is not appropriately] using **this specific reasoning**. but only by Him distorting **it in some [way]** – while simultaneously being [well] trained [in the teaching] – and He reinstated, **as his personal teaching**, **anything of someone's that happened to be mistake-free**, **that was** slightly different from his reasoning...

προσέχειν	to pay attention	ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold towards</i>
προσέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	paying attention	
ὁ θόρυβος οἱ θόρυβοι	uproar	ΘΟΥΡΥΒΟΣ <i>noise</i>
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>spirit in</i>
ἐνθυμηματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	implicit <i>enthymematic</i>	ΕΝΘΥΜΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characterized by being in spirit</i> "in the form of <i>enthymemes</i> " <i>An enthymeme is an argument developed from unstated assumptions that are based on experience and common sense probability.</i>
ἀποφθεγματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	proverbial <i>apophthegmatic</i>	ΑΠΟΦΘΕΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>uttering away from</i> "dealing in <i>apophthegms</i> " <i>An apophthegm is short, clever saying that expresses a general truth or principle, often in a memorable way</i>
παρασκευάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	to also provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΩΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
σολοικίζειν	to commit solecisms	ΣΟΛΟΙΚΙΖΕΙΝ "to act <i>like a person from the city of Sóloi</i> (on the southern coast of Anatolia)" with the meaning of "to make a large number of grammatical errors while speaking or writing"
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
ἀκόλουθος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	consistent	
συναρτῶν <i>(ῶσα, ῶν)</i>	joining together	ΣΥΝΑΡΤΩΝ <i>attaching together</i>
βάλλειν	to throw	ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing</i>
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing upon</i>
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ <i>walking</i>
ἐξαπίνης	suddenly	ΕΞΑΠΙΝΗΣ <i>unexpectedly out of</i>
ἄρχειν	to begin	ΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i>
ἀρχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	beginning	ΑΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>

χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>necessary</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
παραποιεῖν	to distort	ΠΑΡΑΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering across</i>
τὸ ἐπιτήδειον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια	suitable things	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΝ <i>suitable upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιτηδειότης αἱ ἐπιτηδειότητες	supply	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from being</i> <i>suitable towards</i>
ἐπιτηδεύειν	to be trained	ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΕΙΝ <i>suitable towards</i>
ἐπιτηδεύσας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	having been trained	
οἰκεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	belonging [here, "his personal"]	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>
ιστάναι	to stand	ΊΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing</i>
ἀποκαθιστάναι	to reinstate	ΑΠΟΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>standing back</i>
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ <i>happening</i>
τυχών	happening	ΤΥΧΩΝ <i>happening</i>
τὸ τυχόν τὰ τυχόντα	[anything] that happens [to be]	
ἀναμάρτητος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	mistake-free	ΑΝΑΜΑΡΤΗΤΟΣ <i>not missing the mark</i>
μικρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
ἀπέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	different	ΑΠΕΧΩΝ <i>holding away</i>

14.14 Let Them Have Silence

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 col. 10 (column 43)

...αὐτοὺς γὰρ δίκαιον φάσκει[ι]ν σολ[ο]ικίζειν ἢ συμπεφορῆσθαι, λελυμασμένους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τ[ῆ]ς φύσ[ε]ως αὐτῶν ὀρθὸν ἐπ[ι]φορᾶς εἶδος· οἱ δὲ δὴ δι[ὰ] τινος ὀνόματος ἢ ὄνο[μ]ας[ί]ας ἀδιαφόρ[ο]υ κοινότητα, τῷ τε λελογισμέ[ν]ωι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι γ[ι]νομένην, τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐκέτι ἐπαισθανόμενο[ι], παντελῶ[ς] ἡσυχίαν [ἐ]χέτωσαν.

...**Αὐτοὺς γὰρ Δίκαιον φάσκειν σολοικίζειν ἢ συμπεφορῆσθαι – λελυμασμένους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν ὀρθὸν ἐπιφορᾶς εἶδος· Οἱ δὲ δὴ, διὰ ^[1] τινος ὀνόματος ἢ ὀνομασίας ἀδιαφόρου κοινότητα τῷ τε λελογισμένῳ καὶ ^[2] τῷ τυχόντι γινομένην, τῆς διαφορᾶς οὐκέτι ἐπαισθανόμενοι: παντελῶς ἡσυχίαν ἔχέτωσαν**

...for [it is] fair to allege that They [either] commit solecisms, or they have been [eclectically] pressed together – [because] they have spoiled even the correct form of impact [arising] from the chance of their nature. but indeed, because They, [can] no longer sense the difference between ^[1] the general quality of some undifferentiated word or designation [that is] produced from what is reasoned and ^[2] [the general quality of some word] that is produced from what happens [by chance]: We should absolutely let them have silence

δίκαιος <i>(ᾱ, ον)</i>	fair	ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ <i>custom / right</i>
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>affirming</i>
σολοικίζειν	to commit solecisms	ΣΟΛΟΙΚΙΖΕΙΝ <i>[from] Sóloi</i>

φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
συμφέρειν	to bring together	ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing together</i>
συμπεφορῆσθαι	to have been [eclectically] pressed together	ΣΥΜΠΕΦΟΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>having been brought together</i>
ἡ λύσις αἱ λύσεις	solution	ΛΥΣΙΣ <i>loosening</i>
λελυμασμένος <i>(ἡ, ον)</i>	having spoiled	ΛΕΛΥΜΑΣΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having loosened</i>
ἡ τύχη αἱ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ <i>happening</i>
ὀρθός <i>(ἡ, όν)</i>	correct	ΟΡΘΟΣ <i>straight upright</i>
ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying upon</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ἡ ὀνομασία αἱ ὀνομασίαι	designation	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ <i>state of name</i>
διάφορος <i>(ον)</i>	differing	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ <i>carrying apart</i>
ἀδιάφορος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	undifferentiated	ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ <i>not carrying apart</i>
ἡ κοινότης αἱ κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from common</i>
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action</i>
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
τυχών	happening [by chance]	ΤΥΧΩΝ <i>happening</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ἐπαισθανόμενος <i>(ἡ, ον)</i>	sensing	ΕΠΑΙΣΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>result of perceiving upon</i>
παντελῶς	absolutely completely	ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩΣ <i>all completing</i>
ἡ ἡσυχία αἱ ἡσυχίαι	silence	ἩΣΥΧΙΑ <i>stillness</i>
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding</i>
ἐχέτωσαν	let them have	

Epíkouros' On Nature, Book 14, P.Herc. 1148 (subscriptio)

Ἐπικούρου Περί Φύσεως ΙΔ, XXXῙΗΗΗΗ ἐπὶ Κλ[εάρ]χο

Ἐπικούρου *Περί Φύσεως* ΙΔ. XXXῙΗΗΗΗ. ἐπὶ Κλεάρχο

Epíkouros' *On Nature*, [book] 14. 3,900 lines. during [the archonship of] Clearchus [301/300 BC]

<i>X = 1000</i>
XXX = 3000
<i>Ῑ = H (100) x Π (5) = 500</i>
Ῑ = 500
<i>H = 100</i>

ΗΗΗΗ = 400
=
ΧΧΧΠΗΗΗΗ = 3,900

Epíkouros was 40 years old in 301/300 BC. This was the year of the Battle of Ipsus and the death of Antigonus I Monophthalmus.

Book 15

[U89]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.40

καὶ μὴν καὶ, τῶν {τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ Περὶ Φύσεως καὶ τῇ ιδ' καὶ ιε' καὶ τῇ Μεγάλῃ Ἐπιτομῇ} σωμάτων Τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις – Τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται

and indeed, {this is also in the first [book] On Nature and in the 14th and 15th and in the Larger Epitome} Some bodies are compounds – but Some [are bodies] out of which compounds are made

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 1A (superscriptio)

Ἐ[π]ικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΕ. ΧΧΧΗΗ. ἐπὶ [Η]γεμάχου

Ἐπικούρου Περὶ Φύσεως ΙΕ. ΧΧΧΗΗ. ἐπὶ Ἡγεμάχου

Epíkouros' On Nature, [book] 15. 3,200 lines. during [the archonship] of Hēgémachos [300/299 BC]

Epíkouros was 41 years old in 300/299 BC. During this year Demetrius I Poliorcetes married Seleucus I Nicator's daughter, Stratonice.

15.1 Future Developments

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 5

...[εἰ] μὲν οὖν τις φιλοσοφῶν... ...[πρά]γματα ἑαυτῷ παρέχε[ι ἐστὶν ἐ]ξ ἧς εἴρηκα ιδέας· πρ[οιόντ]ος δὲ χρόνου εἴπερ τι τῷ[ν] [ἐνδ]εόντ[ω]ν πράττει...

...εἰ, μὲν οὖν, Τις φιλοσοφῶν... ...πράγματα ἑαυτῷ παρέχει, Ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς Εἴρηκα ιδέας· προιόντος δὲ χρόνου εἴπερ τι τῶν ἐνδεόντων Πράττει...

...if, therefore, Someone philosophizing... ...provides [new] situations for himself, It exists from the idea which I have mentioned. but as time progresses, if He will accomplish something of what is lacking...

ὁ φιλόσοφος οἱ φιλόσοφοι	philosopher	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ loving knowledge
φιλοσοφῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	philosophizing	ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΝ
τὸ πράγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ deed / affair
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ hold beside
εἴρηκα	I have mentioned	
εἰδέναι	to have mentally seen ∴ "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ appearing
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ object from appearing
ἡ ιδέα αἱ ιδέαι	idea	ΙΔΕΑ appearing

προιών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	progressing	ΠΡΟΙΩΝ <i>going before</i>
ό χρόνος οί χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
ένδεϊν	to be lacking	ΕΝΔΕΙΝ
ένδεών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	lacking	ΕΝΔΕΩΝ
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>

15.2 Homoioméreia by Majority

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 11

...καθό γάρ [πρ]οσαγορεύεται ὅτι δῆ[λον εἶ]ναι κατ' έκε[τι]γο έκ τών [πι]λείστων τών[δε] έτινων [πε]ποιη[μ]ένη, έξ
ομοιομε[ρειών]...

...καθό γάρ Προσαγορεύεται ότι "**δῆλον**" **εἶναι** κατ' **έκείνο**, **έκ τών πλείστων**
τῶνδέ τινων πεποιημένη – **έξ ομοιομερειών**...

...to the extent that [*an object's composition*] is said to be "clear" in this
[respect], because it has been made from the greatest [*amount*] of certain
[*uniform parts*] – from [*their*] homoioméreia...

[Sedley] For [it is claimed that] the respect in which it is spoken of – because it
is evident – is the respect according to which it is made out of a majority of
such and such things, namely the homoiomeriies.

καθό	to the extent that	ΚΑΘΟ
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as [here, "to be said"]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
πλείων <i>(ον)</i>	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
πλείστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	most / greatest	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most filling</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
πεποιημένος	having been made	ΠΕΠΟΙΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>gathered</i>
ή ομοιομέρεια αί ομοιομέρειαι	homoioméreia	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ <i>state of similar parts</i>

15.3 Impressions & Categories

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 12

...φαντασίαν τοια[υτη]γεί [ῆ] τοιαυτηνεί, πόθεν ρηθή[σον]ται [έ]χειν αἱ συ[γκρι]σεις...

...**φαντασίαν τοιαυτηνεί** ἢ **τοιαυτηνεί** – **πόθεν** ρηθήσονται **έχειν** αἱ Συγκρίσεις...

...*an image like this very thing* or *like THIS very thing* – *where* will the
compounds be said to have...?

ή φαντασία αἱ φαντασῑαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
τοιοὔτосεί <i>(τοιαύτηεί, τοιοὔτει)</i>	like this very thing, <i>(such as this exact kind of thing here)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣΕΙ <i>this of this sort here</i>

ρήθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῚΡΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i>
ρήθήσεσθαι	will be said	ῚΡΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating</i> <i>together</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 17

...ἀλλ' ἐπιβλέπει πό[σα ο]ὔτως[ς] ἤδε ἡ κατηγορία περιλα[μ]βά[ν]ει τῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰσ[θ]ήσ[εσιν κ]αί...

...ἀλλ' Ὶπιβλέπει **πόσα** οὔτως ἤδε ἡ Κατηγορία περιλαμβάνει **τῶν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν** καί...

...but He fully sees **how many things** this full [categorical] Indication completely encompasses **among what [is] in [the realm of our] sensations** and...

ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking upon</i>
ποσός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	how many / measurable	ΠΟΣΟΣ <i>some / certain</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as [here, "to be said"]	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly</i> <i>toward</i>
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>speaking publicly</i>
ἡ κατηγορία αἱ κατηγορίαι	full [categorical] indication	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>speaking publicly</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i>

15.4 Atomic Size

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 19

...ἐπισπᾶται καὶ τὸ τὰ[ς] ἀτ[ό]μο[υ]ς[ς] μηδέν ἦττον, μ[ηδ]ἐν ἐλάττου[ς] τὰς τοιάσδε ἢ τοιάσδ[ε λ]έγειν εἶναι...

...Ὶπισπᾶται καὶ **τὸ τὰς ἀτόμους μηδέν ἦττον μηδέν ἐλάττους, τὰς τοιάσδε ἢ τοιάσδε, λέγειν εἶναι...**

...He is even drawn to **saying that the Atoms, [whether] of one kind or another, are not to a lesser extent nor smaller...**

ἐπισπᾶν	to draw to	ΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ <i>pulling upon</i>
ἐπισπᾶσθαι	to be drawn to	
ἄτομος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
ἦττον	to a lesser extent	ῚΗΤΤΟΝ <i>inferior</i>
ἐλάττων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	smaller	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 20

...ἀτόμων ἐκβο[λῇ]ν ποιεῖσθαι· τὸ γὰρ τοι[οῦτ]ον ἤδη ἔνδηλον ποι[εῖ] τι ὃ[ν] κἂν ὑπῆρχεν εἰ...

...ἀτόμων ἐκβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι – τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἤδη ἔνδηλον ποιεῖ Τι ὄν, κἂν ὑπῆρχεν...

...to produce an expulsion of atoms – for Something that exists already makes such a thing clear, even if it were to exist...

ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ ἐκβολή αἱ ἐκβολαί	expulsion	ΕΚΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing out</i>
ἔνδηλος (ον)	^(Θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear within</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>

15.6 Organization of Study

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 21

...οὕτω[ς] ὑφηγείσθαι· ὅπερ τε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῇ[ς] πρ[οε]υλόμεθα, οἰκονομεῖται [ῆ]μῖν...

...οὕτως ὑφηγείσθαι – ὅπερ τε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς Προειλόμεθα, Οἰκονομεῖται ἡμῖν...

...to guide in this manner – indeed, just as We preferred from the beginning, It is organized for us...

ὑφηγείσθαι	to guide	ὙΦΗΓΕΙΝ <i>guiding under</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping back</i>
προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping before</i>
προήρησθαι	to prefer	ΠΡΟΗΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>grasped before</i>
ἡ οἰκονομία αἱ οἰκονομαί	operation	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ <i>managing the home</i>
οἰκονομεῖν	to organize	ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΕΙΝ <i>managing the home</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 22

...αὐτοῖς, ἃ ὀχή[σ]ει καὶ στεγά[σ]ει αὐτά, καὶ [α]ὐτ[ᾶ] ὑπ' ἐκείνων διασωθήσεται[ι] καθάπερ καὶ αἱ παρ' ἡμε[τέρ]...

...αὐτοῖς, ἃ ὀχήσει καὶ στεγάσει αὐτά, καὶ Αὐτὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνων διασωθήσεται – καθάπερ καὶ Αἱ παρ' ἡμετέρ...

...to them, Which [] will carry and cover them, and They [themselves] will be preserved by those [things] – just as also Those [] among us as well...

ὁ ὄχος οἱ ὄχοι	carriage, cart, chariot	ΟΧΟΣ <i>riding</i>
ὀχεῖν	to carry	

στεγάζειν	to cover	ΣΤΕΓΑΖΕΙΝ <i>covering</i>
σώζων <i>(σώζουσα, σώζον)</i>	preserving	ΣΩΙΖΩΝ <i>saving</i>
διασώζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	preserving	ΔΙΑΣΩΙΖΩΝ <i>fully saving</i>
διασώζειν	to preserve	

15.7 Qualities from Shape

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 23

...ἔοικεν, οὐ ταῖς κατ[ά] τὴν σχημάτισιν ποιό[τ]ησι τ[ῶν] συγκρίσεων...

...Ἔοικεν, οὐ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν σχημάτισιν ποιότησι τῶν συγκρίσεων...

...It seems [appropriate], not for the qualities of the compounds according to their shapes...

οἰκεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	belonging	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>
ἔοικέναι	to seem [appropriate]	ΕΟΙΚΕΝΑΙ <i>was appropriately</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [asking] what kind</i>
ἡ σύγκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>

15.8 Correct Judgements

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 24

...πεπραγματευμένους· ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξας διορᾶν ἀρχῶν, ποῖαί εἰσιιν ὀρθαὶ ἢ ποῖαι οὐκ ὀ[ρ]θαί...

...πεπραγματευμένους: ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξας διορᾶν ἀρχῶν – Ποῖαί εἰσιν ὀρθαὶ ἢ Ποῖαι οὐκ ὀρθαί...

...[topics] that have been dealt with [in our writings]: but also to distinguish judgments of the foundations [i.e., teachings regarding the atoms] – What kinds [of judgments] are correct and What kinds are not correct...

τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ἡ πραγματεία αἱ πραγματεῖαι	effort	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ <i>state of doing / affair</i>
πραγματεύεσθαι	to deal with	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ <i>doing</i>
πεπραγματευμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been delt with	ΠΕΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having done</i>
τὸ δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching	ΔΟΓΜΑ <i>seeming</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ὀρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὈΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
διορᾶν	to distinguish	ΔΙΟΡΑΝ <i>seeing through</i>

ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ποιῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	making	ΠΟΙΩΝ <i>gathering</i>
ποῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	what kind of	ΠΟΙΟΣ <i>gathering</i>
ὀρθός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	correct	ΟΡΘΟΣ <i>straight upright</i>

15.9 Homoioméreia, Qualities

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 25

...[γ]ὰρ κατὰ τὰς ποιότη[η]τα[ς τὰς] μὴ κατὰ μορφ[ήν] ὁμ[οιο]μέρεια...

...γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητες τὰς μὴ κατὰ μορφήν Ὅμοιομέρεια...

...for the Homoioméreia according to the qualities [that are] not [determined] by shape...

ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [asking] what kind</i>
ἡ μορφή αἱ μορφαί	shape	ΜΟΡΦΗ <i>form</i>
ἡ ὁμοιομέρεια αἱ ὁμοιομέρειαί	homoioméreia	ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΕΙΑ <i>state of similar parts</i>

15.10 Descent into Reasoning

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 26

...ἐκάστη ἐπιφορὰ ἐφ' ὃ τι δῆποτε γίν[ε]ται, τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ τῆς καταφορᾶς συμπεριλαμβα[νό]μ[εν]ον, καὶ ἐπ[ειδ]ὴ ταῖς μ[έν] ἐπιφοραῖς...

...ἐκάστη Ἐπιφορὰ ἐφ' ὃ τι δῆποτε γίνεται – τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ τῆς καταφορᾶς συμπεριλαμβανόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ταῖς μὲν ἐπιφοραῖς...

...each Application is produced in relation to whatever [it is applied to] – as what is completely comprehended together from a descent into [our] reasoning, and since for these applications...

ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying upon</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
ἡ καταφορά αἱ καταφοραί	descent	ΚΑΤΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying thoroughly / down</i>
περιλαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to completely comprehend, [generally] to encompass	ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around</i>
συμπεριλαμβανόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	completely comprehended together	ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasping around together</i>

τὸ συμπεριλαμβανόμενον	what is completely comprehended together	ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ
ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying upon</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 27

...τῆς καταφορᾶς ἐμπ[ερει]λημμένον ἐνδ[ε]ικνύ[σα]σθαι [τῶ]ν οὐκ οἰκ[ε]ίων [ἐν τῇ] πρώτῃ ἐπιφορ[ᾷ]...

...τῆς καταφορᾶς ἐμπειριελημμένον ἐνδεικνύσασθαι – τῶν οὐκ οἰκείων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἐπιφορᾷ...

...to have [already] been indicated in [what is] completely comprehended within the descent [into our reasoning] – of those not belonging in the primary application...

ἡ καταφορά αἱ καταφοραί	descent	ΚΑΤΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying thoroughly / down</i>
ἐμπειριελημμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	*completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>being grasped around in</i>
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing away</i>
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ <i>showing in</i>
ἐνδεικνύσασθαι	to be indicated in [already]	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΑΣΘΑΙ
οἰκεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	belonging	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>
πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying upon</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 15, P.Herc. 1151 fr. 28

...τῶν ἡμῖν τοῖς δόγμασιν· ἀ[να]γκαῖον [ο]ὐ τοῦτ' ἔστ[ι]ν πράττειν δι[ὰ π]ολλὰ[ς] αἰτία[ς]...

...τῶν ἡμῖν τοῖς δόγμασιν – ἀναγκαῖον οὐ τοῦτ' ἔστιν Πράττειν, διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας...

...of those for our teachings – Doing this is not necessary, for many reasons...

τό δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching	ΔΟΓΜΑ <i>seeming</i>
ἀναγκαῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ <i>compulsion</i>
πράττειν	to do	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause [here, "reason"]	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>

[U90]

[Book 16]

[Book 17]

[Book 18]

[Book 19]

[Book 20]

[Book 21]

[Book 22]

[Book 23]

[Book 24]

Book 25

τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	what = <i>Movement,</i> <i>which results in</i>
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	<i>Action,</i> <i>which results in</i> <i>[dispositional]</i> <i>Development</i>

25.1 Human Agency

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 3a (A 16.1)

...[ἀνθρ]ώπους, ἥι μὲν μᾶ[λλον αἴ]τιον τῶνδ'... [λ]έγομεν... ἥι δὲ κ[αὶ ἥττο]ν ἄλλων τινῶν [εἶναι]. ταυτὶ δ' οὐθ'έν...

...ἀνθρώπους ἥ μὲν μᾶλλον αἴτιον τῶνδ'... Λέγομεν... ἥ δὲ καὶ ἥττον ἄλλων
τινῶν εἶναι. Ταυτὶ δ' οὐθ'έν...

...insofar as humans [are] more the cause of these things... We say... but
insofar as [humans] are also to a lesser extent [the cause] of certain other
things. These very things, however, in no way...

ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ANΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
ἥ	insofar as	ἥ <i>in/for which</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
τὸ αἴτιον τὰ αἴτια	what is the cause	ΑΙΤΙΟΝ
ἥττον	to a lesser extent	ἥΤΤΟΝ <i>inferior</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 2 (A 18)

...[τ]ὸ μέρος συμμε[ταλαμβάνει,] τοῖς δὲ λο[ιποῖς κα]θ' ἑν ἑκάστον μ[έρος αὐτ]οῦ συμμεταδ[ίδωσι]...

...τὸ μέρος συμμεταλαμβάνει – τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς καθ' ἑν ἑκάστον μέρος αὐτοῦ Συμμεταδίδωσι...

...[one's soul] jointly partakes in a part [of the motion that surrounds it] – but [also, one's soul] jointly distributes a part of [the motion] to the remaining [parts of the body] one by one...

τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
συμμεταλαμβάνειν	✱ to jointly partake in	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping change together</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
συμμεταδίδοναι	to jointly distribute	ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving change together</i>

25.2 Against Rejection of the Soul

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 419 fr. 7 (A 19)

...τῇ[ν] ψυχὴν καὶ αἰ[τ]ὴν λοιπὴν φύσιν ἀποποιῆσαι τὸ ζῶ[ιον] καὶ τὸ νοουμένην ἐνότητι μηθὲν – ἢ τὸ ἕτερον νοεῖν τὴν [ψυχ]ικὴν καὶ τὴ[ν λοιπὴν] φύσιν ἐξ ἧς εἶναι εἰρήκαμεν... ...μὴ κατ' ὀφθαλμ[ο]...

...τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν φύσιν ἀποποιῆσαι τὸ Ζῶον, καὶ τὸ νοουμένην ἐνότητι μηθὲν – ἢ τὸ ἕτερον νοεῖν τὴν ψυχικὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν φύσιν ἐξ ἧς εἶναι Εἰρήκαμεν... ...μὴ κατ' ὀφθαλμούς...

...for a living Being to reject its soul and its remaining nature, and [to reject] what is conceived in the unity [of the two] as nothing – or to conceive as different, its spiritual [nature] and its remaining nature, from which We have said [both] exist , the... not directly observable...

[alternative] ...to reject the soul and the remaining nature as [constituting] a living being and in no way [as] what is conceived in unity – or to conceive of as the other, the spiritual [nature] and the remaining nature, from which We have said exists... not directly observable...

ἡ ψυχὴ αἰ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ψυχικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	spiritual	
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἀποποιεῖν	to reject	ΑΠΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering / making away</i>
τὸ ζῶον τὰ ζῶα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ <i>life</i>
νοούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ νοούμενον τὰ νοούμεν	what is conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ἐνότης αἰ ἐνότητες	unity	ΕΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of oneness</i>

ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἕτερος <i>other</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	NOEIN <i>seeing</i>
εἰρηκέναι	to have said [in the past]	EIRHKENAI <i>having said</i>
ὁ ὀφθαλμός οἱ ὀφθαλμοί	eye	ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΣ <i>eye chamber</i>
κατ' ὀφθαλμούς	directly observable	

25.3 Source of Feelings

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1634 fr. 1 (A 20)

...τῆς [οὕτως] ἀπογεγεννημένης ἐνότητος ἐκ τ[ῶν κα]τὰ μέρος... ἐπεὶ [δὲ καθ]όλου δήπουθ[εν ἐρρήθ]η πάθη ἢ δι' ἐν μ[όριον ἢ κ]ατὰ τὸ ἀθρόογ [σῶμα]...

...τῆς οὕτως ἀπογεγεννημένης ἐνότητος ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος... ἐπεὶ δὲ ^(κ) καθόλου δήπουθεν Ἐρρήθη πάθη ἢ δι' ἐν μόριον ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον σῶμα...

...with the unity [*of movement of our soul and body*] being fully generated in this way from each part [*of our body*]... but, since It was presumably said ^(κ) universally that [*one's*] experiences [*arise*] either through a single portion [*of one's body*] or by means of the aggregated body [*and soul*]...

ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating out</i>
ἀπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i>
ἡ ἐνότης αἱ ἐνότητες	unity	ΕΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from oneness</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
καθόλου	^(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ <i>completely</i>
δήπουθεν	presumably	ΔΗΠΟΥΘΕΝ <i>indeed from somewhere</i>
εἰρηκέναι	to have said [in the past]	EIRHKENAI <i>having said</i>
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῚΡΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
τὸ μόριον τὰ μόρια	portion	ΜΟΡΙΟΝ <i>dividing</i>
ἄθρόος <i>(α, ον)</i>	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>

25.4 Unity of Soul and Body

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 419 fr. 5 (A 22a)

...[συ]λλογίζεσθαι ὃν [δεῖ τρό]πον, οὕτε γὰρ ἔγ[ο] τί ἦν] ὥς τὸ συμβεβηκ[ὸς κ]αὶ ὦι συμβέβηκ[ε ῥη]τέον εἶναι – οὐτ[ε] ἔτε]ρον ὥς τὸ ἀ[πὸ τινος δι]αστήματος [ἐπεισερχό]μενον...

...συλλογίζεσθαι **ὄν** Δεῖ **τρόπον**: οὔτε γὰρ ^[1] **ἐν τι** ἦν **ᾧς** τὸ συμβεβηκὸς – (καὶ **ᾧ** Συμβέβηκε **ῥητέον** εἶναι) – οὔτε ^[2] **ἕτερον** ᾧς τὸ ἀπὸ τινος διαστήματος **ἐπεισερχόμενον**...

...It is necessary to infer **which way** [*our soul exists*]: for it was neither ^[1] **some singular** [*portion of the body, existing*] as that which has [*inseparably*] endured [*without it*] – (and **into what** It has endured **must be said to exist**)* – nor [was the soul] ^[2] **a different** [*portion distinct from of the body*], as something entering [*into the body*] afterward from a certain separation...

**or "It must be said into what [the parts that compose the soul] have endured existing" i.e., the atoms that compose the soul*

ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i>
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action together</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
συμβεβηκώς <i>(υῖα, ὅς)</i>	having endured	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΩΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	<i>"that which has endured"</i> property <i>(inseparable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
συμβεβηκέναι	to have endured [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΕΝΑΙ <i>to have walked together</i>
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i>
ῥητέον	it must be said	ῬΗΤΕΟΝ
ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾳ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἜΤΕΡΟΣ <i>other</i>
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing between</i>
ἀνέρχεσθαι	ascends	ΑΝΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>moving toward</i>
ἐπεισερχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	coming in afterward	ΕΠΕΙΣΕΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>moving upon into</i>

25.5 Thinking Causes Movement

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 2 (fr. A 37)

...εἴρ[η] καὶ ἐπὶ **τοῦ** παντός ἡ **ἐπι**λ[όγ]ι[σ]ις **ἐ**γ[εν]νᾶται, τὰς **ἐκ** τῶν κεινήσεων... ᾧν προεῖπα ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω αἰτ[ί]ας
κεκτημ[έ]νη...

...Εἶρηκα καὶ, ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός, ἡ Ἐπιλόγισις ἐγγεννᾶται τὰς ἐκ τῶν κεινήσεων... ᾧν Προεῖπα ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω αἰτίαις κεκτημένη...

...I have even said that, **with regard to all things**, the [*faculty of*] Consideration generates **those** [*causes*] out of movements... [*our faculty of Consideration*] possesses **the causes** [*of movement*]... **which I have said before** in the matters above...

τὸ πᾶν <i>(τοῦ παντός)</i>	<i>(individually)</i> everything, <i>(collectively)</i> the universe	ΠΑΝ <i>all</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>

τό διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ result of reasoning through action
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ process of reasoning action upon
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις	[faculty of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ collecting (reasoning) action upon
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ generating out
ἐγγεννᾶν	to generate in	ΕΓΓΕΝΝΑΝ generating in
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ moving action
προλέγειν	to say before	ΠΡΟΛΕΓΕΙΝ speaking before
ὁ ἐπάνω οἱ ἐπάνω	someone above	ΕΠΑΝΩ above upon
τὸ ἐπάνω τὰ ἐπάνω	something above	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ blame
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ acquired

25.6 The Soul's Feeling

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 (fr. B 1)

...λύει τὸ πᾶν ἄθροι[σμά. τ]άσδε δὴ καὶ παρεσ[πι]αρμένας ἔν τισιν μέρε[σι]ν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς [πά]θους καθ' ἃς καὶ τὸ κα[τά] [τὸ συ]μβεβηκὸς καὶ...

...Λύει τὸ πᾶν ἄθροισμα, τάσδε δὴ καὶ παρεσπαρμένας ἔν τισιν μέρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθους – καθ' ἃς, καὶ Τὸ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ...

...It dissolves the whole aggregate, and indeed [it dissolves] these [movements] that are spread out across certain parts [of the body] from the experience of the soul – according to which [movements], even What [exists] according to an inseparable quality also...

λύειν	to dissolve	ΛΥΕΙΝ dissolve
τὸ πᾶν (τοῦ παντός)	(individually) everything, (collectively) the universe	ΠΑΝ all
πᾶς (πᾶσα, πᾶν)	whole	ΠΑΣ all
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ result of action of [being] gathered
παρεσπαρμένος (η, ον)	spread out	ΠΑΡΕΣΠΑΡΜΕΝΟΣ scatter beside
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ part
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ enduring
ἡ ψυχή αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ blowing

τὸ συμβεβηκός τὰ συμβεβηκότα	"that which has endured" property (inseparable quality)	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ <i>to have walked together</i>
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25.7 Desire & Expectations

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 fr. 2 (B 4)

...τὸ προορώμε[**νον** **τοιαῦτα**] ὅτα πάσχει... ἐπὶ [**γὰρ** **τῆς**] ἐπιθυμίας οὐ πᾶν [**κατὰ** **τὴν**] προόρασιν τὸ σύμ[**βαῖνον**]...

...τὸ Προορώμενον **τοιαῦτα** πάσχει... **ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας** οὐ Πᾶν **κατὰ τὴν προόρασιν** τὸ Σύμβαῖνον...

...What is [mentally] seen beforehand undergoes **such things**... for **in the case of desire**, not everything That happens **according to foresight**...

συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
συνορώμενος (η, ον)	fully seen [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seen together</i>
προορώμενος (η, ον)	seen before [mentally]	ΠΡΟΟΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seen before</i>
τὸ προορώμενον τὰ προορώμενα	what is seen before [mentally]	
ἢ προόρασις αἱ προοράσεις	foresight	ΠΡΟΟΡΑΣΙΣ <i>seen before</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience (<i>feeling</i>)	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
πάσχειν	to experience [here, "to undergo"]	ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ <i>enduring</i>
ἢ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ <i>toward spirit</i>
πᾶς (πάσα, πᾶν)	whole [here, "everything"]	ΠΑΣ <i>all</i>

25.8 Soul's Craving

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 1 (fr. B 7)

...γὰρ μὴ εὐρίσκη[**ι, τις**] τόδε τὸ σύμπ[**τωμα πῶς ἀπ**]οτελεῖται, ὁμῶ[**ς**] πειντεῖ ψυχῇ... ...ἀλλὰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ λογικ[**ός**] τρόπος περαίνεται...

...γὰρ μὴ εὐρίσκη **Τις τόδε τὸ σύμπτωμα πῶς ἀποτελεῖται** – ὁμῶς, πειντεῖ **Ψυχῇ**...
...ἀλλὰ μὲν γὰρ ὁ λογικὸς Τρόπος περαίνεται...

...for if Someone does not discover **how this symptom [i.e., separable quality] is fully produced** – nevertheless, the Soul may crave... but the rational Way is accomplished...

εὐρίσκειν	to discover	ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>finding</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	^[temporary for its compound] symptom (separable quality)	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
ἀποτελεῖν	to fully produce	ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>[turning, completing]</i> <i>away</i>
πεινᾶν	to crave	ΠΕΙΝΑΝ <i>hungering</i>
πειντεῖ ≈ πείνη	it may crave	

ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
λογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	rational	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of reasoning</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ὁ λογικός τρόπος	the rational way	
τὸ πέρασ τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>extremity</i>
περαίνειν	to accomplish	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extremity</i>

25.9 Mechanics of Impressions

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 3 (fr. B 11)

...ἥττον, τοῖς δ' ὅλως ἐπὶ βρα[χύ] τι καὶ οὐκ ἐντυπῶν πάλιν τινων καὶ πρὸς τὴν διανοητικὴν σύγκρισιν (ὁμοιοσημόνων τοῖς πρὸς τάδε τὰ αἰσθητήρια) παρεμπιπτόν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖθεν προοδοποι[ῃ]ηθῆναι τὰ γε δὴ πολ λά ἐχούσης μὲν καὶ αὐ τῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν στοιχείων αἱ τίας παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀτ[ό]μων διαφορὰν καὶ τῶν προυπαρχόν των πόρων... οὐ μὴν [ἀ]λλ[ἀ] καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεγεν[νη]μέ[ν]ο[υ] νοηθέντο[ς]...

...ἥττον τοῖς, δ' ὅλως ἐπὶ βραχὺ τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐντυπῶν πάλιν τινων καὶ πρὸς τὴν διανοητικὴν σύγκρισιν – ὁμοιοσημόνων τοῖς πρὸς τάδε τὰ αἰσθητήρια – Παρεμπιπτόν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖθεν προοδοποιηθῆναι:

...to a lesser extent for [*compounds of such a shape*] but entirely with a certain short [*space*], and without [It] again imprinting certain things also in relation to a [*mentally*] perceptible compound – [*imprinting*] with those [*compounds*] that are shaped similarly in relation these very sense-organs – [*while this is incidentally*] occurring from what had been prepared beforehand out of that location:

τά, γε δὴ, Πολλὰ ἐχούσης μὲν καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῆς διὰ τῶν στοιχείων αἰτίας παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀτόμων διαφορὰν καὶ τῶν προυπαρχόντων πόρων... ..οὐ μὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεγεννημένου νοηθέντος...

* certainly indeed, Many [*compounds among*] what possess [*such a shape*] and also among [*many compounds*] of the composition itself through [*the composition's elemental*] components [*possess*] the causes [*of movement*] through the difference of atoms and the preexisting passageways... ..not indeed, but also with what has been fully generated being conceived...

ἥττον	to a lesser extent	ἥΤΤΟΝ <i>inferior</i>
βραχύς <i>(εἷα, ύ)</i>	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ <i>brief</i>
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ <i>imprinting</i>
ἐντυπῶν <i>(οὔσα, ὦν)</i>	<u>imprinting</u>	ΕΝΤΥΠΩΝ <i>imprinting within</i>
τὸ ἐντυπον τὰ ἐντυπα	<u>an imprinting</u>	ΕΝΤΥΠΟΝ <i>imprinting within</i>
διανοηθῆναι	to perceive [already]	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>saw through</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοητὸς <i>(ή, όν)</i>	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>saw through</i>
αἰσθητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	[directly] perceptible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>charateristic of perceiving</i>
διανοητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being seen through</i>

<p>ἡ σύγκρισις = ἡ σύνκρισις αἱ συγκρίσεις</p>	<p>compound</p>	<p>ΣΥΝΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i></p>
<p>ὁμοειδής <i>(ές)</i></p>	<p>appearing the same</p>	<p>ὍΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ <i>appearing same</i></p>
<p>ὁμοιομερής <i>(ές)</i></p>	<p>"similarly composed" homoiomeric</p>	<p>ὍΜΟΙΟΜΕΡΗΣ <i>similar parts</i></p>
<p>ὁμοιόμορφος <i>(ον)</i></p>	<p>similarly formed</p>	<p>ὍΜΟΙΟΜΟΡΦΟΣ <i>similar form</i></p>
<p>τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα</p>	<p>shape</p>	<p>ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i></p>
<p>ὁμοιοσχημών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i></p>	<p>similarly shaped</p>	<p>ὍΜΟΙΟΣΧΗΜΩΝ <i>similar</i></p>
<p>τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὰ αἰσθητήρια</p>	<p>sense-organ</p>	<p>Αἰσθητήριον <i>instrument of perceiving</i></p>
<p>πίπτειν</p>	<p>to fall</p>	<p>ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i></p>
<p>παρεμπιπτών <i>(ουσα, όν)</i></p>	<p>[incidentally] occurring</p>	<p>ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ <i>falling into beside</i></p>
<p>ἐκεῖθεν</p>	<p>from that location <i>(thence)</i></p>	<p>ΕΚΕΙΘΕΝ <i>from over there</i></p>
<p>προοδοποιεῖν</p>	<p>to prepare beforehand</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΟΔΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>making path before</i></p>
<p>ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις</p>	<p>composition</p>	<p>ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i></p>
<p>τὸ στοιχεῖον τὰ στοιχεῖα</p>	<p>component [for facts] or, element [for things]</p>	<p>ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ <i>instance of a row (in a series)</i></p>
<p>ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι</p>	<p>cause</p>	<p>ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i></p>
<p>τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα</p>	<p>atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i></p>	<p>ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i></p>
<p>ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί</p>	<p>difference</p>	<p>ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i></p>
<p>ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i></p>	<p>existing [already]</p>	<p>ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning under</i></p>
<p>προυπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i></p>	<p>preexisting</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>before beginning under</i></p>
<p>ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι</p>	<p>passageway</p>	<p>ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i></p>
<p>ἀπογεννᾶν</p>	<p>to fully generate</p>	<p>ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating out</i></p>
<p>ἀπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i></p>	<p>having been fully generated</p>	<p>ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i></p>
<p>τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα</p>	<p>what has been fully generated</p>	<p>ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>generated out</i></p>
<p>ἐπινοεῖν</p>	<p>to objectively conceive</p>	<p>ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i></p>
<p>ἐπινοηθεῖς <i>(α, έν)</i></p>	<p>[objectively] conceived [already]</p>	<p>ΕΠΙΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ <i>seeing upon</i></p>
<p>νοηθεῖς <i>(εῖσα, έν)</i> νοηθέντες <i>(εῖσαι, έντα)</i></p>	<p>conceived</p>	<p>ΝΟΗΘΕΙΣ <i>seeing</i></p>

25.10 [Perceptions and Standards]

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 48

...[δ]ια[ν]οητι[κ]ῇ[ν] σύγκ[ρι]σιν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλ[ων] κρι[τε]ρίων...

...διανοητικὴν σύγκρισιν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων κριτηρίων...

.....the [mentally] perceptible compound or any of the other standards [of truth]...

διανοητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being seen through</i>
ή σύγκρισις αί συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
τò κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard <i>(test of truth)</i>	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>

25.11 Against Determinism, Fully Generated Memories

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 50 & 51

...{τ[α ά]πό τής προτέρας κ[ι]νήσεως τήν αίτίαν ἔχειν} κ[αί] περικάτω τρέποντες} τ[ὸν λόγον – διό δὴ καί] | [κατ' εύήθεια]ν εἰς
τ[οὔτ' έ]τελέσα[τε άφυείας – α]ὐ[τῶν τῶν άπογεγενν]η[μέ]γων ῥ[ῆτ]έον [τά]ς μνή[μας] γίννε[σθαι ἢ [τὰ] ταῖ[ς] [μνή]μαις
άνάλογ[α πάθη ά συν]ηκολούθ[ησε]}...

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 4 (fr. B 12)

...ἅμα ποιούντες πάν[τ' ά]πό τής προτέρας κινήσε[ω]ς τήν αίτίαν ἔχειν καί περικάτω τρέποντες τὸν λόγον... (διό δὴ καί κατ'
εύ[ήθ]εια<v> [εἰς τοὔ] [έ]τελέσα[τε άφυείας] αὐτῶν τῶν [ά]π[ο]γεγεννημένων [ῥῆ]τέo<v> τὰς μνήμας γ[ίνε]σθαι ἢ τὰ
ταῖς μνή[μαι]ς άνάλο γα πά[θη ά συν]ηκολούθ[ησε]}...

...ἅμα Ποιούντες **Πάντ' άπό τής προτέρας κινήσεως τήν αίτίαν ἔχειν** καί
περικάτω Τρέποντες τὸν λόγον. διό δὴ, καί κατ' εύήθειαν εἰς τοὔ τ' Έτελέσατε
άφυείας – αὐτῶν τῶν άπογεγεννημένων, Ήγτέον τὰς Μνήμας γίνεσθαι ἢ τὰ ταῖς
μνήμαις άνάλογα Πάθη.Ἄ συνηκολούθησει...

...[while you all] simultaneously Make Everything have [its] cause [of
movement] from its former movement and Turn reasoning upside down.
therefore indeed, You all through [naïve] sincerity in [your] inability even
fulfilled some [memory] – and, with [those memories] themselves being fully
generated [in the mind], It must be said that Memories are produced or [at
least] Experiences proportionate to memories [are mentally produced].
Which [experiences] will accompany...

πρότερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	former	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>further [contrast]</i>
ή κίνησις αί κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
ή αίτία αί αίτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
περικάτω	upside down	ΠΕΡΙΚΑΤΩ <i>around below</i>
τρέπων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	turning	ΤΡΕΠΩΝ <i>turning</i>
ό λόγος οί λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
ή εύήθεια αί εύήθειαι	sincerity (naivety)	ΕΥΗΘΕΙΑ <i>good character</i>
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing</i>
ή φύσις αί φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
ή άφυεία αί άφυεῖαι	inability	ΑΦΥΕΙΑ <i>not producing</i>
άπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i>

ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῚΡΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i>
ῥητέον	it must be said	ῚΡΗΤΕΟΝ
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
ἀνάλογος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
συνακολουθεῖν	to accompany	ΣΥΝΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ

25.12 Self-Production of Memories

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 5 (fr. B 13)

...δ' ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ἰδί\αν/ ἐκατέρου. οὐ γὰρ αἱ ἄ\τομοι/... ...πράττουσιν τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον οὐθὲν, ἅ\λλὰ/, καίτερ μιᾶς οὔσης ἐπ' ἐνίων κατὰ τὴν σ[υ]μπλοκὴν τῆς πρ[ό]ξεω[ς]... ...εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον συνάπτουσα πολλὰ, κα[ὶ] δὲ κα[ὶ] εἰς ἕτερον ἐπ' ἐνίων. ἦν δὲ τὸ τῆς μνή[μη]ς...

...δ' ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ἰδίαν ἐκατέρου. οὐ γὰρ αἱ ῚΑτομοι... ...πράττουσιν τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον οὐθὲν – ἅ\λλὰ, καίτερ μιᾶς οὔσης (ἐπ' ἐνίων κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τῆς πράξεως)...
...εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον συνάπτουσα πολλὰ, καὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς ἕτερον ἐπ' ἐνίων. ἦν δὲ Τὸ τῆς μνήμης...

...for which [there is] also a particular [memory] of each [experience]. indeed, the Atoms do not... ...bring about what [memory] has been fully generated in any way – but, while there is even one [atom] (among certain [atoms that compose the soul] in relation to the entanglement of their activity [that we can move with our thought])... ...[this chain of movement] connects many [atoms] into the same task [that we choose to enact], and even into a different [task we choose to enact] among others. and This was the [characteristic] of memory...

Diogenes of Oenoanda (New fr. 5.3:6-14) tells us that "after the impingements of the first images, passages are opened up in us in such a way that, even when the objects which we originally saw are no longer present, our mind takes in likenesses of the original objects."

This suggests that the images of memory have easier access to the mind, and thus occur to it with greater clarity and consistency, than those of mere imagination; and perhaps also that the original visual image of an object imprints its pattern in the atoms of the mind in such a way that memory-images of the same object immediately ' lock in ' to it and are thus identified.

ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>
πράττειν	to do [here, "to bring about"]	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ἀπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i>
εἷς μία ἓν <i>(ένός, μιᾶς, ένός)</i>	one	ῚΕΙΣ ΜΙΑ ῚΕΝ
ἔνιοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	some	ΕΝΙΟΙ
ἡ περιπλοκή αἱ περιπλοκαί	intertangling	ΠΕΡΙΠΛΟΚΗ <i>weave around</i>

ή συμπλοκή αί συμπλοκα	entangling	ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ <i>weave together</i>
πράττειν	to do	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ή πρᾶξις αί πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ <i>action</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>fastening together</i>
συνάπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	connecting	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΩΝ <i>fastening together</i>
ή μνήμη αί μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>

25.13 Mental Movements

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 55

...[νήσεω]{ν ἀπὸ τῆς γεγ[ο]μένης πληγῆς κατ[ᾶ τήν] διαν[ο]ητικὴν σύ[γκρισιν ο]ὐκ εὐθ[ύς ἐγλεί]που[σῶν ἀλλὰ] κ[ατὰ τὸν ἀπολυόμε]νο[ν]}...

{expanded fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1420 col. 1 (fr. B 14)

...ἄθροισμα καὶ δὴ καὶ τ[ῶν] κινήσεω{ν [ᾶ]πὸ τῆς γ[ενομέ]ν[η]ς πλ[η]γῆς κατὰ τ[ήν] διανοητ[ι]κὴν σύγκρι[σιν οὐ]κ εὐ[θ]ύς ἐγλειπτο[υ[σῶ]]ν ἄ[λλὰ] κατὰ τὸν [ἀπολ]υόμεν[ον] τὸ] παθητὸν [τρ]ό[πον]ν, τήν... ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπομάξεως... τοῦ εἰδῶλου κατὰ...

...᾿Αθροισμα. καὶ δὴ καὶ **τῶν Κινήσεων** – **ἀπὸ τῆς γενομένης πληγῆς, κατὰ τὴν διανοητικὴν σύγκρισιν** – **οὐκ εὐθύς ἐγλείπουσῶν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀπολυόμενον, τὸ παθητὸν τρόπον... ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπομάξεως... τοῦ εἰδῶλου κατὰ...**

...Aggregate. and then **because the [mental] Movements** – **[which occur] from a strike that has already occurred from a mentally perceptible compound** – **are not simply disappearing, but according to what is released, the experiential way... from the wiping away... of the film, according to...**

τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
γενόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	produced [already]	ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>come into being</i>
ή πληγή αί πληγαί	strike	ΠΛΗΓΗ <i>to hit</i>
διανοητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being seen through</i>
ή σύγκρισις αί συγκρίσεις	compound	ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating together</i>
εὐθύς <i>(εἷα, ύ)</i>	simply	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>direct</i>
ή ἔκλειψις αί ἐκλείψεις	a disappearance [or, of the sun & moon] an eclipse	ΕΚΛΕΙΨΙΣ <i>leaving out</i>
ἐγλείπειν = ἐκλείπειν	to disappear [or, of the sun & moon] to be eclipsed	ΕΓΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ ΕΚΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>leaving out</i>
ἐγλείπων = ἐκλείπων	disappearing [or, of the sun & moon] being eclipsed	ΕΓΛΕΙΠΩΝ ΕΚΛΕΙΠΩΝ <i>leaving out</i>
ἀπολύειν	to release away	ΑΠΟΛΥΕΙΝ <i>dissolve away</i>

πάσχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	affected [by]	ΠΑΣΧΩΝ <i>suffering</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
παθητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	experiential	ΠΑΘΗΤΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ὁ παθητὸς τρόπος	the experiential way	
ὁ λογικὸς τρόπος	the rational way	
ἡ ἀπομάξις αἱ ἀπομάξεις	wiping away	ΑΠΟΜΑΞΙΣ <i>wiping away</i>
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>

25.14 [Reminders]

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 68

...τοῦ [πι]ρ[άγματ]ος οὔτος [μέλλ]ει μνήμων [ἔσ]εσθαι **δοχ**... ...[στε]ρεμνίου...

...τοῦ πράγματος Οὔτος μέλλει **μνήμων** ἔσεσθαι... ...στερεμνίου...

...of the situation, This will exist **as reminding** [us]... ...of the hard object...

τὸ προᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
μέλλειν	to be about to do [here, "will be"]	ΜΕΛΛΕΙΝ <i>going to</i>
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜONEYΕΙΝ <i>"addition to" thinking</i>
μνήμων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	reminding	ΜΝΗΜΩΝ <i>thinking</i>
ἔσεσθαι	to exist [in the future]	ΕΣΕΣΘΑΙ <i>will be</i>
τὸ στερεμνίον τὰ στερεμνία	hard object	ΣΤΕΡΕΜΝΙΟΝ <i>hard</i>

25.15 General Understanding

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 1.3.3 (B 26)

...κοινοῦ τινος ἐ[πιστ]ῆμαι ἐν πλείοσι κα[ὶ] **δ**[ι]αφόροις ὑπάρχουσιν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ πρῶτα μν[ημ]ονευόμενα καὶ τ[ὰς] **ἐ**[πιστ]ήμας...

...κοινοῦ τινος Ἐπιστῆμαι **ἐν πλείοσι καὶ διαφόροις** ὑπάρχουσιν – **τὰ** γὰρ δὴ **πρῶτα μνημονευόμενα καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας**...

...Understandings of something general [*begin to*] exist **in more and differing** [*ways*] – for indeed **the primary** [*situation*] **being remembered** and [*our*] **understandings**...

κοινός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	general	ΚΟΙΝΟΣ <i>common</i>
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing together</i>
ἡ ἐπιστήμη αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι	understanding	ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ <i>standing upon</i>

πλείων (ον)	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
διάφορος (ον)	differing	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ <i>carrying apart</i>
ὑπάρχειν	to exist [here, "to begin to exist"]	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
πρῶτος (η, ον)	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ <i>"addition to"</i> <i>thinking</i>

25.16 Practical Reductionism

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 6 (fr. B 28)

...ἤι ἄθροισμα τότε τι[ι ᾗ]ν προσαγορεύσαιμ[ε]ν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥ ἀτόμους καὶ ἥ ἄθροισμα καὶ μὴ{ι} μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ κα[τα]κινεῖσθαι λέγονται...

...**ἥ ἄθροισμα τότε τι ᾗν Προσαγορεύσαιμεν: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥ "ἀτόμους" καὶ ἥ "ἄθροισμα." καὶ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ** τὸ Κατακινεῖσθαι λέγονται...

...insofar as We would refer to **this aggregate** as **something**: but also insofar as [we would refer to an aggregate as] "atoms" and insofar as [we would refer to an aggregate as] "an aggregate" [per se]. and **not only** is [the act of] Being completely moved **itself** spoken of as...

ἥ	insofar as	Ἡ <i>in/for which</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἀθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of</i> <i>action of [being]</i> <i>gathered</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly</i> <i>toward</i>
ἄτομος (ος, ον)	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
ἡ ἄτομος αἱ ἄτομοι	atom	ΑΤΟΜΟΣ <i>not cut</i>
κατακινεῖσθαι	to be completely moved	ΚΑΤΑΚΙΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>moving</i>
τὸ κατακινεῖσθαι	[the act of] being completely moved	

25.17 Imagination

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 8 (fr. B 30)

...τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν καταλειπόντων[ν σ]ὺν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ὅθεν ἕτερα προσδοξάζοντων τὰ μὲν κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμ[πτώ]σεις τινας ὅσ' ἀπερι[λή]πτως [προσδο]ξάζουσι[ν ἡ] καὶ ἀναλ[ό]γως ἀπεριλ[ή]πτοι[ς] προ[σδο]ξα[ζ]ι...

...**τὰ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν καταλειπόντων, σὺν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις – ὅθεν, ἕτερα προσδοξάζοντων.** Τὰ μὲν **κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεις τινας, ὅσ'** ἀπεριλήπτως Προσδοξάζουσιν – **ἥ καὶ ἀναλόγως ἀπεριλήπτοις Προσδοξάζουσιν...**

...with the general [collisions that are] thoroughly leaving **many [mental movements]** remaining, in accordance with the [collisions from the films off of] original sources – from these [external collisions], with those [people] adding [their] judgment to **other [mental movements]**. Some [of these mental movements are] **certain collisions** from films, to **which** They add judgment **without complete comprehension** – or They also analogously add judgment to [what is] not completely comprehensible...

κοινός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	general	ΚΟΙΝΟΣ <i>common</i>
καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave [here, "to leave remaining"]	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leave</i>
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of</i> <i>situated under</i>
ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἜΤΕΡΟΣ <i>other</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον	^[Δ+] the addition of judgement	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition</i> <i>to seeming</i>
προσδοξάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	^{Δ+} adding [one's] judgment to	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ <i>addition</i> <i>to seeming</i>
προσδοξάζειν	to add [one's] judgement to	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ <i>hitting</i>
ἡ σύγκρουσις αἱ συγκρούσεις	mutual impact	ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ <i>hitting together</i>
ἡ πληγή αἱ πληγαί	strike	ΠΛΗΓΗ <i>impacting</i>
προσπίπτειν	to fall upon	ΠΡΟΣΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling toward</i>
ἡ ἔμπτωσις αἱ ἐμπτώσεις	collision	ΕΜΠΤΩΣΙΣ <i>falling into</i>
ἀπεριλήπτως	without complete comprehension	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ <i>not taken hold around</i>
ἀπερίληπτος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	not completely comprehensible	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>not taken hold around</i>
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ <i>reasoning again</i>

25.18 Emergence of Awareness

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 9 (fr. B 31)

...έξ όγκων [ων] είναι σωματικῶν πεποιημένον. εἶτα τὸ κοινόν έαυτῆς έπεθεώρησε[ν] πάθος ώς ούδέ διανοηθῆναι άλλα δύναται παρέ[κ] τού[τ]ων, άν τε σώματα... ...άν τε κα[ί] τὸν τό[π]ον πρὸς ανάλογια[ν]...

...έξ όγκων εἶναι σωματικῶν πεποιημένον. εἶτα, τὸ κοινόν έαυτῆς Έπεθεώρησε πάθος – ώς ούδέ διανοηθῆναι άλλα δύναται παρέκ τούτων, άν τε σώματα... ...άν τε καί τὸν τόπον πρὸς ανάλογίαν...

...[because your reasoning] exists composed out of corporeal particles. then, [your Reasoning] carefully envisioned its own general experience – as it is not even possible to mentally perceive other things apart from these [corporeal particles], whether Bodies... ...or even location in relation to an analogy...

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
ὁ ὅγκος οἱ ὅγκοι	particle	ΟΓΚΟΣ <i>bulk</i>
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>

σωματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	corporeal	ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of body</i>
πεποιημένος	having been made [here, "composed"]	ΠΕΠΟΙΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>gathered</i>
ή κοινότης αί κοινότητες	general quality	ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from common</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
ἐπιθεωρεῖν	to carefully envision	ΕΠΙΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing upon</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
παρέκ	apart from	ΠΑΡΕΚ
τὸ σῶμα τὰ σώματα	body	ΣΩΜΑ <i>body</i>
ὁ τόπος οἱ τόποι	location	ΤΟΠΟΣ <i>spot</i>
ή ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>

25.19 Unified Consciousness

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 10 (fr. B 32)

...[ἐ]αυτῷ κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἑαυτὸν ῥηθήσεται διανοεῖσθαι οἷον ἐνός τινος ταύτη τοῦ νοουμένου[ν]υ ὄντος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτ[ὸ]ν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν[τὸς] ἄλλων. καθότι δ' ἐν [πά]θει τινι ἑαυτὸν λέ[γεται διαν]οε[ῖσθ]αι...

...ἐαυτῷ, κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀδιάφορον, ἑαυτὸν ῥηθήσεται διανοεῖσθαι ^[1] οἷον ἐνός τινος ταύτη τοῦ νοουμένου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ^[2] ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν, ἑαυτοῦ, ἐντὸς ἄλλων – καθότι δ' ἐν πάθει τινι ἑαυτὸν λέγεται διανοεῖσθαι...

...for itself, according to what is similar and undifferentiated, [your reasoning] will be said to mentally perceive *itself* ^[1] as if it were one particular thing in what is conceived to exist [i.e., "this is my ability to reason"], but also ^[2] in reference to itself, of itself, within [the context] of other things [i.e., "my ability to reason is based in atomic movement"] – and in as much as [your reasoning] is said to perceive *itself* in some experience [of feeling]...

ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
τὸ ὅμοιον τὰ ὅμοια	what is similar	
ἀδιάφορος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	undifferentiated	ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ <i>not carrying apart</i>
ῥηθῆναι	to be said [already]	ῚΡΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i>
ῥηθήσασθαι	will be said	ῚΡΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ
ή διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
οἶος <i>(οἶα, οἶον)</i>	such as [here "as if"]	ὍΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>

εἷς μία ἔν <i>(ένός, μιᾶς, ενός)</i>	one	ἜΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἘΝ
ἐντός <i>+ gen</i>	within	ΕΝΤΟΣ
καθότι	in as much as	ΚΑΘΟΤΙ <i>thoroughly</i> <i>because</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive ^[mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>

25.20 Internal Dialogue vs. Deterministic Monotony

Epíkourous, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 11 (fr. B 33)

...[ῥη]θήσεται δι[ιανoe]ῖσθα[ι ἅ]λλ' ἤι ἐξεῖπο[ν τό]τε, κα[ὶ] ἑαυτῷ ἑαυτὸ λέγεσθαι διανοεῖσθαι. πάντα γὰρ οὕτω γ' ἅν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀναισθητοῦντα ἐτύγχανεν καὶ **τῶν** τούτων ἐπιλογισμὸν... ἐπ[ὶ] τὸν λαβεῖν, οὐχ ὥ[σ]περ **σὺν** ἐπαισθήσ[ε]σ[ι]ν... σημειο[ῦ]ν... **ἀλλὰ** δὴ τ[οῦ]τον τὸν **τρόπον** γ φημ[ὶ καθ'] ὄν...

...Ρηθήσεται **διανοεῖσθαι** – ἀλλ' **ἢ** Ἐξεῖπον **τότε** – καὶ **ἑαυτῷ ἑαυτὸ** λέγεσθαι **διανοεῖσθαι**. Πάντα γὰρ **οὕτω γ' ἂν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον** ἀναισθητοῦντα **ἐτύγχανεν**: καὶ **τούτων ἐπιλογισμὸν ἐπίπονον** λαβεῖν – οὐχ ὥσπερ **σὺν ἐπαισθήσεσιν... ἀλλὰ δὴ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον** Φημι **καθ' ὄν...**

...[*which one's Reasoning*] will be said **to** *[mentally]* **perceive** – but **insofar** as I spoke out **at that time** – and [*one's reasoning will be said*] to perceive to speak **to oneself, as oneself**. for *[unless it was]* **in this way**, indeed, All things would have become insensible to **themselves in every way**: and would have comprehended *[only]* **a tedious** *[process of]* inductive consideration of these – not as with focused sensations... but truly, I assert that **this way according to which...**

ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
ῥηθῆναι	to be said ^[already]	ῬΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>said</i>
ῥηθησθῆναι	<i>to be said</i> <i>[in the future]</i>	
ῥηθήσεται	it will be said	ῬΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ <i>said</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive ^[mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
ἣ	insofar as ^[here, "in the sense"]	Ἡ <i>in/for which</i>
λέγειν	to say ^[here, "to speak"]	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
ἐκλέγειν	to speak out	ΕΚΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking out</i>
ἐξεῖπον	I spoke out	
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner /</i> <i>direction</i>
ἀναισθητεῖν	to become insensible	ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΕΙΝ <i>not sensing</i>
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
ἐτύγχανεν	it happened	ΕΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΝ <i>came to be</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	^[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of</i> <i>reasoning action</i> <i>upon</i>
ἐπίπονος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	tedious	ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ <i>upon toil</i>

.....{προσεδρε[**ῖαι** **ἐ**]κμετροῦντας [τ]ρόπ[**ους**]} ἐμέμνητο καὶ λαμβάνον **τῇ** μνήμῃ [π]α[**ρ**]εῖχε τῷ φυσικῷ τέλει τὸ χαρτὸν ἢ τὸ λυπ[**ηρὸν**, **ὡς** π]ᾶ[**ν**]υ προκατ[**έ**γρ^α]φον, ἐν δόξαις ἢ/ ἄλλ[**ως**] ποσὸν [δ]ὲ δὴ...

...προσεδρεῖα ἐκμετροῦντας τρόπους Ἐμέμνητο – καὶ λαμβάνον **τῇ μνήμῃ** **παρεῖχε τῷ φυσικῷ τέλει τὸ χαρτὸν ἢ τὸ λυπηρὸν** – ὡς πᾶν προκατέγραφον, ἐν δόξαις ἢ ἄλλως. Ποσὸν, δὲ δὴ...

...through assiduous study He had already been reminded of the ways [of thinking] that measure out [sensations] – and while he was comprehending [these ways] in memory, He yielded to [our arguments regarding] what is delightful or what is distressing in regards to their natural fulfillment – as is entirely already written [by us], in [our] judgments [concerning doctrines] or in other [writings]. but indeed, That which is measurable...

ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἡ προσεδρεῖα αἱ προσεδρεῖαι	assiduous study	<i>ad-sedeō</i> ΠΡΟΣΕΔΡΕΙΑ <i>toward seat</i>
καταμετρῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i> καταμετροῦντες <i>(οὔσαι, οὔντα)</i>	fully measuring	ΚΑΤΑΜΕΤΡΩΝ <i>thoroughly measure</i>
ἐκμετρῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	measuring out	ΕΚΜΕΤΡΩΝ <i>measure out</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ὁ παθητὸς τρόπος	the experiential way	
ὁ λογικὸς τρόπος	the rational way	
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ <i>"addition to" thinking</i>
τὸ μνημονευόμενον τὰ μνημονευόμενα	what is remembered	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of "addition to" thinking</i>
μνημονεύων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	remembering	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΩΝ <i>thinking</i>
μιμνήσκεσθαι	to be reminded	ΜΙΜΝΗΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ <i>thinking "again"</i>
μιμνήσκειν	to recall	ΜΙΜΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thinking "again"</i>
ἐμέμνητο	he had been reminded [already]	
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
λαμβάνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	comprehending	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ <i>grasping</i>
παρέχειν	to yield [here "to admit"]	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold beside</i>
ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
φυσικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ <i>producing</i>
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ <i>goal</i>
ἡ χαρά αἱ χαραί	delight	ΧΑΡΑ <i>cheer</i>
ἡ χάρις αἱ χάριτες	favor	ΧΑΡΙΣ <i>cheer</i>
χαρτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	delightful	ΧΑΡΤΟΣ <i>cheer</i>
ἐπίπονος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	tedious	ΕΠΙΠΟΝΟΣ <i>upon toil</i>
λυπηρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	distressing	ΛΥΠΗΡΟΣ <i>distress</i>
πᾶν	entirely	ΠΑΝΥ

συγγράφειν	to compose together	ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ <i>writing together</i>
προκαταγράφειν	to have already written	ΠΡΟΚΑΤΑΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ <i>writing thoroughly before</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ποσός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	how many / measurable	ΠΟΣΟΣ <i>some / certain</i>

25.23 Silent Memorization

Épikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 4.4 (B 36)

...ποτε ἀπεμν[ημόν]ευεν ἡ ἀνάλογον τῇ[ι ἀπομ]νημον[εύ]σει πάθος ἴσχα[νεν] καὶ ἐνδιέτριβεν ὅθε[ν ἡ] συχίει τε καὶ τῶν... καὶ
μεγίστους φόβους... ἀξ[ό]ντων ἐπισκεψέ[ων]... φυσ[ικοῦ] πάθους φόβ[ους]... κατ[ὰ] τ[οὺς ἀνθ]ρώπους καὶ κατ[ι]ὰ τὰ ὑπ[ὲρ
ἄ]νθρωπον... κα[ὶ] τοῦ ἀφανοῦ[ς]...

...ποτε, Ἀπεμνημόνευεν – ἡ ἀνάλογον τῇ ἀπομνημονεύσει πάθος Ἴσχανεν – καὶ Ἐνδιέτριβεν, ὅθεν Ἦσυχίει τε καὶ... καὶ μεγίστους φόβους... ἀξόντων ἐπισκεψεων... φυσικοῦ πάθους φόβους... κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ κατὰ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον... ...καὶ, τοῦ ἀφανοῦς...

...at some point, He was memorizing – or He was retaining an experience analogous to memorization – and He was occupying himself with [it], for which reason He was silent and... and the greatest fears... of the examinations of those [] leading... fears of natural experience... according to humans and according to what is beyond a human... ...also, of the invisible...

μιμνήσκειν	to recall	ΜΙΜΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thinking "again"</i>
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜONEYΕΙΝ <i>"addition to" thinking</i>
ἀπομνημονεύειν	to memorize	ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜONEYΕΙΝ <i>"addition to" thinking fully</i>
ἀνάλογος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
ἡ ἀπομνημόνευσις αἱ ἀπομνημονεύσεις	memorization	ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜONEYΣΙΣ <i>process of "addition to" thinking fully</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[π] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ἴσχειν	to retain	ΙΣΧΕΙΝ <i>keeping back</i>
ἐνδιετρίβειν	to occupy oneself with	ΕΝΔΙΕΤΡΙΒΕΙΝ <i>rubbing through in</i>
ἡ ἡσυχία αἱ ἡσυχίαι	silence	ἩΣΥΧΙΑ <i>stillness</i>
ἡσυχίειν	to be silent	ἩΣΥΧΙΕΙΝ <i>stillness</i>
μέγιστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	greatest	ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΣ <i>big</i>
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
ἄξων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	leading	ΑΞΩΝ <i>leading</i>
ἐπισκέπτεσθαι	to examine	ΕΠΙΣΚΕΠΤΕΘΑΙ <i>looking upon</i>
ἡ ἐπισκέψις αἱ ἐπισκέψεις	examination	ΕΠΙΣΚΕΨΙΣ <i>looking upon</i>
φυσικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ <i>producing</i>

ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
τὸ ἄφανες τὰ ἄφανη	invisible thing	ΑΦΑΝΕΣ <i>not appearing</i>

25.24 Formation of New Ideas

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 86

...{([μ]νήμη ἢ τὸ τῆι [μνή]μηι πά)θος ἀνάλο[γον] ὧν ἕξει μᾶλλον [ἐνεγί]γνε[το, π]ρὸς τ[ὸ] ὥ[ρισμέ]νον καὶ τὰ πά[ν]τα...

{added to the expanded version below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 2 (fr. A 41)

...{[τούτου μν]ήμη{ι} ἢ ἀ[νάλογος μνή]μηι κεί[νῃσις τὰ μὲν] συνεγε[νέννητο, εὐθ]ύς, τὰ δ' εὖ[ξητο, τή]ν ἀρχήν ἔχου[σα καὶ τή]ν αἰτ[ί]αν, ἥι μέ[ν τῇι π]ρώ[τ]ῃι συστάσ[ει... τῇ ἀτό]μων ἅ[μα καὶ τοῦ ἀπο]γεννη[θέ]ντος, [ἥι δὲ τῇι ἐπαυ]ξαμ[έννηι, ἥι πάντα] δρω[μεν, τῶν ἀτόμ]ωγ ἅμ[α καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ] ἀπο[γεγεννη]}}

{better version below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37) et alia

...{([μ]νήμη ἢ τὸ τῆι [μνή]μηι πά)θος ἀνάλογον ὧν ἕδει μᾶλλον ἐνεγείνεται πρὸς τὸ ὠρισμένον καὶ τὰ πάντα {ἐξελέγχον τῆς ἀναφορᾶς γινομένης καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀόριστα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα — αὕτη δ' αὖ πάλιν ἢ {τούτου μνήμη ἢ ἀνάλογος μνήμηι κίνησις τὰ μὲν συνεγε[γέν]νητο εὐθύς, τὰ δ' ἠϋξῆτο τὴν [ἀρχή]ν ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν. εἴ [μ]ὲν τῇ πρώτῃ συστάσει τ[ῶ]ν τε ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεννηθέντ[ος, εἴ] ᾗ/ δὲ τῇ ἐ[παυ]ξομένει, ἔ[ι π]άντα δρω[με]ν, τ[ῶ]ν ἀτόμω[ν ἅμ]α καὶ αὐ[τοῦ τοῦ ἀ]πογε[γεν]νη)μένου ἐ[ξ] ἀ[νά]γκ[ῃς ἀ]ντίξουν ἐπ' ἐ[νίω]ν [τοῖς] ἀπ[ογ]εγνήσασιν...

...Μνήμη ἢ τὸ **τεῖ μνήμη** Πάθος **ἀνάλογον** ὧν. Ἔδει μᾶλλον Ἐνεγείνεται **πρὸς τὸ ὠρισμένον** – καὶ τὰ Πάντα ἐξελέγχον **τῆς ἀναφορᾶς γινομένης** – καὶ **οὐ πρὸς ἀόριστα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα**. αὕτη δ' αὖ πάλιν ἢ τούτου Μνήμη ἢ **ἀνάλογος μνήμη** Κίνησις: Τὰ μὲν συνεγεγέννητο εὐθύς – Τὰ δ' ἠϋξῆτο, **τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν**.

...Memory, or the Experience of those [movements] **analogous to memory**. It would have been more necessary that [the memory] was implanted in relation to what [experience] was being defined – even with Everything refuting out the reference [to the definition] as it was being produced – and not in relation to the undefined things, that also need separating. but again, this Memory of [an experience] or a Movement **analogous to memory**: with Some [aspect of memory] having been generated together directly [from experiences] – while Other [aspects of memory] had increased, although they have **a foundation** and **a cause [from former experiences]**.

εἴ μὲν,^[1] **τεῖ πρώτῃι συστάσει τῶν τε ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἀπογεννηθέντος** – ^[2] **εἴ δὲ, τῇ ἐπαυξομένει. εἴ πάντα** Δρωμεν **τῶν ἀτόμων ἅμα καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀπογεγεννημένου ἐξ ἀνάγκης: ἀντίξουν ἐπ' ἐνίω**ν τοῖς ἀπογεννήσασιν...

in one respect, [our memories are formed]^[1] in the primary composition of the atoms together with what [movement] had been fully generated [at the time] – while ^[2] in another respect, in [that which] is being further increased [by us over time]. if We do **all things** with the atoms together with what [motion] itself has been fully generated out of necessity: with us, for some [of our actions], resisting against what [atomic motion] has fully generated [out of necessity]...

τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[n] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>
ἀνάλογος (ος, ον)	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ <i>necessary</i>
ἔδει	it would have been necessary	ΕΔΕΙ <i>was necessary</i>
μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ <i>very</i>

ἐνείναι	to implant	ΕΝΕΙΝΑΙ <i>being inside</i>
ἐνεγείνεται	it was implanted	
ὀρίζειν	to set a limit	ὍΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
ὥρισμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being limited / being defined	ὍΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ <i>border</i>
ἡ ἀοριστεία αἱ ἀοριστεῖαι	lack of definition	ΑΟΡΙΣΤΕΙΑ <i>no border</i>
ἀόριστος <i>(ας, ον)</i>	undefined	ΑΟΡΙΣΤΟΣ <i>no border</i>
ἐξελέγγειν	to refute out	ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ <i>confuting out</i> <i>[with contrary proof]</i>
ἐξελέγχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	refuting out	ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ
ἡ ἐπιφορά αἱ ἐπιφοραί	application	ΕΠΙΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying upon</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ἡ συμφόρησις αἱ συμφόρησεις	accumulation	ΣΥΜΦΟΡΗΣΙΣ <i>carrying together</i>
ἡ ἀναφορά αἱ ἀναφοραί	reference?	ΑΝΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying back</i>
γινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	separating	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating</i>
προσδεῖσθαι	to also need	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>needing in addition to</i>
προσδεόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	also needing	ΠΡΟΣΔΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ
ἡ μνήμη αἱ μνήμαι	memory	ΜΝΗΜΗ <i>thinking</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
ἐγγεννᾶν	to generate in	ΕΓΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating in</i>
συνγεννᾶν	to generate together	ΣΥΝΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating together</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
αὐξάνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ <i>increasing</i>
ἡὔξητο	it had increased	ΗΥΞΗΤΟ <i>increasing</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
Part 2		
πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ἡ πρώτη σύστασις τῶν ἀτόμων	the primary composition of the atoms	<i>Epikouros</i> <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</i> <i>P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37)</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating out</i>
ἀπογεννηθῆναι	to be fully generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΗΝΑΙ

ἀπογεννηθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	fully [been] generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΕΙΣ
ἀπογεννήσας	having fully generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΣ <i>generating</i>
ἀπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been fully generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i>
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	what = <i>Movement,</i> <i>which results in</i> <i>Action,</i> <i>which results in</i> <i>[dispositional]</i> <i>Development</i>
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	
εἰ̃ = ἣ̃	insofar as	ἣ̃ <i>in/for which</i>
εἰ̃ μὲν... εἰ̃ δὲ...	in one respect, while in another respect	
αὐξάνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ <i>increasing</i>
ἐπαυξόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being further increased	ΕΠΑΥΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>upon / further</i> <i>increasing</i>
δράν	to do	ΔΡΑΝ <i>taking action</i>
δρῶμεν	we do	ΔΡΩΜΕΝ
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
ἐξ ἀνάγκης	necessarily	
ἀντιέναι	to resist	
ἀντίξων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	resisting	ΑΝΤΙΞΩΝ <i>holding against</i>
ἐνιοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	some	ΕΝΙΟΙ

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 87

...{ἐξελέγχω[v] τῆς ἀ[v]αφορᾶς γινομ[έ]νῃ[ς κ]αὶ οὐ πρὸς ἀόρι[σ]τα καὶ κρίσεως προσδεόμενα... α[ὐ̃τ]ῇ δ' αὖ πάλι[v] ἡ
τ[ούτου] μνήμη [ἡ ἀνάλογος μνή]μη[κίνησις τὰ μὲν συνε]γε}...

{expanded version above}

25.25 Atomic Generation

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 42)

...[ἀ]ποβαινόντων κατὰ [τ]ὰς συνωσθείσας ἀλ[λ]ὰ καὶ αἱ συνωσθεῖσαι δηλόνως ὁμοίως. φύ[σ]ιν γὰρ εἶχον συνως[θ]εῖσαι
τοιαῦτα ἀπογ[ενν]ᾶν καὶ τοιοῦτο[υ] ἐ[ργου ἄρ]χεσθαι αἱ αὐ̃τ[αῖ] κα[τὰ] τὸν [ἀ]π[ὸ] τοῦ αὐ̃τοῦ διαστήματος τρόπον...

...ἀποβαινόντων κατὰ τὰς συνωσθείσας ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ Συνωσθεῖσαι δηλόνως
ὁμοίως. φύσιν γὰρ εἶχον συνωσθεῖσαι τοιαῦτα ἀπογεννᾶν καὶ τοιούτου ἔργου
ἄρχεσθαι, αἱ Αὐταὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διαστήματος τρόπον...

...of those [movements] that result according to the crowded-together
[atoms], but even the Crowded-together [atoms] clearly [move] similarly. for
they had a nature to fully generate such things and to begin such a task, the
same [atoms] in accordance with a way [arising] from the same separation...

[Laursen] ...coming about in accordance with the [atoms] thrust together, but
also the [atoms] thrust together, evidently, in the same way. For they had
the capacity, [if thrust together], to produce such thing and such... the same
[atoms] in accordance with the manner "from the same distance"...

συμβαίνειν	to endure [with its compound]	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
ἀποβαίνειν	to result	
ἀποβαίνων	resulting	ΑΠΟΒΑΙΝΩΝ <i>walking away</i>
συνωσείν	to crowd together	
συνωσθείς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	crowded together [already]	ΣΥΝΩΣΘΕΙΣ <i>pushing together</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
δηλόνως	clearly	ΔΗΛΟΝΩΣ
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating out</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
ἄρχειν	to begin	ΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning</i>
υὑπάρχειν	to exist	ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
ἄρχεσθαι	to begin [for themselves]	ΑΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>beginning</i>
τὸ διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing between</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>

25.26 Responsibility

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 90 & 91

...{[θα]ι κατ<ὰ> [τὸν προειρημ]έ[νον τ]ρόπ[ον] κα[ί]ι τ[ῶν] α[ὐ]τ[ῶ]ν [ἀπ]ερ[γα]στ[ικ]ᾶ εἶναι – π[ολλὰ δέ κ]αὶ τ[ῶ]ν δ[ε] κ[αὶ] τ[ῶ]ν δ[ε] φύσιν ἔ- χ[ο]ντ[α ἀπερ]γ[αστ]ικὰ γί[νν]εσ[θαι] δι' ἑαυτὰ οὐ | γίγγ[εται ἀπε]ρ[γ]αστ[ικ]ά, (οὐ διὰ [τὴν] α[ὐ]τ[ῆ]ν αἰτίαν τῶν τε ἀ[τόμ]ων κα[ὶ] ἑαυτῶν), οἷ[ς δ]ὴ κα[ί]ι μ[α]λ[ίσ]τα μ[α]χό[με]θα κα[ί]ι ἐπιτιμῶ[μεν]... [οὖν]τες κατ[ὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχ]ῆς [τα]ραχώδη φύσιν [έχοντα]}...

{better and expanded version, B 38, below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 (fr. A 43)

...{οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργ[η]κεν εἰς ἓνια ἔργα τε καὶ μεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἢ τῶν [ἀτ]όμων φύσις... ἀλλ' αὐ[τ]ὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα τὴν πᾶσα[ν ἢ] τὴν πλε[ύ]στην κέ[κτ]ητ[αι] αἰτί[α]ν των[δέ τ]ινων, ἔκ δ' [έκε]ίνης [έ]ναι των [ἀ]τόμων [κε]ινῇ[σεις] ταραχώδε[ις] κέ[κτ]ην[ται], οὐχὶ διὰ τὰς [ἀ]τόμο[υς] πάν[τως]}

{overlaps with B 38 below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 92

...κέκ[τηται αἰτί]αν τωνδὲ τ[ινων, ἐκ] δ' [έ]κίνη[ς ἐν]αι των ἀτόμω[ν] κινῆσ[εις] τ[αραχώδ]εις κ[ινοῦν]ται οὐ[χὶ διὰ] τ[ὰς] {ἀ}τόμου[ς] π[άν]τω[ς]... [διὰ των παρεμ]πιπτό[ν] των κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος εἰς] τὴμ φυσικῇ[ν]}...

{added to B 38 below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 16 (fr. B 38)

...[γί]νεσθαι κατὰ τὸν π[ρ]οειρημένον τρόπον καὶ τῶν [α]ύτων ἀπεργαστικά εἶναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶνδε καὶ τῶν[δε φ]ύσιν ἔχοντα ἀπεργαστικά [γί]νεσθαι δι' ἑαυτὰ οὐ γίνεται ἀ[πε]ργαστικά, οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτία[ν] τῶν τε ἀτόμων καὶ ἑαυτῶν. οἷς δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μαχόμεθα καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν, μ[ι]σοῦντες κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῇ[ς] ταραχώδη φύσιν ἔχοντα} καθ[ά]περ ἐπὶ τῶν πάγων ζώων. {οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν εἰς ἓνια ἔργα τε καὶ μεγέθη ἔργων καὶ διαθέσεων ἢ τῶν ἀτόμων φύσις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα τὴν πᾶσα[ν ἢ] τὴν πλε[ίστην] κέ[κ]τητ[αι] αἰτίαν τῶνδε [τι]νων, ἐκ δ' ἐκ[εί]νη[ς] ἐν[ν]αι τ[ῶν ἀτόμ]ων κιν[ή]σεις [τα]ραχώ[δεις κιν]οῦνται, ο[ὐ]χ[ί] διὰ τὰ[ς] ἀ[τό]μο[υς] {ἀ}τόμου[ς] πά[ν]τῳ[ς]... [διὰ * τῶν παρεμ]π[ι]πτόν[των] [των κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐκ τοῦ] περι[έχοντος] εἰς] τὴμ φυσικῇ[ν]...

* P.Herc. 1056 has δε here, in brackets – but P.Herc. 1191 does not.

...**γίγνεσθαι** κατὰ τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπεργαστικά εἶναι. Πολλὰ δὲ, καὶ τῶνδε καὶ τῶνδε φύσιν ἔχοντα, ἀπεργαστικά γίγνεσθαι δι' ἑαυτὰ οὐ γίνεται ἀπεργαστικά – οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν τῶν τε ἀτόμων καὶ ἑαυτῶν. οἷς δὴ καὶ μάλιστα Μαχόμεθα καὶ Ἐπιτιμῶμεν, μισοῦντες κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ταραχώδη φύσιν ἔχοντα – καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πάντων ζώων.

...[one's own actions] are generated in the previously mentioned way, existing as productive of the same things. yet, although they have a nature [that could be productive] of these and those [achievements], Many [actions that people generate], are made unproductive because of themselves – not through of the SAME cause [of movement] of both the atoms and of themselves. against these [unproductive generated actions] We especially contend and rebuke, while resenting [those who] have [a temperament] from their birth in accordance with a disturbing nature – just as [we do] in the case of all living beings [that choose to act counterproductively].

[Sedley 20 B.1-2] ...< > ...But many naturally capable of achieving these and those results fail to achieve them because of themselves, not because of one and the same responsibility of the atoms and of themselves. And with these we especially do battle, and rebuke them, hating them for a disposition which follows their disordered congenital nature as we do with the whole range of animals.

[Laursen] ...come about in the aforementioned manner and be productive of the same things. Many [products] capable of producing both this and that do not produce them, because of themselves and not because of the same cause in the atoms and themselves. These [products] are therefore a main target of our attacks and criticism, because we... behave in accordance with the original disturbing nature, as is the case with animals as a whole.

οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνήργηκεν ^[1] **εἰς ἓνια ἔργα τε καὶ** ^[2] **μεγέθη ἔργων καὶ** ^[3] **διαθέσεων ἢ τῶν ἀτόμων Φύσις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα τὴν πᾶσαν ἢ τὴν πλείστην κέκτηνται αἰτίαν τῶνδε τινων – ἐκ δ' ἐκείνης, ἔναι τῶν ἀτόμων Κινήσεις ταραχώδεις κινοῦνται – οὐχί διὰ τὰς ἀτόμους πάντως διὰ τῶν παρεμπίπτόντων κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος εἰς τὴμ φυσικὴν...**

for them the Nature of the atoms has contributed nothing ^[1] to some [of their] tasks, and ^[2] to the sizes of [their] tasks, and ^[3] of the arrangements [of their tasks], but rather [their movements] that are fully generated have procured the whole or [at least] the greatest cause of these particular [tasks] – and [it is] from that [responsibility of theirs] that some disturbing Movements of the atoms are moved – but not completely through the atoms through what happens to occur according to necessity from the surroundings into the natural...

[Sedley 20 B.3-4] For the nature of their atoms has contributed nothing to some of their behaviour, and degrees of behaviour and character, but it is their developments which themselves possess all or most of the responsibility for certain things. It is as a result of that nature that some of their atoms move with disordered motions – but it is not on the atoms that all <the responsibility should be placed for their behaviour>.

[Laursen] ...For the nature of the atoms never did help them in any way to [perform] certain acts or to [develop] certain dimensions of acts and dispositions, but the products themselves were fully or for the most part responsible for these particulars. and out of that [i.e., the nature of the atoms or the cause] some of the atoms move disturbing movements, not as a whole because of the atoms, but because of what comes in from the environment into the natural... {the original constitution of the atoms being the cause... aggregate... out of the product itself unless... all...}

γίνεσθαι =	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ
γίγνεσθαι	[here, "to be generated"]	<i>come into being</i>

προειρημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	previously mentioned	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>spoke before</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἡ κατεργασία αἱ κατεργασίαι	outflow	ΚΑΤΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ <i>work thoroughly</i>
ἀπεργαστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	productive	ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of working away</i>
οὐ ἀπεργαστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	unproductive	ΟΥ ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>not characteristic of working away</i>
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long [of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>combating</i>
ἡ τιμή αἱ τιμαί	reverence	ΤΙΜΗ <i>value</i>
ἐπιτιμᾶν	to rebuke	ΕΠΙΤΙΜΑΝ <i>value upon "laying a penalty on"</i>
μισῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	resenting	ΜΙΣΩΝ <i>hating</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning [here, "from their birth"]	
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>agitating</i>
ὁ τάραχος = ἡ ταραχή	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>agitating</i>
τεταραγμένως	with disturbance	ΤΕΤΑΡΑΓΜΕΝΩΣ <i>having been agitated</i>
ταραχώδης <i>(ης, ες)</i>	disturbing	ΤΑΡΑΧΩΔΗΣ <i>agitating</i>
τὸ ζῶον τὰ ζῶα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ <i>life</i>
συνεργεῖν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΕΙΝ <i>work together</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
ἡ διάθεσις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing through</i>
ἀπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i>
πλείστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	most / greatest	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most filling</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to procure	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτῆσθαι	{to have procured} to possess	ΚΕΚΤΗΣΘΑΙ <i>acquired</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
κινεῖν	to move	ΚΙΝΕΙΝ <i>moving</i>
παρεμπιπτών <i>(ουσα, όν)</i>	[incidentally] occurring	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΩΝ <i>falling into beside</i>

<p>ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι</p>	<p>[natural] necessity</p>	<p>ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i></p>
<p>περιέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i></p>	<p>surrounding</p>	<p>ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ <i>holding around</i></p>
<p>ἡ φύσις αἱ φύσεις</p>	<p>nature</p>	<p>ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i></p>
<p>φυσικός <i>(ή, όν)</i></p>	<p>natural</p>	<p>ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ <i>producing</i></p>

Epíkouros responds to the arguments of determinists by asserting the existence and causal power of the self and its volitions, which transcend the basic patterns of atomic motion. Many people who could succeed in different tasks fail, not because of their atoms, but because of their own choices and actions. We often criticize these people, avoiding them for their harmful nature.

Psychological impulses are not fully determined by the movements of the atoms. Your psychological impulses can initiate your own thoughts and move your body. Even though your atomic make-up might cause chaotic motions in your mind, it does not mean that you cannot initiate motions that counteract them.

25.27 Fundamental Agency

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 94

...[ἀπο]γεν[vn]θη[ι] λα[μβάνο]ν τινα ἑτερότητ[α τῶ]ν ἀτόμω^γ κ[ατ]ά τ[ινα τρό]πον [διαλ]ηπτικόν, [ο]ὐ [τ]ὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἐτέρου διαστήμ[α]το[ς] ἰσχάνε[ι] τὴν ἐξ [ἐαυ]τοῦ αἰτίαν – εἴτα ἀνα[διδ]ωσιν εὐθ[ύς] μ[έ]χ[ρ]ι τῶ^μ πρώτω^μ φύσ[εω]ν καὶ μία^μ πως ἄ[πασαν] | [αὐτ]ή[ν] ποιεῖ...

{B 39 below is an expanded fragment}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 (fr. A 44)

...{σεσαι μαχόμεν[οι πο]λλοῖς ἅμα τῶν ἀν[θρώ]πων καὶ νουθε[τοῦν]τες, ὃ τῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [τρ]όπου κατ' ἀνάγκην α[ι]τία[ι] ὑπεναντίον ἐστ[ιν.] οὐ}τως, ἐπειδὴν ἀπ[ο]γεννηθῇ [τ]ι λαμ[βάνον] τ[ι]νὰ [ἐ]τερότη[τα] τῶν ἀτό[μ]ων κατὰ [τι]ν[α τρ]όπον [δι]αληπτικόν, οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἐτέρο[υ] δ[ι]αστήματος, ἰσχάνει [τὴν ἐξ] αὐ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν, εἴτα ἀν[αδιδ]ωσι εὐθύς μέχρι τῶν [πρ]ώτω[ν] φύσεων καὶ [κ]αν[όνα] πᾶσαν αὐτή[ν] ποιεῖ. ὁθεν δὴ καὶ οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρεῖν χειμάζουσιν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτίων ἀπόφασιν. καὶ τοῦ [των ἐ]π' αὐτῶν τοῖς [μ]ὲν μᾶλλο[ν τοῖς δ' ἡ]ττον μαχ[όμε]θα καὶ ἐ[πιτιμ]ῶμεν {καὶ καθαίρο}...

{added to B 39 below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.3 (B 39)

...{σεσαι μαχόμεν[οι πο]λλοῖς ἅμα τῶν ἀν[θρώ]πων καὶ νουθε[τοῦν]τες, ὃ τῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [τρ]όπου κατ' ἀνάγκην α[ι]τία[ι] ὑπεναντίον ἐστ[ιν.] οὐ}τως ἐπειδὴν ἀπογεννηθῇ τι λανβάνον [τι]νὰ [ἐ]τερότη[τα τῶν] ἀτό[μ]ων κατὰ τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν, οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἐτέρου δ[ι]αστήματος, ἰσχάνει [τὴν ἐξ] αὐ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν, εἴτα ἀν[αδιδ]ωσι εὐθύς μέχρι τῶν [πρ]ώτω[ν] φύσεων καὶ [κ]αν[όνα] πᾶσαν αὐτή[ν] ποιεῖ. ὁθεν δὴ καὶ οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρεῖν χειμάζουσιν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτίων ἀπόφασιν. καὶ τοῦ [των ἐ]π' αὐτῶν τοῖς [μ]ὲν μᾶλλο[ν τοῖς δ' ἡ]ττον μαχ[όμε]θα καὶ ἐ[πιτιμ]ῶμεν {καὶ καθαίρο}...

...Μαχόμενοι πολλοῖς ἅμα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ Νουθετοῦντες, Ὅ τῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου κατ' ἀνάγκην αἰτίαι ὑπεναντίον ἐστίν: οὕτως, ἐπειδὴν ἀπογεννηθῇ Τι λαμβάνον τινὰ ἑτερότητα τῶν ἀτόμων κατὰ τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν (οὐ τὸν ὡς ἀφ' ἐτέρου διαστήματος), Ἰσχάνει τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ αἰτίαν – εἴτα Ἀναδίδωσι εὐθύς μέχρι τῶν πρώτων φύσεων. καὶ κανόνα πᾶσαν αὐτὴν Ποιεῖ

...[We are] contending with many people simultaneously and Instructing about [this issue], Which is contrary to the cause of the same way [of thinking that all motion is] in accordance with necessity: thus, whenever Something is fully generated [i.e., one's consciousness] that comprehends a certain difference in the atoms in a certain [mentally] distinguishing way, ([but] not as though from a different separation [in space]),* One gains control of the cause [of mental movements] out of his own [conscious choice] – then he simply Delivers [those conscious mental movements] up to the primary natures [of the atoms]. and He makes this [mentally generated movement] entirely a rule [that tests for truth – i.e., a canon]

** i.e., even though the soul can be distinguished from the atoms that compose it as its own emergent object, the soul is not physically distinct from the atoms that compose it.*

[Sedley 20 B.5-6] ...< > ...Thus when a development occurs which takes on some distinctness from the atoms in a differential way – not in the way which is like viewing from a different distance – he acquires responsibility which proceeds from himself; then he straightaway transmits this to his primary substances and makes the whole of it into a yardstick

[Laursen] ...attacking and criticizing at the same time of the human being, something that is in contrast to the cause in this same "necessary" manner. Consequently, whenever something is produced that takes on some otherness within the atoms in a way that allows for a distinction, not the one as from another distance, he acquires the cause out of himself; then he gives it on immediately until it comes to the first natures and in some way makes all of it one.

ὁθεν, δὴ, καὶ Οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρεῖν χειμάζουσιν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτιῶν ἀπόφασιν. καὶ τούτων, ἐπ' αὐτῶν τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ' ἦττον Μαχόμεθα, καὶ Ἐπιτιμῶμεν, καὶ Καθαίρωμεν...

from which, indeed, Those who are not able to distinguish such things in a way distress themselves about [their] denial of [their own generated] causes. and among these [people], We contend against them, more with some and to a lesser extent with others, and We rebuke, and We clarify [them]...

[Sedley 20 B.7] That is why those who cannot correctly make such distinctions confuse themselves about the adjudication of responsibilities... < >...

[Laursen] Hence, clearly, those who cannot distinguish these things correctly put themselves in a winter storm as to the explanation of these causes, and in these same things we attack and criticize some more, some less.

μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>combating</i>
ἅμα	simultaneously	ἌΜΑ
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
ὁ νοῦς οἱ νοῖ	intellect	ΝΟΥΣ <i>mind</i>
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ <i>setting mind</i>
νουθετῶν	instructing about	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΩΝ <i>setting mind</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ὑπεναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contrary	ὙΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>over against</i>
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating out</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ ἄλλοτριότης αἱ ἄλλοτριότητες	incompatibility	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from other</i>
ἐτέρωθι	elsewhere	ἘΤΕΡΩΘΙ <i>different [location]</i>
ἡ ἑτερότης αἱ ἑτερότητες	difference	ἘΤΕΡΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from different</i>
ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾳ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἘΤΕΡΟΣ <i>other</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>

διαληπτός (ή, όν)	[mentally] distinguishable	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>taking hold between</i>
διαληπτικός (ή, όν)	[mentally] distinguishing	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of taking hold between</i>
τò διάστημα τὰ διαστήματα	separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing between</i>
ισχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ <i>strength</i>
ισχύων (ισχύουσα, ισχύον)	prevailing	ΙΣΧΥΩΝ <i>strength</i>
ισχάνειν	to gain control of	ΙΣΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>holding</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
ἀναδιδόναι	to deliver	ΑΝΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving up</i>
εύθύς (εὔτα, ύ)	simply	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>direct</i>
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ <i>until</i>
πρῶτος (η, ον)	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
ή φύσις αί φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
τò κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard (test of truth)	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
ό κανών οί κανόνες	rule (measure of truth)	ΚΑΝΩΝ <i>measuring rod</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
Part 2		
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
τò τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα	such a thing	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ <i>self of this sort</i>
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping back</i>
προαιρεῖν	to bring forth	ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping before</i>
διορίζειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>between the border</i>
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>between the border</i>
διαιρεῖν	to differentiate	ΔΙΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping through</i>
χειμάζειν	to distress	ΧΕΙΜΑΖΕΙΝ <i>winter storm</i>
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>affirming</i>
ή πρόφασις αί προφάσεις	presumption	ΠΡΟΦΑΣΙΣ <i>before affirming</i>
ή απόφασις αί απόφάσεις	denial	ΑΠΟΦΑΣΙΣ <i>affirming away from</i>
ἥττον	to a lesser extent	ἥΤΤΟΝ <i>inferior</i>
ἐπιτιμᾶν	to rebuke	ΕΠΙΤΙΜΑΝ <i>value upon "laying a penalty on"</i>
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping back</i>
προσεκκαθαίρειν	to further clarify out	ΠΡΟΣΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleaning further out</i>

καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleansing</i>
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We can make decisions that control our own mental movements. One's psychological actions can move the atoms in the mind, and this begins the process of moving the whole body.
As the motion of our hands can move material in our hands, the motion of our minds can move the material in our minds.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 95

...[ὅ]θεν δὴ κα[ὶ οἱ] μὴ δυνάμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὰ τοιαῦτα δ[ι]αίρειν χι[μᾶ]ζουσιν ἑαυτοὺς πε[ρὶ] τὴν τῶν αἰτ[ιῶν]
ἀπ[ὸ]φα[σιν] καὶ το[ύτων ἐπ'] αὐ[τῶν] τοῖς μ[έν] μᾶ[λλον, τοῖς δ' ἥττον] μαχόμεθα καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν {καὶ καθαίρο}...

{added to B 39 above}

25.28 Praise and Blame

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 45)

...{οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτ[ῶν] αἰτίαν, ἀλλ[ὰ]} τὴν [τῶν] βελτίστων ἔργω[ν] καὶ διανοημάτ[ων]...

{added to fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 96

...{οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτ[ῶν] αἰτίαν, ἀλλ[ὰ]} [τὴν] τῶ[ν] βελτίστων ἔργων [καὶ δια]ν[ο]ημ[άτων]... τότε [α]ὐτοῖς [μα]χόμε[ε]θα μὲν
[οὐδέ]ν. ἀλλ' ἐα[υ]τ[οῖς], μετὰ... ἀτόμ[ων]... ἐπενεγκαμένοις. καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν α[ἰ]τίαν καίπερ ἔκθα[ι]ρογτες... ἢ οὐ
ν[ο]υθετ[οῦ]ντές γε ὅσα ἄμ...

**...οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βελτίστων ἔργων καὶ διανοημάτων...
τότε, αὐτοῖς Μαχόμεθα μὲν οὐδέν. ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῖς, μετὰ... ...ἀτόμων...
ἐπενεγκαμένοις. καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν αἰτίαν καίπερ Ἐκθαίροντες... ἢ οὐ
Νουθετοῦντές γε ὅσα ἄμα...**

...[we praise others] not [merely] through a cause [of movement that originates] out of themselves but [through] that [cause of movement that originates of themselves] toward the best tasks and mental perceptions... at this time, We contend with them in no way. but for us, along with... of atoms... to those that have applied themselves. and even while [we are] fully clearing out the cause [of movement that originates] out of ourselves... or not Instructing about as many things as simultaneously...

ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
βέλτιστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	best	ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΟΣ <i>strong</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
διανόητος	[mentally] perceptible	
τὸ διανόημα τὰ διανοήματα	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing through</i>
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>combating</i>
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing upon</i>
ἐπενεγκεῖν	to apply to [already]	ΕΠΕΝΕΓΚΕΙΝ <i>brought upon</i>
ἐπενεγκάμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having applied themselves	
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleansing</i>
ἐκθαίρειν	to clear out	ΕΚΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>clearing out</i>
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	

νοῦθετῶν	instructing [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΩΝ <i>setting mind</i>
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25.29 Selective Interaction

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 98

...λεῖν ἐ[πιχειροῦμεν]ν [καὶ παρ]οξ[ύ]νε[ιν ἐπὶ τὰ καιριώ]τατα ὥς [ἤδ]η π[έπηγεν ἀπὸ] τῆς φύ[σεως τῆς αὐτῆς
κ]ακη[θ]ρο[ισμέ]ν[ης] οὐ[χ ἐ]τέρωι τιν[ι τῇ]ν [αἰτίαν] ἀναψούσ[ης τῇ]μ [πῆξ]ιν τὴν ὁμ[οί]αν...

{overlaps with fragment below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 46)

...[χειροῦμ]εν καὶ παρο[ξύνειν] ἐπὶ [τ]ὰ καιρι[ώτατα ὡ]ς ἤδη πέπη[γεν ἀπὸ τῆ]ς φ[ύ]σεως τ[ῆς αὐτῆς κακ]ηθροισμένης ο[ύχ
ἐ]τέρω τ[ινι] τὴν [αἰτία]ν ἀνα[ψ]ούσης [τὴν] πῆξιν [τὴν] ὁμοί[αν]...

{overlaps with fragment below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.4 (B 40)

...οὐ μαχόμεθα τοῖς... κα[ὶ] οὐ τὴν ἀτογ[ί]αν ἔχουσ[ιν ἄλλ'] οὐ[δ]ὲ παρακαλεῖν ἐπιχειροῦμεν καὶ παροξύνειν ἐπὶ τὰ
κ[αιριώτατα], ὥς ἤδη πέπηγεν ἀ[πὸ τῆς φ]ύσεως τῆς αὐτῆς κακηθρ[οισμέ]νης οὐχ ἐτέρως τινι τῇ[ν αἰτίαν] ἀναψού[σης], τὴν
πῆξ[ιν] τ[ὴν ὁ]μοίαν τ[ῇ]... ...[τὴν] α[ιτίαν π]ροσφέ[ροντες] οὐ[δ'] ὅσοι[ς προσφ]έρομε[ν]...

...οὐ Μαχόμεθα τοῖς... καὶ οὐ τὴν ἄτονίαν Ἔχουσιν – ἄλλ' οὐδὲ παρακαλεῖν Ἐπιχειροῦμεν καὶ παροξύνειν ἐπὶ τὰ καιριώτατα, ὥς ἤδη Πέπηγεν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως τῆς αὐτῆς κακηθροισμένης, οὐχ ἐτέρως τινι τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναψούσης τὴν πῆξιν τὴν ὁμοίαν... ...τὴν αἰτίαν προσφέροντες, οὐδ' ὅσοις Προσφέρομεν...

...[regarding those who sincerely struggle to move themselves toward the best tasks] We do not contend with those [people]... and they are not holding onto laziness – but neither do We venture to encourage or provoke them toward the most opportune things, as [their temperaments] have already coagulated from a nature which itself is poorly-assembled, [and which] is not fastening {and igniting} the cause [of movement] for something in a different way to the coagulation [of their temperaments] which is similar to... ...[although we] also possess the cause [i.e., the responsibility for our own movement], We do not possess [it] for as many as...

μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>combating</i>
ἡ ἄτονία αἱ ἄτονιαί	laziness	ΑΤΟΝΙΑ <i>not vigorous</i>
παρακαλεῖν	to encourage	ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΕΙΝ <i>crying out beside</i>
ἐπιχειρεῖν	to venture	ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΕΙΝ <i>upon hand</i>
παροξύνειν	to provoke	ΠΑΡΟΞΥΝΕΙΝ <i>sharp beside</i>
καιριώτατος	most opportune	ΚΑΙΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>time</i>
πήγνυναι	to coagulate	ΠΗΓΝΥΝΑΙ <i>affixing together</i>
πέπηγεν	they had coagulated	ΠΕΠΗΓΕΝ <i>affixed together</i>
ἡ πῆξις αἱ πῆξεις	coagulation	ΠΗΞΙΣ <i>affixing together</i>
τὸ ἄθρόον τὰ ἄθρόα	what is aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΝ <i>gathered</i>
τὸ ἄθροισμα τὰ ἄθροίσματα	aggregate	ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of [being] gathered</i>
κακηθροίζειν	to aggregate badly	ΚΑΚΗΘΡΟΙΖΕΙΝ <i>badly gathered</i>

κακηθροισμένος (η, ον)	badly aggregated	ΚΑΚΗΘΡΟΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>fastening together</i>
συνάπτων (ουσα, ον)	connecting	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΩΝ <i>fastening together</i>
συνάψας (ασα, αν)	having connected	ΣΥΝΑΨΑΣ <i>fastening together</i>
ανάπτειν	to fasten to {or, "to ignite"}	ΑΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly fastening</i>
άναψών	fastening to	ΑΝΑΨΩΝ
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
προσφέρεισθαι	to also possess <i>[for themselves]</i>	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>bringing as well</i>
προσφέρειν	to also possess	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ
προσφέρων (ουσα, ον)	also possessing	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing as well</i>

25.30 Against Empty Linguistic Distinctions
(Bringing Words and Nature to the Same Point)

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 47)

...γε [φύσιν αἰ]τιᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ το[ῦτ]ον οὐθέν διαφέρ[ει, ἀλλ]λ' ἐπὶ ταυτό φέρομ[εν] ἀμφότερα τὰ ὀνό[μα]τα κ[αἰ τῇ]ν φύσιν κακίζογ[τες] ὁμοίω[ς] τοῦτον κ[α]κίζ[ο]μεν ὅταν ...*ὕξωμεν [τ]ι αὐτήν τ[ῇ]ν διάλ[εκτον]. ἔστι δ' [ὅτ]ε [κατὰ] τῇν πρώτ[η]ν [σύστασι]ν κατὰ σάρ[κ]α...

...γε, φύσιν αἰτιᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ τοῦτον οὐθέν Διαφέρει – ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταυτό Φέρομεν ἀμφότερα τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὴν φύσιν, κακίζοντες ὁμοίως τοῦτον Κακίζομεν ὅταν ...Συζύωμεν ταύτην τὴν διάλεκτον... ἔστι δ' ὅτε, κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύστασιν, κατὰ σάρκα...

...indeed, It is in no way different to blame nature, ourselves or this [word "necessity"] – but We bring both the words and nature to the same [point], reproaching this similarly when We reproach... ...We would coalesce this way of speaking... there are also times when, according to [one’s] original composition, [actions] based on flesh...

ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ <i>blame</i>
διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing through</i>
φέρειν	to carry [here, "to bring"]	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
ἀμφίβολος (ος, ον)	ambiguous	ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΟΣ <i>throwing both</i>
τὰ συναμφότερα	both together	ΣΥΝΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΝ <i>both of the two together</i>
ἀμφότεροι (αι, α)	both	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ <i>both of the two</i>
τά ἄμφω	the pair	ΑΜΦΩ <i>both</i>
τὰ ἀμφότερα	both things	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΑ <i>both of the two</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
κακίζειν	to reproach	ΚΑΚΙΖΕΙΝ <i>bad</i>
κακίζων (ουσα, ον)	reproaching	ΚΑΚΙΖΩΝ <i>bad</i>

ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
*υξωμεν συζύξωμεν	we would coalesce	ΣΥΖΕΥΓΕΤΗΝΥΝΑΙ <i>yoking</i> <i>together</i>
ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ <i>speaking across</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ἡ σάρξ αἱ σάρκες	flesh	ΣΑΡΞ <i>flesh</i>

25.31 Emergent Causation

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 48)

...νεσθαι ἢ καὶ τοιαυτηνὶ διά[θ]εσιν καὶ κ[εῖ]νησιν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τ[ο]ιοῦδε ἀπογεννω[μέ]ν[ο]υ ἐκ τῶν τοιoutωνὶ μ[έ]χρι δὲ τοῦ τοιανδὶ [ψυ]χὴν ἢ τ[οι]ανδὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιοῦδ' ἀπ[ο]γενν[ωμ]ένου [ἦ] οὐκ ἐπειδὰν προβῇ[ι γ]ε τῇ[ι] ἡλικ[ι]αι τοιοῦδ' ἀπογενν[ωμ]ένου κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκ[η]ν ἀ[λλ']...

{B41 below is an expanded fragment}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 102, 103

...ἀπ[ο]γεγεννημένου, μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέχρι των[δ]ί τωνων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀ[πο]γενν[ωμένου ἀλλὰ μέ]χρι τοῦ ψυχὴν [γενέσθαι ἢ καὶ τ]οια[υ]τηγὶ δ[ι]ά[θ]εσιν [καὶ κίνησιν] ἔ[χουσαν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοι]ο[ῦ]δε ἀ[πο]γενν[ωμένου ἐκ τῶν] το[ιoutωνί] μέχρι δὲ τοῦ [τοιανδ]ί [ψυχ]ῇν [ἢ τοιανδὶ οὐκ ἐ]ξ ἀνάγκ[ης τ]οιοῦ[δ]ε ἀπογεννωμένου ἢ οὐκ ἐπειδὰμ προβ[ῇ]ι γε τῇι ἡλικίαι τοιοῦδε ἀπογενν[ω]μένου κατ' ἀνάγκ[κ]ην, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτ[ο]ῦ δυ[ναμέ]νου {καὶ τ[ῆς] ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ αἰτ]ίας καὶ ἄλλο}...

{added to fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 19 (fr. B 41)

...κατηγορουμένης φύσεως καὶ οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ ἦ καὶ αὐτὸς προσαγοευ[ο]μένης... κἄν κατὰ διάνοιαν δέ [τ]ι ἐκβιάζεται ἡ πρώτη σύστασις τοῦ ἀπογεγεννημένου, μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μέχρι τωνδὶ τωνων τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου ἀλλὰ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ψυχὴν γενέσθαι ἢ καὶ τοσαυτηνὶ διάθεσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης [τοιοῦ]δε ἀπογεν[νω]μένου ἐκ [τῶν το]ιout[ωνί, μ]έχρι δὲ τ[ο]ῦ τοιαν[δί]ο ψυχὴν [ἢ τοι]αν[δί]ο οὐκ ἐξ [ἀνάγκ]ης τοιοῦ[δ]ε ἀ[πο]γεν[νω]μένου ἢ οὐκ ἐπειδ[ᾶν] [πρ]οβῇι γε τ[ῇι] ἡλικία[ι] το[ι]οῦδε ἀ[πο]γεννωμένου κατ' [ἀνάγκη]ν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δυνα[μέ]νου {καὶ τ[ῆς] ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ αἰτ]ίας καὶ ἄλλο}...

...κατηγορουμένης φύσεως – καὶ οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ ἦ καὶ αὐτὸς προσαγοευομένης...

...[however one refers to his self-generated movement, it is clear it exists] with a nature that is fully indicated [by his experience of it] – even while it is not referred to as itself or according to itself...

...κατὰ διάνοιαν δέ **τι** ἐκβιάζεται ἡ πρώτη Σύστασις **τοῦ ἀπογεγεννημένου – μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης – μέχρι τωνδὶ τωνων τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου: ἀλλὰ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ψυχὴν γενέσθαι – ἢ καὶ τοσαυτηνὶ διάθεσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἔχουσαν Ψυχὴν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου ἐκ τῶν τοιoutωνί**

...according to [our mental] perception, [our] primary Composition would – NOT out of necessity – force out some of [the movement] that has been fully generated up to [the point of] certain kinds of such a thing [as our own non-necessitated movements] being fully generated: while [our primary atomic composition would force out some movement] up to the point of a Soul being produced – and even a Soul having an arrangement and movement as great as this, given that some [movement] of this kind is necessarily generated from [a composition] such as this*

* the soul's subtle physical nature makes it susceptible to both moving and being moved

μέχρι δὲ τοῦ – τοιανδὶ ψυχὴν ἢ τοιανδὶ – οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου. ἢ οὐκ ἐπειδὰν Προβῇ γε **τῇ ἡλικίαι τοιοῦδε ἀπογεννωμένου κατ' ἀνάγκη**ν – **ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δυναμένου καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αἰτίας...**

but [*one's atomic Composition would force out some movement*] up to [*the point of movement*] such as this – [*specifically, the movement of*] this or that kind of soul – being fully generated NOT out of necessity. or [*at least one's atomic Composition would force out some volitional movement*] whenever [*Someone*] advances to the stage of life of such [*volitional initiations*] being fully generated NOT according to necessity – but by having the force [*of movement*] from himself and from his own cause...

κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
προσαγορευόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being referred to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
Part 2		
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ὁ βιασμός οἱ βιασμοί	forcing	ΒΙΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of violence</i>
ἡ παραβίασις αἱ παραβιάσεις	distortion	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ <i>violence alongside</i>
ἐκβιάζειν	to force out	ΕΚΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ <i>violence out</i>
ἐκβιάζεται	it would force out	
πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ἡ πρώτη σύστασις τῶν ἀτόμων	the primary composition of the atoms	<i>Epikouros</i> <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</i> <i>P.Herc. 1056 col. 15 (fr. B 37)</i>
ἀπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been fully generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i>
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating out</i>
ἀπογεννηθείς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	fully [been] generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΘΕΙΣ
ἀπογεννήσας	having fully generated [already]	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΣ <i>generating</i>
ἀπογεννώμενος	being fully generated	
Part 3		
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ <i>until</i>
ἡ ψυχὴ αἱ ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already] [here, taken as middle]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>came into being</i>
οὗτος <i>(αὕτη, τοῦτο)</i>	this	ΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this</i>

τοσοῦτος <i>(τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτο)</i>	so long <i>(so great)</i>	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this so much</i>
οὔτοσί <i>(αὐτή, τουτί)</i>	this here	ΟΥΤΟΝΙ <i>this here</i>
τοσοῦτοσί <i>(τοσαύτη, τοσοῦτί)</i>	so great as this here	ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΣΝΙ <i>this so much here</i>
τοῖος <i>(τοῖα, τοῖον)</i>	like <i>(such)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
τὸ τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα	what is like this <i>(such a thing)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ <i>this of this sort</i>
τοιοῦτοσεῖ <i>(τοιαύτηεῖ, τοιοῦτεῖ)</i>	like this very thing, <i>(such as this exact kind of thing here)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣΕΙ <i>this of this sort here</i>
τοιόσδι = τοιόσδε <i>(τοιάδε, τοιόνδε)</i>	like this here <i>(such a kind as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΣΔΙ ΤΟΙΟΣΔΕ <i>of this sort here</i>
ἡ διάθεις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing through</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
διαβαίνειν	pass through	ΔΙΑΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking through</i>
προβαίνειν	to advance, to go forward	ΠΡΟΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking forward</i>
ἡ ἡλικία αἱ ἡλικίαι	age <i>(stage of life)</i>	ἩΛΙΚΙΑ <i>comrade</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
δυναμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having the force	ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΟΣ
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>

25.32 [Severed Cause], Respecting Existing Terminology

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 20 (fr. B 42)

...πράττε[ι], ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάντ' ἔχον οὐκ [έξ]α[ι]ρούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας τὸ ἀπ[ογεν]εννημένον ἀλλ' ἔν τι ποιοῦν[τες] αὐ[τ]ὸ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν [ὁμοίως κα]θαίρομεν τὸ δ' οὐ νο[υθε]τοῦμέν {νε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατὰ τινας ἐθισμ[ο]ῦ[ς] ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως μετακ[ο]σ[μ]οῦμεν... τὸ γ[ὰρ] ἐξαιροῦ μεν[ο]ν τῆς αἵτ[ίας] κατ' ἀνάγκ[ην]....

{added to 1191 below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 49)

...{[έξ] τῇ[ι]} έξ ἀρχῆς συστατικαὶ τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον καὶ μὴ ἦι δυνατόν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπογεγεννη[μέ]νον ποιῆσαι μη[δ· ἐπὶ] τοῦ παρόντος μη[δέν] ἐτερον ἢδ' ἡ πρώτη σ[ύ]σ[τασις] ἀπηρ[γάσαστο] [μῆδ'] ἐν[α] κ[α]τὰ βρα[χ]ύ τ[ι] μηδὲ βιαζόμενον κ[αί]...

{not added to 1191 below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 104, 105

...τέι έξ [ἀρ]χῆς συστατικαῖ τὸ ἀπον[εγε]νν[ημένον] καὶ μὴ ἦι [δυνα]τ[ὸν] ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπ[ο]γε[ν]εννημένον ποιῆσαι μ[ηδ'] ἐπ[ὶ] τοῦ παρόντος μ[ηδέν] ἐτερον ἢδ' ἡ πρώτη σ[ύ]σ[τασις] ἀπηρ[γάσαστο] [μῆδ'] ἐν[α] κατὰ βραχύ τι μηδὲ βιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτίτον... τι πράττ[ε]ι, ἀλλὰ τὰ α[ὐτ]ὰ πάντ' ἔχον οὐκ ἐξαι[ρ]ούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας τ' ἀ[πο]γενεννημένον – ἀλλ[ὰ] ἔν τι ποιοῦντες αὐτὸ κ[αί] τῇν σ[ύ]σ[τασιν] ὁμ[ο]ίως κ[αθα]ίρομεν [τὸ δ' οὐ] νουθ[ετοῦμεν] {νε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατὰ τινας ἐθισμ[ο]ῦ[ς] ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως μετακ[ο]σ[μ]οῦμεν... [τὸ γ]ὰρ ἐξαιροῦ μεν[ο]ν τῆς αἵτ[ίας] κατ' ἀνάγκ[ην]....

...έξ ἀρχῆς, Συστατικαὶ **τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον**, καὶ μὴ ἦ δυνατόν. ἀλλὰ **τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον** ποιῆσαι – **μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος** **μηδὲν ἕτερον** ἢδ' ἡ πρώτη Σύστασις ἀπηργάσατο. **μηδ' ἓν** **κατὰ βραχύ τι**, **μηδὲ βιαζόμενον** καὶ **ἀντιτίτον...**

...[if our atomic composition did not force out some volitional movement] from the beginning, [then these] constitutive [parts of our composition would have automatically set in motion] what [movement] has been fully generated, and It would not be possible [to have volitional movement]. but [our] primary Composition already has made what [movement] has been fully generated – and not even at the present [time] has it produced anything different. even though [the atomic Composition of the soul itself has] not [produced] certain [movements, even] by some small [degree], nor [has it produced volitional movements] while being forced and being affected [by external movement]...

...τι Πράττει – αλλά, τὰ αὐτὰ πάντα ἔχον: οὐκ'Ἐξαιρούμεθα τῆς αἰτίας – τ' ἀπογεγεννημένον

...[our atomic composition] is doing something – but, [although it] has all the same things.* We do not remove ourselves from the cause [of the generation of movement] – and [we do not remove ourselves from] what [movement] has been fully generated

i.e., although our soul is only composed of, and affected by, matter

ἀλλὰ ἔν τι ποιοῦντες, αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν σύστασιν ὁμοίως Καθαίρομεν. τὸ δ' οὐ Νουθετοῦμεν – γε, πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ κατὰ τινας ἔθισμούς ἄνευ νοῦ λέξεως Μετακοσμοῦμεν... ...τὸ γὰρ Ἐξαιρούμενον τῆς αἰτίας κατ' ἀνάγκην...

but by [even] doing ONE certain thing, We similarly clarify [the nature of] ourselves and [of our] composition. We do not instruct about it – indeed, We do not even rearrange many [words] in accordance with certain [linguistic] conventions without [taking any] mind of the terminology...
...for What is removed from a cause [of movement] BY NECESSITY [is ITSELF its own cause of movement]...

ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ first order
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
συστατικός (ή, όν)	constitutive	ΣΥΣΤΑΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of standing together
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ standing together
ἀπογεγεννημένος (η, ον)	having been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ generated out
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	what = Movement, which results in
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	Action, which results in [dispositional] Development
δυνατός (ή, όν)	able / possible	ΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ power
παρών (παρουσα, παρόν)	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ to be beside
ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος	up to the present	
ἀπεργάζεσθαι	to produce	ΑΠΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ work out
ἔνιοι (αι, α)	some [here, "certain"]	ΕΝΙΟΙ
βραχύς (εἶα, ύ)	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ brief
κατὰ βραχύ	gradually	
βιάζειν	to force	ΒΙΑΖΕΙΝ violence
βιάζεσθαι	to be forced	ΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ violence

βιαζόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being forced	ΒΙΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>violence</i>
τίνειν	to pay a price	ΤΙΝΕΙΝ <i>paying</i>
ἀντιτίνειν	to be affected	ΑΝΤΙΤΙΝΕΙΝ <i>paying against</i>
ἀντιτίνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	being affected	
πράττειν	to do	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ἀναιρεῖν	to take away	ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping back</i>
ἐξαιρεῖν	to remove	ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping out</i>
ἐξαιρεῖσθαι	to be removed from	ΕΞΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>grasping out</i>
Part 2		
τὸ σύστημα τὰ συστήματα	structure	ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing together</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
ἐκθαίρειν	to clear out	ΕΚΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleansing out</i>
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleansing</i>
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ <i>setting mind</i>
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ὁ ἔθισμός οἱ ἔθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of being accustomed</i>
ὁ νοῦς οἱ νοῖ	intellect <i>[here, "mind"]</i>	ΝΟΥΣ <i>mind</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
μετακοσμεῖν	to rearrange	ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ <i>change order</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>

25.33 Controlling Natural Impulses

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 107

...σύστασιν εἰς ἓν τι συμ[πλέ]κοντες, οὐ μὴν [οὔ]τε τῷ[ι νου]θε[τ]η[ι]κῶι τρόπῳ καὶ ἐ[πρ]αγορθωτικῶι {οὔτε τῷ ἀπλῶς ἀ[ντι]ποιητικῶι χρώμεθα}...

{added to fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 50)

...αὐτὴν ἐκεῖ[ν]η πε[ρ]αῖνον. ἂν δὲ κ[αί] βα[δ]ί[ζ]η διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ [ἤ]δη α[ι]τίαν εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον τῇ ἐ[ξ] ἀρχῆς συσ[τά]σει φαύλ[η]ι οὐσ[η]ι, ἔτι μᾶλλον [ἐν]ί[ο]τε κ[α]κίζομεν. ἐν νουθετητ[ικ]ῶι μέντοι μᾶλλον τρόπῳ[ι], καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ [τ]ὰ ἄγρια τῶν ζώων [καθ]αίρομεν μὲν ὁμοίως [α]ὐ[τ]ὰ τὰ ἀπογεγε[ν]νημένα [κ]αὶ τῇ[ν] σύστασιν εἰς ἓν τι συμ[πλέ]κοντες, οὐ μὴν ο[ὔ]τε τῷ νουθε[τ]η[ι]κῶι τρόπῳ καὶ ἐπαγορθωτικῶι {οὔτε τῷ ἀπλῶς ἀ[ντι]ποιη[η]τικῶι χρώμεθα}...

...αὐτὴν ἐκείνη Περαιῖνον. ἂν δὲ καὶ Βαδίζη διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἤδη αἰτίαν εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστάσει φαύλη οὔση, ἔτι μᾶλλον, ἐνίοτε, Κακίζομεν. ἐν νουθετητικῷ μέντοι μᾶλλον τρόπῳ καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄγρια τῶν ζώων Καθαίρομεν: μὲν ὁμοίως ^[a] αὐτὰ τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα καὶ ^[2+b] τὴν σύστασιν εἰς ἓν

τι συμπλέκοντες – οὐ, μὴν, οὔτε τῷ νουθετητικῷ τρόπῳ καὶ ἐπανορθωτικῷ οὔτε τῷ ἀπλῶς ἀντιποιητικῷ Χρώμεθα...

...Accomplishing *it in that very way*. but if [Someone] also proceeds *through a cause [of movement that is]* already his own into what is similar to a composition that *originally exists as base [i.e., if one chooses to give-in to his basic original nature]*, We reproach [him], at times, even more. however, We clarify *in a more instructive way* and not as *with the wild among living beings*: [*because, in the helpless case of the wild, we*] entangle *as similar* ^[a] *what [actions] have been fully generated themselves* and ^[b] [*their dispositional*] composition ^[a=b] into one [*same*] thing – no, indeed, [*with the wild*] neither do We use *the instructive and corrective way* nor *the absolutely contradictory [way]*...

[Sedley 20 j] ...< > ...We sometimes vilify it [a self-determining animal] all the more, but more in an admonitory mode – and not in the way in which we exonerate those animals which are while by conflating their developments and their make-up alike into a single thing, and indeed do not use either the admonitory and reformatory mode or the simply retaliatory mode.

[Laurсен] ...< > ...We occasionally criticize even more: that is, not in the primary blaming way – and not as wild animals do, we rinse, in that we plait together ^[1] the products themselves and ^[2] the composition....< > ...

τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>extremity</i>
περαίνειν	to accomplish	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extremity</i>
περαίνων	accomplishing <i>[here, "bringing to the end"]</i>	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΩΝ <i>extremity</i>
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ <i>walking</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
φαῦλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	base	ΦΑΥΛΟΣ <i>common / easy</i>
ὢν <i>(οὔσα, ὄν)</i>	being	ΩΝ <i>being</i>
ἡ κακοτεχνία αἱ κακοτεχνίαι	harmful art	ΚΑΚΟΤΕΧΝΙΑ <i>bad technique</i>
κακηθροίζειν	to aggregate badly	ΚΑΚΗΘΡΟΙΖΕΙΝ <i>badly gathered</i>
κακίζειν	to reproach	ΚΑΚΙΖΕΙΝ <i>bad</i>
μέντοι	never-the-less	
μᾶλλον	more	
μέντοι μᾶλλον	never-the-less more	
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ <i>setting mind</i>
νουθετητικός	instructive [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of setting mind</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἄγριος <i>(η, ον)</i>	wild	ΑΓΡΙΟΣ <i>field</i>
τό ἄγριον τά ἄγρια	the wild	ΑΓΡΙΟΝ <i>field</i>
τὸ ζῶον τὰ ζῶα	living being	ΖΩΙΟΝ <i>life</i>

καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleansing</i>
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated out of necessity	what = <i>Movement,</i> <i>which results in</i>
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης	what has been fully generated not out of necessity	<i>Action,</i> <i>which results in</i> <i>[dispositional]</i> <i>Development</i>
συμπλέκειν	to entangle with	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ <i>weaving together</i>
συμπλέκων	entangling	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΩΝ <i>weaving together</i>
ὀρθός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	correct	ΟΡΘΟΣ <i>straight upright</i>
ἐπανορθωτικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	corrective	ΕΠΑΝΟΡΘΩΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>straight upright</i> <i>again upon</i>
ἀπλῶς	absolutely	
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ἀντιποιητικός	contradictory	ΑΝΤΙΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>gathering against</i>

*We help and correct only those who take responsibility for their actions.
We also recognize that some living beings are not able to take responsibility for their actions – therefore we do not vainly try to change or correct their behavior.*

25.34 Self-Development

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 108

...{νημένον ἤδη γίνεσθ[αι τ]οῖα ἢ τοῖα καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περ[ιέχον]τος [κατ'] ἀνάγκ[ην δι]ὰ τ[ῶ]ν πό[ρων] εἰσρέο[ν]τα [π]αρ' ἡ[μ]ᾶς [πο]τε [γί]νν[εσθαι κ]αὶ π[αρ]ὰ [τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐξ] ἡμῶν α[ὐτῶν δόξας. κ]αὶ εἰ [παρὰ τὴν φύσιν]}...

{same as text below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 3 (fr. A 51 fin.)

...{ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶ[ς ποθ'] ἀπ[λ]ῶς τὸ [ἀ]πο[γ]ε[γενν]η[μέν]ον ἤδη γείνεσ[θαι] το[ῖ]α [ἢ] το[ῖ]α κα[ὶ] τὰ ἐκ τ[οῦ π]εριέχ[ον]τος κ[α]τ' ἀν[άγκ]ην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εἰσρ[έον]τα παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γε[ίνε]σθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς] ἡμε[τέρας] [ἐξ] ἡμῶν αὐτ[ῶν] δόξ[ας, καὶ] εἰ παρὰ τὴν φ[ύ]σιν}...

{same as text below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 21 (fr. B 43)

...ἀπ[λ]ῶς τῆς πρ[ώ]της ἀρχῆς σπέρμ[ατα ἡμῖν ἀγ]ωγά, τὰ μὲν εἰς τάδ[ε] τὰ δ' εἰς τάδε τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω ταῦτά [ἐ]στιν αἰεὶ [κα]ὶ πρᾶ[ξ]εων [καὶ] διανοήσεων καὶ διαθέ[σε]ων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω. {ὥστε παρ' ἡμᾶς π[ρῶτον] ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀπογεγεν{νημένον ἤδη γείνεσθαι, [τ]οῖα ἢ τοῖα, καὶ τ[ὰ ἐ]κ τοῦ περιέχοντος κ[α]τ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πό[ρους] εἰσρέο[ν]τα [παρ'] ἡμᾶς π[ο]τε γε[ίνε]σθαι καὶ παρὰ τ[ὰς] ἡμε[τέρας] [ἐξ] ἡμῶν αὐτ[ῶν] δόξ[ας, καὶ] εἰ παρὰ τὴν φ[ύ]σιν} }...

...ἔκ τε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς, Σπέρματα ἡμῖν ἀγωγά, Τὰ μὲν εἰς τάδε, Τὰ δ' εἰς τάδε, Τὰ δ' εἰς ἄμφω Ταῦτά ἐστιν αἰεὶ καὶ ^[1] πράξεων καὶ ^[2] διανοήσεων καὶ ^[3] διαθέσεων, καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω. ὥστε, παρ' ἡμᾶς πρῶτον ἀπλῶς τὸ Ἀπογεγεννημένον ἤδη γείνεσθαι – τοῖα ἢ τοῖα: καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος κατ' ἀνάγκην διὰ τοὺς πόρους Εἰσρέοντα παρ' ἡμᾶς, ποτε γείνεσθαι καὶ παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξας. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν...

...from [our] primary foundation, Seeds are always leading us, Some [seeds] into these, Some into those, and Other [seeds] into both [types] of ^[1] activities and ^[2] [mental] perceptions and ^[3] [dispositional] arrangements, [some] more, [some] less. therefore [it is necessary that] what [habitual action] has been fully generated – [characteristics] such as this or such as that – is already produced first ABSOLUTELY FROM US: and what [seeds] Flow into us from what surrounds [us] by necessity through [our] passageways at some point is also produced by us FROM OUR JUDGMENTS. and if contrary to nature...

[Sedley 20 C.1] From the very outset we always have seeds: some directing us towards these, some towards those, some towards these and those actions and thoughts and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently that which we develop – characteristics of this or that kind – is at first absolutely up to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us and depend upon beliefs of our own making. If against the nature...

πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ <i>seed</i>
ἡ συναγωγή αἱ συναγωγαί	gathering	ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ <i>going together</i>
ἡ ἄγωγή αἱ ἄγωγαί	guidance	ΑΓΩΓΗ <i>going</i>
ἄγωγός <i>(ός, όν)</i>	leading	ΑΓΩΓΟΣ <i>going</i>
τά ἄμφω	the pair	ΑΜΦΩ <i>both</i>
αἰώνιος <i>(αἰωνιά, αἰώνιον)</i>	perpetual <i>(moving, multiple)</i>	ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ <i>characterized by being forever</i>
ἄϊδιος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	eternal <i>(static, singular)</i>	ΑἰΔΙΟΣ <i>characterized by forever [heavenly]</i>
ἀεὶ	always	ΑΕΙ <i>forever</i>
ἡ πράξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ <i>action</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἡ διάθεσις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing through</i>
πλείων <i>(ον)</i>	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
ἐλάττων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	smaller / lesser	ΕΛΑΤΤΩΝ <i>lesser</i>
ἀπογεγεννημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>generated out</i>
τὸ ἀπογεγεννημένον τὰ ἀπογεγεννημένα	what has been fully generated	ΑΠΟΓΕΓΕΝΝΗΜΕΝΟΝ
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τοῖος <i>(τοιᾶ, τοῖον)</i>	like <i>(such)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
περιέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ <i>holding around</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
τὸ ῥεῦμα τὰ ῥεύματα	flow	ῬΕΥΜΑ <i>result of flowing</i>

ῥεῖν	to flow	ῥΕΙΝ <i>flowing</i>
εἰσρέων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	flowing into	ΕΙΣΡΕΩΝ
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>

There are external physical influences upon the development of our character – nevertheless we do have the ability to control these influences and change our character.

Επίκουρος argues that, because we begin with a wide range of seeds (σπέρματα) for potential character traits, our actual development is not predetermined but can be decided upon from our own judgments (ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν δόξας).

25.35 [Character, Passageways]

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 109

...τὰ τὸ μ φυσικὸν χα[ρακ]τῆρα ὁμοίως καὶ τοῖς τ[οιοῦ τ]οῖς κ[ενο]ῖς πόροις... ...[τ]ῶν αὐ[τ]ῶν ἰδιοτῆ[των]... ...[ἐ]πὶ πάν[τ]ων...

...**τὸν φυσικὸν χαρακτήρα**, ὁμοίως καὶ **τοῖς τοιοῦτοις κενοῖς πόροις**... ...**τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδιοτήτων**... ...**ἐπὶ πάντων**...

...**the natural character**, similarly even **to these empty passageways**... ... of the particularities... ...**in all**...

ὁ χαρακτήρ οἱ χαρακτῆρες	character	ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ <i>engraving</i>
ὁμοίως	similarly	ΟΜΟΙΩΣ <i>similar</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
κενός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ <i>emptiness</i>
ὁ πόρος οἱ πόροι	passageway	ΠΟΡΟΣ <i>piercing</i>
ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>

25.36 Overcoming Natural Dispositions

*Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 52 *sup.*)*

...{νου[θετ]εῖν τ' ἀλλήλους καὶ μ[άχεσθ]αι καὶ μετα[ρυσθ]μίζειν [ὥς ἐχ]οντας καὶ ἐν ἐα[υ]τοῖς [τῇ]ν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῇι [ἐ]ξ ἀρ[χῆς] μόνον συστάσε[ι κ]αὶ ἐν [τῇι τ]οῦ περιέχοντ[ος] καὶ ἐπει[σιό]ντος κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον [ἀ]νάγκη... εἰ γάρ τις καὶ τῷ [νο]υθετεῖν καὶ τῷ νουθετεῖσθ[αι] τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐ[τόματο]ν [ἀ]νάγκ[η]ν [π]ρο[σ]τιθε[ίη καὶ τοῦ] [πο]θ' ἑαυτῷ[ι] ὑπάρχοντος}). ... {[συ]νιέναι}...

{same as text below}

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 22 (fr. B 44), et alia.

...εσθήκει ὦν οὐ[δὲ ἄ]πολείπει τὰ πάθη τοῦ γίνε[σθαι, τὸ] {νουθε[τ]εῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ μάχε[σθ]αι καὶ μεταρुθμίζειν ὥς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῇι ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνον συστάσει καὶ ἐν τῇι τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκ[η]ι. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ τῷ νουθετεῖν καὶ τῷ νουθετεῖσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐ[τό]μα[τ]ον ἀνάγκην προστι[θείη] ἀεὶ τοῦ [τό]θ' ἑαυτῷ[ι] ὑπάρχον[ντος]}, μὴ οὐ[χ]ί πο[τε] δύν[ηται αὐτ]ῇ [συ]νιέναι...

...Ἐσθήκει – ὦν, οὐδέ ἀπολείπει τὰ Πάθη τοῦ γίνεσθαι: τὸ ^[1] **νουθετεῖν τε ἀλλήλους** καὶ ^[2] **μάχεσθαι καὶ** ^[3] **μεταρुθμίζειν** ὥς **ἔχοντας καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν** – καὶ οὐχὶ ἐν τῇ **ἐξ ἀρχῆς** μόνον **συστάσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ ἐπεισιόντος** – κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον **ἀνάγκη**

...[against the false conclusion that one's innate composition already] has been set in place – from which [innate composition], the Experiences of what [automatic mental motion] is produced do not go away: [we can demonstrate that there is] the ^[1] instructing of one another and ^[2] contending and ^[3] readjusting as though also having WITHIN OURSELVES the cause [of volitional movement] – and NOT ONLY [having the cause of movement] in [our] composition from its foundation and in the [composition] of the surrounding [environment] and of what enters into [us] – according to automation by necessity

[Sedley 20 C.2] <and we can invoke, against the argument that our eventual choice between these alternatives must be physically caused either by our initial make-up or by those environmental influences> by which we never cease to be affected, the fact that we ^[1] rebuke, ^[2] oppose and ^[3] reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and penetrates us.

εἰ γὰρ Τις καὶ, τῷ νουθετεῖν καὶ τῷ νουθετεῖσθαι, τὴν κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκην προστιθεῖν ἀεὶ τοῦ τόθ' ἑαυτῷ ὑπάρχοντος· μὴ οὐχὶ ποτε Δύναιται ταύτη συνιέναι...

for if Someone should always attribute, to both [the actions of] instructing and being instructed, the [natural] necessity of what exists for oneself at that time according to what is automatic: He would never in this way be able to put it together [i.e., the determinist's theory will never be consistent with his actions]...

[Sedley 20 C.3] For if someone were to attribute – to the very processes of rebuking and being rebuked – the accidental necessity of whatever happens to be present to oneself at the time, I'm afraid that he can never in this way understand <his own behavior in continuing the debate>

ἴστασθαι	to be stood up	ἸΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ standing
στη̐ναι	to stand [already]	ΣΤΗΝΑΙ standing
ἐστάναι	to have set in place [already]	ἙΣΤΑΝΑΙ setting up
λείπειν	to leave	ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ leaving
ἀπολείπειν	to go way	ΑΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ leaving away/out
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[n] experience (feeling)	ΠΑΘΟΣ enduring
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being
νουθετεῖν	to instruct [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΝ setting mind
νουθετεῖσθαι	to be instructed [about]	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΕΙΣΘΑΙ setting mind
ἡ ἀλληλουχία αἱ ἀλληλουχίαι	interconnectedness	ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΧΙΑ holding each other
^[no nominative] ἀλλήλων	of one another	ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ each other
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ combating
μεταρρυθμίζειν	to readjust	ΜΕΤΑΡΥΘΜΙΖΕΙΝ change ordering
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ blame
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ first order
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ standing together
περιέχων ^(ουσα, ον)	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ holding around

ἐπεισιών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	entering into	ΕΠΕΙΣΙΩΝ <i>going upon</i>
αὐτόματος <i>(ή, ον)</i>	automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΣ <i>self</i>
τὸ αὐτόματον τὰ αὐτόματα	what is automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΝ <i>self</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	^[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against</i> <i>constraint</i>
κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀνάγκη	according to automation by necessity	<i>i.e.,</i> <i>"Determinism"</i>
Part 2		
συντιθέναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing together</i>
προστιθέναι	to put into	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing toward</i>
ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	existing ^[already]	ΥΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning</i> <i>under (before)</i>
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
συνιέναι	to put it together {i.e. understand}	ΣΥΝΙΕΝΑΙ <i>sending together</i>

Dēmókritos' reductionist atomism led to both skepticism and mechanistic determinism: his belief that everything could be explained by the interactions of atoms led to the idea that events are predetermined by these interactions, leaving no room for free will – this mechanistic view also fostered skepticism, as it suggested the movements of the atoms alone were real and what we sense was too subjective and inconsistent to be true.

25.37 Inconsistency of Determinists

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 52 fin.)

...[συ]νιέναι [μεμφόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν], ἀλλ' [εἰ μέ]ν το[ῦτο πράττοι, τ]ὸ μέ[ν ἔργον ἂν εἴη καταλεί]πον ὃ [ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ τήν τ]ῇ[ς αἰτίας πρόληψιν]

{overlaps with fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 110

...[μεμ]φόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν. ἀλλ' ε[ἰ] μέν τοῦτο πράττοι, τὸ [αὐτὸ] ἔργ[ο]ν ἂν εἴη [κ]ατα[λεί]πον ὃ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν [ποιεῖ / κατὰ] τήν τῆς αἰτίας πρό[λη]ψιν, ἐν ᾧ οὐ μέν τὸ {δό[γμα] / ὃ' ὃ[νο]μ[α]}... μετατεθε[ι]μένο[ς]...

...**μεμφόμενος ἢ ἐπαινῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ μέν τοῦτο Πράττοι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον ἂν Εἴη – Καταλείπων "Ο ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν Ποιεῖ τήν τῆς αἰτίας πρόληψιν: ἐν ᾧ, οὐ μέν τὸ δόγμα... μετατεθειμένος...**

...[He may even perceive his self-refutation while he is] accusing or praising. but if He were to accomplish **this**, It would be **the same task** – [and] He would be thoroughly leaving behind ***What establishes the anticipation of the cause of our own [movement]: in which [case]**, having changed for himself **at one point** [his use of *his*] **teaching [that relates to natural necessity]**...

** i.e., our sense of our own volition affecting our movement and thoughts*

[Sedley 20 C.4] «He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to» blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he would be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned creates the preconception of our own responsibility. And **in that** he would **at one point** be altering his theory, at another...

[O'Keefe] «*He may simply choose to maintain his thesis while in practice continuing to*» blame or praise. But if he were to act in this way he would be leaving intact the very same behavior which as far as our own selves are concerned creates the preconception of our own responsibility. And *we would understand* (έννοοῦμεν for ἐν ᾧ οὐ μὲν) that the theory was altered

αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ <i>blame</i>
κακίζειν	to reproach	ΚΑΚΙΖΕΙΝ <i>bad</i>
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>combating</i>
μέμφεσθαι	to accuse	ΜΕΜΦΕΣΘΑΙ <i>finding fault with</i>
μεμφόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	accusing	ΜΕΜΦΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>finding fault with</i>
ἐπαινεῖν	to praise	ΕΠΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>praising upon</i>
ἐπαινῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	praising	
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
καταλείπειν	to thoroughly leave	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly leaving</i>
καταλείπων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	thoroughly leaving	ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΠΩΝ <i>thoroughly leaving</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>before taking hold</i>
τό δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching	ΔΟΓΜΑ <i>seeming</i>
συντιθέναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing together</i>
προστιθέναι	to put into	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing toward</i>
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing change</i>
μετατεθειμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having changed {for oneself [one's use of]}	ΜΕΤΑΤΕΘΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>placed change</i>

25.38 Self-Refuting Determinism

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 12

...{ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι – ὥς ἔστιν τοιαυτά πάντα <τὰ κατ' ἀ>νάγκην καλ[ο]ύμενα, ἀλλὰ μάχεται τινι περ[ὶ αὐτοῦ] τοῦ τ[οῦ]τ[ο]υ ὥς δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀβελ[τερ]ευομένῳ. κ[ἀ]ν εἰς ἅπε[ρ] οὐ φῆ[μι] [πάλιν] γ[ὰρ] [κατ' ἀνάγκην]}...

{A 53 below is an expanded fragment}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 23 (fr. B 45)

...{το[σ]α[ύ]της πλάνης... περικά[τω] γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπετα[ι] καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὥς ἔστι τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ μάχεται τινι περ[ὶ] αὐτ[ο]ῦ τούτου ὥς δι[ὲ]ς ἑαυτὸν ἀβελτ[ε]ρευομένῳ. κἂν εἰς ἅπειρον φῆ[μι] πάλιν κατ' ἀ[νά]γκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων ἀεὶ, οὐ[κ ἐ]πιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν [ἀνάπ]τειν}...

{A 54 below is an expanded fragment}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 112 | P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 53)

...{τοι[αύτ]ης πλάνης. περικάτ[ω] γάρ {ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τρέπεται, καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὥς ἔστιν τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην καλούμενα. ἀλλὰ μάχεταί τινι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου ὥς δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἀβελτερευομένῳ. κἂν εἰς ἄπειρον φῃ πάλιν κατ' ἀνάγκην} τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων αἰεὶ, οὐκ ἐπιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνά[π]τειν} τοῦ κα[τὰ τ]ρόπον λελογίσθαι εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἅ πο[ιεῖ] ἀπολήγοι [εἰ]ς ἑαυτὸ[v], ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν [ἀ]νάγ[κην] τ[ι]θεῖη, [ο]ὐδ' ἂν...

...τοιαύτης πλάνης. περικάτω γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος Λόγος τρέπεται – καὶ οὐδέποτε δύναται βεβαιῶσαι ὥς ἔστιν Τοιαῦτα πάντα οἷα τὰ "κατ' ἀνάγκην" καλούμενα. ἀλλὰ Μάχεταί τινι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, ὥς δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἀβελτερευομένῳ!

...of such an error. for Reasoning like this is turned upside down – and is never able to affirm that ALL such Things exist as those things which are called "according to necessity." instead, He contends with some [opponent] about this very [issue], as if [that opponent] through himself is being obstinate!

[Sedley 20 C.5] ...such error. For this sort of account is self-refuting, and can never prove that everything is of the kind called 'necessitated' – but he debates this very question on the assumption that his opponent is himself responsible for talking nonsense.

κἂν εἰς ἄπειρον Φῃ πάλιν κατ' ἀνάγκην τοῦτο πράττειν ἀπὸ λόγων αἰεὶ, οὐκ ἔπιλογίζεται ἐν τῷ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάπτειν τοῦ κατὰ τρόπον λελογίσθαι εἰς δὲ τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα τοῦ μὴ κατὰ τρόπον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἅ ποιεῖ Ἀπολήγοι εἰς ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκην Τιθεῖη, οὐδ' ἂν...

and even if He infinitely asserts again from [his logical] reasoning that he always does this by necessity, He does not inductively consider [the fact that he attributes] in [the act of] fastening onto himself the cause of reasoning ACCORDING TO a [proper] way, but onto [his] opponent [the cause] of [reasoning] NOT ACCORDING TO a [proper] way. and if He would not desist from [attributing] what he does to himself, but instead He would assign [his actions] to [natural] necessity, [he] would not even...

[Sedley 20 C.6-7] And even if he goes on to infinity saying that this action of his is in turn necessitated, always appealing to arguments, he is not reasoning it empirically – so long as he goes on imputing to himself the responsibility for having reasoned correctly and to his opponent that for having reasoned incorrectly. But unless he were to stop attributing his action to himself and to pin it on necessity instead, he would not even <be consistent>...

ἡ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ roaming
περικάτω	upside down	ΠΕΡΙΚΑΤΩ around below
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ this of this sort
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ collecting (reasoning)
διατρέπειν	to refuse	ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ turning thoroughly
τρέπειν	to turn	ΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ turning
οὐδεὶς (οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ not even one
οὐδέποτε	never	ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ not even at some point
δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ power
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ firm standing
τὸ τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα	what is like this (such a thing)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ this of this sort
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ up against constraint
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ crying out

καλούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being called	ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>crying out</i>
μάχεσθαι	to contend	ΜΑΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>combating</i>
βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ
ἀβελτερεύειν	to be obstinate	ΑΒΕΛΤΕΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>not seeking better</i>
ἀβελτερευόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being obstinate	ΑΒΕΛΤΕΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>not seeking better</i>
<i>I cannot find this word anywhere else</i>		
ἄπειρος <i>(ον)</i>	infinite	ΑΠΕΙΡΟΣ <i>not limited</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
πάλιν	again	ΠΑΛΙΝ <i>back</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning</i> <i>action upon</i>
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>process of reasoning</i> <i>action upon</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ἀνάπτειν	to fasten to {or, "to ignite"}	ΑΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly fastening</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
λογίζεσθαι	to reason	ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action</i>
λελογίσθαι	to have reasoned	ΛΕΛΟΓΙΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoned action</i>
τά ἄμφω	the pair	ΑΜΦΩ <i>both</i>
ἡ σβένσις = ἡ σβέσις	extinguishing	ΣΒΕΝΣΙΣ <i>quenching</i>
ἀμφισβητεῖν	to oppose	ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΕΙΝ <i>quenching</i> <i>both [sides]</i>
ἀμφισβητῶν	opposing	
ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες	opponent	
ἀπολήγειν	to desist from	ΑΠΟΛΗΓΕΙΝ <i>stopping</i>

Determinists often defend their actions by claiming they are compelled to behave in a certain way. These determinists might view their attitudes as necessary, but this does not prevent their self-refutation.

25.39 Anticipated Imprints

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 114

...εἰ τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καλούμενον τῷ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὀνόματι προσαγ[ο]ρεύων [δ]νομα μό[ν]ομ μετατίθετα[ι] μη δ' ἐπιδίξει ὅτι τοιοῦτό τι ψ̣ μοχθηρ[ι] εἰσι τύποι προειλ[η]φότες τὸ δι' ἡμῶ[ν αὐ]τῶν αἴτιον καλ[οῦ]μεν, οὐτ' ἰδ[ι]...

...εἰ, τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καλούμενον τῷ τῆς "ἀνάγκης" ὀνόματι προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον Μετατίθεται, μη δ' Ἐπιδείξει ὅτι τοιοῦτό τι: ᾧ μοχθηρί εἰσι Τύποι προειληφότες – τὸ δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν αἴτιον Καλοῦμεν. οὐτ' ἴδι...

...[but] if, he is calling, with the word "necessity," what [action] is being invoked by us ourselves, [then] He is only changing the name, but He is NOT [actually] exhibiting that it is such a [circumstance]: in which [our] anticipated Impressions are in a wretched [state] – [specifically the anticipated impressions] which We call responsible [for the actions we take] by us ourselves. and [his] particular [actions will] not [change]...*

* i.e., our anticipation [i.e., our mental impression before active thought] of our own agency is accurate. Merely changing the word used to refer to this agency does not demonstrate that these anticipated imprints are incorrect – neither does it lead to any practical change in one's actions.

[Sedley 20 C.8] <on the other hand> if in using the word 'necessity' of that which we call our own agency he is merely changing a name, and won't prove that we have a preconception of a kind which has faulty delineations when we call our own agency responsible, neither his own <behavior nor that of others will be affected>...

καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ crying out
καλούμενος (η, ον)	being called	ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ crying out
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ up against constraint
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ name
τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὄνομα	the name of necessity, the word 'necessity'	
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ speaking publicly toward
προσαγορεύων	calling [by the name/word]	
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ placing change
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ giving away
δεικνύναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ showing
ἐπιδεικνύναι	to exhibit	ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ showing upon
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ this of this sort
μοχθηρός (ή, όν)	wretched	ΜΟΧΘΗΡΟΣ hardship
ὁ τύπος οἱ τύποι	impression	ΤΥΠΟΣ imprinting
προλαμβάνειν	to anticipate	ΠΡΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ before grasping
προειληφώς (υῖα, ός)	anticipated [i.e., prior to active thinking]	ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ before having grasped
	[perfect active participle taken here as implicit passive]	
τύποι προειληφότες	anticipated impressions	
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ blame
αἴτιος	responsible	ΑΙΤΙΟΣ blame
ἴδιος (α, ον)	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ particular

Epíkouros argues that determinism is not a meaningful explanation of the world. We all sense of our own agency. When determinists apply the wording of 'necessity' to human actions: this does not provide any new understanding – it is merely a change IN THE INDICATION (i.e., wording) and not a change in WHAT IS BEING INDICATED.

25.40 False Equivocation of Determinists

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 24 (fr. B 46)

...{δ' ἀνάγκην καλε[τ]ν προ[ὸς] ὧν φάτε... ἂν δὲ μή τις [τ]οὔτ[ο ἄ]π[ο]δείξει μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τ]ι συνεργὸν μηδ' ὄρμημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ὧν καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν ἀ[λλ]ὰ π[ᾶ]νθ' ὅσα νῦν δι' ἡμῶν α[ὐτῶν ὄνο]μάζοντες τὴν αἰτία[ν πως προ]θ[υ]μούμεθα πράττε[ιν κ]ατ[ᾶ] χ[ώ]ραν ἀνάγκην [προ]ο[σα]γορε[ύ]ω[ν ὄνο]μα μόνον ἀμ[ε]ί[ψ]ει[ι]}...

{1191 below is an expanded fragment}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 54)

...{ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει, ἔργον δ' οὐθὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστίν, ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι πράττειν. ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὐρεῖν τὸ ποῖον [ν]ομίζει[ιν τὸ ἐξ [ῥ]μῶν αὐτῶ[ν πως [πρ]αττόμενον τῇ προθυμ[ίαι τοῦ πράτ]τειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλ[λ' οὐθὲν]} προ[ᾶ]τ[τ]ει[ν] ἢ φάν[α]ι...

{1191 below is an expanded fragment}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 115/116

...γενέσθαι, ἀλ[λὰ κε]νὸν [καί] τὸ {δ' ἀνάγκην καλ[εῖ]ν προ[ὸς] ὧν φάτε. ἂν δὲ μ[ῆ] τις τοῦτο ἀποδείξει, μηδ' ἔχει ἡμῶν [τ]ι συνεργὸν μηδ' ὄρμημα ἀπο[τ]ρέπειν ὧν καλοῦντες δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν συντελοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσ[α] νῦν δι' ἡμῶν αὐ[τῶ]ν ὀνομάζοντες τὴν αἰτίαν [εἶναι διαβ]ε[βα]ιούμεθα πράττε[ιν] κατὰ χώραν {ἀνάγκην προσαγορεύων, ὄνομα μόνον ἀμείψει.} ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῶν μετακοσμήσει, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἐνίων ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστίν ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι π[ρ]άττειν. ζητήσει δ' ἡ διάνοια εὐρεῖν τὸ ποῖον [ο]ὗν τι δεῖ νομί[ζε]ιν τὸ ἐξ ῥ[η]μῶν αὐτῶ[ν πως [πρ]αττόμενον [μ]ὴ προθυμ[ουμένων] πράτ]τειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλ[λο τι οὐθὲν]} εἰ μὴ φά[ναι τὸ] ποῖον [κατ' ἀνάγκην] ἐσ[τ]ι...

...γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ κενὸν καὶ τὸ δι' "ἀνάγκην" Καλεῖν πρὸς ὧν φάτε. ἂν δὲ μή Τις τοῦτο ἀποδείξει – μηδ' ἔχει ^[1] ἡμῶν τι συνεργὸν μηδ' ^[2] ὄρμημα ἀποτρέπειν ὧν, καλοῦντες δι' "ἡμῶν αὐτῶν," τὴν αἰτίαν Συντελοῦμεν – ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δι' "ἡμῶν αὐτῶν" ὀνομάζοντες "τὴν αἰτίαν" εἶναι Διαβεβαιούμεθα πράττειν κατὰ χώραν. "ἀνάγκην" προσαγορεύων – ὄνομα μόνον Ἀμείψει

...are [already] produced. but, from what you assert, what [you] Call "by necessity" [is] also EMPTY.* and if One cannot fully prove this [theory] – he has neither [the ability] to dissuade ^[1] something of ours [that is internally] cooperative nor any ^[2] impulse of what, [while we are] calling "by us ourselves," We mutually fulfill as the cause [of movement]. but [with us] using the word "cause" We thoroughly affirm that we accomplish BY US OURSELVES all that [movement that] now exists in [our own] realm. while he is naming [this volitional movement as] "necessity" – He will only be replacing a name

**i.e., The term "necessity", when used to mean "all-encompassing natural automation," is purely a logical construct with no physical basis. As a label, it attempts to denote something that does not actually exist.*

On the other hand, using the word "necessity" for our volitional movement is a misapplication of the word for what does exist.

[Sedley 20 C.9] ...but even to call necessitation empty as a result of your claim. If someone won't explain this, and has no auxiliary element or impulse in us which he might dissuade from those actions which we perform, calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – but is giving the name of foolish necessity to all the things which we claim to do calling the responsibility for them 'our own agency' – he will merely be changing a name.

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῶν Μετακοσμήσει – ὥσπερ, ἐπ' ἐνίων, Ὁ συνορῶν τὰ ποῖα κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστίν, ἀποτρέπειν εἴωθε τοὺς προθυμουμένους παρὰ βίαν τι πράττειν.

...[by changing what he refers to by using the word "necessity"] He will rearrange no [actual] task of ours [i.e., he will not change the reality of our volitional movements] – just as, in case for some [people], One who fully sees what kinds [of movements] DO EXIST BY NECESSITY, has been accustomed to dissuade those eager to accomplish something AGAINST THE FORCE [OF THIS NECESSITY].

[Sedley 20 C.10] He will not be modifying any of our actions in the way in which, in some cases, the man who sees what sort of actions are necessitated regularly dissuades those who desire to do something in the face of compulsion.

ζητήσει δ' ἡ Διάνοια εὐρεῖν τὸ ποῖον οὖν τι Δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πως πραττόμενον, μὴ Προθυμουμένων πράττειν! οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἄλλο τι οὐθὲν εἰ μὴ φάναι τὸ ποῖον κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐστί...

but [our mental] Perception will seek to discover what kind of thing, then, It is necessary to think of as being accomplished somehow from us ourselves, while [we] are not eager to act!* for He has nothing else except to assert what kind of [movement] exists by necessity...

*i.e., It is inconceivable that we can willingly act against our will

[Sedley 20 C.11] And the mind will be inquisitive to learn what sort of action it should then consider that one to be which we perform in some way because of us ourselves but without desiring to. For he has no alternative but to say what sort of action is necessitated, <and what is not>...

γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
γενέσθαι	to be produced [already]	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>came into being</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
κενός (ή, όν)	empty	ΚΕΝΟΣ <i>emptiness</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against constraint</i>
καλεῖν	to call	ΚΑΛΕΙΝ <i>crying out</i>
τὸ καλεῖν	a calling	
καλούμενος (η, ον)	being called	ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>crying out</i>
καλῶν (οὔσα, ῶν)	calling	ΚΑΛΩΝ <i>crying out</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
ἐπιδεικνύναι	to exhibit	ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing upon</i>
δεικνύναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
ἀποδεικνύναι	to fully prove	ΑΠΟΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing away</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
ὁ συνεργός οἱ συνεργοί	colleague	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΟΣ <i>working together</i>
συνεργός (ός, όν)	cooperative	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΟΣ <i>working together</i>
τρέπειν	to turn	ΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>turning</i>
ἀποτρέπειν	to dissuade	ΑΠΟΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>turning away</i>

συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ὀνομάζειν	to use the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΕΙΝ <i>naming</i>
ὀνομάζων	using the word	ΟΝΟΜΑΖΩΝ <i>naming</i>
βεβαιούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being affirmed	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>firm standing</i>
διαβεβαιοῦσθαι	to thoroughly affirm	ΔΙΑΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΣΘΑΙ <i>firm standing through</i>
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ἡ χώρα αἱ χώραι	space	ΧΩΡΑ <i>location</i>
κατὰ χώραν	in [one's own] realm	
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
προσαγορευόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being referred to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
προσαγορεύων	referring to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΩΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
ἀμείβειν	to replace	ΑΜΕΙΒΕΙΝ <i>exchanging</i>
Part 2		
μετακοσμεῖν	to rearrange	ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ <i>change order</i>
ἔνιοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	some	ΕΝΙΟΙ
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
συνορῶν	fully seeing [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΩΝ <i>seen together</i>
ποῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	what kind of	ΠΟΙΟΣ <i>gathering</i>
τὸ ποῖον τὰ ποῖα	what kind of thing	ΠΟΙΟΝ
ἀποτρέπειν	to dissuade	ΑΠΟΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>turning away</i>
εἰωθέναι	to be accustomed	ΕΙΩΘΕΝΑΙ <i>to set as one's own</i>
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>spirit in</i>
ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ <i>toward spirit</i>
προθυμεῖσθαι	to strive for	ΠΡΟΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>spirit forward</i>
προθυμούμενος	being eager [through oneself]	ΠΡΟΘΥΜΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>spirit forward</i>
ὁ προθυμούμενος οἱ προθυμοῦμενοι	one who is eager	ΠΡΟΘΥΜΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ
ὁ βιασμός οἱ βιασμοί	forcing	ΒΙΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of violence</i>
ἡ παραβίασις αἱ παραβιάσεις	distortion	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ <i>violence alongside</i>
ἡ βία αἱ βίαι	force	ΒΙΑ <i>violence</i>
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>

πραττόμενος	being accomplished	ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>action</i>
Part 3		
ζητεῖν	to seek	ΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seeking</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
εὕρίσκειν	to discover	ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>finding</i>
ποῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	what kind of	ΠΟΙΟΣ <i>gathering</i>
δεῖν	to be necessary	ΔΕΙΝ <i>necessary</i>
νομίζειν	to think	ΝΟΜΙΖΕΙΝ <i>custom</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>

Determinists claim humans fundamentally lack an internal source of self-control. Consequently, determinists cannot – in a way that is consistent with their doctrine – expect their arguments to prevent humans from taking any actions.

25.41 The Great, Greatly Fallen

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 118

...{μάλιστα άδιανοήτων. άν δέ τις τοῦτο μή παραβιάζεται μηδ' αὐ ὁ έξελέγχει} υε ἡ ὁ εἰσφέρει πρᾶγμα έκτιθεῖ, φω{νῆ} μόνον άμίβεται, καθάπερ πάλαι θρυλῶ. οἱ δ' αίτιολογήσαντες έξ άρχ{χῆ}ς {ι}κ{αν}ῶς κ{αἰ ο}ύ μ{όνον τ}ῶμ πρ{ὸ}...

{added to fragment below}

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 25 (fr. B 47.1)

...{μάλιστα άδιανοήτων. άν δέ τις τοῦτο μή παραβιάζεται, μηδ' αὐ ὁ έξελέγχει} | γ{ε ἡ ὁ εἰσ}φ{ε}ρε{ι ι π}ρᾶγμα έκτιθε{τ}ι, φωνῆ μόνον άμείβεται, καθάπερ πάλαι θρυλῶ. οἱ δ' αίτιολογήσαντες έξ άρχῆς ικανῶς, και ού μό{ν}ον {τ}ῶμ πρὸ | αὐτῶν πολὺ διενέγκαντες αλλά και τῶν ὕστερον πολλαπλ{α}σίως, έλαθον έαυτοῖς, καίπερ έν πολλοῖς μεγάλα κουφίσαντες, ε{ι}ς τὸ τ{ῆ}ν άνάγκην και ταυτόματ{ο}ν πάντα α{ιτι}ᾶσθαι

...**μάλιστα άδιανοήτων. άν δέ Τις τοῦτο** μή παραβιάζεται, μηδ' αὐ **ὁ** έξελέγχει, **τε ἡ ὁ** εἰσφέρει: **πρᾶγμα** έκτιθεῖ – **φωνῆ μόνον** Άμείβεται – καθάπερ **πάλαι** Θρυλῶ

...especially of what is [mentally] imperceptible [i.e., willfully acting against our will]. but if Someone does not distort this [false equivocation of "necessity" with volitional movement], nor again [clearly] refutes it out, or even [clearly] introduces it: while he is setting out the situation – He replaces only a statement – just as I have repeated long ago

[Sedley 20 C.12] ...supremely unthinkable. But unless someone perversely maintains this, or makes it clear what fact he is rebutting or introducing, it is merely a word that is being changed, as I keep repeating.

Οἱ δ' αίτιολογήσαντες έξ άρχῆς ικανῶς, και ού μόνον τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν πολὺ διενέγκαντες – αλλά και τῶν ὕστερον πολλαπλασίως: Έλαθον έαυτοῖς – (καίπερ έν πολλοῖς μεγάλα κουφίσαντες) – εἰς τὸ τῆν άνάγκην και ταυτόματον πάντα αίτιᾶσθαι

but Those who, having reasoned into the [essential] causes sufficiently from the beginning, not only differed greatly from those before them – but also [they differed] in many ways from those [that came] afterward: [yet] THEY ESCAPED NOTICE TO THEMSELVES – (even though, in many things, they had lightened what is great [i.e., they made difficult topics easier to understand]) – IN ORDER TO BLAME everything [on] necessity and what is spontaneous

[Sedley 20 C.13] The first men to give a satisfactory account of causes: men, not only much greater than their predecessors, but also many times greater than their successors, turned a blind eye to themselves – although in many matters they had alleviated great ills – in order to hold necessity and accident responsible for everything

[Taylor] <...> Those who gave an adequate account of causes from the beginning, far surpassing not only their predecessors but their successor ways, though they alleviated many great evils, failed to see what they were doing in making necessity and chance the cause of everything

μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ <i>very</i>
μάλιστα	especially	ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ <i>very</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἀδιανόητος	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing through</i>
τὸ ἀδιανόητον τὰ ἀδιανόητα	what is imperceptible [mentally]	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΝ <i>not seeing through</i>
ἡ παραβίασις αἱ παραβιάσεις	distortion	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΣΙΣ <i>violence alongside</i>
παραβιάζεσθαι	to distort	ΠΑΡΑΒΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>violence alongside</i>
ἐξελέγχειν	to refute out	ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ <i>confuting out [with contrary proof]</i>
εἰσφέρειν	to carry in [here, "to introduce"]	ΕΙΣΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing into</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
προστιθέναι	to put into	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing toward</i>
ἐκτιθέναι	to set out	ΕΚΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing out</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
ἀμείβειν	to replace	ΑΜΕΙΒΕΙΝ <i>exchanging</i>
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ <i>thoroughly just as</i>
πάλιν	again	ΠΑΛΙΝ <i>back</i>
πάλαι	long ago	ΠΑΛΑΙ <i>back</i>
θρυλεῖν	to repeat	ΘΡΥΛΕΙΝ <i>murmuring</i>
αἰτιολογεῖν	to reason into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>collecting blame</i>
αἰτιολογήσας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	having reasoned into the [essential] causes [already]	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ <i>collecting blame</i>
ὁ αἰτιολογήσας οἱ αἰτιολογήσαντες	one who has reasoned into the [essential] causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ <i>collecting blame</i>
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἱκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ΊΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
ἱκανῶς	sufficiently	ΊΚΑΝΩΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long [of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>

διαφέρειν	to differ	ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing through</i>
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
ἐνεγκεῖν	to carry [already]	ΕΝΕΓΚΕΙΝ <i>brought</i>
διενέγκας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	differing [already]	ΔΙΕΝΕΓΚΑΣ <i>brought through</i>
ὕστερον	afterward	ΎΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>next</i>
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ <i>many times</i>
πολλαπλασίως	in many ways	ΠΟΛΛΑΠΛΑΣΙΩΣ <i>many fold</i>
λανθάνειν	to escape notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ <i>to be hidden</i>
ἔλαθον	they escaped notice	
καίπερ	even though	ΚΑΙΠΕΡ <i>and indeed</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
τὸ μέγα τὰ μεγάλα	what is great	ΜΕΓΑ <i>large</i>
τὸ κοῦφον τὰ κούφα	light things	ΚΟΥΦΟΝ <i>nimble</i>
κουφίζειν	to lighten	ΚΟΥΦΙΖΕΙΝ <i>nimble</i>
κουφίσας	having lightened [already]	ΚΟΥΦΙΣΑΣ <i>nimble</i>
ἡ ἀνάγκη αἱ ἀνάγκαι	[natural] necessity	ΑΝΑΓΚΗ <i>up against</i> <i>constraint</i>
αὐτόματος <i>(η, ον)</i>	automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΣ <i>self thinking</i>
τὸ αὐτόματον τὰ αὐτόματα	what is automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΝ <i>self thinking</i>
τὸ ταυτόματον τὰ ταυτόματα	what is spontaneous	ΤΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΝ <i>same thinking</i>
αἰτιᾶσθαι	to blame	ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ <i>blame</i>

Epikouros argues that if Dēmókritos had applied his idea of universal necessity to his own actions, it would have led to severe negative outcomes. Consider the "Lazy Argument" (Ἀργὸς Λόγος) which shows the practical absurdity of the determinists' position: since everything is fated, no action is necessary.

Epikouros was also well aware of his older contemporary Pyrrho's "agnosticism and suspension of judgement" which led him to lead "a life consistent with this doctrine – going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses." (D.L. 9.62)

25.42 Cognitive Dissonance

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 55)

...**ᾄσθαι**. ὁ δὴ λόγος αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἐλάνθανε τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἐργο[ι]ς πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συγκρού[ο]ντα, καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθῃ τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνετο, συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ταράττοντα, ἧι δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης, κἂν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις περιπείπτοντα, ἧ[ι] **δὲ** μὴ ἐκρά[τει, σ]τάσ[ε]ως ἐμ[πι]πλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν [ἐ]ρ[υ]ων καὶ τ[ῆς δόξης]. τοῦ[τω]ν οὐ[ν] οὐ[τ]ως ἐ[χό]ντων δεῖ κα[ὶ] περὶ **οὐ** **λέγων** **ἐ**ξ [ἀρ]χῆς **εἰς** τὸ ταῦτα] π[αρεκκαθαί]ρει[ν ἀφικόμη]ν ἀποδιδ[ό]...

{expanded fragment below}

ὁ δὴ λόγος αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων κατεάγνυτο καὶ ἐλάνθανεν τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συνκρού[ο]ντα. καὶ εἰ μὴ λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνετο, συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν τaráττοντα. ἦι δ' ἐκράτει τὸ τῆς δόξης κᾶν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις π[ε]ριτείπτοντα. ἦ[ι δὲ] μὴ ἐκράτει στάσεως ἐμπιπλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δόξης. τούτων οὖν οὕτως ἐχόντων δεῖ κα[ὶ] περὶ οὗ λέγων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ταῦτα παρεκκαθαίρειν ἀφικόμην ἀποδιδόναι, μ[ὴ] κακ[όν τι] τοιοῦτ[ο]

ὁ δὴ Λόγος αὐτὸς, ὁ τοῦτο διδάσκων, κατεάγνυτο – καὶ ἐλάνθανεν τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὴν δόξαν συνκρούοντα – καὶ εἰ μὴ Λήθη τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων τῆς δόξης ἐνεγείνετο: συνεχῶς ἂν ἑαυτὸν τaráττοντα

...the Reasoning itself, which teaches this [i.e., total determinism], shattered – and it escaped the man [from noticing that] in [his daily] tasks he was clashing with [his own] judgment – and unless a certain Forgetfulness of [his] judgment had not been inherent for [his daily] tasks: he would continuously be disturbing himself

[Sedley 20 C.14 sup.] Indeed, the actual account promoting this view came to grief when it left the great man blind to the fact that in his actions he was clashing with his doctrine, and that if it were not that a certain blindness to the doctrine took hold of him while acting he would be constantly perplexing himself

[Taylor] The very thesis which asserts this broke down and involved the man [i.e., Dēmókritos] unawares in a conflict between his actions and his opinion, so that, had he not in his actions forgotten his opinion, he would have been in a continual state of self-induced confusion

ἦ δ' ἐκράτει Τὸ τῆς δόξης: κᾶν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις περιπείπτοντα – ἦ δὲ μὴ ἐκράτει: στάσεως ἐμπιπλάμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δόξης. τούτων, οὖν, οὕτως ἐχόντων: Δεῖ καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ταῦτα παρεκκαθαίρειν Ἀφικόμην ἀποδιδόναι – μὴ κακόν Τι τοιοῦτο

...insofar as This [aspect of his] judgment was preeminent [in his daily life]: he would be falling into extreme [circumstances] – but insofar as [his philosophical judgment] was not ruling [among his practical actions]: He was being filled full with conflict due to the contradiction of his tasks and his judgment. therefore, since these things are so: It is also necessary to demonstrate concerning what I was saying from the beginning, that I arrived at clarifying these things as well – [so that] Something bad like this does not [occur in our own thinking or behaviour]...

[Sedley 20 C.14 fin. – 15] and that wherever the doctrine prevailed he would be falling into desperate calamities, while wherever it did not he would be filled with conflict because of the contradiction between his actions and his doctrine. It is because this is so that the need also arises to explain the matter which I was discussing when I first embarked on this digression, lest some similar evil <befall us>

[Taylor] ...< >...succumbing to the most extreme consequences when his opinion prevailed, and full of conflict when it did not, through the opposition of his actions and his opinion... < >...

ἦ	insofar as	ἦ in/for which
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ collecting (reasoning)
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ teaching
κατάγνυναι	to shatter	ΚΑΤΑΓΝΥΝΑΙ thoroughly breaking
λανθάνειν	to escape notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ to be hidden
ὁ ἄνῆρ οἱ ἄνδρες	man	ΑΝΗΡ man
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ work
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ seeming

ἀντικόπτειν	to collide against	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beats against</i>
ἡ κρούσις αἱ κρούσεις	impact	ΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ <i>hitting</i>
συνκρούειν	to clash with	ΣΥΝΚΡΟΥΕΙΝ <i>hitting together</i>
συνκρούων <i>(η, ον)</i>	clashing with	ΣΥΝΚΡΟΥΩΝ <i>hitting together</i>
ἡ λήθη αἱ λήθαι	forgetfulness	ΛΗΘΗ <i>oblivion</i>
τὸ ἔργον τὰ ἔργα	task	ΕΡΓΟΝ <i>work</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἐνγίγνεσθαι	to be inherent	ΕΝΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding</i>
συνεχῶς	continuously	ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ <i>holding together</i>
ταράττειν	to disturb	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>agitating</i>
ταράττων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	disturbing	ΤΑΡΑΤΤΩΝ <i>agitating</i>
Part 2		
κρατεῖν	to rule	ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ <i>governing</i>
ἔσχατος <i>(ἐσχάτη, ἔσχατον)</i>	extreme	ΕΣΧΑΤΟΣ <i>last</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
περιπίπτειν	to fall [upon]	ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling around</i>
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	[stationary] position, or conflict	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i>
ἐμπιπλάναι	to fill full	ΕΜΠΙΠΛΑΝΑΙ <i>filling in</i>
ἡ ὑπεναντιότης αἱ ὑπεναντιότητες	contradiction	ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΤΗΣ <i>over against</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
προσεκκαθαίρειν	to further clarify out	ΠΡΟΣΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleaning further out</i>
καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleansing</i>
ἐκθαίρειν	to clear out	ΕΚΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>clearing out</i>
παρεκκαθαίρειν	to clarify as well	ΠΑΡΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>cleansing out alongside</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>come towards</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>

25.43 Causation of Characteristics

...πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀμφοτέρα κέκτηται μὲν αἰτίαν καὶ μὴ συνεπεσπασμένα τὰ ἕτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων μηδὲ συνεπισπώμενα καὶ βιαζόμενα παρὰ τε χρόνους πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων συνπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτίας. ὅθεν κ[αὶ τὸ] τ[οῦ τέλους] αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγ[ισμ]α εἶχε μ[ὲ]ν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τὴν αἰτίαν, εἴ[τε] χο[με]ν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς...

{expanded fragment 1191 below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 56)

...καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἥν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν· ἐπαίσθησις τοῦ εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα, τίς ὁ κανὼν καὶ τὸ ἐπικρεῖνον πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶ[ν] δοξῶν περαινό[με]να, ἀλλ' ἀκολ[ο]υθησομεν ἀλόγως ταῖς τ[ῶ]ν πολλῶν φοραῖ[ς], οἰχῆσεται πάντα, καθ' ἃ διερε[υνώ]μεθ' αὖτις, καὶ ὑπεροχὴ... τ[ὸ] δ' αὐτὸ κ[αὶ] αἰδ[ι]ον ἐγεν[νή]θη καὶ σπέρ[ρμ]α ἦν τι, ὥσ[περ] λ[η]ρῶ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἐ[τε]ρ[ον] ἀγω[γόν], π[αρ]όντος δὲ τοῦ τοῦ ν[οοῦμεν] ἢ δοξ[ι]ζόμεν...

{added to fragment 1191 below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 121/122

...πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀμφοτέρα κέκτηται μὲν αἰτίαν καὶ μὴ συνε[πε]σπασμ[έν]α ἕτερ[α] ὑπὸ τ[ῶν ἐ]τέρων μ[η]δὲ συνεπ[ι]σπ[ώ]μενα καὶ βιαζόμενα παρὰ τε χρόνους πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων συνπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτ[ι]ας... ὅθεν καὶ τὸ τοῦ τ[έ]λους αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγισμα εἶχε μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τὴν αἰτίαν, εἴχομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς. ἥν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐπαίσθησις τοῦ – εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα τίς ὁ καν[ὼν] καὶ τὸ ἐπικρεῖνον πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶ[ν] δοξῶν περαινό[με]να, ἀλλ' ἀκολ[ο]υθησομεν ἀλόγως ταῖς τ[ῶ]ν πολλῶν φοραῖ[ς], οἰχῆσεται πάντα, καθ' ἃ διερε[υνώ]μεθ' αὖτις, καὶ ὑπεροχὴ... τ[ὸ] δ' αὐτὸ κ[αὶ] αἰδ[ι]ον ἐγεν[νή]θη καὶ σπέρ[ρμ]α ἦν τι, ὥσ[περ] λ[η]ρῶ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἐ[τε]ρ[ον] ἀγω[γόν], π[αρ]όντος δὲ τοῦ τοῦ ν[οοῦμεν] ἢ δοξ[ι]ζόμεν...

...πολλάκις δὲ καὶ **τὴν αὐτὴν Ἀμφοτέρα** κέκτηται μὲν αἰτίαν – καὶ μὴ συνεπεσπασμένα Ἔτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων – μηδὲ συνεπισπώμενα καὶ βιαζόμενα παρὰ τε χρόνους: Πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων συμπίπτειν καὶ ἡλικίας καὶ ἄλλας αἰτίας... ...ὅθεν καὶ τὸ τοῦ τέλους αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγισμα. εἶχε μὲν καὶ ^[1] ἡ Ἀρχὴ – τὴν αἰτίαν – Εἴχομεν δὲ καὶ ^[2] Ἡμεῖς

...often, Both things possess the same cause [of movement] – and with Different [movements] not having been drawn on together by other [movements] – nor being drawn on together and being forced overtime: [it is necessary to demonstrate that] Many of these types of [actions] are SYMPTOMATIC of [people's] ages and other causes [i.e., not a NECESSARY PROPERTY of their ages or other causes]... ...from where also [we have] an inductive consideration regarding [our] fulfillment. ^[1] THE FOUNDATION [from natural necessity] had – and ^[2] WE OURSELVES also had – a cause [of initiating movement]

ἥν δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν Ἐπαίσθησις: τοῦ εἰ μὴ Ληψόμεθα τίς ὁ Κανὼν καὶ τὸ Ἐπικρεῖνον πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶν δοξῶν περαινόμενα, ἀλλ' Ἀκολουθήσομεν ἀλόγως ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν φοραῖς – οἰχῆσεται Πάντα καθ' ἃ διερευνώμεθ' αὖτις, καὶ Ὑπεροχὴ...

but this is our focused Sensation: for if We will not comprehend [for ourselves] what the Rule [i.e., the Canon] is and what Discriminates all things that are accomplished through [our] judgments, but We will unreasonably follow along with the transmissions of the public [thought] – [then] EVERYTHING by which we investigate ANYTHING will be gone. and Excellence...

...τὸ δ' Αὐτὸ καὶ αἰδῖον ἐγεννήθη – καὶ σπέρμα ἦν τι. ὥσπερ Ληρῶ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀγωγόν, παρόντος δὲ τούτου, Νοοῦμεν ἢ Δοξάζομεν...

...and the Same [?] was generated also as eternal – and it was a certain seed. as though I am being foolish, [while] leading from the beginning towards something different – but with this [situation actually] being present, We conceive or judge...

πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ many times
τὰ ἀμφοτέρα	both things	ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΑ both of the two
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ acquire
ἡ αἰτία αἰ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ blame
ἐπισπᾶν	to draw to	ΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ pulling upon

συνεπισπᾶν	to draw on together	ΣΥΝΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ <i>dragging upon together</i>
συνεπεσπασμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been drawn on together	
συνεπισπώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being drawn on together	
βιαζόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being forced	ΒΙΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>violence</i>
ὁ χρόνος οἱ χρόνοι	time	<i>[unknown]</i>
παρά χρόνους	overtime?	
τοιούτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
τὸ σύμπτωμα τὰ συμπτώματα	<i>[temporary for its compound]</i> symptom <i>(separable quality)</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
συμπίπτειν	to be symptomatic	ΣΥΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling together</i>
ἡ ἡλικία αἱ ἡλικίαι	age <i>(stage of life)</i>	ἩΛΙΚΙΑ <i>comrade</i>
τὸ τέλος τὰ τέλη	fulfillment	ΤΕΛΟΣ <i>goal</i>
ἐπιλογιστέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	out to be inductively considered	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be action upon reasoning</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	<i>[process of]</i> inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>
τὸ ἐπιλόγισμα τὰ ἐπιλογίσματα	an inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of reasoning action upon</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
Part 2		
ἡ ἐπαίσθησις αἱ ἐπαίσθησεις	focused sensation	ΕΠΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>upon perceiving</i>
λήψεσθαι	to be comprehended <i>[in the future]</i>	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ <i>taking hold</i>
ὁ κανὼν οἱ κανόνες	rule <i>(measure of truth)</i>	ΚΑΝΩΝ <i>measuring rod</i>
ἡ κρίσις αἱ κρίσεις	separating	ΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating</i>
ἐπικρίνειν	to discriminate	ΕΠΙΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ <i>separating upon</i>
ἐπικρεῖνων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	discriminating	ΕΠΙΚΡΕΙΝΩΝ <i>separating upon</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
περαίνειν	to accomplish	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extremity</i>
περαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being accomplished	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>extremity</i>
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow <i>[along with]</i>	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
ἄλόγως	unreasonably	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>
ἡ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying</i>
οἷχεσθαι	to be gone	ΟΙΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>having departed</i>

ἡ ἔρευνα αἱ ἔρευναι	search	ΕΡΕΥΝΑ <i>searching</i>
διερευνᾶν	to investigate	ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΑΝ <i>searching through</i>
ἡ ὑπεροχή αἱ ὑπεροχαί	excellence	ὙΠΕΡΟΧΗ <i>holding above</i>
Part 3		
αἰώνιος <i>(αἰωνιά, αἰώνιον)</i>	perpetual <i>(moving, multiple)</i>	ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ <i>characterized by being forever</i>
αἰῖδιος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	eternal <i>(static, singular)</i>	Αἰῖδιος <i>characterized by forever [heavenly]</i>
ἐγγεννᾶν	to generate in	ΕΓΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating in</i>
γεννᾶν	to generate	ΓΕΝΝΑΝ <i>generating</i>
ἐγεννήθη	it was generated [already]	ΕΓΕΝΝΗΘΗ <i>generated</i>
τὸ σπέρμα τὰ σπέρματα	seed	ΣΠΕΡΜΑ <i>seed</i>
ὁ λῆρος οἱ λῆροι	trifle	ΛΗΡΟΣ <i>trash / trifle</i>
ληρεῖν	to be foolish	ΛΗΡΕΙΝ <i>trash / trifle</i>
ἐξ ἀρχῆς	from the beginning	
ἀγωγός <i>(ός, όν)</i>	leading	ΑΓΩΓΟΣ <i>going</i>
παρών <i>(παρουσα, παρόν)</i>	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ <i>to be beside</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>

25.44 Autonomy

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 123

...πολὺ δ[ἐ] αὐ[τ]ὸ ἐστιμὲν ὃ [ο]υνε[ρ]γούσης τῆς φύσεω[ς], ἔστι δ' [ὃ] οὐ συνε[ρ]γο[ύση]ς, [ἐ]στ[ι] δ' ὃ κατακ[οο]μουμένης ὑφ' ἡμῶν. ἔστι δ[ἐ] καὶ αὐτῆς προηγουμένης Τι...

...πολὺ δὲ Αὐτὸ: ^[1] ἐστὶν μὲν Ὁ συνεργούσης τῆς φύσεως, ^[2] ἔστι δ' Ὁ οὐ συνεργούσης, ^[3] ἔστι δ' Ὁ κατακοσμουμένης ὑφ' ἡμῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς προηγουμένης Τι...

...This [*i.e., multiple causes of motion*] is significant: [*there is*] indeed, ^[1] That which exists with nature contributing [*movement by necessity*]; but [*also*] ^[2] That which exists with [*nature*] not contributing [*movement by necessity*], and ^[3] That which exists with arrangement by us. [*the fact that*] Something exists with it also proceeding on its own...

συνεργεῖν	to contribute	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΕΙΝ <i>work together</i>
συνεργῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	contributing	ΣΥΝΕΡΓΩΝ <i>work together</i>
μετακοσμεῖν	to rearrange	ΜΕΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ <i>change order</i>
κατακοσμεῖν	to arrange	ΚΑΤΑΚΟΣΜΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly order</i>
κατακοσμούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being arranged	

προηγ εῖσθαι	to proceed	ΠΡΟΗΓ ΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>leading before</i>
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*It is important to understand the distinction between **the primary causes of movement**, be it ^[1] **from automated necessity** or ^[2] **from the swerve**, and **the emergent cause of movement**, ^[3] **from our own initiation**.*

25.45 Leadership towards Improvement

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 124

...ἐπαυξόμενον ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπεισιόντα τὰς καθηγεμονίας[**ς** **εἰ**]**ς** τὸ βέλτιον, [**ο**]ὐ μόνον τὰς συ[**να**]**χ**[**ο**]λουθήσεις λ[**α**]μβάνοντα. εἰ δὲ καὶ... ἡσυχίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ θαυμασμὸν [**ι**]σχυρῶς

...ἐπαυξόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπεισιόντα τὰς καθηγεμονίας εἰς τὸ βέλτιον – οὐ μόνον τὰς συνακολουθήσεις λαμβάνοντα. εἰ δὲ καὶ...

...further increasing, but also **leaderships** toward the better, through what is entering in **from the surrounding** – not merely comprehending **consequences**. and if also...

...Ἡσυχίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ θαυμασμὸν ἰσχυρόν...

...Silence from the beginning and strongly toward marveling...

αὐξ άνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞ ΑΝΕΙΝ <i>increasing</i>
ἐπαυξ όμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being further increased	ΕΠΑΥΞ ΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>upon / further increasing</i>
ἐπαυξ άνειν	to further increase	ΕΠΑΥΞ ΑΝΕΙΝ <i>growing upon</i>
περιέχ ων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧ ΩΝ <i>holding around</i>
ἐπεισι έναι	to enter in	ΕΠΕΙΣΙ ΕΝΑΙ <i>going upon into</i>
ἐπεισι ών	entering in	ΕΠΕΙΣΙ ΩΝ <i>going upon into</i>
ὁ ἡγεμ ών οἱ ἡγεμ όνες	guide	ἮΓΕΜ ΩΝ <i>leading</i>
ἡ ἡγεμ ονία αἱ ἡγεμ ονίαι	guidance	ἮΓΕΜ ΟΝΙΑ <i>quality of leading</i>
ὁ καθηγεμ ών οἱ καθηγεμ όνες	leader	ΚΑΘΗΓΕΜ ΩΝ <i>thoroughly leading</i>
ἡ καθηγεμ ονία αἱ καθηγεμ ονίαι	leadership	ΚΑΘΗΓΕΜ ΟΝΙΑ <i>quality of thoroughly leading</i>
βελτί ων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙ ΩΝ
βέλ τιον	in a better way	
συμπαρ ακολουθ <u>ῶ</u> ν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	following along together	ΣΥΜΠΑΡΑΚΟΛΟΥΘ ΩΝ <i>following alongside together</i>
ἡ συνακολουθ ήσεις αἱ συνακολουθ ήσεις	consequences	ΣΥΝΑΚΟΛΟΥΘ ΗΣΙΣ <i>following together</i>
λαμβάν ειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑ ΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
ἡ ἡσυχ ία αἱ ἡσυχ ίαι	silence	ἮΣΥΧΙΑ <i>stillness</i>
ἐξ ἀρχ ῆς	from the beginning	
θαυμά ζειν	to marvel	ΘΑΥΜΑΖ ΕΙΝ

ὁ θαυμασμός οἱ θαυμασμοί	marveling	ΘΑΥΜΑΣΜΟΣ <i>wondering / marveling</i>
ἰσχυρός (ἄ, ὄν)	prevails	ΙΣΧΥΡΟΣ <i>strength</i>
ἰσχυρόν	strongly	

25.46 The Canon, Increasing Agency

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 27 (fr. B 49)

...{κα[ι vo]ήσεων κα[ι ἐ]πινοημ[ά]των καὶ φαντασμάτων καὶ τῆς αἰωνίας κ[ατ]ᾶ ψυχὴν ὀχλή[σ]εως ἢ εὐδαιμονίας ἢ μ[ὴ] αἰωνίας τὴν α[ιτ]ίαν τοῦ θηρεύειν τὴν ἀρχὴν κ[α]ὶ κανόνα καὶ κριτήριον [καί] κατ[ᾶ] μικρόν. ταῦτά τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν επιλογισμὸν τοῦ κριτηρίου ἦγεν κα[ὶ ἐκ το]ῦ κριτηρίου... ...εἰς τὴ[ν κατὰ μικρόν] ὥνπερ [ἐ]ν[πρ]ο[σθ]εν εἶπ[α δ]ιερεῦν[ησι]ν. ἀλλήλοις γὰρ [τα]ῦτα [τῇ]ν [αἰτίαν κ]αὶ χρε[ί]αν παρ[είχ]ετο κα[ὶ] ἐ[ναλλὰ]ξ ἐκάτερο[ν παρ]ε[ν]τ[ι]τον ἐπ[εσπ]άσατο εὐθύς τὸ ἔτερον ἐπινόη[μα] κατὰ μ[ικρὸν] πρῶτ[ον ἐν]γει[νόμ]ε[νον] καὶ ταχέω[ς ἐκ]ρέον, εἴτ[α μᾶλλ]ο[ν] κ[α]ταν[ο]ο[ύ]μεν[ον] τ[ᾶ μὲν] διὰ τὴν [φυσικὴ]ν αἰ[τί]αν τῆς ἐπαυξήσεως κ[αὶ] τῆς ἀπαλλά[ξ]...

{added to fragment A 57 below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 125

...σατο εὐθύς τὸ ἔτερον ἐπινόημα, κατὰ μικρόν πρῶτον ἐγγιγνόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον, εἴτα [μᾶλ]λομ[α] μᾶλ[λο]ν κατα[νοο]ύμε[νον], τὰ μὲν διὰ [τῇ]ν φυσικὴν αἰτίαν τῆς [αὐξ]ήσεως καὶ ἀπαλλά[ξε]ως *πλαδαρ*ότητος, τ[ᾶ δέ]...

{expanded fragment A 57 below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 col. 4 (fr. A 57)

.....{κα[ι vo]ήσεων κα[ι ἐ]πινοημ[ά]των καὶ φαντασμάτων καὶ τῆς αἰωνίας κ[ατ]ᾶ ψυχὴν ὀχλή[σ]εως ἢ εὐδαιμονίας ἢ μ[ὴ] αἰωνίας τὴν α[ιτ]ίαν τοῦ θηρεύειν τὴν ἀρχὴν κ[α]ὶ κανόνα καὶ κριτήριον [καί] κατ[ᾶ] μικρόν. ταῦτά τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν επιλογισμὸν τοῦ κριτηρίου ἦγεν κα[ὶ ἐκ το]ῦ κριτηρίου... ...εἰς τὴ[ν κατὰ μικρόν] ὥνπερ [ἐ]ν[πρ]οσθεν εἶπα: διερεύνη[σι]ν. ἄ[λλ]ήλοις γὰρ ταῦτα τὴν αἰ[τί]αν [κ]αὶ χρεῖαν παρείχετο καὶ ἐνα[λλ]ᾶ[ξ ἐκ]άτερον παρεμπεῖπτον ἐπεσπ[άσατο] εὐθύς τὸ ἔτερον ἐπινόημα, κατὰ μεικρόν πρῶτον ἐγγεινόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον, εἴτα μᾶλλ[ο]ν μᾶλλον κατανοούμενον, τὰ μ[ὲν] διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν αἰτ[ί]αν τῆς ἐπαυ[ξή]σ[εω]ς κα[ὶ] ἀπαλ[λ]ᾶ[ξε]ως πλαδαρότητος, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν γεινομένην[ν] καί...

...καὶ νοήσεων, καὶ ἐπινοημάτων, καὶ φαντασμάτων, καὶ τῆς αἰωνίας κατὰ ψυχὴν ὀχλήσεως ἢ εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ μὴ αἰωνίας: τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ θηρεύειν τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ κανόνα, καὶ κριτήριον, κατὰ μικρόν. Ταῦτά τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν τοῦ κριτηρίου ἦγεν: καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κριτηρίου... ...εἰς τὴν κατὰ μικρόν, ὥνπερ ἔνπροσθεν Εἶπα, διερεύνησιν

...and of concepts, and of objective conceptions, and of mental images, and of the perpetual disturbance or wellbeing of the soul, or of the non-perpetual [*disturbance or wellbeing of the soul: through these mental movements we have*] the cause of pursuing the foundation, and the rule [*i.e. the canon*], and the standard [*i.e. the criterion*], little by little. for These [*mental movements*] led into [*our process of*] inductive consideration of the standard: and out of the standard [*we measure truth*]... ...into the investigation, little by little, of which I previously spoke precisely

[Sedley] "step by step to seek the starting-point and yardstick and criterion, for these led men to make an empirical calculation of the criterion, and from the criterion methods of empirical calculation were themselves learnt."

ἀλλήλοις γὰρ Ταῦτα ^[1] τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ ^[2] χρεῖαν παρείχετο. καὶ ἐναλλάξ Ἐκάτερον, *παρεμπεῖπτον*, ἐπεσπάσατο εὐθύς τὸ ἔτερον ἐπινόημα: κατὰ μεικρόν πρῶτον ἐγγεινόμενον καὶ ταχέως ἐκρέον – εἴτα μᾶλλον μᾶλλον κατανοούμενον, Τὰ μὲν διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐπαυξήσεως καὶ ἀπαλλάξεως πλαδαρότητος, Τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν γεινομένην...

for These [*actions of thinking, conceiving, and focusing*] yielded to one another ^[1] the cause [*of our movement*] and ^[2] the use [*of our movement*]. and alternatively Each, intertwined, directly draws toward the other objective conception: being introduced at first little by little and quickly flowing out – then while they [*i.e., the cause and the use of our movement*] are more and more fully conceived, Some through the natural cause of further increasing [*the use of their agency*] and [*through*] the removal of sluggishness, and Others through what was being generated from us...

ή κατανόη σις αί κατανοή σεις	full conception	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>thoroughly seeing</i>
ή προσκατανόη σις αί προσκατανοή σεις	additional full conception	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>addition to thoroughly seeing</i>
ή νόη σις αί νοή σεις	concept	ΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ ἐπινόη μα τὰ ἐπινοή ματα	[objective] conception	ΕΠΙΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing upon</i>
τὸ φάντασ μα τὰ φαντάσ ματα	mental image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΑ <i>result of appearing</i>
ἄϊδι ος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	eternal <i>(static, singular)</i>	ΑἸΔΙΟΣ <i>characterized by forever [heavenly]</i>
αἰώνι ος <i>(αἰωνίᾱ, αἰώνιον)</i>	perpetual <i>(moving, multiple)</i>	ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ <i>characterized by being forever</i>
ή ψυχή αί ψυχαί	soul	ΨΥΧΗ <i>blowing</i>
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ <i>crowd of people</i>
τό ὄχλη μα τά ὀχλή ματα	[cause of] disturbance	ΟΧΛΗΜΑ <i>result of a crowd of people</i>
ή ὀχλη σις αἱ ὀχλή σεις	[feeling of] disturbance	ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ <i>process of a crowd of people</i>
ή εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ <i>good spirit</i>
ή αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
ὁ θηρευ τής	hunter	
θηρεύ ειν	to pursue	ΘΗΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>hunting</i>
ή ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ὁ κανών οἱ κανόνες	rule <i>(measure of truth)</i>	ΚΑΝΩΝ <i>measuring rod</i>
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
μικρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	small	ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
κατὰ μικρόν κατὰ μεικρόν	little by little	
ή ἐπιλόγι σις αἱ ἐπιλογί σεις	[faculty of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ <i>collecting (reasoning) action upon</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισ μός οἱ ἐπιλογισ μοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>
ὧνπερ	of which precisely	
προσθεν	earlier / before	ΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ <i>before</i>
τοὔ μ προσθεν τᾶ μ προσθεν	what is ahead	ΤΟΥΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ = ΤΟ ΕΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ <i>in before</i>
ἐν προσθεν	previously	ΕΝΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ <i>in before</i>
ή ἔρευ να αἱ ἔρευ ναι	search	ΕΡΕΥΝΑ <i>searching</i>
ή διερεύν ησις αἱ διερευ νήσεις	investigation	ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΗΣΙΣ <i>searching through</i>

Part 2		
<i>[no nominative]</i> ἀλλήλων	of one another	ἈΛΛΗΛΩΝ <i>each other</i>
ἡ χρεία αἱ χρειᾶι	use	ΧΡΕΙΑ <i>necessary</i>
παρέχειν	to yield	ΠΑΡΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold beside</i>
ἐναλλάξ	alternatively	ΕΝΑΛΛΑΞ <i>in other</i>
ἐκάτερος <i>(ἐκατέρω, ἐκάτερον)</i>	each one	ἙΚΑΤΕΡΟΣ
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
παρεμπίπτειν	to intertwine	ΠΑΡΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>beside in falling</i>
ἐπισπᾶν	to draws toward	ΕΠΙΣΠΑΝ <i>pulling upon</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	ΝΟΗΜΑ <i>seeing</i>
τὸ ἐννόημα τὰ ἐννοήματα	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing within</i>
τὸ ἐπιλόγισμα τὰ ἐπιλογίσματα	an inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of reasoning action upon</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	<i>[objective]</i> concept	ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing upon</i>
τὸ ἐπινόημα τὰ ἐπινοήματα	<i>[objective]</i> conception	ΕΠΙΝΟΗΜΑ <i>result of seeing upon</i>
μικρός = μικρός <i>(ἄ, ὄν)</i>	small	ΜΕΙΚΡΟΣ ΜΙΚΡΟΣ <i>little</i>
μικρόν μικρόν	a little bit	
πρῶτος <i>(η, ον)</i>	primary	ΠΡΩΤΟΣ <i>first</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἐγγίνεσθαι	to be introduced	ΕΓΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being in</i>
ἐγγεινόμενος	being introduced	ΕΓΓΕΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>come into being in</i>
ταχέως	quickly	ΤΑΧΕΩΣ <i>quickly</i>
ἐκρέειν	to flow out	ΕΚΡΕΕΙΝ <i>flowing out</i>
ἐκρέων	flowing out	ΕΚΡΕΩΝ <i>flowing out</i>
εἴτα	next	ΕΙΤΑ <i>hereafter</i>
μᾶλλον	more	ΜΑΛΛΟΝ <i>very</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
κατανοούμενος	fully conceived	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
φυσικός <i>(ῆ, ὄν)</i>	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ <i>producing</i>
αὐξάνειν	to increase	ΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ <i>increasing</i>

ἐπαυξάνειν	to further increase	ΕΠΑΥΞΑΝΕΙΝ <i>growing upon</i>
ἡ ἐπαύξεις αἱ ἐπαυξήσεις	further increasing	ΕΠΑΥΞΗΣΙΣ <i>process of growing upon</i>
ἀπαλλάσσειν	to remove away	ΑΠΑΛΛΑΣΣΕΙΝ <i>other away</i>
ἀπαλλαγῆσθαι	to remove away [in the future]	
ἡ ἀλλαγὴ αἱ ἀλλαγαί	change	ΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>other</i>
ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ αἱ ἀπαλλαγαί	removal	ΑΠΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>other away</i>
ἡ πλαδαρότης αἱ πλαδαρότητες	sluggishness	ΠΛΑΔΑΡΟΤΗΣ <i>flabby</i>

*The criterion is both the product and the starting point of empirical reasoning. The establishment of the **τό κριτήριον** as (1) **αἱ αἰσθήσεις**, (2) **αἱ πάθαι**, (3) **αἱ προλήψεις** is an empirical process. Only because we have empirically learned that the senses are reliable do we have a firm basis for making further empirical discoveries.*

25.47 Experiential Certainty

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1191 fr. 126

...ων **τῶν τε** δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ περιέχον, ὥστε ἀποδέδοται **καὶ ὁ** παθολ[ο]γικὸς τρόπος **καὶ ὁ** αἰτιολογικὸς, ὧν] ἐξ ἀρχῆς π[ρ]οεθέμε[θα. **κα]**τέχεται γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα ὅσα ποτὲ κατέχεται τῶν **[κα]**τὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας...

{slightly expanded fragment below}

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 col. 28 (fr. B 50)

...[έ]κ **[δὲ τε]**ούτων **[τε]**ῶν αἰτιῶν... τάνουσαι καὶ κ[ι]νήσεων **[τ]**ῶν τε δι' ἡμᾶς **[κ]α[ὶ τῶν δ]**ιὰ τὴν φύσιν κα[ὶ] **[τὸ]** πε[ρ]ιέχον. **[ὥσ]**τε ἀποδέδοτα**[ι κα]**ὶ ὁ παθολ[ο]γικὸς τρόπος καὶ ὁ αἰτιολογικός, ὧν ἐξ ἀρχῇ**[ς]** προεθέμεθα. κατέχετ**[α]** **[ι γὰρ ἤ]**δη ταῦτα ὅσα ποτὲ κατέχ**[ε]**τα**[ι τῶν]** κατὰ **[τὰ]**ς ἐπ[ισ]τ[ή]μα[ς]...

...ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν αἰτιῶν... ...τάνουσαι καὶ κινήσεων τῶν τε δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ περιέχον. ὥστε ἀποδέδοται καὶ ^[1] ὁ παθολογικὸς Τρόπος καὶ ^[2] ὁ αἰτιολογικός, ὧν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Προεθέμεθα. κατέχεται γὰρ ἤδη Ταῦτα – ὅσα ποτε κατέχεται τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας...

...and from these causes... extending out from these movements, both those [movements] from us and those [movements] from nature and the surrounding [environment]. therefore, both ^[1] the Way [of thinking] relating to the study of [sensed] experiences and ^[2] the [way of thinking] relating to the study of the causes [of movement] have been demonstrated, which We proposed from the beginning. for These things are already firmly held – as far as anything is ever firmly held regarding the ways of understanding...

ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
συντείνειν	to also contribute	ΣΥΝΤΕΙΝΕΙΝ <i>stretching together</i>
τείνων <i>(τείνουσα, τεῖνον)</i>	extending	ΤΕΙΝΩΝ <i>stretching</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
περιέχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	surrounding	ΠΕΡΙΕΧΩΝ <i>holding around</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
τὸ πάθος τὰ πάθη	^[n] experience <i>(feeling)</i>	ΠΑΘΟΣ <i>enduring</i>

λογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	rational	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of reasoning</i>
παθολογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	relating to the study of experiences	ΠΑΘΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of reasoning about enduring / feeling</i>
ό τρόπος οί τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
αίτιολογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	relating to the study of causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of reasoning about blame / cause</i>
έξ άρχής	from the beginning	
προστιθέναι	to put into	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing toward</i>
προτιθέναι	to propose	ΠΡΟΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing before</i>
κατέχειν	to firmly hold	ΚΑΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly holding</i>
ή έπιστήμη αί έπιστήμαι	understanding	ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ <i>standing upon</i>

Επίκουρος informs us in this summary that he has structured his explanation in two approaches:

One focusing on sensation and feeling – i.e., the "the way [of thinking] relating to the study of experiences" (παθολογικός τρόπος) and the other approach focusing on natural causes – i.e., the "the way [of thinking] relating to the study of causes" (the αίτιολογικός τρόπος)

25.48 Subscriptio

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 697 subscriptio (subscriptio A 59)

Έπικο[ύρου Περί] Φύσεω[ς.. ΚΕ]

Έπικούρου Περί Φύσεως, ΚΕ

Επίκουρος' On Nature, Book 25

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 25, P.Herc. 1056 subscriptio (B)

Έπικούρου Περί Φ[ύ]σεως Κ[Ε]

Έπικούρου Περί Φύσεως ΚΕ

Επίκουρος' On Nature, Book 25

[Book 26]

[Book 27]

Book 28

KNOWLEDGE LIST

γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ <i>having known process</i>
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γινῶσκων (ουσα, ον)	knowing	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΩΝ <i>having known</i>
γνωστός (ή, όν)	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ <i>knowing</i>
ή γνῶσις αί γνώσεις	knowledge	ΓΝΩΣΙΣ <i>knowing</i>
άγνοεῖν	to not know	ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ <i>not knowing</i>
γνωρίζειν	to acknowledge	ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>knowing</i> <i>[transformation]</i>
γνωρίζων (ουσα, ον)	acknowledging	

COMPREHENSION LIST

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
λαμβάνειν τήν ιδέαν	<i>"to comprehend an idea"</i>	<i>Epíkouros</i> <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 28</i> <i>P.Herc. 1417, fr. H (col. 2a)</i>
λαμβανόμενος (η, ον)	comprehended	ΛΑΜΒΑΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasping</i>
Πᾶν [B'δ'] κατ' ἐπιβολήν {δ} λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ (α) ἀληθές ἐστι	<i>"Everything</i> {δ} <i>comprehended</i> [B'δ'] <i>through our attention</i> <i>to mental perception</i> <i>is (α) true"</i>	<i>Epíkouros</i> <i>Letter to Hēródotos</i> <i>Laértios 10.62b</i>
λαμβάνων (ουσα, ον)	comprehending	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΩΝ <i>grasping</i>
τοῦ τέλους μνήμην λαμβάνον	<i>"comprehending the memory of fulfillment"</i>	<i>Epíkouros</i> <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</i> <i>P.Herc. 1056 col. 12 (fr. B 34)</i>
λαβεῖν	to comprehend [already]	ΛΑΒΕΙΝ <i>grasped</i>
᾽Εστι μίαν λαβεῖν φοράν τήν ἄνω... καί μίαν τήν κάτω	<i>"It is possible to comprehend one transmission that is above... and one that is below"</i>	<i>Epíkouros</i> <i>Letter to Hēródotos</i> <i>Laértios 10.60b</i>
τὸ λαμβανόμενον τὰ λαμβανόμενα	what is comprehended	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>grasping</i>
ή λῆψις αί λῆψεις	* <i>comprehension</i>	ΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold</i>
λήψεσθαι	to comprehend for oneself [in the future]	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ <i>taking hold</i>
Ληψόμεθα τίς ὁ κανὼν	* <i>"We will comprehend what the rule is"</i>	<i>Epíkouros</i> <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</i> <i>P.Herc. 1191 fr. 121/122</i>
ληπτέος (α, ον)	ought to be comprehended	ΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ <i>taking hold</i>
ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου Ληπτέον φοράν τινα	<i>"It is necessary to comprehend some transmission from an original source"</i>	<i>Epíkouros</i> <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 11</i> <i>P.Herc. 1042 col. 9 (column 41)</i>
εἰλημμένος (η, ον)	[intellectually] having been comprehended, [generally] having been acquired	ΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasped</i>

Φεύγεις τὸν βίον ὕπὸ τῶν πολλῶν εἰλημμένον	<i>"You flee the lifestyle acquired by the public"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 28</i> <i>P.Herc. 1479, fr. L (col. 5)</i>
ἀπολαμβάνειν	to partially comprehend	ΑΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping away</i>
ἀπειληφέναι	to have partially comprehended	ΑΠΕΙΛΗΦΕΝΑΙ <i>grasped away</i>
ἡ ὑπὲρ τούτων Χρεία ἀκρίβειαν ἀπειληφέναι	<i>"[our] use regarding these things has partially comprehended precision"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Letter to Hēródotos</i> <i>Laértios 10.80b</i>
διαλαμβάνειν	to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping separation</i>
ἀμφοτέρα διαλαμβάνεται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ Συμπτώματα	<i>"both Symptoms concerning the soul are distinguished"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Letter to Hēródotos</i> <i>Laértios 10.67b</i>
διαλήψεσθαί	going to distinguish	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ <i>taking hold separation</i>
Οἰηθῶμεν διαλήψεσθαί τι	<i>"We suspected we were going to distinguish something"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Letter to Hēródotos</i> <i>Laértios 10.58b</i>
ἡ διάληψις αἱ διαλήψεις	differentiation	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold separation</i>
διάληψιν δὲ μερῶν	<i>"differentiation of parts"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Letter to Hēródotos</i> <i>Laértios 10.58a</i>
ἡ ἀδιαληψία αἱ ἀδιαληψίαι	indiscrimination	ΑΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΑ <i>not taking hold separation</i>
ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἀδιαληψία	<i>"the indiscrimination of words vs. [practical] situations"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 28</i> <i>P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 2 inf.)</i>
διαληπτικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	[mentally] distinguishing	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of taking hold between</i>
λαμβάνειν τινὰ ἐτερότητα τῶν ἀτόμων κατά τινα τρόπον διαληπτικόν	<i>"to comprehend a certain difference of the atoms in a certain [mentally] distinguishing way"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</i> <i>P.Herc. 1056 fr. 5.3 (B 39)</i>
διειλημμένος	having been distinguished	ΔΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>grasped through</i>
ὁ διειλημμένος ἡμῖν Χρόνος	<i>"the time that has been distinguished by us"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10</i> <i>P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 47</i>
εὐλαβούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	carefully comprehending	ΕΥΛΑΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>properly grasped</i>
οὐκ εὐλαβούμενος τοῦτο	<i>"not carefully comprehending this"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Peri Phýseōs, Book 28</i> <i>P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 10 sup.)</i>
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly grasping</i>
καταλαβεῖν	to thoroughly comprehend [already]	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ
καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ	<i>"to thoroughly comprehend with the mind"</i>	Epíkouros <i>Letter to Hēródotos</i> <i>Laértios 10.78b</i>
ἡ κατάληψις αἱ καταλήψεις	<i>*thorough comprehension</i>	ΚΑΤΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>thoroughly taking hold</i>
μεταληπτός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	substitutable	ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>taken hold change</i>

<div>μεταληπτέος</div> <div>(α, ον)</div>	ought to be substituted	<div>ΜΕΤΑΛΗΠΤΕΟΣ</div> <div>change ought to be taken hold</div>
μεταληπτέον	it is necessary to substitute	
οὔτε διαλέκτους ὥς βελτίους Μεταληπτέον	"Nor is it necessary to substitute ways of speaking as [though they are] better	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Letter to Hēródotos</div> <div>Laértios 10.72b</div>
<div>περιλαμβάνειν</div>	<div>[intellectually]</div> <div>to completely comprehend,</div> <div>[generally]</div> <div>to encompass</div>	<div>ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ</div> <div>grasping around</div>
<div>τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον</div> <div>τὰ περιλαμβανόμενα</div>	<div>[intellectually]</div> <div>what is completely comprehended,</div> <div>[generally]</div> <div>what is completely encompassed</div>	<div>ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ</div> <div>grasping around</div>
<div>τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον</div> <div>ὕπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου</div>	"what is completely comprehended [directly] from the original source"	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Peri Phýseōs Book 11</div> <div>P.Herc. 1042 col. 8 (column 40)</div>
<div>συμπεριλαμβανόμενος</div> <div>(η, ον)</div>	completely comprehended together	<div>ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ</div> <div>grasping around together</div>
τὸ συμπεριλαμβανόμενον	what is completely comprehended together	ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ
<div>τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ τῆς καταφορᾶς</div> <div>συμπεριλαμβανόμενον</div>	"what is completely comprehended together from a descent into [our] reasoning"	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Peri Phýseōs, Book 15</div> <div>P.Herc. 1151 fr. 26</div>
<div>ἡ περίληψις</div> <div>αἱ περιλήψεις</div>	complete comprehension	<div>ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ</div> <div>taking hold around</div>
ταῖς περιλήψεσι τῶν ἀθρόων	"in [our] complete comprehension of what is aggregated"	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Letter to Hēródotos</div> <div>Laértios 10.56b</div>
<div>τὸ περιληπτόν</div> <div>τὰ περιληπτά</div>	what is completely comprehensible	<div>ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΝ</div> <div>taken hold around</div>
<div>ἐπινοεῖν ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς</div>	"to objectively conceive analogously to what is completely comprehensible"	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Letter to Hēródotos</div> <div>Laértios 10.40b</div>
<div>τὸ περιειλημμένον</div> <div>τὰ περιειλημμένα</div>	what has been completely comprehended	<div>ΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ</div> <div>result of being grasped around</div>
<div>τὰ αὐτῶν σχημάτων περιειλημμένα</div>	"what has been completely comprehended about their [atomic] shapes"	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Letter to Hēródotos</div> <div>Laértios 10.42b</div>
<div>περιληπτῶς</div>	with complete comprehension	<div>ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ</div> <div>taken hold around</div>
ἐπινοεῖν περιληπτῶς	"to objectively conceive with complete comprehension"	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Letter to Hēródotos</div> <div>Laértios 10.40b</div>
<div>περιληπτός</div> <div>(ή, όν)</div>	completely comprehensible	<div>ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ</div> <div>taken hold around</div>
τό μήκος περιληπτόν	"a completely comprehensible length"	<div>Epíkouros</div> <div>Letter to Hēródotos</div> <div>Laértios 10.46b</div>
<div>περιληπτικός</div> <div>(ή, όν)</div>	relating to what is completely comprehensible	<div>ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ</div> <div>characteristic of being taken hold around</div>

τῶν ἐν περιληπτικῷ τρόπῳ διανοήσεων	"...of mental perceptions in a way relating to what is completely comprehensible..."	Epikouros Peri Phýseōs, Book 28 P.Herc. 1417, fr.5 (col.2)
περιληπτικῶς	in a completely comprehensible way	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΩΣ characteristic of being taken hold around
πολλοῖς ἂν Δόξειε... περιληπτικῶς...	* "it might have seemed to many in a completely comprehensible way..."	Epikouros Peri Phýseōs, Book 28 P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 6 inf.)
ἀπεριλήπτως	without complete comprehension	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ not taken hold around
ἀπεριλήπτως Προσδοξάζουσιν	"They add judgment without complete comprehension"	Epikouros Peri Phýseōs Book 25 P.Herc. 1056 col. 8 (fr. B 30)
ἀπερίληπτος (ος, ον)	not completely comprehensible	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ not taken hold around
ἀπεριλήπτοις Προσδοξάζουσιν	"They add judgment to [what is] not completely comprehensible"	idem supra Peri Phýseōs Book 25 P.Herc. 1056 col. 8 (fr. B 30)
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	* to completely comprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ grasping around in
καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἐμπεριλαμβάνων	* "completely comprehending one [idea] after another within"	Epikouros Peri Phýseōs, Book 28 1479, fr. 13 (col. 12 sup. – part 2)
ἐμπεριληπτικός (ή, όν)	* completely comprehensible way within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of being taken hold around in
ὁ ἐμπεριληπτικός τρόπος	* "the completely comprehensible way [of thinking] within"	Epikouros Peri Phýseōs, Book 28 P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 5)
ἐμπεριειλημμένος (η, ον)	* completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ being grasped around in
κατόψεται... ἐμπεριειλημμένα	"to inspect... what is completely comprehended within"	Epikouros Letter to Hēródotos Laértios 10.68a
προλαμβάνειν	to anticipate	ΠΡΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ before grasping
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ before taking hold
ἡ βλεπομένη παρ' ἡμῖν πρόληψις	"the anticipation seen by us"	Epikouros Letter to Hēródotos Laértios 10.72a
εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττειν	"to fit fully into the anticipation"	ΚΔ 37
τοῦ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέροντος ἡ πρόληψις	"the anticipation of benefit in regards to justice"	ΚΔ 37
μὴ ἀρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν	"not fitting the anticipation"	ΚΔ 38
"τοῦ θυμωθήσεσθαι" ἡ πρόληψις	"the anticipation of 'becoming angry'"	Philódēmos On Anger P.Herc. 182, col. 44 fin. – col. 45
κατὰ τὴν κοινοτέραν πρόληψιν	"according to the more common anticipation"	Philódēmos On Anger P.Herc. 182, col. 44 fin. – col. 45

<p>τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότροπον πρόληψιν νοούμενον</p> <p>ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἡ τῆς αἰτίας πρόληψις</p> <p>τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν πρόληψεων γιννόμενον</p> <p>καθάπερ ὀρίζεται Χρόνος εἶναι πρόληψιν</p> <p>"πρόληψιν" – id est, anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem</p>	"What is conceived according to a particular type of anticipation"	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10</p> <p>P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 38</p>
	"the anticipation of the cause on the basis of own [movement]"	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</p> <p>P.Herc. 1191 fr. 110</p>
	"what is produced upon the anticipations [i.e. error]"	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Peri Phýseōs, Book 28</p> <p>P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 3)</p>
	"just as Time is distinguished to exist as an anticipation"	<p>Philódēmos</p> <p>On Piety</p> <p>1.66A.1887</p>
<p>προειληφώς (υῖα, ὅς)</p> <p>μοχθηρί εἰσι Τύποι προειληφότες</p>	<p>anticipated</p> <p>[i.e., prior to active thinking]</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΦΩΣ</p> <p><i>before having grasped</i></p>
	"anticipated Impressions in a wretched [state]"	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</p> <p>P.Herc. 1191 fr. 114</p>
<p>προειλημμένος (η, ον)</p> <p>τὸ προειλημμένον τὰ προειλημμένα</p> <p>τὸ προειλημμένον κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον ὄνομα</p>	<p>having already been anticipated</p>	<p>ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ</p> <p><i>being having grasped before</i></p>
	^[•Λ] what has already been anticipated	<p>ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ</p> <p><i>being having grasped before</i></p>
	"what has already been anticipated according to a particular word"	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Peri Phýseōs, Possibly Book 10</p> <p>P.Herc. 1413/1416 fragment 11</p>
<p>συμμεταλαμβάνειν</p> <p>τὸ μέρος συμμεταλαμβάνει</p>	<p>* to jointly partake in</p>	<p>ΣΥΜΜΕΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ</p> <p><i>grasping change together</i></p>
	[one's soul] jointly partakes in a part [of the motion that surrounds it]	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Peri Phýseōs, Book 25</p> <p>P.Herc. 1634 fr. 2 (A 18)</p>
συλλαμβάνειν	to comprehend together	<p>ΣΥΛΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ</p> <p><i>grasping together</i></p>
συλλαβεῖν	to comprehend together [already]	<p>ΣΥΛΛΑΒΕΙΝ</p> <p><i>grasped together</i></p>
<p>συλλαβών (οὔσα, ὄν)</p> <p>ὁ συλλαβόντες κατὰ τὸ ἄθρόον σῶμα Προσαγορεύομεν</p>	comprehending together [already]	
	* "which we refer to while comprehending together in accordance with the aggregated body"	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.70b</p>
<p>ὑπολαμβάνειν</p> <p>σοφώτερον ὕπελάμβανε τι</p>	to suppose	<p>ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ</p> <p><i>grasping under</i></p>
	"He supposed something [was] wiser"	<p>Epíkouros</p> <p>Peri Phýseōs, Book 28</p> <p>P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 7 inf.)</p>
<p>ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις</p>	supposition	<p>ὙΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ</p> <p><i>taking hold under</i></p>
<p>ἡ ἐναπολήψις αἱ ἐναπολήψεις</p>	integration	<p>ΕΝΑΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ</p> <p><i>taking hold from within</i></p>

ΟΙ ΤΡΟΠΟΙ			
OBJECTIVE [Δ●]			
ὁ ἐπιβλητικὸς τρόπος	the objective way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of being thrown upon	focuses on evidence from sensation
φανταστικῶς	in an image-based way	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΩΣ characteristic of appearance	focuses on appearances
ὁ πραγματικὸς τρόπος	the practical way	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of doing / affair	focuses on immediate surroundings
ὁ νουθετητικὸς τρόπος	the instructive way	ΝΟΥΘΕΤΗΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of setting mind	focuses on correcting a mental error that could turn into a negative practical consequence
ὁ ἐπανορθωτικὸς τρόπος	the corrective way	ΕΠΑΝΟΡΘΩΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of straight upright again upon	focuses on correcting a practical error that has occurred
ὁ παθητὸς τρόπος	the affected way	ΠΑΘΗΤΟΣ experiencing	focuses on how one is affected by external influences
SPECULATIVE [Δ◉]			
θεωρητικῶς	in a speculative way	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ characteristic of [mentally] observing	focuses on conceivability
ὁ διαληπτικὸς τρόπος	the distinguishing way	ΔΙΑΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of taking hold between	focuses distinguishing what is conceivable
περιληπτικῶς	in a completely comprehensible way	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΩΣ characteristic of being taken hold around	focuses on inconceivability
ὁ ἐμπεριληπτικὸς τρόπος	✱ the completely comprehensible way [of thinking] within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of being taken hold around in	focuses on internal inconceivability
ὁ ταπινὸς τρόπος	the humble way	ΤΑΠΙΝΟΣ low	focuses on the opportunity for direct observation
ἀνεπιλογίστως	in a way without inductive consideration	ΑΝΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΣ not reasoning action upon	
LOGICAL [Δ]			
ὁ λογικὸς τρόπος	the rational way	ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ characteristic of reasoning	thinking about conclusions based on given premises or evidence
ὁ ἀντιποιητικὸς τρόπος	the contradictory way	ΑΝΤΙΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of gathering against	thinking about the errors in an argument
ὁ αἰτιολογικὸς τρόπος	the way relating to the study of causes	ΑΙΤΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ characteristic of reasoning about blame / cause	thinking about the causes of movement
ὁ παθολογικὸς τρόπος	the way relating to the study of experiences	ΠΑΘΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ characteristic of reasoning about experience	thinking about our own feelings and experiences

ὁ ἀναλογιστικὸς τρόπος	the analogistic way	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of action of reasoning back/again</i>	thinking about what is beyond perception
ὁ ὁμοιοτικὸς τρόπος	the way by similarity	ὍΜΟΙΟΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being similar</i>	thinking about similarities (of the visible to the non-visible)
ὁ διαφορικὸς τρόπος	the way by difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of carrying apart</i>	thinking on differences (of the visible to the non-visible)
ὁ ἐπιλογιστικὸς τρόπος	the inductive way	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of action of reasoning upon</i>	thinking based on empirical data
ὁ συλλογιστικὸς τρόπος	the inferential way	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of action of reasoning together</i>	thinking about logical deduction and structured argumentation
OTHER			
ὅσδηποτε τρόπος	whichever way	ΟΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ <i>indefinite which</i>	relates to any way of thinking
ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διαστήματος τρόπος	the way [arising] from the same separation	ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ <i>standing between</i>	relates to thinking about ourselves as only atoms and void vs. ourselves as compositions with emergent properties

28.1 Labeling Objects Seen by Comprehension

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 1 (col. 1)

...ἅμα καὶ ὅτι πᾶν... ...[το]ῦτ[ο εἰ] μὴδ' οὕτως [εἴη τις ἐ]γνοῶν, ὥς ἔ[σ]τι τό τε [σ]ωματικὸν καὶ τὸ κενόν...

...ἅμα, καὶ ὅτι Πᾶν... ...**τοῦτο, εἰ μὴδ' οὕτως εἴη, Τ**ις ἐννοῶν, ὥς ἔστι: ^[1] **τό τε Σ**ωματικὸν καὶ ^[2] **τὸ Κενόν...**

...**simultaneously**, and that Everything... ...One internalizes **this**, **even if not in this way**, as both exist: ^[1] What is corporeal and ^[2] the Void...

ἅμα	simultaneously	ἌΜΑ
ἢ ἐννοια αἰ ἐννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing in</i>
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	ΕΝΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing within</i>
ἐννοῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὖν)</i>	internalizing	ΕΝΝΟΩΝ
σωματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	corporeal	ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of body</i>
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. D (col. 1c)

...ὅτι οὐ περιληπτικὴ] ἢ τῶν ἀτόμων γνῶ[σὶς ἐστι]...

...ὅτι **οὐ περιληπτικὴ ἢ τῶν ἀτόμων Γ**νῶσὶς ἐστι...

...[they say] that Knowledge of the atoms does **not relate to what is completely comprehensible**...

περιληπτικός (ή, όν)	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being taken hold around</i>
γνώστος (ή, όν)	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ <i>knowing</i>
ή γνώσις αί γνώσεις	knowledge	ΓΝΩΣΙΣ <i>knowing</i>

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 3 (col. 5b)

...[β]ουλόμε[θά σ]οι... προϊούσης... όμοιότητά τι[να]... [έτ]ερά τινα ώμλη[μένα, έν τ]έ τισι φθόγγοις...

...Βουλόμεθά σοι... ...προιούσης... ...όμοιότητά τινα... ...έτεραί τινα ώμλημένα, έν τέ τισι φθόγγοις...

...We want for you... ...while going forward... ...some similarity... ...some other [similarly] conversed [words], in certain expressions...

βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ <i>wishing</i>
προϊέναι	to go forward	ΠΡΟΪΕΝΑΙ <i>going forward</i>
προϊών (οὔσα, όν)	going forward	ΠΡΟΪΩΝ <i>going forward</i>
ή όμοιότης αί όμοιότητες	similarity	ΎΟΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being similar</i>
όμλεῖν	to converse	ΎΟΜΙΛΕΙΝ <i>keeping company</i>
ώμλημένος (η, ον)	conversed	ΎΟΜΙΛΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>keeping company</i>
ό φθόγγος οί φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>uttering</i>

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 4 (col. 4)

...[πρ]οσηγορευμένον [ϞϞ] ὥι έτερόν το ώμλημένον ὄνομα... ...[τή]ν ταραχήν...

...προσηγορευμένον Ϟ̣̣ έτερόν το ώμλημένον Όνομα... ...τήν ταραχήν...

...the different conversed Word referred to with that [meaning]... ...the disturbance...

προσαγορεύειν	to refer to as	ΠΡΟΣΑΓΟΡΕΥΕΙΝ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
προσηγορευμένος (η, ον)	referred to [as]	ΠΡΟΣΗΓΟΡΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>speaking publicly toward</i>
έτερος (έτέρᾱ, έτερον)	different [other / another]	ΈΤΕΡΟΣ <i>other</i>
ώμλημένος (η, ον)	conversed	ΎΟΜΙΛΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>keeping company</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ό τάραχος = ή ταραχή	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>agitating</i>

Ερίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. E (col. 1)

...ισχ[υρῶς ἤ] οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς δεδ[ίχμεν] τῇμ παραλλαγ[ὴν καθ' ἣν] τοῖς[δε ἐ]χρώμεθα [τοῖς.] σιν· ὅθεν δὲ τὸ καγ[ονικὸμ]
βελτίον ἢ χῖρον ἀγ[ελελογί]σμεθα, πολλαχοῦ [εἰ]ρήται...

...ἰσχυρῶς ἢ οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς, Δεδίχμεν τὴν παραλλαγὴν καθ' ἣν τοῖςδε Ἐχρώμεθα... ...ὅθεν, δὲ τὸ κανονικὸν βελτίον ἢ χῖρον Ἀνελελογίσμεθα – πολλαχοῦ εἴρηται...

...[depending on the issue], We have, firmly or not firmly, divided the variety according to which [classifications] We used these [specific "ways" of thinking]... ...from which, then, We have analogized what is canonical as better or worse [for measuring truth] – as has been stated in many places...

ἰσχύων <i>(ισχύουσα, ἰσχύον)</i>	prevailing	ΙΣΧΥΩΝ <i>strength</i>
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ
ἰσχυρῶς	prevailingly [here, "firmly"]	ΙΣΧΥΡΩΣ
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
διδοῦναι	to give	ΔΙΔΟΥΝΑΙ <i>giving</i>
ἡ παραλλαγή αἱ παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
χρᾶσθαι	<i>[with dative]</i> to use, <i>[with genitive]</i> to desire	ΧΡΑΣΘΑΙ
τὸ κριτήριον τὰ κριτήρια	a standard	ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ <i>little interpreter / small discerner</i>
ὁ κανὼν οἱ κανόνες	rule <i>(measure of truth)</i>	ΚΑΝΩΝ <i>measuring rod</i>
τὸ κανονικόν τά κανονικά	what is canonical	ΚΑΝΟΝΙΚΟΝ <i>characteristic of measuring rod</i>
βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ
ἡ χεὶρ αἱ χεῖρες	hand	ΧΕΙΡ <i>hand</i>
χείρων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	worse	ΧΕΙΡΩΝ <i>[work done by] hand</i>
ἀναλογίζεσθαι	to analogize	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action again</i>
πολλαχοῦ	in many places	ΠΟΛΛΑΧΟΥ <i>many</i>

Ερίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 4 (col. 4)

...ἄξιό[ν τι]νος... ταύτην τὴν [αἰ]τίαν ἐπιλέγομεν. πάν[τε]ς [γ]ὰρ οἱ τρόποι τῶν αἰ-...

...ἄξιόν τινος... ...ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν Ἐπιλέγομεν – πάντες γὰρ οἱ Τρόποι τῶν...

...deserving of something... ...We say in addition that this cause [of mental movement] – for all the Ways [of thinking] of the...

ἄξιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	deserving	ἄξιος <i>counterbalancing</i>
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ <i>blame</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>

ἐπιλέγειν	to say in addition	ΕΠΙΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking in addition</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. H (col. 1a)

...τὰ προειλ[ημμένα]... ...ἐπιμαρτ[υ]ρήσει[ς]... τυγχάνε[ι]... ...[κατη]γοροῦμεμ... ...[άν]τικειμένον...

...**τὰ προειλημμένα**... ...Ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις... ...Τυγχάνει... ...Κατηγοροῦμεμ...
...**ἀντικειμένον**...

...the [*things*] that have already been anticipated... ...You further attest... ...It happens to be... ...We fully indicate... ...the contrary [*observation*]...

ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>before taking hold</i>
προειλημμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having already been anticipated	ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>being having grasped before</i>
τὸ προειλημμένον τὰ προειλημμένα	[•Λ] what has already been anticipated	ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΝ <i>being having grasped before</i>
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα	[M] what is attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of testifying upon</i>
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to further attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΕΙΝ <i>testifying upon</i>
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
κατηγορεῖν	to fully indicate	ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking publicly</i>
κεῖσθαι	to lie [down]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting</i>
ἀντικεῖσθαι	to oppose	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting against</i>
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>

28.3 The Clear Natural Character of a Word vs. Semantic Indeterminacy from Convention

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. H (col. 2a)

...οὔτ’ ἀδιάλυτον· εἰ δὲ μὴ [πάν]τες κατὰ τοῦτο ταύτ[ην] τὴν ιδέαν ἔλαβον, ἀλλ[ά τι]νες καὶ κατὰ τούτου...

...οὔτ’ **ἀδιάλυτον**· εἰ δὲ μὴ Πάντες **κατὰ τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν ιδέαν** ἔλαβον – **ἀλλά**
Τινες καὶ κατὰ τούτου...

...nor *indissoluble*. but if All [*people*] do not comprehend *this very idea* in accordance with this [*meaning of the word*] – but Some [*people*] also against that [*meaning, comprehend a different idea*]...

ἀδιάλυτος <i>(ον)</i>	indissoluble	ΑΔΙΑΛΥΤΟΣ <i>not fully loose</i>
ἡ ιδέα αἱ ιδέαι	idea	ΙΔΕΑ <i>appearing</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>

...φανταστικῶς ἐπεὶ... ...μεν οὐδ’ ὑπάρχοντος... ...νοήση... ...[ἐ]π’ ἐνίων... ...ἴ[σ]ως οὖν ἤδη... [δι]αφορὰν ἀπὸ [ταύτης τῆς ο]ὔτως οὐ φαν[ταστικῆς] δόξης οὐ φαν[ταστικῶ]ς ἂν κατὰ τούτω[ν]...

...φανταστικῶς, ἐπεὶ... ...μεν οὐδ’ ὑπάρχοντος... ...νοήση... ...ἐπ’ ἐνίων... ...ἴσως οὖν ἤδη... ...διαφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς οὔτως, οὐ φανταστικῆς δόξης – οὐ φανταστικῶς ἂν κατὰ τούτων...

...in an image-based way [*i.e., in an objective way of thinking*], since... ...even though not existing... ...to a concept... ...already upon some... ...a difference [*in meaning*] from this very judgment, [*which is*] NOT image-based – would not in an image-based way against these...

φανταστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	image-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
φανταστικῶς	in an image-based way	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
ὑπάρχων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	existing [already]	ὙΠΑΡΧΩΝ <i>beginning under (before)</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἢ νόησις αἱ νοήσεις	concept	ΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>seeing</i>
ἔνιοι <i>(αι, α)</i>	some	ΕΝΙΟΙ
ἴσως	perhaps	ΙΣΩΣ <i>equal / likely</i>
ἢ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ἢ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr.5 (col.3a)

...χουσι τοῦτο ἐπὶ... ...ἀλλὰ λαμβάνουσι... ...θεώρημ[α]... ...[ἐμ περιλ]ηπτικῶ[ι] τ[ρόπωι τήν φαν]τασίαν...

...τοῦτο ἐπὶ... ...ἀλλὰ Λαμβάνουσι... ...Θεώρημα... ...ἐμ περιληπτικῶ τρόπῳ, τήν φαντασίαν...

...this upon... ...but They comprehend... ...a [*mental*] Observation... ...in a way relating to what is completely comprehensible, the image...

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
ἢ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	[the act of mental] envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of observing</i>
τὸ θεώρημα τὰ θεωρήματα	[a mental] observation	ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑ <i>result of observing</i>
περιληπτικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being taken hold around</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>

ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασῑαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
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Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr.5 (col.2)

...δόξαν... ...ἀτό[μ]ω[ν]... ...φαν[ταστικ]οῖς ἐγγενό[σ]ι εἰ... ...οὐκ ἐ[λ]άμβανον... ...[ἀλ]λ’ ἐ[σ]τιν τοιοῦτο... π[ἀν]των τῶν...

...[φ]υσικὸν χαρακτῆρα... ...τῶν ἐμ περ[ι]λη[πτικῶι] τρὸ[πι]ωι διανο[ρήσ]εων...

...δόξαν... ...ἀτόμων... ...φανταστικοῖς ἐγγενόσι, εἰ... ...οὐκ’Ελάμβανον... ...ἀλλ’ ἔστιν τοιοῦτο... πάντων τῶν... ...φυσικὸν χαρακτῆρα... ...τῶν ἐμ περιληπτικῶ τρόπῳ διανοήσεων...

...judgment... ...of atoms... ...in the inherent [*objects of thought that are*] image-based, if... ...They did not comprehend... ...but [] *such as this* exists... ...of all... ...the natural character [*lit., "the physical engraving"*]... ...of mental perceptions in a way relating to what is completely comprehensible...

ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ἄτομος <i>(ον)</i>	indivisible	ΑΤΟΜΑ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ ἄτομον τὰ ἄτομα	atom <i>("what is indivisible")</i>	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
φανταστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	image-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἐγγίγνεσθαι = ἐνγίγνεσθαι = ἐνγίγεσθαι =	to be inherent	ΕΝΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἐνγενής = ἐγγενής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	inherent	ΕΝΓΕΝΗΣ <i>coming to be in</i>
λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
φυσικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	natural	ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ <i>producing</i>
ὁ χαρακτήρ οἱ χαρακτῆρες	character	ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ <i>engraving</i>
περιληπτικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being taken hold around</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 5 (col. 4)

...ὔστ[ερον]... ...τοῖ[ς ἀν]τικειμέν[οις]... ...Τι τῆς αἰ[σ]θήσεω[ς]... ...τάδε αὐ[τὰ] μῆδε πῶπο[τε π]οιηθῆ[ναι]... τήν αὐτήμ

[φ]ύσιν... ...ὔστερον ἐξ [ἄλλ]η[ς τινός φύ]σεως ἐφήσαμ[εν]... ...ἀμέλει ἐπὶ... ...[ἀλ]λὰ [πάσ]ας τὰς... ...φάσκειν εἶνα[ι]...

...ὄνομ[α]... ...δοθ[έν] οὐ φανταστικόν]... ...εἶ[ναι] τῶν...

...ὔστερον... ...τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις... ...Τι τῆς αἰσθήσεως... ...τάδε αὐτὰ μῆδε πῶποτε ποιηθῆναι... ...τὴν αὐτὴμ φύσιν... ...ὔστερον, ἐξ ἄλλης τινός φύσεως Ἐφήσαμεν... ...ἀμέλει ἐπὶ... ...ἀλλὰ πάσας τὰς... ...φάσκειν εἶναι... ...”Ονομα... ...δοθέν, οὐ φανταστικὸν... ...εἶναι τῶν...

...afterward... ...to the things that are contrary to... ...Something of sensation... ...that these very things have never been made... ...the same nature... ...afterward, We asserted from a certain other nature... ...doubtless

upon... ...but **all the**... ...to allege to be... ...a Word... ...given, the **NON-image-based**... ...to be **of the**...

ὕστερον	afterward	ΎΣΤΕΡΟΝ <i>next</i>
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ποιηθῆναι	to be made ^[already]	ΠΟΙΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>gathered</i>
ἀναφωνεῖν	to declare	ΑΝΑΦΩΝΕΙΝ <i>speaking up</i>
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ <i>firm standing</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
φάσκειν	to allege	ΦΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>affirming</i>
ἀμέλει	doubtless	ΑΜΕΛΕΙ <i>not caring</i>
ἡ ὁμιλία αἱ ὁμιλῖαι	common usage	ὍΜΙΛΙΑ <i>association</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
ἡ διάλεκτος αἱ διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ <i>speaking across</i>
ἡ ὀνομασία αἱ ὀνομασίαι	designation	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ <i>state of name</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
δοθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	given	ΔΟΘΕΙΣ <i>given</i>

28.4 Inaccurate Language Shift

A change in the use of a word that is based *only in the addition of opinion* – and *not based on sensation* – obviously would *not stand up empirically*. Applying a name to an object expresses an opinion, and this opinion can be correct or incorrect.

The fact that differences in environment are reflected in differences in language further supports the idea that human use of language has a *natural connection to its environment*.

Within the original development of any functional language, each word must have naturally been used, *mostly by natural impulse*, to denote objects or circumstances that were *immediately present and visible* – yet, over time, *by logical manipulation and conventional usages*, languages tend to add abstractions.

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 6 (col. 1)

...πραγ[μ]άτωμ... ...[οὔ]τως ἐμφαιν[ό]ν[τω]ν ἐπὶ τῇ[ς] ἐμῆς περὶ διαθέσεως λόγ[ου]ς γυμνα[σ]ίας· οὐ[τω γ]ὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τοῦτο {υτο} ἐνδίκνυ[σ]θαι τὸ δὴ ὅτ[ι] βλέποντες [το]ὺς ὁμοφώνου[ς] ἡμῖν ὁ[ν]τα[ς] ἀ[ν]τικειμ[έ]ν[ω]ς αἷς ἡμε[ῖ]ς φωναῖς χρ[ώ]με[θ]α ψευδέ[ς] τι ἄλλ[ο] ὑποτάττοντα[ς] ἀνύποπτόν τε ἐπ[ὶ] ἐκί[ναι]ς ταῖς ἐ[ν]νο[ί]αι[ς], ἀλλὰ μένο[ν]τι[ς]... ...πρὸ[ς] αὐτοὺς... ...[δεδο]ξάσθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ... κατ[α]φατικόν... μᾶ[λ]λον ἐπετ...

*addidi [οὔ]

...πραγμάτων... ...οὕτως ἐμφαινόντων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐμῆς περὶ διαθέσεως λόγους γυμνασίας: οὕτω γὰρ, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν Τοῦτο ἐνδίκνυσθαι τὸ δὴ ὅτι, Βλέποντες τοὺς ὁμοφώνους ἡμῖν – ὄντας αντικειμένως αἷς Ἡμεῖς φωναῖς χρώμεθα – ψευδές τι ἄλλο ὑποτάττοντας, ἀνύποπτόν τε ἐπ' ἐκίναις ταῖς ἐννοίαις. ἀλλὰ μένοντες... ...πρὸς αὐτούς... ...δεδοξάσθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ... ...καταφατικὸν... ...μᾶλλον...

...of [practical] situations... ...thus appearing in relation to my reasonings about the arrangement of schools: for in this way, It was necessary for This to indicate the [fact] that indeed, [we are] Seeing those people speaking the same [language] as us – while they are in opposition to Our use of statements – [because they are] assigning something else [that is] false, and [which is] not also concerning those very internal conceptions. but [we are still] pending... ...towards those... ...to have been judged or through the...
...affirmative... ...more...

[Sedley] ...< >...For it was so necessary to point out that we, by observing that those who speak the same language as us were, in contrast to our own use of words, assigning some unsuspected false connotation in addition to those meanings... < >...

τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
ἐμφαίνειν	to appear in	ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing in</i>
ἐμφαινών	appearing in	
ἡ διάθεσις αἱ διαθέσεις	arrangement	ΔΙΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of</i> <i>placing through</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>
ἡ γυμνασία αἱ γυμνασῖαι	school / gymnasium	ΓΥΜΝΑΣΙΑ <i>naked</i> <i>This has both a literal and a metaphorical meaning. Initially, it referred to physical exercises or a gymnastic school, but it later came to mean a school more broadly, including philosophical schools</i>
ἀναγκαῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	necessary	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ <i>necessity</i>
δείκνυναι	to prove	ΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing</i>
ἐνδίκνυσθαι = ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ <i>showing in</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
τό σύμφωνον τά σύμφωνα	agreement [with]	ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΝ <i>speaking</i> <i>together</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
ὁμόφωνος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	speaking the same	ΟΜΟΦΩΝΟΣ <i>speaking</i> <i>the same</i>
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>
ἀντικειμένως	in opposition	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΩΣ <i>situated against</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
χρᾶσθαι	<i>[with dative]</i> to use, <i>[with genitive]</i> to desire	ΧΡΑΣΘΑΙ
ψευδής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ <i>deceiving</i>
διατάττειν	to arrange	ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>ordering across</i>
ὑποτάττειν	to assign	ΥΠΟΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>ordering under</i>
ὑποτάττων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	assigning	

ἀνύποπτος (ος, ον)	not concerning	ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΟΣ <i>not looking</i> <i>[suspiciously]</i> <i>under</i>
ἐκίνος = ἐκεῖνος (ἐκείνη, ἐκεῖνο)	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ <i>that there</i>
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ΕΝΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing in</i>
προσμένων (ουσα, ον)	still pending	ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΩΝ <i>remaining</i> <i>further</i>
μένων (ουσα, ον)	pending	ΜΕΝΩΝ <i>remaining</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
δεδοξάσθαι	to have been judged	ΔΕΔΟΞΑΣΘΑΙ <i>seemed</i>
φαίνεσθαι	to be seen	ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
καταφατικός (ή, όν)	affirmative	ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>thoroughly</i> <i>appearing</i>

28.5 Impression-Based Interpretations
vs. Non-Impression-Based Interpretations

Mental images (**τὰ φαντάσματα**) come from films (**τὰ εἶδωλα**) of external objects, and our feelings and experiences (**τὰ πάθη**) result, in part, from their infiltration from the outside world. Hence the primitive languages of different people are largely an instinctive reaction to their particular environment.

People utter sounds naturally in reaction to objects and feelings, and, noticing that they have one sound to correspond with each object or feeling, they find it useful to employ those sounds as labels.

After this process, the role of convention is twofold:

(1) people try to rationalize or simplify language that *ambiguous* or *excessively long-winded*

(2) people introduce *new words for objects of thought which lie beyond the range of direct perception (and thus do not have naturally formed labels)*.

Therefore language is *based on natural impulse* and is then altered, for better or worse, by reason and convention.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 2)

...εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐν οἷον τῶν [τε] ἐνταῦθα μετ[άθε]σις κα[ὶ] οὐ δογμάτωμ φανταστικῶν, τῶμ μέντοι οὐ φανταστικῶν καὶ δογμάτων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέρα γ' ἂν τινα δηλονότι εἴη ἐκίνοι[ς] εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ προήενν[κα καὶ] ἐπ' ἄλλ' ἅτ[τ]α ἃ φαντ[ασιά]ζοιεν τὰς ἀναγωγάς...

...καὶ μὴ ἐν οἷον τῶν τε ἐνταῦθα μετὰθεσις – καὶ οὐ δογμάτων φανταστικῶν, τῶν μέντοι οὐ φανταστικῶν καὶ δογμάτων. οὐ μὴν – ἀλλ' ἑτερα γ' ἂν τινα δηλονότι εἴη ἐκίνοις – εἰ μὴ Ἐγὼ προήεννκα καὶ, ἐπ' ἄλλ' ἅττα, ἃ Φαντασιάζοιεν τὰς ἀναγωγάς...

...[we did not recommend the rearrangement of meaning of all types of words], and NOT one such as the rearrangement [of the meaning] regarding those [words based] on immediate surroundings – indeed NOT [the rearrangement of meaning] regarding the IMAGE-BASED interpretation, but rather [the rearrangement of meaning] regarding the NON-image-based interpretation. no indeed – instead it is clear that certain Different [false connotations] would exist for them – if I had not also presented, in relation to certain other things, that which They might have imagined [to be] references [to image-based interpretations]...

[Sedley] ...< >...Nevertheless, it is clear that they would have additional ones, had I not cited appeals which they made to other opinions which they* associated with images...

**Possibly referring to the Megarian circle of Diodorus 'Cronus,' a contemporary of Epikouros, who is indirectly referenced later in this book*

ἐνταῦθα	from immediate surroundings	ENTAYΘA <i>in this</i>
ἡ μετάθεσις αἱ μεταθέσεις	rearrangement	ΜΕΤΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>placing change</i>
τό δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching [here, "interpretation"]	ΔΟΓΜΑ <i>seeming</i>
φανταστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	image-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἜΤΕΡΟΣ <i>other</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
δῆλον	clearly	ΔΗΛΟΝ <i>clear</i>
δηλονότι	it is clear that	ΔΗΛΟΝΟΤΙ <i>clear that</i>
ἐκεῖνος <i>(ἐκεῖνη, ἐκεῖνο)</i>	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ <i>that there</i>
φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
προφέρειν	to present	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing forward</i>
ἄττα	some	ΑΤΤΑ <i>is an alternative form of</i> ΤΙΝΑ
τινά	certain	
ἡ φαντασία αἱ φαντασίαι	image	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ <i>state of appearing</i>
ὁ φαντασμός οἱ φαντασμοί	imagination [an act of imagining]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΜΟΣ <i>process of appearing</i>
φαντασιάζεσθαι	to imagine [for oneself]	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>to make the state of appearance</i>
ἡ συναγωγή αἱ συναγωγαί	gathering	ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ <i>going together</i>
ἡ ἄγωγή αἱ ἄγωγαί	guidance	ΑΓΩΓΗ <i>going</i>
ἡ ἀναγωγή αἱ ἀναγωγαί	reference	ΑΝΑΓΩΓΗ <i>going again</i>

28.6 Void as an Object of Thought

Consider 10.37b: "First of all, Heródotos, it is necessary to understand *what is assigned to expressions: in order that*, we may have *what is judged, investigated, or uncertain* to test *by referring to these [expressions]* – so that everything does not go *untested by us* – leading into infinity, or us having *empty expressions [i.e., using meaningless words]*. Seeing [for ourselves] the primary internal conception for each word, and in no way needing *proof*, is *necessary* – if we are to have [something] to which we will refer *what is investigated, uncertain, or judged.*"

The "*first meaning*" or "primary internal conception (**τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα**)" is equivalent to *an anticipation* (**ἡ πρόληψις**) – a basic mental image that exists in the mind from exposure to sense-evidence, but before any active manipulative thinking. By accessing this primary internal sense, a perceived object can be mentally associated with a word in an *immediate and perceptual way*.
Thus a word used in a secondary non-perceptual sense can have no anticipation (**ἡ πρόληψις**). However many such words can be traced back to the anticipations naturally associated with a class of objects that is directly perceptible.

...κενὸμ, μηδὲν ἦττον εἶναι γέ τι φήσωμεν Κενόν. τοῦτο οὖν δὴ Φημι... ...ἡμῖν
Λέγουσιν... τοῦθ' εὐρέθη οὐ τοιοῦτον ὃν οἶον Ἐδοξάζομεν...

...void, We shall assert that Void IN NO WAY TO A LESSER EXTENT also exists as something. Therefore, indeed, I assert this... ...They say to us... ...[that] this was discovered not to be such as We had judged...

τὸ ΚΕΝΟΝ	void	KENON <i>emptiness</i>
ἦττον	to a lesser extent	ἥΤΤΟΝ <i>inferior</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
εὐρίσκειν	to discover	ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ <i>finding</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
οἶος <i>(οἶα, οἶον)</i>	such as	ΟΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>

28.7 Example of the Void

Take, for example, the use of Κενόν to denote "void" in physics. To grasp this *derived sense* you must form *an anticipation (ἡ πρόληψις)* by picturing how the word is used in its primary, perceptual sense. You may perhaps picture an empty (Κενόν) box. What distinguishes it from a full box is that *you can move your hand around inside it without hindrance*.
Thus when using the word "void" in physics you will know – without requiring any further proof – that it always *presupposes the possibility of movement*.
Language, when used in this way, can act as an analogy between the visible and the invisible.

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 4)

...φύσις ἐνταῦθα κατὰ γε τήν[] δόξ[αν τ]ὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτ[ου οἰομ]ένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ ποτ[έ καί] ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὐ[τως ο]ὔν καὶ τ[ο]ῦτο [ν]οεῖται [ἐν ἐκ]ίναις τα[ῖς] λέξ[εσιν] ἃς ἐν τῶ[ι] περὶ τῶ[ι]μ πρώτ[ου] γιγνω[σκ]όντω[ν αὐ] τοὺς γεγράφα[μεν· εἴ]τα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὐ[θις τ]ὸ [βι]βλίον ἡκριβ[ώ]σαμεν... ...καὶ μακροτέρω[ς]...

...Φύσις, ἐνταῦθα, κατὰ γε τὴν δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτον οἰομένου καὶ ἅμα καὶ ποτέ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ κενόν· οὕτως οὖν, καὶ Τοῦτο νοεῖται ἐν ἐκίναις ταῖς λέξεσιν ἃς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν πρώτων γιγνωσκόντων αὐτοὺς Γεγράφαμεν· εἴτα δ' ἀναλαβόντες αὖθις τὸ βιβλίον – Ἠκριβώσαμεν... ...καὶ μακροτέρως...

...the Nature [of the void exists], from immediate surroundings, according to the judgment of the one who was originally suspecting at once, at some time and from immediate surroundings that the void [exists]. thus, This [nature of the void] too is conceived in those terms which We have composed in the work concerning those first [men] knowing those [words]. but then, [when we] took up [our] book again – We have made precise... ...and more extensively...

[Sedley] ...The nature [of the void is] here, according to the opinion of the first man to think of void in terms of immediacy and time and place. Consequently, void too is given this meaning in those expressions which we have written in our work* concerning the men who *first had knowledge of them. We subsequently resumed that book and made a study of...

**possibly Epíkouros' book "Declarations" (Ἀναφωνήσεις).*

**A language, in its early development, is more focused on visible objects and the present time. This is observably true for the origin of a new language from a pidgin to a patois. As a language develops from its origin of simple immediacy, purposeful human convention adds abstractions.*

ή φύσις αἱ φύσεις	nature	ΦΥΣΙΣ <i>producing</i>
ἐνταῦθα	from immediate surroundings	ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ <i>in this</i>
ή δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
οἷεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
οἰόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	suspecting [here, "believing"]	ΟΙΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>perceive</i>
ἅμα	simultaneously [here, "at once"]	ἌΜΑ
τὸ κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ή λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
ή γνῶσις αἱ γνώσεις	knowledge	ΓΝΩΣΙΣ <i>knowing</i>
γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ <i>knowing process</i>
γινώσκων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	knowing	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΩΝ <i>knowing</i>
συγγράφειν	to compose together	ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ <i>writing together</i>
γράφειν	to compose	ΓΡΑΦΕΙΝ <i>writing</i>
λαβών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	[intellectually] comprehended, [generally] acquired	ΛΑΒΩΝ <i>grasped</i>
ἀναλαβών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	took up again	ΑΝΑΛΑΒΩΝ <i>grasped up / again</i>
αὔθις	again	ΑΥΘΙΣ
τὸ βιβλίον τὰ βιβλία	book	ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ
ή ἀκρίβεια αἱ ἀκρίβειαι	precision	ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ <i>state of pointed</i>
τὸ ἀκρίβωμα τὰ ἀκριβώματα	precise detail	ΑΚΡΙΒΩΜΑ <i>result of pointed</i>
ἀκριβοῦν	to make precise	ΑΚΡΙΒΟΥΝ <i>pointed</i>
μακράν	by a long way	ΜΑΚΡΑΝ <i>long-reaching</i>
μακρός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	distant	ΜΑΚΡΟΣ <i>long-reaching</i>
μακροτέρως	more extensively	ΜΑΚΡΟΤΕΡΩΣ <i>long-reaching</i>

Originally, Epíkouros and Mētródōros understood, *through the process of inductive consideration*, i.e. "empirical reasoning" (ὁ ἐπιλογισμός), that certain words were *incorrectly or at least not precisely defined by convention* in the non-image-based way of thinking – but could be *naturally and more immediately understood by analogy to the visible*. Therefore they wished to correct *the errors and imprecision in conventional language* and return to *the immediacy of a youthful language*.

With this understanding, Mētródōros began redirecting what many words indicated *back to their natural and immediate sense, in a way that gave little regard to conventional usages*.

However they eventually came to realize that (although this process is conceptually sound) it is nevertheless not possible to change most words, even if conceptual reasoning suggests they are used imprecisely – due to the deeply ingrained conventional usage now associated with those words.

From this will follow the concession that, for the most part, we do employ ordinary conventional language in our philosophy. Over time Epíkouros came to accept that large linguistic changes were not practical and accepted conventional usages for most words – now only insisting on correcting those that actually indicate an error in thought (which will inevitably result in an error in action).

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 8 (col. 5)

...[οὐκ ἔξεστι ποιῆσαι πολλῶν] καὶ παντο[ί]ω[ν] ὀνομάτωμ μεταθ[έ]σε[ις]· ὀλίγα γὰρ ἔξ[ε]στιν τῶ[ν σ]ὺν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἅ πρότερον [ο]ὔτως δ[ι]ο[ρ]ρ[ι]ζοντες κατὰ τὸν οὐ φανταστικ[ὸν] τρ[ό]πομ[ε]τεθέμεθα συνιδόντες οὐ [τοιαῦτα] ἔκ τινος ἐπ[ι]λογισμοῦ· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐ[μ]περιληπτικῶν τρόπω[ν] ἐλεγχομένων ἄν... ...τινι ἢ κατακαλύψει ὀχλεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ὄνομα... ...μετατιθέμενοι... ...οἱ πολλοὶ...

...οὐκ”Ἐξεστι ποιῆσαι **πολλῶν** καὶ **παντοίων ὀνομάτων μεταθέσεις**· Ὀλίγα γὰρ ἔξέστιν τῶν **σὺν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν – ἅ, πρότερον οὕτως (διορίζοντες κατὰ τὸν οὐ φανταστικὸν τρόπον)** Μετεθέμεθα – συνιδόντες **οὐ τοιαῦτα ἔκ τινος ἐπιλογισμοῦ**· τὰ δὲ Πλεῖστα **τῶν ἐμπεριληπτικῶ τρόπῳ ἐλεγχομένων**, ἄν... ...τινι ἢ Κατακαλύπει **ὀχλεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ὄνομα**... ...μετατιθέμενοι... ...οἱ Πολλοὶ...

...It is not possible to make **rearrangements of many** and **all kinds of words**. for [only a] Few [rearrangements] are allowed of those [words] relating to sensation – **which [words]**, We **formerly** changed in **this way** (while we were differentiating in a **NON-image-based way**) – because we fully mentally saw from a certain [process of] inductive consideration [*that they were*] not like **this**. but the Greatest [amount] of those [words] being refuted [*that exist instead*] in the completely comprehensible way [*of thinking*] within, would [not be able to be changed due to their deeply ingrained conventional usage]... ...**to some [thing]**, or It would completely cover **Another [phrase]** or **Word that is annoying [due to its improper use]**... ...[they] rearranged... ...the Public...

[Sedley] It is not possible to alter many different kinds of names. It is possible to alter a few of those which entail perception – the one which we previously defined in the non-image-making manner, ***** but which we altered when by some act of empirical reasoning we saw that they were not of this kind. ***** But as for the majority of names which might have been found false by a conceptual process... < >...

*****Defining a word in a "non-image-making manner" is to associate a word with an object without referring that word to a mental image (**φαντασία**) of the object to check that the word is suited to it. *Some words are tied to perception in ways that are not obvious – we will use these words correctly when we understand them by analogy to observation. The process of empirical reasoning (ἐπιλογισμός) can show that a word is not suited to an object by tracing that word back to its single original connotation.*

*****Practically speaking, during one's lifetime, most words are fixed in their usage (*for example, the unnatural but conventional use of "wealth" for objects that extend beyond the wealth of nature*) – but some words tied to perception and feelings can be corrected (*for example, the naturally correct but unconventional meaning of the word "pleasure" for the lack of pain*).

ἔξεστιν	it is possible	ἔΞΕΣΤΙΝ <i>it exists out of</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>

παντοῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	all kinds	ΠΑΝΤΟΙΟΣ <i>all of this sort</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ἡ μετάθεσις αἱ μεταθέσεις	rearrangement	ΜΕΤΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>placing change</i>
ὀλίγος <i>(η, ον)</i>	few, short [of time]	ΟΛΙΓΟΣ <i>little</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
πρότερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	former	ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>further [contrast]</i>
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>between the border</i>
διορίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	differentiating	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΩΝ <i>between the border</i>
φανταστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	image-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing change</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ιδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	ΙΔΕΙΝ <i>saw</i>
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
συνιδεῖν	to have fully seen [mentally]	ΣΥΝΙΔΕΙΝ <i>saw together</i>
συνιδών <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	having fully seen [mentally]	ΣΥΝΙΔΩΝ <i>saw together</i>
τὸ τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα	what is like this <i>(such a thing)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ <i>this of this sort</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	^[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>
πλεῖστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	the greatest <i>[the most]</i>	ΠΛΕΙΣΤΟΣ <i>most</i>
ἐμπεριληπτικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	* completely comprehensible way within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being taken hold around in</i>
ἐξελέγγειν	to refute out	ΕΞΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ <i>confuting out [with contrary proof]</i>
ἐλέγγειν	to refute	ΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ <i>confuting [with contrary proof]</i>
ἐλεγχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being refuted	ΕΛΕΓΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>confuting [with contrary proof]</i>
κατακαλύπτειν	to cover completely	ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ <i>completely covering</i>
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ <i>crowd of people</i>
ἐνοχλεῖν	to be disturbing to	ΕΝΟΧΛΕΙΝ <i>in a crowd of people</i>
όχλεῖν	to disturb	ΟΧΛΕΙΝ <i>crowd of people</i>

ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἕτερος <i>other</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ONOMA <i>name</i>
μετατιθέμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	rearranged	METATITHEMENOS <i>placing change</i>

ἡ ὀνομάτων μεταθέσεις	rearrangement of words
τῶν ὀνομάτων μετατίθεσθαι σὺν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν	rearranging of words [in alignment] with the sensations
<i>i.e., using empirical reasoning to match the primary connotation of the word with its corresponding object</i>	

*Epíkouros considered some of his early writings to contain mistakes. These early writings were called **τὰ ἀρχαῖα** and **τὰ ἀρχαϊκά**.*

*"[The Stoics] claim 'just as Epíkouros is not considered worthy of reproach for the mistakes mentioned in early writings (**ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖκοις**), so Zeno should not be either.'"* (Philodemus, P.Herc. 339 col. 17, On the Stoics, 11.4-22)

[Sedley] "Epíkouros' conclusion that the philosopher may, for want of a better medium, use ordinary language, is necessarily qualified by the demand (which he was already making when he wrote the Letter to Heródotos), that the resulting linguistic inaccuracies and ambiguities should be evaded by always seeing beyond the present conventional meanings of words to the natural first meanings which underlie them – and also that error should so far as possible be identified by reference not to language but to the practical behavior in which someone's falsity manifests itself."

28.9 [Reference Practical Outcomes]

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. fr.10 (col. 1a)

...πραγμ[ατα]... [πι]ραγματικῶν [θε]ωρημ[άτω]ν ἐνδίδει καὶ [τ]ήμ περ[ίληψι]μ... ...τῆς δόξη[ς τ]ῆς... τοῖς πραγ[μασιν]... περ[ι] ταύτ]ης [τε] τῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἐμ[β]αλλούσης ὑπολήψεως. ὄντων δ’ οὖν τοιούτων οἷον... τούτων κατὰ τὴν [αἴρ]εσιμ π[ρατ]τόντων... τῇ[ς] ἐπαγωγῇ[ς] γιγν[έσθ]ω τῆς πραγματ[ικ]ῆς...

*addidi [ατα] atque [μασιν]

...πράγματα... ...πραγματικῶν θεωρημάτων ἐνδίδει καὶ τήμ περίληψιμ... ...τῆς δόξης τῆς... ...τοῖς πράγμασιν... ...περὶ ταύτης τε τῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἐμβαλλούσης ὑπολήψεως – ὄντων δ’ οὖν τοιούτων οἶον... ...τούτων, κατὰ τὴν αἵρεσιμ πραττόντων... ...τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς Γιγνέσθω τῆς πραγματικῆς...

...[practical] situations... ...to even indicate [our] complete comprehension with practical [mental] observations... ...of the judgment which... ...to the [practical] situations... ...about this and [about] the supposition [being] thrown into this [definition] – but with [words] like this existing such as this... ...with these [observations of practical consequences], according to the choice of those accomplishing... ...Let [this argument] be produced with a reference [to observation] of the practical [way of thinking]...

τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
πραγματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	practical	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of doing / affair</i>
ἡ θεωρία αἱ θεωρίαι	[the act of mental] envisioning	ΘΕΩΡΙΑ <i>act of observing</i>
τὸ θεώρημα τὰ θεωρήματα	[a mental] observation	ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑ <i>result of observing</i>
ἐνδεικνύσασθαι	to be indicated in [already]	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΑΣΘΑΙ
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ <i>showing in</i>

ἐνδεικνύναι	to indicate in	
λήψεσθαι	to be comprehended [in the future]	ΛΗΨΕΣΘΑΙ taking hold
ἡ περίληψις αἱ περιλήψεις	complete comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΙΣ taking hold around
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ seeming
βάλλειν	to throw	ΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ throwing
ἐμβάλλειν	to throw in	ΕΜΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ throwing in
ἐμβάλλων (ουσα, ον)	throwing in	ΕΜΒΑΛΛΩΝ
ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις	supposition	ΥΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ taking hold under
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ this of this sort
οἷος (οἷα, οἷον)	such as [here "as if"]	ΟΙΟΙΟΣ of this sort
οὗτος (αὕτη, τοῦτο)	this	ΟΥΤΟΣ this
αἰρεῖν	to choose	ΑΙΡΕΙΝ taking
ἡ αἵρεσις αἱ αἱρέσεις	choice	ΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ action
πράττων (ουσα, ον)	accomplishing	ΠΡΑΤΤΩΝ action
συνάγειν	to gather	ΣΥΝΑΓΕΙΝ going together
ἐπάγειν	to bring in	ΕΠΑΓΕΙΝ going toward
ἡ ἐπαγωγή αἱ ἐπαγωγαί	reference [to observation]	ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ result of going toward
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being
πραγματικός (ή, όν)	practical	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ characteristic of doing / affair

EPISTEMOLOGY CHART

[▽]	τὰ Διημαρτημένα	Misinterpretations can result from
[Δ+]	τὸ Προσδοξαζόμενον	The Addition Of Judgement while
{Δ}	Ἐξαιτιολογῶν	Fully Reasoning Into The Causes
[Δ●]	ἡ Ἐπιβλητική Δόξα	Objective Judgment is used for
[Θ]	τὸ Θεωρούμενον	What Is Observed including
	τὸ Παρόν	What Is Present
	τὸ Ὁρατόν	What Is Seen
	τὸ Δῆλον	What Is Clear
	τὸ Λαμβανόμενον	What Is Comprehended and therefore is

[Θ]	τὸ Μὴ Προσμένον	What Is Not Pending [a basis in direct observation]
[Δ◊]	ἡ Θεωρητικὴ Δόξα	Speculative Judgement <i>is used for</i>
[Ο]	τὸ Μὴ Θεωρούμενον	What Is Not Observed
		<i>including</i>
	τὸ Μὴ Παρόν	What Is Not Present
	τὸ Ἀόρατον	What Is Unseen
	τὸ Ἄδηλον	What Is Unclear
	τὸ Μὴ Λαμβανόμενον	What Is Not Comprehended
		<i>and therefore</i>
{Μο}	τὸ Ἐπιμαρτυρηθόμενον	What Is To Be Attested <i>which is</i>
[Ο]	τὸ Προσμένον	What Is Pending [a basis in direct observation]
	τὰ Κριτήρια	The Criteria
		<i>for</i>
[α]	τὸ Ἀληθές	What Is True
		<i>are all</i>
[Α]	αἱ Αἰσθήσεις	Sensations
		<i>including</i>
[Π]	τὰ Πάθη	Experiences <i>(i.e., feelings)</i>
		<i>and</i>
[•Λ]	αἱ Προλήψεις	Anticipations <i>(what is mentally perceived before active consideration)</i>
		<i>and</i>
[Β']	ἡ Ἐπιβολή	Attention
		<i>to</i>
[Ε]	ἡ Ἐνάργεια	Perceivable Reality
		<i>including</i>
[Β'δ]	ἡ Ἐπιβολὴ τῆς Διανοίας	Attention To Mental Perception
[Δ]	ἡ Δόξα	A Judgement <i>is</i>
(¬α)	Οὐκ Ἀληθές	Not True
		<i>if</i>
{¬Μ}	Μὴ Ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ	It Is Not Attested
		<i>or</i>
{W}	Ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ	It Is Contested
		<i>by</i>
[Α]	ἡ Αἴσθησις	<i>sensation</i>
[Δ]	ἡ Δόξα	A Judgement <i>is</i>
(α)	Ἀληθές	True
		<i>if</i>
{Μ}	Ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ	It Is Attested
		<i>or</i>
{¬W}	Μὴ Ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ	It Is Not Contested
		<i>by</i>
[Α]	ἡ Αἴσθησις	<i>sensation</i>

ATTESTATION		CONTESTATION		
(M) ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον attested <i>being attested by sensation is sufficient to establish the truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation</i>	✓ or	(¬W) μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον not contested <i>not being contested by sensation is sufficient to establish the truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation</i>	⇒	(α) TRUE
(¬M) μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον not attested <i>not being attested by sensation is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment as long as there continues to be no attestation</i>	Λ and	(W) ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον contested <i>being contested by sensation is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment long as there continues to be no attestation</i>	⇒	(Ο) προσμένον pending <i>(no evidence → unknown)</i>
	✓ or		⇒	(¬α) FALSE
(M) ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον attested	Λ and		⇒	(Ο) προσμένον pending <i>(conflicting evidence → more observation needed)</i>

28.10 [Sensations as a Test for Conceptions]

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. fr. 11 (col. 1)

...α[ισ]θήσεων ὀξυδερκίας... ...ἐν ἀπ[ορ]ήματι νεν[ό]ηκε ἢ κατ[α]καλύψει· δοξα[σ]τὸν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τ[ῶ]μ φαινομένων [ἅπα]σιν ἀν[θρ]ώποις τὸ δηλ[ω]θησόμενον ἀναλογίσματ[ι] ἐ[σ]τιν. ὅθεν κατὰ τὸν τοιο[ῦ]τον τρόπον τὰ φαιν[ό]μενον... ...ἐπὶ τῶν αὐ[τῶν]...

...^[A]αἰσθήσεων ὀξυδερκίας... ...^[O]ἐν ἀπορήματι Νενόηκε ἢ κατακαλύψει.
δοξαστὸν γὰρ δὴ^[Θ] ἐκ τῶμ φαινομένων ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις Τὸ δηλωθησόμενον^[Δ◊] ἀναλογίσματί ἐστιν – ὅθεν, κατὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον, Τὰ φαινόμενον... ...ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν...

...[one should make use]^[A] of the sharp perception of the sensations... ...[to test what] He has conceived^[O] in questions or in obscurities. for What will be made clear by^[Δ◊] an analogous thought is able to be judged indeed from^[Θ] what appears to all people – from where, according to the way [of thinking] like this, The appearing things... ...upon the same...

^[Sedley] [one should rely on] sharpness of perception [in order to check notions] of the kind which one conceives with difficulty or obscurity. For it is from what is plain for all men to see that opinions can be formed about that which awaits an analogically-reasoned proof. Hence it is in such a way that the perceptible...

ἡ αἴσθησις αἰ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
δέρκεσθαι	to see [clearly]	ΔΕΡΚΕΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ ὀξυδερκία αἰ ὀξυδερκίαι	sharp perception	ΟΞΥΔΕΡΚΙΑ <i>sharp seeing</i>
ἡ διαπορία αἰ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ <i>doubting across</i>
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epíkouros	
τὸ ἀπόρημα τὰ ἀπορήματα	question	ΑΠΟΡΗΜΑ <i>result of doubting</i>

νοεῖν	to conceive	NOEIN <i>seeing</i>
κατακαλύπτειν	to cover completely	ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ <i>completely covering</i>
ἡ κατακάλυψις αἱ κατακαλύψεις	obscurity	ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΨΙΣ <i>completely covering</i>
δοξαστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	able to be judged	ΔΟΞΑΣΤΟΣ <i>seeming</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ἅπας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	all together	ἌΠΑΣ <i>all together</i>
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
δηλοῦν	to make clear	ΔΗΛΟΥΝ <i>clear</i>
τὸ δηλωθησόμενον τὰ δηλωθησόμενα	what will be made clear	ΔΗΛΩΘΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>clear</i>
τό διαλογισμα τὰ διαλογίσματα	thorough reasoning	ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of reasoning through action</i>
τὸ ἐπιλόγισμα τὰ ἐπιλογίσματα	an inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of reasoning action upon</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
τὸ ἀναλόγισμα τὰ ἀναλογίσματα	analogous thought	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of reasoning back</i> <i>[a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>
ὅθεν	from where	
τοιούτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>

28.11 Review of Previous Language Theories

^[-M] non-attestation and ^[W] contestation are evoked in order to test the current meaning of words based in convention vs. their actual fundamental etymological meaning based in natural impulse. The connection of a word to an object is not correct if that connection is not attested or is contested by sensation.

^(-α) The error in the use of a word comes from our misapplication of our external sense of an object to our internal anticipation (πρόληψις) associated with that object.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr.11 (col. 2)

...ιδιοτήτος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μὴ σοφῷ διε[φώ]νεις, οὐδὲμ παρε[μ]βάλλων [τοῦ πι]ερί τῶν οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεων κα[i] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεων. ἐτίθεις δ[έ] τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθύς διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως, καὶ τήν κατ' αὐτάς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῷμ πολ[λῶ]ν ἀπο[σ]ημαίνων, οὐ μόν[ον] τήν ἐν[νοιαν]... τῆς ἐντ[ε]ύ[ξεως]...

...ιδιοτήτος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μὴ σοφῷ, Διεφώνεις – οὐδὲν παρεμβάλλων τοῦ περι τῶν ^[-M] οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεων καὶ ^[W] ἀντιμαρτυρήσεων – ^[Δ] Ἐτίθεις δέ τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων εὐθύς διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως, καὶ τήν κατ' ^[Α] αὐτάς τὰς αἰσθήσεις ^(-α) πλάνην τῶν πολλῶν ἀποσημαίνων – οὐ μόνον τήν ἔννοιαν... ...τῆς ἐντεύξεως...

...of a particularized [vocabulary] for the wise man and for the unwise man, You [Mētródōros] made transparent – [you were] adding in nothing about ^[-M] non-attestations and ^[W] contestations [from sensations] – yet ^[Δ] You were setting up some of [your technical] words directly through the same terminology, and clearly signifying ^(-α) the error of the public concerning ^[Α] the sensations themselves – not only [our] internal conception... ...of the encounter...

[Sedley] [In your search for verbal] individuality you were in conflict [as much] with the wise man as with the unwise, by including nothing about lack of confirmatory evidence and the presence of counter-evidence. You fixed some of your vocabulary directly with the same language, also representing the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive...

Despite his eventual provisional acceptance of ordinary language as a philosophical medium, Epikouros did not drop his view that it can represent false opinion. Note in "the error of most men with regard to what they actually perceive (τὴν κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς αἰσθήσεις πλάνην τῶν πολλῶν)" that once again a connection is implied between inaccurate word-usage and failure to correctly identify perceived objects.

ἡ ιδιότης αἱ ιδιότητες	particularity	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΣ <i>particular</i>
ιδιότροπος <i>(ον)</i>	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ιδιότητος <i>(η, ον)</i>	particularized	ΙΔΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ <i>particular characteristic?</i>
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
ἐμφαίνειν	to appear in	ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing in</i>
διαφαίνειν	to make transparent	ΔΙΑΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing through</i>
μεταβάλλων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	transforming	ΜΕΤΑΒΑΛΛΩΝ <i>throwing in change</i>
ὑποβάλλων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	suggesting	ΥΠΟΒΑΛΛΩΝ <i>throwing under</i>
παρεμβάλλων	adding in	ΠΑΡΕΜΒΑΛΛΩΝ <i>throwing in beside</i>
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	{M} to attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	[M] attestation	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>action of testifying upon</i>
ἡ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	[-M] non-attestation	
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	{W} to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις	[W] contestation	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>action of testifying against</i>
τιθέναι	to put [here, "to set up"]	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term [here, "terminology"]	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving process</i>
ἡ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ <i>roaming</i>
τὸ σημεῖον τὰ σημεῖα	sign	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ <i>indication</i>
ἀποσημαίνειν	to clearly signify	ΑΠΟΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ

ἀποσημαίνων (ουσα, ον)	clearly signifying	
ἡ ἔννοια αἱ ἔννοιαι	internal conception	ENNOIA <i>seeing in</i>
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
ἡ ἐντεύξις αἱ ἐντεύξεις	encounter	ΕΝΤΕΥΞΙΣ <i>meeting within</i>

28.12 Mētródōros' Past Writings

*The Epicurean work upon which it is suggested an opponent might seize is presumably one written by **Metrodorus** (possibly his book **Πρὸς τοὺς Διαλεκτικούς**).*

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 11 (col. 4)

...συλλογίζόμεθα... ἥττον... ...μυθο[ι]ης αὐτοῦ [τὸ ἤδ]η λεγόμενον. οὐκ ἔχει οὔν οὐδὲ τοῦτο τ[ὸ]ν χαρα[κ]τῆρα κα[ὶ] ὥς] ἂν τις λανθάν[η] αὐτοῖ[ς] τι ἐναντι[ο]λογῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ...

...Συλλογίζόμεθα... ...ἥττον... ...Μυθοίης αὐτοῦ τὸ ἤδη λεγόμενον. οὐκἜχει, οὔν, οὐδὲ **τοῦτο τὸν χαρακτῆρα:** καὶ ὥς ἂν **Τις, λανθάνη αὐτοῖς, τι** ἐναντιολογῶν – ὥσπερ καὶ **ἐπὶ τοῦ...**

...We infer... ...**to a lesser extent**... ...You [*Mētródōros*] would have related **what is already being said about it.** therefore, It does not even have **this character:** as if Someone, while contradicting **something**, would also escape **their** notice – just as also **in the case of...**

συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action together</i>
ἥττον	to a lesser extent	ἭΤΤΟΝ <i>inferior</i>
μυθολογεῖν	to tell myths	ΜΥΘΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>collecting speech / words</i>
ὁ μῦθος οἱ μῦθοι	myth	ΜΥΘΟΣ <i>speech / word</i>
μυθεῖσθαι	to relate	ΜΥΘΕΙΣΘΑΙ
μυθῆσαι	to have related	μυθῆσαι
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
λεγόμενος (η, ον)	being said	ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>speaking</i>
τὸ ἤδη λεγόμενον	what is already being said	
ὁ χαρακτήρ οἱ χαρακτῆρες	character	ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ <i>engraving</i>
λανθάνειν	to escape notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ <i>to be hidden</i>
ἐναντίος (α, ον)	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>
ἐναντιολογεῖν	to contradict	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>collecting in against</i>
ἐναντιολογῶν (οὔσα, οὔν)	contradicting	

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. K (col.1)

...λέξ[εις]... ...[τοῖς] φα[ι]νομένοις σοφοῦ καὶ μὴ [σο]φοῦ... ...ἔμοιγε δὴ [δοκε]ῖ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν... ...ἔχειν ὡ[ς] λέγεις... ...[κα]τανοεῖς ὅτι νῦν... ...ἡμεῖς τ[ὰ]ς λέξ[εις]...

...λέξεις... ...τοῖς φαινομένοις σοφοῦ καὶ μὴ σοφοῦ... ...ἔμοιγε, δὴ, Δοκεῖ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν... ...ἔχειν ὥς **Λέγεις...** ...**Κατανοεῖς ὅτι νῦν... ...Ἡμεῖς τὰς λέξεις...**

...terms... ...for what appears of the wise and of the unwise... ...to Me,
indeed, It seems, both in the past and now... ...to have, as You [Mētródōros]
say... ...You fully conceive that now... ...We [use] the terms...

ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
φαίνόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
σοφός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	wise	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i> <i>thoroughly</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. K (col. 2)

...τ[α]ῦτα... ...[σημ]αίνομεν τῶι... ...[τάς] αἰσθήσεις καὶ τήν... ...[τῇ] διανοίᾳ ἐπιβλε[π]... ...καὶ οὐ μόν[ον]... ...διαφοράς...

...ταῦτα... ...Σημαίνομεν τῶ... ...τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τήν... ...τῇ διανοίᾳ Ἐπιβλεπ...
...καὶ οὐ μόνον... ...διαφοράς...

...these things... ...We indicate to... ...the sensations and the... ...[] Fully see
with the [mental] perception... ...and not only... ...differences...

σημαίνειν	to indicate	ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>sign making</i> <i>known</i>
ἡ αἴσθησις αἱ αἰσθήσεις	^[A] sensation	ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ <i>perceiving</i> <i>process</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	^[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking upon</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 2)

...ἔλεγε... ...[ἐπ]ιβο[λ]ήν... ...κατὰ τὴν διδ[α]σ[καλί]αν ὠιχόμεθα ἐπὶ τοῖς... ...αἰσθητοῖς ἰδίο[ις]... ...πλάνης δ[ηλ]οῦντ[ες]...
...[τ]ὸ ἀφανές... ...ἐπ’ αὐτῆς... ...οὐ [μ]ὴν ἀλλ’ ἐ[τύ]χομέ[γ] γε οὐδὲ [κ]ακῶς ἐπ[ιν]ενοη[κ]ότες τὴν διδ[α]σ[καλί]αν...
...πρ[ο]φανοῦσα...

...Ἐλεγε... ...ἐπιβολήν... ...κατὰ τὴν διδασκαλίαν, Ὡιχόμεθα ἐπὶ τοῖς...
...αἰσθητοῖς ἰδίοις... ...πλάνης Δηλοῦντες... ...τὸ ἀφανές... ...ἐπ’ αὐτῆς... ...οὐ μὴν
ἀλλ’ Ἐτύχομέγ γε οὐδὲ κακῶς ἐπινενοηκότες τὴν διδασκαλίαν... ...προφανοῦσα...

...You [Mētródōros] were saying... ...attention... ...according to the teaching,
We went toward the... ...to what is sensible particular [to each sense]...
...with [us] making clear an error... ...the unseen... ...upon it... ...yet
nevertheless, We happened to have objectively conceived about the
teaching not at all badly... ...coming to light...

ἡ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	^[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>teaching</i>
ἡ διδασκαλία αἱ διδασκαλῖαι	teaching	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑ <i>teaching</i>

οἷχεσθαι	to be gone	ΟΙΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>having departed</i>
αἰσθητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	^(A) sensible	ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ <i>perceiving</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
ή πλάνη αί πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ <i>roaming</i>
ἐνδηλος <i>(ον)</i>	^(Θ) fully clear	ΕΝΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear within</i>
δηλοῦν	to make clear	ΔΗΛΟΥΝ <i>clear</i>
δηλῶν	making clear	ΔΗΛΩΝ
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	ΕΠΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing upon</i>
ἐπινενοηκώς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	having objectively conceived	ΕΠΙΝΕΝΟΗΚΩΣ <i>saw upon</i>
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
προφαίνειν	to appear	ΠΡΟΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing forth</i>
προφαίνων <i>(προφανοῦσα προφαῖνον)</i>	to come to light	ΠΡΟΦΑΙΝΩΝ <i>appearing forth</i>

28.13 "All Errors Come from Language Conventions"

(Former Teaching)

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 3)

...ναι ἐπὶ πλείω συ[ν]οι[κει]οῦν ὧι αὐτοὶ βουλόμε[θα]. εἰ δὲ τότε [τα]υτό τι διαν[ο]οῦμενοι ἐλέγομεν κατὰ [τ]ὴν [ἐ]κκειμένην ἐρμηνίαν τῷ ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ ἀμ[α]ρτία ἐστὶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ τῷμ προλήψεων γιγν[ό]μενον καὶ τῷμ φαιν[ομ]ένων διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐ[θ]ισμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, καὶ... ...δ[ι]ὰ τ[α]ῦτα ἢ δεδί[χαμεν]... ...προλήψεσι...
...πᾶν ῥήσεις...

...ναί, ἐπὶ πλείω συνοικειοῦν ὧ Αὐτοὶ βουλόμεθα – εἰ δὲ τότε ταυτό τι διανοοῦμενοι Ἐλέγομεν κατὰ τὴν ἐκκειμένην ἐρμηνίαν: τῷ ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ Ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔχουσα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν προλήψεων γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν φαινομένων διὰ τοὺς πολυτρόπους ἐθισμοὺς τῶν λέξεων, καὶ... ...διὰ ταῦτα ἢ Δεδίχαμεν... ...προλήψεσι... ...πᾶν Ῥήσεις...

...indeed, to integrate [common terms into technical vocabulary] more closely with what We ourselves want – but if at that time, thinking the same thing, We were speaking according to the interpretation [then] set-forth: in which [we said] that every human Error exists having no different shape than what is produced due to the multifaceted conventions of terms upon the preapprehensions and [upon] the appearances [of objects] , and... ...because of these things, We have split [them] into two... ...[with the] anticipations...
...every Saying...

[Sedley] ...< >...If in those days we used to express an opinion equivalent, in the terminology which we then employed, to saying that all human error is exclusively of the form that arises in relation to preconceptions and appearances because of the manifold conventions of language... < >...

[Sedley] In earlier years the attitude to language had been different in the Epicurean school, where they had altered the names of things if they judged them on an empirical basis to be false, and that they had regarded the inexactness of common parlance – and the consequent difficulty of identifying perceived objects with the correct name – as the source of all human errors of thinking.

This attitude, summed up by the phrase "*because of the manifold habituations of language*," i.e., "*due to the multifaceted conventions of terms*," represents the young Epíkouros' former view, which was still under the influence of the Democritean school which made these very same conventionalist claims.

πλείων <i>(ον)</i>	more / greater	ΠΛΕΙΩΝ <i>more filling</i>
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οἰκεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	belonging	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>
οἰκείως	comfortably	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ <i>appropriate</i>
συνοικειοῦν	to integrate <i>[common terms into technical vocabulary]</i>	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ <i>appropriate together</i>
βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ <i>council</i>
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>seeing through</i>
συγκεῖσθαι	to be compounded	ΣΥΓΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting together</i>
κεῖσθαι	to lie [down]	ΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting</i>
ἐκκεῖσθαι	to set fourth	ΕΚΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>setting out</i>
ἡ ἐρμηνεία αἱ ἐρμηνεῖαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ <i>explaining</i>
ἀναμάρτητος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	mistake-free	ΑΝΑΜΑΡΤΗΤΟΣ <i>not missing the mark</i>
ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	ἍΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ <i>missing the mark</i>
ἡ ἁμαρτία αἱ ἁμαρτίαι	mistake	ἍΜΑΡΤΙΑ <i>failing</i>
ἡ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ <i>roaming</i>
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
ἕτερος <i>(ἐτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)</i>	different [other / another]	ἙΤΕΡΟΣ <i>other</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>before taking hold</i>
γινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	produced	ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>become</i>
ἀποφαινόμενος <i>(ομένη, όμενον)</i>	representing	ΑΠΟΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing away</i>
φαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	appearing	ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long [of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
πολύτροπος	multifaceted [lit. "of many ways"]	ΠΟΛΥΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>much direction</i>
ιδιότροπος <i>(ον)</i>	particular type of	ΙΔΙΟΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>particular way</i>
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ὁ ἐθισμός οἱ ἐθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of being accustomed</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
διχάζειν	to split into two	ΔΙΧΑΖΕΙΝ <i>two</i>
ῥηθεῖς <i>(εῖσα, έν)</i> ῥηθέντες <i>(εῖσαι, έντα)</i>	said	ῬΗΘΕΙΣ <i>said</i>
ἡ ῥῆσις αἱ ῥήσεις	saying	ῬΗΣΙΣ <i>said</i>

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 12 (col. 5)

...[οὐ]κ ἐπιμαρτυ[ρ]ήσεις γίν[ν]ονται πολλαῖ... ...ἀλλ’ ἄγουσ[ι]... ...[ἀ]δήλους ἡμᾶς εἶναι [πό]τερα ὅλως ἐπελελήσμ[ε]θα ταύτης τῆς δόξης καὶ τ[ἀ ἐν]αντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐλ[άβ]ομεν, ὥσπερ [κ]αὶ ἄλλοι π[ο]λλοὶ ἐμπολλοῖς, ἢ ἐμεμνήμεθαμέν, οὐ[δὲ]ν δὲ οὐδὲ [τὸ] ἀνα[γ]καῖον...

...οὐκ^[M] Ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις γίνονται **πολλαῖ**... ...ἀλλ’ ἄγουσι... ...**ἀδήλους ἡμᾶς εἶναι** **πότερα ὅλως** Ἐπελελήσμεθα **ταύτης τῆς δόξης** καὶ **τὰ ἐναντία** ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς Ἐλάβομεν: ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ **ἐμ πολλοῖς** – ἢ Ἐμεμνήμεθαμέν. οὐδὲν δὲ, οὐδὲ **τὸ ἀναγκαῖον**...

...not many^[M] Attestations are produced... ...but They lead... ...Us being unclear as to whether We have entirely let this judgment be forgotten or [whether] We comprehended something opposing even to ourselves: just as many others [have] in many [cases] – or We remembered it. but in no way, not even what is necessary...

^[Sedley] that it is unclear whether we completely forgot this opinion and took the standpoint opposed to ourselves, as many others have also done in many cases, or remembered it, but...

ἢ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	attestation	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>action of testifying upon</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long ^[of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
συνάγειν	to gather	ΣΥΝΑΓΕΙΝ <i>going together</i>
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ <i>going</i>
ἄδηλος <i>(ον)</i>	⁽⁰⁾ unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΣ
ὅλως	entirely	ὍΛΩΣ <i>whole</i>
λανθάνειν	to escape notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ <i>to be hidden</i>
ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι	to let X be forgotten about <i>(+ genitive)</i>	ΕΠΙΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>to be hidden</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
τὸ ἐναντίον τὰ ἐναντία	what is opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ
λαμβάνειν	^[intellectually] to comprehend, ^[generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
μιμνήσκειν	to recall	ΜΙΜΝΗΣΚΕΙΝ <i>thinking "again"</i>
μιμνήσκεσθαι	to be reminded	ΜΙΜΝΗΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ <i>thinking "again"</i>

28.15 Mētródōros' Past Epistemology

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr.12 (col. 6)

...[τ]ίθηι τὸ παραθεῖναι τὸ... ...[τ]οῦ τρόπου τοῦ περὶ [τὰς οὐκ] ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις [καὶ ἀντι]μαρτυρήσεις πῶς... ...ἢ μανθάνειν...
...[ἐνα]ντίως περὶ τοῦ... ...[προ]σδοξάζον... ...καὶ φαίνεται... ...διελ[έ]γου... ...[ἀ]οράτας ἔφερε...

...Τίθηι **τὸ παραθεῖναι, τὸ**... ...**τοῦ τρόπου τοῦ περὶ**^[~M] **τὰς οὐκ** ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις καὶ^[W] **ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις, πῶς**... ...**ἢ μανθάνειν**... ...**ἐναντίως περὶ τοῦ**...
...^[Δ+] **προσδοξάζον**... ...καὶ **Φαίνεται**... ...**Διελέγου**... ...^[0] **ἀοράτας** Ἐφερε...

...You put the [act of] juxtaposing [conventional vs. natural usage], which...
...of the way which concerns the ^[-M] non-attestations and ^[W] contestations,
how... ...or to learn... ...oppositingly about the... ...[which] adds ^[Δ+] judgment...
...and It appears... ...You were giving a discourse... ...It carried ^[O] the unseen
[things]...

συντιθέναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing together</i>
προστιθέναι	to put into	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing toward</i>
τιθέναι	to put	ΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing</i>
παρατιθέναι	to juxtapose	ΠΑΡΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing alongside</i>
ἡ παράθεσις αἱ παραθέσεις	juxtaposition	ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΙΣ <i>process of placing alongside</i>
τὸ παραθεῖναι	the [act of] juxtaposing	
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
τὸ προσμένον τὰ προσμένοντα	^[O] what is still pending <i>[further attestation]</i>	ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣΜΕΝΟΝ <i>remaining further</i>
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	^{M} to attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying upon</i>
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενα	^[M] what is attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of testifying upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	attestation	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>action of testifying upon</i>
τὸ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον	^[-M] what is not attested	
ἡ ἐπιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις	attestation	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>action of testifying upon</i>
ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν	^{W} to contest	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying against</i>
τὸ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον τὰ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενα	^[W] what is contested	
ἡ ἀντιμαρτύρησις αἱ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις	contestatation	ΑΝΤΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΣΙΣ <i>action of testifying against</i>
μανθάνειν	to learn	ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ <i>thinking</i>
ὑπεναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	contrary	ΎΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>over against</i>
ἐναντίος <i>(α, ον)</i>	opposing	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΣ <i>in against</i>
ἐναντίως	oppositingly	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ <i>in against</i>
τὸ προσδοξαζόμενον	^[Δ+] the addition of judgement	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition to seeming</i>
προσδοξάζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	^{Δ+} adding [one's] judgment to	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΩΝ <i>addition to seeming</i>
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
διαλέγειν	to give a discourse	ΔΙΑΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly speaking / choosing</i>
ἀόρατος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ <i>not looking</i>

φέρειν	to carry	ΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing</i>
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Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. L (col. 5)

...φεύγεις τὸμ β[ίον ὑπὸ] τ[ῶμ] πολλῶν εἰλη[μμένον]... ...δέ τις ταῦ[τα]... ...σοφοῦ...

...Φεύγεις **τὸμ βίον** ὑπὸ **τῶμ πολλῶν εἰλημμένον**... ...**δέ Τις ταῦτα**... ...**σοφοῦ**...

...You flee **the lifestyle acquired** by the public... ...but Someone [] **these** []...
...of the wise man...

ἐκφεύγειν	to flow out from	ΕΚΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ <i>fleeing out</i>
φεύγειν	to flee	ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ <i>fleeing</i>
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ <i>life</i>
εἰλημμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	[intellectually] having been comprehended, [generally] having been acquired	ΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 2 sup.)

...[ψ]ευδεῖ[ς]... ...ἐπεπιπτ[ει]... ...τούτοις τι [ὥς] λέγεις, Μητρόδ[ωρε] – ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία – τῶμ μὲν καθ' ἕκα[σ]τα οὐκ ἄμ φήσαιμι[ι
τ]ότε γε συλλογισμόν, ἐ[φ' ᾧ ἐσημ]α[ῖ]ωμέν τι, εἰδέναι...
*addidi [ει]

...**ψευδεῖς**... ...Ἐπεπίπτει... ...**τούτοις τι** ὥς **Λέγεις, Μητρόδωρε** – **ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία!** – **τῶν μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα**, οὐκ ἂν **Φήσαιμι, τότε γε, συλλογισμόν** (**ἐφ' ᾧ Ἔσημαίωμέν τι**) **εἰδέναι**...

...false... ...it falls upon... ...somewhat for those [words], just as You say,
Metrodorus – **but by Zeus!** – I would not assert, **at least at that time**, to have
known **the inference of those [words] concerning each thing** (by which We
would indicate **something**)...

[Sedley] ...but I would not say that in those days you were familiar with
reasoning about individual things, which was the basis on which we assigned
meanings...

ψευδής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ <i>deceiving</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
ἐμπίπτειν	to fall in	ΕΜΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling in</i>
ἐπιπίπτειν	to fall upon	ΕΠΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling upon</i>
Μητρόδωρος	Metrodorus	ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ <i>gift [to] mother</i>
ὁ Ζεύς (τοῦ διός)	Zeus	ΖΕΥΣ <i>sky god / day</i>
μὰ Δία!	by Zeus!	
ἕκαστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	each <i>(with plural verb)</i>	ἙΚΑΣΤΟΝ <i>each</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>

ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i>
σημαίνειν	to indicate	ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>sign making known</i>
εἰδέναι	<i>to have mentally seen ∴</i> "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing</i>

28.16 Lack of Discernment in Linguistic Conventions

*In his early days, Mētródōros had been establishing vocabulary while **disregarding convention** (probably in an attempt to only use the original image-based meaning of a particular word). In building up a private terminology in this way, Mētródōros had chosen some words **without fully considering "the association of certain [linguistic] conventions."***

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 2 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 3 sup.)

...κ[αί ἄ]νευ τῆς [τινων]ν *έθισμ[ῶν συ]γοικεώ[σεως έ]πιφέρω[ν τότε έτ]υχες, [μή] δήλομ ποιώιης τὸ πάντα φθόγγον
έπιφέροντα δοξάζειν τόδε τι κα[ί] τήν τῶν ὀνομάτ[ω]ν κα[ί π]ραγμά|τω[ν | ά]δι[αλ]ηψία[ν ὀρ]ώμ περ[ι]ν[ω]ίως.

**Orazi supplevit έθισμ[ῶν], Sedley emendavit ad έθισμ[ῶν]*

...καὶ ἄνευ τῆς τινων έσθισμῶν συνοικεώσεως έπιφέρων τότε”Ετυχες – μή **δῆλον Ποιώης**: τὸ **πάντα φθόγγον έπιφέροντα Δοξάζειν τόδε τι** – καὶ **τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων άδιαληψίαν ὀρῶν**, Περινοώης

...and You happened to be applying [your choice of words] **at that time** without the association of certain conventions [which have been developed] – [thus] You would not have made **clear**: the [fact that] Judging **every expression applies to a certain [judgment* – but you were]** still seeing [the public] indiscrimination of words vs. [practical] situations, [and] You were fully conceiving [this issue]

[Sedley] ...< >...and you also used in those days to assign [names] without adapting certain conventional usages, in order that you should not make plain the principle that by assigning any name one expresses a particular opinion,* and see and reflect upon the indiscriminate treatment of words and objects.

** i.e., most words naturally apply to an originally specific concept.*

τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ὁ ἔθισμός οἱ ἔθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of being accustomed</i>
οἰκείως	comfortably	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ <i>appropriate</i>
συνοικειοῦν	to integrate <i>[common terms into technical vocabulary]</i>	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ <i>appropriate together</i>
ἡ συνοικεώσις αἱ συνοικεώσεις	association	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΩΣΙΣ <i>appropriate together</i>
ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing upon</i>
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
δῆλος <i>(η, ον)</i>	^(θ) clear	ΔΗΛΟΣ <i>clear</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>uttering</i>

ἐπιφέρειν	to apply to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing upon</i>
ἐπιφέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	applying to	ΕΠΙΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing upon</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ἡ λῆψις αἱ λῆψεις	<i>comprehension</i>	ΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold</i>
ἡ ἀδιαληψία αἱ ἀδιαληψίαι	indiscrimination	ΑΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΑ <i>not taking hold</i> <i>separation</i> <i>This word is only found in Epikouros and Philodemus (who uses it frequently)</i>
ὀρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ὀρῶν <i>(ῶσα, ῶν)</i>	seeing	ὍΡΩΝ
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
περινοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΠΕΡΙΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing around</i>
ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>process of</i> <i>reasoning action</i> <i>upon</i>

28.17 Former Indiscrimination

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 3 sup.)

κά[γῶ] δ' ἔβλεπον ὅ[τι] οὐ ποιήσας διάφορα τά[δε] ἢ τάδε εἶναι λέγειν τάδε [φ]ῆς αἰρεῖσθαι τ[ῶι] δ[ὲ] [ῆ] βελ[τίο]ν εἶναι ἢ τάδε·
ἄλλ' ὀνόμασιν οἷς δήποτε χρώμε[ν]ον οἷόν τε φ[ή]σας [εἰ]ῖναι [λέγει]ν τὰ πράγματα, πᾶ[σιν ἐνε]δικνύου ἡμῖν τε τοῖς [τε
σοφίας] μετεσχηκόσιμ[ι μόνον ὅτι οἱ]κειότερόν ἐστ[ι]ν... ...τόδε τ[ι λ]έγε[ις]...

**Orazi supplevit ἐσθ[ι]σμ[ῶν], Sedley emendavit ad ἐθισμ[ῶν]*

κ'Αγὼ δ' ἔβλεπον ὅτι, οὐ ποιήσας **διάφορα τάδε ἢ τάδε εἶναι** – **λέγειν τάδε** Φῆς **αἰρεῖσθαι τῷ δὴ βελτίον εἶναι ἢ τάδε** – ἄλλ' **ὀνόμασιν οἷς δήποτε** χρώμενον οἷόν **τε** φήσας εἶναι λέγειν **τὰ πράγματα, πᾶσιν ἐνεδικνύου ἡμῖν, τε τοῖς τε σοφίας μετεσχηκόσιν, μόνον ὅτι οἰκειότερόν' ἔστιν... ...τόδε τι, Λέγεις...**

and I was seeing that, [with you] not having made **these [words]** or **those [words] to be different** – [and] with You [not] asserting that **these [words]** are chosen for speaking **because they are actually better than those [words]** – but with [you] using **whatever words at any time**, such as also asserting that it is possible to speak of **[practical] situations [in this way]**, you were indicating **to all of us**, and **to those others who also have partaken in wisdom**, only that It is **more fitting... ...this certain thing**, You say...

[Sedley] And I too used to notice that you did not establish a difference between two sets of words and then say that you chose one set because it was better than choosing the other; instead, by saying that it was possible to use any name at all in speaking of things, you demonstrated to everyone, both to us and to those who have a share of wisdom, merely, that it is more suitable...

κάγῶ = καὶ + ἐγώ	and I	ΚΑΙ + ΕΓΩ <i>myself</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ποιήσας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	having made	ΠΟΙΗΣΑΣ <i>gathering</i>

διάφορος <i>(ον)</i>	differing	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΣ <i>carrying apart</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
αἰρεῖν	to choose	ΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>taking</i>
αἰρεῖσθαι	to choose for oneself	ΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ
βελτίων <i>(ων, ον)</i>	better	ΒΕΛΤΙΩΝ
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ὅπωςδήποτε	in any way	ὍΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ <i>indefinite</i> <i>in what way</i>
δήποτε	ever, at any time	ΔΗΠΟΤΕ
χρώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
οἷος <i>(οἷα, οἷον)</i>	such as [here "as if"]	ΟΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ἐνδείκνυσθαι	to be indicated in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΣΘΑΙ <i>showing in</i>
ἐνδεικνύναι	to indicate in	ΕΝΔΕΙΚΝΥΝΑΙ <i>showing in</i>
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
ἡ σοφία αἱ σοφίαι	wisdom	ΣΟΦΙΑ <i>knowledge</i>
μετέχειν	to partake	ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold among</i>
μετεσχηκώς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	having partaken in	ΜΕΤΕΣΣΧΗΚΩΣ <i>hold among</i>
μετεσχηκέναι	to have partaken in	ΜΕΤΕΣΣΧΗΚΕΝΑΙ <i>hold among</i>
οἰκεῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	belonging	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>
οἰκειότερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	more fitting	ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΕΡΟΣ <i>appropriate</i>

28.18 Appreciating Natural Constraints

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 3 inf.)

...τὸ σχῆμα... ...ἀναλογισμοῦ τοῦ... ...τ' ἐπρατ[τε]ς τότε, νῦ[ν] συνορῶ τότε δ' οὐ· καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος δὲ πιεσμοὺς τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἕκαστα λέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος νῦν συνορῶ τότε δ' οὐ. καὶ...

...τὸ σχῆμα... ...ἀναλογισμοῦ τοῦ... ...τ' Ἐπραττες τότε, νῦν Συνορῶ, τότε δ' οὐ – καὶ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος δὲ πιεσμοὺς τοῦ ὀρθῶς Ἐκαστα λέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος – νῦν Συνορῶ, τότε δ' οὐ. καὶ...

...the shape [of external objects]... ...of analogical consideration [i.e., conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]... ...and [what] You were accomplishing then, now I fully see, but not then – and also the constraints for each part of Each [word choice] being correctly spoken in regards to this form [of words that are only mentally envisionable by analogy to the visible], now I fully see, but not then. and...

[Sedley] ...[what] you were doing in those days I now see, although I did not at the time. And I also now see, although I did not at the time, the particular difficulties, with regard to this class, of using the correct names for individual things.* And [nothing would be consistent with them]...

**As we have seen, by the time of this writing, Epikouros had given up this quest for an entirely accurate philosophical vocabulary.*

τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
ἀναλογικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ <i>reasoned again</i>
ἀναλογιστέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be reasoning action again</i>
ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
τὸ ἀναλόγισμα τὰ ἀναλογίσματα <i>[a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>	analogous thought	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of action of reasoning back</i>
ὁ ἀναλογισμός οἱ ἀναλογισμοί <i>[conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>	analogical consideration	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action again</i>
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
συνορᾶν	to fully see <i>[mentally]</i>	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
κατὰ μέρος	for [the details of] each part	
ὁ πιεσμός οἱ πιεσμοί	constraint	ΠΙΕΣΜΟΣ <i>pressure</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ὀρθῶς	^{α} correctly	ΟΡΘΩΣ <i>straight upright</i>
ἕκαστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	each <i>(with plural verb)</i>	ἕΚΑΣΤΟΝ <i>each</i>

28.19 Concession to Convention

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 4 sup.)

...οὐ συσταίῃ ἂν τι πρὸς αὐτά ἢ διαπορῆσαι ποικίλως νῦν ἐπιβλέβω, ὥς ἐγῶμαι. ἔπε[ι] καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόμ[η] που, [ὀρθῶς] ταῖς αὐταῖς αἰρέσε[σι] τ[ῶ]μ[η] φωνῶ[ν] κατὰ τὴν διδ[α]σκαλίαν χρήσαιτό τις ἂν, εἴπερ ταῦτα ἡμῖ[μ] βλέποι ἐκ τοῦ[τοῦ] αὐτοῦ γ[ε] ἰδίου ε[ἵ]δη, μὴ πολὺ παρηλ[λα] γμέναι[ς] φύσει περι[τ]έσοι. [τὸ] δ' ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὰ πρ[α]γματα [ῆ]λέ[γχε]το εἰ πολὺ παρηλλα- [γμέναις φύσει]ν... ...ἀν[αλόγ]ισμ[α γὰρ] ἡμεῖς... ...κατὰ τοῦ[ς] φ[θό]γγ[ους]...

1) ...οὐ συσταίῃ ἂν Τι πρὸς αὐτά ↔ ἢ διαπορῆσαι ποικίλως: νῦν Ἐπιβλέβω, ὥς Ἐγῶμαι

...Something would not be composed in relation to them ↔ or rather it would be uncertain in various ways: now, I suspect, I fully see this

[Sedley] And nothing would be consistent with them. *◀Sedley thinks a line was skipped here when the text was copied▶* which instead of ignoring or doubting it, I now think I see vividly.

2) ἐπεὶ, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόν, που ὀρθῶς ταῖς αὐταῖς αἰρέσεσι τῶν φωνῶν κατὰ τὴν διδασκαλίαν χρήσαιτό Τις ἂν: εἴπερ, ταῦτα, ἡμῖν, Βλέποι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε ἰδίου εἶδη – μὴ πολὺ παρηλλαγμέναις φύσει Περιπέσοι

since, *as is said [by us]*, Someone would perhaps correctly use the same choices of statements according to the teaching: if indeed, like us, He would see that *these [choices of statements correspond to] forms [i.e., physical attributes]* from the same particular [characteristic] – so that He did not fall upon *[applying the same word to objects with]* very much varied natures

[Sedley] For, as I have said, a person would be correct to make the same choices of vocabulary in the exposition of philosophy, provided that we could count on his seeing that these are classes resulting from the same distinguishing characteristic, in order that he should avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative changes.

Epikouros says that the philosopher may use words from ordinary language provided that he always keeps in view the distinguishing characteristics from which they draw their meanings, so as to avoid the pitfalls involved in completely changing the class of object referred to.

3) Τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὰ πράγματα ἡλέγχετο – εἰ πολὺ παρηλλαγμέναις φύσεσιν...
...ἀναλόγισμα γὰρ ἡμεῖς... ...κατὰ τοὺς φθόγγους...

but The [fact] that it was not refuted according to the situations [i.e., showed no practical consequences] – if with very much varied natures... ...for We [use] analogous thought [i.e., a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]... ...according to the expressions...

[Sedley] The fact that there was no factual refutation of someone who [was ensnared] by major qualitative changes...

συνιστάναι	to compose	ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ <i>standing together</i>
τὸ ἀπόρημα τὰ ἀπορήματα	question	ΑΠΟΡΗΜΑ <i>result of doubting</i>
ἡ διαπορία αἱ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ <i>doubting across</i>
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epikouros	
διαπορεῖν	to be in uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΕΙΝ <i>doubting through</i>
ποικίλως	in various ways	ΠΟΙΚΙΛΩΣ <i>intricate</i>
ἐπιβλέπειν	to fully see	ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking upon</i>
οἷεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
ἐγῶμαι = ἐγώ + οἶμαι	I suspect	
Part 2		
λεγόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being said	ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>speaking</i>
ὀρθῶς	{α} correctly	ΟΡΘΩΣ <i>straight upright</i>
ἡ αἵρεσις αἱ αἱρέσεις	choice	Αἶρεσις
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
διδάσκειν	to teach	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙΝ <i>teaching</i>
ἡ διδασκαλία αἱ διδασκαλαί	teaching	ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑ <i>teaching</i>
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>necessary</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
ἴδιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	particular	ΙΔΙΟΣ <i>particular</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>

πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long ^[of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
ή παραλλαγή αί παραλλαγαί	variety	ΠΑΡΑΛΛΑΓΗ <i>changing across</i>
παρηλλαγμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having been varied	ΠΑΡΗΛΛΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ
περιπίπτειν	to fall [upon]	ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling around</i>
Part 3		
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ἐλέγχειν	to refute	ΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ <i>confuting</i> <i>[with contrary proof]</i>
ὁ ἀναλογισμός οἱ ἀναλογισμοί	analogical consideration	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action</i> <i>again</i> <i>[conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>
τὸ ἀναλόγισμα τὰ ἀναλογίσματα	analogous thought	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of</i> <i>action of</i> <i>reasoning back</i> <i>[a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>
ή λέξις αί λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
ή διάλεκτος αί διάλεκτοι	way of speaking	ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΣ <i>speaking across</i>
τὸ ἰδίωμα τὰ ιδιώματα	idiom	ΙΔΙΩΜΑ <i>particular</i>
ή ὁμιλία αί ὁμιλῖαι	common usage	ὍΜΙΛΙΑ <i>association</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
ή ὀνομασία αί ὀνομασίαι	designation	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ <i>state of name</i>
ὁ φθόγγος οἱ φθόγγοι	[verbal] expression	ΦΘΟΓΓΟΣ <i>uttering</i>

Generally speaking, a "linguistic conventionalist" thinks *that languages come about only by convention. The conventionalist denies a word's intrinsic relationship to any class of objects and therefore asserts that any class of objects can be referred to by any word – and no particular word is better per se for this purpose. With no natural anchor, there can be no "incorrect usage."*

In contrast, Epíkouros recognizes that – even though linguistic conventions are increasingly added as a language matures and these conventions make it less objective – nevertheless there is an intrinsic relationship between a class of objects and the primary expression naturally used (specific to race and location) to identify that class in an objective (i.e., image-based) way. With a natural anchor, there can be a "correct usage."

28.20 Respecting Linguistic Associations

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 4 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 5 sup.)

...ὕπὸ τε [τοῖς] αὐ[τ]οῖς[ς] τρ[ό]ποις τῶ[μ] περιπιπτόντ[ων] το[ύ]τ[ο]ις, πέπεισμαι διαβλέπειν ὡς διηροῦμεν, ὡς σο[φ]ῖ ἐνο[υ]εῖτο, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ τινὲς ἂν ἐγδέξαιντο. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ εὐκαιρόν | ἐστ[ι] ταῦτ[α] προφέροντα μηκύνει[ν].· [κ]αὶ μαλ' ὀρθῶς [γε, ὦ] Μητρόδωρε·

...ὕπὸ τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόποις τῶν περιπιπτόντων τούτοις: Πέπεισμαι διαβλέπειν, ὡς Διηροῦμεν – ὡς σοῖ Ἐνοεῖτο – καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Τινὲς ἂν ἐγδέξαιντο. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ εὐκαιρόν Ἔστι ταῦτα προφέροντα μηκύνειν: καὶ μαλ' ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Μητρόδωρε

...under the same ways of [thinking as] those falling upon these [words: which ways of thinking] I am persuaded that I discern, as We were differentiating [back then] – as It was conceived within you – and not just as Some [people]* might accept. but perhaps It is not convenient to lengthen out these [topics] being offered: and very correctly so, Metrodorus

[Sedley] ... < >...am convinced that I see them clearly in the way in which we used to distinguish them, as you took the meaning, and not in the senses in which certain people* would understand them. Perhaps, though, you might say that it is inappropriate to lengthen the discussion by citing these cases. Quite so, Metrodorus.

**probably the group in Megara led by Diódōros "Krónos" (who maintained a conventionalist view of language), rather than the group in Megara led by Stilpo (who held a more naturalist view).*

Epíkouros' contemporary Diódōros "Krónos" tried (like Zeno of Elea about 150 years before him) to bring the skill of the dialectician to use in defense of the doctrines of Parmenides. For example, Diódōros had four arguments for the impossibility of motion:

- 1. *STUCK MINIMA PARADOX: Atomic minima can never move – because they are always "in the same place" relative to the surrounding minima.*
- 2. *EXACT LOCATION PARADOX: If something is moving, it is moving either "in the place it is in," or "in the place it is not in."*
- 3. *IMMOBILITY PARADOX: Everything that exists is "in a place," but being "in a place" means being at rest.*
- 4. *THE MINIMA MAJORITY PARADOX: If two moving parts out of three make "the body move," then continually adding more non-moving parts should not change the fact that the body is moving, even though it will become mostly composed of non-moving parts.*

ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
περιπίπτειν	to fall [upon]	ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling around</i>
περιπίπτων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	falling [upon]	ΠΕΡΙΠΙΠΤΩΝ <i>falling around</i>
πείθειν	to persuade	ΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ <i>convincing</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>seeing</i>
διορᾶν	to distinguish	ΔΙΟΡΑΝ <i>seeing through</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
διαβλέπειν	to discern	ΔΙΑΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking through</i>
διαιρεῖν	to differentiate	ΔΙΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>grasping through</i>
νοεῖν	to conceive	ΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing</i>
ἐνοεῖν = ἐν + νοεῖν	to conceive within	ΕΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing in</i>
καθάπερ	just as	ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ <i>thoroughly just as</i>
τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα	possibility [of]	
ἐγδέχεσθαι = ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΓΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>accepting in</i>

ἴσως	perhaps	ΙΣΩΣ <i>equal / likely</i>
καιριώτατος	most opportune	ΚΑΙΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>time</i>
εὔκαιρος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	convenient	ΕΥΚΑΙΡΟΣ <i>good time</i>
φέρων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	carrying	ΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing</i>
προφέρων	offering	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing forward</i>
τό μήκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>length</i>
μηκύνειν	to lengthen out	ΜΗΚΥΝΕΙΝ <i>extent</i>
ὀρθῶς	^{α} correctly	ΟΡΘΩΣ <i>straight upright</i>
Μητροδόωρος	Metrodorus	ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ <i>gift [to]</i> <i>mother</i>

28.21 Examples of Absurd Language Usage

Diódōros "Krónos," who's name literally means *'Gift of Zeus, "the Old Fool,"'* gave some of his slaves extremely absurd names (imitating Hermogenes in Plato's Cratylus) – even naming one of his slaves *"Yet indeed"* (**Ἀλλὰ μὲν**) *as his proof that language and grammar are purely conventional (and thus no word is inherently better than another as a label).*

Nevertheless, naming a slave "Yet indeed" (Ἀλλὰ μὲν) does not prove language is purely conventional; it merely shows that absurd naming is possible, which was never in dispute.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 5 sup.)

πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαί σε πολλὰ ἂν ἔχειμ προε[ν]έγκα σθαι ἃ ἐθεώρεις γελοίως [π]ί[ω]ς τι[να]ς ἐγδεξαμένους καὶ π[ί]αντα μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὰς λέξεις, οὐκ ἔξω τῶν ἰθισμένων λέξεων ἡμῶν χρωμένων οὐδὲ μετατιθέντων ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶμ φανε[ρ]ῶν.

πάνυ γὰρ Οἶμαί Σε πολλὰ ἂν ἔχειν προενέγκασθαι ἃ Ἐθεώρεις γελοίως πώς Τίνας ἐγδεξαμένους – καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ νοούμενον κατὰ τὰς λέξεις: οὐκ ἔξω τῶν ἰθισμένων λέξεων Ἡμῶν χρωμένων – οὐδὲ μετατιθέντων ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῶν φανερῶν

for I wholly suspect that You [Mētródōros] would have set forth many [examples of words] which You envisioned Certain [people] accepted [the use of] in some ridiculous way – and [You saw] every [meaning accepted] rather than what is [clearly] conceived according to the terms: while [in contrast] We are using the terms not out of their customary [bounds of meaning] – nor while changing words for evident things

[Sedley] For I do not doubt that you could cite many cases, from your own past observations, of certain people taking words in various ridiculous senses, and indeed in every sense in preference to their actual linguistic meanings, whereas our own usage does not flout linguistic convention, nor do we alter names with regard to the objects of perception.

ὅλως	entirely	ὍΛΩΣ <i>whole</i>
πᾶς <i>(πᾶσα, πᾶν)</i>	whole	ΠΑΣ <i>all</i>
πάνυ	wholly	ΠΑΝΥ <i>all</i>
οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
οἶμαί	I suspect	
προφέρειν	to set forth	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing forward</i>

θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
γελοΐως	ridiculously	ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ <i>laughing</i>
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>accepting in</i>
ἐγδεξάμενος = ἐνδεξάμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having accepted	ΕΓΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΣ ΕΝΔΕΞΑΜΕΝΟΣ <i>accepting in</i>
νοούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	conceived	ΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
τὰ ἔξω	external objects	ΕΞΩ <i>outside</i>
ἔξω	out of bounds	ΕΞΩ <i>outside</i>
ἰθύς <i>ionic for</i> εὐθύς <i>(εἶτα, ὕ)</i>	simply	ΙΘΥΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>direct</i>
ἰθισμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	customary	ΙΘΙΣΜΕΝΟΣ <i>direct</i>
χρώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
μετατιθέναι	to change [one's use of]	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing change</i>
μετατιθείς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	changing	ΜΕΤΑΤΙΘΕΙΣ <i>placing change</i>
τό ὄνομα τά ὀνόματα	word	ΟΝΟΜΑ <i>name</i>
φαίνειν	to appear	ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>appearing</i>
φανερὸς <i>(ἄ, ὀν)</i>	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ <i>appearing</i>

28.22 Guiding Those Who Seek Wellbeing
(Defense of Analogy)

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 5 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 6 sup.)

καταγέλαστο^γ γὰρ [δὴ] τι καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὄταμ... ...ψε[ῦδος]... ...μ[ὴ ἔ]τερο[ν]... ...μεταφορὰς ποι[εῖν φωνῶ]ν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνω[στα]
ὕ[πὸ τῶν γν]ωστῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς αὐ[τῶ]μ πλάνας ἅς λέγ[ο]μεν ἐν το[ύτ]ῃ Περι Ἀμ[φ]ιβολίας ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμ|μένοις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
τί τούτῶν ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διώρισται μέχρι πόσου φροντιστέον αὐτῶν ἅς ποτ' ἂν ἔχωσι καθ' ἡμῶν δόξας,
καὶ μέχρι πόσου τε καὶ ἐμ ποιῶμι λόγον οὐδένα ἐκτέον. αἰ[εῖ] δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἔνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν
κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους π[οι]εῖν, ἐπειδὴ [π]ερ... ...τὸμ β[ί]ου...

1) **καταγέλαστον γὰρ δὴ τι καὶ Τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὄταμ... ...^(-α) Ψεῦδος... ...μὴ ἔτερον...
...μεταφορὰς ποιεῖν φωνῶν^[ο] ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνωστα^[θ] ὑπὸ τῶν γνωστῶν – ἀλλὰ διὰ^[ν]
τὰς αὐτῶν πλάνας, ἅς λέγομεν ἐν τοῖς *Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας* ἡμῖν ἀναγεγραμμένοις**

for This too is indeed something thoroughly ridiculous, whenever...
...^(-α) Falsity... ...not different... ...[not because other people are] making
[metaphorical] transfers of statements^[ο] onto unknown [objects of thought]
^[θ] from known [objects of thought] – but because of their^[ν] own errors,
which We discuss in those [books] that have been written by us [entitled] *On Ambiguity*

[Sedley] For another absurdity is when... [not because] others transfer words
from the class of that which is knowable to denote that which is
unknowable, but because of their own errors, which we point out in our
work *On Ambiguity*.

2) **ἀλλὰ γὰρ, Τί τούτῶν ἡμῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλαχοῦ, γὰρ, Διώρισται μέχρι
πόσου Φροντιστέον αὐτῶν: ἅς ποτ' ἂν ἔχωσι καθ' ἡμῶν δόξας – καὶ μέχρι
πόσου τε καὶ ἐν ποιῶ, λόγον οὐδένα ἐκτέον**

but indeed, What from these people [is there] for us? for, in many places, It has been differentiated up to what extent One must be concerned with them: [regarding] whatever judgments They may have against us – and up to what extent and in what kind of [issues], One ought to hold onto none [of their] reasoning

[Sedley] But [you might say] why concern ourselves with these people? For we have frequently elsewhere defined to what extent we should heed whatever hostile opinions they hold towards us, and to what extent, and in what sort of circumstances, we should ignore them.

3) αἰεὶ δὲ τῶν εὐπαγῶν ἔνεκα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων τοὺς λόγους Ποιητέον, ἐπειδήπερ... ...τὸμ βίον...

but One must always make these reasonings for the purpose of those [people] well-composed and fully prepared for wellbeing, precisely because... ...the lifestyle...

[Sedley] We ought always to aim our discussions at the benefit of those who are sturdy disciples in the pursuit of happiness, since life...

γελοῖως	ridiculously	ΓΕΛΟΙΩΣ laughing
καταγέλαστος (ον)	thoroughly ridiculous	ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΑΣΤΟΣ thoroughly laughing
τὸ ψεῦδος τὰ ψεύδη	falsity	ΨΕΥΔΟΣ falsehood / lie
ἕτερος (ἐτέρᾱ, ἕτερον)	different [other / another]	ἕτερος other
ἢ φορά αἱ φόραι	transmission	ΦΟΡΑ carrying
ἢ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ carrying apart
ἢ μεταφορά αἱ μεταφοραί	transfer	ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ carrying change
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ gathering
ἢ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ speaking
γινώσκειν	to know	ΓΙΓΝΩΣΚΕΙΝ knowing process
τὸ ἄγνωστον τὰ ἄγνωστα	unknown thing	ΑΓΝΩΣΤΟΝ not knowing
γνωστός (ή, όν)	known	ΓΝΩΣΤΟΣ knowing
ἢ πλάνη αἱ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ roaming
τά ἄμφω	the pair	ΑΜΦΩ both
ἢ ἐπιβολή αἱ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ throwing upon
ἢ ἀμφιβολία αἱ ἀμφιβολιαί	ambiguity	ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ both throwing
Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας	"On Ambiguity" a book by Epíkouros	ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ both throwing
This book was not listed in Usener's list of Epíkouros' works		
ἢ διαπορία αἱ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ doubting across
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epíkouros	
τὰ ἀναγεγραμμένα	things written	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΑ written again
ἀναγεγραμμένος (η, ον)	having been written	ΑΝΑΓΕΓΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΣ
Part 2		

ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
πολλαχοῦ	in many places	ΠΟΛΛΑΧΟΥ <i>many</i>
διορίζειν	to differentiate	ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>between the border</i>
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ <i>until</i>
ὅσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	as much as	ὍΠΟΣΟΣ <i>some / certain which</i>
πόσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	how much / how far	ΠΟΣΟΣ <i>some / certain</i>
μέχρι πόσου	up to what extent	
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	concern	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ <i>mind</i>
φροντίζειν	to be concerned	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΖΕΙΝ <i>mind</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ποῖος <i>(α, ον)</i>	what kind of	ΠΟΙΟΣ <i>gathering</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
οὐδεὶς <i>(οὐδεμία, οὐδέν)</i>	no one	ΟΥΔΕΙΣ <i>not even one</i>
ἔχειν	to have	ΕΧΕΙΝ <i>holding</i>
ἐκτέον	it should be held	
Part 3		
αἰεὶ <i>lonic for</i> ἀεὶ	always	ΑΕΙ <i>forever</i>
εὐπαγής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	well composed	ΕΥΠΑΓΗΣ <i>fixing well</i>
ἡ εὐδαιμονία αἱ εὐδαιμονίαι	wellbeing	ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ <i>good spirit</i>
παρασκευάζειν	to provide	ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΖΕΙΝ <i>preparing alongside</i>
κατασκευαζόμενος	being provided [here, "fully prepared"]	
ἐπειδήπερ	precisely because	ΕΠΕΙΔΗΠΕΡ <i>since indeed certainly</i>
ὁ βίος οἱ βίοι	lifestyle	ΒΙΟΣ <i>life</i>

IDEAS

AN IDEA IS CORRECT IF IT MATCHES THE ENVIRONMENT		
{Δ●}	in an objective way <i>[tests impressions, externally focusing]</i>	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
OR IN		
{Δ◌◌}	in a speculative way <i>[tests envisionability]</i>	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of [mentally] observing</i>
[Δ+]	the addition of judgement	ΠΡΟΣΔΟΞΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of addition to seeming</i>
THAT INCLUDES		
[∇]	misinterpretations	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>fully missing the mark</i>

RESULTS IN A		
[∇+]	a false Judgment	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ <i>deceiving</i>
ψευδῆς Δόξα		
WHICH IS A JUDGMENT THAT NOT MATCH THE ENVIRONMENT:		
{¬Δ●}	not in an objective way	
κατὰ τὸν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον		
AND IN ANY		
{¬Δ◉}	not an envisionable way	
οὐ θεωρητικῶς		

28.23 Past Errors: Practical vs. merely Linguistic

*Epíkouros has raised certain **questions of inaccurate word-usage**. Someone might use these questions against the school, by pointing to **prior wittings of the kathēgemónes**, and claim that **these contain usages that are now considered to be incorrect**.*

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 6 inf.)
 | *P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 7 sup.)*

...καὶ [ἐκτῷ]νο ἔγωγε πολλάκις ἐνεθυμήθην τὸ ὅτι [εἰ, ἐ]μοῦ προφέροντος ἀπορήμ[α]τα ἃ τις ἂμ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔ[τρε]πεν, ἀποδιδῶη ὃ ἐκ τῶν [λέ]ξεων συνοικε[ιοῦν] ὥς ταυτό συνέβαινε μελετ[ᾶν] ἐπὶ τῆς γραφῆς, πολλο[ί]ς ἂν ἴσως δόξειε τότε μὲν ἦτοι κατὰ τὸν ἐπι|βλητικὸν τρόπον ἢ περιληπτικῶς ἢ φανταστικ[ῶς] ἢ δι[υ]ὰ λόγου δὴ θεωρητικῶς ψευδῆς ὑποτετάχθαι ταῖ[ς] λέξεσ[ιν] ἐκίнайς δόξα, ἦτοι κατὰ τὸν οὐκ ἐπιβλ[ητ]ικὸμ μὲν οὐδὲ κατὰ μίαν τῶν ἐκκειμένων ἰδεῶν ἐξ ἐ[α]υτοῦ δὲ μόνον κινητικόν

...καὶ ἐκεῖνο, Ἔγωγε **πολλάκις ἐνεθυμήθην**, Τὸ ὅτι εἰ, **έμοῦ προφέροντος ἀπορήματα: ἃ** Τις ἂν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔτρεπεν – Ἀποδιδῶη **ὃ ἐκ τῶν λέξεων συνοικειοῦν ὡς ταυτό**, Συνέβαινε μελετᾶν ἐπὶ τῆς γραφῆς, **πολλοῖς ἂν ἴσως Δόξειε τότε** – (μὲν ἦτοι ^[Δ●] **κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον ἢ ^[Δ◉] περιληπτικῶς ἢ ^[Δ●] φανταστικῶς ἢ ^[Δ◉] διὰ λόγου δὴ θεωρητικῶς**) – ^[∇+] **ψευδῆς ὑποτετάχθαι ταῖς λέξεσιν ἐκίнайς Δόξα, ἦτοι ^[¬Δ●] κατὰ τὸν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικόν, μὲν ^[¬Δ◉] οὐδὲ κατὰ μίαν τῶν ἐκκειμένων ἰδεῶν, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μόνον κινητικόν**

...and **that**, I at least have **often** reflected upon, the fact that if, **while I was offering questions [in the work "On Ambiguity"]**, Someone might turn **those [questions]** against us – that **what [we] were integrating** from the terms **[of conventional vocabulary]** He would demonstrate **as the same [words used in our philosophical vocabulary, and I reflected that if]** He persisted to study **[this issue] regarding [our] writing**, then **perhaps** It might have seemed **to many at that time** – (either ^[Δ●] in an objective way, or ^[Δ◉] in a completely comprehensible way or ^[Δ●] in an image-based way, or indeed ^[Δ◉] through reasoning in a speculative way) – that a ^[∇+] false Judgment had been assigned to those terms **[by us]**, either ^[¬Δ●] according to the non-objective **[way of thinking]** or ^[¬Δ◉] not according to one of **[our] set-forth ideas [of how ways of thinking are divided]**, but **only put into motion** from itself

^[Sedley] I also frequently reflected that if, when I raised difficulties which someone might have turned against us, he should claim that what used to be assimilated from ordinary language was the same as used to be practiced in the written work, many might well conclude* that in those days false opinion was represented in that language, whether through an ^[1] empirical process, ^[2] **[ἢ περιληπτικῶς]** ^[3] an image-based process, or ^[4] a theoretical process, or through a non-empirical process, not following one of our current divisions, but simply arising from an internal movement**

***** *The concession which Epicureans might mistakenly make to their opponent is to argue that **certain expressions formerly represented false opinion, but that now the truth can be obtained owing to some change in the use of language**. Epíkouros' objection to this concession [as we will see] is that **concrete evidence in the form of practical consequences is required to establish that a particular usage was correct or incorrect (rather than merely referencing logical definitions)**.*

****** *i.e., using words based only on logic – the mind's own movement – rather than based on sensation.*

ἐκεῖνος <i>(ἐκεῖνη, ἐκεῖνο)</i>	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ <i>that there</i>
ἔγωγε	I indeed	ΕΓΩΓΕ <i>myself</i>
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ <i>many times</i>
ἐνθυμεῖσθαι	to reflect upon	ΕΝΘΥΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>spirit in</i>
προφέρων	offering	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΩΝ <i>bringing forward</i>
Περὶ Ἀμφιβολίας	"On Ambiguity" a book by Epíkouros	
ἡ ἀμφιβολία αἱ ἀμφιβολίαι	ambiguity	ΑΜΦΙΒΟΛΙΑ <i>both</i>
ἡ διαπορία αἱ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ <i>doubting across</i>
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epíkouros	
τὸ ἀπόρημα τὰ ἀπορήματα	question	ΑΠΟΡΗΜΑ <i>result of doubting</i>
τρέπειν	to turn	ΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>turning</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
οἰκείως	comfortably	ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ <i>appropriate</i>
συνοικειοῦν	to integrate <i>[common terms into technical vocabulary]</i>	ΣΥΝΟΙΚΕΙΟΥΝ <i>appropriate together</i>
συμβαίνειν	to endure <i>[here, "to persist"]</i>	ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>walking together</i>
ἀμέλει	doubtless	ΑΜΕΛΕΙ <i>not caring</i>
μελετᾶν	to study	ΜΕΛΕΤΑΝ <i>caring</i>
ἡ γραφή αἱ γραφαί	[text of] writing	ΓΡΑΦΗ <i>writing</i>
πολύς <i>(ή, ύ)</i>	many, long ^[of time]	ΠΟΛΥΣ <i>much</i>
ἴσως	perhaps	ΙΣΩΣ <i>equal / likely</i>
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
ἐπιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἐπιβλητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	objective	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ἀπερίληπτος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	not completely comprehensible	ΑΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΟΣ <i>not taken hold around</i>
περιληπτῶς	with complete comprehension	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΩΣ <i>taken hold around</i>

<i>Epíkouros shows above:</i> ὁ [X]τικὸς τρόπος ≈ [X]τικῶς		
περιληπτικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	relating to what is completely comprehensible	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being taken hold around</i>
περιληπτικῶς	in a completely comprehensible way	ΠΕΡΙΛΗΠΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of being taken hold around</i>
φανταστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	image-based	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
φανταστικῶς	in an image-based way	ΦΑΝΤΑΣΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of appearance</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	envisionable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
θεωρητικῶς	in a speculative way	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of [mentally] observing</i>
ψευδής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ <i>deceiving</i>
διατάττειν	to arrange	ΔΙΑΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>ordering across</i>
ὑποτάττειν	to assign	ὙΠΟΤΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>ordering under</i>
ὑποτετάχθαι	to be assigned	ὙΠΟΤΕΤΑΧΘΑΙ <i>ordered under</i>
ἐκεῖνος <i>(ἐκεῖνη, ἐκεῖνο)</i>	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ <i>that there</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
εἷς μία ἓν <i>(ένός, μιᾶς, ένός)</i>	one	ἜΙΣ ΜΙΑ ἘΝ
ἐκκείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	set forth	ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated out</i>
ἡ ἰδέα αἱ ἰδέαι	idea	ΙΔΕΑ <i>appearing</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
κινεῖν	to move	ΚΙΝΕΙΝ <i>moving</i>
κινητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	putting into motion	ΚΙΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of moving</i>

28.24 True Interpretations

Words are *naturally based upon perception* and only subsequently *organized by logic*. *Epíkouros* points out that *error arises* not from the external data that our senses perceive but *from the internal movements* of our own thought processes.

Epíkouros is careful to locate the cause of error *as internal* and eliminate the possibility that something *in the external world* is to blame: *the mental movement (κίνησις)* that leads to error *it is entirely an internal and personal movement*, not directly necessitated by external factors.

νῦν δὲ τῆς ἐρμηνείας] ἐφαρμοττούσης καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλ' ἅττα ἐπαγωγή τις ἐκ τῆς διαστολῆς γίνε[σ]θαι εἰς τάληθές . ἄλλ' ὅμως
*σοὶ μηδέποτε μὴ συμ[πλεκέ]τω μηδέ[ν τ]ις πειρώ[μενος ἐ]ξισοῦσθαι σοι ταύτης τῆς ὑποψίας· ἄλλ' εἰς ὅ[λην]ν [τὴν]
ἐπιλ[ό]γι[σ]ιν...
*Versio Sedley litteram Σ habet, quae necessaria est

νῦν δὲ, ^[Δ] τῆς ἐρμηνείας ἐφαρμοττούσης καὶ ἐπ' ^[Θ] ἄλλ' ἅττα· Ἐπαγωγή τις ἐκ τῆς διαστολῆς γίνεσθαι εἰς ^(α) τάληθές

even though now, with ^[Δ] the interpretation [of a word] fitting also to ^[Θ] other [externally observed] things: a certain Reference [to what is actually observed] out of a differentiation [from what is observed vs. what is an addition of the mind] is being produced into ^(α) the truth

^[Sedley] but that now, because the means of expression is adapted to additional ends, discrimination provides a lead towards the truth.

ἄλλ' ὅμως: σοὶ μηδέποτε μὴ Συμπλεκέτω μηδέν Τις, πειρώμενος ἐξισοῦσθαι σοι, ταύτης τῆς ὑποψίας – ἄλλ' εἰς ὅλην τὴν ἐπιλόγισιν...

still nevertheless: Do not let Someone, [who is] attempting to become equal to you, ever entangle anything to you with this suspicion – rather, into the entire [faculty of] inductive consideration...

^[Sedley] However, let no one ever try to get even with you* by linking with you any trace of this suspicion; but [turn] to the entire faculty of empirical reasoning...

* Epíkouros urges Mētródōros to defend himself against the implication from the last section – even in his early years, when Mētródōros was disregarding convention in an effort to align a word with its natural and immediate sense, Mētródōros was not making the more serious mistake of the conventionalists such as Diodorus Cronus, who's subjectivist theory of language fully equates the meaning of a word only with the intention in the mind of the speaker while uttering it.

Given that Epíkouros relates the meaning of a word more to its natural, fundamental, and immediate usage rather than to its conventional usage, he is reluctant to accept any claim that the words under discussion have changed their meaning in the absence of incontrovertible evidence.

This is why 'inductive consideration' is brought in as a test. Epíkouros demands evidence in the form of practical consequences as proof of correct or incorrect usage.

ἡ ἐρμηνεία αἱ ἐρμηνείαι	interpretation	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ explaining
ἐναρμόττων (ουσα, ον)	fitting into	ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ adapting into
ἐφαρμοττών (οὔσα, όν)	fitting	ΕΦΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ adapting upon
ἡ ἐπαγωγή αἱ ἐπαγωγαί	reference [to observation]	ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ result of going toward
ἡ ἐπαγωγή is used technically by Aristotle as "induction" or "inductive reasoning" – and refers to the (Evidence-Based) process of moving from particular observations to broader generalizations. Inductive reasoning contrasts with (Logic-Based) deductive reasoning, where reasoning proceeds from general principles and is applied specific cases.		
ἡ στολή αἱ στολαί	pressure	ΣΤΟΛΗ equipping
ἡ διαστολή αἱ διαστολαί	differentiation	ΔΙΑΣΤΟΛΗ equipping apart
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being
λανθάνειν	to escape notice	ΛΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ to be hidden
ἀληθής (ής, ές)	true	ΑΛΗΘΗΣ not hidden
τάληθές = τὸ ἀληθές τὰ ἀληθῆ	truth	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ not hidden

ὁ ὁμογενής οἱ ὁμογενεῖς	the same kind	ὍΜΟΓΕΝΗΣ <i>same born</i>
ὅμως	nevertheless	ὍΜΩΣ
μηδέποτε	never	ΜΗΔΕΠΟΤΕ <i>but not ever</i>
συμπλέκειν	to entangle	ΣΥΜΠΛΕΚΕΙΝ <i>weaving together</i>
πειρᾶσθαι	to attempt	ΠΕΙΡΑΣΘΑΙ <i>trail / attempt</i>
πειρώμενος	attempting	ΠΕΙΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>trail / attempt</i>
ἴσος (η, ον)	equal	ΙΣΟΣ <i>equal</i>
ἐξισοῦσθαι	to be made equal	ΕΞΙΣΟΥΣΘΑΙ <i>out of equal</i>
ἡ ὑποψία αἱ ὑποψίαι	suspicion	ὙΠΟΨΙΑ <i>looking under</i>
ὅλως	entirely	ὍΛΩΣ <i>whole</i>
ὅλος (η, ον)	entire	ὍΛΟΣ <i>whole</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις	[faculty of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ <i>collecting (reasoning) action upon</i>

28.25 Practical Analysis

The correct use of relative classifications must vary depending on the circumstances – for example how many people make a space "crowded" depends on the size of the space (the practical consequence of 10 people being in a small room is that is "crowded") and what makes something "just" depends on the circumstances (the application of the word "just" can only be judged to be correctly applied relative to practical consequences in specific circumstances).

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 7 inf.)

...[πιθανώτερ]ογ γίνεσ[θαι ἂν τὸν τοῦτο] δὴ φανερόμ[η] ποιοῦντα [ῥήν]ι κα[ὶ] [ῥῆ] ἔπραττέ τις τουτὶ ἢ οὐκ [ἔπρα]ττεν, ἤπερ ῥήνικα οὐκ ῥῆν ἢ διάληψις ἀναλογιστ[η]κῆ ὥς τῷδέ τινα λέγει τοῦτο, τὸ ἐναντίον [ἔ]δοξάζετο.

...πιθανώτερογ γίνεσθαι ἂν Τὸν τοῦτο δὴ φανερόν ποιοῦντα ^[a] ῥήνικα ἢ ἔπραττέ
Τις τουτὶ ἢ οὐκ ἔπραττεν – ^[b] ἤπερ ῥήνικα οὐκ ῥῆν ἢ Διάληψις ἀναλογιστική –
(ὥς τῷδέ τινα Λέγει τοῦτο, Τὸ ἐναντίον Ἐδοξάζετο)

...That [person] who would make this [change in word meaning] in-fact
evident would have been more persuasive [in making his case] ^[a] when
Someone was either accomplishing or not accomplishing the very thing [that
would make the change evident] – ^[b] rather than when the [logical]
Differentiation – (that while He says this [word] to a certain person,
Something opposite was being judged) – was NOT analogistic [i.e., NOT based
the analogy to any evidence]*

[Sedley] [When it is suggested that a word has changed its meaning, always
bear in mind that] the man trying to prove this would have been more
persuasive at a time when someone was either acting, or not acting, in a
certain manner, than at a time when the distinction, that by using a certain
word he [means one thing but] used to hold the opposite opinion, was not
analogically reasoned.

*Someone trying to demonstrate that an error was made in the application of a word should reference the practical consequence of that supposed error. Merely referring to some logical distinction or formal definition that does not relate to any specific circumstance is insufficient to prove that any error has been made.

πιθανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	persuasive	ΠΙΘΑΝΟΣ <i>probable</i>
πιθανώτερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	more persuasive	ΠΙΘΑΝΩΤΕΡΟΣ <i>probable</i>
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced [here, "to come to be"]	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
φανερός <i>(ά, όν)</i>	evident	ΦΑΝΕΡΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
ποιεῖν	*to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
ποιοῦν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	making	ΠΟΙΟΥΝ <i>gathering</i>
ήνικά	when	
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ή διάληψις αί διαλήψεις	differentiation	ΔΙΑΛΗΨΙΣ <i>taking hold</i> <i>separation</i>
σοφιστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	"wise"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>"wisdom"</i>
ἀναλογιστέος <i>(α, ον)</i>	ought to be analogized	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΣ <i>ought to be</i> <i>reasoning action</i> <i>again</i>
ό ἀναλογισμός οί ἀναλογισμοί	analogical consideration	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action</i> <i>again</i> <i>[conceiving the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>
τό ἀναλόγισμα τά ἀναλογίσματα	analogous thought	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΑ <i>result of</i> <i>action of</i> <i>reasoning back</i> <i>[a conception of the unseen by analogy to the seen]</i>
ἀναλογιστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	analogistic	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of</i> <i>action of</i> <i>reasoning</i> <i>back/again</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>

28.26 Suspending Judgment

An Epicurean understands that it is an error to form a judgment *without repeated evidence* – and because of this, he knows he may have to suspend judgment. While doing so, he should be careful *not to adopt some purely logical argument in place of that suspended judgment. To define 'just' or 'crowded' in absolute terms critically ignores that such terms depend on context.*

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 7 inf.)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 8 sup.)

ἐπὶ γὰρ δὴ τῶν τοιούτω[ν] οἶμαι μόνων ἂν ὑποπτεύσαιμι τόν γ' ἄστιομ μή ποτε ἐναντίως ἔμπροσθε ἔδοξάζε|το ἢ ὅλως [σοφώ]τερον ὑπελάμβανέ τι[ἐκ τ]ῶν ἀ[ν]τικειμ[έ]νων, ἐπεὶ οὐχὶ π[α]ρόντων οἶδα ἐπιβλητικὴν ἔχ[ει] δόξαν ἐν ᾧδήποτε τρόπῳ.

ἐπὶ, γὰρ δὴ, τῶν τοιούτων Οἶμαι μόνων, ἂν Ὑποπτεύσαιμι τὸν γ' ἄστιον: μὴ ποτε ἐναντίως ἔμπροσθε Ἐδοξάζετο – ἢ ὅλως σοφώτερον Ὑπελάμβανέ τι ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων: ἐπεὶ, οὐχὶ παρόντων, Οἶδα, ἐπιβλητικὴν Ἔχει δόξαν ἐν ᾧδήποτε τρόπῳ

for indeed, I suspect that only in [*a case*] like this here [*i.e., where the practical consequences are not evident*], that I would ever be concerned with the cultured man: that He would not have ever been judging in opposition before – or [ever] Supposed *some [meaning of a word was]* entirely wiser from contrary [*logical arguments*]: since, I know, He does not hold an objective judgment of present [*circumstances*] in whatever way [*he is thinking*]

✱ [Sedley] For it is only, I think, on grounds such as these that I would suspect that the clever fellow held a contradictory opinion before he accepted some opposing belief as being in general wiser; for the opinion which he holds is, I know, by no means empirically based on current evidence.

τοιόσδι = τοιόσδε <i>(τοιάδε, τοιόνδε)</i>	like this here (such a kind as this)	ΤΟΙΟΣΔΙ ΤΟΙΟΣΔΕ <i>of this sort here</i>
οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
οἶμαί	I suspect	
ὑποπτεύειν	to be concerned [by]	ὙΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ <i>looking [suspiciously] under</i>
ἀστίος <i>(α, ον) =</i> ἀστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	cultured	ΑΣΤΙΟΣ ΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>of the city</i>
ἐναντίως	against	ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ <i>in against</i>
ἔμπροσθε	before	ΕΜΠΡΟΣΘΕ <i>in before</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
ὅλως	entirely	ὍΛΩΣ <i>whole</i>
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
σοφός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	wise	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
σοφώτερος <i>(α, ον)</i>	wiser	ΣΟΦΩΤΕΡΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
ὑπολαμβάνειν	to suppose	ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping under</i>
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>
παρών <i>(παρουσα, παρόν)</i>	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ <i>to be beside</i>
εἰδέναι	<i>to have mentally seen ∴</i> "to know"	ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ <i>appearing</i>
οἶδα	I know	
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἐπιβλητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	objective	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
ὅπωςδήποτε	in any way	ὍΠΩΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ <i>indefinite in what way</i>
δήποτε	ever, at any time	ΔΗΠΟΤΕ
ὅσδηποτε <i>(ἢσδήποτε, ὅτιδήποτε)</i>	whichever	ΟΣΔΗΠΟΤΕ <i>indefinite which</i>

Epikouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 8 sup.)
| *P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 8 inf. – part 1)*

εἰς τοῦτον [οὔ]ν δὴ φημι τὸν ὅρον ἀπο[β]λεπέ[τω πᾶσα] δόξα ἥ' αὖ τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν [ἐ]τ[ι μ]ὴ προστεθηκότες ἦμεν· οὐ γὰρ
πᾶσαν οἶμαι εὐθὺ[ς] ἔστι δόξαν καὶ εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν ἄγειν· ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἂν δύναμιν τις ἔχει μόνον τῆς ἐπ[ι]λογίσεω[ς]
φθῆσε[τ]αι ὅταν [ὁ] καιρὸς [ς π]αρα[δύ]δῃ. [ὁ γ]ὰρ ἀν[ε]πιλογίστως [οὔ]τως πρὸς ταύτην λία[ν τε] τα[πι]νῶι τρόπῳ [προσέχων
ὁμῶς ἐ]πιλογ[ί]σασθαι δυνήσεται... | ...κέχρη[ται] τ[αύτ]ε[ι] τεῖ κ[ι]νῆ[σει]· καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττ[ον] ὑπὸ τῇ μ φυγῇ ἢ αἵρεσιν [κα]τ'
αὐτὴν ἀγόμενος τεύξεται τοῦ ὀρθοῦ.

**εἰς τοῦτον, οὔν, δὴ, Φημι – τὸν ὅρον ἀποβλεπέτω πᾶσα Δόξα (ἥ τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν
ἔτι μὴ προστεθηκότες ἦμεν): οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν Οἶμαι εὐθύς ἔστι δόξαν καὶ εἰς
ἐπιλογισμὸν ἄγειν**

into this [*way of thinking*], then, indeed, I assert – let every Judgment look at
this boundary (insofar as We had not yet introduced the [*process of*]
inductive consideration): I do not suppose that It is possible for every
judgment to also lead directly into a [*process of*] inductive consideration

[Sedley] I am saying, then, that every opinion to which we had not yet at that
time applied an empirical assessment should be referred to the following
rule: it is not possible, in my view, to subject every opinion immediately to
an empirical assessment

**ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἂν δύναμιν Τis ἔχειν μόνον τῆς ἐπιλογίσεως φθῆσεται – ὅταν ὁ
Καιρὸς παραδιδῷ. Ὁ γὰρ ἀνεπιλογίστως οὕτως πρὸς ταύτην, λίαν τε ταπινῶ
τρόπῳ, Προσέχων – ὁμῶς ἐπιλογίσασθαι δυνήσεται... ...Κέχρηται ^[Δ] ταύτει τεῖ
κινήσει – καί, οὐδὲν ἦττον ὑπὸ τὴν φυγῇ ἢ αἵρεσιν, κατ' αὐτὴν ἀγόμενος,
Τεύξεται τοῦ ὀρθοῦ**

but [*even though forming a judgment based in direct evidence is not always
possible*], it is sufficient if Someone will succeed in only having the force of
[*his faculty of*] inductive consideration – whenever the Opportunity allows.
for the One Paying attention for this [*opportunity for observation of practical
consequences*] in this way without inductive consideration, and in a very
humble a manner – will nevertheless be able to inductively consider [*when
the opportunity DOES allow for observation*]... ...[if] He uses ^[Δ] this movement
[*of his thought based in observation*] – and, while being led according to [*this
inductive consideration*], He will happen to be correct no less in regards to
avoidance than [*in regards*] to choice

[Sedley] but it is sufficient that a man will be ready merely to display a capacity
for reasoning empirically when the opportunity allows. For someone who
examines it with this lack of empirical reasoning, and in an utterly
inadequate fashion, will nevertheless be able to assess it empirically [*if it is
an opinion that concerns actions, when he has the opportunity to observe
someone who proceeds to action on the basis of it; he will see with what
result the person*] performs this action, and under its guidance he will arrive
at the truth just as much in [*the category of*] avoidance as in that of choice

*If sufficient information is unavailable, forming a complete judgment through
inductive consideration will not be possible. Often times, the best we can do is wait
until more complete observation is possible.*
*For example, we know when to properly call a room 'crowded' or an action 'just'
by observing the practical conditions that justify – or fail to justify – the use of those
terms in any particular circumstance.*

λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
βεβαιοῦν	to affirm	ΒΕΒΑΙΟΥΝ <i>firm standing</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
φημι	I assert	
τὸ πέρας τὰ πέρατα	limit	ΠΕΡΑΣ <i>extremity</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>

ὁ ὄρος οἱ ὄροι	outline	ὍΡΟΣ <i>marking out</i>
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
διαβλέπειν	to discern	ΔΙΑΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking through</i>
ἀποβλέπειν	to look at	ΑΠΟΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking out</i>
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις	[faculty of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i> <i>action upon</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of</i> <i>reasoning action</i> <i>upon</i>
προστιθέναι	to introduce	ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ <i>placing toward</i>
προστεθικώς <i>(υἷα, ός)</i>	introduced	ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΗΚΩΣ <i>placing toward</i>
οἶεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ <i>going</i>
Part 2		
ἱκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ΊΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
ἡ δύναμις αἱ δυνάμεις	force	ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ <i>power</i>
ἡ ἐπιλόγισις αἱ ἐπιλογίσεις	[faculty of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i> <i>action upon</i>
ἀφικνεῖσθαι	to arrive	ΑΦΙΚΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>towards arriving</i>
φθάνειν	to succeed [first]	ΦΘΑΝΕΙΝ <i>overtaking</i>
ἄν... φθήσεται...	<i>note the use of the future</i> <i>indicative with ἄν</i>	
καιριώτατος	most opportune	ΚΑΙΡΙΩΤΑΤΟΣ <i>time</i>
εὐκαιρος <i>(ας, ον)</i>	convenient	ΕΥΚΑΙΡΟΣ <i>good time</i>
ὁ καιρός οἱ καιροί	opportunity	ΚΑΙΡΟΣ <i>time</i>
ἀποδιδόναι	to demonstrate	ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving away</i>
ἀναδιδόναι	to deliver	ΑΝΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving up</i>
παραδιδόναι	to hand over <i>[here, "to allow"]</i>	ΠΑΡΑΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ <i>giving alongside</i>
ἀνεπιλογίστως	in a way without inductive consideration	ΑΝΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΤΩΣ <i>not reasoning</i> <i>action upon</i>
λίαν	very	
ταπινός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	humble	ΤΑΠΙΝΟΣ <i>low</i>
προσέχειν	to pay attention	ΠΡΟΣΕΧΕΙΝ <i>hold towards</i>
ὁμως	nevertheless	ὍΜΩΣ
ἐπιλογίσασθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΑΣΘΑΙ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i> <i>action upon</i>

δύνασθαι	to have the force	ΔΥΝΑΣΘΑΙ <i>power</i>
χρῆσθαι	to use	ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>necessary</i>
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ <i>moving action</i>
ἥττον	to a lesser extent	ΉΤΤΟΝ <i>inferior</i>
ἡ φυγή αἱ φυγαί	avoidance	ΦΥΓΗ <i>fleeing</i>
αἰρεῖν	to choose	ΑΙΡΕΙΝ <i>taking</i>
ἡ αἵρεσις αἱ αἱρέσεις	choice	ΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ <i>taking</i>
ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ <i>going</i>
ἀγόμενος <i>(ἡ, ον)</i>	being led	ΑΓΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>going</i>
τυγχάνειν	to happen to be	ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>coming to be</i>
ὀρθός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	correct	ΟΡΘΟΣ <i>straight upright</i>

28.28 Errors of Speculative Judgement

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 8 inf. – part 2)
| P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 9 sup. – part 1)

ὅσαι δὲ μὴ περὶ πράξεων εἰσὶν τῶν δοξ[ῶν] λέγω δὲ τῶν οὐκ ἐπιβλητικῶν ἀλ[λ' ἐ]κ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ μέρους οὔσαι αὗται δὲ ἀλώσονται, ἅμ[] ψευδεῖς ὧσι καὶ ἡ [ἀλόγως ἢ ἐ]κ συλλ[ο] | γισμ[ο]ῦ ἔχωσ[ι] τὸ διημαρτημέν[ο]ν, ἐν τῷ ἢ ἄλλο τι κατὰ ταύτας λέγεσθαι τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὃ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἢ ἢι <ἅμ> ἅμ πῶρ[ρω]θέμ ποθεν εἰς πράξεως συναφὴν βαδίζωσιν εἰσάγωσιν εἰς τήν [ἀ]νεπιτήδιομ πράξιν.

“Ὅσαι δὲ ^[¬•] μὴ περὶ πράξεων εἰσὶν ^[Δ] τῶν δοξῶν – Λέγω δὲ τῶν ^[¬Δ•] οὐκ ἐπιβλητικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκ ^[Δ•] τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ μέρους Οὔσαι: Αὗται δὲ ἀλώσονται ἅμ ^(-α) ψευδεῖς ὧσι – καὶ ἡ ἀλόγως ἢ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ”Ἐχωσι ^[∇] τὸ διημαρτημένον – ἐν τῷ ἢ ^[W1] ἄλλο τι ^[∇•] κατὰ ταύτας λέγεσθαι τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὃ ^(-α) οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν – ἢ ἢ ἅμ πῶρρωθεν ποθεν εἰς ^[•→•] πράξεως συναφὴν ^[∇•] βαδίζωσιν, Εἰσάγωσιν εἰς ^[W2] τὴν ἀνεπιτήδιον πράξιν

as Many ^[Δ] of one's judgments as are ^[¬•] not about [external] activities – I am speaking about ^[¬Δ•] those [judgments] that are not of the objective [type of thinking], but Those [judgements that] do exist from the ^[Δ•] speculative part [of thought]: These [judgments] will be caught if they are ^(-α) false – and Have ^[∇] what is thoroughly mistaken either unreasonably or out of inference – whether in [the case] that ^[W1] Something else may be said according to those ^[∇•] incorrect judgements from the speculative [parts of thought] that is ^(-α) not true – or insofar as ^[∇•] these [incorrect speculative judgments] may proceed from somewhere at a distance ^[•→•] into union with activity, [and] They lead into ^[W2] unsuitable activity

[Sedley] As for those opinions which do not concern actions (by which I mean those which are not included among empirical opinions but belong to the theoretical side), these will be confuted, if they are false and whether the cause of their error is irrational or rational either because ^[1] some other than theoretical opinion expressed on the basis of them is untrue, or, ^[2] if they become indirectly linked up with action, wherever they lead to disadvantageous action.

the error in case 1 is that a ^[Δ•] speculative judgment, which is a judgment about what is what is conceivable, is asserted that is ^(W) contested by further speculation – i.e., contrary evidence is conceivable. (For example "the void does not exist" is contested by the fact that we conceive that motion is not possible without it.)

the error in case 2 is that a ^[Δ•] speculative judgment is asserted that (although being a judgment about what is only conceivable) is still ^(W) contested by the direct observation of the consequences that result from that error in judgment. (For example, people who say "motion is not possible" are contested by their own movement.)

ὅσος <i>(η, ον)</i>	as many as	ὍΣΟΣ <i>however great</i>
ἡ πράξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ <i>action</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
λέγειν	to say [here "to speak"]	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἐπιβλητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	objective	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
θεωρεῖν	to envision	ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing</i>
θεωρητικῶς	in a speculative way	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of [mentally] observing</i>
θεωρητός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	envisionable	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>observing</i>
θεωρητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	speculative	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of observing</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
ἀλίσκεσθαι	to be caught	ἈΛΙΣΚΕΣΘΑΙ <i>being conquered</i>
ψευδής <i>(ής, ές)</i>	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ <i>deceiving</i>
εἶναι	to be	ΕΙΝΑΙ <i>being</i>
ῶσι	they may be	
ἄλόγως	unreasonably	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>not reasoning</i>
ὁ συλλογισμός	inference	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>reasoning action together</i>
ἀναμάρτητος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	mistake-free	ΑΝΑΜΑΡΤΗΤΟΣ <i>not missing the mark</i>
ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	ἌΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ <i>missing the mark</i>
διαμαρτάνειν	to thoroughly make a mistake	ΔΙΑΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ <i>missing the mark through</i>
διημαρτημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ
τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>missing the mark through</i>
λέγειν	to say	ΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking</i>
λέγεσθαι	to be said	ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
ἀληθής <i>(ές)</i>	^(α) true	ΑΛΗΘΕΣ <i>not concealed</i>
ἧ	insofar as	ἧ <i>in/for which</i>
πῶρρωθεν	from a distance	ΠΩΡΡΩΘΕΝ <i>distant</i>
ποθεν	from somewhere	
ἡ συναφή αἱ συναφαί	union	ΣΥΝΑΦΗ <i>joining together</i>
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ <i>walking</i>

ἄγειν	to lead	ΑΓΕΙΝ <i>going</i>
εἰσάγειν	to lead into	ΕΙΣΑΓΕΙΝ <i>going into</i>
ἀνεπιτήδειος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	unsuitable	ΑΝΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΙΟΣ <i>not towards order</i>

28.29 The "Concealed Father" Demonstration
ὁ Συγκεκαλυμμένος Πατήρ

The "Concealed Father" is a provocative demonstration used to publicly argue that real knowledge is impossible due to a fundamental epistemological paradox: that we can both *know* and *not know* the same thing.

This scenario presents a situation in which, in front of an audience, a Sophist covers a man with a blanket. Then, the Sophist brings in the man's son and asks him who is beneath the blanket. When the son admits he does not know, the Sophist reveals that the person under the blanket is actually his own father.

The paradox arises because *when the son says he does not know who is under the blanket, it implies that he does not know who his father is* – *which is strange because he should know his own father.*

Really the error is in the language, as the son in fact simultaneously does NOT KNOW who is under the blanket and does KNOW who his father is.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 9 sup. – part 2)

ἂν δὲ μηδὲν τούτων, εὐσυνθεώρητον ἔσται ὥς οὐκ [εἰ]σὶ ψ[ε]υδεῖς. διὸ καὶ ραιδίως ἅπαντες κ[α]ταγελῶσ[ι]ν ὅταν τις ὁμ[ο]λογήσαντός τινος μηδ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ταύτῳ ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι προφέρ[η]ν τὸν συγκεκαλυμμένον μ[ὴ] τέρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·

ἂν δὲ μηδὲν τούτων, εὐσυνθεώρητον Ἔσται ὥς ^(α) οὐκ εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς.

but if these [i.e., instances of contrary evidence or negative consequences] do not [occur], It will be well envisioned together that They are ^(α) not false

[Sedley] If none of these consequences ensues, it will be correct to conclude that opinions are not false.

i.e., ^[Δ:] speculative judgment is only ^(α) true when it is ^(M) attested by evidence or ^{-W} not contested by contrary evidence (which includes the practical consequences of that speculative judgment)

διὸ, καὶ ραιδίως Ἄπαντες καταγελῶσιν ὅταν Τις – (ὁμολογήσαντός τινος μηδ' Ἐνδέχεσθαι ταύτῳ ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι) – προφέρῃ "τὸν Συγκεκαλυμμένον Πατέρα" καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα

therefore, All [people] together easily thoroughly ridicule whenever Somebody – (when another person has agreed that It is not even possible to both understand and to NOT understand the same thing) – sets forth "the Concealed Father" and such things

[Sedley] For this reason, everybody can easily laugh when somebody gets another to assert that it is impossible to know and not know the same thing, and then cites the riddle of the Covered Father, and others of the same kind.

Consider the line from Lucian's **Βίων Πρᾶσις (Vitarum Auctio)**, where the Stoic, after stating the riddle of 'The Crocodile and the Child,' lists some more riddles that he can recite:

"The Reaper, the Master, and above all, the Electra and the Veiled Figure." (§ 22)

συνθεωρεῖν	to envision together	ΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ <i>observing together</i>
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εὖσυνθεώρητος (ος, ον)	well envisioned together	ΕΥΣΥΝΘΕΩΡΗΤΟΣ <i>properly observing together</i>
ψευδής (ής, ές)	false	ΨΕΥΔΗΣ <i>deceiving</i>
ῥάδιος ῥαιδιος (α, ον)	easy	ῚΡΑΙΔΙΟΣ <i>easily</i>
ῥαδίως ῥαιδίως	easily	ῚΡΑΙΔΙΩΣ <i>easily</i>
ἅπας (ασα, αν)	all together	ἈΠΑΣ <i>all together</i>
καταγέλαστος (ον)	thoroughly ridiculous	ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΑΣΤΟΣ <i>thoroughly laughing</i>
καταγελᾶν	to thoroughly ridicule	ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΑΝ
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>
ἐνδέχεσθαι	to be possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>accepting in</i>
στήναι	to stand [already]	ΣΤΗΝΑΙ <i>standing</i>
ἵστασθαι	to be stood up	ἼΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>standing</i>
ἐπισταμένως	in an understandable way	ΕΠΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΩΣ <i>standing upon</i>
ἡ ἐπιστήμη αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι	understanding	ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ <i>standing upon</i>
ἐπίστασθαι	to understand	ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>standing upon</i>
προφέρειν	to set forth	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing forward</i>
κατακαλύπτειν	to cover completely	ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ <i>completely covering</i>
ἡ κατακάλυψις αἱ κατακαλύψεις	obscurity	ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΨΙΣ <i>completely covering</i>
συγκαλύπτειν	to conceal	ΣΥΓΚΑΛΥΠΤΕΙΝ <i>covering together</i>
ὁ πατήρ οἱ πατέρες	father	ΠΑΤΗΡ <i>father</i>
τοιοῦτος (τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)	like this (such as this)	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>

The Concealed Father demonstration probably originated from Euboulídēs of Miletus, who was a pupil of the founder of the Megarian school, Euclid of Megara. The paradox remained popular among the Megarians, including *Diódōros 'Krónos,'* who made use of it as well.

The Megarian school in general subscribed to the Eleatic tradition of dialectic, and *thus generally denied motion, change, plurality, and the value of sense evidence. Their riddles backed up the Eleatic thesis that there can be no true knowledge of the physical world.*

Zeno of Citium was impressed with these riddles, and they eventually became associated with Stoicism as the Megarian school's popularity faded.

28.30 Practical Indication vs. False Equivocation

[τοῦτ]ο γὰρ οὐ... | ...τῇ[ι ἀγ]νώστει ἐξ [ἀρχῆς] αὐτοῦ ὁμ[ο]λογίαι ὅμως βλέπων ἐφ' ᾧ ὠμολόγε[ι] τοῦτο γελαῖ ἐπ[ι] τῷ[ι] σοφίσματι ὡς οὐ συμπεριλαβὼν ἐν ἐκίνει τεῖ ἀποκρίσει καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἂν ἐφαρμοσθὲν ἕκ τινος ἐθισμού λέξεως, ὥστε πίπτειν εἰς τὸ λέγειν ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸν <ἐ>[πίσ]τασθαί τε | καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθα[ι], οὐδ' ἀρνηθ[ῆναι] τοῦτο, [διὰ] τοῦ τρόπου ο[ὔ] ὁ σοφιστὴς προφέρει. διὸ καὶ π[άνυ] ἀντικειμένως ὁμολογήσας [τ]ις ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ [ο]ὐκ εὐλα[βοῦ]μενος τοῦτο ὥσπερ τιν[ἐς] τῶν σοφιστῶν οὐκ οἶετ[αι] πραγματικὸν ἔλεγχον λαμβάνειν.

τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ... ...τῇ ἀγνώστει ἐξ ἀρχῆς – αὐτοῦ ὁμολογίαι ὅμως βλέπων ἐφ' ᾧ ὠμολόγει: τοῦτο Γελᾷ ἐπὶ τῷ σοφίσματι ὡς οὐ συμπεριλαβὼν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τεῖ ἀποκρίσει καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἂν ἐφαρμοσθὲν ἕκ τινος ἐθισμού λέξεως – ὥστε πίπτειν εἰς τὸ λέγειν ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ Αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι – οὐδ' ἀρνηθῆναι τοῦτο, διὰ τοῦ τρόπου οὔ ὁ Σοφιστὴς προφέρει

for this [will] not... [confound a son who waits to see the practical reality of the circumstance, even if] ...[due] to [his] ignorance at the beginning [of the riddle's presentation – the son] nevertheless sees his own agreement in regards to what he had agreed to [i.e., even though he does see his error in quickly agreeing that he did not know the covered man]: He [still] ridicules this [riddle] in regards to [its] "wisdom" since he had not completely comprehended together in that response what also would have been adapted out of some convention of a term in this way * – so as to fall into saying that it is possible for the Same person to understand and also to not understand – and to not deny that this [paradox expresses a universal truth], through the way in which a "Wise man" sets it forth

[Sedley] For this will not [defeat anybody who... ..replies that the question is about actions and therefore cannot immediately be decided by mere empty words. By contrast, someone who is forced to contradict] the assertion which he blindly made at the outset nevertheless laughs at the sophism when he sees the conditions under which he was making this assertion, and says that he did not include in his answer the example which could in this way be accommodated to it in consequence of a certain linguistic convention* – and that he is thus being tricked into asserting, instead of denying, that it is possible to know and not know the same thing, because of the way the sophist cites the riddle.

* i.e., the different ways that the words "knowing" and "understanding" are used. Although the son "does not know who" is under the blanket (in the sense that the identity of the man is a mystery) – the son "does know who" is under the blanket (in the sense that the son is aware of the identity of his father).

διὸ, καὶ πάνυ ἀντικειμένως ὁμολογήσας Τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς – (καὶ οὐκ εὐλαβούμενος τοῦτο, ὥσπερ Τινὲς τῶν σοφιστῶν) – οὐκ οἶεται πραγματικὸν ἔλεγχον λαμβάνειν

therefore, even Someone who originally has agreed wholly in opposition [that he DID NOT know the covered man] – (and while he was not carefully comprehending this, as Some of the "wise men" do) – [he still] does not think [that he is] receiving a practical refutation [when it is proven that he really DID know the covered man]

[Sedley] So a man who at the start made quite the opposite assertion, and does not display the wariness on this score shown by certain of the sophists, does not consider the refutation which he undergoes to be one that concerns actions.

[Sedley] The correct Epicurean retort to the sophist must be to say, "You have asked me a question about practical reality, and a purely verbal argument can never answer it satisfactorily. The only proof that I will accept is an empirical one (ὁ ἐπιλογισμός). Only when I see how one can lead one's life well according to the principle that it is possible to know and not know the same thing will I believe that the principle is true."
In most circumstances IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to know and not know the same thing, the sophist has merely played upon an exception to this rule.

τὸ ἄγνωστον τὰ ἄγνωστα	unknown thing	ΑΓΝΩΣΤΟΝ not knowing
ἡ ἀγνώστεια αἱ ἀγνώστειαι	ignorance	ΑΓΝΩΣΤΕΙΑ not knowing
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation [here, "beginning"]	ΑΡΧΗ first order
ἡ ὁμολογία αἱ ὁμολογίαι	agreement	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ

ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>
ὁμως	nevertheless	ὍΜΩΣ
βλέπειν	to see	ΒΛΕΠΕΙΝ <i>looking</i>
γελαῖν	to ridicule	ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΛΑΝ
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
τὸ σοφίσμα τὰ σοφίσματα	"wisdom"	ΣΟΦΙΣΜΑ <i>result of knowledge</i> <i>action</i>
συμπεριλαμβάνειν	to completely comprehend together	ΣΥΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around together</i>
ἐκίνος = ἐκεῖνος <i>(ἐκεῖνη, ἐκεῖνο)</i>	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ <i>that there</i>
ἀποκριθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, ἐν)</i>	distinguished [already]	ΑΠΟΚΡΙΘΕΙΣ <i>separating away from</i>
ἡ ἀπόκρισις αἱ ἀποκρίσεις	[chosen] response	ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ <i>separating away from</i>
ἐναρμόττων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	fitting into	ΕΝΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ <i>adapting into</i>
ἐφαρμοττῶν <i>(οὔσα, όν)</i>	fitting	ΕΦΑΡΜΟΤΤΩΝ <i>adapting upon</i>
ἐφαρμόζειν	to fit	ΕΦΑΡΜΟΖΕΙΝ <i>adapting upon</i>
ἐφαρμοσθεῖς <i>(εἶσα, θέν)</i>	have been fit [here, "have been adapted"]	ΕΦΑΡΜΟΣΘΕΙΣ <i>adapting upon</i>
τὸ ἔθνος τὰ ἔθνη	ethnicity	ΕΘΝΟΣ <i>accustomed</i>
ὁ ἐθισμός οἱ ἐθισμοί	convention	ΕΘΙΣΜΟΣ <i>result of being accustomed</i>
ἡ λέξις αἱ λέξεις	term	ΛΕΞΙΣ <i>speaking</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
ἐνδεχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	possible	ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>accepting in</i>
ἐπίστασθαι	to understand	ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>standing upon</i>
ἀρνεῖσθαι	to deny	ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>denying</i>
ἀρνηθῆναι	to deny [already]	ΑΡΝΗΘΗΝΑΙ <i>denying</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ὁ σοφιστής οἱ σοφισταί	"wise man"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ <i>"wisdom"</i>
προφέρειν	to set forth	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing forward</i>
Part 2		
πάνυ	wholly	ΠΑΝΥ <i>all</i>
ἀντικειμένως	in opposition	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΩΣ <i>situated against</i>
ὁ ὁμολογήσας οἱ ὁμολογήσαντες	he who has agreed	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ <i>same reasoning</i>
ἐν ἀρχῇ	originally	ΕΝ ΑΡΧΗ <i>in the first order</i>

λαμβάνειν	[intellectually] to comprehend, [generally] to acquire	ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping</i>
εὐλαβούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	carefully comprehending	ΕΥΛΑΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>properly grasped</i>
ὁ σοφιστής οἱ σοφισταί	"wise man"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ <i>"wisdom"</i>
πραγματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	practical	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of doing / affair</i>
ἐλέγχειν	to refute	ΕΛΕΓΧΕΙΝ <i>confuting [with contrary proof]</i>
ἐλεγχόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being refuted	ΕΛΕΓΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ
ὁ ἔλεγχος οἱ ἔλεγχοι	refutation	ΕΛΕΓΧΟΣ

QUALITIES

ἡ ποιότης αἱ ποιότητες	quality	ΠΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition from [asking] what kind</i>
αἱ ποιότητες περὶ τὰς ἀτόμους	qualities of the atoms	ΑΤΟΜΟΝ <i>not cut</i>
τὸ σχῆμα τὰ σχήματα	shape	ΣΧΗΜΑ <i>holding [a form]</i>
τὸ μέγεθος τὰ μεγέθη	size / extension	ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ <i>largeness</i>
τὸ βάρος τὰ βάρη	weight	ΒΑΡΟΣ <i>heavy</i>
ἡ χώρας ποιότης	quality of space	ΧΩΡΑ <i>location</i>
κενόν	void	ΚΕΝΟΝ <i>emptiness</i>
ἀναφής <i>(ές)</i>	intangible	ΑΝΑΦΗΣ <i>not touchable</i>
<p><i>Beyond the qualities of void and the atoms themselves, everything is an emergent and transforming quality of their mixture.</i></p> <p><i>Qualities are either necessary or unnecessary from an object's existence</i></p>		
τὰ συμβεβηκότα CONIUNCTA	<i>Necessary Qualities:</i> "PROPERTIES" Weight to stone, Heat to fire, Liquidity to water <i>i.e., characteristics that are ^(κ) universal to the object</i>	ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΤΑ <i>to have walked together</i>
τὰ συμπτώματα ἜΒΕΝΤΑ	<i>Unnecessary Qualities:</i> "SYMPTOMS" <i>Slavery or Freedom, Poverty or Riches, Peace or War i.e., characteristics that are ^(-κ) not universal to the object</i>	ΣΥΜΠΤΩΜΑΤΑ <i>to fall together</i>
<p><i>This outline is specific to Epíkouros. For example, Aristotle uses τὰ συμβεβηκότα, with the sense of τὰ συμπτώματα</i></p>		

JUDGMENTS

<div>ὁ Ἐπιλογισμός</div> <div>[the act of] inductive consideration</div>	<div>[Δ●] ἡ Ἐπιβλητική Δόξα</div> <div>Objective Judgment</div>
<div>distinguishes (-κ) <i>specific characteristics</i> (unnecessary qualities, i.e., "symptoms") from (κ) <i>universal characteristics</i> (necessary qualities, i.e., "properties")</div>	<div><i>judgement of directly sensible</i> (-κ) <i>specific characteristics</i></div> <div>truth-value tested by (^M) attestation and (^W) contestation from direct practical circumstances</div>
only (κ) <i>universal characteristics</i> provide a valid basis for	
<div>ὁ ἀναλογισμός</div> <div>[the act of] analogical consideration</div>	<div>[Δ◉] ἡ Θεωρητική Δόξα</div> <div>Speculative Judgement</div>
<div>considers the unseen by analogy to the seen</div>	<div><i>judgement of conceivable</i> (κ) <i>universal characteristics</i></div> <div>truth-value tested by (^M) attestation and (^W) contestation from indirect practical consequences</div>

28.31 Specific Objective Judgment

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 10 sup. – part 2)

καίτοι[ι] γε οὐκ ἐπελελόγιστο ὅτι πλήν τῶν τοιούτων ὧν ὁ σοφιστής προφέρει ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ ἀγν[οε]ῖν . ἀλλ' ὅμοιον τι ἂν ἔδοξε πεπονθέναι τοῖς μὴ συλλογιζομένοις τὴν διαφορὰν ὥσπερ ἂν τις καὶ καθόλου τοῦ[τ]ο ὠμολο[γηκέναι] τὸ [σό]φισμ[α] ἅ[ναγκ]ασ[θῆι]...

καίτοι γε, οὐκ Ἐπελελόγιστο ὅτι – πλήν τῶν τοιούτων ὧν ὁ Σοφιστής προφέρει – ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ Ἐπίστασθαί τε καὶ Ἀγνοεῖν

and yet **indeed**, [*the son*] had not inductively considered* that – **besides such things as** the "Wise man" sets forth – It is **impossible** to both Understand and Not know **the same thing**

[Sedley] His mistake is that he did not work out empirically* that apart from the sort of case cited by the sophist it is impossible to know and not know the same thing.

**The son may initially be fooled by the riddle while referencing logic or language – but he will not be fooled by the riddle while referencing his directly sensed experience of the entire event.*

ἀλλ' ὅμοιον τι ἂν ἔδοξε πεπονθέναι τοῖς μὴ συλλογιζομένοις τὴν διαφορὰν – ὥσπερ ἂν Τις καὶ (κ) καθόλου τοῦτο ὠμολογηκέναι τὸ σόφισμα Ἀναγκασθῇ...

but [*the son*] would seem to have experienced **something similar to those who do not infer the difference*** – just as if Someone were also Forced to have agreed (κ) **universally** to **this "wisdom"**

[Sedley] However, people not reasoning out the difference* might think that he has suffered a fate similar to that of someone who is forced to assert this sophism as being also universally true.

*i.e., the difference between **specific** objective judgments vs. **universal** speculative judgments.*

*We have to be cautious about invalid generalizations – there may well be cases in which something is objectively true, but that does not make it universally true unless the speculative judgment is based on **necessary qualities**.*

καίτοι

and indeed

ΚΑΙΤΟΙ

ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>
πλὴν	besides	
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
ὁ σοφιστής οἱ σοφισταί	"wise man"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ <i>"wisdom"</i>
προφέρειν	to set forth	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing forward</i>
ἀδύνατος <i>(ον)</i>	impossible	ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΣ <i>not powerful</i>
ἐπίστασθαι	to understand	ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>standing upon</i>
ἀγνοεῖν	to not know	ΑΓΝΟΕΙΝ <i>not knowing</i>
Part 2		
ὅμοιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
πάσχειν	to experience	ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ <i>enduring</i>
πεπονθέναι	to have experienced [already]	ΠΕΠΟΝΘΕΝΑΙ <i>endured</i>
συλλογίζεσθαι	to infer	ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>reasoning action together</i>
συλλογιζόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	inferring	
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
καθόλου	^(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ <i>completely</i>
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>
ὠμολογηκέναι	to have agreed [already]	
σοφός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	wise	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
σοφιστικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	"wise"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of "wisdom"</i>
σοφιστεύων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	engaging in "wisdom"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΕΥΩΝ <i>"wisdom"</i>
ὁ σοφιστής οἱ σοφισταί	"wise man"	ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ <i>"wisdom"</i>
τὸ σόφισμα τὰ σοφίσματα	"wisdom"	ΣΟΦΙΣΜΑ <i>"wisdom"</i>
ἀναγκάζειν	to force	ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΕΙΝ <i>necessary</i>

28.32 Universal Speculative Judgment

Epíkouros distinguishes between those who accept the paradox (that it is possible to both know and to not know the same thing) as valid in particular logical cases posed by the sophists, and those who accept it as universally true.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 10 inf.)
 | *P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 11 sup. – part 1)*

...καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἐκίνωι γε τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧ καθόλου ὁμολογεῖται, οὐκ ἐπιβάλλοντος τοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐφ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῷ μ πραγμαμάτων, οὐδ' ἓν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ ἐπὶ πάντων ὁμολογήσαντος ἢ ἀρνηθέντος. ἔδοξεν οὖν ἂν δὴ φη|μι τῷ μὴ [σ]υνορῶντι τὴν διαφορὰν τούτῳ[ν] ὁμοιόν τι ποιεῖν.

...καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἐκίνωι γε τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧ^(κ) καθόλου Ὁμολογεῖται – οὐκ ἐπιβάλλοντος τοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐφ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πραγμάτων – οὐδ' ἓν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ ἐπὶ^(κ) πάντων ὁμολογήσαντος ἢ ἀρνηθέντος

...[nevertheless, a universally true speculative judgment is based] in accordance with each one [specific situation], but in that way in which it is^(κ) universally agreed* – while [the son who] agrees [that the paradox is true] does not objectively focus upon each one of the situations – nor while having agreed or having denied what [exists] in regards^(κ) all things [universally] in this way**

[Sedley] [The difference which they do not see is that the man who expresses a universal opinion does so, possibly by empirical examination of] individual cases, but at any rate in the manner of a universal assertion,* whereas our man who concedes the sophism does not empirically examine individual factual cases, and does not make any generally applicable affirmation or denial in the manner of a universal assertion.**

* Of course, all^(ακ) universally true^[Δ:κ] speculative judgments must necessarily be based upon the sense data from only^(-κ) specific cases – observing every case is neither possible nor required to form true speculative judgments.

** A universal^[Δ:κ] speculative judgment is only^(α) true when based in^(M) attested necessary qualities that are never^(W) contested by contrary^(-κ) specific evidence

Ἔδοξεν οὖν ἂν, δὴ, Φημι – τῷ μὴ συνορῶντι τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων – ὁμοιόν τι ποιεῖν

therefore, I assert, It might seem – for the one who does not [mentally] see the difference between these – that [the son] does do something similar [to really agreeing to a universal judgement in a practical way]

[Sedley] So, I repeat, anyone blind to this difference might have supposed our man to be acting in a similar way.

i.e., For those that do not perceive the distinction, it may seem that by agreeing with the specific judgment that he both "does not know who" and "does know who" is under the blanket – he seems to also have agreed to the universal judgment "in general, what we know, we also do not know."

ἕκαστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	each <i>(with plural verb)</i>	ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ <i>each</i>
ἐκίνος = ἐκεῖνος <i>(ἐκεῖνη, ἐκεῖνο)</i>	that	ΕΚΕΙΝΟΣ <i>that there</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
καθόλου	^(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ <i>completely</i>
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing upon</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
ὁ ὁμολογήσας οἱ ὁμολογήσαντες	he who has agreed	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΗΣΑΣ <i>same reasoning</i>
ἀρνεῖσθαι	to deny	ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>denying</i>
ἀρνηθεῖς <i>(εἴσα, ἐν)</i>	having denied [already]	ΑΡΝΗΘΕΙΣ <i>denying</i>

Part 2		
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
συνορῶν	[mentally] seeing together	ΣΥΝΟΡΩΝ <i>seen together</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
ὅμοιος (α, ον)	similar	ὍΜΟΙΟΣ <i>similar</i>
ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to do"]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>

28.33 Universal vs. Specific Facts

A man who is persuaded that some proposition is universally true is bound *to reflect this belief in his behaviour* ("μαρτυρεῖ, δ', Αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, *He attests for himself*"). Yet, as we know from our own experience, people who agree with such paradoxical assertions *are still unable to act as though the assertions are true. In this case, it is not possible to live for very long while suspending all judgment.*

*It is no more likely that the man who is forced to concede that it is possible to know and not know the same thing will adjust his behaviour to fit this principle than, for instance, the man who cannot refute Zeno's or Diódōros Krónos' paradoxes of the impossibility of motion will stop moving. **By not acting in accordance with the sophist's paradoxical assertions, the man shows that he does not really accept it as a universal truth.***

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 11 sup. – part 2)

ἀλλ' οὐ πο[ιεῖ], μα[ρτυ]ρεῖ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅ[ταν τε] καθόλου τι ὁμολ[ο]γήσει, [καὶ]μυριάκις μὴ παρ' ἑκαστον ἐπιβλητικῶς ἀρνηθεῖη ἐπινεύσει, καὶ ὅταμ μὴ. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ βαδίζει εὐθύς εἰς πράξιν τοιαύτην οἷαν εἰ καὶ καθ' ἓν ἑκαστον ἐπιβλητικῶς ὠμολογῇ τι τοῖόνδε τι εἶναι ἢ ἥρνητο, ἅμπερ εἴ πραγματικὴ ἡ δόξα, ἔνθα δ' οὐ βαδίζει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρητικῶν, ἔνθα μὲν τι ἀλλοτρίως κατὰ τὸν [ἐ]πιβλητικὸν τρόπον τοῦ ἐπιμ[αρ]τυρηθησο[μένου εὐθύς ὠμολόγησε]...

ἀλλ' οὐ Ποιεῖ. μαρτυρεῖ, δ', Αὐτὸς αὐτῷ^[1] ὅταν τε^(κ) καθόλου τι ὁμολογήσει – (κᾶν μυριάκις μὴ, παρ'^[-κ] ἑκαστον^[Δ•] ἐπιβλητικῶς, Ἀρνηθεῖη Ἐπινεύσει) – καὶ^[2] ὅταν μὴ

however the [son] does not [act in a way that shows that he believes the paradox is universally true]. but, He attests for himself [in his actions]^[1] whenever it happens that he will also agree to something^(κ) universally – (even if innumerable times [in his words] He will consent [that it is universally true] so that He does not have to deny [this incorrect judgment] in^[Δ•] an objectively focusing way for^[-κ] each single [practically observable example]) – and [He attests for himself in his actions]^[2] whenever [he will] not [agree to something as universally true]

[Sedley] But this is not how he acts; and he bears witness for himself⁽¹⁾ whenever he makes a universal assertion (even if he should make ten thousand statements of its truth for fear that by empirical examination of an individual case he might admit its falsity) and⁽²⁾ when he does not.

The parenthetical statement above suggests that Epíkouros distrusts generalizations and sees them as a means of shutting one's eyes to factual evidence.

When someone makes a *universal* (καθόλου) assertion which he believes to be true about something, he will proceed to think just as if he had also empirically asserted (or denied) *in EACH SINGLE CASE* (καθ' ἓν ἑκαστον), that each case is *LIKE THAT* (τοιόνδε) OBJECT OR CIRCUMSTANCE which he based his *universal* assertion upon.

Consider Aristotle's "practical syllogism" which tries to show the exact logical sequence between the acceptance of a *universal* (καθόλου) principle and acting in accordance with it. Aristotle does demand the recognition of a *minor premise – the principle's applicability in a particular instance* (καθ' ἕκαστονκαθ' ἕκαστον) – before an action can follow.

Epíkouros sees this process as more immediate: for all practical purposes a universal opinion is one that can affect our behaviour at any time. If someone expresses such an opinion such as "all actions are causally necessitated," or "all perception is illusory" – but does not act in every instance as if it were true – then it cannot be said to be a universal opinion, since there is at least one situation in which he manifestly does not believe that it applies.

^[κ] ἔνθα μὲν, γὰρ Βαδίζει εὐθύς εἰς πράξιν τοιαύτην οἷαν εἰ καὶ καθ' ^[-κ] ἔν ἕκαστον ^[Δ•] ἐπιβλητικῶς Ὁμολογῇκει τοιόνδε τι εἶναι, ἢ Ἦρνητο – ἄμπερ εἴ πραγματικῇ ἢ Δόξα ^[-κ] ἔνθα δ' οὐ Βαδίζει

^[κ] in the first case [where he asserts that something is universally true or false], He proceeds directly into an activity like this such as if He had [already] agreed in ^[Δ•] an objectively focusing way that something exists according to ^[-κ] each single [case] like this [case in front of him], or [as if] He had denied [it]– if indeed the Judgment is practical – ^[-κ] but in the second case [where he does not assert that something is universally true or false], He does not proceed [to take action as though he understood the nature of every case]*

^[Sedley] For in case (1) he embarks immediately upon an action such as if he had also accepted empirically that in a particular instance something was or was not of a certain kind; whereas in case (2) he does not. This is if the opinion is of the kind that concerns actions.

(For case 1) If a man recognizes the major premise of a practical syllogism (for example, 'it is good to pursue pleasure'), he will immediately act as if he also recognized the minor premise (for example, 'resting after working will bring me pleasure') – and so, he rests after working, without needing to always think out the full syllogism logically. In this way, a change in reasoning about values and facts often leads to a change in behavior.

ὥσαύτως δέ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ^[Δ•] θεωρητικῶν, ^[κ] ἔνθα μὲν, τι ἄλλοτρίως κατὰ τὸν ^[Δ•] ἐπιβλητικὸν τρόπον τοῦ ^[Δ•] ἐπιμαρτυρηθησομένου εὐθύς Ὁμολόγησε...

but likewise, ^[κ] in the first case [where he asserts that something is universally true or false] in accordance with ^[Δ•] speculative [judgment], He simply IMMEDIATELY agreed to something incompatibly according to an ^[Δ•] objective way of [of judging] ^[Δ•] what is TO BE attested

* ^[Sedley] But so too in the theoretical field, in case (1) he at once goes outside his subject and asserts in empirical terms the [truth of some opinion] which awaits positive confirmation ^[Sedley takes τι with τοῦ ἐπιμαρτυρηθησομένου]

^[Δ•] Speculative judgment can only correctly be used to form ^(κ) universally true judgments when it is based upon ^[θ] empirical observation of necessary characteristics. Forming a ^[Δ•] speculative judgment and then ignoring ^[θ] contrary evidence is obviously a use of speculation that is incompatible with forming true judgments about the real world.

ποιεῖν	to make [here, "to do"]	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ gathering
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ testifying upon
καθόλου	^(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ completely
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ same reasoning
μυριάκις	innumerable times	ΜΥΡΙΑΚΙΣ ants
ἕκαστος (η, ον)	each (with plural verb)	ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ each
ἐπιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ characteristic of being thrown upon

ἀρνείσθαι	to deny	ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>denying</i>
ἐρμηνεύειν	to interpret	ἙΡΜΗΝΕΥΕΙΝ <i>Hermes nod, interpreter sign</i>
ἐπινεύειν	to consent	ΕΠΙΝΕΥΕΙΝ <i>nod towards</i>
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>
Part 2		
ἐνθα μὲν... ἐνθα δὲ	in the first case... in the other case...	
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ <i>walking</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
ἡ πράξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ <i>action</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
οἷος <i>(οἷα, οἷον)</i>	such as	ὍΙΟΣ <i>of this sort</i>
ἕκαστος <i>(η, ον)</i>	each <i>(with plural verb)</i>	ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ <i>each</i>
ἐπιβλητικῶς	in an objectively focusing way	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΩΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>
τοιόσδ᾽ = τοιόσδε <i>(τοιάδε, τοιόνδε)</i>	like this here <i>(such a kind as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΣΔΙ ΤΟΙΟΣΔΕ <i>of this sort here</i>
ἀρνείσθαι	to deny	ΑΡΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>denying</i>
ἤρνητο	he had denied <i>[already]</i>	
ἄμπερ = ἄνπερ	if indeed	ΑΝΠΕΡ <i>"if" indeed</i>
πραγματικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	practical	ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of doing / affair</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
Part 3		
ὡσαύτως	likewise	ὍΣΑΥΤΩΣ <i>self</i>
θεωρητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	speculative	ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of observing</i>
ἄλλοτρίως	incompatibly	ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΩΣ <i>different other</i>
ἐπιβάλλειν	to objectively focus	ΕΠΙΒΑΛΛΕΙΝ <i>throwing upon</i>
ἐπιβλητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	objective	ΕΠΙΒΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of being thrown upon</i>
ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν	to attest	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΙΝ <i>testifying upon</i>
τὸ ἐπιμαρτυρηθισόμενον τὰ ἐπιμαρτυρηθισόμενα	<i>[◇M]</i> what is to be attested	ΕΠΙΜΑΡΤΥΡΗΘΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>will be testified upon</i>
εὐθύς <i>(εἷτα, ύ)</i>	simply	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>direct</i>
ὁμολογεῖν	to agree	ὍΜΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ <i>same reasoning</i>

To underline the difference between being forced to concede to *the specific* paradoxes of the sophists vs. incorrectly accepting that these riddles betray *the universal* truth that knowledge is not possible, Epíkouros now proceeds to describe the behavior which typically accompanies *universal assertions*, but which is absent when the assertion is *not universal*. In doing so, he reverts to the division which he has laid down above for the manifestations of true and false opinions:

- (1) if it is ^[Δ•] an objective judgment, *it will DIRECTLY lead to some practical consequences.*
- (2) if it is ^[Δ∴] a speculative judgment, it will either lead to some statement *about the perceptible world, or it will INDIRECTLY lead to some practical consequences.* (For example, one believing in an incorrect theory of soul – which taught that the soul was never liable to disintegrate – might be expected to worry about their afterlife; but knowledge of the true nature of the soul will allow one to eliminate this worry and to enjoy life.)

28.34 Invalid Generalizations

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col 11 inf.)
| 1479, fr. 13 (col. 12 sup. – part 1)

...το[ῖς κ]αθ[ό]λου ἀκολο[υ]θ[ῶ]ν μ[ὲ]ν β[ο]υλόμ[ε]νός τι ποιεῖν, καὶ ἥ ἂμ ποτε πράξις τις αὐτῷ συνάπτηται, διήμαρτεν, ἔνθα δ' οὐδέν τοιοῦτον ἐποίησεν. οἷς δὲ σημίους χρώμενον συνορᾷν τὴν διαφοράν. κἂν τοῦτο πράττωμεν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν | λόγων, οὐ δυσωπηθησόμεθα τὸ [μ]έρος ὃ προ[ε]ῖρηκα.

... ^(κ) καθόλου ἀκολουθον Βουλόμενος τι ποιεῖν, καὶ ἧ ἂν ποτε Πράξις τις αὐτῷ συνάπτηται – Διήμαρτεν. ^(-κ) ἔνθα δ' οὐδέν τοιοῦτον Ἐποίησεν

...[he agreed to a fact that is not empirically supported] because He wanted to make *some [judgment] that follows* ^(κ) *universally*, and *insofar* as a certain Activity might be connected *to him* – He thoroughly made a mistake. ^(-κ) *in the second case [where he does not agree to a universal fact]*, He did *nothing like this [i.e., making a mistake in his actions based on his mistaken generalization]*

[Sedley] [he asserts in empirical terms the truth of some opinion which awaits positive confirmation and which in fact turns out to be false] through a desire to do something in accordance with his generalization, and wherever some action linked with the assertion occurs, he acts wrongly; whereas in case (2) he does nothing of this kind.

οἷς δὲ Δεῖ σημίους χρώμενον, συνορᾷν τὴν διαφοράν. κἂν τοῦτο Πράττωμεν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν λόγων – οὐ Δυσωπηθησόμεθα τὸ μέρος ὃ Προεῖρηκα

therefore It is necessary, *while using these signs [of objective qualities and consequences]*, *to fully [mentally] see the difference [between a universal judgment and a specific judgment]*. and if We accomplish *this [awareness of the difference]* in regard to all reasonings – We will not be troubled by *the part [of epistemology] which* I have spoken about [*i.e., using only necessary qualities as the basis for universal judgments*]

[Sedley] These are the indications which you must heed in order to see the difference. And if we follow the same procedure in examining all utterances, we shall have no cause for shame with regard to the field of study of which I have spoken.

καθόλου	^(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ completely
ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ following
ἀκολουθῶν <small>(οὔσα, οὖν)</small>	following	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΩΝ following
ἀκολουθος <small>(ον)</small>	follows	
βουλόμενος <small>(η, ον)</small>	wanting	ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ council
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ gathering
ἧ	insofar as	ἧ in/for which

ἡ πρᾶξις αἱ πράξεις	activity	ΠΡΑΞΙΣ <i>action</i>
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>fastening together</i>
διαμαρτάνειν	to thoroughly make a mistake	ΔΙΑΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ <i>missing the mark through</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
Part 2		
τὸ σημίον = τὸ σημείον τὰ σημεία	sign	ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ <i>indication</i>
χρώμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	using	ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ <i>necessary</i>
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>
ἡ διαφορά αἱ διαφοραί	difference	ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ <i>carrying apart</i>
πράττειν	to accomplish	ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ <i>action</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting (reasoning)</i>
ὁρᾶν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ἡ ὥψ	face	ὭΨ <i>face</i>
ὁ ἄνθρωπος οἱ ἄνθρωποι	person (human)	ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ <i>man face</i>
δυσωπεῖν	to trouble	ΔΥΣΩΠΕΙΝ <i>difficult face</i>
δυσωπηθήσεσθαι	to be going to be troubled by	ΔΥΣΩΠΗΘΗΣΕΣΘΑΙ <i>difficult face</i>
τὸ μέρος τὰ μέρη	part	ΜΕΡΟΣ <i>part</i>
προλέγειν	to say before	ΠΡΟΛΕΓΕΙΝ <i>speaking before</i>
εἰρηκέναι	to have said [in the past]	ΕΙΡΗΚΕΝΑΙ <i>having said</i>
προειρηκέναι	to have said before [in the past]	ΠΡΟΕΙΡΗΚΕΝΑΙ <i>having said before</i>

28.35 Effective Use of the Canon

By carefully using sensation as a measure of truth for both objective and speculative judgments, and by keeping in mind the difference between *universal* and *specific* judgements, we can act on our true understanding of the world in a way that is advantageous to our wellbeing.

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, 1479, fr. 13 (col. 12 sup. – part 2)

κ[αῖ] ἦι δ' ἄν οὕτω [ἦι τ]ὸ ἡμαρτημένον, [τὰ γινόμενα δεῖ σ]υναισθάνεσθαι κ[άκ] πρ[ώ]του, ὥσπερ εἴ τινα εἰς ἐγ[ά]ργειαν αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν, ἦ[ι] καὶ εὐθύς μὴ ἀθρόαι τις δισχυρίσει ἐπ' αὐτὸ πορεύη[τ]αι, ἀλλ' εὐλαβοῦμ[ε]νος, καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τὸ ψεῦδος ἐμπεριλαμβάνων [τὰ] καθόλου δὲ μὴ δοξ[ά]ζωγ οὕτω, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἔχωμ[πα]ρ' ἐ[α]ντῷ κανόνα ἐξ οὗ, μέχρ[ι τ]ῆς οἰονί ἐνεργητικῆς ιδέας ἢ ἀναλόγου ταύτηι κειμένης, οὐ βαδιεῖ[τ]αι ἐπὶ τῷ μ[υ] ψευδῶν. κἂν οὕτως οὖν δῆ, φημι ἦι τι διημαρτημένον, δεῖ συνορᾶν...

καὶ ἦ δ' ἂν οὕτω ἦ ^[V] τὸ ἡμαρτημένον: τὰ γινόμενα Δεῖ συναισθάνεσθαι, κάκ πρώτου – ὥσπερ εἴ Τίνα εἰς ἐνάργειαν αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν. ἦ καὶ εὐθύς ^(-κ) μὴ ἀθρόαι Τis δισχυρίσει, ἐπ' αὐτὸ Πορεύηται

but even insofar as ^[V] What is mistaken may exist in this way [*without making the distinction between universal and specific*]: It is necessary to fully perceive what [*practical consequences*] occur, even from the start – just as if Some [*of those consequences*] were to come into his detectible reality. and insofar as Someone will directly thoroughly confirm ^(-κ) NOT in an aggregated [*way, i.e., NOT relating to a universal generalization*], He could proceed toward that [*action based on that specific judgment without making the errors that are involved in a universal judgment*]

but even insofar as ^[V] What is mistaken may exist in this way: It is necessary to fully perceive what occurs, even from the start – just as if Some were to come into his detectible reality. and insofar as Someone will directly thoroughly confirm ^(-κ) NOT in an aggregated [*way*], He could proceed towards it

[Sedley] so too wherever there is error of this kind, it is necessary right from the start to observe events, as if to come to some sort of clear picture of it, so that a person can immediately approach it not with a generalization

ἀλλ' εὐλαβούμενος καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ^[-α] τὸ ψεῦδος ἐμπεριλαμβάνων – ^[κ] τὰ καθόλου δὲ μὴ ^{Δ} δοξάζων οὕτω – ἀλλὰ τιν' ἔχων, παρ' ἑαυτῷ, κανόνα ἐξ οὗ – (μέχρι τῆς οἰονὶ ἐνεργητικῆς ιδέας ἢ ἀναλόγου ταύτη κειμένης) – οὐ Βαδιεῖται ἐπὶ τῶν ψευδῶν

but [*he could form a true judgment about something specific, while*] carefully comprehending one [*idea*] after another [*idea*] as ^[-α] a falsity – yet not ^{Δ} judging [*and accepting each true idea as being*] ^[κ] what is universal in the way [*described above*] – but having, beside oneself, a certain rule [*i.e., a canon*] with which – (up to a kind of activating idea or [*up to*] what is placed as analogous to [*an idea that effects actions*]) – He will not proceed toward falsities

[Sedley] but with caution – encompassing the falsehood this way and that, and not forming a universal opinion in the manner which I have described, but keeping at his side a yardstick with the help of which, until he forms the so-to-speak activating notion, or one of similar stamp, he will not proceed in the direction of falsehood.

κἂν οὕτως, οὖν δὴ, Φημι ἧ τι διημαρτημένον, Δεῖ συνορᾶν...

and in this way, therefore, I say that insofar as something [*is*] thoroughly mistaken, It is necessary to see...

[Sedley] and so I say that if there is some error of this kind we must see...

The *activating idea* (ἐνεργητικὴ ἰδέα) is the correct end-product of a chain of philosophical reasoning: a thought that results in action. Elsewhere Epíkouros regards the entire study of philosophy as being an *activity* (ἐνέργημα) resembling the practical application of a skill. In the letter to Herodotus, he recommends "*continuous activity in physics* (τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ)."

Consider also Demetrius Laco:

Let us persist in activity in accordance with philosophy – and especially in [*mental*] observation in accordance with physics

Συνεχίζωμέν τε ἐν τῷ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐνεργήματι – καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς κατὰ φυσιολογίαν θεωρήμασιν (The Harms of Drifting Thought, P.Herc. 831, col. 8)

ἧ	insofar as	ἧ <i>in/for which</i>
ἧ...	insofar as... so that...	ἧ <i>in/for which</i>
ἧ	It may be	HI
ἢ πλάνη αἰ πλάναι	error	ΠΛΑΝΗ <i>roaming</i>
ἁμαρτάνειν	to make a mistake	ἍΜΑΡΤΑΝΕΙΝ <i>missing the mark</i>
ἢ ἁμαρτία αἰ ἁμαρτίαι	mistake	ἍΜΑΡΤΙΑ <i>failing</i>

τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	^[V] what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of fully missing the mark</i>
τὸ ἡμαρτημένον τὰ ἡμαρτημένα	^[V] what is mistaken	ΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>missing the mark</i>
τὸ γιννόμενον τὰ γιννόμενα	what happens	ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ <i>birthing</i>
ἐπαισθανόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	sensing	ΕΠΑΙΣΘΑΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>result of perceiving upon</i>
συναισθάνεσθαι	to fully perceive	ΣΥΝΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceiving together</i>
ἐναργής <i>(ές)</i>	detectible	ΕΝΑΡΓΗΣ <i>within clear</i>
τὸ ἐνάργημα τὰ ἐναργήματα	^[E] perceivable fact	
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	^[E] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
ἔρχεσθαι	to come / go	ΕΡΧΕΣΘΑΙ <i>moving</i>
εὐθύς	directly	ΕΥΘΥΣ <i>straight</i>
ἄθροος <i>(α, ον)</i>	aggregated	ΑΘΡΟΟΣ <i>in groups</i>
ἰσχύειν	to prevail	ΙΣΧΥΕΙΝ <i>strength</i>
διισχυρίζεσθαι	to thoroughly confirm	ΔΙΙΣΧΥΡΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>strength through</i>
πορεύεσθαι	to proceed	ΠΟΡΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ <i>traveling</i>
Part 2		
εὐλαβεῖσθαι	to carefully comprehend	ΕΥΛΑΒΕΙΣΘΑΙ <i>properly grasped</i>
εὐλαβούμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	carefully comprehending	ΕΥΛΑΒΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>properly grasped</i>
τὸ ψεῦδος τὰ ψεύδη	falsity	ΨΕΥΔΟΣ <i>falsehood / lie</i>
ἐμπεριλαμβάνειν	* to completely comprehend within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>grasping around in</i>
ἐμπεριειλημμένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	*completely comprehended within	ΕΜΠΕΡΙΕΙΛΗΜΜΕΝΟΣ <i>being grasped around in</i>
τὸ καθόλου τὰ καθόλου	^[K] what is universal	ΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ <i>completely</i>
δοξάζειν	to judge	ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
ὁ κανών οἱ κανόνες	rule <i>(measure of truth)</i>	ΚΑΝΩΝ <i>measuring rod</i>
μέχρι	up to	ΜΕΧΡΙ <i>until</i>
οἷονι	of what sort [here, "a kind of"]	ΟΙΟΣ + ΝΙ <i>such as</i>
τὸ ἐνέργημα τὰ ἐνεργήματα	activity	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΜΑ <i>result of working within</i>
ἐνεργητικός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	activating	ΕΝΕΡΓΗΤΙΚΟΣ <i>characteristic of working within</i>
ἡ ιδέα αἱ ιδέαι	idea	ΙΔΕΑ <i>appearing</i>
οἷονι ἐνεργητική ιδέα	a kind of activating idea	
ἀναλόγως	analogously	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΩΣ <i>reasoning again</i>

ἡ ἀναλογία αἱ ἀναλογίαι	analogy	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
ἀναλόγος <i>(ον)</i>	analogous	ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΣ <i>reasoning back/again</i>
ἀντικείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	contrary	ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated against</i>
ἐκκείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	set forth	ΕΚΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated out</i>
συνκείμενος	composed together	ΣΥΝΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated together</i>
κείμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being placed	ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ <i>situated</i>
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ <i>walking</i>
Part 3		
φάναι	to assert	ΦΑΝΑΙ <i>speaking</i>
ἤ	It may be	
τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>missing the mark through</i>
διημαρτημένος <i>(η, ον)</i>	thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ
συνορᾶν	to fully see [mentally]	ΣΥΝΟΡΑΝ <i>looking together</i>

28.36 Actively Exposing Errors

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1417, fr. 13 (col. 12 inf.)

...ἤι δ' ἐτὶ τοιοῦ[το ἡμ]ῖν ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀκνήσ[ω σ]οί τε κα[ὶ] τοῖσδε πολλάκις προφέρειν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δέ, τὰ μὴ ἦι τοιαῦτα, δόξαντα δ' ἂν διημαρτῇ[σθ]αι. ἀλλ' οὐ βούλομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προφέρεισθαι αὐτά, μὴ ἀρχὴμ ποιησώμεθα μῆκος ἐχόντων ἱκανὸν λόγων.

...ἤ δ' ἐτὶ τοιοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐστίν, οὐκ Ὀκνήσω σοί τε καὶ τοῖσδε πολλάκις προφέρειν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ – δέ τὰ μὴ ἦ τοιαῦτα, δόξαντα δ' ἂν διημαρτῆσθαι

...but insofar as [incorrect judgments] like this [from the lack of distinction between universal and specific] exist for us, I will not hesitate to often set forth to you and also to these [students] the remaining [sources of those errors] – but also [I will not hesitate] insofar as the [remaining sources of errors are] NOT like those, but still would seem to have been thoroughly mistaken

[Sedley] Nor shall I hesitate to cite repeatedly, to you and to these others, cases where there is still error of this kind among us; and so too all other cases, which are not of this kind, but which we would nevertheless consider to involve error.

ἀλλ' οὐ Βούλομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προφέρεισθαι αὐτά: μὴ ἀρχὴν Ποιησώμεθα μῆκος ἐχόντων ἱκανὸν λόγων

but I do not want to also bring them in at present: so that We do not make a [new] foundation of this reasoning [which already] has sufficient length

[Sedley] For the present, however, I do not wish to cite them, to avoid making a new start in a discussion which has already reached sufficient length.

ἤ	insofar as	ἦ <i>in/for which</i>
τοιοῦτος <i>(τοιαύτη, τοιοῦτον)</i>	like this <i>(such as this)</i>	ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ <i>this of this sort</i>
ὀκνεῖν	to hesitate	ΟΚΝΕΙΝ <i>hesitating</i>
πολλάκις	often	ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ <i>many times</i>

προφέρειν	to set forth	ΠΡΟΦΕΡΕΙΝ <i>bringing forward</i>
λοιπός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	remaining [rest of + <i>gen</i>]	ΛΟΙΠΟΣ <i>what is left over</i>
δοκεῖν	to seem	ΔΟΚΕΙΝ <i>seeming</i>
δόξας <i>(ασα, αν)</i>	seems	ΔΟΞΑΣ <i>seeming</i>
τὸ διημαρτημένον τὰ διημαρτημένα	what is thoroughly mistaken	ΔΙΗΜΑΡΤΗΜΕΝΟΝ <i>fully missing the mark</i>
διημαρτάνεσθαι	to thoroughly mistake	
διημαρτηῆσθαι	to thoroughly mistake [already]	
Part 2		
βούλεσθαι	to want	ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ <i>wishing</i>
παρών <i>(παρουσα, παρόν)</i>	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ <i>to be beside</i>
προσφέρεσθαι	to also possess [here, "to also bring"]	ΠΡΟΣΦΕΡΕΣΘΑΙ <i>bringing as well</i>
ἡ ἀρχή αἱ ἀρχαί	foundation	ΑΡΧΗ <i>first order</i>
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
τό μήκος τὰ μήκη	length	ΜΗΚΟΣ <i>length</i>
ἱκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ΊΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
ὁ λόγος οἱ λόγοι	reasoning	ΛΟΓΟΣ <i>collecting</i> <i>(reasoning)</i>

28.37 Let This Writing Continue Speaking

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 13 sup. – part 1)

[ικ]ανῶ[ς] οὖν ἡμῖν ἡδολεσχήσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ ὑμεῖς [μ]υ[ρ]ιάκι[ς μνημο]νεύε[ι]μ[η] π[ε]ρ[ι]ᾱ[σ]θε τὰ ἐμοί τε καὶ Μητρ[ο]δώρῳ τῷδε ν[ε]ωστί[ει] ρημένα. οἶμαι δ' ὑμῖν ὃ[γ]δο[ν] καὶ εἰκοστὸν εἶδος ἀκ[ρο]άσεως τῇ[ς] ἐξῆς περαιν[ο]μένης τουτί ν[ῦ]ν ἡδολε[σ]χῆσθαι

ικανῶς οὖν ἡμῖν ἡδολεσχήσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ Ὑμεῖς: μυριάκις μνημονεύειν Πειρᾱσθε τὰ ἐμοί τε καὶ Μητροδώρῳ τῷδε νεωστί εἰρημένα

therefore, Let [this writing] sufficiently prattle on for us at present. and [all] You [readers]: Attempt innumerable times to remember what has been said just now by me and also by Metrodorus here

[Sedley] So let the words which we have prattled suffice for the present. And you others, try ten thousand times over to commit to memory what I and Metrodorus here have just said.

Οἶμαι δ' ὑμῖν, ὄγδοον καὶ εἰκοστὸν Εἶδος ἀκροάσεως, τῆς ἐξῆς περαινομένης, τουτί νῦν ἡδολεσχῆσθαι

but I suspect that for you all, this eighth-and-twentieth Volume of our instruction, [which is] being accomplished in succession, even now has prattled on

[Sedley] And now I think I have finished prattling to you this twenty-eighth instalment of our consecutive lecture series.

ικανῶς	sufficiently	ΊΚΑΝΩΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>
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ἀδολεσχεῖν	to prattle	ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΕΙΝ <i>chattering</i>
ἀδολεσχήσασθαι	to have prattled on [for oneself]	ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ <i>chattering</i>
ἡδολεσχήσθω	Let X prattle on for X self	ΗΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΘΩ
παρών <i>(παρουσα, παρόν)</i>	present	ΠΑΡΩΝ <i>to be beside</i>
μυριάκις	innumerable times	ΜΥΡΙΑΚΙΣ <i>ants</i>
μνημονεύειν	to remember	ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙΝ <i>"addition to" thinking</i>
πειρᾶσθαι	to attempt	ΠΕΙΡΑΣΘΑΙ <i>trail / attempt</i>
Μητρόδωρος	Met ro do rus	ΜΗΤΡΟΔΩΡΟΣ <i>gift [to] mother</i>
νεωστὶ	just now	ΝΕΩΣΤΙ <i>new</i>
εἰρήσθαι	to have been said	ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ <i>spoke</i>
εἰρημένος	having been said [already]	ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>spoke</i>
τὸ εἰρημένον τὰ εἰρημένα	what has been said	ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΝ
Part 2		
οἷεσθαι	to suspect	ΟΙΕΣΘΑΙ <i>perceive</i>
ὄγδοος <i>(η, ον)</i>	eighth	ΟΓΔΟΟΣ <i>eight</i>
εἰκοστός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	twentieth	ΕΙΚΟΣΤΟΣ <i>twenty</i>
ἡ εἰκάς αἱ εἰκάδες	20 th day of the month	ΕΙΚΑΣ <i>twenty</i>
τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον τὰ εἰκοσάεδρα	icosahedron <i>(20 faced polyhedron)</i>	ΕΙΚΟΣΑΕΔΡΟΝ <i>twenty-face</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form [here, "volume"]	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
τὸ ἄκρον τὰ ἄκρα	boundary	ΑΚΡΟΝ <i>highest</i>
ἡ ἀκρόασις αἱ ἀκροάσεις	instruction	ΑΚΡΟΑΣΙΣ <i>highest</i>
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ <i>seeming</i>
τό δόγμα τά δόγματα	teaching	ΔΟΓΜΑ <i>seeming</i>
ἑξῆς	in succession	ἙΞΗΣ <i>six</i>
περαίνειν	to accomplish	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>extremity</i>
περαινόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being accomplished	ΠΕΡΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>extremity</i>
ἀδολεσχήσασθαι	to have prattled on [for oneself]	ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ <i>always chattering</i>
ἡδολεσχήσθαι	to have been prattling on [for oneself]	ΗΔΟΛΕΣΧΗΣΘΑΙ

Epíkouros' *On Nature Book 28*, from the early writings... ...[This was] written in [the period] of Nicias, who followed Antiphátēs

[Sedley] Epíkouros On Nature Book XXVIII From the old exemplars written in the archonship of Nicias the successor of Antiphátēs.

In 297 BCE, Demetrius Poliorcetes learned the wealthy Athenian Lacháres was working (with Cassander's support) to undermine the democracy that Demetrius had allowed the Athenians to reestablish after Demetrius' conquest, back in 307, of the regime (which was also supported by Cassander) that had been controlling Athens. Demetrius responded with a fraught but ultimately successful operation against Cassander's forces that were holding Athens. It was at this time that "the philosopher Epíkouros sustained the lives of his associates with beans, which he counted out and distributed among them" (Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 34)

Nicias was eponymous archon in 296/295 BCE, following Antiphátēs who was eponymous archon in 297/296. Therefore, book 28 was probably written in 296, when Epíkouros was 45 years old.

CONCEPTION LIST

νοεῖν	to conceive	NOEIN seeing
ἡ νόησις αἱ νοήσεις	concept	NOHISIS seeing
τὸ νόημα τὰ νόηματα	conception	NOHMA seeing
νοηθεῖς (εἶσα, ἐν) νοηθέντες (εἶσαι, ἐντα)	conceived	NOHΘEIS seeing
ἐπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive	EPINOEIN seeing upon
ἐπινενοηκῶς (υῖα, ὅς)	having objectively conceived	EPINENOHKΩS saw upon
ἐπिनोηθεῖς (α, ἐν)	[objectively] conceived [already]	EPINOHΘEIS seeing upon
ἡ ἐπίνοια αἱ ἐπινοίαι	[objective] concept	EPINOIA seeing upon
τὸ ἐπινόημα τὰ ἐπινοήματα	[objective] conception	EPINOHMA result of seeing upon
τὸ ἐπινοηθὲν τὰ ἐπινοηθέντα	what is objectively conceived	EPINOHΘEN seeing upon
ἐπινοοούμενος (η, ον)	objectively conceived	EPINOΟΥMENOΣ seeing upon
προσεπινοεῖν	to objectively conceive additionally	PROSEPINOEIN
ἐννοεῖν	to internalize	ENNOEIN seeing within
τὸ ἐννόημα τὰ ἐννοήματα	internal conception	ENNOHMA result of seeing within
ἐννοῶν (ἐννοοῦσα, ἐννοοῦν) ἐννοοῦντες (ἐννοοῦσαι, ἐννοοῦντα)	internalizing	ENNOΩN
διανοεῖσθαι	to perceive [mentally]	DIANOEISΘAI seeing through
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	DIANOIA seeing through

ἀδιανόητος (οῦ)	[mentally] imperceptible	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing through</i>
τὸ ἀδιανόητον τὰ ἀδιανόητα	what is imperceptible [mentally]	ΑΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΝ <i>not seeing through</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
κατανοούμενος	fully conceived	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
ἡ κατανόησις αἱ κατανοήσεις	full conception	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>thoroughly seeing</i>
προσκατανοεῖν	to additionally conceive fully	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>addition to seeing thoroughly</i>
ἡ προσκατανόησις αἱ προσκατανοήσεις	additional full conception	ΠΡΟΣΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΙΣ <i>addition to thoroughly seeing</i>
ἀπερινόητος (οῦ)	not completely conceivable	ΑΠΕΡΙΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>not seeing around</i>
ἐνπερινενοημένος (η, οῦ)	completely conceived within	ΕΝΠΕΡΙΝΕΝΟΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>having seen around in</i>

[Book 29]

[Book 30]

[Book 31]

Book 32

32.1 Detectible Reality the Gods

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911

...πάν γὰ[ρ]... ...οἶεται καθάπ[ερ ὀρί]ζεται χρό[νος, εἶναι] πρόληψιν· [καὶ κα]θάπερ κἀν [τῷ δευ]τέρῳ καὶ [τριακοσ]τῷ, καὶ τῶν [θεῶν ἐ]ναργεῖαι φησ[ὶν κατα]λαμβάνεσθα[ι τὸ ὄν], καίπερ ἐν τῶν [ἐν ὑπο]κειμένοις ὄν, [τὴν δὲ] φύσιν διανο[ητήν] [ἦ]ττον ἔχον [τῶν] ἄλλων ὄντων [καὶ καθόλ]ου πρὸς τή[ν]...

...πάν γὰρ... ...οἶεται, καθάπερ ὀρίζεται Χρόνος εἶναι **πρόληψιν** – καὶ καθάπερ **κἀν τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ**, καὶ τῶν θεῶν Ἐναργεῖαι, Φησὶν, **καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ ὄν** – καίπερ **ἐν τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄν** – **τὴν δὲ φύσιν διανοητὴν ἦττον ἔχον τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων**. καὶ καθόλου, πρὸς τὴν...

...for all [*the universe*]... ...is thought of, just as Time is distinguished to exist as an anticipation – and just as in the Second-and-Thirtieth [*book On Nature, Epikouros*] says, the detectible Realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing – even though existing as a single [*object of thought*] among those [*other objects of thought*] in the original sources [*of the films from their bodies*] – nevertheless [*these detectable realities of the gods*] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things. and universally, in relation to the...

[Obbink] ...For all [*infinity*] is thought of, just as time is defined, as being a naturally formed generic conception; and just as also in book 32 he says that because the existence of the gods is apprehended with clarity [*i.e., vivid knowledge*], although as a unified entity among underlying existents, and their nature is less able to be perceived by thought than other existents [*lit. having its nature less conceivable than the other entia*], and generally towards...

[Obbink] here the fact that the gods exist *in the first instance as conceptualized by humans* is illustrated by comparison *to the ontological status of time, which according to Epicurus is not even a per se entity (but rather an accident or attribute of other entities) yet is not in consequence any less real. Rather, it is an epiphenomenon of our thinking about certain occurrences in relation to other events and objects.*

ὀρίζειν	to set a limit [here, "to distinguish"]	ὍΡΙΖΕΙΝ <i>border</i>
ἡ πρόληψις αἱ προλήψεις	[•Λ] anticipation	ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ <i>before taking hold</i>
ἡ ἐνάργεια αἱ ἐναργεῖαι	[Ε] detectible reality	ΕΝΑΡΓΕΙΑ <i>within clear</i>
καταλαμβάνειν	to thoroughly comprehend	ΚΑΤΑΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly grasping</i>
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ ὑποκείμενα	original source	ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ <i>result of situated under</i>
ἡ διάνοια αἱ διάνοιαι	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ <i>seeing through</i>
διανοητὸς <i>(ἡ, ὄν)</i>	[mentally] perceptible	ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΟΣ <i>saw through</i>
καθόλου	(κ) universally	ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ <i>completely</i>

32.2 Epíkouros' Long and Short Outlines, Polyaeus' *On Outlines*

Auctor ignotus, Opus ignotum, P.Herc. 998, fragment 11, 12, & 16

...τικόν. Σύντομον δέ τινα καὶ κεφαλαιώδ[η] καὶ ἐπιτομικὸν τῶν διὰ πλε[υ]όνων τε θεωρημένων ὅρον τινὰ προφέρεται ἐν τῷ Β καὶ Λ. Ῥηθείηι γὰρ ἂν, φ[η]σίν, ψυχὴ φύσις τις εἶναι ταῖς υματι... | ...λόγον οὔτε τῶν λ τω[ν] ἁποδιδόνα[ι]... ναδιλωνωσις εὔ... ...τῇ Α καὶ... ...καὶ παρὰ Πολυαίνωι δ' ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅρων τόνδε συν... | ...[α]ὐτὸς οὗτος [δ'] ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδήλου διεξιὼν, ὄντως νομίσα[ς] τὸν ακούσ[ας]... . . . δῆτα τοιαῦτ[α] προπνω... ...τὸ ἄδηλο[ν]...

*Addidi [ας]

...**σύντομον δέ τινα καὶ κεφαλαιώδη καὶ ἐπιτομικὸν τῶν διὰ πλειόνων τε θεωρημένων ὅρον τινὰ Προφέρεται ἐν τῷ Β καὶ Λ – Ῥηθείηι γὰρ ἂν, Φησίν, Ψυχὴ Φύσις τις εἶναι ταῖς...**

But [Epíkouros], in 2 and 30 [*i.e., book 32 On Nature*], puts forth **a certain brief, principal, and epitomized outline of mental observations** and also **a certain [definition of mental observations] through many [words]** — for, He says, It might be said that the Soul exists as **some Nature in relation to the...**

...**λόγον οὔτε τῶν... ...ἀποδιδόναί... ...τῇ Α καὶ... ...καὶ παρὰ Πολυαίνωι δ' ἐν τῷ Περί Ὅρων, τόνδε...**

...to give **a reasoning** nor **of the**... ...to render... ...in [*book*] 1 also... ...and also in Polyaeus, in his book *On Outlines*, **this very [definition]** is [*discussed*]...

...**Αὐτὸς οὗτος δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδήλου διεξιὼν, ὄντως νομίσας τὸν ακουσας δῆτα τοιαῦτα... ...τὸ ἄδηλον...**

...but He himself, while going through **what is unclear, truly** having thought **the one who certainly heard such things... ...what is unclear...**

τὸ θεώρημα τὰ θεωρήματα	<i>[a mental]</i> observation	ΘΕΩΡΗΜΑ <i>result of observing</i>
ὁ ὅρος οἱ ὅροι	outline	ὍΡΟΣ <i>marking out</i>
τὸ ἄδηλον τὰ ἄδηλα	[0] what is unclear	ΑΔΗΛΟΝ <i>not clear</i>

Book 34

34.1 Limit of Instruction & Limit of Doubt

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 1 (column 3)

...ἀγωγῆς [πα]ραλαβε[ῖ]ν, ἀλλ' [ὁ]ψιν μὴ π[εῖ]σαι οὐδ' [ἐ]τοιμοτ[ά]τοις, πᾶ[ν] ἀπολειπ[ό]μ[ενο]ν πρὸς ὑπολ[ή]ψει οὐθὲν ἄ[ν] ποιή[σ]αι φοβερόν, ἀ[λλὰ]... ...διανο[ί]ας...

...ἀγωγῆς παραλαβεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁψιν μὴ πείσαι – οὐδ' ἑτοιμοτάτοις. Πᾶν ἀπολειπόμενον πρὸς ὑπολήψει οὐθὲν ἂν ποιήσαι φοβερόν, ἀλλὰ... ...διανοίας...

...to comprehend the guidance from another, but not to persuade vision – not even for the most prepared. Everything being left behind for supposition would make nothing fearful, but... ...of [mental] perception...

"Everything being left behind for supposition would make nothing fearful" is probably an allusion to the fact that – although many things are pending definitive specific judgment – the most critical issues are settled by our definitive universally true judgments (which is a sufficient basis to live without fear).

ἡ ἀγωγή αἱ ἀγωγαί	guidance	ΑΓΩΓΗ going
λαβεῖν	[intellectually] to comprehend [already]	ΛΑΒΕΙΝ grasped
παραλαβεῖν	✱ to comprehend [gen.] from another	ΠΑΡΑΛΑΒΕΙΝ
ἡ ὄψις αἱ ὄψεις	vision	ΟΨΙΣ eye
πείθειν	to persuade	ΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ convincing
ἕτοιμος (η, ον)	prepared	ἙΤΟΙΜΟΣ ready
ἑτοιμότατος (η, ον)	most prepared	ἑτοιμότατος most ready
λείπειν	to leave	ΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ leaving
ἀπολείπειν	to go way	ΑΠΟΛΕΙΠΕΙΝ leaving away/out
ἀπολειπόμενος (η, ον)	being left behind	
ἡ ὑπόληψις αἱ ὑπολήψεις	supposition	ὙΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ taking hold under
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ gathering
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ fleeing
φοβερός (ά, όν)	fearful	ΦΟΒΕΡΟΣ tendency toward fleeing
ἡ δiάνoια αἱ δiάνoiai	[mental] perception	ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ seeing through

Επίκουρος, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 2 (column 5)

...ὑποψίας τοῦ εἶδο[υς] ἔχουσιν, καὶ γ[ὰρ] αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάλ[ιν] δὲ μετέπ[εσ]εν ἐπὶ β[ρα]χύ τι...

...ὑποψίας τοῦ εἶδους ἔχουσιν – καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ Τοῦτο, πάλιν δὲ, μετέπεσεν ἐπὶ βραχύ τι...

...having a suspicion of its form — for even This very thing, again, shifted for a short bit...

ἡ ὑποψία αἱ ὑποψίαι	suspicion	ὙΠΟΨΙΑ <i>looking under</i>
τὸ εἶδος τὰ εἶδη	form	ΕΙΔΟΣ <i>appearing</i>
πίπτειν	to fall	ΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling</i>
μεταπίπτειν	to shift	ΜΕΤΑΠΙΠΤΕΙΝ <i>falling differently</i>
βραχύς <i>(εἶα, ύ)</i>	short	ΒΡΑΧΥΣ <i>brief</i>

34.2 Developing Fearlessness

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 3 (column 8)

...λάχθαι φό[β]ων οὐδέπ[ο]τ' ὥς νομίζων, οὐδ' ὥς κατανεγ[ο]ηκῶς ὅτι ταυτὶ μὲν δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν ἀφοβὸν ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἅττα π[οι]ῶν, [ο]ὔτος εὐφραινόμεν[ενος] ἄλλο οὐτ' ἔχων ὁ[χλη]μα οὐτ' ἐπ[ιθυμ]ίαν...

...φόβων οὐδέποτ' ὥς νομίζων, οὐδ' ὥς κατανενοηκῶς ὅτι: ταυτὶ μὲν Δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν Ἔφοβον ἐσόμενον, καὶ – Ὁ μὲν ἅττα ποιῶν – Οὔτος, εὐφραινόμενος, ἄλλο οὐτ' ἔχων ὁχλημα οὐτ' ἐπιθυμίαν...

...in terms of fears, never as if thinking, nor as if having fully conceived that: It is necessary that the One who is to be unafraid does these things, and – the One doing some [of these recommended actions] – this One, while making himself glad, has neither another disturbance nor desire...

λαγχάνειν	to obtain (by lot)	ΛΑΓΧΑΝΕΙΝ <i>obtaining by lot</i>
λάχθαι	to have obtained (by lot)	ΛΑΧΘΑΙ <i>obtaining by lot</i>
ὁ φόβος οἱ φόβοι	fear	ΦΟΒΟΣ <i>fleeing</i>
οὐδέποτε	never	ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ <i>not even at some point</i>
νομίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i>	thinking	ΝΟΜΙΖΩΝ <i>custom</i>
ἐπινενοηκῶς <i>(υῖα, ός)</i>	having objectively conceived	ΕΠΙΝΕΝΟΗΚΩΣ <i>saw upon</i>
κατανοεῖν	to fully conceive	ΚΑΤΑΝΟΕΙΝ <i>seeing thoroughly</i>
κατανενοηκῶς	having fully conceived	ΚΑΤΑΝΕΝΟΗΚΩΣ <i>thoroughly saw</i>
ἄφοβος <i>(ος, ον)</i>	not dreadful	ΑΦΟΒΟΣ <i>not fleeing [in fear]</i>
ἐσόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	[about] to be	ΕΣΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>will be</i>
ἅττα	some	ΑΤΤΑ <i>is an alternative form of</i>
τινά	certain	ΤΙΝΑ
ποιεῖν	to make	ΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>gathering</i>
εὐφραίνειν	to become glad	ΕΥΦΡΑΙΝΕΙΝ <i>good mind</i>
εὐφραινόμενος	making oneself glad	
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ <i>crowd of people</i>

<p>ἡ ὀχλησις αἱ ὀχλήσεις</p>	<p>[feeling of] disturbance</p>	<p>ΟΧΛΗΣΙΣ <i>process of a crowd of people</i></p>
<p>τό ὄχλημα τά ὀχλήματα</p>	<p>[cause of] disturbance</p>	<p>ΟΧΛΗΜΑ <i>result of a crowd of people</i></p>
<p>ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι</p>	<p>desire</p>	<p>ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ <i>toward spirit</i></p>

34.3 [Distorted Myths, Fulfilled Vengeance]

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 4 (column 9)

...παραδεδομ[έ]νων μύθων κα[ὶ ἐπὶ] τούτοις τοῖς ἔρ[γοι]ς ἢ ἄλλος διαστρέφει ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν ἀντιπτώσεων· αὐται δὴ συντελοῦνται τιμωρίαι τ[οῖς] ὑ[πὲρ] τοῦ παντὸς[ς]...

...**παραδεδομένων μύθων. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις** ἢ Ἄλλος διαστρέφει ἢ **Αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν ἀντιπτώσεων**· αὐται, δὴ, συντελοῦνται Τιμωρίαι **τοῖς** ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς...

...while the myths have been handed down. and in regard to these tasks either Another person distorts [them] out of contrary occurrences or He himself [does so]. these Vengeances, therefore, are mutually fulfilled for those [?] on behalf of the whole...

παραδιδό ναι	to hand over [here, "to hand down"]	ΠΑΡΑΔΙΔΟ ΝΑΙ <i>giving alongside</i>
παραδεδο μένος	have been handed down	ΠΑΡΑΔΕΔΟΜΕ ΝΟΣ <i>gave alongside</i>
ὁ μῦ θος οἱ μῦ θοι	myth	ΜΥΘ ΟΣ <i>speech / word</i>
τὸ ἔρ γον τὰ ἔρ γα	task	ΕΡΓ ΟΝ <i>work</i>
καταστρέφ ειν	to overturn	ΚΑΤΑΣΤΡΕΦ ΕΙΝ <i>thoroughly turning</i>
διαστρέφ ειν	to distort	ΔΙΑΣΤΡΕΦ ΕΙΝ <i>turning through</i>
ἡ περίπ τωσις αἱ περιπτώ σεις	circumstance	ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩ ΣΙΣ <i>fall around</i>
ἡ ἔμπ τωσις αἱ ἐμπτώ σεις	collision	ΕΜΠΤΩ ΣΙΣ <i>falling into</i>
ἡ ἀντίπ τωσις αἱ ἀντιπτώ σεις	contrary occurrence	ΑΝΤΙΠΤΩ ΣΙΣ <i>falling against</i>
συντελ εῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛ ΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
ἡ τιμω ρία αἱ τιμω ρίαι	vengeance	ΤΙΜΩ ΡΙΑ <i>guarding honor</i>

34.4 Mental Attention on the Unseen

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 5 (column 11)

...ὥστε καὶ [πι]ά[σας φ]ύσεις τὰς [ἐ]κ [τῶν ἐπι]βολῶν [τῶν ἐπὶ τ]ὸ ἀόρατον ἤδ[η βαδ]ιζουσῶν ὁ[ψι]όμ[ε]θ' ἅ[ν] εἰς ὁμοιό[τε]ητα[ς] ἰδῶμεν ἅς...

...ὥστε καὶ **πάσας φύσεις τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιβολῶν τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀόρατον ἤδη βαδίζουσῶν** Ὅψόμεθ' ἂν **εἰς ὁμοιότητας** – Ἰδῶμεν **ἅς**...

...so that We would also see for ourselves all the natures from [our] attentions directed at the unseen that are already proceeding into the similarities – Let us see which ones...

"*The similarities*" could be a reference to only using shared ^(κ) universal qualities of a class of objects for further ^[Δ:~] speculative judgments concerning that class (i.e., "*the unseen*").

ή ἐπιβολή αἰ ἐπιβολαί	[B'] attention	ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗ <i>throwing upon</i>
ὄρᾱν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ἀόρατος <i>(ας, ον)</i>	unseen	ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ <i>not looking</i>
βαδίζων <i>(ουσα, ον)</i> βαδίζοντες <i>(ουσαι, οντα)</i>	proceeding	ΒΑΔΙΖΩΝ
ὄρᾱν	to see [mentally]	ὍΡΑΝ <i>looking</i>
ὁψόμεθα	we will see [for ourselves]	ΟΨΟΜΕΘΑ <i>will look</i>
ἰδεῖν	to have seen [mentally]	ΙΔΕΙΝ <i>saw</i>
ἰδῶμεν	let us see	ΙΔΩΜΕΝ <i>saw</i>
ή ὁμοιότης αἰ ὁμοιότητες	similarity	ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΣ <i>condition of being similar</i>

34.5 Inductive Consideration of Specific Characteristics

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 6 (column 12)

...ὅθεν ἂν [τ]ύχηι καθ' ἕν τι πρα[γ]μ[ά]των κ[αί] οὐχ ἅπαντ[α] ἐπιλογισάμενος τ[ὰ] κατὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τ[οῦ] εἰδ[ώ]λου
συναπτο[μέν]ην αὐτῷ [ὁ]ξυδέ[ρ]κειαν...

...ὅθεν ἂν Τύχη, καθ' ^(-κ) ἕν τι πραγμάτων καὶ οὐχ ^(κ) ἅπαντα, ἐπιλογισάμενος, τὰ
κατὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ εἰδώλου συναπτομένην αὐτῷ ὀξυδερκεῖαν...

...from wherever it may happen that, having inductively considered,
according to ^(-κ) a certain one of the situations and not ^(κ) all things
[together], the things according to sharp perception connected to him
concerning the film...

Inductive consideration (ὁ ἐπιλογισμός) distinguishes ^(-κ) specific characteristics from ^(κ) universal characteristics, so that we can use only ^(κ) universal characteristics for our analogical consideration (ὁ ἀναλογισμός) in forming ^[Δ:~] speculative judgements.

ή τύχη αἰ τύχαι	chance	ΤΥΧΗ <i>happening</i>
τύχη	it may happen	ΤΥΧΗΙ <i>happening</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
τὸ πᾶν <i>(τοῦ παντός)</i>	<i>(individually)</i> everything, <i>(collectively)</i> the universe	ΠΑΝ <i>all</i>
τό ἅπαν τά ἅπαντα	everything ^[together] all things ^[together]	ἌΠΑΝΤΑ <i>all together</i>
ὁ ἐπιλογισμός οἱ ἐπιλογισμοί	^[process of] inductive consideration	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>

ἐπιλογίζεσθαι	to inductively consider	ΕΠΙΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ <i>process of reasoning action upon</i>
ἐπιλογισάμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	having inductively considered [for oneself]	
τὸ εἶδωλον τὰ εἶδωλα	film	ΕΙΔΩΛΟΝ <i>object from appearing</i>
συνάπτειν	to connect	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΕΙΝ <i>fastening together</i>
συναπτόμενος <i>(η, ον)</i>	being connected	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ <i>fastening together</i>
ὄξυδερκείη <i>ionic</i> ἡ ὄξυδερκία αἱ ὄξυδερκίαι	sharp perception	ΟΞΥΔΕΡΚΙΑ <i>sharp seeing</i>

34.6 [Nothing would be Terrible]

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 7 (column 13)

...[τῆς συνκ]ρ[ο]ύσεως· καὶ αὐτόθεν μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἀντικοπῆς καθ' ὃν λέγω τρόπον οὐθὲν [α]ν ἡ δειν[ό]ν· νῦν δὲ ταῦτα...

Forma "η" hic probabiliter contrahitur ex "εἴη," optativo verbi "εἶναι,"

quod constructionem cum ἄν complet ad sensum possibilitatis exprimendum

...τῆς συγκρούσεως – καὶ αὐτόθεν μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἀντικοπῆς, καθ' ὃν Λέγω τρόπον: Οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη δεινόν – νῦν δὲ, Ταῦτα...

...of the mutual impact – and with the collision being produced from that place, in the way I am describing: Nothing would be terrible – but as it is, These things...

ἡ σύγκρουσις αἱ συγκρούσεις	mutual impact	ΣΥΓΚΡΟΥΣΙΣ <i>hitting together</i>
πανταχόθεν	from/on all sides	ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ <i>from all places</i>
αὐτόθεν	* from that place	ΑΥΤΟΘΕΝ
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
ἡ ἀντικοπή αἱ ἀντικοπαί	collision [against]	ΑΝΤΙΚΟΠΗ <i>beating against</i>
ὁ τρόπος οἱ τρόποι	way	ΤΡΟΠΟΣ <i>manner / direction</i>
δεινός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	terrible	ΔΕΙΝΟΣ <i>terrifying</i>

34.7 The Cycling of Opinion into Confusion

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 8 (column 14)

...[ἐπι]κρατείας [καί] πᾶνθ' ὅλως μία τις κύκησις ὑπ[ῆ]ι ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ μηδ' αἱ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν δόξαι γίνωνται· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς μυθώδεις διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν κ[αί] οὗτος πάλιν [δ]όξας βα[δ]ίζ[ει]...

**ἐπι addidi*

...ἐπικρατείας, καὶ πάνθ' ὅλως μία τις Κύκησις ὑπῆ ἐν αὐταῖς – καὶ μηδ' αἱ κατ' ἐπικράτειαν Δόξαι γίνωνται. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς μυθώδεις, διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ Οὔτος πάλιν δόξας βαδίζει...

...of the prevailing opinion, and altogether one certain Stirring up [of confusion] might exist among them – and not even the Judgments according to the prevailing opinion would be produced. due to this cause [of stirred-up mental confusion], He also turns [his] judgments again toward the mythical [interpretations]

κρατεῖν	to rule	ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ governing
ἡ ἐπικράτεια αἱ ἐπικρατεῖαι	prevailing opinion	ΕΠΙΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ governing upon
ὁ κύκλος οἱ κύκλοι	sphere	ΚΥΚΛΟΣ wheel
ἡ κύκῃσις αἱ κυκήσεις	stirring up [of confusion]	ΚΥΚΗΣΙΣ wheel
ὑπάρχειν	to exist	ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ beginning under (before)
ὑπῆ	it might exist	
ἡ δόξα αἱ δόξαι	judgment	ΔΟΞΑΙ seeming
γίνεσθαι = γίγνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ come into being
ὁ μῦθος οἱ μῦθοι	myth	ΜΥΘΟΣ speech / word
μυθώδης (ης, ες)	mythical	ΜΥΘΩΔΗΣ full of speech / word
ἡ αἰτία αἱ αἰτίαι	cause	ΑΙΤΙΑ blame
βαδίζειν	proceed	ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ walking

34.8 Active Error Comes from the Self – Passive Error, from Convention

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 9 (column 15)

...οὐ πολλ[ο]ύς [ο]ὔτως ἐκκαθαίρεσθαι· τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς συναπτομένη[ς ἐ]ξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κινήσεως αἴτιον ἀπογεννᾶ[ν] μὲν καὶ τὰς ἀ[λόγ]ους δεῖν νομίζε[ιν κα]τὰ τὰς τῶ[ν] πρα[γμάτ]ων φωνά[ς αὐ]τὰς χω[ροῦν]τας...

...οὐ Πολλοὺς οὔτως ἐκκαθαίρεσθαι: τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς συναπτομένης ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κινήσεως Αἴτιον ἀπογεννᾶν μὲν καὶ τὰς Ἀλόγους Δεῖν νομίζειν κατὰ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων φωνὰς αὐτὰς χωροῦντας...

...not Many [people] clarify themselves out [of their mental errors] in this way: but what Causes the [mental] movement connected to us ourselves fully generates [itself] and It is necessary that the Unreasoning [mental movements] themselves are advancing according to the statements of the situations...

καθαίρειν	to clarify	ΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ cleansing
προσεκκαθαίρειν	to further clarify out	ΠΡΟΣΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ cleaning further out
ἐκκαθαίρειν	to clarify out	ΕΚΚΑΘΑΙΡΕΙΝ cleaning out
συναπτόμενος (η, ον)	being connected	ΣΥΝΑΠΤΟΜΕΝΟΣ fastening together
ἡ κίνησις αἱ κινήσεις	movement	ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ moving action
τὸ αἴτιον τὰ αἴτια	what is the cause	ΑΙΤΙΟΝ blame
ἀπογεννᾶν	to fully generate	ΑΠΟΓΕΝΝΑΝ generating out
ἄλογος (ον)	unreasoning	ΑΛΟΓΟΣ not reasoning

νομίζειν	to think	NOMIZEIN <i>custom</i>
τὸ πρᾶγμα τὰ πράγματα	situation	ΠΡΑΓΜΑ <i>doing / affair</i>
ἡ φωνή αἱ φωναί	statement	ΦΩΝΗ <i>speaking</i>
χωρεῖν	to advance	ΧΩΡΕΙΝ <i>place / location</i>
χωρῶν <i>(οὔσα, οὔν)</i>	advancing	

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 17 (column 17)

...ση[μεῖον] οὐχ ἅπαντος δ[ήλου γι]γνομέν[ο]υ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τι[νος] μέν, τινὸς δ' οὔ, [τῇ]γ δὲ δι[ι]αφ[ο]ρὰν μ[ή τι]νες [εὐ]κρ[ι]νοῦντε[ς οὔ]τως ο[ὔ]...

...σημεῖον οὐχ ἅπαντος δήλου γιγνομένου λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τινος μέν, τινὸς δ' οὔ, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν μὴ τινες εὐκρι νοῦντες οὔτως οὐ...

...X...

x	v v v	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 11 (column 18)

...δήποτε ὁδ' [έ]γβιάζετ' ἀντιτ[είνων] καὶ μὴ ἀκο[λούθοις] συνκατα[τιθέμε]νος, τοῦ ψεύδο[υς πρ]οσαγορεύω αὐτὸν [ᾄ]ξιον· ἀδιάφορον [γὰρ] ταῦτα [ἀ]γορεύε[σθ]αι πράγματ[α]...

...δήποτε ὁδ' ἐγβιάζετ' ἀντιτείνων καὶ μὴ ἀκολούθοις συνκατατιθέμενος, τοῦ ψεύδους προσαγορεύω αὐτὸν ἄξιον· ἀδιάφορον γὰρ ταῦτα ἀγορεύεσθαι πράγματα...

...whenever he is forced, opposing and not being consistent, joining in agreement, I call him worthy of falsehood; for these things are discussed indifferently...

x	v v v	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 12 (column 19)

...ῥηθέναι κινητικά· οὐδ' ὀλίγα ταῦτα φήσομεν εἰ αἱ, τὰ πλεῖστα κατ' ἐπίεσοδον ἐκ τοῦ περ[ι]έχον[το]ς, ἄλλα παντὶ τῷ φ[αν]ταστικῶι παρακ[ο]λουθοῦντα...

...ῥηθέναι κινητικά· οὐδ' ὀλίγα ταῦτα φήσομεν εἰ αἱ, τὰ πλεῖστα κατ' ἐπίεσοδον ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἄλλα παντὶ τῷ φανταστικῷ παρακολουθοῦντα...

...to be described as kinetic; nor would we say these are few, if most, occurring from the surrounding environment, others entirely following the imaginative...

x	v v v	x

34.4 Symmetries & Proportions of the Pores

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 13 (column 20)

...μένοις ἂ ἀληθῇ[ι προσ]ἀγορεύομεν· ἐν[νοοῦ]μεθα δ' ὥς οὐδ[ὲν ἄλ]λ' ἢ φασιν οἱ τὴν φλε[β]οπαλίαν ὀνομάζοντες τῶν ἀρχαίων φυ[σ]ιολόγων τὸ πρᾶ[γμα] α ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν...

...μένοις ἃ ἀληθῆ προσάγορεύομεν· ἐννοούμεθα δ' ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ φασιν οἱ τὴν φλεβοπαλίαν ὀνομάζοντες τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν...

...things which we call true; and we comprehend that it is nothing more than what the ancient physiologists refer to as phlebotomy ["the beating of the pulse"] regarding the matter we are discussing...

x	VVV	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 14 (column 21)

...ἥ καὶ ὅτι[ο]ῦν τὸ ὠμοιωμέ[ν]ον τούτῳι καλέσο[μ]εν ἐνάργειαν μὴ ἐκ τοῦ περιεχοντο[ς] ὄν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῆ[ν] φλεβοπαλίαν· [έ]άν δὴ καὶ ἀγορε[ύω]σ[ι]ν καὶ...

...ἥ καὶ ὅτιοῦν τὸ ὠμοιωμένον τούτῳ καλέσομεν ἐνάργειαν μὴ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ὄν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν φλεβοπαλίαν· ἐάν δὴ καὶ ἀγορεύωσιν καὶ...

...or anything resembling this, we will call clarity, not coming from the external surroundings, but in accordance with phlebotomy; if indeed they also proclaim and...

x	VVV	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 15 (column 22)

...[π]αρὰ τὰς με[τε]α[βάσεις] καὶ τὰς δι[ι]ήξει[ς] τῶν πόρων γίνεσθαι τις συμ[με]τρία, καὶ τισι μὲν [ε]ύθυς ἐτοιμῶς δι[α]κειμένοις, τισὶν... ...ε[ί]σιν, φημί... ...δ[ι]ανοίᾳς... ...[ἀ]τα[ρ]άχως...

...παρὰ τὰς μεταβάσεις καὶ τὰς διήξεις τῶν πόρων γίνεσθαι τις συμμετρία, καὶ τισιν μὲν εὐθύς ἐτοιμῶς διακειμένοις, τισὶν... ...εῖσιν, φημί... ...διανοίας...
...ἀταράχως...

...through the transitions and passages of the pores, a certain symmetry arises, and for some, it happens readily and smoothly, while for others... without disturbance...

x	VVV	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 16 (column 23)

...ἀ[να]γκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸς[ς] ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται – οὐθὲν ἦττον παρὰ τὰς [έξ] ἡμῶ[ν], τ[ίς] σ[υμ]μετρ[ία] αὐτ[αῖς] γίννε[σθαι]...

...Ἀναγκαῖον αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας κρούσεις – ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γραφῇ εἴρηται – οὐθὲν ἦττον παρὰ τὰς ἐξ ἡμῶν, τις συμμετρία αὐταῖς γίνεσθαι...

* It is necessary for [atoms] to exist with collisions with each other – as it has been said in the first writing – nonetheless, from to those [atoms] that come from us, a certain symmetry with them occurs...

...It is necessary for them to exist according to their mutual collisions – as stated in the first writing – no less than through those from us, that some symmetry is formed among them...

x	VVV	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 24 (column 24)

...[πυκ]νότης κἄ[ν] μὴ σ[υ]ν[ή]ι αἰ [συμμ]ετρ[ί]αι [τῶν] πόρ[ω]ν ποιοῦσ[ι]ν ὥ[στε] τ[ὰς] περὶ τὰς ἐν[πτώ]σεις ταῦτα[ς] καὶ αὐταῖς] μετ[α]β[ά]σεις ὑπάρχ[ε]ιν· ὅσ[α] δὴ καὶ...

...πυκνότητος κἂν μὴ συνῇ αἱ συμμετρίαι τῶν πόρων ποιοῦσιν ὥστε τὰς περὶ τὰς ἐνπτώσεις ταύτας καὶ αὐταῖς μεταβάσεις ὑπάρχειν· ὅσα δὴ καὶ...

...density, and even if the symmetries of the pores do not coincide, they ensure that these impacts and transitions exist among them as well; as much as indeed also...

x	VVV	x

34 Interpreting the Unseen with Reasoning

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 17 (column 25)

...ἂν γὰρ τα[ύ]τό τις συνθεωρῇ καὶ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ[ι] ὄν τρόπον ἐχόμενος ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων διηρμήνευκεν οὐποτε μὲν δόξει πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ φυσικὸν ἄλλας οἰ[κ]ειότερας φω[ν]ᾶς...

...ἂν γὰρ ταυτό τις συνθεωρῇ καὶ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ ὄν τρόπον ἐχόμενος ὁ λόγος **περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων** διηρμήνευκεν οὐποτε μὲν δόξει πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ φυσικὸν ἄλλας οἰκειότερας φωνᾶς...

...for if someone contemplates the same thing and the method of reasoning within the discourse, observing how the reasoning has interpreted **about the unseen**, they will never judge that, towards the natural end, there are other more fitting expressions...

x	VVV	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, Book 34, P.Herc. 1431, col. 26 (title subscriptio)

Ἐπικ[ο]ύρου Περὶ Φύσε[ε]ως ΛΔ

Ἐπικούρου *Περὶ Φύσεως* ΛΔ

Epíkouros' *On Nature* Book 34

✱✱ *Tepedino Guerra, A. (1991) Polieno, frammenti (Naples), Polyaenus fr. 27, pg. 91*

✱✱

[U91]

Book 35

Benefits from God

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.37.1053

...ἔν τε τῷ τρε[ι]σκαὶ δεκάτῳ, περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἣ[ν πρὸς] τινὰς ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος.] ἐν δὲ τῷ πέ[μπτῳ καὶ] τριακ[οσ]τῷ[ι, φησι], σὺν τῷ τι [ταύ]της τῆς ὠφελ[είας] διασ[α]φεῖν, κ[αὶ] διό[τι νομ]ιζον...

...ἔν τε τῷ **τρεισκαιδεκάτῳ**, **περὶ τῆς οἰκειότητος** ἦν **πρὸς τινὰς** ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει καὶ **τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος**. ἐν δὲ τῷ **πέμπτῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ**, φησι, **σὺν τῷ τι ταύτης τῆς ὠφελείας** διασαφεῖν, καὶ διότι νομίζον...

✱ In the **thirteenth** [book], **regarding the familiarity** that God has **with certain individuals** and **alienation**. And in the **five-and-thirtieth** [book 35], he says, explaining **along with something of this benefit**, on which account even considering...

[Obbink] And in book 13 he speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some people. And in book 35, in addition to clarifying somewhat this benefit, he says that even on account of thinking...

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 1639 fr. 4

...μο[ρ]φῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραλλαγ[μ]άτων ἐπὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐλθ[εῖν] ἠθέλησεν, μήπως οὐκ ἐχ[ρ]ῆν γενομένους αὐτοὺς εὐδαίμον[ας] ποιῆσαι. Τότε γὰρ...

...μορφῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παραλλαγμάτων ἐπὶ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐλθεῖν ἠθέλησεν, μήπως οὐκ ἐχρῆν γενομένους αὐτοὺς εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι. Τότε γὰρ...

...of forms and other variations to reach completion, he wished, lest it would not be appropriate to make them happy once they had been created. For at that time...

x	v v v	x

Imageless Names are Meaningless

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 362 fr. 3 | P.Herc. 362 subscriptio

...μὲν ἀπὸ τῶνδὲ τινὰς ὥς [β]λαβησομένο[υς] ἢ ταραχθησομέν[ο]υς εἴ[ρ]ηται. καὶ καθὸ καὶ ψευδῆ τινα καὶ μὴ ὄντα φαμέν δοξάζειν καὶ κ[α]θό[λου] οὐ[δ]ὲ λαμβάνειν [οὐ]θὲ[ν] φάσμα ἐπινοητικόν, ἀλλὰ ἢ [μόνα] ὀνόμα[τα]. | Ἐπι[κ]ο[ρ]ο[υ] Π[ε]ρὶ Φύσεως...

...μὲν ἀπὸ τῶνδὲ τινὰς ὥς βλαβησομένους ἢ ταραχθησομένους εἴρηται. καὶ καθὸ καὶ ψευδῆ τινα καὶ μὴ ὄντα φαμέν δοξάζειν καὶ καθόλου οὐδὲ λαμβάνειν οὐθὲν φάσμα ἐπινοητικόν, ἀλλὰ ἢ μόνα ὀνόματα. Ἐπικούρου Περί Φύσεως...

...indeed, some of these are said to be harmed or disturbed. And as we say that they hold false and nonexistent beliefs and generally do not grasp any imaginative vision, but only names. | Epíkouros *On Nature*...

x	v v v	x

Sexual Reproduction

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 1

...τῆς παρα[λαμ]βανόντων εἰς τὴν τοῦ παρ[ε]κκειμένου παρα[λλά]γματος αἰτίαν καὶ [τὸ]ν τόπον τὸν [δ]εχόμε[ν]ον τὸ σπέρμα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρρην τις δύναται πολλὴν ὕλην ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σπ[έρμ]ατος [γ]εννη[τ]ικ[οῦ] ὥς καὶ αἷ[μ]ατος καὶ χο[λῆς] ἔχου[σ]ιν πολλοί· δ[ιὸ καί] κατα[β]άλλειν...

...τῆς παραλαμβανόντων εἰς τὴν τοῦ παρεκκειμένου παραλλάγματος αἰτίαν καὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν δεχόμενον τὸ σπέρμα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρρην τις δύναται πολλὴν ὕλην ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σπέρματος γεννητικοῦ ὥς καὶ αἵματος καὶ χολῆς ἔχουσιν πολλοί· διὸ καὶ καταβάλλειν...

...receiving into the cause of the adjacent transformation and the place that accepts the seed; for a man can have a lot of substance within himself for producing seed, just as many have blood and bile; hence, also casting down...

x	v v v	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 2

...ὀλίγονεμένου τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ἀντικοπτομένου καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σκεδασμὸν λαμβάνοντος· καὶ παρὰ τὸ σχεῖσμα δ' ἂν γένοιτο τ[οῦ] πόρου[υ τ]ὸ τοιοῦτο· δῆ[λον] γὰ[ρ] ὅ[τι εὐ]θυτενῶς μέ[ν] κ[εῖ]μεν[ος] ὁ πόρος τὴν π[ᾶ]σαν ἢ τὴν πλε[ίστ]ην δυνή[σεται] καταβ[άλλειν] τὴν ὕλην κατ' [ἀντι]κρῦ(?) ἀ[ντι]κοπτομένου [καὶ δ]ιαφερομένου κα[τὰ τοὺς] κλασμοὺς...

...ὀλιγονομένου τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ἀντικοπτομένου καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σκεδασμὸν λαμβάνοντος· καὶ παρὰ τὸ σχεῖσμα δ' ἂν γένοιτο τοῦ πόρου τὸ τοιοῦτο· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εὐθυτενῶς μὲν κείμενος ὁ πόρος τὴν πᾶσαν ἢ τὴν πλείστην δυνήσεται καταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην κατ' ἀντικρὺ ἀντικοπτομένου καὶ διαφερομένου κατὰ τοὺς κλασμοὺς...

...as the lesser amount diminishes and the greater amount is broken apart, thus leading to dispersion; this phenomenon can also occur due to the structure of the passageway. It is evident that a passageway that is straight will be able to channel all or most of the material directly, while being broken up and varying according to the fractures...

x	v v v	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 3

...τὴν [σώ]ματος παντὸς ἀπόκρισιν· εἰς ταὐτὸ δὲ παραλαμβάνεσθαι δ[ύ]ν[α]ται καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ θηλείᾳ ἀνγεῖον· εἰ γὰρ [σ]τε[ν]ὸν ὀλίγον πέφυκε δέ[ξ]ασθαι, μέγα δὲ πο[λύ, σύ]νμετρον ἂν ἔχηι τὸ [μ]έγε[θ]ος...

...τὴν σώματος παντὸς ἀπόκρισιν· εἰς ταὐτὸ δὲ παραλαμβάνεσθαι δύναται καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ θηλείᾳ ἀνγεῖον· εἰ γὰρ στενὸν ὀλίγον πέφυκε δέξασθαι, μέγα δὲ πολύ, σύμμετρον ἂν ἔχη τὸ μέγεθος...

...the reaction of the entire body; similarly, the vessel within the female can also accommodate the same. If it is small, it is naturally able to receive only a little, but if it is large, it can receive a lot, proportional to its size...

x	v v v	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 4 sup

...τὴν ἀνάλογον παραλλαγὴν ποιήσουσιν· καὶ ἐξεναντ[ί]ως μὲν κ[ε]ιμένου πρὸς [πα]ραδοχὴν τὴν παντὸς εὐθέ[του] ἔχον[τ]ος τοῦ ἀνα... τὴν θέσιν ἔχον[τ]ος καταντ[ί]ν πρὸς τοῦ [τ'] ἐν[τ]ὸς ποδίζοντος...

...τὴν ἀνάλογον παραλλαγὴν ποιήσουσιν· καὶ ἐξεναντίως μὲν κειμένου πρὸς παραδοχὴν τὴν παντὸς εὐθέτου ἔχοντος τοῦ ἀνα... τὴν θέσιν ἔχοντος καταντῆ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐνποδίζοντος...

...they will make the necessary adjustment; and indeed, when placed in opposition to receiving the full alignment, having the position of descending towards this, it hinders...

x	v v v	x

Epíkouros, Peri Phýseōs, P.Herc. 908 col. 4 inf | col. 5

...τε φυσ[ικὰ τῆς] γυναικὸς πρὸς [ἀμφότε]ρ[α] δύναται εὐθε[τεῖν] κα[ὶ] πάλιν ἐναντ[ί]οῦσθαι· κ[αὶ] γὰρ κατὰ τὸ [εἶ]ναι [τ]όπον [τῷ ἄ]ρρενι καταβαλλόμενος[ς π]ρὸς τά, ποτὲ μὲν δι' ἡδονῆς τ' εἰσφέρεισθαι, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς [τ]ὸ [μ]ὴ πολὺ μηδὲ πάν[τ]ως· ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς παραλλαγῆς τὴν διαφορὰν γείνεσθαι [τῶν] μ[εγάλων] ἀπο[τε]λεσθ[έντων] σωμά[των]...

...τε φυσικὰ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς ἀμφότερα δύναται εὐθετεῖν καὶ πάλιν ἐναντιοῦσθαι· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τόπον τῷ ἄρρενι καταβαλλόμενος πρὸς τά, ποτὲ μὲν δι' ἡδονῆς τ' εἰσφέρεισθαι, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μὴ πολὺ μηδὲ πάντως· ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς παραλλαγῆς τὴν διαφορὰν γείνεσθαι τῶν μεγάλων ἀποτελεσθέντων σωμάτων...

...the woman's natural capacities can align with both and also oppose; and indeed, being positioned to receive from the man, sometimes bringing pleasure, sometimes not much or entirely; from this alteration arises the difference in the formation of large bodies...

x	v v v	x

[U92]

Examples Over Definitions

✱✱ *Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, The Art of Grammar, [p. 660, 25 Bekk.]*

Καὶ Ἐπίκουρος – δὲ ἀεὶ ὑπογραφαῖς κεκρημένος – δηλῶν ὅτι τιμιώτεροι οἱ ὄροι, ὄροις ἀντὶ ὑπογραφῶν ἐν τῇ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως πραγματείᾳ [ἐχρήσατο]. διαιρῶν γὰρ τὸ πᾶν εἰς τε ἄτομον καὶ κενὸν ὄροις ἐχρήσατο: λέγων ὅτι ἄτομόν ἐστι σῶμα στερεὸν ἀμέτοχον κενοῦ παρεμπλοκῆς. κενόν ἐστι φύσις ἀναφής, τουτέστιν ἀψηλάφητος.

✱ And Epíkouros – although he used **examples all the time** – he shows that definitions are **more valuable**, [because he used] **definitions instead of examples in his work** of his natural philosophy lecture. For he divided **the whole into atom and void**, by using **definitions**: He said that an **atom is a solid body having no share of interposition with the void**. **Void is an intangible nature**, that is, something **untouchable**.

And although Epíkouros always made use of general outlines [of the senses of words], he showed that definitions are more worthy of respect by using definitions instead of general outlines in the treatise *On Nature*; for he used definitions when he divided the totality [of existence] into the atomic and the void, saying that "the atomic is a solid body which has no share of void included in it; void is an intangible nature" i.e., not subject to touch.

ἡ ὑπογραφή	example	ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΗ <i>to write under</i> <i>(copy)</i>
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[U93]

Laértios 10.7

Τιμοκράτης... καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα βίβλοις ταῖς *Περὶ Φύσεως τὰ πλεῖστα ταυτά* λέγειν καὶ ἀντιγράφειν ἐν αὐταῖς ἄλλοις τε καὶ *Ναυσιφάνει, τὰ πλεῖστα* καὶ *αὐτῇ λέξει* φάσκειν οὕτως "Ἄλλ' ἴτωσαν – εἶχε γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ὠδίνων, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος καύχῃσιν τὴν σοφιστικὴν, καθάπερ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων."

✱ Timokrátēs [also claims]... **in the seven-and-thirtieth book *On Nature***, [Epíkouros] says **mostly the same things** and writes back **against those others and even Nausiphánēs**, and asserts **most things in the such words** as "But let them go on by – for that one, suffering, had **from the mouth the boast that is sophistical**, just as many others **among the captives**."

Timokrátēs [also alleges]... that in his thirty-seven books *On Nature*, Epíkouros uses much repetition and writes largely in sheer opposition to others, especially Nausiphánēs, and here is his own words: "but let them go; for, when laboring with an idea, he too had a sophist's off-hand boastfulness like so many other slaves."

x	v v v	x

[U94]

Marriage

[=U19] *Laértios 10.119*

καὶ **μη**{δὲ} καὶ **γαμήσειν** καὶ **τεκνοποιήσειν** τὸν **Σοφόν**, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν ταῖς **Διαπορίαις** – καὶ ἐν τοῖς **Περὶ Φύσεως**, κατὰ περιστάσιν δέ **ποτε βίου** **γαμήσειν** καὶ **διατραπήσεσθαι** **Τίνας**

and the wise Man is not even going to marry and sire children, as Epíkouros says in his "*Uncertainties*" – and [he says] in "*On Nature*" that [some wise men] will marry at some point according to circumstance in [their] life and some will refuse [to marry]

γαμεῖν	to marry	ΓΑΜΕΙΝ <i>marriage</i>
γαμήσειν	going to marry	
τεκνοποιεῖν	to sire children	ΤΕΚΝΟΠΟΙΕΙΝ <i>child gathering</i>
τεκνοποιήσειν	going to sire children	
ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
ἡ διαπορία αἱ διαπορίαι	uncertainty	ΔΙΑΠΟΡΙΑ <i>doubting across</i>
"Διαπορίαι"	"Uncertainties" a book by Epíkouros	
ἡ στάσις αἱ στάσεις	stationary position	ΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing</i>
ἡ σύστασις αἱ συστάσεις	composition	ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>standing together</i>
ἡ περίστασις αἱ περιστάσεις	circumstance	ΠΕΡΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ <i>around together</i>
διατρέπειν	to refuse	ΔΙΑΤΡΕΠΕΙΝ <i>turning thoroughly</i>

[Book 36]

[Book 37]

End of *Peri Phýseōs*

49. Summary of Objections to the Physicists

Ἐπιτομή Τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς

Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Ἔρωτος. Ἐπιτομή τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς. Πρὸς Τοὺς Μεγαρικούς...

...On Love. Summary of Objections to the Physicists. Against the Megarians...

50. Chairédēmos

Χαιρέδημος

Laértios 10.27

...Περὶ Κριτηρίου, ἢ Κανών. Χαιρέδημος. Περὶ Θεῶν...

...On the Criterion, or The Canon. Chairédēmos. On the Gods...

End of Fragments from Known Books

LETTERS

Ἐπιστολαί

Laértios 10.28

...Περὶ Βασιλείας. Ἀναξιμένης. Ἐπιστολαί...

...On Kingship. Anaximénēs. Letters...

Laértios 10.30

...τὸ δὲ Φυσικὸν τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς Περὶ Φύσεως βίβλοις ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς κατὰ στοιχεῖον τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν [ἔχει] τὰ περὶ αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς – ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταῖς Περὶ Βίων βίβλοις καὶ ἐπιστολαῖς καὶ τῷ Περὶ Τέλους...

...The Physical [part is] the entire theory about nature, and exists in the thirty-seven books *On Nature* and in the letters according to [their] basic components [*i.e., in an abridged form*] but the ethical Part [concerns] things relating to choice and avoidance – and it is in the books *On Lifecourses*, in the letters, and in the book *On the End-Goal*...

Cicero, De Finibus, 1.20.65

at vero Epicurus, una in domo – et ea quidem angusta – quam magnos, quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientis, tenuit amicorum greges! Quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis

(Torquatus) but indeed Epíkouros, in a single house – and in one quite small – maintained, in such harmony of loving affection, so great a pack of friends! Which is done even now by the Epicureans

Cicero Academica 2.36.115

Epicureos, tot meos familiarīs – tam bonos, tam inter se amantīs uiros!

(Lucullus) the Epicureans, so many of [whom are] my friends – [are] such good, such affectionate men among themselves!

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 15 (column 116)

...καὶ δι[ι]ὰ τί παυσάμενων ἐπὶ τοῖς ὕμν[ου]ς μετ[α]βήσεται καὶ τοῦ[τοις] δὲ πῶς αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀ[νακ]άκχεσιν ἐνηνοχότ[ας] ἐπιδείξει; συνελ[όν]τι δ' εἰπεῖν οὕτω παρρησίαι χρήσεται σοφὸς ἀνὴρ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ὡς Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Μητρόδω[ρος] εἰώθεσαν π[ρὸς]...

...καὶ διὰ τί, παυσάντων, ἐπὶ τοὺς ὕμνους μεταβήσεται – καὶ τούτοις δὲ πῶς αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνακάκχεσιν ἐνηνοχότας ἐπιδείξει; συνελόντι δ' εἰπεῖν: οὕτω παρρησίαι χρήσεται σοφὸς Ἄνὴρ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Μητρόδωρος εἰώθεσαν πρὸς...

...And why, when they have stopped, will [the teacher] turn to the hymns [of praise]? – and how will he also demonstrate those who have endured his gloating to them? but to sum up [is] to say: a wise Man will use frankness toward his friends, as Epíkouros and Metrodorus were accustomed to do towards...

[U95]

Laértios 10.14

καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ Χαίρειν Εὖ πράττειν καὶ Σπουδαίως ζῆν.

And in his correspondence he replaces the usual greeting, "I wish you joy" by wishes for welfare and right living, "May you do well" and "Live well."

Laértios, 3.60-61 (Plato)

Ἐπιστολαὶ τρεισκαίδεκα, ἠθικαὶ – ἐν αἷς ἔγραφεν εὖ πράττειν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ εὖ διάγειν, Κλέων χαίρειν

...Lastly, his {Plato's} thirteen Epistles deal with ethics. In these epistles his salutation was "Do well" as that of Epíkouros was "Live well" and that of Cleon: "All joy."

Loukianós, A Slip of the Tongue in Salutation, 6, [p. 732 Hemst.]

καὶ τί σοι τοὺς παλαιοὺς λέγω, ὅπου καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ πάνυ χαίρων τῷ χαίρειν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν πρὸ ἀπάντων αἰρούμενος ἐν ταῖς σπουδαιοτέραις ἐπιστολαῖς — εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται ὀλίγαι — καὶ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς φιλτάτους μάλιστα ὑγιαίνειν εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ προστάττει; πολὺ δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀρχαίᾳ κωμωδίᾳ εὖροις τὸ ὑγιαίνειν πρῶτον εὐθὺς λεγόμενον

Epíkouros was a man who certainly enjoyed enjoyment itself, and esteemed pleasure above everything else. Yet, in his most serious letters (which are not very numerous) and in those to his most intimate friends, he starts off with "Live well!"

Suda, under "Greetings," Χαίρειν, chi-166

Χαίρειν: οὕτως ἐπέγραφε Κλέων, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων εὖ πράττειν, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος εὖ διάγειν.

Cleon headed {his letters} thus, but Plato {preferred} "Do well" and Epíkouros "Live well." {and again at epsilon, 3664 - "Do well"}

Summary of Letters

Life of Philonides of Laodicea the Epicurean, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 14

...πὰς εἰς τὰ δόγματ' α[ὕτοῦ] γεωμετρικὰς περὶ ἐλα[χίς]του πολλὰς. Πεπότηκεν δὲ νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους καὶ [τ]ὰς ἐπιτομὰς [τῶν] ἐπιστολῶν τῶν Ἐπικούρ[ου,] Μητροδώρου, Πολυαίνου, Ἑρμάρχου καὶ τῶν σ[υνηγ] μέ[νω]ν κατὰ γένος ἐπ[ὶ]στο[λῶν]...

πὰς εἰς τὰ δόγματ' αὐτοῦ γεωμετρικὰς περὶ ἐλαχίστου πολλὰς. Πεπότηκεν δὲ νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους καὶ τὰς ἐπιτομὰς τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τῶν Ἐπικούρου, Μητροδώρου, Πολυαίνου, Ἑρμάρχου καὶ τῶν συνηγμένων κατὰ γένος ἐπιστολῶν.

... and the summaries of the letters of Epíkouros, of Mētródōros, of Polýainos, of Hermárchos, and of the disciples.

Fragments of Letters Written in Certain Years

Under the Archonship of Caerimus
118th Olympiad, 308 – 307 B.C.

Caerimus is also spelled Charinus, and there was another eponymous archon Charinus for the year, 291–290 BC.
The Archonship of Caerimus refers to the period when Caerimus served as the eponymous archon of Athens during 308–307 B.C. The eponymous archon was the chief magistrate of Athens and gave his name to the year, a practice common in the city-state's administration.
This particular year (just one year before Epíkouros' return to Athens to set up the Garden) was notable because it marked a significant period of transition in Athenian politics. During Charinus' tenure, Demetrius of Phalerum, the governor supported by the Macedonian regent Cassander, continued to hold sway over Athens. However, towards the end of Charinus' archonship, Dēmétrios Poliorkētēs (Demetrius I, the Besieger), son of Antigonus I Monophthalmus, launched a successful military campaign to liberate Athens from Cassander's control. In 307 B.C., he entered Athens, marking the end of Demetrius of Phalerum's rule and the beginning of a new political era under Antigonid influence.

[=U158] Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 18.9

Certos habebat dies ille magister voluptatis Epicurus quibus maligne famem exstingueret, visurus an aliquid deesset ex plena et consummata voluptate, vel

quantum deesset, et an dignum quod quis magno labore pensaret. Hoc certe in iis epistulis ait quas scripsit Charino magistratu ad Polyaenum; et quidem gloriatur non toto asse <se> pasci, Metrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto.

The great hedonist teacher Epíkouros used to observe certain periods during which he would be niggardly in satisfying his hunger, with the object of seeing to what extent, if at all, one thereby fell short of attaining full and complete pleasure, and whether it was worth going to much trouble to make the deficit good. At least so he says in the letter he wrote to Polýainos in the archonship of Charinus {308 - 307 B.C.}. He boasts in it indeed that he is managing to feed himself for less than a half-penny, whereas Mētródōros, not yet having made such good progress, needs a whole half-penny!

[U96]

Philódēmos, On Epíkouros, Book 1, P.Herc. 1232, fragment 2

...[ἐπὶ δὲ] Χαρίνου... ...ἐν τῷ] Συμποσίῳ, κατα[δέδεικται] γὰρ Ἐπικούρῳ...

...ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου... ...ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ, καταδέδεικται γὰρ Ἐπικούρῳ...

[U97]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 3/34

...ὁ[τ]αν δ[ιανοῶν]ται περι[γ]ινοντ[αι] τῷ[ν] κατὰ [τῇ]ν [ἐ]νδειαν κα[ὶ] πε[νί]αν καὶ δέ[ησιν]· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου... ...εἰς με[τ]άθεσιν ὅλ[η]ν τῆς ὅλ[η]ς ὑπάρξεως ἄξει· [κ]αὶ πρὸς [Πο]λύαι[νον]... ...τὴν πενίαν...

...ὅταν διανοῶνται περιγίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν καὶ πενίαν καὶ δέησιν· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου... ...εἰς μετάθεσιν ὅλην τῆς ὅλης υπάρξεως ἄξει· καὶ πρὸς Πολύαινον... ...τὴν πενίαν...

Then, under Charinus, all and poverty is not to changing will be brought.

[U98]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 4/35

...[ἐπὶ] Χαρίνου... ...[λα]μβάνει [διὰ τὸ] [μη]δὲν ὅλως ἀπεργά[ζε]σθαι μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας ἑάσομεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοῦ[ς] ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φί[λ]ους [ἐπὶ] Φιλίππου καὶ πάντ[ως] ἀποδεξόμεθα· κα[ὶ] γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν εἰ-πε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐ[ργα-]σίας [κ]αὶ λατρείας...

...ἐπὶ Χαρίνου... λαμβάνει διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας ἑάσομεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φίλους ἐπὶ Φιλίππου καὶ πάντως ἀποδεξόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν εἶπε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐργασίας καὶ λατρείας...

[U99]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.33.929

...οαλη... "κἂν πόλ[ε]μ[ος] ᾗ δεινὸν οὐκ ἄν<νέ>θ[ε]σθαι, θεῶν εἴλω[ν] των·" καὶ Π[ολυ]αίνω· "καθαρὰν τ[ὴν] ζωήν] διηχένας κ[αὶ] διά]ξειν σὺν αὐτ[ῷ] Μάτρωνι, θε[ῶν] εἴ]λεων ὄντων·" [καὶ] πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν [ἐ]πὶ Χαρίνου· "τῇ[ν] φιλί]αι φίλων αὐτῶν·" μεν... ...ἔξωθ[ε]ν ἐπιφέρον[τ]ος· ὁ δ' ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ [κ]αὶ ζηλωτῆς καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐσχηκῶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προκοπὴν φησιν "εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀργυρείου βοήθειαν θεοῖς ὁσίως δέον νέμειν" οὐ πρὸς ιδιώτην γράφων ἀλλὰ πρὸς Φύρσωνα τὸν Κολοφώνιον, ἄνδρα καὶ οὐδενὸς κατὰ τὰ πολιτι...

...οαλη... "κἂν πόλεμος ᾗ δεινὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔσσεσθαι, θεῶν εἴλεων ὄντων" καὶ Πολυαίνω: "καθαρὰν τὴν ζωὴν διηχένας καὶ διάξειν σὺν αὐτῷ Μάτρωνι, θεῶν εἴλων ὄντων·" καὶ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ Χαρίνου· "τῇ φιλίαι φίλων αὐτῶν·" μεν... ἔξωθεν ἐπιφέροντος· ὁ δ' ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ζηλωτῆς καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐσχηκῶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προκοπὴν φησιν "εἶναι τὴν ἀπ' ἀργυρείου βοήθειαν θεοῖς ὁσίως δέον νέμειν" οὐ πρὸς ιδιώτην γράφων ἀλλὰ πρὸς Φύρσωνα τὸν Κολοφώνιον, ἄνδρα καὶ οὐδενὸς κατὰ τὰ πολιτι...

[Obbink] [He said] "Even if there should be war, it would not be terrible, if the gods are propitious" and [he writes] to Polyaenus: that he has "lived and would continue to live a pure life with Matron himself, if the gods are

propitious " and to the same in the archonship of Charinus that "in friendship with these being friends"... imposing/applying (it) from without. And his brother, an admirer and advanced student of his, says "it is necessary to distribute piously assistance from our money for the gods" writing not to a layman but to Phyrson the Colophonian, a man [second to] no one in political affairs.

εὔλεος (ος, ον)		
=	gracious / blameless	ΕΙΛΕΟΣ <i>favoring</i>
ἴλαος (ος, ον)		

Obbink connects this reference to Charinus (as well as the one below) as referring to the eponymous archon Charinus for the year, 291–290 BC (as opposed to the Caerimus/Charinus of 308–307 B.C.)

[U100]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.28.806 – 1.30.846

...τὴν τῷ **ν Χοῶν ἑορτὴν** **[συν]**εορτάζων καὶ **[τὰ]** μυστήρια **τά[στι]** καὶ καὶ τὰς ἄλ**[λας ἐπὶ τὸν τε]**θλιμμένον **[δεῖπν]**ον, αὐτόν τε **[δεῖν τ]**αὐτήν ἄγειν **[τὴν ταῖς]** εἰκά<σ>ι διαφό**[ροις εἰλ]**απινα**[σ]**ταῖς, **[τῶν κατὰ]** τὴν οἰκίαν ὅ**[λως ὅσι]**αν ἐπιλαμπρυ**[νάντω]**ν, καὶ καλέσαν**[τα πάντ]**ας εὐωχῆσαι· **[μετ]**ὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν **[ὅτι μ]**ὲν ὄρκους καὶ θεῶν ἐπιρρήσεσιν ἐδοκίμαζον χρῆσθαι γελοῖον ὑπομνήσκειν ἀναμέστου τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιούτων οὔσης· προσῆκον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι παρῆνει τὰς δι' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πί**[σ]**τεις φυλάττειν καὶ μάλ**[ι]**στα πάντων αὐτῷ γ**[ε]** Δι**[ι]** φυλάττειν τόνδε τ**[ὸν]** φανερόν τρόπ**[ον]**, καὶ οὐ γράφων "ναὶ τ**[ὸ]** ὄζω" καὶ "τί γάρ;" **[ἔμελε δέ]** καὶ Κωλώτῃ **[πάντῳ]**ν τε ὄρκων καὶ **[πάσης]**θεολογίας· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρί**[νου καὶ ἐπὶ]** Διοτίμ**[ου παραινεῖ]** τὴν καθ' **[ἑρᾶς τραπέζης [συνθήκην μὴ]** παραβαί**[νειν· καὶ]** μὴν...

...τὴν τῶν Χοῶν ἑορτὴν συνεορτάζων καὶ τὰ μυστήρια τάστικα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὸν τεθλιμμένον δεῖπνον, αὐτόν τε δεῖν ταύτην ἄγειν τὴν ταῖς εἰκάσι διαφόροις εἰλαπινάσταις, τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὅλως ὀσίαν ἐπιλαμπρυνάντων, καὶ καλέσαντα πάντας εὐωχῆσαι· μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν ὅτι μὲν ὄρκους καὶ θεῶν ἐπιρρήσεσιν ἐδοκίμαζον χρῆσθαι γελοῖον ὑπομνήσκειν ἀναμέστου τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιούτων οὔσης· προσῆκον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι παρῆνει τὰς δι' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πίστεις φυλάττειν καὶ μάλιστα πάντων αὐτῷ γε Διὶ φυλάττειν τόνδε τὸν φανερόν τρόπον, καὶ οὐ γράφων "ναὶ τὸ ὄζω" καὶ "τί γάρ;" ἔμελε δὲ καὶ Κωλώτῃ πάντων τε ὄρκων καὶ πάσης θεολογίας· ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου καὶ ἐπὶ Διοτίμου παραινεῖ τὴν καθ' ἑρᾶς τραπέζης συνθήκην μὴ παραβαίνειν· καὶ μὴν...

...and that while [Epíkouros] was joining in celebrating the festival of the Choes [at the Anthesteria] and the urban mysteries [i.e., the Attic Dionysia] and the other festivals at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him* to celebrate this feast of the twentieth for distinguished revelers, while those in the house decorated it most piously, and after making invitations to host a feast for all of them. Now it would be absurd to relate in addition that [Epíkouros and his followers] thought it right to make use of oaths and epithets of the gods, since their philosophical writing is filled with them. But it is proper to say that [Epíkouros] advised them to retain asservations made by means of these and similar expressions, and above all to preserve them for Zeus himself [i.e., they maintained the practice of swearing by Zeus] in this open manner, and not writing "by the twin shoots!" [i.e., euphemistically referencing the Dioscuri] or merely "it must be so." Moreover to Kolotes he took pains with regard to all forms of oaths and speaking about the gods. And in the archonship of Charinus [291/0] and in that of Diotimus [286/5] he warns against violating the covenant of the sacred festival table.

* this may be a reference to Epíkouros himself doing the hosting and inviting or it is a reference to Phyrson's friend Theodotus the Colophoniam (mentioned in the text preceding this quote).

The **Anthesteria**, **Ἀνθεστήρια** was a three-day Halloween-like festival dedicated to Dionysus and the dead, celebrated from the 11th to the 13th of Anthesterion (late February to early March) in Athens:

- day one, **Pithoigia**, **Πιθοιγία** (Cask Opening Day) focused on opening new jars of wine.
- day two, **Choes**, **Χοαί** (Jug Drinking Day) centered around silent drinking contests – to speak was to be eliminated from the competition – and the sacred "marriage" of to Dionysus with that year's "priest-queen" Basilinna (who was the wife of the annual "priest-king" Archon Basileus). Everyone got a personal chous, χοῦς (wine jug) to participate in the drinking competition, including children and slaves – provided by the state.
- day three, **Chytroi**, **Χύτροι** (Cooking-Pot Day) dedicated to rituals appeasing the dead and cooking in ritual pots. At the end of this day, there was a ritual of expulsion, asking the dead to leave the festival.

The urban rites were an extension of the Dionysian mysteries adapted to fit the urban setting of Athens. The rites were in honor of Dionysus, and could reference to either:

- **the Lenaea** (in the month of Gamelion), or
- **the Lesser Mysteries** (20-26 Anthesterion)

[U101]

Under the Archonship of Olympiodorus
121th Olympiad, 294 – 292 B.C.

Philódēmos, P.Herc. 1418

...ἀδελφὸς μὲν [αὐτ]οῦ Τιμοκράτης, μηθὲν ἐλόγτων αὐτῶν αὐτούς, καὶ γὰρ αὐ[τὸς] μηδ' ἐπι[ταθ]εῖς {ἀν} ἐὰν ἤκοι καὶ [ἔς] τι πρὸς [τ]ὸ εὖνο[υν] ἐκτενεῖ σῶ[ιζων] τὸν... καὶ \δι/ αὐτὸ... γνοὺς [τῇ]ν ἐπ[ιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐ]τῶν ποιεῖσθαι.' δηλοῦται, δ' ἀμέλει, καὶ γ[ε]γονυῖά τις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπί[κουρ]ο[ν] [φ]ροντίς. ἐπ' Ὀλυμπιοδῶρου γ[ράφει ἦ]τοι γε [τινὰ] δεῖ τόνων [ἀντέχεσθαι]...

...ἀδελφὸς μὲν αὐτοῦ Τιμοκράτης, μηθὲν ἐλόγτων αὐτῶν αὐτούς, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς μηδ' ἐπιταθεῖς ἐὰν ἤκοι καὶ ἐς τι πρὸς τὸ εὖνουν ἐκτενεῖ σῶιζων τὸν... καὶ δι' αὐτὸ... γνοὺς τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι.' δηλοῦται, δ' ἀμέλει, καὶ γεγονυῖά τις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον φροντίς. ἐπ' Ὀλυμπιοδῶρου γράφει ἦτοι γε τινὰ δεῖ τόνων ἀντέχεσθαι...

Under the Archonship of Philippus
122th Olympiad, 292 – 291 B.C.

[see U108] *Philódēmos, On Wealth, Book 1, P.Herc. 163 col. 4/35*

...πρὸς τοῦ[ς] ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φί[λους ἐπ]ὶ Φιλίππου...

...πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φίλους ἐπὶ Φιλίππου...

[see U127] *Philódēmos, Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, column 10*

...πρὸς[ς] Θεμίσταν ἐπὶ Φιλίππου...

...πρὸς Θεμίσταν ἐπὶ Φιλίππου...

[see U156] *Scriptor Epicureus, P.Herc. 176 fr. 5 col. 24*

...ἐπὶ τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτὸ[ν] καὶ [Λ]εοντέα...

...ἐπὶ τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ Λεοντέα...

Under the Archonship of Diotomus
123th Olympiad, 286 – 285 B.C.

...ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρί[νου καὶ ἐπὶ] Διοτίμ[ου παραινέϊ] τὴν καθ' ἱερᾶς τραπέζης [συνθήκην μὴ] παραβαί[νειν]...

...ἐπὶ δὲ Χαρίνου καὶ ἐπὶ Διοτίμου παραινέϊ τὴν καθ' ἱερᾶς τραπέζης συνθήκην μὴ παραβαίνειν...

...And in the archonship of Charinus [291/0] and in that of Diotimus [286/5] he warns against violating the covenant of the sacred festival table...

[see U168] Philódēmos, P.Herc. 1418, column 2

...αὐτῷ καὶ μνημονεύ[ει] κατὰ Δι[ότιμο]ν Ἐπίκουρος ἄρ[χο]ντα τοῦ βιβλ[ίου] Φύρσωνι γο[ῦν] γράφων...

...αὐτῷ καὶ μνημονεύει κατὰ Διότιμον Ἐπίκουρος ἄρχοντα τοῦ βιβλίου Φύρσωνι γοῦν γράφων...

Under the Archonship of Isaeus
123th Olympiad, 285 – 284 B.C.

***** Philódēmos, On the Philosophers, Vol. Herc. 1, VIII cap. 5, 7, **P.Herc. 1057?**

...εἴθ' [ὔ]στερον [τοὺς ἐχθίσ]τους κατα[λ]ύει[ν] Μακε[δόνας], ὥς τ[ό]τε ἐπ' [Ἰσα]ίου γρά[φει]...

...εἴθ' ὕστερον τοὺς ἐχθίστους καταλύειν Μακεδόνας, ὥς τότε ἐπ' Ἰσαίου γράφει...

[U102]

Under the Archonship of Euthius
123th Olympiad, 284 – 283 B.C.

Philódēmos, P.Herc. 1418, column 32

...γράφων Ἐπίκουρος... ἀγοραία[ς μηθῆ]ν [ἐνόμισ]ας τὰς π[ρὸς ε]ὑδ[αίμονα] βίον [σ]υντεινούσας ἰδ[έ]ας τοῦ [βιοῦ].¹ καὶ πάλιν· ἄξιος γὰρ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνεφάνης ἡμῖν τῷ [ι] ὅλῳ ἦθαι [ε]ἶναι οὐ κατὰ νόμους ἐλευθέρας βιοτῆς.² τὰ μὲν δὲ περὶ τούτου προσκατακεχωρίσθω νῦν δι' ἃς αἰτίας ἔφαμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ Μιθρέους· λέγωμεν δ' ἡμεῖς ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς μνημονεύει τ[ο]ῦ συνγράμματος. ἐπὶ δ' Ἰσαίου καὶ γέγραφεν... ...ἐ[πι] δ' Ὀρίου Λεοντεῖ προγρά[ψας, ἐ]πέσταλκ[ε] δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρ[ος πρὸς] Μιθρῆν ἐ[πι]στ... ...ολήν [ὕ]περ [τῶν] μερῶν τούτων...

...γράφων Ἐπίκουρος... ἀγοραίας μηθὲν ἐνόμισας τὰς πρὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον συντεινούσας ιδέας τοῦ βιοῦ.¹ καὶ πάλιν· ἄξιος γὰρ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνεφάνης ἡμῖν τῷ ὅλῳ ἦθαι εἶναι οὐ κατὰ νόμους ἐλευθέρας βιοτῆς.² τὰ μὲν δὲ περὶ τούτου προσκατακεχωρίσθω νῦν δι' ἃς αἰτίας ἔφαμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ Μιθρέους· λέγωμεν δ' ἡμεῖς ὅτι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς μνημονεύει τοῦ συνγράμματος. ἐπὶ δ' Ἰσαίου καὶ γέγραφεν... ἐπὶ δ' Ὀρίου Λεοντεῖ προγράψας, ἐπέσταλκε δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς Μιθρῆν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν μερῶν τούτων...

Under the Archonship of Pytharatus
127th Olympiad, 271-270 B.C.

This is the Olympiad of Epikouros' death, for this period we seem to have:
*** U122, U138, U177, & U191**

Under Archonships of Questionable History

Under Archonship of Aristonymus
123th Olympiad, 290-289 B.C.?

[see U169] Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.28.785

...ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστ]ωνύμου μέγ γὰ[ρ] Φύρσωνι περὶ τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου Θεοδότου γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν [φησὶ] πασῶν με[τεσχηκέ]ναι...

..ἐπ' Ἀριστωνύμου μέγ γαρ Φύρσωνι περί τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου Θεοδότου γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν φησι πασῶν μετεσχηκέναι...

...In the archonship of Aristonymus [289-288 B.C.], for instance, writing to Thyrṣōn about a countryman of his, Theodotus, he says that [Epíkouros] shared in all the festivals...

Under Archonship of Telocles
127th Olympiad, 272-271 B.C.?

[see U154] Philódēmos, On Wealth, Vol. Herc. 2, 3.87

καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῇ[**v**] ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους· κ[**αῖ**]τοι [ἄ]ν[**εκτέο**]ν τὸν τρόπ[**ο**]ν·

καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῇν ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους· καίτοι ἀνεκτέον τὸν τρόπον·

[U103]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, P.Herc. 163, col. 7/38

...[**έ**]κεῖνα, κακὸν ὅσον ἐ[**πι**] τῇ φύσει ῥαίδιον ἤδη συνιδεῖν· ἐπ[**ι**]... λαιου διακ[**ρι**]βω[**σας**]...

...έκεῖνα, κακὸν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει ῥαίδιον ἤδη συνιδεῖν· ἐπὶ... λαιου διακριβώσας...

Collections Of Letters

1. Letters to Important Persons
Πρὸς τοὺς Μεγάλους

[U104]

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.33.944

place in 2nd half of U99

And his brother, {Epíkouros' brother Neoklês} an admirer and advanced student of his, says "it is necessary to piously distribute assistance from our money for the gods" writing not to a layman but to Thyrṣōn the Colophonian, a man [lesser] than no one in political affairs.

Philódēmos, P.Herc. 1418, column 18

...[**έ**]ν ἄ[**λλαις καὶ**] [**έ**]ν τῇ[**ι πρὸς**] Ἀριστόβουλον... ἀπάσῃ, καὶ τῇι πρὸς [Κω]λώτην, καὶ τῇι νῦν πρὸς Εὐδ[**ημο**]ν. ἐπιδεχιμ...
...καρφους ἀ[**κού**]σας οὔ[**ν**]ν φιλανθρώπως ὑπὲρ ἐμ[**οῦ**]... οὔτωι μακρὰν ἀπηρτήθη τ[**οῦ γεγο**]νότος χωρίσας ἑαυτὸν... πρὸς αὐτὸν μιμνήσκοιο [γ]εγρ[**αφέ**]ναι, συνιστὰς φίλον σαυ[**το**]ῦ καὶ Ἐπικούρου πάλι τὸν Ἰπποκλεῖ[**ῖδην**], συνειληφέναι δὲ καὶ ταῦτ[**α πάν**]τα καθ' ἕκαστα πυθόμενος π[**α**]ρ' Εὐβούλου· ' συ[**νίσ**]τησι δ' ἔτι αὐ[**τῶι**] Πρώταρχον. γράφει δὲ [κ]αὶ ταυ[**τί·**] 'Εὐδῆ[**μ**]ου τὸ θαῦμ' ἄκο[**υσον**· ο]ὔ[**τ**]ιωι μακ[**ρ**]ὰν ἀπ[**η**]ρτήθη τ[**οῦ τάγ**]ματος χωρίσας ἑαυτόν...

...έν ἄλλαις καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον... ἀπάσῃ, καὶ τῇ πρὸς Κωλώτην, καὶ τῇ νῦν πρὸς Εὐδημον. ἐπιδεχιμ... καροὺς ἀκούσας οὔν φιλανθρώπως ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ... τῷ μακρὰν ἀπηρτήθη τοῦ γεγονότος χωρίσας ἑαυτὸν... πρὸς αὐτὸν μιμνήσκοιο γεγράφεναι, συνιστὰς φίλον σαυτοῦ καὶ Ἐπικούρου πάλι τὸν Ἰπποκλείδην, συνειληφέναι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα καθ' ἕκαστα πυθόμενος παρ' Εὐβούλου. συνίστησι δ' ἔτι αὐτῷ Πρώταρχον. γράφει δὲ καὶ ταυτί· 'Εὐδήμου τὸ θαῦμ' ἄκουσον. οὔτωι μακρὰν ἀπηρτήθη τοῦ τάγματος χωρίσας ἑαυτόν...

2. Spurious Letters

Laértios 10.3

Διότιμος δ' ὁ Στωικός δυσμενῶς ἔχων πρὸς αὐτὸν πικρότατα αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν, ἐπιστολὰς φέρων πεντήκοντα ἀσελγεῖς ὡς Ἐπικούρου· καὶ ὁ τὰ εἰς Χρύσιππον ἀναφερόμενα ἐπιστόλια ὡς Ἐπικούρου συντάξας

Diotimus the Stoic, who was hostile to him, assailed him with bitter slanders, adducing fifty scandalous letters as written by Epíkouros; and so too did the author who ascribed to Epíkouros the epistles commonly attributed to Chrysippus

✱ *Philódēmos, VH² I 152,4*

...ὕποψ[ι]ν τιν[ᾶ] λα[μ]βάν[ει]ν, ὡς περὶ τινῶν ἐπιστολ[ῶν] καὶ τῆς [πρὸς Πυθ]οκλέα π[ε]ρὶ [με]τεώρων ἐπιτομῆς καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἀρετῶν] κα[ὶ] τῶν εἰς Μητρόδωρον ἀναφερομένων ὑποθηκῶν...

...ὕποψίαν τινὰ λαμβάνειν, ὡς περὶ τινῶν ἐπιστολῶν: καὶ τῆς πρὸς Πυθοκλέα περὶ μετεώρων ἐπιτομῆς καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἀρετῶν, καὶ τῶν εἰς Μητρόδωρον ἀναφερομένων ὑποθηκῶν...

...to comprehend a certain suspicion, as concerning certain letters: concerning the epitome on meteorology addressed to Pythoclês, and the treatise on virtues, and the teachings referring to Metrodorus...

[U105]

[=U131] *Aelius Theon, Preliminary Exercises, 168 fin. – 170 sup.*

...ἐπιμελητέον δὲ καὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων, πάντα διδάσκοντα ἐξ ὧν διαφεύξονται τὸ κακῶς συντιθέναι, καὶ μάλιστα δὲ τὴν ἔμμετρον καὶ ἔνρυθμον λέξιν, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Ἡγησίου τοῦ ῥήτορος, καὶ τῶν Ἀσιανῶν καλουμένων ῥητόρων, καὶ τινὰ τῶν Ἐπικούρου, οἷά που καὶ πρὸς Ἰδομενέα γράφει· ὧ πάντα τάμᾳ κινήματα τερπνὰ νομίσας ἐκ νέου καὶ τῶν περιφερομένων δ’ ὡς ἐκείνου (ἡμεῖς δ’ οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν αὐτὰ εὐρίσκομεν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν αὐτοῦ·) λέγε δὴ μοι Πολύαινε συναπέριμεν μεγάλη χαρὰ γένηται. τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἐπίμεμπα καὶ πρόδηλον ἔχει τὴν κακίαν τῆς συνθέσεως...

...One must also pay attention to the arrangement of words, by providing instruction about all the ways in which they will avoid faulty arrangement, but especially metrical and rhythmical style, like many of the phrases of the orator Hegesias ..., as well as some of the phrases of Epíkouros, and to those works being circulated as his (but even now, I have yet to find them in his writings): "Tell me now, Polýainos, do you know what has been a great joy to me?" Such passages, therefore, are to be completely condemned, and have a faultiness of arrangement that is quite obvious...

[U106]

Letters Addressed To Several Persons

[3. To Friends Living in Egypt]

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Φίλους

[U107]

4. To Friends Living in Asia

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ Φίλους

Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1128 F – 1129 A sup.

καὶ μὴν εἴ γε τοῖς χρηστοῖς λανθάνειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖσθαι παραινεῖς, Ἐπαμεινώνδα λέγεις ‘μὴ στρατήγει’ καὶ Λυκούργῳ ‘μὴ νομοθέτει’ καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ ‘μὴ τυραννοκτόνει’ καὶ Πυθαγόρῳ ‘μὴ παίδευε’ καὶ Σωκράτει ‘μὴ διαλέγου:’ καὶ σεαυτῷ πρῶτον Ἐπίκουρε, μὴ γράφε τοῖς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ φίλοις μηδὲ τοῖς ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου ξενολόγει μηδὲ τοὺς Λαμψακηνῶν ἐφήβους δορυφόρει: μηδὲ διάπεμπε βίβλους, πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν σοφίαν, μηδὲ διατάσσου περὶ ταφῆς.

On the other hand, if it is to the good that you tender this advice to be unnoticed and unknown... you yourself, Epíkouros, ought not to write your friends in Asia, not to enlist recruits from Egypt, not to cultivate the youth of Lampsacus!

5. To Friends Living in Lampsacus

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ Φίλους

Strabo, Geography, 13.1.19

ἐκ Παρίου μὲν οὖν ὁ γλωσσογράφος κληθεὶς ἦν Νεοπτόλεμος μνήμης ἄξιος, ἐκ Λαμψάκου δὲ Χάρων τε ὁ συγγραφεὺς καὶ Ἀδεΐμαντος καὶ Ἀναξιμένης ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου ἐταῖρος· καὶ αὐτὸς δ' Ἐπίκουρος τρόπον τινὰ Λαμψακηνὸς ὑπῆρξε, διατρίψας ἐν Λαμψάκῳ καὶ φίλοις χρησάμενος τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, τοῖς περὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Λεοντέα. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ μετήνεγκεν Ἀγρίππας τὸν πεπτωκότα λέοντα, Λυσίππου ἔργον· ἀνέθηκε δὲ ἐν τῷ ἄλσει τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς λίμνης καὶ τοῦ εὐρίπου.

Now Neoptolemus, called the Glossographer, a notable man, was from Parium; and Charon the historian and Adeimantus and Anaximenes the rhetorician and Metrodorus the comrade of Epicurus were from Lampsacus; and Epicurus himself was in a sense a Lampsacanian, having lived in Lampsacus and having been on intimate terms with the ablest men of that city, Idomeneus and Leonteús and their followers. It was from here that Agrippa transported the Fallen Lion, a work of Lysippus; and he dedicated it in the sacred precinct between the Lake and the Euripus.

Neoptolemus, surnamed the Glossographer, a writer of repute, was of Parium. Charon, the Historian, was of Lampsacus. Adeimantus, Anaximenes, the Rhetorician, and Metrodorus, the friend of Epicurus, even Epicurus himself might be said to be a Lampsacanian, having lived a long time at Lampsacus, and enjoyed the friendship of Idomeneus and Leonteús, the most distinguished of its citizens. It was from Lampsacus that Agrippa transported the Prostrate Lion, the workmanship of Lysippus, and placed it in the sacred grove between the lake⁹ and the strait.

[U108]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Book 1, P.Herc. 163 col. 4/35

...[λα]μβάνει [διὰ τὸ] [μη]δὲν ὅλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας ἐάσομεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοῦ[ς] ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φί[λους] [ἐπὶ] Ἰ Φιλίππου καὶ πάν[τως ἄ]ποδεξόμεθα· κα[ὶ] γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν εἴτε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐ[ργασίας [κ]αὶ λατρείας...

...λαμβάνει διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀπεργάζεσθαι μένειν ἐπὶ χώρας ἐάσομεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φίλους ἐπὶ Φιλίππου καὶ πάντως ἀποδεξόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν πενίαν εἶπε μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐργασίας καὶ λατρείας...

[U109]

Philódēmos, Treatises, column 7, P.Herc. 1418

...κατὰ τὰ ἐν Κυ[ζίκῳ] ἐπιμεληθεῖς' ἐπ' Εὐθ[ίου] δὲ περὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτοῦ διασαφεῖ τοῖς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φίλοις ἐπιστέλλων· 'ἠκούσαμεν γὰρ [ὅτι] δὴ Λεοντεὺς πάντα'...

...κατὰ τὰ ἐν Κυζίκῳ ἐπιμεληθεῖσα ἐπ' Εὐθίου δὲ περὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτοῦ διασαφεῖ τοῖς ἐν Λαμψάκῳ φίλοις ἐπιστέλλων· "ἠκούσαμεν γὰρ ὅτι δὴ Λεοντεὺς πάντα"...

According to those in Cyzicus, having been taken care of, and regarding Euthius' choice, he clarified to the friends in Lampsacus in a letter: "We have heard that Leonteús has indeed taken care of everything"

[U110]

[see U107] Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129 A

*** add just the reference to Asia from 107 above*

6. Letter to the Philosophers of Mytilene

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ Φιλοσόφους

[U111]

Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναῖκούς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει – Ὅ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν: ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Αἰρέσεως καὶ Φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ Τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ Βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ

[Epíkouros] differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure: [the Cyrenaics] do not include [that] which is a state of rest [*i.e., static pleasure*], but only that which consists in motion [*i.e., kinetic pleasure*] – [Epíkouros] admits both: [pleasure] of mind and of body, as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End* and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene

[U112]

[=U145] Laértios 10.7

Τιμοκράτης... τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον πολλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἡγνοηκέναι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸν βίον, τό τε σῶμα ἐλεεινῶς διακεῖσθαι – ὥς πολλῶν ἐτῶν μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ φορείου διαναστῆναι – μὲν ἄν τε ἀναλίσκειν ἡμερησίαν εἰς τὴν τράπεζαν, ὥς Αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Λεόντιον ἐπιστολῇ γράφει καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους

Timokrátēs [also claims that]... Epíkouros was greatly ignorant in reasoning and even more so in life, that his body was in a pitiful condition – [so much so] that he was unable to rise from his portable chair for many years – and that he spent a mina within a day on his table, as He himself writes in a letter to Leóntion and in a letter to the philosophers in Mytilene

A mina was equivalent to 100 drachmas. A drachma was about 4.3 grams of silver and was an average daily wage for average labor and had the purchasing power of around \$30 during Epíkouros lifetime.
A full meal with meat, cheese and wine could easily cost a drachma. Epíkouros probably only spent so much as a mina on special occasions when hosting many people.

[U113]

Laértios 10.8 sup.

καὶ αὐτὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς περὶ Ναυσιφάνους λέγειν: "Ταῦτα ἤγαγεν αὐτὸν εἰς ἔκστασιν τοιαύτην, ὥστε μοι λοιδορεῖσθαι καὶ ἀποκαλεῖν διδάσκαλον." πλεύμονά τε αὐτὸν ἐκάλει καὶ ἀγράμματον καὶ ἀπατεῶνα καὶ πόρνην:

besides, he himself in his letters says of Nausiphanes : "This so maddened him that he abused me and called me pedagogue." Epicurus used to call this Nausiphanes jelly-fish, an illiterate, a fraud, and a trollop

Furthermore, Epíkouros himself in his letters says of Nausiphánēs: "This so maddened him that he abused me and called me a didaskalon." {="pedagogue" a trite, pedantic teacher} Epíkouros used to call Nausiphánēs a pleumonon. {="jellyfish" imputing obtuseness and insensibility}

ὁ πλεύμων

lungs

ΠΛΕΥΜΩΝ
sides

[U114]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 1.3 (add text above when complete)

Γενόμενος οὖν τούτου μαθητῆς ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδίδακτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυῆς φιλόσοφος ἥρνεῖτο ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, τὴν τε περὶ αὐτοῦ φήμην ἐξαλείφειν ἔσπευδε, πολὺς τε ἐγένετο τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος, ἐν οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐσεμνύνετο.

Επίκουρος, then, though he had been one of this man's disciples, did his best to deny the fact in order that he might be thought to be a self-taught and original philosopher, and tried hard to blot out the reputation of Nausiphánēs, and became a violent opponent of the Arts and Sciences wherein Nausiphánēs prided himself.

φησὶ γοῦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ 'οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε τοὺς Βαρυστόνους καὶ μαθητὴν με δόξειν τοῦ Πλεύμονος εἶναι, μετὰ μειρακίων τινῶν κραιπαλόντων ἀκούσαντα ὃ νῦν πλεύμονα καλῶν τὸν Ναυσιφάνην ὡς ἀναίσθητον·

Thus, in his Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilenê, Epíkouros says, "I quite suppose that 'the bellowers' will fancy that I am even a disciple of 'the Oyster' having sat under him in the company of some intoxicated young men" where he calls Nausiphánēs a "Stockfish" as being without sense.

καὶ πάλιν προβάς πολλά τε κατειπὼν τάνδρὸς ὑπεμφαίνει τὴν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν αὐτοῦ προκοπὴν λέγων 'καὶ γὰρ πονηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἦν καὶ ἐπιτετηδευκῶς τοιαῦτα ἐξ ὧν οὐ δυνατόν εἰς σοφίαν ἐλθεῖν,' αἰνισσόμενος τὰ μαθήματα. πλὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος, ὡς ἂν τις εἰκοβολῶν εἴποι, ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν πολεμεῖν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡξίου

And again, after proceeding further and abusing the man at length, he hints at his proficiency in Arts and Sciences when he says "In fact he was a sorry fellow and exercised himself on matters which cannot possibly lead to wisdom" alluding thereby to Arts and Sciences. Such, in fact, as we may conjecture were the sort of motives which Epíkouros decided to make war on the Arts and Science.

Letters Addressed To Single Persons

7. To Athēnaîos
Πρὸς Ἀθηναίων
"Of Athena"

[U115]

Scriptor Epicureus, P.Herc. 176 fr. 5 col. 22

...λόγου[ς] καὶ κ[α]τὰ πάντας τρόπου[ς] ἐκπολυωρηθεὶς μέχρι ὅσου τὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς τὸ [σ]εαυτὸν κυβερνᾶν [ἄν] ἡλι<κί>αν ἔσχες. Ἀθηναίωι δέ· Πολυαίνου παραγεγονότος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὗ τὸν πατέρ[α] ὁμώνυμον οὐκ ἐφίλεις μόνον, ἀλλὰ [καί] ἐ[σέβου]σιν συντραφεῖς, ὃ<π' αὐ> τοῦ κα[ί] πρὸς [πά]ντα τὰ [χρ]ήσιμα τῷ(*) τέ[λει, οὐ μό]νον προαχθεῖ[ς ὃν εὖ γιν]ώσκεις τρόπ[ον κατὰ τὴ]ν ὅλην κηδεμονί[αν, ἀ]λλὰ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ...

...λόγους καὶ κατὰ πάντας τρόπους ἐκπολυωρηθεὶς μέχρι ὅσου τὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς τὸ σεαυτὸν κυβερνᾶν ἡλικίαν ἔσχες. Ἀθηναίωι δέ· Πολυαίνου παραγεγονότος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὗ τὸν πατέρα ὁμώνυμον οὐκ ἐφίλεις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐσέβου συντραφεῖς, ὃπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὰ χρήσιμα τῷ τέλει, οὐ μόνον προαχθεῖς ὃν εὖ γινώσκεις τρόπον κατὰ τὴν ὅλην κηδεμονίαν, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ...

... then to Athēnaîos, "When Polýainos came to us, you no continued to demonstrate affection to his paternal namesake, but ... "

[U116]

8. Against Anaxárkhon
Πρὸς Ἀναξάρχον
"Ruler of Kings"

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 1117A

εἰ τοίνυν ὁ περὶ Σωκράτους, ἀνδρὸς εἰς ἀρετὴν θεολήπτου γενομένου, χρησμὸς ἀνενεχθεὶς ὡς σοφοῦ, φορτικὸς ἦν καὶ σοφιστικὸς, τίνι προσείπωμεν ἀξίως ὀνόματι τοὺς ὑμετέρους 'βρόμους' καὶ 'ὄλολυγμούς' καὶ 'κροτοθορύβους' καὶ 'σεβάσεις' καὶ 'ἐπιθειάσεις', αἷς προστρέπεσθε καὶ καθυμνεῖτε τὸν ἐφ' ἡδονὰς

παρακαλοῦντα συνεχεῖς καὶ πυκνάς; ὃς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον ἐπιστολῇ ταυτὶ γέγραφεν **{ }**ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετάς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἐλπίδας."

Such is ... the man who, in in the letter to Anaxárhon can pen such words as these: "But I, for my part, summon you to sustained pleasures and not to empty virtues, which fill us with vain expectations that destroy peace of mind."

9. To Apellês
Πρὸς Ἀπελλῆν

[U117]

Athēnaïos, *Deipnosophists*, XIII p. 588A

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν μνησθήσομαι τοῦ φιλαληθεστάτου Ἐπικούρου: ὅστις ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὦν ἐμακάριζε καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίως αὐτῷ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν παρερχομένους, τοιαύτας φωνὰς προιέμενος "μακαρίζω σε, ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὥρμησαι." ὅθεν αὐτὸν καὶ ὁ Τίμων φησὶν "γραμμαδοδασκαλίδην, ἀναγωγότατον ζώντων."

And first of all, I will speak of that most devoted lover of truth, Epicurus, who, never having been initiated into the encyclic series of learning, used to say that those were well off who applied themselves to philosophy in the same way in which he did himself; and these were his words—"I praise and congratulate you, my young man, because you have come over to the study of philosophy unimbued with any system." On which account Timon styles him: "The most unlettered schoolmaster alive."

First of all, I will recall Epíkouros, who is distinguished for his candor; for, being himself uninitiated in the Mÿsteries of a general education {i.e., professional training}, he congratulated those who went in for philosophy as he had, giving vent to such words as these: "I congratulate you, sir, having gone in for philosophy free from all corruption."

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 12, 1094D

ταύτας μέντοι τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἡδονὰς ὥσπερ ἀεννάους ἐκτρέποντες οὗτοι καὶ ἀποστρέφοντες οὐκ ἐῷσι γεύεσθαι τοὺς πλησιάσαντας αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν «ἐπαραμένους τὰ ἀκάτια» φεύγειν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν κελεύουσι, Πυθοκλέους δὲ πάντες καὶ πᾶσαι δέονται δι’ Ἐπικούρου καὶ ἀντιβολοῦσιν, ὅπως οὐ ζηλώσει τὴν ἐλευθέριον καλουμένην παιδείαν· Ἀπελλῆν δὲ τινα θαυμάζοντες καὶ ὑπερασπαζόμενοι γράφουσιν ὅτι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀποσχόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθαρὸν ἑαυτὸν ἐτήρησε.

In admiration and most hearty commendation of a certain Apellês, they write that from childhood he steered clear of mathematical education and kept himself pure.

[U118]

10. To Apollōnídēs
Πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην

"Son of Apollo"

Philódēmos, *On Frank Criticism*, P.Herc. 1471 fr. 73

...[νουθε]τεῖν, ἐπειδὴ [προσηκόν]τω[ς δια]τίθεται, καθάπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐπ[ιφο]ράς τ[ι]ν[ας] πρὸς Ἀπο[λλ]ωνίδην ἐπὶήσεν, ὥστε καὶ τοι[αῦτ'] α[ἰ]τιώμε[νος, ἐ]άν [γ' ἀλη]θινὸς ᾗ, π[ε]ίθειν ἄλλους δ' οἰκειῶσαι [πολλὰ] [τε, κᾶ]ν ὄντες μεγάλοι προσ[επ]έλθωσι[ν, ὥ]σπερ ἀν[α]ξιοπαθήσαντες καὶ [ἀπάντησιν κυ]νικ[ω]τέραν ἐπιφωνοῦντες...

...νουθετεῖν, ἐπειδὴ προσηκόντως διατίθεται, καθάπερ ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐπιφοράς τινας πρὸς Ἀπολλωνίδην ἐποίησεν, ὥστε καὶ τοιαῦτ' αἰτιώμενος, ἐάν γ' ἀληθινὸς ᾗ, πείθειν ἄλλους δ' οἰκειῶσαι πολλά τε, κᾶν ὄντες μεγάλοι προσεπέλθωσιν, ὥσπερ ἀναξιοπαθήσαντες καὶ ἀπάντησιν κυνικωτέραν ἐπιφωνοῦντες...

...to admonish {him}, since he is suitably disposed, just as Epíkouros made certain reproaches against Apollōnídēs, in such a way that, even in accusing him of these things, <provided he was truthful, he persuaded others to acknowledge {them} as their own, and may things, even if, being great men,

they impugned as having suffered {them} undeservedly and, citing a rather Cynic-like rejoinder... ›

see text for alt trans notes

11. To Aristóbuolos
Πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον

"Best Counsel" Brother of Epíkouros

[U119]

Laértios 7.6 (Zénō of Citium):

ἀπεδέχετο δ' αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀντίγονος καὶ εἴ ποτ' Ἀθήναζε ἦκοι, ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ πολλά τε παρεκάλει ἀφικέσθαι ὥς αὐτόν. ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν παρητήσατο... ..Ἀπέστειλε δὲ Περσαῖον καὶ Φιλωνίδην τὸν Θηβαῖον, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων Ἐπίκουρος μνημονεύει ὥς συνόντων Ἀντιγόνῳ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀριστόβουλον τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐπιστολῇ.

And Antigonus [Gonatas] esteemed [Zénō the Stoic], and whenever [Antigonus Gonatas] came to Athens he would hear [Zénō the Stoic] lecture and often invited him to come to his court. This [offer Zénō] declined... ...[but instead Zénō] sent Persaeus and Philonides the Theban; both mentioned by Epíkouros, in his letter to his brother Aristóbuolos, as associating with Antigonus [Gonatas].

[U120]

12. To Dōsítheos
Πρὸς Δωσίθεον

"God's Gift"

[part of U27] Plutarch, Non Posse, 1101A

add up when complete

(ὅτι) τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμούς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς, μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι "τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ὑφ' ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν: ὡμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης – διὸ, πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ, νῆ Δία, λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς καὶ τήκεσθαι" καὶ ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες ὕγροί τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι.

To those who remove griefs and tears and sighs over the deaths of friends, and they oppose and say that "the painlessness which is established in impassivity exists because of another greater evil: of harshness or of excessive pride and madness – therefore, to suffer something is better, and to grieve and, by god, to moisten the eyes and to melt into tears" and indeed they seem to be moist [tipsy] and friendly, both experiencing and writing such things.

...that they disagree with those who would do away with grief and tears and lamentation at the death of friends, and say that "an absence of grief that renders us totally insensible stems from another great evil: hardness or a passion for notoriety so excessive as to be insane, therefore it is better to be moved somewhat and to grieve and to melt into tears" and so with all the maudlin sentiment they feel and put on paper, getting themselves the name of being soft-hearted and affectionate characters.

ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἴρηκε καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἥγησιάννακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Δωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Φύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος: ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολάς διῆλθον αὐτοῦ.

For Epíkouros has said these things in many other contexts and also in writing about the death of Hēgēsíanax to Dōsítheos, the father, and Phyrson, the brother of the deceased; for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

For this is what Epíkouros has said not only in many other passages, but in his letter on the death of Hēgēsíanax to Dōsítheos and Phyrson – the father and brother of the deceased. for just recently, by chance, I went through his letters...

13. To Hermárchos
Πρὸς Ἑρμάρχον
"Leader guided by Hermes"

[U121]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 13.53:

οὗτος οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος οὐ Λεόντιον εἶχεν ἐρωμένην τὴν ἐπὶ ἐταιρεία διαβόητον γενομένην; ἢ δὲ οὐδ’ ὅτε φιλοσοφεῖν ἤρξατο ἐπαύσατο ἐταιροῦσα, πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις συνῆν ἐν τοῖς κήποις, Ἐπικούρῳ δὲ καὶ ἀναφανδόν: ὥστ’ ἐκεῖνον πολλὴν φροντίδα ποιούμενον αὐτῆς τοῦτ’ ἐμφανίζειν διὰ τῶν πρὸς Ἑρμαρχον Ἐπιστολῶν

Well, did not this same Epíkouros keep Leóntion as his mistress, the woman who had become notorious as a courtesan? Why! Even when she began to be a philosopher, she did not cease her courtesan ways, but consorted with all the Epicureans in the Gardens, and even before the very eyes of Epíkouros; wherefore he, poor devil, was really worried about her, as he makes clear in his Letters to Hermárchos.

[U122]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.30.96

Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho salutem. Cum ageremus', inquit, “vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribebamus haec. tanti autem aderant vesicae et torminum morbi, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere.” Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest.

Let me repeat the dying words of Epíkouros, to prove to you that the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: "Epíkouros to Hermárchos, greeting. I write these words" he says, "on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity." Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chef Evil, that is the only thing to be said.

sed audiamus ipsum: 'Compensabatur', inquit, “tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam⁴ voluntate ab adolescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos.”

But let us hear his own words. "Yet all my sufferings" he continues, "are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Mētródōros."

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.31.88

Ordiamur ab eo, si placet, quem mollem, quem voluptarium dicimus. quid? is tibi mortemne videtur aut dolorem timere, qui eum diem, quo moritur, beatum appellat maxumisque doloribus adfectus eos ipsos inventorum suorum memoria et recordatione confutat? nec haec sic agit, ut ex tempore quasi effutture videatur.

Well, do you think him afraid of death or pain? He calls the day of his death happy and in the sufferings of acute pains he represses those very pains by the living remembrance of the truths he has discovered, and this he does not in a spirit that makes it seem to babble about the moment.

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.9.26

nihil gravius, nihil philosophia dignius, nisi idem hoc ipsum “honeste sapienter iuste” ad voluptatem referret. Quid melius quam: fortunam exiguam intervenire sapienti? sed hoc isne dicit, qui, cum dolorem non modo maxumum malum, sed solum malum etiam dixerit, toto corpore opprimi possit doloribus acerrumis tum, cum maxime contra fortunam gloriatur? quod idem melioribus etiam verbis Metrodorus: "occupavi te" inquit, "Fortuna, atque cepi omnisque aditus tuos interclusi, ut ad me adspirare non posses."

...What better than his remark that "fortune has but little weight with the wise?" {Principal Doctrine 16} But is this said by one who, after saying that not only is pain the chief evil but the only evil as well, can bear all over his body the crushing burden of acutest pain at the moment he utters his loudest boasts against fortune?...

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.19.45

omittamus hunc igitur nihil prorsus dicentem cogamusque confiteri non esse ab eo doloris remedia quaerenda, qui dolorem malorum omnium maxumum dixerit, quamvis idem forticulum se in torminibus et in stranguria sua praebeat

Let us then pass him over as saying absolutely nothing and compel him to admit that means of relief from pain are not to be sought from one who has pronounced pain to be the greatest of all evils, however resolutely the same person may show a touch of bravery in an attack of colic or a difficulty in passing water.

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.26.74

nec vero illa sibi remedia comparavit ad tolerandum dolorem, firmitatem animi, turpitudinis verecundiam, exercitationem consuetudinemque patiendi, praecepta fortitudinis, duritiam virilem, sed una se dicit recordatione adquiescere praeteritarum voluptatum, ut si quis aestuans, cum vim caloris non4 facile patiatur, recordari velit sese aliquando in Arpinati nostro gelidis fluminibus circumfusum fuisse.

He has in no way provided for himself those healing aids to the endurance of pain ... but says that he finds peace in the recollection of past pleasures...

14. (To a Hetera)

Laértios 10.6

καὶ ἄλλαις δὲ πολλαῖς ἐταίραις γράφειν, καὶ μάλιστα Λεοντίῳ, ἧς καὶ Μητρόδωρον ἐρασθῆναι.

It is also said that Epíkouros had written to many other Heterai, especially Leóntion.

15. To Eurýlochos
Πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον
"Far-Reaching Defender"

[U123]

Laértios 10.13:

τοῦτον Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς Ναυσιφάνους ἀκοῦσαί φησι καὶ Πραξιφάνους: αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ φησιν, ἀλλ’ ἐαυτοῦ, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Εὐρύλοχον ἐπιστολῇ.

Apollodorus in his Chronology tells us us that [Epíkouros] was a pupil of Nausiphánēs and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurýlochos, Epíkouros himself denies it and says that he was self-taught.

16. To Hēródotos
Πρὸς Ἡρόδοτον
"Given by Hera"

Laértios 10.5

ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Ἡρόδοτον καὶ Τιμοκράτην τοὺς ἔκπυστα αὐτοῦ τὰ κρύφια ποιήσαντας ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ κολακεύειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

It is said that Epíkouros also extolled Idomeneús, Hēródotos, and Timokrátēs, who had published his cryptic doctrines, and flattered them for that very reason.

17. To Themísta
Πρὸς Θεμιστᾶν
"Order-keeper" "Of Themis"

Laértios 10.25

Λεοντεύς τε Λαμψακηνὸς ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ τούτου γυνὴ Θεμίστα, πρὸς ἣν καὶ γέγραφεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος

And then there is Leonteús of Lampsacus and his wife Themísta, to whom Epíkouros wrote letters

[U125]

Laértios 10.5

πρὸς δὲ Θεμίσταν τὴν Λεοντέως γυναῖκα Οἷός τε φησὶν εἰμί, ἐὰν μὴ ὑμεῖς πρὸς με ἀφίκησθε, αὐτὸς τρικύλιστος, ὅπου ἂν ὑμεῖς καὶ Θεμίστα παρακαλῆτε, ὠθεῖσθαι.

Then again to Themísta, the wife of Leonteús: "I am quite ready, if you do not come to see me, to spin thrice on my own axis and be propelled to any place that you, including Themísta, agree upon."

[U126]

Laértios 10.5

καὶ πάλιν πρὸς Θεμίσταν γράφων νομίζειν αὐτῇ παραινεῖν, καθά φησι Θεόδωρος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον

...And, as Theodorus says in the fourth book of his work, Against Epíkouros, in another letter to Themísta he thinks he preaches to her.

[U127]

Philódēmos, Treatises, P.Herc. 1418, column 10

...περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαρ[ιδή]μωι [γ]ράφ[ων]· ἤκουσα Λύκ[ου] φησὶν (ἦκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὅτι ν[εα]νίσκον... πρὸς [ς] Θεμίσταν ἐπὶ Φιλίππου· {{Λύκον φή[σ] πιστ[ὸν] εὐτακτόν // δεκον φή [ις] εὐτακ' κτως [τε] νο[εῖ]ν δαίμοσ[ι]...}}

...περὶ τῆς Ἀθήνησιν αὐτοῦ παρουσίας Χαριδήμωι γράφων· ἤκουσα Λύκου φησὶν (ἦκει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὅτι νεανίσκον... πρὸς Θεμίσταν ἐπὶ Φιλίππου· {{Λύκον φή πιστόν εὐτακτόν // δεκον φή εὐτάκτως τε νοεῖν δαίμοσι...}}

18. To Idomeneús
Πρὸς Ἰδομενέα
"Strength of Ida"

Laértios 10.25

πρὸς ἦν καὶ γέγραφεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος· ἔτι τε Κολώτης καὶ Ἰδομενεύς, καὶ αὐτοὶ Λαμψακηνοί.

And Epíkouros wrote letters to Kōlótēs and Idomeneús, who were also natives of Lampsacus.

[U128]

[see U124] *Laértios 10.5*

add from 124

[U129]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 72

...διὸ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς Ἰδομενέα γράφει μέχρι τούτου ζῆν εὖ[χ]εσθαι· καὶ παραδείξει πόσοι κακῶς ἀ[π]ώλοντο παντὸς στερόμενοι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τοῦ(*) μετὰ παρρησία[ς] ὁμιλῆ[σαί τισι] καὶ πάντα δ’ ὅσα προ[σενεγκό]ντες [με]τ[ά]γομεν, [κατ]α[φή]σει...

...διὸ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πρὸς Ἰδομενέα γράφει μέχρι τούτου ζῆν εὖχεσθαι· καὶ παραδείξει πόσοι κακῶς ἀπώλοντο παντὸς στερόμενοι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τοῦ μετὰ παρρησίας ὁμιλῆσαί τισι καὶ πάντα δ’ ὅσα προσενεγκόντες μετάγομεν, καταφήσει...

(therefore even Epíkouros writes to Idomeneús that he prays to live up to this point). And he will point out how many came to ruin badly, bereft of everything because of such a disposition to converse with frankness with certain people, and <he will assent> to all that we, having applied, <transfer>...

[U130]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 1117D

εἰ δὲ τοιαύταις, ὧ Κωλῶτα, Σωκράτους φωναῖς περιέπεσες, οἷας Ἐπίκουρος γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα ‘πέμπε οὖν ἀπαρχὰς ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν ὑπὲρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τέκνων: οὕτω γάρ μοι λέγειν ἐπέρχεται’ τίσιν ἂν ῥήμασιν ἀγροικοτέροις ἐχρήσω;

But if, Kōlótēs, you had met with expressions of Socrates' such as Epíkouros pens in a letter to Idomeneús: "So send us for the care of our sacred body an offering of first-fruits on behalf of yourself and your children – so I am inspired to put it;" to what more unmannerly terms could you have resorted? {Traditionally, first-fruits were offered to a god – support for Epíkouros' bodily needs is so depicted.}

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 279F

ταύτης γὰρ {τῆς γαστρὸς}} ἔνεκεν ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς ἐκολάκευεν καὶ Ἰδομενέα καὶ Μητρόδωρον. καὶ αὐτὸς δέ που ὁ Μητρόδωρος οὐκ ἀποκρυπτόμενος τὰς καλὰς ταύτας θέσεις φησὶν ‘περὶ γαστέρα γάρ, ὧ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, περὶ γαστέρα ὁ κατὰ φύσιν βαδίζων λόγος τὴν ἅπασαν ἔχει σπουδὴν.’ Ἐπίκουρος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τούτων διδάσκαλος

For, on account of his stomach, and of the rest of his sensual pleasures, the man was always flattering Idomeneus and Metrodorus. And Metrodorus himself, not at all disguising this admirable principle of his, says, somewhere or other, “The fact is, Timocrates, my natural philosopher, that every investigation which is guided by principles of nature, fixes its ultimate aim entirely on gratifying the stomach.” For Epicurus was the tutor of all these men

It was in fact, for the sake of the belly and the pleasures of the flesh in general that this man flattered Idomeneús and Mētródōros. ... Epíkouros, in fact, was the teacher of these men.

[U131]

Aelius Theon, Preliminary Exercises, 2, I [p. 169 Walz] {2,154 Butts}:

... faulty arrangement, but especially metrical and rhythmical style, like many of the phrases of the orator Hegesias ... as well as some of the phrases of Epíkouros, such as where he writes to Idomeneús: "Oh you who have from youth have regarded all my impressions as pleasurable."

[U132]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 21.3

Studia te tua clarum et nobilem efficient. exemplum Epicuri referam. Cum Idomeneo scriberet et illum a vita speciosa ad fidelem stabilemque gloriam revocaret, rigidae tunc potentiae ministrum et magna tractantem: "Si gloria," inquit, "tangeris, notiozem te epistulae meae facient quam omnia ista, quae colis et propter quae coleris." Numquid ergo mentitus est? Quis Idomenea nosset, nisi Epicurus illum litteris suis incidisset? Omnes illos megistanas et satrapas et regem ipsum, ex quo Idomenei titulus petebatur, oblivio alta suppressit.

It is your own studies that will make you shine and will render you eminent. Allow me to mention the case of Epíkouros. He was writing to Idomeneús and trying to withdraw him from a showy existence to a sure and steadfast renown. Idomeneús was at that time a minister of state who exercised a rigorous authority and had important affairs in hand. "If you are affected by glory, my letters will make you more famous than all those things which you cherish and which make you cherished." Did Epíkouros speak falsely? Who would have known of Idomeneús, had not the philosopher thus engraved his name in those letters of his? All the grandees and satraps, even the king himself, who was petitioned for the title which Idomeneús sought, are sunk in deep oblivion.

[U133]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 22.5

You understand by this time that you must withdraw yourself from those showy and depraved pursuits; but you still wish to know how this may be accomplished. ... Read the letter of Epíkouros which bears on this matter; it is addressed to Idomeneús. The writer asks him to hasten as fast as he can, and beat a retreat before some stronger influence comes between and takes from him the liberty to withdraw. But he also adds that one should attempt nothing except at the time when it can be attempted suitably and seasonably. Then, when the long-sought occasion comes, let him be up and doing. Epíkouros forbids us to doze when we are not in too great a hurry before the time, nor lag when the time arrives.

[U134]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 34, p. 1127D

Again, in a letter to Idomeneús, I believe – he calls upon him "not to live in servitude to laws and men's opinions, as long as they refrain from making trouble in the form of a blow administered by your neighbor." Ibid.: ... they recommend contempt for law if it is not backed by the fear of a blow or punishment.

[U135]

Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 3.17.24

Again from Epíkouros: "If you wish to make Pythoklês rich, do not give him more money, but diminish his desire."

Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 23 [Arsenius, Paroemiogr. Gotting. t. 2 p. 382, 11]

The precept of Epíkouros... & Ibid. XVII.37: Epíkouros, when asked how one can enrich oneself, responded: "Not by accumulating extraneous goods, but rather by trimming one's needs."

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 21.7

In order that Idomeneús may not be introduced free of charge into my letter, he shall make up the indebtedness from his own account. It was to him that Epíkouros addressed his well-known saying, urging him to make Pythoklês rich, but not rich in the vulgar and equivocal way. "If you wish to make Pythoklês rich" said he, "do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires."

[U136]

Photius I of Constantinople, Lexicon, p 473, 1, under "Pythia and Delia" [= Suda {pi-3128}, 2.2; p. 555, 10 Bernh.; Apostolius Proverbs, XV 9 Arsen.]

They say that Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, having created the Pythia and the Delia {festivals} in Delos at the same time, sent an embassy to the oracle of the god {Apollo} to ask whether he was performing the details of the sacrifice in accordance with what was ordained: the Pythia answered: "these things are your Pythia and Delia" – she intended to make clear that this was the end, for after a short time it happened that he was killed. Epíkouros in one of his letters to Idomeneús refers to these things.

[U137]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125,9

And to Idomeneús, then: to this

[U138]

Laértios 10.22

Ἦδη δὲ τελευτῶν γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα τήνδε ἐπιστολήν:
Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. Στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ Πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμη. σὺ δ' ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μεираκίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμέ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παιδῶν Μητροδώρου.

Already, as he was ending, he writes this letter to Idomeneus:
While spending the blessed and at the same time the final day of life, we wrote these things to you. **Strangury had also followed, and dysenteric sufferings, not failing to exceed their inherent magnitude.** Yet, opposing all these, was the joy in the soul at the memory of our reflections on what has happened. But you, in a manner worthy of your companionship with me and with philosophy since youth, take care of the children of Metrodorus.

At the point of death, he also wrote the following letter to Idomeneús: "On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them. But the cheerfulness of my mind, which arises from the remembrance of our past conversations, counterbalances all these afflictions. I am asking you to care for the children of Mētródōros, in a manner befitting the devotion you have given to me and to philosophy since you were a youth."

[cf. U122]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66.47

There are other things which, though he would prefer that they not happen, he nevertheless praises and approves, for example the kind of resignation, in times of ill-health and serious suffering, to which I alluded a moment ago, and which Epíkouros displayed on the last and most blessed day of his life. For he {Epíkouros} tells us that he had to endure excruciating agony from a diseased bladder and from an ulcerated stomach – so acute that it permitted no increase of pain; "and yet" he says, "that day was none the less happy." And no man can spend such a day in happiness unless he possesses the Supreme Good. ... We cannot say that the good which has rounded out a happy life, the good for which Epíkouros rendered thanks in the last words he uttered, is not equal to the greatest.

Does it not seem just as incredible that any man in the midst of extreme suffering should say, "I am happy."? And yet this utterance was heard in the very factory of pleasure, when Epíkouros said: "Today and one other day have been the happiest of all!" although in the one case he was tortured by strangury, and in the other by the incurable pain of an ulcerated stomach.

Cicero, Letters to Friends, VII.26,1

{To Marcus Fadius Gallus, ca. 57 B.C.} I have a shrinking horror of all diseases, especially of that in regard to which the Stoics put a sinister interpretation upon your great Epíkouros' admission that he was troubled with strangury and gastritis; for they attributed the latter to gluttony, and the former to a still baser kind of self-indulgence.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 5, p. 1089E

If reason could avert them {maladies of the body}, reasonable men would never be afflicted with strangury, dysentery, consumption, and the dropsy, with some of which Epíkouros himself had to contend, Polýainos with others, while others were fatal to Neoklês and Agathobulus {a botched reference to "Neoklês and Aristóbuolos" – brothers of Epíkouros}.

Ibid., 18, p. 1099D

For one thing, not one of us would believe Epíkouros when he says that while he was dying in the greatest pain and bodily afflictions he found compensation in being escorted on his journey by the recollection of the pleasures he had once enjoyed.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, I.23.21

So what is it, Epíkouros ... {= Arrian @ U34} ... that wrote as it was dying: "We are spending what is our last and at the same time a happy day..."?

19. To Kráteros **Πρὸς Κράτερον** "Powerful"

[U139]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125

And to the same Kráteros, he writes to be at Míthrēs.

20. To Kōlótēs **Πρὸς Κωλώτην**

[U140]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 9

... in general such and such of their (sc. the students') errors and what Epíkouros learns from Leóntion he will {hypothetically} ascribe to Kōlótēs. Since the wise man will also sometimes transfer to himself an intemperate error, {saying} that it occurred in his youth...

[U141]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 17, p. 1117B

Kōlôtēs himself, for another, while hearing a lecture of Epíkouros on natural philosophy, suddenly cast himself down before him and embraced his knees; and this is what Epíkouros himself writes about it in a tone of solemn pride: "You, as one revering my remarks on that occasion, were seized with a desire, not accounted for by my lecture, to embrace me by clasping my knees and lay hold of me to the whole extent of the contact that is customarily established in revering and supplicating certain personages. You therefore caused me" he says, "to consecrate you in return and demonstrate my reverence." My word! We can pardon those who say that they would pay any price to see a painting of that scene, one kneeling at the feet of the other and embracing his knees while the other returns the supplication and worship. Yet that act of homage, though skillfully contrived by Kōlôtēs, bore no proper fruit: he was not proclaimed a Sage. Epíkouros merely says: "Go about as one immortal in my eyes, and think of me as immortal too."

Ibid., 19, p. 1117F

Now since Kōlôtēs was no Sage, not even after that demonstration of reverence...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 18, p. 1100A

Epíkouros said... that except for himself and his pupils, no one had ever been a Sage, but even wrote that as he was lecturing on natural philosophy, Kōlôtēs embraced his knees in an act of adoration.

Ibid., 19, p. 1100C

For he, who made so much of Neoklēs' testimony and Kōlôtēs act of adoration ...

[U142]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.74, 11 [p. 104 Gomperz] {Obbink I.29.820}

Now it would be absurd to relate in addition that they thought it right to make use of oaths and epithets of the gods, since their philosophical writing is filled with them. But it is proper to say that he advised them to retain asseverations made by means of these and similar expressions, and above all to preserve those made by Zeus himself in the open manner, and not writing "by twin shoots!" {i.e., swearing oaths without stating by whom} or merely "it must be so." Moreover to Kōlôtēs he took pains with regard to all forms of oaths and speaking about the gods.

21. To Leóntion
Πρὸς Λεόντιον
"Little Lion"

Laértios 10.6

{cited above} It is also said that Epíkouros had written to many other Heterai, especially Leóntion. {cf. Cicero, above}

Alciphron, Letters (Letters of Courtesans), 2.2 (Leóntion depicted writing to Lamia)

How that Epíkouros tries to manage me, scolding me for everything, suspicious of everything, writing me well-sealed letters, chasing me out of his school garden! (3): He wants to be a Socrates and to talk on and on and to feign ignorance, and he regards his Pythoklēs as an Alcibiades and counts on making me his Xanthippe. And the end will be that I shall leave for some destination or other and flee from land to land rather than put up with his interminable letters.

[U143]

Laértios 10.5

In his letters, he wrote to Leóntion, "Oh Lord Paeon {a reference to Apollo's role as god of healing}, my dear little Leóntion, to what tumultuous applause we were inspired as we read your letter." [= Suda, under κροτοθορύβου ("loud applause") kappa-2480}

For Epíkouros expresses himself gracelessly when he says of his friends' letters that they give rise to hullabaloo.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 17, p. 1117A

But what epithet do they deserve – with your "roars" of ecstasy and "cries of thanksgiving" and tumultuous "bursts of applause" and "reverential demonstrations" and the whole apparatus of adoration that you people resort to in supplicating and hymning the man who summons you to sustained and frequent pleasures?

[U144]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 9

[= U140]

[U145]

Laértios 10.7

Τιμοκράτης... **τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον πολλὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἡγνοηκέναι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸν βίον, τό τε σῶμα ἐλεεινῶς διακεῖσθαι** – ὥς **πολλῶν ἐτῶν μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ φορέϊου διαναστῆναι** – **μνᾶν τε ἀναλίσκειν ἡμερησίαν εἰς τὴν τράπεζαν**, ὥς Αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Λεόντιον ἐπιστολῇ γράφει καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους

Timokratēs [also claims that]... Epíkouros was greatly ignorant in reasoning and even more so in life, that his body was in a pitiful condition – [so much so] that he was unable to rise from his portable chair for many years – and that he spent a mina within a day on his table, as He himself writes in a letter to Leóntion and in a letter to the philosophers in Mytilene

22. To Mētródōros
Πρὸς Μητρόδωρον
"Mother's Gift"

[U146]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.3.7

You have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the opinions of a Sage – who stands alone, so far as I am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself that title. For I do not suppose that Mētródōros himself claimed to be a Sage, though he did not care to refuse the compliment when the name was bestowed upon him by Epíkouros.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 18, p. 1100A

Indeed, was he not himself so impatient for renown that ... he said that except for himself and his pupils no one had ever been a Sage ... ?

[U147]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, V p. 279F

= [= U130]

23. To Mithras
Πρὸς Μίθρην

[Cf. U102, U194]

[U148]

They accuse Epíkouros of flattering Mithras, the minister of Lysimachus, bestowing upon him, in his letters, Apollo's titles of Paeon and Lord.

[U149]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125

[U150]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.125

[U151]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.127

[24. To Mÿs]

Πρὸς Μῦν

[These four fragments are no longer accepted as referring to Mÿs]

[U152]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment VI

he will be frank with the one who has erred and even with him who responds with bitterness. Therefore, Epíkouros too, when Leonteús, because of Pythoklês, did not admit belief in gods, reproached Pythoklês in moderation, and wrote to him {i.e., Leonteús, though Usener renders "Mÿs"} the so-called "famous letter" taking his point of departure from Pythoklês...

[U153]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.111

[U154]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Vol. Herc. 2, 3.87

...τὴν μ[ετάπ]τωσ[ι]ν, οὐκ [ἐ]νο[χ]λήσει· καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῇ[ν] ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους· κ[αί]τοι [ἀ]ν[εκτέο]ν τὸν τρόπ[ο]ν· οὐ [γὰρ] ἄξιον φόβου τὸ κατὰ μετάπτωσιν ἐνόχλημα, κἂν [διαί]της οὐ πάντα[κες] τὸ τ]ὸ κατ' ἐ[ν]δειαν [ἀλγοῦν ἐξ]α[ιρο]ύμενον...

...τὴν μετάπτωσιν, οὐκ ἐνοχλήσει· καὶ πρὸς Μιθρῇν ἐπὶ Τηλοκλέους· καίτοι ἀνεκτέον τὸν τρόπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον φόβου τὸ κατὰ μετάπτωσιν ἐνόχλημα, κἂν δαιτιῆς οὐ πάντακες τὸ κατ' ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρούμενον...

[U155]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.120 [p. 135 Gomperz]

25. To Polýainos

Πρὸς Πολύαινον

"Much Praised"

[U156]

Scriptor Epicureus, P.Herc. 176 fr. 5 col. 24

...ἐπειδὴν μεθ' Ἑρμαρχον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἐπικούρου φίλων ποιῶμαι τὴν γραφὴν. ὅλως δὲ τοιοῦτοις ἤθεσί τε καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἐπιδεξίαις ὁμιλίαις ἐκέχρητο Πολύαινος ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων εὐμενεῖς κατεσκευακέναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, οὐ μόνο[v τ]οὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ποικίλης Στοᾶς, ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἔγραψεν ἐπὶ τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτὸ[v] καὶ [Λ]εον[τέα, ἀλ]λὰ [καὶ τοὺς]...

...ἐπειδὴν μεθ' Ἑρμαρχον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἐπικούρου φίλων ποιῶμαι τὴν γραφὴν. ὅλως δὲ τοιοῦτοις ἤθεσί τε καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἐπιδεξίαις ὁμιλίαις ἐκέχρητο Πολύαινος ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων εὐμενεῖς κατεσκευακέναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ποικίλης Στοᾶς, ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἔγραψεν ἐπὶ τε Φιλίππου πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ Λεοντέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς...

[U157]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.75, 25 [p. 105 Gomperz] {Obbink I.30.865}

Moreover, in his letter to Polýainos he says that one should join in the celebration of the festival of the Anthesteria. For one must remember the gods ... of many ...

[U158]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 18.9

The great hedonist teacher Epíkouros used to observe certain periods during which he would be niggardly in satisfying his hunger, with the object of seeing to what extent, if at all, one thereby fell short of attaining full and complete pleasure, and whether it was worth going to much trouble to make the deficit good. At least so he says in the letter he wrote to Polýainos in the archonship of Charinus {308 - 307 B.C.}. He boasts in it indeed that he is managing to feed himself for less than a half-penny, whereas Mētródōros, not yet having made such good progress, needs a whole half-penny!

[Cf. Diogenes Laértios , U181]

[U159]

Philódēmos, On Wealth, Vol. Herc. 2, 3.85

[U160]

^[=U170] *Philódēmos, Scholion Zénō, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2 fr. 49*

26. To Pythoklês
Πρὸς Πυθοκλέα
"Pythian Fame" "Glory of Apollo"

[U161]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 29, p. 1124C

The young are made flighty and headstrong by the one who writes of Pythoklês, not yet eighteen, that in all of Greece there is no one more gifted and that his powers of expression are a prodigy, who writes that he himself is moved to pray as the women do – that all that superiority of talent may not bring down on the young man's head the jealousy and resentment of heaven.

[U162]

Alciphron, Letters (Letters of Courtesans), 2.2,3

(cf. above) ... he regards his Pythoklês as an Alcibiades ...

[U163]

Laértios 10.6

{Epíkouros writes} in his letter to Pythoklês: "Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all culture."

Plutarch, On Listening to Lectures, c.1, p. 15D

Shall we ... force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course clear of it?

Plutarch, Non Posse, 12, p. 1094D

Yet these men divert and alter the course of these pleasures, so great and numerous – that never as it were, go dry – and cut off their disciples from the taste; instead they tell some to "hoist all sail" to escape from them.

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XII.2.24

In the first place, Epíkouros banishes us from his presence without more ado, since he bids all his followers to fly from learning in the swiftest ship that they can find.

[U164]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 12, p. 1094D

Pythoklês is urgently implored by all, men and women alike, in the person of Epíkouros, not to set his heart on "the so-called education of free men."

[U165]

Laértios 10.5

And to the beautiful Pythoklês he {Epíkouros} writes: "I shall sit down and await your lovely and godlike appearance."

27. To Timokrátēs
Πρὸς Τιμοκράτη
"Power of Honor"

[U166]

[= U¹²⁴] *Laértios 10.5*

28. To Thyrsōn
Πρὸς Θυρσῶνα
"Thyrus Bearer" "Bacchic Wand"

[U167]

[= U¹²⁰] *Plutarch, Non Posse, 20, p. 1101B*

[U168]

Philódēmos, P.Herc. 1418, column 2

...αὐτῷ καὶ μνημονεύ[ει] κατὰ Δι[ότιμο]ν Ἐπίκουρος ἄρ[χο]ντα τοῦ βιβλ[ίου] Φύρσωνι γο[ῦν] γράφων· Ἀπέστει[λε]ν δ[ὲ]
ἡ[μῖν] καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοῦ[ς] ἀσ[χο]λ[ό]λους] [κ]αὶ κἄ[ν] ἡ[μῖν] ναγκασμέν[ος] ...

...αὐτῷ καὶ μνημονεύει κατὰ Διότιμον Ἐπίκουρος ἄρχοντα τοῦ βιβλίου Φύρσωνι
γοῦν γράφων· Ἀπέστειλεν δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀσχολοὺς καὶ κἂν
ἡναγκασμένος...

[U169]

...τινων ἀμε[ίνο]νας ἢ [τῶι φυλάτ]τειν ἐνε[ρ]γε[ίαι] τὰς ἐπινο[ί]ας τῶν θεῶν διὰ τ[ινων] χρόνων· οὐ [μόνον] δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδο[γματί]σεν ἀλλὰ καὶ δι[ὰ τῶν] ἔργων αὐτῶν ἐ[ύ]ρίσκεται πάσαις ταῖς πατρίοις ἑορταῖς καὶ θυσίαις κε[χρ]η[μ]ένος. ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστ]ωνύμου μέγ γὰρ [ρ] Φύρσωνι περὶ τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου Θεοδότου γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν [φησ]ι πασῶν με[τεσχηκέ]ναι...

..τινων ἀμείνονας ἢ τῷ φυλάττειν ἐνεργεῖαι τὰς ἐπινοίας τῶν θεῶν διὰ τινων χρόνων· οὐ μόνον δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδογματίσεν ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν εὐρίσκεται πάσαις ταῖς πατρίοις ἑορταῖς καὶ θυσίαις κεχρημένος. ἐπ' Ἀριστωνύμου μέγ γαρ Φύρσωνι περὶ τινος αὐτοῦ πολίτου Θεοδότου γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν φησι πασῶν μετεσχηκέναι...

...[Epíkouros says that not from gods badly conceived does he know the causes] of some [religious rites] to be better [as he does by] by effectively preserving one's conceptions of the gods during certain times [*i.e., at festivals and sacrifices*]. And not only did [Epíkouros] teach these things but also by his very deeds he is found to have taken part in all the traditional festivals and sacrifices. In the archonship of Aristonymus [289-288 B.C.], for instance, writing to Thyrsōn about a countryman of his, Theodotus, he says that [Epíkouros] shared in all the festivals...

29. To Carmides
Πρὸς Χαρμίδην
"Grace"

[U170]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment 49

... that Hērakleídēs {Usener renders "Carmides"} is praised because, deeming the censures for the things that would be revealed to be less {important} than their benefit, he disclosed to Epíkouros his errors. Polýainos too was such a man, who indeed, when Apollōnídēs was remiss, would go to Epíkouros...

Letters Addressed To Uncertain Persons

30. Letter on Vocations

[U171]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 354B

I am aware that Epíkouros, the ardent devotee of truth, has said of him {Aristotle}, in his letter On Vocations, that after he had devoured his inheritance he entered the army, and on meeting with poor success in the campaign he betook himself to drug-selling. Afterwards, Epíkouros says, Plato opened his school, and Aristotle went so far as to hazard himself there, and attended the lectures, being no dullard, and gradually assumed the contemplative habit. I am aware, too, that Epíkouros is the only one that has said these things against him, and not Eubulides as well; nor has Cephisodorus, even, ventured to say that kind of thing against the Stageirite, although both he and Eubulides have published tracts against the man.

Laërtios 10.8

Epíkouros called ... Aristotle a reckless spender, who, after devouring his patrimony, took to soldiering and selling drugs.

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 2 p. 791A

How is it possible, according to what Epíkouros claims in his letter On Vocations, that he {Aristotle} squandered his patrimony during his youth; dedicated himself afterwards to military life; then, because things went badly, occupied himself selling drugs, and finally, when Plato opened his school to the public, he participated there?

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 354C

In the same letter Epíkouros says also that Protagoras the sophist, from being a porter and wood-carrier, became the private secretary of Dēmókritos. For the latter, struck by something peculiar in the way in which Protagoras piled wood, gave him his first start by adopting him into his household. He then taught reading and writing in some remote village, and from this branched out into the sophist's profession.

Laértios 10.8

Epíkouros called ... Protagoras a basket-carrier (phormophóron) and the scribe of Dēmókritos and a village schoolmaster.

Diogenes Laértios, Lives of Philosophers, IX.53 (Protagoras)

He also invented the shoulder-pad on which porters carry their burdens ... for he himself had been a porter, says Epíkouros somewhere.

[U173]

Uncertain Author, in Cramer Anec. Paris., 2 p. 171, 31

In the work entitled The Large Lecture, {Megalo Logo}, Protagoras says: "Teaching requires some natural ability and some practice; and one must begin to learn this skill during one's youth." Yet, this ought not to be said if he himself began teaching later, as Epíkouros mentions about Protagoras.

31. Letter on Stilpo

[U174]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 9.18

For just as other things have for us an inherent attractiveness, though the Sage may love his friends dearly, often comparing them with himself, and putting them ahead of himself, yet all the good will be limited to his own being, and he will speak the words which were spoken by the very Stilpo, after his country was captured and his children and his wife lost, as he emerged from the general desolation alone and yet happy, spoke as follows to Dēmétrios (known as "Poliorcetes" {Sacker of Cities} because of the destruction {poliorkeîn} he brought upon them) in answer to the question whether he had lost anything: "I have all my goods with me!" ... This saying of Stilpo makes common ground with Stoicism; the Stoic also can carry his goods unimpaired through cities that have been burned to ashes; for he is self-sufficient. Such are the bounds which he sets to his own happiness. But you must not think that our school alone can utter noble words; Epíkouros himself, the reviler of Stilpo, used similar language... {more below @ U474}

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 9.1

You desire to know whether Epíkouros is right when, in one of his letters, he rebukes those who hold that the Sage is self-sufficient and for that reason does not stand in need of friendships. This is the objection raised by Epíkouros against Stilpo and those {Cynics and/or Stoics} who believe that the chief good is a mind devoid of feeling {impatiens}.

[U175]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 9.8

Let us now return to the question. The wise man, I say, self-sufficient though he be, nevertheless desires friends if only for the purpose of practicing friendships, in order that his noble qualities may not lie dormant. Not, however, for the purpose mentioned by Epíkouros in the letter quoted above: "That there may be someone to sit by him when he is ill, to come to his rescue when he is hard up or thrown into chains" but so that on the contrary he may have someone by whose sickbed he himself may sit or whom he may himself release when that person is held prisoner by hostile hands.

32. Letter to a Child

[U176]

Herculaneum Papyrus 176, c. 10 [Gomperz "Hermes" Edition, 5, p. 386]

33. Letter From His Last Days

[U177]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, l.128 (31 Diano)

As I write this, it is the seventh day that I have been unable to urinate and have had pains of the kind which lead to death. So, if anything should happen, take care of Mētródōros' children for four or five years, spending no more on them than you now spend on me in a year.

Epíkouros' Remarks On Private Problems

[U178]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 20, p. 1100A

Epíkouros admitted that some pleasures come from glory. Indeed, was he not himself so impatient for renown... that he even wrote that as he was lecturing on on natural philosophy, Kōlótēs embraced his knees in an act of adoration, and that his own brother Neoklēs declared from childhood that there had never been born and was not now anyone wiser than Epíkouros, and that their mother got in herself atoms of such a kind that by their conjunction must produce a Sage?

Ibid., 19, p. 1100C

For he, who made so much of Neoklēs' testimony and Kōlótēs' act of adoration and took such satisfaction in them would never convince any man alive that if he had been applauded by the assembled Greeks at Olympia, he would not have lost his head and raised a shout of jubilation.

Plutarch, On Brotherly Love, 16, p. 487D

In the case of Epíkouros also, his brothers' respect for him was clearly great because of the goodwill and solicitude he had for them, inspired as they were with admiration both for his other attainments and especially for his philosophy. For even if they were mistaken in their opinion (they were convinced and constantly declared from their earliest childhood that there was no one wiser than Epíkouros), we may well admire both the man who inspired this devotion and also those who felt it.

Cf. Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 26, 2 p. 779A

How many atoms, in fact, and of what type, had shed from Epíkouros' father to he himself, when Epíkouros was seeded? And, once immersed in the womb of his mother, how did they assemble, what form did they assume, what figure; how did they move, how did they develop?

[U179]

Laértios 10.2

He himself says that he began his devotion to philosophy at fourteen years of age.

[U180]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.116

.. of the difference relating to the good, for which reasons Epíkouros proclaimed himself the supreme monarch, or at least considered himself residing principally with Athena, where they live [in envy?] of the philosophers.

[U181]

Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVII.24

From Epíkouros: "I revel in the pleasure of my humble body, employing water and bread, and I spit upon the pleasures of extravagance, not for their own sake, but because of the difficulties which follow from them."

Laértios 10.11

In his correspondence he himself mentions that he was content with plain bread and water.

Go to his Garden some time and read the motto carved there: "Dear Guest, here you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure." The caretaker of that abode, a friendly host, will be ready for you; he will welcome you with barley-meal, and serve you water also in abundance, with these words: "Have you not been well entertained? This garden does not whet your appetite; but quenches it. Nor does it make you more thirsty with every drink; it slakes the thirst with a natural cure – a cure that requires no fee. It is with this type of pleasure that I have grown old."

[U182]

Laértios 10.11

In his correspondence ... [= U181] ... And again: "Send me a little pot of cheese, that, when I like I may fare sumptuously."

[U183]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 15, p. 1097C

One cannot ignore the man's absurd inconsistency: he treads under foot and belittles the actions of Themistocles and Miltiades and yet writes this to his friends about himself: "The way in which you have provided for me in the matter of sending the grain was godlike and magnificent, and you have given tokens of your regard from me that reach to high heaven." So if someone had taken that corn ration of his bread-stuff from our philosopher's letter, the expressions of gratitude would have conveyed the impression that it was written in thanksgiving for the freedom or deliverance of the whole Greek nation or of the Athenian state.

[U184]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, l.127

"The only contribution I require is that which ... ordered the disciples to send me, even if they are among the Hyperboreans. I wish to receive from each of you two hundred and twenty drachmae a year and no more." And in another letter: "Ctesippus brought me the annual tribute, which was sent on behalf of your father and you yourself."

[U185]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, l.118

After having given a sheep to a young boy from an enclosed pen: "Take care of the toy that I have gifted to you."

[U186]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1097E

But for one ... to be proud ... {U190} ... recalling Neoklês' last words, by the curious pleasure that is mingled with tears – no one would call this the "mental joy" or "delight" of men in their sound minds.

[U187]

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r (Maxims of Epíkouros)

"I never desired to please the rabble. What pleased them, I did not learn; and what I knew was far removed from their understanding."

Maximus the Abbot, Gnomologion, 6, [p.172 Tig.; t. 2 pp. 549- Combef.]

(Author not given; the Laurentianus and Borbonicus codices report, "from Epíkouros.")

Here I shall pay what I owe you. "I have never wished to cater to the crowd; for what I know, they do not approve, and what they approve, I do not know." "Who said this?" you ask, as if you were ignorant of whom I am pressing into service; it is Epíkouros. But this same watchword rings in your ears from every sect: Peripatetic, Academic, Stoic, Cynic. For who that is pleased by virtue can please the crowd?

Cf. Tertullian, Apologetics, 38

But we disapprove of what pleases you, and what is ours does not please you. But the Epicureans rightly recognized something honest within pleasure, namely: peace of mind.

[U188]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 79.15

There is Epíkouros, for example; mark how greatly he is admired, not only by the more cultured, but also by this ignorant rabble. This man, however, was unknown to Athens itself, near which he had hidden himself away. And so, when he had already survived by many years his friend Mētródōros, he added in a letter these last words, proclaiming with thankful appreciation the friendship that had existed between them: "So greatly blessed were Mētródōros and I that it has been no harm to us to be unknown, and almost unheard of, in this well-known land of Greece."

[U189]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 6, p. 1090E

... the reflux of the sea that came near to engulfing Epíkouros on his voyage to Lampsacus, as he writes?

[U190]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1097E

But for one to go out of his way to work up an excitement about small comforts, like sailors celebrating a feast of Aphrodite, and to be proud because when suffering from dropsy he invited friends to a number of feasts and in spite of the disease did not refuse to take liquid ... {U186} ... no one would call this the "mental joy" or "delight" of men in their sound minds.

[U191]

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IX.41

"During my illness" Epíkouros says himself, "my lectures were not about the sufferings of my body, nor did I talk to my visitors about such matters. All my time was spent contemplating natural philosophy, reasoning on its most important points, particular this: how my mind, though partaking a natural and unavoidable sympathy with the present indisposition of my body, might nevertheless keep itself free from disturbance, and in constant possession of its own proper happiness." He adds, "With regard to my body, I did not permit the physicians to altogether do with me what they would, as if I expected great results from them, or as if I thought it a matter of such great consequence, to recover my health by their methods. For my present condition, I thought, was tolerable, and still allowed me great content."

Regarding Epíkouros' Disciples

[U192]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 52.3

Epíkouros remarks that certain men have worked their way to the truth without anyone's assistance, carving out their own passage. And he gives special praise to these, for their impulse has come from within, and they have forged to the front by themselves. Again, he says, there are others who need outside help, who will not proceed unless someone leads the way, but who will follow faithfully. Of these, he says, Mētródōros was one; this type of man is also excellent, but belongs to the second grade. We ourselves are not of that first class, either; we shall be well-regarded if we are admitted into the second. Nor need you despise a man who can gain salvation only with the assistance of another; the will to be saved means a great deal, too. You will find still another class of man – and a class not to be despised – who can be forced and driven into righteousness, who do not need a guide as much as they require someone to encourage and, as it were, to force them along. This is the third variety. If you ask me for a man of this pattern also, Epíkouros tells us that Hermárchos was such. And of the two last-named classes, he is more ready to congratulate the one, but he feels more respect for the other; for although both have reached the same goal, it is a greater credit to have brought about the same result with the more difficult material upon which to work.

[U193]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 22, p. 1103A

{noted above} Mētródōros, Polýainos, and Aristóbuolos were sources of "confidence" and "joy" to Epíkouros; indeed he continually cared for them when they were ill and mourned them when they died.

[U194]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 33, p. 1126E

Yet when Mētródōros went down to the Piraeus, a distance of some forty stades, {~ 5 miles} to help one Míthrēs, a Syrian, a royal officer who had been arrested, letters went out to everyone, men and women alike, with Epíkouros' solemn glorification of that journey.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 22, p. 1097B (Theon Speaking)

Thus a short while ago we heard our friend here {Plutarch} describe the expressions Epíkouros gave vent to and the letters he sent to his friends as he extolled and magnified Mētródōros, telling how nobly and manfully he went from town to the coast {from Athens to Piraeus} to help Míthrēs the Syrian, although Mētródōros accomplished nothing on that occasion.

[U195]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.119,4

Because not even Eudemus was proficient enough in philosophy, according to something even Mŷs tells us...

[U196]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.129

Epíkouros says: "We call 'vain pursuits' the types of life that do not tend towards happiness." And again: "For the gods, it would seem worthwhile for the entire conduct of life, of a free way of life, not to be subject to laws." Indeed, now he adds the things relative to such a one, for those reasons that we have shown, and also those relating to Míthrēs.

[U197]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.113

... to Timokrátēs us, all these things that are in fashion, as you know, are intended to help even you, not just through awareness, but also through their usage, until you gain the full assistance that one gets from philosophy, and of which and benevolent to the people politician ... of the populace...

Laértios 7.5 (Zénō of Citium)

He {Zénō} used to lecture, pacing up and down the Stoa Poikile {Painted Porch}, which is also called the colonnade or Portico of Pisianax, but which received its name from the painting of Polygnotus; his object being to keep the spot clear of a concourse of idlers. ... Here then, people came henceforth to hear Zénō, and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa, or Stoics; and the same name was given to his followers, who had formerly been known as Zénōnians. So it is stated by Epíkouros in his letters.

Sayings

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 8.7

I am still culling through the pages of Epíkouros. I read today, in his works, the following maxim: "To win real freedom, you must be the slave of Philosophy." The man who submits and surrenders himself to her is not kept waiting; he is emancipated on the spot. For the very service of Philosophy is freedom. It is likely that you will ask me why I quote so many of Epíkouros' noble words instead of words taken from our own {Stoic} school. But is there any reason why you should regard them as sayings of Epíkouros and not common property?

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 30, [p. 209, 7 Nauck]

Do not think it unnatural that when the flesh cries out for anything, the soul should cry out too. The cry of the flesh is, "Let me not hunger, or thirst, or shiver" and it's hard for the soul to restrain these desires. And while it is difficult for the soul to prevent these things, it is dangerous to neglect nature which daily proclaims self-sufficiency to the soul via the flesh which is intimately bonded to it.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 4.10

Let me share with you a saying which pleased me today. It, too, is culled from another man's Garden: "Poverty, brought into conformity with the law of nature, is great wealth." Do you know what limits that law of nature ordains for us? Merely to avert hunger, thirst, and cold.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2 21, p. 178.41

Epíkouros, who held that happiness consists in not being hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold...

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.35.102

Time would fail me should I wish to carry on about the cause of poverty; for the matter is evident and nature herself teaches us daily how few and how small her needs are, and how cheaply satisfied.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 16.7

There is also this saying of Epíkouros: "If you shape your life according to nature, you will never be poor; if you do so according to opinion, you will never be rich." For nature's wants are small; the demands of opinion are boundless.

So he who follows nature and not groundless opinions is in all things self-sufficient. For every possession is wealth when it comes to satisfying nature, while even the greatest wealth is poverty when it comes to the unlimited desires.

[U203]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 29, p. 209, 1

But insofar as you are in want, it is through forgetfulness of your nature that you feel the want. For thereby you cause to yourself vain fears and desires.

[U204]

Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVI.28

From Epíkouros: "We are born once and there can be no second birth. For all eternity we shall no longer be. But you, although you are not master of tomorrow, are postponing your happiness. We waste away our lives in delaying, and each of us dies without having enjoyed leisure." {= Vatican Saying 14}

Plutarch, Non Posse, 27, p. 1104E

... those who say that "We are born once; there is no second birth; we must forever be no more." Indeed by discounting the present moment as a minute fraction, or rather as nothing at all, in comparison with all time, men let it pass fruitlessly. {Source may be a letter to Idomeneús – cf. U133 & Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.38 (U491)}

Ibid., 30, p. 1106F

"There is no second birth; we must forever be no more" Epíkouros says.

Arsenius, Paroemiogr. Gotting., 2 p341, 25

This noble thought is from Epíkouros.

[U205]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 26.8

Epíkouros will oblige me, with the following saying: "Rehearse death" or, the idea may come across to us rather more satisfactorily if put in this form: "It is a very good thing to familiarize oneself with death." ... "Rehearse death" – to say this is to tell a person to rehearse his freedom. A person who has learned how to die has unlearned how to be a slave.

Cf. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.51

Most people, even though they have many possessions, make endless efforts because they think they will lack enough. We are satisfied with available, simple things if we keep in mind that all the wealth in the world is not strong enough to give the soul a worthy release from disturbance, but the trouble of the flesh is removed by very moderate, ordinary things which are very easy to get. And if even things on this level fall short, that does not disturb the person who rehearses death.

[U206]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 20.9

Although you may look askance, Epíkouros will once again be glad to settle my indebtedness: "Believe me, your words will be more imposing if you sleep on a cot and wear rags. For in that case you will not be merely saying them; you will be demonstrating their truth." I, at any rate, listen in a different spirit to the utterances of our friend Dēmétrios, after I have seen him reclining without even a cloak to cover him, and, more than this, without rugs to lie upon. He is not only a teacher of the truth, but a witness to the truth.

[U207]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 29, p. 209, 1

"It is better for you to have confidence {about the future} while lying on a cheap bed than to be disturbed while possessing a golden couch and an extravagant table."

[U208]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 7.11

Here is a nice expression by Epíkouros, written to one of the partners of his studies: "I write this not for the many, but for you; each of us is enough of an audience for the other." Lay these words to hear, Lucilius, that you may scorn the pleasure which comes from the applause of the majority. Many men praise you; but have you any reason for being pleased with yourself, if you are a person whom the many can understand?

[U209]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 25.6

When this aim has been accomplished, and you begin to hold yourself in some esteem, I shall gradually allow you to do what Epíkouros, in another passage, suggests: "The time when you should most of all withdraw into yourself is when you are forced to be in a crowd."

[U210]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 11.8

My letter calls for a conclusion. Here's one for you, on that will serve you in good stead, too, which I'd like you to take to heart. "We need to set our affections on some good man and keep him constantly before our eyes, so that we may live as if he were watching us and do everything as if he saw what we were doing." This, my dear Lucilius, is Epíkouros' advice, and in giving it he has given us a guardian and a moral tutor – and not without reason either: misdeeds are greatly diminished if a witness is always standing near intending doers.

[U211]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 25.5

I must insert in this letter some more of his sayings: "Do everything as if Epíkouros were watching you."

[U212]

Philódēmos, Treatises, Vol. Herc. 2, I.126 [29 Diano]

... bringing your letter and the reasoning which you had carried out concerning men who could see neither the analogy which obtains between the phenomena and the unseen {realities} nor the consistency which exists between the senses and the senses {realities} and again the counterfactuals, which also might be, in truth, the only ...

[U213]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 28, p. 1105D

If then, "the memory of a dead friend is pleasant on every count" as Epíkouros said, we need no more to make us see the great delight that they renounce when, although they suppose that they can receive and capture the apparitions and likenesses of dead companions {in dreams?} – images that have neither mind nor feeling – they do not think they will ever again meet those friends themselves, or ever again see a dear father or dear mother or perhaps a gentle wife, and have not even the hope of such company.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 63.7

Thinking of departed friends is to me something sweet and mellow.

[U214]

Maximus the Abbot (aka "Maximus the Confessor"), Sayings, c. 8 [p. 196 Ribittiana]

"Do not avoid conferring small favors: for then you will likewise seem to be open to conferring great things."

[U215]

Maximus the Abbot (aka "Maximus the Confessor"), Sayings, 66 [p. 259 Ribittiana]

"If your enemy makes a request to you, do not scorn his request; but keep on your guard; for he is like a dog."

[U216]

Philódēmos, On Vices and Virtues, 1.IX Vol. Herc. 1, 3 c.27.20 [= Oxon. I.104; p. 64,5 Goettl.]

Now if someone reproaches us because we write about economy, that would be enough for us, together with Epíkouros and Mētródōros, who give advice and exhortations on household management in a particularly accurate way, albeit with minimal details.

Laértios 10.16

(Reproduced elsewhere)

Aelian, fr. 39, p. 201,1 [= Suda, under Epíkouros, {epsilon-2405}; p. 418, 12 (Bernh.)]

Epíkouros was so enslaved by pleasure that, towards the end, he wrote in his will to offer a sacrifice to his father, to his mother, and to his brothers once a year, and to the above-mentioned Mētródōros and Polýainos, but to he himself, the Sage, two times – preferring even here, in his depravity, the largest portion. And this gourmand and glutton stipulated that stone tables would be set up at the tomb as votive offerings.

Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129A

Oh Epíkouros, don't leave instructions about funeral ceremonies. For what else is the meaning of the feasts? Of the meetings of your friends and the fair? {referring to the provisions for the annual celebration of Epíkouros' birthday and monthly gatherings of Epicureans}

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§ 1.1 On Wisdom & the Sage

[U219]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists, (Against the Dogmatists, V) 169:

For they {the Dogmatists} promise to present us with an "art of life" and because of this Epíkouros declared that "philosophy is an activity secures the happy life by arguments and discussions."

[U220]

Sacred and Profane Parallels, A 14, 156 [p. 761 Gaisf.]:

From Epíkouros: "It is not the pretended but the real pursuit of philosophy that is needed; for we do not need the appearance of good health but to enjoy it in truth." {= Vatican Sayings 54}

[U221]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 31, [p. 209, 23 Nauck]:

Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. For just as there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy either, if it does not expel the suffering of the mind.

[U222]

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 19, p. 1117F:

It is one of Epíkouros' tenets that none but the Sage is unalterably convinced of anything.

[U222a]

Laértios 10.117:

Moreover {Epíkouros says}, he who has become wise never resumes the opposite habit, nor even pretends to, if he can help it.

[U223]

Cicero, Academica, 2.14.45 (Lucullus):

What we have termed "perspicuity" {clarity of reasoning} is cogent enough to identify things as they are. But nevertheless, so that we may abide by things that are perspicuous more firmly and consistently, we require some further exercise of method or of attention to save ourselves from being thrown off – by trickery and ill-conceived arguments – from positions that are clear in themselves. For Epíkouros who desired to come to the relief of the errors that appear to upset our power of knowing the truth, and who said that the separation of opinion from perspicuous truth was the function of the wise man, carried matters no further, for he entirely failed to do away with the error connected with mere opinion.

[U224]

Monastic Florilegium, 195:

Epíkouros also deemed opinion the "hallowed epidemic."

[U225]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.9.19 [p. 398.11 Diels] (Parallel A.27.39 p.767 [Gaisf.]):

Epíkouros says that a Sage can only be recognized by another Sage.

[U226]

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellenies, I.15 [p. 130.37 Sylb]:

Epíkouros, however, supposes that only the Greeks are qualified to practice philosophy.

§ 1.2 On the Arts

[U227]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, I.1:

The case against the Mathematici – professors of Arts and Sciences – has been set forth in a general way, it would seem, both by Epíkouros and by the School of Pyrrho ... Epíkouros took the ground that the subjects taught are of no help in perfecting wisdom; and he did this, as some speculate, because he saw in it a way of covering up his own lack of culture (for in many matters Epíkouros stands convicted of ignorance, and even in ordinary conversation, his speech was not correct). Another reason may have been his hostility towards Plato and Aristotle and their like who were men of wide learning.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.4.12:

Your school {Epicureanism} argues decisively that there is no need for the aspirant to philosophy to study literature at all.

Cf., Ibid., I.21, 71-72 (Torquatus to Cicero):

You are disposed to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness. Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astrology, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspond so fruitful, the art of living? No! Epíkouros was not uneducated: the real philistines are those who ask us to go on studying till old age the subjects that we are supposed to be ashamed of not learning in childhood.

[U227a]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.25.4:

For what else is it to deny wisdom to men than to take away from their minds the true and divine light? But if the nature of man is capable of wisdom, it is necessary that workmen and rustics and women and all who have human form be taught, that they might be wise, and that a people of sages be raised up from every tongue and condition and sex and age.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 25.7:

So the Stoics realized this, for they said that slaves and women ought to engage in philosophy; Epíkouros, also, who summoned even the illiterate to philosophy. ...

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 25.8:

Indeed, they tried to do what truth exacted, but it was not possible to get beyond the words, first, because there is need of many arts to be able to arrive at philosophy. ...

For this reason, Tullius {i.e., Cicero} says that philosophy "shrinks from the crowd." {Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.2.4} Still, Epíkouros will accept the untutored. How, therefore, will they understand those things which are said about the beginnings of things, perplexing and involved things which even educated men scarcely grasp? In matters involved with obscurity, then, and spread over by the variety of abilities and colored with the exquisite oratory of eloquent men, what place is there for the inexperienced and unlearned? Finally, they never taught any women to be philosophers except one, from all memory: Themísta.

[U227b]

Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, p 649, 26:

This is how the Epicureans define craft: a craft is a method which effects what is advantageous for human life. "Effects" is used in the sense of "produces."

scholium to Dionysius Thrax, the grammarian, report the following view

(fr. 227b Us.): “the Epicureans define 'technē' as follows: a technē is a method

producing what is beneficial for life” (οἱ μὲν Ἐπικούρειοι οὕτως ὀρίζονται τὴν

τέχνην· τέχνη ἐστὶ μέθοδος ἐνεργοῦσα τῷ βίῳ τὸ συμφέρον). A similar statement appears in the second century ce Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda (fr.

12 col. II.8–11 Smith):28 “for needs and experiences over the course of time produced all of them [sc. the technai]” (πάσας [sc. τὰς τέχνας] γὰρ ἐγέννησαν αἱ

χρεῖαι καὶ περιπτώσεις μετὰ τοῦ χρόνου)

[U228]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1086F:

Hērakleídēs then, a student of literature, is repaying his debt to Epíkouros for such favors of theirs "as rabble of poets" and "Homer's idiocies" and the verity of abuse that Mētródōros has in so many writings heaped upon the poet.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellenies, V.14, p. 257.52:

Homer, while representing the gods as subject to human passions, appears to know the Divine Being, whom Epíkouros does not so revere.

[U229]

Heraclitus Ponticus, Allegories of Homer, 4:

Heraclitus Ponticus, Allegories of Homer. 75:

Proclus Lycaeus, Commentary on Plato's "Republic" [p. 382 Bas.]:

[U229a]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 11, p. 1093C:

They even banish the pleasures that come from mathematics!

Saint Augustine, On the Utility of Faith, c. 6, 13, t. VIII [p. 53F Venice edition, 1719]:

Cicero Academica 2.33.106 (Lucullus):

Polýainos is said to have been a great mathematician; after he had accepted the view of Epíkouros and come to believe that all geometry is false, {surely he did not forget even the knowledge that he possessed?}

There are those, however, who are only predisposed to knock down the principles of geometry, like the Epicureans.

[U229b]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Musicians (Against the Professors, VI) 27:

Moreover, if Plato welcomed music, we should not therefore assert that music contributes to happiness, since others who are not inferior to him in trustworthiness – such as Epíkouros – have denied this contention, and declared on the contrary that music is unbeneficial – "Wine-loving, idle, having no regard for wealth." {Euripides, fr. 184 Nauck}.

[U230]

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On the Composition of Words, 24, p. 188:

The dictum that "writing presents no difficulties to those who do not aim at a constantly changing standard" which Epíkouros himself propounded, was intended as a talisman to ward off the charge of extreme sloth and stupidity. {c.f. above}

§ 1.3 On Philosophers

[U231]

Cicero, Brutus, 85.292 (Atticus speaking):

I grant that that irony, which they say was found in Socrates ... is a fine and clever way of speaking... Thus Socrates in the pages of Plato praises to the skies Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and the rest, while representing himself as without knowledge of anything and a mere ignoramus. This somehow fits his character, and I cannot agree with Epíkouros who censures it.

[U232]

Laërtios 10.13:

Both Epíkouros and Hermárchos deny the very existence of Leucippus the philosopher, though some say, including Apollodorus the Epicurean, that he was the teacher of Dēmókritos.

[U233]

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.26.72

(Cotta) The fact is that you people merely repeat by rote the idle fancies that Epíkouros uttered when half asleep; for, as we read in his writings, he boasted that he had never had a master. ... He could have studied under Xenocrátēs ... and there are some who think he did. But he himself denied it, and he should know! He does say that he heard the lectures of a certain Pamphilus, a student of Plato, when he was living in Sámos. He lived there as a young man with his father and brothers, his father Neoklēs having settled there as an immigrant farmer. But when he could not make a decent living from his small-holding, I believe he kept a school. Epíkouros however had a supreme contempt for Pamphilus as a follower of Plato, and in this he showed his usual anxiety never to learn anything from anyone. Look how he behaved towards Nausiphánēs, a disciple of Dēmókritos. He does not deny that he heard him lecture, but heaps all manner of abuse upon him. What, after all, is there in his own philosophy which does not come from Dēmókritos? Even if he introduced some variations – such as the swerve in the motion of the atoms which I mentioned just now – still for the most part his theory is identical – atoms, void, images, the infinity of space, the numberless universes, their birth and death, and so on through practically the whole field of natural philosophy.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 18, p. 1100A:

Was not Epíkouros himself in such a fury of tense and palpitating passion for renown that he ... disowned his teachers?

[U234]

Cicero, De Finibus, I.6.17:

Here {regarding physics}, in the first place, he is entirely second-hand. His doctrines are those of Dēmókritos, with a very few modifications. And as for the latter, where he attempts to improve upon his original, in my opinion he only succeeds in making things worse. ... 21: Thus where Epíkouros alters the doctrines of Dēmókritos, he alters them for the worse; while for those ideas which he adopts, the credit belongs entirely to Dēmókritos. ... For my own part I reject these doctrines altogether; but still I could wish that Dēmókritos, whom every one else applauds, had not been vilified by Epíkouros who took him as his sole guide.

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 3, p. 1108E:

He begins with Dēmókritos, who thus receives for his teaching a handsome and appropriate fee. And this although Epíkouros long proclaimed himself a Democritean, as is attested among others by Leonteús, one of Epíkouros' most devoted pupils, who writes to Lycophron that Dēmókritos was honored by Epíkouros for having reached the correct approach to knowledge before him, and that indeed his whole system was called Democritean because Dēmókritos had first his upon the first principles of natural philosophy.

[U235]

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.33.93

(Cotta) Was it on the basis of dreams that Epíkouros and Mētródōros and Hermárchos attacked Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, and that little harlot Leóntion dared to write criticisms of Theóphrastos? ... You Epicureans are touchy yourselves. ... But Epíkouros himself made the most libelous attacks on Aristotle and violently abused Phaedo, the disciple of Socrates. He heaped whole volumes of invective on Timokrátēs, the brother of his own colleague Mētródōros, because of some petty disagreement on a philosophical point. He even showed no gratitude to Dēmókritos, his own forerunner, and had no use for his own teacher Nausiphánēs, from whom he had learnt nothing in any case.

[U236]

Laértios 10.8:

Epíkouros used to call Nausiphánēs a pleumonon {="jellyfish" imputing obtuseness and insensibility}, an illiterate, a fraud, and a whore.

[U237]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1086E:

Zeuxippus said: "Hērakleídēs has gone off charging us with undue vehemence in our attack on the unoffending Epíkouros and Mētródōros." Here, Theon declared: "And you didn't reply that by their standard Kōlótēs looks like a paragon of measured speech? For they made a collection of the most disgraceful terms to be found anywhere 'charlatanism' {bomolochiás} 'buffoonery' {lekythismoús} 'bragging' {alazoneías} 'prostitution' {hetaireséis} 'assassin' {androphonías} 'loudmouth' {barystonoús} 'hero of many of a misadventure' {polyphthórous} 'nincompoop' {baryegkephálous} – and showered it on Aristotle {U71}, Socrates {U231}, Pythagoras, Protagoras {U172 - U173}, Theóphrastos, Hērakleídēs {U16}, Hipparchia – indeed, what eminent name have they spared?

Cf. Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 29, p. 1124C: T

he sophists and braggarts then, are those those who in their disputes with eminent men write with such shameless arrogance.

Laértios 10.8:

Plato's school he called the "flatterers of Dionysius." Plato himself he called "golden." ... Heraclitus a "muddler" Dēmókritos he called "Lerocritus" {the gossip-monger}, Antídōros "Sannidorus" {a fawning gift-bearer}, the Cynics "enemies of Greece" the Dialecticians "despoilers" and he called Pyrrho "ignorant" and a "bore."

[U239]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 26, p. 1121E:

The fame of Arcesilaus, the best loved among the philosophers of the time, would appear to have annoyed Epíkouros mightily. Thus he {Kōlótēs} says although this philosopher said nothing new, he gave the illiterate the impression and belief that he did. Our critic of course is widely read himself and writes with a beguiling charm.

[U240]

Laértios 10.12:

Among the early philosophers, says Diocles, his favorite was Anaxagóras, although he occasionally disagreed with him, and Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates.

[U241]

Laértios 10.23:

The goodness of Mētródōros was proved in all ways, as Epíkouros testifies in his prefaces {of some of his books}.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 89.11:

The Epicureans held that there are two parts of philosophy: physics and ethics – they got rid of logic. Then, since they were forced by the very facts to distinguish what was ambiguous and to refute falsities lying hidden under the appearance of truth, they themselves also introduced that topic which they call "on judgment and the criterion" {i.e., canonics}; it is logic by another name, but they think that it is an accessory part of physics.

Laértios 10.30:

The usual arrangement, however, is to join canonics with physics; the former they call the science which deals with the standard and first principles, or the elementary part of philosophy...

Saint Augustine, Against Cresconius, I.13.16 t. IX [p. 397E Venice edition, 1719]:

Cicero, De Finibus, I.19.63 (Torquatus to Cicero):

Logic, on which your {Platonic} school lays such stress, he held to be of no effect either as a guide to conduct or as an aid to thought. Natural Philosophy he deemed all-important. This science explains to us the meaning of terms, the nature of predication, and the law of consistency and contradiction; secondly, a thorough knowledge of the facts of nature relieves us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of death, and shields us against the disturbing effects of ignorance, which is often in itself a cause of terrifying apprehensions; lastly, to learn what nature's real requirements are improves the moral character also. Besides, it is only by firmly grasping a well-established scientific system, observing the Rule or Canon that has fallen as it were from heaven so that all men may know it—only by making that Canon the test of all our judgments, that we can hope always to stand fast in our belief unshaken by the eloquence of any man. On the other hand, without a full understanding of the world of nature it is impossible to maintain the truth of our sense-perceptions. Further, every mental presentations has its origin in sensation: so that no certain knowledge will be possible, unless all sensations are true, as the theory of Epíkouros teaches that they are. Those who deny the validity of sensation and say that nothing can be perceived, having excluded the evidence of the senses, are unable even to expound their own argument. Besides, by abolishing knowledge and science they abolish all possibility of rational life and action. Thus Natural Philosophy supplies courage to face the fear of death; resolution to resist the terrors of religion; peace of mind, for it removes all ignorance of the Mÿsteries of nature; self-control, for it explains the nature of the desires and distinguishes their different kinds; and, as I showed just now, the Canon or Criterion of Knowledge, which Epíkouros also established, gives a method of discerning truth from falsehood.

Cicero, De Finibus, I.7.22:

Turn next to the second division of philosophy, the department of Method and of Dialectic, which its termed Logikē. Of the whole armor of Logic your founder, as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition; he has no doctrine of Division or Partition; he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation; once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed. {lacuna} He lays the very greatest stress upon that which, as he declares, Nature herself decrees and sanctions, that is: the feelings of pleasure and pain. These he maintains lie at the root of every act of choice and of avoidance.

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2).9:

Epíkouros said that all sensibles were true and real. For there is no difference between saying that something is true and that it is real. And that is why, in giving a formalization of the true and the false, he says, "that which is such as it is said to be, is true" and "that which is not such as it is said to be, is false."

§ 2.1 On the Standards of Judgment

[U245]

Cicero Academica 2.46.142:

(Lucullus?) Epíkouros places the standard of judgment entirely in the senses and in notions of objects and in pleasure.

§ 2.2 On Sensation

[U246]

Diogenes Laértios , Lives of Philosophers, IX.106 (Pyrrho):

An apparent fact serves as the Skeptic's criterion, as indeed Aenesidemus says, and so does Epíkouros.

[U247]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, I (Against the Dogmatists, I) 203:

Epíkouros says that there are two things which are linked to each other, presentation and opinion, and that of these presentation (which he also calls 'clear fact') is always true. For just as the primary feelings, i.e., pleasure and pain, come to be from certain productive factors and in accordance with productive factors themselves (for example, pleasure comes to be from pleasant things and pain from painful things, and what causes pleasure can never fail to be pleasant, nor can what produces pain not be painful; but rather, it is necessary that what gives pleasure should be pleasant and that what gives pain should, in its nature, be painful), likewise, in the case of presentations, which are feelings within us, what causes each of them is presented in every respect and unqualifiedly, and since it is presented it cannot help but exist in truth just as it is presented [...lacuna...] that it is productive of presentation. And one must reason similarly for the individual senses. For what is visible not only is presented as visible but also is such as it is presented; and what is audible is not only presented as audible, but also is like that in truth; and similarly for the rest. Therefore, it turns out that all presentations are true. And reasonably so. For if, the Epicureans say, a presentation is true if it comes from an existing object and in accordance with the existing object, and if every presentation arises from the object presented and in accordance with the presented object itself, then necessarily every presentation is true.

Some people are deceived by the difference among impressions seeming to reach us from the same sense-object, for example a visible object, such that the object appears to be of a different color or shape, or altered in some other way. For they have supposed that, when impressions differ and conflict in this way, one of them must be true and the opposing one false. This is simple-minded, and characteristic of those who are blind to the real nature of things. Let us make our case for visible things. For it is not the whole solid body that is seen – to take the example of visible things – but the color of the solid body. And of color, some is right on the solid body, as in the case of things seen from close up or from a moderate distance, but some is outside the solid body and is objectively located in the space adjacent to it, as in the case of things seen from a great distance. This color is altered in the intervening space, and takes on a peculiar shape. But the impression which it imparts corresponds to what is its own true objective state. Thus just as what we actually hear is not the sound inside the beaten gong, or inside the mouth of the man shouting, but the sound which is reaching our senses, and just as no one says that the man who hears a faint sound from a distance hears is falsely just because on approaching he registers it as louder, so too I would not say that the vision is deceived just because from a great distance it sees the tower as small and round but from near-to as larger and square. Rather I would say that it is telling the truth. Because when the sense-object appears to it small and of that shape it really is small and of that shape, the edges of the images getting eroded as a result of their travel through the air. And when it appears big and of another shape instead, it likewise is big and of another shape instead. But the two are already different from each other: for it is left for distorted opinion to suppose that the object of impression seen from near and the one seen from far off are one and the same. The peculiar function for sensation is to apprehend only that which is present to it and moves it, such as color, not to make the distinction that the object here is a different one from the object there. Hence for this reason all impressions are true. Opinions, on the other hand, are not all true but admit of some difference. Some of them are true, some false, since they are judgments which we make on the basis of our impressions, and we judge some things correctly, but some incorrectly, either by adding and appending something to our impressions or by subtracting something from them, and in general falsifying irrational sensation.

According to Epíkouros, some opinions are true, some false. True opinions are those which are attested by and not contested by clear facts, while false opinions are those which are contested and not attested by clear facts. Attestation is perception through a self-evident impression, that the object of opinion is such as it once was thought to be—for example, if Plato is approaching from far off, I form the conjectural opinion, owing to the distance, that it is Plato. But then he has come close, there is further testimony that he is Plato, now that the distance is reduced, and it is attested by the self-evidence itself. **Non-contestation is the conformity between a non-evident thing which is the object of speculation, and the opinion about what is apparent**—for example, Epíkouros, in saying that void exists, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident fact of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not be motion either, since the moving body would lack a place to pass into as a consequence of everything being full and solid. Therefore, the non-evident thing believed is not contradicted by that which is evident, since there is motion. **Contestation, on the other hand, is opposed to non-contestation, for it is the elimination of that which is apparent by the positing of the non-evident thing**—for example, the Stoic says that void does not exist, something non-evident; but once this denial is put forward, then that which is evident, namely motion, ought to be co-eliminated with it. For if void does not exist, then motion does not occur either, according to the method already demonstrated. Non-attestation, likewise, is opposed to attestation, for it is confirmation through self-evidence of the fact that the object of opinion is not such as it was believed to be—for example, if someone is approaching from far off, we conjecture, owing to the distance, that he is Plato. But when the distance is reduced, we recognize through self-evidence that it is not Plato. This sort of thing turns out to be non-attestation.

So attestation and non-contestation are the criterion of something's being true, while non-attestation and contestation are the criterion of its being false. And self-evidence is the foundation and basis of all [four] of these.

Epíkouros said that all sensibles were true and real. For there is no difference between saying that something is true and that it is real. And that is why, in giving a formalization of the true and the false, he says, "that which is such as it is said to be, is true" and "that which is not such as it is said to be, is false." {= U244} ... And he says that sensation, being perceptive of the objects presented to it and neither subtracting nor adding nor transposing (being devoid of reason), constantly reports truly and grasps the existent object as it really is by nature. And whereas all the sensibles are true, the opinables differ: some of them are true, others false – as we showed before.

Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, I (Against the Dogmatists, I).369:

Some of the natural philosophers, like Dēmókritos, have abolished all phenomena, and others, like Epíkouros and Protagoras, have established all, {while still others, like the Stoics and Peripatetics, have abolished some and established others.}

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2).185:

Epíkouros declared that all sensibles really exist such as they appear and present themselves in sensation, as sense never lies, {though we think that it lies}.

Ibid., 355:

Epíkouros declared that every sensible thing has stable existence.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics" [p. 428.20 Bon.]:

Some tend to call sense perceptions essences, and maintain that nothing else exists but sense-perceptions themselves, as for example ... and even the Epicureans.

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato's "Phaedo" [p. 80.1 Finckh.]:

Those who maintain that the sensations precisely relate the truth ... Protagoras, Epíkouros.

Cicero Academica 2.26.82 (Lucullus):

Enough of this simpleton, who thinks that the senses never lie.

Tertullian, On the Soul, 17: The Epicureans, again, show still greater consistency by maintaining that all the senses are equally true in their testimony, and always so – only in a different way. It is not our organs of sensation that are at fault, but our opinion. The senses only experience sensation, they do not exercise opinion; it is the soul that opines. They separated opinion from the senses, and sensation from the soul. Well, but whence comes opinion, if not from the senses? Indeed, unless the eye had descried a round shape in that tower, it could have had no idea that it possessed roundness. Again, from where does sensation arise if not from the soul?

Saint Augustine, City of God, VIII.7: {Regarding the Platonists teachings on Logic} ... far be it from me to think of comparing with them those who have placed the criterion of truth in the bodily senses and decreed that all learning should be measured by such unreliable and deceptive standards. I mean the Epicureans and others like them...

Saint Augustine, Letter to Dioscorus, 118.29 t. 2 [p. 336E Venice Edition 1719]: Therefore, when the Epicureans said that the bodily senses were never deceived, while the Stoics granted that they were sometimes deceived, although, both placed the test of acquiring truth in the senses, would anyone listen to the Platonists over the opposition of these two?

Ioannes Siculus, Commentary on Hermogenes' "Rhetoric" VI [p. 88.24 Walz.]: The teachings of many that consider sensation an infallible criterion of knowledge or of some knowledge, impose the same errors: for example, even Epíkouros...

[U248]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.9.5 [p. 396 Diels] (Parallel A.27.27): Epíkouros says that every sense-perception and every presentation is true, but of opinions, some are true and some are false.

Aetius, Doxography, IV.8.2 [p. 394 Diels] (Plutarch IV.8, Parallel A.27.9)

(Epíkouros): Perception is to some degree integrating, being a faculty, while to perceive is an act. So that, on your part, perception is spoken of in two senses: perception as a faculty on the one hand, and to perceive as an act on the other hand.

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 4-, p. 1109A: But whatever we think of that {how Kōlótēs interprets Dēmókritos}, whoever held that nothing is any more of one description than of another {no more this than that} is following an Epicurean doctrine, that all the impressions reaching us through the senses are true. For if one of two persons says that the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet? Again, you may observe that in one and the same bath some consider the water as too hot, others as too cold, the first asking for the addition of cold water, the others of hot. There is a story that a Spartan lady came to visit Beronice, wife of Deiotarus. No sooner did they come near each other than each turned away, the one (we are told) sickened by the perfume, the other by the butter. So if one sense-perception is no more true than another, we must suppose that the water is no more cold than hot, and that perfume or butter is no more sweet-smelling than ill-smelling; for he who asserts that the object itself is what appears one thing to one person and another to another has unwittingly said that it is both things at once.

As for the old story of the "right size" and "perfect fit" of the passages in the sense organs, and on the other hand the multiple mixture of the "seeds" that they say are found dispersed in all tastes, odors, and colors, so as to give rise in different persons to different perceptions of quality, do not these theories actually compel objects in their view to be "no more this than that?" For when people take sensation to be deceptive because they see that the same objects have opposite effects on those resorting to it, these thinkers offer the reassuring explanation that since just about everything is mixed and compounded with everything else, and since different substances are naturally adapted to fit different passages, the consequence is that everyone does not come into contact with and apprehend the same quality, and again the object perceived does not affect everyone in the same way with every part. What happens instead is that different sets of persons encounter only those components to which their sense organs are perfectly adjusted, and they are therefore wrong when they fall to disputing whether the object is good or bad or white or not white, imagining that they are confirming their own perceptions by denying one another's. The truth of the matter is that no sense-perception should be challenged, as all involve a contact with something real, each of them taking from the multiple mixture as from a fountain what agrees with and suits itself; and we should make no assertions about the whole when our contact is with parts, nor fancy that all persons should be affected in the same way, when different persons are affected by different qualities and properties in the object.

It is time to consider the question: who are more chargeable with imposing on objects the doctrine that "nothing is more this than that" than those who assert that every perceivable object is a blend of qualities of every description, "mixed like the must entangled in the filter" {fragment of a lost tragedy}, and who confess that their standards would go glimmering and the criterion of truth quite disappear if they permitted any sense-object whatsoever to be purely one thing and did not leave every one of them a plurality?

Cicero Academica 2.25.79 (Lucullus): His own senses, he says {in contrast with the Stoics}, are truthful! If so, you always have an authority, and one to risk his all in defense of the cause! For Epíkouros brings the issue to this point, that if one sense has told a lie once in a man's life, no sense must ever be believed.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.25.70 ^(Cotta) Epíkouros was afraid that if any of our sense-perceptions were false, then none of them could be true: and so he asserted that all our senses were always "the messengers of truth."

Cicero Academica 2.32.101 (Lucullus): A single first principle of Epíkouros combined with another belonging to your school results in the abolition of perception and comprehension, without our uttering a word. What is the principle of Epíkouros? "If any sense-presentation is false, nothing can be perceived." What is yours? "There are false sense-presentations." What follows? Without any word of mine, logical inference itself declares that "nothing can be perceived."

Cicero Academica 2.26.83 (Lucullus): There are four points of argument intended to prove that there is nothing that can be known, perceived or comprehended. ... The first of these arguments is that there is such a thing as a false presentation; ... the first is not granted by Epíkouros.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 428, p. 1124B: If it is possible to withhold judgment about these sensations, it is not impossible to withhold it about others as well, as least on the principles of your school, who set one act or image of sensation on exactly the same footing as another.

Ibid., 1123D: By putting all in the the same boat, their theory does more to estrange us from established beliefs than to convince us that the grotesques {fanciful or fantastic human and animal forms} are real.

[U252]

Cicero Academica 2.7.19 (Lucullus): Nor is it necessary to delay at this point while I answer about the case of the bent oar {c.f. Lucretius, IV.436-} or the pigeon's neck {c.f. Lucretius, 2.801-}, for I am not one to assert that every object seen is really such as it appears to be. Let Epíkouros see to that, and a number of other matters.

Plutarch, Against Kōlōtēs, 25, p. 1121A: So it is with Kōlōtēs: the reasoning that he accepts with satisfaction when he finds it in the writings of Epíkouros he neither understands nor recognizes when it is used by others. For the school that asserts that when a round image impinges on us, or in another case a bent one, the important is truly received by the sense, but refuses to allow us to go further and affirm that the tower is round or that the oar is bent, maintains the truth of its experiences and sense impressions, but will not admit that external objects correspond; and as surely as that other school must speak of "being horsed" and "walled" but not of a horse or wall, so this school of theirs is under the necessity of saying that the eye is rounded or be-angled, and not that the oar is bent or the tower round, for it is the image producing the effect in the eye that is bent, whereas the oar is not bent from which the image proceeded. Thus, since the effect produced on the senses differs from the external object, belief must stick to the effect or be exposed as false if it proceeds to add "it is" to "it appears." That vociferous and indignant protest of theirs in defense of sensation, that it does not assert the external object to be warm, the truth being merely that the effect produced in sensation has been of this kind – is it not the same as the statement about taste? Why does it not assert, if the external object is sweet, that there has merely occurred in the taste an effect and movement of this kind? A man says "I receive an impression of humanity, but I do not perceive whether a man is there." Who put him in the way of such a notion? Was it not the school who asserts that they receive an impression of curvature, but that their sight does not go beyond to pronounce that the thing is curved or yet that it is round' there has merely occurred in it an appearance and impression of rotundity?

"Exactly" someone will say, "but for my part I shall go up to the tower and I shall feel the oar, and thereupon I shall pronounce the oar straight and the tower angular; but this other fellow even at close quarters will only grant he has this 'view' and that there is this 'appearance,' but will grant nothing more." Exactly, my good friend, since he is a better hand than you at noticing and holding to the consequences of his doctrine – that every sensation is equally trustworthy when it testifies on its own behalf, but none when it testifies on behalf of anything else, but all are on the same footing. And here is an end to your tenet that all sensations are true and none untrustworthy or false – if you think it proper for one set of them to proceed to make assertions about external objects, whereas you refused to truth the others in anything beyond the experience itself. For if they are on the same footing of trustworthiness whether they come close or are at a distance, it is only fair to confer on all the power of adding the judgment "it is" or else to deny it to the former as well. Whereas if there is a difference in the effect produced on the observer when he stands at a distance and when he is close at hand, it is false to say that no impression and no sensation has in its stamp of reality a better warrant of truth than another. So too the "testimony in confirmation" and "testimony in rebuttal" of which they speak has no bearing on the sensation but only on our opinion of it; so if they tell us to be guided by this testimony when we make statements about external objects, they appoint opinion to pass the verdict "it is" and sense to undergo the experience "it seems" and thus transfer the decision from what is unfailingly true to what is often wrong.

[U253]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, 2) 63-: Epíkouros said that all sensibles are true, and that every impression is the product of something existing and like the thing which moves the sense. He also said that those who contend that some impressions are true but others false are wrong, because they cannot distinguish opinion from self-evidence. At least in the case of Orestes, when he seemed to see the Furies, his sensation, being moved by the images, was true, in that the images objectively existed; but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid bodies, held a false opinion. "And besides" he says, "the persons mentioned above when introducing a difference in the presentations, are not capable of confirming the view that some of them are true, others false. For neither by means of an apparent thing will they prove such a statement, since it is apparent things that are in question, nor yet by something non-evident, since something non-evident must be proven by means of something apparent."

[U254]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlôtēs*, 28, p. 1123B: These {images from the furies} and many of another artificial variety, resembling the Empedoclean monsters that they deride, "with lurching ox-feet, random arms" and "Ox-creatures, fronted like a man" – what phantom or prodigy do they omit? All of these they assemble from dreams and delirium and say that none is an optical illusion or false or unsubstantial, but all are true impressions, bodies and shapes that reach us from the surrounding air. That being the case, is there anything in the world about which it is impossible to suspend judgment, when such things as these can be accepted as real? Things that no artful joiner, puppet-maker, or painter ever ventured to combine of our entertainment into a likeness to deceive the eye, these they seriously suppose to exist, or rather they assert that, if these did not exist, there would be an end of all assurance and certainty and judgment about truth.

§ 2.3 On Representations & Words

[U255]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, 2.4 [p. 157.44 Sylb.; p. 121 Stählin]: Indeed, Epíkouros, who more than anyone prefers pleasure to truth, supposes that a preconception {prolepsis} is the basis of the intellect's conviction; he defines a preconception as an application of the intellect to something clear and to the clear conception of the thing, and holds that no one can either investigate or puzzle over, nor even hold an opinion or even refute someone, without a preconception.

Laértios 10.33: By preconception they mean a sort of "apprehension" or a "right opinion" or "notion" or universal idea stored in the mind – that is, a recollection of an external object often presented. For example: "this thing is human" – and no sooner than the word "human" is uttered that we imagine a human shape by an act of preconception, in which the senses take the lead. Thus the object primarily denoted by the very term is then plain and clear. And we should never have started an investigation, unless we had known what it was that we were in search of. For example: "The object standing way over there is a horse or a cow." Before making this judgment we must at some time or another have known by preconception the shape of a horse or a cow. We should not have given anything a name, if we had not first learnt its form by way of preconception.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.16.43 (Velleius speaking): What race of men or nation is there which does not have some untaught apprehension of the gods? Such an innate idea Epíkouros calls prolepsis, that is to say, a certain form of knowledge which is inborn in the mind and without which there can be no other knowledge, not rational thought or argument. The force and value of this doctrine we can see from his own inspired work on *The Canon*. {= Cicero @ U34}

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.17.44 (Velleius speaking): We must admit it as also being an accepted truth that we possess a "preconception" as I called it, or "prior notion" of the gods. For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote novel ideas, just as Epíkouros himself employed the word prolepsis in a sense which no one had ever used before.

Plutarch, by way of Olympiodorus the Younger, *Commentary on Plato's "Phaedo"* [p. 125.10 Finckh.]: The Epicureans, then, accuse us of seeking and rediscovering the prolepses. If these, as they say, correspond to real objects, then to seek them is useless; if, on the other hand, they don't correspond, how can we seek an explanation regarding preconceptions that we haven't we been able to think of already?

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors*, 1.57: According to the wise Epíkouros, it is not possible to investigate or even to be puzzled without preconceptions.

Cicero, De Finibus, I.9.30 (Torquatus to Cicero): Hence Epíkouros refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.2.6: {Epíkouros} is always harping on the necessity of carefully sifting out the meaning underlying the terms we employ...

Laértios 10.31: They reject dialectic as superfluous; holding that in their inquiries, physicists should be content to employ ordinary terms for things.

Erotianus, Glossary of Hippocrates, Preface, [p. 34, 10 Klein]: For if we are going to explain the words known to everybody, we would have to expound either all or some. But to expound all is impossible, whereas to expound some is pointless. For we will explain them either through familiar locutions or through unfamiliar. But unfamiliar words seem unsuited to the task, the accepted principle being to explain less known things by means of better known things; and familiar words, by being on a par with them, will be unfamiliar for illuminating language, as Epíkouros says. For the informativeness of language is characteristically ruined when it is bewitched by an account, as if by a homeopathic drug.

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2).258: We see that there are some who have denied the real existence of "expressions" and these not only men of other schools, such as the Epicureans, {but even Stoics like Basilides...}

Plutarch, Against Kōlôtēs, 22, p. 1119F: What school is more at fault in its views about language than yours {Epicureanism}, which makes a clean sweep of the whole category of meanings, which impart to discourse its substantial reality, and leave us with nothing but vocables and facts, when you say that the intermediate objects of discourse, the things signified, which are the means of learning, teaching, preconceptions, conceptions, desires, and assent, do not exist all?

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2).13: The disciples of Epíkouros and Strato the physicist, who admit only two things – the thing signifying and the thing existing – appear ... to ascribe truth or falsity to the mere word.

§ 2.4 On the Passions

Laértios 10.34: They assert that there are two kinds of feelings, pleasure and pain, which arise in every living thing. The one is appealing and the other vexing to one's nature; in consideration of these, choices and avoidances are made.

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 21 p. 768D: Some say that as the principle and criterion of choosing and avoiding we have pleasure and pain: at least the Epicureans now still say something of this kind ... For my part then I am so far from saying that feeling is the principle and canon of things good and evil, that I think a criterion is needed for feeling itself.

Aetius, Doxography, IV.9.11, [p. 397 Diels] (Parallel A.27.52): For Epíkouros, pleasure and pain are a part of sensations.

§ 2.5 On Signs

[U262]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, 2).177: Epíkouros and the leaders of his school have stated that the sign is sensible, while the Stoics state that it is intelligible.

[U263]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlótēs*, 29, p. 1124B: ...these people are deluded who regard what is seen as evidence of things unseen although they observe that appearances are so untrustworthy and ambiguous.

§ 2.6 On Disputation

[U264]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.1.3: In philosophical investigation, a methodical and systematic discourse must always begin by formulating a preamble ... so that the parties to the debate may be agreed as to what the subject is about which they are debating. This rule is laid down by Plato in *Phaedrus*, and it was approved by Epíkouros, who realized that it ought to be followed in every discussion.

[U265]

Laértios 10.34: They assert that there are two kinds of inquiry: one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words.

Pseudo-Plutarch, Miscellanies, Fragment 8 from Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, I.8.24B, Greek Doxography, [p. 581, 19 Diels.]: Epíkouros asserts that nothing new happens in the universe when compared to the infinite time already passed.

§ 3.1 On the Atoms

Aetius, Doxography, I.3.18, pp. 285-86D (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 10, 14; Plutarch I.3.25): Epíkouros, the son of Neoklēs and an Athenian, philosophized in the manner of Dēmókritos and said that the principles {i.e., elementary constituents} of existing things are bodies inferable by reason, which do not participate in the void and are uncreated and indestructible – since they can neither be broken nor be compounded out of parts, nor be altered in their qualities. They can be inferred by reason ... {lacuna here} ... They move in the void and through the void. And the void itself is infinite, and so are the bodies. Bodies have these three properties: shape, size, weight. Dēmókritos said that there were two – size and shape – but Epíkouros added weight to these as a third. For, he says, it is necessary that the bodies move by the blow of [an object with] weight, otherwise they will not move. The shapes of the atoms are innumerable, but not infinite. For there are none which are hooked or trident-shaped or ring-shaped; for these shapes are easily broken and the atoms are impervious. They have their own shapes which can be contemplated by reason. The atom {a-tomos} is so-called not because it is smallest, but because it cannot be divided, since it is impervious and does not participate in void.

Achilles, Introduction, 3, [p.125A Pet.]: Epíkouros of Athens maintained that the principles {i.e., elementary constituents} of all things are comprised in extremely tiny bodies, knowable by the intellect, and he named them "atoms" or other words, minimums, because of their smallness, or because they are indestructible and cannot be divided.

Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies, I) 22, [p. 572.3 Diels.]: Epíkouros says that the atoms are the most minute bodies; it is not possible to ascribe them a center nor a point nor any subdivision: and because of this he called them atoms.

Simplicius of Cilicia Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-1" preface, fr. 216r [925.12 Konstan]: Others, who had given up on [the idea of] cutting to infinity on the grounds that we cannot [in fact] cut to infinity and thereby confirm the endlessness of cutting, used to say that bodies consist of indivisibles and are divided into indivisibles. Leucippus and Dēmókritos, however, believed not only in imperviousness as the reason why primary bodies are not divided, but also in smallness and partlessness, while Epíkouros later did not hold that they were partless, but said that they were atomic {i.e., uncuttable} by virtue of imperviousness alone. Aristotle refuted the view of Leucippus and Dēmókritos in many places, and it is because of these refutations in objection to partlessness, no doubt, that Epíkouros, coming afterwards but sympathetic to the view of Leucippus and Dēmókritos concerning primary bodies, kept them impervious but took away their partlessness, since it was on this account that they were challenged by Aristotle.

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 13, p. 1114A: For Epíkouros, the number of bodies is infinite and every single object is the world of sense is generated from them. Observe right here the sort of first principles you people {Epicureans} adopt to account for generation: infinity and the void – the void incapable of action, incapable of acted upon, bodiless; the infinite disordered, irrational, incapable of formulations, disrupting and confounding itself because of a multiplicity that defies control or limitation.

Pseudo-Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, I.3, 27, [p. 286A 4 Diels] [preceding fragment 275]: The forms of the atoms are certainly incalculable, but not infinite. Indeed, none are hook-shaped, trident-shaped, or ring-shaped: these shapes break easily, but the atoms are in fact impenetrable and have, instead, their own shapes, intuitable by reason.

§ 3.2 On the Void

[U271]

Aetius, Doxography, I.20.2, p. 318, 1D (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 18, 2): Epíkouros says that void, place, and space differ only in name.

Addendum

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, IV).2: Therefore we must understand that, according to Epíkouros, one part of that nature which is termed intangible is called the void, one part place, and another part space – the names varying according to the different ways of looking at it since the same substance when empty of all body is called void, when occupied by a body is named place, and when bodies roam through it becomes space. But generically it is called "intangible substance" in Epíkouros' school, since it lacks resistance.

[U272]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, 2).329: Epíkouros, for instance, opines that he has put forward a very strong argument for the existence of void, namely this: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." But if the premises of this proof had been agreed to by all, it would necessarily have had a conclusion also following from them and admitted by all. Instead, some have objected to it (i.e., the deduction of the conclusions from the premises) not because it does not follow from them, but because they are false and not admitted.

Ibid., 314: Hence also they {the Dogmatists} describe it thus: "A proof is an argument which by means of agreed premises reveals by way of deduction a non-evident conclusion." For example: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." For the existence of void is non-evident, and also it appears to be revealed by way of deduction by means of the true premises: "If motion exists, void exists" and "but motion exists."

[U273]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-5 (to the end)" (p. 213A 10) [fr. 140u Ald.; p. 379B Brand.]:

Cf. [fr. 144u]:

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-4" (p. 211B 7) [fr. 133r]:

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-4" (p. 211B 14), [fr. 38u Ald.; p. 268.23 Speng.]: It remains for us to demonstrate also that place is not extension. An extension is what is conceived of as between the limits of the container, e.g., what is within the hollow surface of the pot. Now this belief is traditional, and associated with those who posit the void, yet later both Chrysippus' crowd and Epíkouros were nonetheless adherents. Some imposed the doctrine on Plato too. It relies on a plausible explanation, yet one that is quite false: namely, since we reach a conception of place in general from the mutual replacement of bodies (i.e., from different bodies continually coming to be in the same place at different times), they took place to be the intervening extension, which they believed remained the same when it received the bodies that were replacing one another, while being separated from each of these incoming bodies. Vessels above all egged them on to this inference. For since water and air enter the vessel at different times while the hollow surface within the clay remains the same (i.e. circumscribed by unique limits), they inferred the existence of the extension within the hollow surface, which resembled the surface of the vessel in remaining the same (i.e., separated from the bodies) as it received the bodies in succession. But this is invalid. If the vessel could at any time be devoid of body, then perhaps this so-called "extension" would be detected per se. But, as it is, fluid flows out and air simultaneously enters to replace it, and that leads them astray. For since every body is accompanied by an extension, they transfer the extension belonging to bodies to place, without reasoning that an extension is always in place just because a body always is too, as completely covered bronze vessels reveal: for [in their case] there would be no efflux of fluid unless the air acquired a space for its influx. What dupes them is that the vessels' hollow surface also always remains rigid; but if there were an implosion when the fluid was extracted, as there is in the case of wine-skins, they would not be similarly deluded.

[U274]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-6" (p. 213A 32), [fr. 40u Ald.; p. 284.2 Speng.]: The void can be posited in two ways: either as disseminated in bodies, as Dēmókritos and Leucippus claim, and many others, including Epíkouros later (they all make the 'interlacing' of the void the cause of bodily division, since according to them what is truly continuous is undivided); or else as separate (i.e., gross), per se, surrounding the cosmos, as some early thinkers were the first to believe, and later Zénō of Citium and his followers. We, then, must examine what those involved with the void claim.

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-6" (p. 213A 32), [fr. 151u-]:

§ 3.3 On Bodies & their Attributes

[U275]

Aetius, Doxography, I.12.5, p. 311D (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 14, 1; Plutarch I.12.3): Epíkouros maintains that the primary and simple bodies are imperceptible, and also that compounds formed by them all have weight.

Pseudo-Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, I.3.26, p. 285, 11D: Bodies have these three attributes: shape, size, and weight. Dēmókritos guessed two of them, size and shape. Epíkouros, for his part, added weight to these; it is necessary, he argues, that bodies be moved by the blow of their weights, for otherwise they would not move

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, 2 (Against the Dogmatists, IV) 240: When Epíkouros asserts that we conceive body by means of a combination of size and shape and resistance and weight, he is forcing us to form a conception of existent body out of non-existents.

Ibid., 257: ... this too Epíkouros acknowledged, when he said that "body is conceived by means of a combination of form and magnitude and resistance and weight."

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists (Against the Dogmatists, V) 226: For whether body is, as Epíkouros asserts, a combination of size and form and solidity...

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 8, p. 1110F: I can affirm that this view {that denying the reality of emergent properties contradict the senses} is as inseparable from Epíkouros' as shape and weight are by their own assertion inseparable from the atom.

[U276]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary of Aristotle's "De Caelo" (On the Heavens), Gamma-1 (p. 299A 25); [254B 27 Karst.; 510A 30 Brand.]: The followers of Dēmókritos, and, later, Epíkouros, say that all atoms of the same nature have weight. However, because some are heavier, they sink down and in doing so they push the lighter ones up. Hence, they say, some are light and others are heavy.

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary of Aristotle's "De Caelo" (On the Heavens), Alpha-8 (p. 277B 1); [121A 18E 31 Karst.; 486A 4 Brand.]: Elementary bodies move either as a result of their own nature, or are moved by something else, or are squeezed out by one another. And he [Aristotle] shows that they do not move under the force of mutual extrusion either as follows. This opinion was held after him by both Strato of Lampsacus, and Epíkouros, who thought that every object possessed weight and moved towards the middle, and that lighter ones settled out above the heavier ones by being forcibly squeezed out upwards by them, so that if the earth were removed, water would move to the center, and if the water [were removed] the air, and if the air [were removed] the fire.

Cf. [p. 111B 25 Karst.; 486A 12 Brand.]: Those who treat as an indication that everything moves naturally towards the middle the fact that when earth is removed water moves downwards, and when water [is removed] the air [does so too], do not know that the reciprocal motion is the cause of this. For when the denser things are transferred into the place of the rare, the rarer take the place of the denser, propelled downwards because there can be no void, and because body cannot pass through body. But one must realize that it was not just Strato and Epíkouros who held that all bodies were heavy and moved naturally downwards, unnaturally upwards, but Plato too knows that this opinion is held, and disputes it, thinking that 'downwards' and 'upwards' are not properly applied to the world, and refusing to accept that things are called heavy in virtue of their downward motion.


[U277]

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-2" (p. 232A 23-), fr. 219r,v [938.18 Konstan]: Unless every magnitude were divisible, it would not always be possible for a slower object to move a lesser distance in equal time than a quicker one. For slower and quicker objects cover the atomic and indivisible distance in the same time, since if one took more time, it would cover in the equal time a distance less than the indivisible distance. And that is why the Epicureans too think all bodies move at equal speed through indivisible distances, so that they can avoid having their atomic quantities be divided – and thus no longer atomic.

[U278]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-1" (p. 232A 1-17), [fr. 52u Ald.; p. 370.4 Speng.]:

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Zeta-1" fr. 218,u 3 [934.18 Konstan]: He {Aristotle} adds yet another absurdity that follows upon this hypothesis, [namely] that something has moved that was not previously moving, for example, that something has walked that did not previously walk. For it is posited that O moves [with] the motion DEF over the magnitude ABC, but it moves neither over A (for it has moved over it), nor over B, nor likewise, over C. It will consequently, have moved [with] the whole motion without previously moving [with] it.



That this obstacle which he {Aristotle} has formulated is itself not entirely beyond belief is shown by the fact that despite his having formulated it and produced his solution, the Epicureans, who came along later, said that this is precisely how motion does occur. For they say that motion, magnitude and time have part-less constituents, and that over the whole magnitude composed of part-less constituents the moving object moves, but at each of the part-less magnitudes contained in it, it does not move but has moved; for if it were laid down that the object moving over the whole magnitude moves over these too, they would turn out to be divisible.

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Delta-8" (p. 216A 17) fr. 159u:

[U280]

Aetius, Doxography, I.12.5, [p. 311A 10 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 14, 1; Plutarch I.12.3): Atoms sometimes move straight down, sometimes swerve, and those which move upwards do so by collision and rebound.

Aetius, Doxography, I.23.4, [p. 319 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 19, 1; Plutarch I.23.1): Epíkouros said there are two types of the motion: the straight and the swerve.

§ 3.5 On the Atomic Swerve

[U281]

Cicero, De Finibus, I.6.18: Epíkouros for his part, where he follows Dēmókritos, does not generally blunder. ... I now come to the lapses peculiar to Epíkouros. He believes that these same indivisible solid bodies are borne by their own weight perpendicularly downward, which he holds is the natural motion of all bodies; but thereupon this clever fellow, being met with the difficulty that if they all traveled downwards in a straight line, and, as I said, perpendicularly, no one atom would ever be able to overtake any other atom, accordingly introduced an idea of his own invention: he said that the atom makes a very tiny swerve—the smallest divergence possible; and thus produces entanglements and combinations and cohesion of atoms with atoms, which result in the creation of the world, and all its parts, and of all that in them is. Now not only is this whole affair a piece of childish fancy, but it does not even achieve the result that its author desires. The swerving is itself an arbitrary fiction; for Epíkouros says the atoms swerve without cause—yet this is the capital offense in a natural philosopher, to speak of something taking place uncaused. Then also he gratuitously deprives the atoms of what he himself declared to be the natural motion of all heavy bodies, namely, movement in a straight line downwards, and yet he does not attain the object for the sake of which this fiction was devised. For, if all the atoms swerve, none will ever come to cohere together; or if some swerve while others travel in a straight line, but their own natural tendency, in the first place this will be tantamount to assigning to the atoms their different spheres of action, some to travel straight and some sideways; while secondly (and this is a weak point with Dēmókritos also) this riotous hurly-burly of atoms could not possibly result in the ordered beauty of the world we know.

Cicero, On Fate, 10.22: Epíkouros, however, thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom; and so a certain third movement arises, part from weight and collision, when the atom swerves by a very small distance – this he calls a "minimum." That this swerve comes about without a cause he is compelled to admit, if not by his words, by the facts themselves. For it is not the case that an atom swerves when struck by another; for how can one be struck by another if individual bodies are carried downwards by their weight in straight lines, as Epíkouros supposes? For if one is never struck from its course by another, it follows that none even touches another; and from this it results that, even if there is an atom and it swerves, it does so without cause. Epíkouros introduce this theory because he was afraid that, if the atom was always carried along by its weight in a natural and way, we would have no freedom, since our mind would be moved in the way in which it was constrained by the movement of the atoms. Dēmókritos, the inventor of the atoms, preferred to accept this, that all things come about through fate, rather than to remove the natural movements of individual bodies from them.

Ibid. 20.46: This is how the case ought to be argued; one ought not to seek help from atoms that swerve and deviate from their path. "The atom swerves" he says. First why? For the atoms will have one force to move them from Dēmókritos, the force of an impulse which he calls a blow, and from you, Epíkouros, the force of weight and heaviness. So what new cause is there in nature to make the atom serve? Or do they draw lots among themselves which will swerve and which not? Or why do they swerve by a minimum interval and not by a larger one, or why do they swerve by one minimum and not by two or three? This is wishful thinking, not argument. For you do not say that the atom is moved from its position and swerves through an impulse from outside, nor that in that void through which the atom travels there was any cause for its not traveling in a straight line; nor has there been any change in the atom itself as a result of which it might no preserve the motion natural to its weight. So, although [Epíkouros] has not brought forward any cause which might cause that serve of his, nevertheless he thinks he has a point to make when he says the sort of thing which the minds of all reject and repudiate.

Ibid. 9.18: There is no reason for Epíkouros to tremble before fate, seek help from the atoms and turn them aside from their path, and for him to commit himself at one and the same time to two things that cannot be proved: first that something should happen without a cause, from which it will follow that something comes from nothing, which neither he himself nor any natural philosopher accepts; and second that, when two indivisible bodies travel through the void, one moves in a straight line and the other swerves aside.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.25.69 ^(Cotta) Epíkouros saw that if those atoms of his were always falling downwards by their own weight, their motion would be fixed and predetermined, and there would be no room for free will in the world. So casting about for a way to avoid this determinism, which Dēmókritos had apparently overlooked, he said that the atoms, as they fell, just swerved a little!

Plutarch, *On The Birth? of the Soul in Plato's "Timaeus"* 6, p. 1015C: The fact is that they [the Stoics] do not concede to Epíkouros that the atom can swerve the tiniest bit, on the grounds that he introduces a causeless motion coming from nonexistence...

Saint Augustine, *Against the Academicians*, 3.10.23 t. I [p. 284E Venice Edition, 1719]: How shall we decide the controversy between Dēmókritos and earlier physicists about whether there is one world or innumerable worlds, when Dēmókritos and his heir Epíkouros were unable to remain in agreement? Once that voluptuary Epíkouros allows atoms, as though they were his little handmaids – that is, the little bodies he gladly embraces in the dark – not to stay on their courses but to swerve freely here and there into the paths of others, he has also dissipated his entire patrimony through such quarrels.

§ 3.6 On Aggregation and Dissolution

Varro, *On Latin Language*, VI.39, p. 219: Dēmókritos, Epíkouros, and still others who have deemed the original elements to be unlimited in number, though they do not tell us where the elements came from but only of what sort they are, still perform a great service: they show us the things of the world which consist of these elements.

[U282]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlótēs*, 16, p. 1116C: But I should like to ask the very man {Kōlótēs} who brings this indictment {against Plato} if his school does not see this distinction in their own system, whereby some objects are enduring and unchanging in their being, just as atoms too in their doctrine are forever the same because they are too hard to be affected, while all aggregates of atoms are subject to flux and change and come into being and pass of of it, as innumerable images leave them in a constant stream, and innumerable others, it is inferred, flow in from the surroundings and replenish the mass, which is varied by this interaction and altered in its composition, since in fact even the atoms in the interior of the aggregate can never cease moving or vibrating against one another, as the Epicureans say themselves.

[U283]

Ibid., 10, p. 1112A: {The Epicureans} assume that there is neither generation of the non-existent nor destruction of the existent, but that generation is a name given to the conjunction of certain existents with one another and death a name given to their separation.

[U284]

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary of Aristotle's "De Caelo, Alpha-7"* (On the Heavens) [p. 275B 29 Karst.; 484A 23 Brand.]: Aristotle then demonstrated that the number of types of elementary bodies were not infinite, as Leucippus and Dēmókritos and their followers (who lived before him) supposed and Epíkouros (who lived after him). These men indeed maintained that the principles {i.e., elements} were unlimited in number, and they also thought that they were atomic and indivisible and impervious, because they were dense and did not enclose any empty space; for they said that division takes place where there is some void within bodies, and also that these atoms, being separated from each other in the unlimited void and differing in shape and size and position and ordering, move in the void and that they catch up with each other and collide and that some rebound to any chance place while others get entangled with each other, in accordance with the symmetry of their shapes and sizes and positions and orderings; and in this way it comes about that the origin of compounds is produced.

[U285]

Galen, On the Preparation of Simple Medicines, I.14 t. XI [p. 405 K.]: ... always remembering how space is said to be empty by those who maintain that its essence is unique. But space is not empty in the sense in which it seems to Epíkouros and to Asclepiades, but rather it is full of air, sparsely populated with bodies everywhere.

Galen, Comment on the 6th book of "Epidemics" by Hippocrates, IV 10 t. XVII 2 [p 162 K.]: The statement that there might empty spaces, in water or in the air, corresponds to the opinion of Epíkouros and of Asclepiades in regards to the elements.

[U286]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 10, p. 1112B: {The Epicureans}, who herd together unyielding and unresponsive atoms, produce nothing out of them – only an uninterrupted series of collisions among the atoms themselves. For the entanglement that prevents dissolution produces rather an intensification of the collisions, so that generation is by their account neither mixture nor cohesion, but confusion and conflict. On the other hand, if the atoms after an instant of collision rebound for while from the impact, and for a while draw near when the blow is spent, the time that they are separated from one another, without contact or proximity, is more than twice as long, so that nothing, not even an inanimate body, is produced out of them; while perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best of will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality and which on meeting are not thereby affected or changed.

Ibid., 9, p. 1111E: Whereas an atom, taken alone, is destitute and bare of any generative power, and when it collides with another it is so hard and resistant that a shock ensues, but it neither suffers nor causes any further effect. Rather the atoms receive and inflict blows for all time, and so far are they from being that they cannot even produce out of themselves a collective plurality or the unity of a heap in their constant shaking and scattering.

[U287]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.22: {Regarding atoms:} Why then, do we not feel nor perceive them? Because, he says, they have neither color, nor heat, nor odor. They are free of taste also, and moisture, and they are so minute that they cannot be cut and divided. Thus, the necessity of consequent things led him to wild ravings because he had undertaken falsehood in the beginning. For where or whence are those little bodies? Why did nobody save that one Leucippus dream them up, by whom Dēmókritos was instructed, he who left the inheritance of foolishness to Epíkouros? If these little bodies are indeed solid, as they say, certainly they can come under the eyes. If the nature of all of them is the same, how do they effect various things? They come together, he tells us, in varied order and position just as letters do: although they are few, yet variously arranged, they bring about innumerable words. But letters have various forms. So do these have commencements themselves, he says, for there are rough ones, there are hooked ones, there are smooth ones. Therefore, they can be cut and divided if there is in them something which projects. But if they are smooth and in need of hooks or projections, they cannot cohere. They must be hooked bodies, then, for a concatenation of them to take place. But since they are said to be so minute, that they are able to be severed by no sharp blade, how do they have hooks or corners? It is necessary for them, since they exist, to be torn apart. Then, by what pact, by what agreement do they come together among themselves, that something may be formed of them? If they lack sense, they are not able to come together with such order, for it is not possible for anything but reason to bring about anything rational. With how many proofs is this vanity able to be refuted!

§ 3.7 On Qualities

[U288]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlōtēs*, 10, p. 1111A: Dēmókritos is not to be censured not for admitting the consequences that flow from his principles, but for setting up principles that lead to these consequences. For he should not have posited immutable first elements; having posited them, he should have looked further and see that the generation of any quality becomes impossible. But to see the absurdity and deny it is the purest effrontery. Epíkouros {as reported by Kōlōtēs} acts with the purest effrontery when he claims to lay down the same first principles, but nevertheless does not say that "color is by convention" and thus the qualities sweet, bitter, etc. If "does not say" means "does not admit" it is so, he is following his familiar practice... 1111C: There was no necessity to assume, or rather filch from Dēmókritos, the premise that the primary elements of all things are atoms. But once you have laid down the doctrine and made a fine showing with its initial plausibility, you must drain the disagreeable conclusions along with it, or else show how bodies without quality have given rise to qualities of every kind by the mere fact of coming together. Take for the example the quality called hot. How do you account for it? From where has it come and how has it been imposed on the atoms, which neither brought heat with them nor became hot by their conjunction? For the former implies the possession of quality, the latter the natural capacity to be affected, neither of which, say you, can rightly belong to atoms by reason of their indestructibility.

Galen, *On the Art of Medicine*, [7, t. I p. 246 K.]: {Galen, *Selected Works*, P.N. Singer ca. page 325}

Cf. Galen, *On the Elements According to Hippocrates*, [I.2, t. I p. 416 K.; 2.6 De Lacy]: It could be said that all things are one in form and power, as Epíkouros and Dēmókritos and their followers say about atoms.

Ibid., [p. 418 K.; 2.16 De Lacy]: All the atoms, then, being small bodies, are without qualities, and the void is a kind of place in which these bodies, being carried downward, all of them for all time, somehow become entwined with each other or strike each other and rebound; and in such assemblages they cause separations and recombinations with each other; and from this (interaction) they produce, besides all other compounds, our bodies, their affections, and their sensations. But (these philosophers) postulate that the first bodies are unaffected, some of them, like Epíkouros, holding that they are unbreakable because of hardness, some, like Diódōros and Leucippus, that they are indivisible because of their small size; and [they hold that] these bodies cannot undergo any of those alterations in whose existence all men, taught by their senses confidently believe; for example, they say that none of the primary bodies grows warm or cold, and similarly none becomes dry or wet, and much less would they become black or white or admit to any other change whatsoever in any quality.

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary of Aristotle's "Categories"* 8, p. 8B 25, quat. Kappa, [fr. 8u Venice Edition; fr. 56u 10 Bas.; 216.31 Fleet]: In objection to Dēmókritos and Epíkouros, the question can be put: why on earth do they grant certain differentiae to atoms such as shape, weight, solidity, corporeality, edges, size, and motion, while asserting that they possess neither color nor sweetness nor life, and that the logoi of other such things do not pre-exist? For it is absurd, since there is a common account {logos} of the havables, not to classy like with like; it is even more absurd to make the most primary powers secondary, such as life, intellect, nature, reason {logos} and the like. It is equally impossible for these to be produced out of the conjunction [of atoms]; for according to Dēmókritos, color and suchlike are by convention, and only atoms and void exist in truth. But once a person has done away with realities, he will have nothing to put in their place, and he who admits the causeless will have no ground to stand on. For why should the person starting from no definite cause prefer these to the contraries? So it is better to have recourse to the hypothesis which produces the havables from being had, in the way that the Academics defined 'hivable' by representing it as 'that which can be had' {hektón}, not accepting the definition on the basis of its etymology.

Ibid. 14, p. 15A 30, quat. Phi, [fr. 8u Venice Edition; fr. 56u 10 Bas.]: The followers of Dēmókritos, and subsequently those of Epíkouros, in hypothesizing atoms to be unaffected and unqualified by other qualities apart from the shapes [of the atoms] and the way they are composed {tên poian autôn sunthesin}, say that other qualities – whether simple, such as temperatures {thermotêtes} and textures {leioêtes}, or those in respect of colors and tastes – supervene. And if these latter things [consist] in the way atoms are composed, alteration too will consist in change in respect of them {i.e., the atoms}. But the way they {i.e., the atoms} are composed, and their transposition and order, derive from nowhere else than from their motion and spatial movement, so that alteration is the same thing as their motion, or at least is a concomitant of this and is something belonging to this.

[U289]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, *Questions*, I.13 [p. 52 Spengl.]: {R.W. Sharples}

§ 3.8 On Mixture

[U290]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, *On Mixture*, fr. 140u (214.28-215.8): Epíkouros wanted to avoid what Dēmókritos supposed happened for those who say that blending occurs by means of a juxtaposition of the components of the blend. He himself said that blending occurs by means of the juxtaposition of certain bodies – not of bodies which were themselves preserved as compounds, but rather of bodies that were broken down into elementary atoms which formed particular compounds, e.g., wine, water, honey, etc. He then says that the mixture is created by a certain kind of reciprocal compounding by component elements. It is these which produce the new mixture – not water and the wine, but the atoms which made up the water, as one might designate them, are combined together with those which made up the wine by a destruction and generation of the compound bodies. For the breakdown of each into its elements is a form of destruction, and the compounding produced from the elements themselves is «a sort of genesis».

§ 3.9 On Change

[U291]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, IV) 42: Some of the natural philosophers, amongst them Epíkouros, have declared that the motion of change is a particular form of transitional motion; for the composite object which changes in quality changes owing to the local and transitional motion of the rationally perceived bodies which compose it. Thus, in order that a thing may become bitter from sweet, or black from white, the particles which must be arranged in a new order and take up different positions; that this could not be brought about in any other way than by the transitional motion of the molecules. And again, in order that a thing may become soft from hard or hard from soft, the parts whereof it is composed must move in place; for it is made soft by their expansion, but made hard by their coalescence and condensation. And owing to this the motion of change is, generically, nothing else than transitional motion.

[U292]

Galen, *On the Elements According to Hippocrates*, [I.9, t. I p. 483 K.]: ... the {qualitative} change of bodies, as it happens, isn't aggregation and dispersal, as the disciples of Epíkouros and Dēmókritos think.

§ 3.10 On Magnetism

[U293]

Galen, *On Natural Faculties*, I.14, t. 2 [p. 45 K.]: Now Epíkouros, despite the fact that he employs in his *Physics* elements similar to those of Asclepiades, still allows that iron is attracted by the lodestone, and chaff by amber. He even tries to give the cause of the phenomenon. His view is that the atoms which flow from the stone are related in shape to those flowing from the iron, and so they become easily interlocked with one another; thus it is that, after colliding with each of the two compact masses (the stone and the iron) they then rebound into the middle and so become entangled with each other, and draw the iron after them. So far, then, as his hypotheses regarding causation go, he is perfectly unconvincing; nevertheless, he does grant that there is an attraction. Further, he says that it is on similar principles that there occur in the bodies of animals the dispersal of nutrient and the discharge of waste matter, as also the actions of cathartic drugs.

Asclepiades, however, who viewed with suspicion the incredible character of the cause mentioned, and who saw no other credible cause on the basis of his supposed elements, shamelessly found his way out by stating that nothing is in any way attracted by anything else. Now, if he was dissatisfied with what Epíkouros said, and had nothing better to say himself, he ought to have refrained from making hypotheses, and should have said that Nature is a constructive artist and that the substance of things is always tending towards unity and also towards alteration because its own parts act upon and are acted upon by one another. For, if he had assumed this, it would not have been difficult to allow that this constructive nature has powers which attract appropriate and expel alien matter. For in no other way could she be constructive, preservative of the animal, and eliminative of its diseases, unless it be allowed that she conserves what is appropriate and discharges what is foreign.

But in this matter, too, Ascelpiades realized the logical sequence of the principles he had assumed; he showed no scruples, however, in opposing plain fact; he joins issue in this matter also, not merely with all physicians, but with everyone else, and maintains that there is no such thing as a crisis, or a critical day, and that nature does absolutely nothing for the preservation of the animal. For his constant aim is to follow out logical consequences and to upset obvious fact, in this respect being opposed to Epikouros; for the latter always affirmed the observed fact, although he gives an ineffective explanation of it, saying that these small corpuscles belonging to the lodestone rebound, and become entangled with other similar particles of the iron, and that then, by means of this entanglement (which cannot be seen anywhere) such a heavy substance as iron is attracted. I fail to understand how anybody could believe this. Even if we admit this, the same principle will not explain the fact that, when the iron has another piece brought in contact with it, this becomes attached to it.

For what are we to say? That, indeed, some of the particles that flow from the lodestone collide with the iron and then rebound back, and that it is by these that the iron becomes suspended? That others penetrate into it, and rapidly pass through it by way of its empty channels? That these then collide with the second piece of iron and are not able to penetrate it although they penetrated the first piece? And that they then course back to the first piece and produce entanglements like the former ones?

The hypothesis here becomes clearly refuted by its absurdity. As a matter of fact, I have seen five writing-stylets of iron attached to one another in a line, only the first one being in contact with the lodestone, and the power being transmitted through it to the others. Moreover, it cannot be said that if you bring a second stylet into contact with the lower end of the first, it becomes held, attached, and suspended, whereas, if you apply it to any other part of the side it does not become attached. For the power of the lodestone is distributed in all directions; it merely needs to be in contact with the first stylet at any point; from this stylet again the power flows, as quick as thought, all through the second, and from that again to the third. Now, if you imagine a small lodestone hanging in a house, and in contact with it all round a large number of pieces of iron, from them again others, from these others, and so on, all these pieces of iron must surely become filled with the corpuscles which emanate from the stone; therefore, this first little stone is likely to become dissipated by disintegrating into these emanations. Further, even if there be no iron in contact with it, it still disperses into the air, particularly if this be also warm.

"Yes" says Epikouros, "but these corpuscles must be looked on as exceedingly small, so that some of them are a ten-thousandth part of the size of the very small particles carried in the air." Then do you venture to say that so great a weight of iron can be suspended by such small bodies? If each of them is a ten-thousandth part as large as the dust particles which are borne in the atmosphere, how big must we suppose the hook-like extremities by which they interlock with each other to be? For of course this is quite the smallest portion of the whole particle.

Then, again, when a small body becomes entangled with another small body, or when a body in motion becomes entangled with another also in motion, they do not rebound at once. For, further, there will of course be others which break in upon them from above, from below, from front and rear, from right to left, and which shake and agitate them and never let them rest. Moreover, we would be forced to suppose that each of these small bodies has a large number of these hook-like extremities. For by one it attaches itself to its neighbors, by another – the topmost one – to the lodestone, and by the bottom one to the iron. For if it were attached to the stone above and not interlocked with the iron below, this would be of no use. Thus, the upper part of the superior extremity must hang from the lodestone and the iron must be attached to the lower end of the inferior extremity; and, since they interlock with each other by their sides as well, they must, of course, have hooks there too. Keep in mind also, above everything, what small bodies these are which possess all these different kinds of outgrowths. Moreover, remember how, in order that the second piece of iron may become attached to the first, the third to the second, and to that the fourth, these absurd little particles must both penetrate the passages in the first piece of iron and at the same time rebound from the piece coming next in the series, although this second peeve is naturally in every way similar to the first.

Such a hypothesis, once again, is certainly not lacking in audacity; in fact, to tell the truth, it is far more shameless than the previous ones; according to it, when five similar pieces of iron are arranged in a line, the particles of the lodestone which easily traverse the first piece of iron rebound from the second, and do not pass readily through it in the same way. Indeed, it is nonsense, whichever alternative is adopted. For, if they do rebound, how then do they pass through into the third piece? And if they do not rebound, how does the second piece become suspended to the first? For Epíkouros himself regarded the rebound as the active agent in the attraction.

But, as I have said, one is driven to talk nonsense whenever one gets into discussion with such men. Having, therefore, given a concise and summary statement of the matter, I wish to be done with it. For if one diligently familiarizes oneself with the writings of Asclepiades, one will see clearly their logical dependence on his first principles, but also their disagreement with observed facts. Thus, Epíkouros, in his desire to adhere to the facts, cuts an awkward figure by aspiring to show that these agree with his principles.

... 15.59: How, then, do they {kidneys} exert this attraction {pulling waste from the blood}. If, as Epíkouros thinks, all attraction takes place by virtue of the rebounds and entanglements of the atoms, it would be certainly better to maintain that the kidneys have no attractive action at all; for his theory, when examined, would be found as it stands to be much more ridiculous even than the theory of the lodestone, mentioned a little while ago.

[U294]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, 2 (*Against the Dogmatists*, IV).219: According to the account of Dēmétrios of Laconia, Epíkouros says that time is a concurrence of concurrences, one which accompanies days, nights, hours, the presence and absence of feelings, motions and rests. For all of these are incidental properties of certain things, and since time accompanies them all it would be reasonable to call it a concurrence of concurrences.

[Ibid., 238-247, = *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* , 3.137, Cf. U79]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.22.5, p. 318, 19 [Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 8, 45): In regards to the essence of time, Epíkouros defines it a concurrence <of concurrences>, that being what accompanies motion.

§ 3.11 On the Universe & its World-Systems

[U295]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.18.3, p. 316 4 [Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 18, 1; Plutarch I.18.1): Lucretius, Dēmókritos, Dēmétrios, Mētródōros, Epíkouros – they consider the atoms to be infinite in number, while the void is infinite in size.

[U296]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlótēs*, 13, p. 1114A: Epíkouros, who says that "the universe" is infinite, uncreated and imperishable, and subject neither to increase nor diminution, speaks of the universe as if it were a unity.

[U297]

Cicero, *On Divination*, 2.50.103: You see how Epíkouros proceeds from admitted premises to the proposition to be established. But this you Stoic logicians do not do; for you not only do not assume premises which everybody concedes, but you even assume premises which, if granted, do not tend in the least to establish what you wish to prove. For you start with this assumption: "If there are gods, they are kindly disposed towards men." Now, who will grant you that? Not Epíkouros! He says that the gods are concerned at all – for themselves or for anybody else.

Simplicius of Cilicia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Gamma-4" (p. 203B 20), fr. 197u: There is fourth point which is hard to deal with: the fact that everything which is limited seems to be limited by something. For if everything which is limited is limited by something which is external to itself, then that external thing by which it is limited is itself either unlimited or limited. And if it is unlimited, then we immediately have the result that the unlimited exists. And if it is limited, like the earth for example, then this too is limited by something else, and so on without limit. And if it goes on without limit, the unlimited exists. For one will never get one's hands on the final limit, if indeed this too is limited by something else. The Epicureans, according to Alexander, relied on this argument above all else when they said that the universe was infinite, because everything which is limited by something has outside it something which is limited {and so on and so on}. Aristotle mentions that this argument is quite old.

Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisia, Questions, 3.12, [p. 200.20 Spengl.; 10.104,20-23 Sharples]: If the being limited of what is limited consisted in being considered [as] up against something else, then our opponents would have a point when they claim that outside every limited thing there has to be something up against which it is seen to be limited – if it is in this that being {einai}, for what is limited, consists.

[U298]

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Physics, Gamma-8" (p. 208A 11), [fr. 36r Ald.], [p. 251.1 Speng.]:

[U299]

Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles, 28, p. 425D: For, if we take the expressions below and above as referring, not to the world, but outside of it, we shall become involved in the same difficulties as Epíkouros, who would have all his atoms move to places under our feet, as if either the void had feet, or infinity granted us to conceive of below and above within itself.

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 8, p. 1111B: {Epíkouros} says that while he posits an infinite universe, he does not eliminate "up" and "down."

Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions, 44, p. 1054B: It is frequently asserted by Chrysippus that outside the world there is infinite void and that what is infinite has no beginning, middle, or end; and this the Stoics use especially to annihilate the downward motion which Epíkouros says the atom has of itself, their contention being that in an infinite void, there is no difference by which to distinguish one part as being up and the other as down.

[U300]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Pythoklēs, Laértios 10.88: "A world-system is a circumscribed portion of the universe, which contains stars and earth and all other visible things, cut off from the infinite, and terminating..." and terminating in a boundary which may be either thick or thin, the dissolution of which will bring about the ruin of everything within...

[U301]

Galen, On the Diagnosis and Cure of Soul's Errors, 7, t. V [p. 102 K., Singer]: The Stoic says that there is no void in the world, but that there is empty space outside it. The Epicurean grants both these types of void, but differs from the [Stoics] in another respect. He does not admit that there is only one world, as does the Stoic, who in this respect agrees perfectly with the Peripatetics. But just as he maintains that the void is infinite in size, so also does he say that there are in it an infinite number of world-systems.

Aetius, Doxography, 2.1.3, [p. 327 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 22, 3; Plutarch 2.1.1): Dēmókritos and Epíkouros maintain that there are infinite worlds in the infinite <universe>, in every direction.

Achilles, Introduction, 8, [p.131 E Pet.]: Some assert that there exists something externally, as indeed Epíkouros, who supposes that there are infinite world-systems in the infinite void. 5 p. 130B: Epíkouros and his master [sic] Mētródōros believe in the existence of many world-systems.

Servius, Commentary on Virgil's "Aenids" l.330 at "Under which skies:" ... according to the Epicureans, who would have it that there exist more skies, as Cicero does in his Hortensius.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, l.24.67 (Cotta to Velleius): Where is this "truth" of yours to be found? Among the innumerable world-systems, born and dying through every instant of time?

Cicero, *De Finibus*, I.6.21: The very conception of infinite space, *apeiria* as they term it, is entirely derived from *Dēmókritos*; and again the countless numbers of world-systems that come into existence and pass out of existence every day.

Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 23, 2 p. 773A: The atoms comprise an infinity of world-systems. [Cf. 26.14 p. 781A]

Hermias, *Derision of the Pagan Philosophers*, 18, [p. 656, 7 Diels]: *Epíkouros* jumps up and tells me "You actually have counted only one world-system, my friend. But there are many world-systems – in fact, they are infinite." [Cf. Commentary on Lucan, *Civil War*, VI.696]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, *Questions*, 3.12, [p. 199, 20 Spengl.; 10.104,4-8 Sharples]: That there is a plurality of unlimited things according to those who say that the principles {i.e., elements} are unlimited is clear also from what follows. They say that the world-systems, too, are unlimited [in number]. If each of these too is composed out of unlimited principles, it is necessary for the unlimited things to be unlimited an unlimited number of times over.

[U301a]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.1.8, [p. 329B 3 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 22, 3): *Epíkouros* asserts that the spaces between world-systems are unequal.

[U302]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.2.3, [p. 329A 5 Diels] (Plutarch 2.2): *Epíkouros* affirms that, on the one hand, it is possible that world-systems might be spherically shaped, and on the other hand, that it is also possible they may be characterized by other configurations.

[U303]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.7.3, [p. 336 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 22, 2; Plutarch 2.7.2): *Epíkouros* maintains that the edges of some world-systems may be thin, others thick, and that of these, some move and others remain stationary.

[U304]

Philo, *On the Indestructibility of the Cosmos*, 3, [p. 2222, 2 Bern.]: *Dēmókritos*, *Epíkouros*, and a numerous company of Stoic philosophers believe in a birth and destruction of the world, though not in the same way. The ones who believe in the existence of an infinity of world-systems attribute their births in terms of reciprocal impacts and entanglement of atoms, and their deaths to crashing atoms and to collisions from that which it was formed out of.

Commentary on Lucan, *Pharsalia* (The Civil War), VII.1, p. 220.5: They don't agree with the Stoics and Epicureans, who assert that the world was born and will perish.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, VII.1.10: *Epíkouros* then, on the authority of *Dēmókritos*, was truly versed on this point. He said that [the world] had begun at one time and would come to extinction at some time. However, he was not able to render any account either for what causes or at what time this such great work would be dissolved.

Ibid., 2.10.24: But if the world can perish entirely, since it perishes in parts, it is clear that at some time it began. Fragility thus exposes the end of the world just as it shows its beginning. And if these things are true, Aristotle will not be able to defend the point he held, namely, that the world itself had no beginning. If Plato and Aristotle, who thought that the world will always be, although they are eloquent, the same *Epíkouros* will force the same point from them, however unwilling, since it follows that it also has an end.

[U305]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.4.10, [p. 331.24 Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, physics, 20, 1; Plutarch 2.4.2): *Epíkouros* says that the world {continuously} destroys itself in very many ways: for it can be destroyed in the manner of an animal, in the manner of plant, and in lots of other ways.

[U306]

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Theta-1"* (p. 250b 18), fr. 257u:

St. Jerome, Commentary on "Ecclesiastes" c. 1, t. 3 [p. 391D Vall.]: We do not believe that signs and portents and many unusual facts, which happen in the world by divine will, have already happened in past generations, such as Epíkouros would have it, asserting that through innumerable temporal cycles, the same things happen, in the same places, by means of the same agents.

Aetius (Plutarch), On the Opinions of the Philosophers, I.4, [p. 289 Diels]: So the world was compounded and endowed with its bent {i.e., rounded} shape in the following manner: Because atomic bodies, which move without guidance and in a haphazard manner, were constantly moving at the greatest of speeds, many bodies happened to be assembled together in the same place, and thereby had variety of shapes and seizes <and weights>. As they assembled in the same place, the larger and heavier bodies tended to move toward the bottom and settled; but the small, round, smooth, and slippery ones were pushed out in the concourse of atoms and so moved into the celestial regions. So when the force of the blows [of atomic collisions] stopped raising them up, and the blows no longer carried them into the celestial regions, they were still prevented from falling down because they were squeezed into places that could accommodate them. Now these were situated all around, and most of the bodies were bent around to these places. By becoming entangled with each other during the bending, they generated the sky. Retaining the same nature and being varied, as was said, the atoms which were pushed out to the celestial regions produced the nature of the heavenly bodies. The majority of the bodies which were evaporated upwards struck the air and compressed it. And the air, being made wind-like during its movement and gathering together the heavenly bodies, drove them around with itself and by this twisting produced their present circular movement in the celestial regions. And then the earth was produced from the bodies which settled at the bottom, while those which were raised upwards produced the sky, fire, and air. Since a great deal of matter was still contained in the earth and this was packed densely by the blows of the atomic bodies and by those from the rays of the heavenly bodies, the earth's entire configuration, which was made up of small particles, was squeezed together and so produced the nature of fluids. And since this nature was disposed to flow, it moved down into the hollow places and those able to receive it and contain it; either that, or the water all by itself hollowed out the existing places by settling there. So the most important parts of the world were produced in this way.

§ 3.12 On Planets

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, V.26, [p. 438 Diels]: The Stoics and the Epicureans do not consider the planets to be living beings (some are actually characterized as being irascible and lustful – others as rational), but instead the planets move, in a certain sense, automatically, without mental guidance.

§ 3.13 On Man

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, I (Against the Dogmatists, I).267: Epíkouros and his followers supposed that the conception of Man could be conveyed by indication, saying that "Man is this sort of a shape combined with vitality." But they did not notice that if the thing indicated is Man, the thing not so indicated is not Man.

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.25: Epíkouros says that Man is "This sort of shape combined with vitality." According to him, then, since a man is revealed by direct perception, he that is not perceived as such is not a man.

§ 3.14 On the Soul

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.66: He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms – far more so than those of fire; part of it is irrational and scattered throughout the body, while the rational part resides in the chest, where we feel it in our fears and our joy.

Aetius, Doxography, IV.4.6, [p. 390 Diels] (Plutarch IV.4.3) (Dēmókritos): Dēmókritos and Epíkouros say that the soul has two parts, one which is rational and situated in the chest, and the other which is non-rational and spread throughout the entire body.

Ibid., IV 5.5, p. 391 [Diels] (Plutarch IV.5.2): Parmenides and Epíkouros maintain that the seat of consciousness – the rational part of the soul – occupies the entire chest.

Tertullian, On the Soul, 15: You must not suppose that the sovereign faculty ... is found enclosed in the breast, as Epíkouros thinks.

Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 2, VII.17 col. XXII- :

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 20, p. 1118D: Kōlótēs, however finds the question absurd {Socrates' inquiries into "what is a man?"}. Why then does he not deride his master too, who did this very thing as often as he wrote or spoke about the constitution of the soul and the "initiation of the aggregate." For if (as they themselves hold) the combination of the two parts, a body of a certain description and a soul, is man, then one who seeks to discover the nature of the soul is seeking to discover the nature of man, starting from the more important source. And that the soul is hard to apprehend by reason and cannot be discerned by sense let us not learn from Socrates, "the sophist and charlatan" but from these sages, who get as far as those powers of the soul that affect the flesh, by which it imparts warmth and softness and firmness to the body, when they manufacture its substance by the combining their own varieties of heat, gas and air, but quite before they reach the seat of power. For its ability to judge, remember, love, and hate – in short, its thinking and reasoning faculty – is added to these, they say from a quality "that has no name." This talk of the thing "that has no name" is, we know, a confession of an embarrassed ignorance – what they cannot make out they assert that they cannot name. But let this too "be excused"* as they say.

"just move past it"?




Aetius, Doxography, IV.3.11, p. 388 [Diels] (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, physics, 41 p. 798; Plutarch IV.3.4): Epíkouros said that the soul is a blend of four things: one of which is fire-like, one air-like, one wind-like, while the fourth is something which lacks a name. (This last he made the one which accounts for sensation.) The wind, he said, produces movement in us, the air produces rest, the hot one produces the evident heat of the body, and the unnamed one produces sensation in us. For sensation is found in none of the named elements

Macrobius, Commentary on the "Dream of Scipio" I.14.20: Epíkouros called the soul a being commixed with fire, air, and breath.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, On the Soul, I.8 f. 127u: ... and the Epicureans: indeed, according to them, the soul is a compound of more varied bodies. [Cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 3.231]

§ 3.15 On Temperaments

Lucretius transitions from discussing temporary moods to the enduring traits of individuals. He shows some of the effects that result depending on which of the three named elements of the soul exists in the greatest proportion:

^[1] Thermal Element	 τό Θερμόν, τό Πυρώδες	Calor, Vapor
^[2] Pneumatic Element	 τό Πνευματικόν	Ventus, Aura
^[1 & 2] Aerial Mix	 τό Ἀερώδες	Aer
^[3] Unnamed Element	τό Ἄκατονόμαστον	Nominis Experts

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things:

3.294 **sed** *cálidī* **Plūs est** *íllīs quíbus ácria* **Corda**

īrācúndaque Mēns *fácil*^e effervēscit *in* īrā:

quō *génér*^e in prímīs Vīs est *violénta* leónum,

péctora Quī *frémitū* rumpunt – plērúmque *geméntēs*

nec *cáper*^e *īrārum flúctūs in péclore* possunt.

More **heat** exists **in those whose violent** Heart
and **irascible** Mind easily boil over **in anger**:
of which kind in first place is the **violent** Force of lions,
Who puff out **their chest with roaring** – generally they
cannot contain **the growling waves of anger** in their chest.

3.299 **āt** *ventōsa* magis *cervōrum frīgida* Mēns est

et *gelidās citius per viscera concitat aurās* –

quae *tremulum faciunt membrīs* *existere mōtum*

but the **cold** Mind **of deer** is more **full of breath**
and quickly stirs **cold currents** through its organs –
which causes a **trembling movement** to arise **in the limbs**.

3.302 **āt** Nātūrā *boum placidō* *mágis āēre* vīvit

(nec *nimis īrāī* Fāx umquam *subdita* percit

fūmida – suffúndēns *caecae cāliginis umbram*)

nec *gélidīs* torpet *tēlīs prefixa pavōris*:

interutrāsque sita ^est *cervōs saevōsque leōnēs*.

But the Nature **of cattle** lives more **in calm air**,
(nor is the **smoky** Torch **of anger**, arousing too much, ever **applied** –
pouring forth **the shadow of blind darkness**)
nor does it become numb, **pierced** by the **cold darts of fear**:
as she is situated **between** the **deer** and the **fierce lions**.

3.307 **sīc** *hominum Genus* est: quamvīs *Doctrīna* *polītōs*

cōstituāt *pariter quōsdam* – *tamen illa relinquit*

nātūrae cuiusquē animī *vestīgia prīma*.

the Species of humans is like this: however much Education
can dispose **each** to be similarly **polite** – yet it leaves
the first traces of each man's nature **in the mind**.

3.310 **nec *rādīcitus ēvellī mala* posse *putandumst*:**

quīn, *prōclīvius*, ^Hīc *īrās dēcurrat ad ācrīs* –

ille metū citius paulō temptētur – at ille

tertius accipiat quaedam clēmentius aequō.

nor must it be thought that *faults* can be *pulled out from the roots*:

but that this Man, *more inclined*, may run down *into fierce angers* –

that man may be tempted *by fear* a little *more quickly* – but a

third man may receive *certain things more gently than is fair*.

3.314 ***inqu^e alīs rēbus multīs diffērrē necessest***
nātūrās hominum variās mōrēsque sequācīs –
quōrum ēgō nunc nequeō caecās expōnere causās,
nec reperīre figūrārum tōt nōmina quōt sunt
principīs – undē haec orītur Variāntia rērum.

and so in many other ways, it is necessary to differentiate
various natures of man and the *behaviors* that *follow*–
which I cannot now set out the *obscure causes*,
nor can I find so many *names of the forms* as there are
in the atoms – from which these Differences *in things* emerge.

3.319 ***illud in hīs rēbus videō firmāre potesse:***
usqu^e adeō nātūrārum vestīgia linquī
***parvola* quae *nequeat Ratiō depellere nōbīs* –**
ut: Nihil impediat dignam dīs dēgere vītam.

I see *it possible to confirm this* in these matters:
to such an extent that *the traces* of natures *are left*
very small which Reason cannot drive away for us –
so that: Nothing may impede *leading a life worthy for the gods*.

§ 3.16 On Sensation

[U317]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.8.10, [p. 395 Diels] (Parallel A27, 18;
Plutarch IV.8.5): Leucippus, Dēmókritos, and Epíkouros say that sense-perception
and thought occur when images approach from the outside. For we apply neither
[sense-perception nor thought] to anything in the absence of an image striking form
the outside.

Cicero, De Finibus, I.6.21: Those ideas which he {Epíkouros} adopts, the credit
belongs entirely to Dēmókritos – {e.g.,} the atoms, the void, the images, or as they
call them, eidola, whose impact is the cause not only of vision but also of thought.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.38.108 (Cotta to Velleius): You are trying to foist these
images of yours not only on our eyes but on our minds as well.

Ibid., I.38.107: Suppose that there are such images constantly impinging on our minds...

Saint Augustine, Letter to Dioscorus, 118.27 t. 2 [p. 340D Venice Edition 1719] (cf., ibid., 31 p. 342A): Let them say, then, in which class they would include the images which, as they think, stream from solid substances, without themselves being at all solid, and by their impact on the eyes cause us to see; on the mind, to think. They could not possibly be perceived if they are themselves substances.

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, IV.23.2, [p. 414 Diels]: Epíkouros maintained that both emotions and sensation take place in the parts of the body susceptible to being affected, while the sovereign faculty is unaffected.

§ 3.17 On Vision

[U318]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.13.1, [p. 403 Diels] (Parallel O14, 1; Plutarch IV.13): Leucippus, Dēmókritos, and Epíkouros maintain that visual perception takes place by the entrance of images [into the eyes].

Meletius, in Cramer, Oxoniensian Anecdote, 3 p. 71, 7: There is much disagreement among philosophers regarding [the act of seeing]: the Epicureans profess that images from apparent objects come to impact the eyes and produce vision.

[U319]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "On the Sensations" 2 p. 438A 5- [p. 51,3 Thur.]: Dēmókritos himself, and before him Leucippus, and after him the Epicureans, think that certain images, which are of the same shape as the objects from which they flow, flow from them and strike the eyes of those who are seeing and that this is how seeing occurs. As a proof of this he offers the fact that there is always in the pupil of those who are seeing a reflection and image of what is seen, and this is exactly what the act of seeing is. [Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisia, On the Soul, 2.13]

Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, VII 7 t. V [p. 643 K.; p. 643,3 Müll.; VII.7.21 De Lacy]: Therefore Epíkouros' view – although both views are mistaken – is much better than that of the Stoics. For the latter do not bring anything of the visual object up to the visual power, but Epíkouros declared that he did so. Aristotle is much superior to «Epíkouros»; he does not posit a corporeal image but a quality from the visual object to the eyes through an alteration of the surround air. [ibid. p. 643 K.; p. 643,3 Müll.]

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, V.16.3: Epíkouros believes that there is a constant flow from all bodies of images from those bodies themselves, and that these impinge upon the eyes, and hence the sensation of seeing arises.

Macrobius, Saturnalia, VII 14.3: The nature of vision has been brilliantly investigated by Epíkouros, and his views on the subject should not, in my opinion, be rejected, especially since the theories of Dēmókritos agree with them—for in this as in everything else those two philosophers are of the same mind. Epíkouros, then, holds that from all bodies images flow in a continuous stream and that the sloughed-off particles, cohering to form an empty shape, are forever carried abroad, without the slightest intermission, to find lodgment in our eyes, thus reaching the seat which nature has appointed for them as the seat of the appropriate sense. Such is the explanation given by that famous man.

§ 3.18 On Mirrors

[U320]

Aetius, Doxography, IV.14.2, [p. 405 Diels] (Parallel O14, 14; Plutarch): Leucippus, Dēmókritos, and Epíkouros assert that what we see in mirrors is formed by opposition of images moving away from us and upon the mirror will be reflected backwards.

Appuleius, Apology or On Magic, 15: What is the reason why, not even for these motives, that the philosopher, and only him, should not look into the mirror? Indeed sometimes it is proper ... to consider also the criterion of the resemblance itself, it, as Epíkouros affirms, certain images moving away from us, like husks that emanate from bodies in a continuous flux, once they have bumped against something smooth and solid, are reflected backwards upon impact, and reproduced in reverse, corresponding in the opposite way.

Aetius, Doxography, IV.19.2, [p. 408 Diels]: Epíkouros maintains that the voice is a flow sent out from those who make utterances or produce sounds or noises. This flow is broken up into particles of the same shape. ("Of the same shape" means that the round are like the round and the angular and the triangular are like those of those types.) And when these strike the organs of hearing, the perception of voice is produced.

Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, British Museum codex, in Cramer, Oxoniensian Anecdote, IV p. 317, 8: Epíkouros, Dēmókritos, and the Stoics say that voice is a body. For everything which can act or be acted upon is a body. For example, iron: it is acted upon by fire and it acts on men or wood. So if voice can act and be acted upon, it is a body. But it acts, since we enjoy hearing a voice or a lyre; and it is acted upon, as when we are speaking and the wind blows, which makes it harder to hear our voice.

Grammaticus the Byzantine, Paris codex, 2555 BAG p. 1168: Dēmókritos, Epíkouros, and the Stoics said that the voice must be a body, since everything that has activity and reactivity – that is: anything able to act and be acted upon – is a body.

Plutarch, Table Talk, VIII 3.1 p. 720E: The fact which needed explanation, continued Ammonius, was rather that voices are more sonorous at night and preserve not only their volume but the precise articulation. ... 2. p. 720F: Boëthus then said that when he was still young and occupied with academic pursuits, he had been accustomed to using postulates and adopting unproved assumptions, after the manner of geometry, but that he would now employ some of the demonstrated doctrines of Epíkouros. "Existing things move about in the non-existent. There is a great deal of void interspersed and mingled with the atoms of air. Now when air is dispersed and has scope and motility because of its loose structure, the empty spaces left between the particles are small and narrow and the atoms, being scattered, fill a good deal of space, but when it is compressed and the atoms are crowded into a small space, and are forced close together, they leave plenty of space outside and make the intervals large. This is what happens at night, under the influence of cold. For warmth loosens and separates and dissolves concentrations, which is why bodies when boiling or softening or melting take up more room, while on the other hand the particles in freezing and cooling bodies join together more compactly and leave vacuums – spaces from which they have withdrawn – in the vessels which hold them. A sound which approaches and strikes a large number of particles collected in a mass is either silenced completely or undergoes serious convulsions and many collisions and delays. But in an empty stretch, devoid of atoms, it travels a smooth, continuous, and unimpeded path to the organ of hearing, preserving, by its velocity, not only the sense of the message but its fine detail. Surely you have noticed that empty vessels when struck are more responsive and send the sound a long way, and often the sound goes round and round and there is much communication of it; but a vessel filled either with solid matter or with some liquid becomes completely mute and soundless, since the sound has no way or passage by which to go through. Of physical bodies themselves, gold and stone, because of their compactness, are weak-voiced and dull-sounding, and quickly extinguish sounds within them, but bronze is melodious and vocal, because it has much empty space within its structure and is light and fine in its spatial mass, not constricted by crowding particles, but containing an abundance of flimsy, yielding substance. This gives easy passage to other motions and especially to sound, receiving it hospitably and speeding it on its journey, until someone, like a highway-robber, seizes and detains and blindfolds it. There it comes to a halt, ceasing to move on because of the obstruction. This is in my opinion what makes the night sonorous and the day less so. Daytime, by its warmth, and the expansion of the air, makes the intervals between the atoms small, so long as no one objects to my basic assumptions.

[Cf. Ibid., c. 3 p. 721F]: There was no need to trouble the night with contraction and increased tension of its air, so as to leave passages and vacuums elsewhere, as through the air were a hindrance to sound or destroyed its substance. Air is itself the substance and body and power of sound. Apart from these points, turbulent nights, for example cloudy or stormy ones, ought to be in your theory more sonorous than nights that are clear and uniform in composition, because then the atoms are forced together in one place, and leave the place they are driven from empty of matter. It is also very obvious that a cold day would be more sonorous than a hot summer night. But neither are true.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlôtēs*, 25, p. 1121B: {That ... protest of theirs in defense of sensation, that it does not assert the external object to be warm, the truth being merely that the effect produce in sensation has been of this kind – } is it not the same as the statement about taste? It does not assert that the external object is sweet – there has merely occurred in the taste an effect and movement of this kind.

§ 3.21 On Sleep & Dreams

Tertullian, *On the Soul*, 43: The Epicureans maintain that sound is a diminution of vital spirit.

Plutarch, *Table Talk*, VIII 10.1 p. 734D: [regarding] the common notion about dreams – that they are especially likely to be unreliable or false in the autumn months ... I don't know ... how it came to be ... §2 p. 734F: Favorinus ... on this occasion advanced an old argument of Dēmókritos. Taking it down all blackened with smoke, as it were, he set about cleaning and polishing it. He used for a foundation the familiar argument found in Dēmókritos that ghostly films penetrate the body through the pores and that when they emerge they make us see things in our sleep. These films that come to us emanate from everything – from utensils, clothing, plants, and especially from animals, because of their restlessness and their warmth. The films have not only the impressed physical likeness in contour of an animal – so far Epíkouros agrees with Dēmókritos, though he drops the subject at this stage – but they gather and convey by attraction ghostly copies of each man's mental impulses, designs, moral qualities, and emotions.

Commentary on Lucan, *Pharsalia* (The Civil War), 2.380, p. 75.13: Epíkouros asserts that flowing atoms penetrate our minds from the images of objects, and that during the sleep there appears either actions that we have done or those we are about to do.

Tertullian, *On the Soul*, 46: Epíkouros, who used to liberate the divinity from every occupation, and eliminate the order of things, and dispersed them into passivity ... [more]

Cicero, *On Divination*, I.30.62: Shall we listen to Epíkouros rather than Plato {regarding dreams}?

Ibid., I.44, 99: Sisenna ... later, influenced to doubt by some petty Epicurean, goes on inconsistently to maintain that dreams are not worthy of belief.

Petronius, *Satyricon*, 104 [Eumolpus speaking]: Exactly. And this {coincidence of similar dreams by two different people} shows you why we consider Epíkouros almost superhuman. As you many remember, he very wittily disposes of such coincidences as mere silly superstitions.

[Cassius, by way of Plutarch, *Life of Cassius*, 37: {Referring to other doctrines as if they might be Epicurean...} And they explain the transpiration of dreams during periods of sleep – transpirations that are due to the imaginative faculty, which from minor beginnings, gives rise to varied emotions and images. This faculty, on the other hand, is always set in motion by nature and its motion is a representation or a concept.]

§ 3.22 On Reproduction

Aetius, *Doxography*, V.3.5, [p. 417 Diels]: Epíkouros asserts that seminal fluid is a small detachment from the body and soul.

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, V.5.1, [p. 418 Diels]: Pythagoras, Epíkouros, and Dēmókritos all say that the female also secretes seminal fluid. It comes from testicles, flipped around in the opposite sense; it must thereby also have an impetus for union.

[U331]

Censorinus, On the Natal Day, 5.4: Even on this question there is uncertainty among the various scholars: if the child is born only by the semen of the father..., or also by that of the mother as well, which ... is the opinion of Epíkouros.

[U332]

Ibid., 6.2: The Stoics assert that the fetus forms itself in its entirety in a single moment. ... There are also those who think that it arrives by the work of Nature itself, like Aristotle and Epíkouros.

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, V.16.1, [p. 426 Diels]: Dēmókritos and Epíkouros say that the embryo in the womb partially nourishes itself through the mouth, ...etc...

[U333]

§ 3.23 On the Origin of Human Beings

Censorinus, On the Natal Day, IV.9: Dēmókritos of Abdera first held that men were created from water and mud. And Epíkouros' view is not much different, for he believed that when the mud became warm, first there grew wombs of some kind or another which clung to the earth by roots, and these begat infants and provided a natural supply of milky fluid for them, under the guidance of nature. When these [infants] had been brought up in this manner and reached maturity, they then propagated the human race.

§ 3.31 On Religion

[U384]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 8, p. 1092B: Since, however, the aim of their theology is to have no fear of God, but instead to be rid of our anxieties, I should think that this condition is more securely in the possession of creatures that have no faintest notion of God than of those who have been taught to think of him as injuring no one.

Ibid., 1091F: It does not follow that if pain, fear of the supernatural and terror about the hereafter are evil, escape from them is godlike and bliss beyond compare.

[U385]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5 p. 800A: {And as to our deriving any benefit from them while they remain in heaven,} ... in this way, even according to Epíkouros, men get help from the gods, "They say, for instance, that the better emanations from them become the causes of great blessings to those who partake of them..."

[U386]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.76.1 [p. 106 Gomperz] {Obbink I.27.754}: ... he says that as being both the greatest thing, and that which as it were excels in sovereignty, it possesses everything: for every wise man holds pure and holy beliefs about the divine and has understood that this nature is great and august. And it is particularly at festivals that he, progressing to an understand of it, through having its name the whole time on his lips, embraces with conviction more seriously

Philódēmos, On Music, Vol. Herc. 1, I c.4,6: Now, these very important things may still be said at the present: that the divine does not need any honor; for us, nevertheless, it's natural to honor it, above all, with pious convictions, even through the rites of national tradition, each according to his proper part.

Philódēmos, On the Life of the Gods, Vol. Herc. 1, VI col. 1: ... to the gods, and he admires their nature and their condition and tries to approach them and, so to speak, yearns to touch them and to be together with them; and he calls Sages "friends of the gods" and the gods "friends of Sages."

[U387]

Philódēmos, On Piety, Vol. Herc. 2, 2.108.9 [p. 126 Gomperz] {Obbink I.31.880}: Again, he says, "let us sacrifice to the gods piously and well, as is appropriate, and let us do everything well according to the laws. But let us do so not disturbing them at all with our opinions on the topic of those who are best and most majestic; again, we say that it is even right to do this on the basis of the opinion which I was discussing. For in this way, by Zeus, it is possible for a mortal nature to live like Zeus, as it appears."

[U388]

Gnomolgion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (Maxims of Epíkouros): [=Maximus the Abbot, Gnomologion, 14, p.180 Turic; t. 2 p. 579 Combef.]: From Epíkouros: "If the gods listened to the prayers of men, all men would quickly have perished: for they are always praying for evil against one another."

[U389]

Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 26, 2 p. 779A: And moreover he {Epíkouros} inserts in his own books countless oaths and adjurations addressed to those who are nothing to us, swearing continually "No, by Zeus" and "Yes, by Zeus" and adjuring his readers and opponents in argument "in the name of the gods" having, I suppose, no fear himself of perjury nor trying to frighten them, but uttering this as an empty, and false, and idle, and unmeaning appendage to his speeches, just as he might hawk and spit, and turn his face, and wave his hand. Such an unintelligible and empty piece of acting on his part was his mentioning the name of the gods.

[U390]

Origen, Against Celsus, VII.66, [p. 386 Hoesch.]: And the charge of folly applies not only to those who offer prayers to images, but also to such as pretend to do so in compliance with the example of the multitude: and to this class belong the Peripatetic philosophers and the followers of Epíkouros and Dēmókritos. For there is no falsehood or pretense in the soul which is possessed with true piety towards God

[U391]

Diogenes Laértios , Lives of Philosophers, 2.97 (Arístippos): Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled Of the Gods which is not contemptible. From that book, it is said, Epíkouros borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.

Origen, Against Celsus, VIII.45, [p. 419 Hoesch.]: For why may not our accounts be true, and those of Celsus fables and fictions? At least, these latter were not believed by the Greek philosophical schools, such as the followers of Dēmókritos, Epíkouros, and Aristotle...

Cf. Ibid., I.43, p. 33: We shall therefore say, in the first place, that if he who disbelieves the appearance of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove had been described as an Epicurean, or a follower of Dēmókritos, or a Peripatetic, the statement would have been in keeping with the character of such an objector.

[U392]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 22, p. 1119D: What is grave, Kōlótēs, is not to refuse to call a man good or some horsemen innumerable – it is to refuse to call or believe a god a god. This is what you and your company do, who will not admit that Zeus is "Author of the Race" Demeter "Giver of Laws" or Poseidon "Guardian of Growth." It is this disjoining of one word from another that works harm and fills your lives with godless negligence and recklessness, when you tear away from the gods the appellations attached to them and by that single act annihilate all sacrifices, Mysteriess, processions and festivals.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.32: Grateful men indeed and reverential. Why, if nothing else, at least they eat bread every day, and yet have the audacity to say, "We do not know if there is a Demeter, or a Kore, or a Pluto;" not mention that, although they enjoy night and day, the changes of the year and the stars and the sea and the earth and the cooperation of men, they are not moved in the least by any one of these things, but look merely for a chance to belch out their trivial "problem" and after thus exercising their stomach to go off to the bath.

[U393]

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, I.8 [p. 307 Diels]: In regards to demons and to heroes... Epíkouros doesn't admit anything about any of this.

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.10 p.

800A: We seek a providence that has an interest for us, and in such that man has no share who has admitted that neither demons, nor heroes, nor any souls at all can live on hereafter.

[U394]

Plutarch, On the Obsolescence of Oracles, 19 p. 420B: As for the scoffing and sneers of the Epicureans which they dare to employ against Providence also, calling it nothing but a myth {cf. U369}, we need have no fear. We, on the other hand, say that their "Infinity" is a myth, which among so many worlds has not one that is directed by divine reason, but will have them all produced by spontaneous generation and concretion. If there is need for laughter in philosophy, we should laugh at those spirits, dumb, blind, and soulless, which they shepherd for boundless cycles of years, and which make their returning appearance everywhere, some floating away from the bodies of persons still living, others from bodies long ago burned or decayed, whereby these philosophers drag witlessness and obscurity into the study of natural phenomena; but if anyone asserts that such demigods exists, not only for physical reasons, but also for logical reasons, and that they have the power of self-preservation and continued life for a long time, then these philosophers feel much aggrieved.

§ 3.24 On Linguistics

[U334]

Origen, Against Celsus, I.24, [p. 18 Hoesch.]: As to this, one should also say that a deep and arcane debate about the nature of names emerged. Are names conventional, as Aristotle thinks? ... Or are names natural, as Epíkouros teaches – in a manner different from that of the Stoics – such that the first men burst forth with particular sounds which were then applied to things?

[U335]

Proclus Lycaeus, Commentary on Plato's "Cratylus" 16 [p. 6 Boiss.]: Pythagoras and Epíkouros shared the view of Cratylus... 17 [p. 8]: Epíkouros thought that names were natural in [one] sense, as being a primary function of nature, such as voice and vision and seeing and hearing, in the same way naming is natural. So that names too are natural in the sense of functions of nature. But Cratylus says that names are natural in [another] sense; that is why he says that each thing has its own proper name, since it was given specifically by the first name-givers in a craftsman-like fashion based on an understanding of the thing. Epíkouros, however, said that these men did not give names based on an understanding of things, but because they were moved in a natural fashion, like those who cough and sneeze and below and bark and lament.

§ 3.25 On Death

[U336]

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, IV.7.4, [p. 393 Diels]: Dēmókritos and Epíkouros said that the soul is mortal and perishes with the body.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.33: What of the fact that that argument is completely false, since souls do not perish? "Reflect again on the truth" [Epíkouros] says, "for it is necessary that that which is born with the body, perish with the body." Cf. Ibid., VII.12.1: Now let us refute the arguments of those who set forth contrary opinions. Lucretius worked them into his third book. "Since the soul is born with the body" he said, "It must perish with the body." {Cf. Lucretius, 3.417, 3.634, & 3.746} Ibid., VII.13.7: Thus, the opinion of Dēmókritos and Epíkouros and Dicaearchus about the dissolution of the soul is false then. [Ibid., VII.8.8: {...those who opposed [Plato, Pythagoras, & Pherecydes] held no less influence: Dicaearchus, at first; then Dēmókritos; finally, Epíkouros}]

St. Augustine (attributed), Exegesis of the Psalm, 73.25, t. IV [p. 781 Venice Edition]:

St. Augustine, Sermon, 348, t. V p. 1344 A: And, once this life is spent, they do not believe that there might be another one in the hereafter.

[U337]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, I (*Against the Dogmatists*, 3).72: [Souls] persist as they are in themselves, and are not, as Epíkouros said, "dispersed like smoke when released from their bodies."

Cf. Iamblichus, by way of Stobaeus, *Anthology*, *Physics*, 41.43, [p. 924 H.]:

[U338]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.31.100: He {Epíkouros} repeatedly argued at length, and also stated briefly and plainly in the work I have just mentioned {The Principal Doctrines}, that death does not affect us at all...

[U339]

Gnomolgia from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (*Maxims of Epíkouros*): It is possible to provide security against other afflictions, but as far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls. {= Vatican Saying 31}

[Cf. Maximus the Abbot, *Gnomologion*, 36, [p.194 Turic.; t. 2 p. 827 Combef.]

[U340]

Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions" (*Refutation of all Heresies*, I) 22.5 [p. 572.14 Diels.]: He {Epíkouros} concluded that the souls of men are dissolved along with their bodies, just as also they were produced along with them; these, in fact, are blood, and when this has gone forth or been altered, the entire man perishes. In keeping with this tenet, it follows that there are neither trials in Hades, nor tribunals of justice; so that whatsoever any one may commit in this life, that, provided he may escape detection, he is altogether beyond any liability of trial.

[U341]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 24.18: I am not so foolish as to go through at this juncture the arguments which Epíkouros harps upon, and say that the errors of the world below are idle – that Ixion does not whirl round on his wheel, that Sisyphus does not shoulder his stone uphill, that a man's entrails cannot be restored and devoured everyday; no one is so childish as to fear Cerberus, or the shadows, or the ghostly garb of those who are held together by nothing but their bare bones.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.42: Epíkouros says ... the punishments of hell do not have to be feared, because souls die after death; nor is there any hell at all.

Ibid., VII.7.13: Zénō, the Stoic, taught that there was a hell, and that the abodes of the virtuous were separated from the wicked, and that the former inhabited quiet and delightful regions, while the latter paid their penalty in dark places and horrible caverns of mud. The prophets made the same thing clear to us. Therefore, Epíkouros was in error who thought that this was a figment of the poet's imagination, and took those punishments of hell to be those which are borne in this life.

§ 3.26 On Celestial Phenomena

[Tertullian, *On the Pagan Nations*, 2.4: Epíkouros, however, who had said, "What is above us is nothing to us" wished notwithstanding to have a peep at the sky, and found the sun to be a foot in diameter.]

[U342]

Aetius (Plutarch), *Doxography*, V.20.2, [p. 432 Diels]: Dēmókritos and Epíkouros do not believe that celestial bodies are living beings.

Plutarch, *Against Kōlótēs*, 27, p. 1123A: Who is it that upsets accepted beliefs and comes in conflict with the plainest facts? It is those who reject... {divination, providence, and} that the sun and moon are living beings, to whom sacrifice and prayer and reverence is offered up by all mankind.

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, XII 6, t. IV [p. 21 K.]: Even our Creator, though knowing perfectly the ingratitude of such men as these, has yet created them. The sun makes the seasons of the year and perfects the fruits without paying any heed, I suppose, to Diagoras, Anaxagóras, Epíkouros, or the others blaspheming against it. No beneficent being bears malice over anything, but naturally aides and adorns all.

St. Augustine, City of God, XVIII 41: At Athens did there not flourish both the Epicureans, who asserted that human affairs are of no concern to the gods, and the Stoics, who, coming to the opposite conclusion, argued that these are guided and supported by the gods, who are our helpers and protectors? I wonder therefore why Anaxagóras was tried for saying that the sun is a blazing stone and denying that it is a god at all, while in the same city Epíkouros lived in glory and in safety, though he not only believed neither in the divinity of the sun nor in that of any other luminary, but also maintained that neither Jupiter nor any other god dwells in the universe at all for men's prayers and supplications to reach him.

[U343]

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, 2.20, 14, [p. 350 Diels] (Stobaeus, Anthology, Physics, 25.3; Plutarch, 2.20,5): Epíkouros maintains that the sun is a compact amassment of earth, similar in aspect to pumice-stone, spongy because of its pores, and ignited by fire.

Cf. Achilles, Introduction, 19, [p.138D Pet.]: Epíkouros asserts that it [the sun] is similar in a way to pumice-stone, and that from fire and through certain pores, it emanates its light.

[U344]

Aetius, Doxography, 2.22.6, [p. 352 Diels] (Plutarch 2.22): Anaximénēs believes that the sun might be large and flat as a petal, Heraclitus that it might be similar to a bowl-shaped container, and very bent; the Stoics that it might be spherical, like the world and celestial bodies; Epíkouros, that it might be able to assume any given shape.

[U345]

Aetius, Doxography, 2.21.5, [p. 352,1 Diels] (Plutarch 2.21.2; Stobaeus, Anthology, Physics, 25.3): Epíkouros maintains that the sun is more or less as large as it appears.

[U346]

Servius, Commentary on Virgil's "Georgics" I.247: At the expression "intempesta silet" ... The Epicureans maintain that the sun does not proceed around the other hemisphere, but according to them sparkles always gather together in the east, and the disc of the sun is formed.

Servius, Commentary on Virgil's "Aenids" IV.584: "With new light" ... according to the Epicureans, who foolishly believe that the sun is composed of atoms, and that it is born together with the day, and together with the day perishes.

[U347]

Junius Philargirius, Commentary on Virgil's "Georgics" 2.478 [p.248 Orsini] ("Various eclipses"): Epíkouros maintains that, regarding the phenomenon in which the sun seems to diminish, one should not attribute a single cause, but rather various hypotheses: it may be proposed, in fact, that it extinguishes itself, or that it ventures further out, or that some other body hides it.

Themistius, Paraphrases of Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics, Alpha-33" (p. 89 A 38), [fr. 9u Ald.]: Therefore it is not possible, for the same belief, that it can be opinion and knowledge for the same person simultaneously, for he would then assume that the same thing can and cannot also be something else at the same time. But it happens that a man can have a certain belief as his opinion, while for another man, it is knowledge. For Epíkouros, in particular, it was indeed an opinion that the sun is eclipsed when the moon, in its course, passes under it; but in fact he believed it possible for things to be otherwise; for Hipparchus, by contrast, it was knowledge.

[U348]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Letter to Hēródotos, Laértios 10.74 p. 26.9: Elsewhere he says that the earth is supported on air.

[U349]

Aetius, Doxography, 3.4.5, [p. 371 Diels] (Parallel N 6.5 p. 691 Gf.; Plutarch, 3.4.2): Epíkouros says that all these things {i.e., clouds, rain, etc.} can be explained with the atomic theory. Hail and rain, in particular, are rounded off because they are so-shaped from their long fall.

[U350]

Aetius, Doxography, 3.15.11 (Plutarch, 3 15.9): As for earthquakes, Epíkouros says that it is possible that the earth is moved by being violently thrust upwards when struck by the air from below, which is humid and dense; it's also possible that it happens because the earth is cavernous underground, and thus jolted by the wind, which bursts into its cavities, which are like caverns, and diffused into their interiors.

[U351]

Seneca, Natural Questions, VI.20.1: Now we come to those writers who have stated as a cause of earthquakes either all the elements I mentioned or several of them. Dēmókritos thinks several. For he says that an earthquake is produced sometimes by moving air, sometimes by water, sometimes by both. (5) Epíkouros says that all these things can be causes and he tries several other causes. Also he criticizes those who insist that some single one of them is the cause, since it is difficult to promise anything certain about theories which are based on conjecture. Therefore, as he says, water can cause an earthquake if it washes away and erodes some parts of the earth. When these parts are weakened they cease to be able to sustain what they supported when they were intact. The pressure of moving air can cause earthquakes; for perhaps the air inside the earth is agitated by other air entering, perhaps the earth receives a shock when some part of it suddenly falls and from this the earth takes on movement. Perhaps a warm quantity of moving air is changed to fire and like lightning is carried along with great destruction to things that stand in its way. Perhaps some blast pushes the swampy and stagnant waters and consequently either the blow shakes the earth or the agitation of the air increases by its very motion and, stirring itself up, travels all the way from the depths to the surface of the earth. At any rate, Epíkouros is satisfied that air is the main cause of earthquakes.

§ 3.27 On the Gods

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.52:

The man who gets the better of all this
by words and without weapons, will not such a one {Epíkouros}
deserve to be reckoned among deities?

[U352]

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.16.43 - 20.56 (Velleius' monologue): {Translated elsewhere}

Ibid., 34.95 ^(Cotta) You say that there are both male and female gods – well, you can see as well as I can what is going to follow from that!

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VII.3.5: A man who denies that god is a "spirit diffused through all the parts of the world" {a Stoic definition} would not be saying that it is mistaken to call the world divine, as Epíkouros would, for he gave God human form and a place in the spaces between worlds.

Saint Augustine, Letter to Dioscorus, 118.27 t. 2 [p. 340B Venice Edition 1719]: How much better for me not even to have heard the name of Dēmókritos than to reflect with sorrow that someone was considered great in his own times who thought that the gods were images which were emitted from solid substances, although they themselves were not solid, and that they, by circling around this way and that, of their own motion, and by sliding into the minds of men, make them think the image is a divine force, while the substance from which the image was given off was deemed excellent in proportion to its solidity! Therefore, his theory wavered, as they say, and varied, so that sometimes, he said that a certain substance from which the images streamed was god, yet, that substance cannot be conceived except through the images which it emits and gives off, that is, those which come from that substance, which he somehow thinks is corporeal and eternal and therefore divine, while the images are carried long by a constant emanation like mist, and they come and enter into ours so that we can think they are a god or gods. Those philosophers hold that there is no other cause for any thought of ours except these images which, when we think, come from those substances and enter into our minds. ... 28: However, Dēmókritos is said to differ from Epíkouros in his natural philosophy, in that he thinks there is a certain living and breathing force present at the coming together of atoms, by which force, I believe, he says "the images are endowed with divinity" – not the images of all things, but those of gods – and "that the elements from which the mind is compounded" exist in the universe, and to these he attributes divinity, and that these are "animate images which are wont to exercise a beneficent or harmful influence over us." But Epíkouros postulated nothing as the beginning of the world but atoms, that is, certain particles of matter so minute that they cannot be divided or perceived by either sight or touch, and by the chance meeting of these particles he says that innumerable worlds, and living beings, and the principle of life itself were produced, as well as the gods whom endows with human form, and locates, not in any world, but beyond and between the worlds. He refuses absolutely to consider anything but material substances, but, in order to be able to think even about these, he says that images are given off by the very things which he supposes to be formed by the atoms, that they enter the mind, and that they are finer than the other images which appear to the eyes – for he says that this is the cause of our sight – but that they are "vast images of such a size as to envelop and enfold the entire world."

[U353]

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists, I (Against the Dogmatists, 3).25: Epíkouros thinks that men have derived the conception of god from presentations [received] while asleep. For he says, since large manlike images strike them while they sleep, they supposed that some such manlike gods also existed in reality

§ 3.28 On the Nature & Form of the Gods

[U354]

Tertullian, Apologetics, 47: Some are sure that he [God] is incorporeal, others that he has a body – i.e., the Platonists and the Stoics respectively. Others say he consists of atoms, others of numbers – as do the Epíkouros and the Pythagoreans respectively.

[Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 10.28: Let us concede to them, however, that the things which are earthly are made from atoms. Are the things which are heavenly also? They say that the gods are incorrupt, eternal, happy, and to them alone they give immunity, such that they may not be seen to be formed by the assembly of atoms. For if the gods also had come from these, they would also be able to be dissipated, any time the seeds break apart and return to their natural state. Therefore, if there is something which atoms have not brought about, why do we not understand that this is the case with other things, too? My question is, before those beginning-bodies had generated the world, why did not the gods build a dwelling for themselves? Surely, unless the atoms had come together and made heaven, the gods would still be hanging in the empty void.]

[U355]

Scholion on Epíkouros, Principal Doctrines 1, Laértios 10.139: Elsewhere he says that the gods are discernible as mental impressions, some being unique, while others look similar, owing to the continuous flow of similar images to the same place, culminating in human form.

Aetius, Doxography, I.7.34, [p. 306 Diels] (Plutarch, I.7.15; Stobaeus, Anthology, Physics, 2.29): Epíkouros thinks the gods resemble humans, and can be contemplated by reason as a result of the fineness of the nature of their images.

Philódēmos, *On the Life of the Gods*, Vol. Herc. 1, VI c. 13: It must also be said that the gods speak, and that they entertain themselves with one another. Indeed, we would no longer believe that the gods are happy and incorruptible, if the did not speak and did not communicate with one another. On the contrary, they would be similar to mute men. In effect, just as we use our voice...

Cf. c. 14: ... and since for virtuous men, conversation with their equals is a source of inexpressible pleasure. And, by Zeus, it is necessary to uphold that they have a language like Greek, or not far from it, and we know that those who have become gods only used the Greek language.

[U357]

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists*, I (*Against the Dogmatists*, 3).178: Thus, to define God as speechless is perfectly absurd and in conflict with our general conceptions. But if he is gifted with speech, he employs speech and has organs of speech, such as lungs and windpipe, tongue and mouth. But this is absurd and borders on the mythology of Epíkouros.

[U358]

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.10.23 (Velleius speaking): As for those who say that the world itself is a conscious intelligence, they have not grasped the nature of consciousness, or understood in what shape it can be manifest. ... I am astonished by the stupidity of those who say that the world itself is a conscious and immortal being, divinely blest, and then say that it is a sphere, because Plato thought this to be the most beautiful of all shapes – I for one find more beauty in the shape of a cylinder, a square, a cone, or a pyramid. What mode of existence is assigned to their spherical deity? Why, he is in a state of rotation, spinning around with a velocity that surpasses all powers of conception. But what room can there be in such an existence for stability of mind and for happiness – I cannot see. Also, why should a condition that is painful in the human body, if even the smallest part of it is affected, be supposed to be painless in the deity? Now clearly the earth, being a part of the world, is also a part of the god. Yet we see that vast portions of the earth's surface are uninhabitable deserts, being either scorched by the sun's proximity, or frost-bound and covered with snow owing to its extreme remoteness. But if the world is god, these, being parts of the world, must be regarded as limbs of the god, undergoing the extremes of heat and cold respectively.

Ibid., 2.17.46 (Balbus speaking): Epíkouros may make a joke of this if he likes, although humor was never his strong point – an Athenian without the "Attic salt!" He may say that he can make no sense of a "spherical and revolving god." But he will never move me from the one view which even he himself accepts: he agrees that gods exist, because there must be some supreme being which is superior to all else.

Cf. Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 1, VI c. 21: ... that which the other philosophers ascribe to [a god]. They must surely know that [a god] does not have a spherical bodily form, nor a tendency towards arguments, anger, or pettiness, but rather has a bodily form that approaches the sublime, and a disposition that disregards all that is impure, being entirely devoted to true blessedness and incorruptibility.

[U359]

Hippolytus, "Philosophical Questions" (*Refutation of all Heresies*, I) 22.3 [p. 572.5 Diels.]: Acknowledging the Deity to be eternal and incorruptible, he says that God has providential care for nothing, and that there is no such thing at all as providence or fate, but that all things are made by chance. For that the Deity reposed in the intermundane spaces, (as they) are thus styled by him; for outside the world he determined that there is a certain habitation of God, denominated "the intermundane spaces" and that the Deity surrendered himself to pleasure, and took his ease in the midst of supreme happiness; and that neither has he any concerns of business, nor does he devote his attention to them.

§ 3.29 On the Blessed Life of the Gods

[U360]

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 17.1: "God" says Epíkouros, "cares for nothing." Therefore, He has no power – for it is necessary that he who has power exercise care – or if He has power and does not use it, what is the reason of negligence so great that, I will not say our race, but even the world itself, is vile and worthless to Him? "On this account" he says, "He is incorrupt and blessed, because He is always quiet." To whom, then, has the administration of such great affairs yielded, if these things which we see controlled by the highest plan are neglected by God? Or how is he who lives and feels able in any way to be quiet? For quiet is a quality of either sleep or death.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.12.15: Epíkouros calls a god happy and incorrupt because he is everlasting. Beatitude ought to be perfect so that there be nothing which can vex or lessen or change it, nor can anything be considered blessed unless through its being incorrupt. And nothing is incorrupt save what is immortal.

[U361]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.9 p. 800A: In Epíkouros' view, providence disappears; the gods according to him pay most attention to the preservation of their own good.

Uncertain Epicurean Author, by way of Pseudo-Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, I 1.7.7 p. 300: "Both [Anaxagóras and Plato] share this error, because they portrayed a god as being concerned for human affairs and as making the cosmos for the sake of man. For a blessed and indestructible being, overflowing with good things and free of any share of what is bad, is completely preoccupied with the continuance of his won happiness and indestructibility and so is not concerned with human affairs. For he would be wretched, like a workman or builder, if he undertook burdens and felt concern for the creation of the cosmos."

[U362]

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.11 p. 800B: But therein Epíkouros, in my judgment, seems to have acted more modestly {than Aristotle}: for as if he had not hope of the gods being able to abstain from the care of mankind if they came in contact with them, he transferred them, as it were, to a foreign country, and settled them somewhere outside the world, excusing them from the charge of inhumanity by the removal, and by their separation from all things.

[U363]

Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, 20.3: ... they [the Epicureans] removed the Deity as far as possible from feelings of kindness or anger or concern for us, into a life that knew no care and was filled with ease and comfort.

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 2.7: Certain individuals say that [God] neither is pleased nor angered by anything, but that, free from care and in repose, He enjoys the good of His own immortality.

Cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 2.1093:

I appeal to the holy hearts of the gods,
which in tranquil peace pass untroubled days and a life serene.

Ibid., V.82:

Those who have been correctly taught
that the gods lead a life without care...

Horace, Satire, 1.5.101:

I've learned that the gods exist carefree,
And, if a miracle does happen in Nature,
That petulant gods have nothing to do
With dispatching it down from the heavenly rooftop

Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 27, 1 p. 781A: To work, to administer, to do good and to show forethought, and all such actions are burdensome perhaps to the idle and foolish, and to the feeble and wicked, among whom Epíkouros enrolled himself by entertaining such thoughts of the gods.

Tertullian, Apologetics, 47: The Epicureans picture him [God] as idle and unemployed, a nobody (so to say) in regards to human affairs.

Salvianus, On the Governence of God, 1.5, p.3, 17: Among the Epicureans... who, just as they connect pleasure with virtue, so too they connect God with disinterest and laziness.

[U364]

Seneca, On Benefits, IV.4.1: "True; therefore God does not bestow benefits, but, free from care and unmindful of us, He turns away from our world and either does something else, or else does nothing, which Epíkouros thought the greatest possible happiness, and He is not affected either by benefits or by injuries." The man who says this surely cannot hear the voices of those who pray... IV.4.19: You, Epíkouros, ended by making God unarmed; you stripped him of all weapons, of all power, and, lest anyone should fear him, you banished him from the world. There is no reason why you should fear this being, cut off as he is, and separated from the sight and touch of mortals by a vast and impassable wall; he has no power either of rewarding or of injuring us; he dwells alone half-way between our heaven and that of another world, without the society either of animals, of men, or of matter, avoiding the crash of worlds as they fall in ruins above and around him, but neither hearing our prayers nor interested in us. Yet you wish to seem to worship this being just as a father, with a mind, I suppose, full of gratitude; or, if you do not wish to seem grateful, why should you worship him, since you have received no benefit from him, but have been put together entirely at random and by chance by those atoms and mites of yours? "I worship him" you answer, "because of his glorious majesty and his unique nature."

Ibid., VII.31.3: Some blame [the gods] for neglecting us, some with their injustice towards us; others place them outside of their own world, in sloth and indifference, without light, and without any functions;

Dionysius the Episcopalian, On Nature, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 27, 8 p. 782C: As for the gods of whom their poets sing as "Givers of good things" {Homer, Od. viii. 325} these philosophers with mocking reverence say, The gods are neither givers nor partakers of any good things. In what way then do they show evidence of the existence of gods, if they neither see them present and doing something, as those who in admiration of the sun and moon and stars said that they were called gods (θεοός) because of their running (θεειν), nor assign to them any work of creation or arrangement, that they might call them gods from setting (θεῖναι), that is making (for in this respect in truth the Creator and Artificer of the universe alone is God), nor exhibit any administration, or judgment, or favor of theirs towards mankind, that we should owe them fear or honor, and therefore worship them? Or did Epíkouros peep out from the world, and pass beyond the compass of the heavens, or go out through some secret gates known only to himself, and behold the gods dwelling in the void, and deem them and their abundant luxury blessed? And did he thence become a devotee of pleasure, and an admirer of their life in the void, and so exhort all who are to be made like unto those gods to participate in this blessing, [etc.]

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 25.59 (Attributing these words to Piso): "What, Caesar, is the strong attraction that these thanksgivings of such frequency and such long duration as have been decreed to you possess? The world is under a deep delusion concerning them, the gods care naught for them; for they, as our godlike Epíkouros has said, feel neither kindness nor wrath towards any."

[U365]

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 4.1: What follows is of the school of Epíkouros. He teaches that just as there is no anger in God, so there is not even kindness. For since Epíkouros thought that to do evil or do harm was foreign to God (an action which is generally spring from the emotion of anger), he also took from Him beneficence because he saw it to be a consequence that, if God possessed anger, He would have kindness also. "From this" he says, "he is blessed and incorrupt, because he cares for nothing, and he neither has any concern himself, nor does he show it for another."

[U366]

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 4.11: Accordingly, then, if there is neither anger nor kindness in [God], surely there is neither fear nor joy nor grief nor compassion. For there is one plan for all the affections, one connected movement, which cannot be in God. But if there is no affection in God, because whatever is affected is a weakness, therefore, neither is there any care of anything nor any providence in Him. The argument of [Epíkouros] extends only this far. He was silent about the other things which follow, namely, that there is no care in Him nor providence, and, therefore, that there is not any reflection nor any sense in Him, by which it comes about that He does not exist at all. So when he had descended step by step, he stopped on the last step because he then saw the precipice. But what advantage is it to have kept silent and to have concealed the danger? Necessity forced him to fall even against his will.

Ibid, 15.5: Since, therefore, there are good and evil things in human affairs ... it is of necessity that God is moved with reference to each. He is moved to kindness when He sees just things done, and to wrath when He beholds the unjust. But Epíkouros is in opposition to us and he says: "If there is in God movement of joy unto kindness and of hatred unto wrath, then he must have both fear, and inclination, and desire, and the other affections which belong to human feebleness." But it is not necessary that he who is angry should also fear, or that he who rejoices should grieve. ... The affection of fear is a matter in man – not in God.

Ibid, 16.6: So the arguments are found to be empty ... of those who think that there is no movement of the mind in God. Because there are some affections which do not happen to be found in God, like desire, fear, avarice, grief, and envy, they have said that He is utterly free from all affection. He is free of these because they are affections of vices; but, those which are of virtue (that is, anger toward the evil, love toward the good, compassion for the afflicted) since they are becoming to His divine power.

§ 3.30 On the Care & Governance of the World

[U367]

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.8.18 - 9.23 (Velleius' monologue): {Translated elsewhere}

[U368]

Loukianós, The Double Indictment, 2: Epíkouros certainly spoke the truth when he said that we {gods} do not provide for things on earth.

Loukianós, Icaromenippus, 2: The Epicureans are really quite insolent, and they attack us without restraint, affirming that we {gods} don't concern ourselves with human affairs, nor do we control events whatsoever.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, On Fate, 31, [p.100 Or.]: The so-called "absence of {divine} providence" by those in Epíkouros' circle...

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, I.12.1: Concerning gods, there are some who say that the divine does not even exist while others, that it does exist but is inactive and indifferent, and takes forethought for nothing; ...

Ibid, 2.20.23: "Consider the contrary assertion: The gods not exist, and even if they do, they pay no attention to men, nor have we any fellowship with them, and hence this piety and sanctity which the multitude talk about is a lie told by 'impostors and sophists,' or, I swear, by lawmakers to frighten and restrain evildoers."

Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.9 p. 800A: [= U361]

Ibid, 13 p. 800A: He {Epíkouros} deprived the gods of their activity towards us, from which alone a just confidence in their existence was likely to be derived.

Ibid, XV 5.3 p. 799A: He who puts aside this divine nature, and cuts off the soul's hope of hereafter, and destroys reverence before superior Beings in the present life, what communion has he with Plato? Or how could he exhort men to what Plato desires, and confirm his sayings? For on the contrary he surely would appear as the helper and ally of those who wish to do injustice. For every one who is human and constrained by human desires, if he despise the gods and think they are nothing to him, inasmuch as in life he dwells far away from them, and after death exists no more, will come prepared to gratify his lusts.

Ibid, 5.6 p. 799A: ... guaranteeing the impunity on the part of the gods.

Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks, 5, [p. 20.8 Sylb.]: Epíkouros alone I will banish from memory, and willingly at that. For he, preeminent in impiety, thinks that God has no care for the world.

Plotinus, Dissertations, (Aeneids, 2.9), 15: Epíkouros, who rejects providence...

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, I.2.1: I do not think it so necessary to maintain a principle from what question which seems to be primary by nature, whether it is providence which takes care of all things, or whether they have been made and are carried on fortuitously. The author of this opinion is Dēmókritos; its establisher, Epíkouros. Ibid., 2.8.48: The world was made by Divine Providence. ... this was held as an acknowledged and indubitable fact by those first seven wise men up to Socrates and Plato even, until the mad Epíkouros arose many ages after, and dared to deny that which is most evident, with a zeal and desire of inventing new beliefs, so that he might set up a system under his own name.

Lactantius, On the Anger of God, 9.4: Later, however, Epíkouros said that there was a god, indeed, because it was necessary that there be in the world something outstanding, and distinguished, and blessed, but still he held that there was no providence; and, as a result of this, the world itself he regarded as fashioned neither by any plan nor by design nor by art, but that the nature of things had conglobated by certain minute and inseparable seeds.

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 27, p. 1123A: Who is it that upsets accepted beliefs and comes in conflict with the plainest facts? It is those who reject divination and deny that there exists divine providence.

Ibid., 30, p 1124E: When, therefore, will our life be that of a beast, savage and without fellowship? When the laws are swept away, but the arguments that summon us to a life of pleasure are left standing; when the providence of heaven is not believed in ...

Ibid., 8, p 1111B: Thus he does away with providence, but says he has left us with piety.

Plutarch, Against the Stoics, 32, p. 1075E: The Stoics themselves make no end of fuss crying woe and shame upon Epíkouros for violating the preconception of the gods because he does away with providence, for they say that god is preconceived and conceived to be not only immortal and blessed but also humane and protective and beneficent.

[U369]

Origen, Against Celsus, I.13, [p. 12 Hoesch.]: ... the Epicureans, who charge as superstitious those who advocate Providence and put God in lordship of everything. [Ibid., I.8 p. 8 (I.10 p. 10; 3 75 p. 161; V.61 p. 279)]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 21, p. 1101C: {The Epicureans} malign Providence as if she were some foul witch to frighten children with or an unrelenting Fury of punishment hanging over our heads.

[U370]

Lactantius, Divine Institutions, 3.17.8: Epíkouros saw that adversities were always befalling the good: poverty, labors, exiles, and loss of dear ones; that the evil on the contrary were happy, were gaining in wealth, and were given honors. He saw that innocence was not safe, that crimes were committed with impunity; he saw that death raged without concern for morals, without any order or regard for years, but that some reached old age, while others were snatched away in childhood; some still robust reach the end, but others are cut off by untimely deaths in the first flower of adolescence; and in wars the better ones are conquered and die. It was especially disturbing, however, that religious men were among the first to be afflicted with the more serious evils, but upon those who either neglected the gods entirely or who did not piously revere them, either lesser disadvantages came or none at all. Often, also, the very temples were struck with lightning. {Cf. Lucretius, 2.1101} ... 17.16: When, therefore, Epíkouros thought on these matters, as if influenced by the iniquity of those things, for so it seemed to one not knowing the cause and reason, he believed that there was no providence. When he had persuaded himself of this theory, he even undertook that it should be defended. Thus he cast himself into inextricable errors. For if there is no providence, how was the world made so orderly, by its arrangement? "There is no arrangement" he says, "for many things have been done differently from the way they should have been." {Cf. Lucretius, 2.180 & V.195} And a godlike man discovered what he should reprehend. If there were time to refute each single thing, I would show easily that this man was neither wise nor sane. Likewise, if there is no providence, how are bodies of animals so ordered that each of the members disposed in a marvelous arrangement preserves its own functions? He says: "The plan of providence has done nothing in the procreating of animals. Neither were the eyes made for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the tongue for speaking, nor the feet for walking, since these were in existence before there was seeing, hearing, speaking, and walking. So these things were not produced for use, but the use came from them. {Cf. Lucretius IV.822} If there is no providence, why do the rains fall, grains rise, trees flower? He says that "those are not for the sake of living things, since they are of no profit to providence, but all things must happen of their own accord." Whence, therefore, are they born, or how do all things which happen come to be? He says that it is not the work of providence. "There are seeds flying about through the void, and when these have massed together at random among themselves, all things are born and grow."

[U371]

Lactantius, Divine Institutions, VI.1.5.3: Therefore, just as God did not make the world for Himself, because He does not need its advantages; but because of man who uses it, so He made man on account of Himself. "What usefulness for god is there, that he should make man for himself?" asks Epíkouros. {Cf. Lucretius, V.165} Surely, it was so that he might understand His works; that he might be able to admire with his senses and declare with his voice the providence of His arrangement, the plan of His accomplishment, and the virtue of His completion of the work. The summation of all these acts is that he worships God. 5.7: "What then" he says, "does the worship on the part of man confer upon a god who is blessed and in need of nothing? If he had so much regard for man that he made the world on account of him, that he equipped him with wisdom, that he made him master of living things, and that he loved him as a son, why did he make him mortal and frail? Why did he put him whom he loved up against all evils, when man should have been both happy, as though joined and near to god, and everlasting, as he is himself, for the worshiping and contemplation of whom he was made?"

Cf. Ibid., VII.3.13: The Stoics say that the world was made for the sake of men. I hear this argument. But Epíkouros does not know the men themselves, or why, or who made them.

[U372]

Lactantius, *The Works of God*, 2.10: Wherefore, I often marvel at the folly of those philosophers in the wake of Epikouros who condemn the works of nature that they may show that the world is formed and governed by no providence. They assign the origin of things to inseparable and solid bodies from the chance combinations of which all things come to be and have arisen. I pass by the things pertaining to the world itself with which they find fault; in this they are mad, even to the point of ridicule. I take up now that which pertains to the subject which we have at hand. 3.1: They complain that man is born more weak and frail than other animals. For as soon as the others come forth from the womb, they are able at once to stand erect and move about with delight, and they are at once able to endure the air because they have come forth into the light fortified by natural protections. Man, on the other hand, they claim, is cast forth naked and unarmed as from a shipwreck and is hurled upon the miseries of this life. He is able neither to move himself from the place where he has been put forth, nor to seek the nourishment of milk, nor to bear the brunt of weather. So they say that nature is not the mother of the human race, but a stepmother. She has been very liberal with the dumb beasts, but she has produced man in such a way – needy and weak – and in want of all aid he can do nothing else but indicate his condition by wailing and weeping, that is "as one for whom there remains in life only the passage of evils." {Lucretius, V.227} ... 3.6: "But the training of man" they say, "consists of great struggle." 4.1: Then too, people complain that man is subjected to sickness and untimely death. They are incensed, in fact, that they have not been born gods. "Not at all" they will say, "but from this we demonstrate that man was not made with any providence, and it should have been otherwise." ... 4.3: They, mind you, would have no man die except when he has completed a hundred years of life. ... 4.12: Our opponents do not see the reason of the outcomes, because they erred once in the very keypoints of this discussion. For when divine providence was excluded from human affairs, it necessarily followed that all things came into being of their own accord. From this stage, they hit upon those impacts and chance comings together of minute seeds, because they saw no origin of things. And when they had cast themselves into these straits, then, sheer necessity forced them to think that souls were born with their bodies and were also extinguished with them. They had taken it for granted that nothing was done by a divine mind. And this very point they could not prove in any other way than by showing that there were some things in which the determination of Providence seemed to limp. They found fault, therefore, with those things in which Providence marvelously, even exceptionally, expressed in divinity, namely, those things I have referred to concerning sicknesses and untimely death, although they should have considered, when they were assuming these things, what would be a necessary consequence.

[U373]

Lactantius, *The Works of God*, 6.7: Epikouros, therefore, saw in the bodies of animals the skill of a divine plan, but, in order to accomplish what he had rashly taken upon himself before, he added another piece of nonsense in accordance with the former. He said that eyes of the body were not created for seeing or the ears for hearing or the feet for walking, since these parts were formed before there was any use of seeing and hearing and walking, but that the functions of all of these came about from them after they were produced. {Cf. Lucretius IV.822} ... What did you say, Epikouros? That the eyes were not made to see? Why, then, do they see? "Afterwards" he says, "their use appeared." For the purpose of seeing, therefore, they were produced, inasmuch as they cannot do anything else but see.

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, I.21, t. 3 [p. 74 K.]: At this point it is proper for us not to pass over the statements of certain men who embrace the doctrines of Epikouros, the philosopher, and Asclepiades, the physician, and who disagree with me on these matters. ... These men do not believe that it is because the tendons are thick that they are powerful, or because they are slender that their actions are weak, but think that actions are what they are as the necessary result of their usefulness in life, and that the size of the tendons depends on how much they are moved; that is, tendons that are exercised in all likelihood thrive and grow thick, whereas those that lie idle get no nourishment and waste away. Hence they say that Nature did not form the tendons as they are because it was better for the tendons of powerful actions to be strong and thick, and those of more feeble actions to be thin and weak – for if so, apes would not have fingers like ours – but as I said, before, they claim that parts which are exercised necessarily become thick because they are well nourished, and parts that lie idle are poorly nourished and become thin.

[U374]

Lactantius, *On the Anger of God*, 13.19: You see, then, that we need wisdom much more on account of evils. Unless these had been set before us, we would not be rational animals. And if this reasoning is true, then that argument of Epíkouros is refuted. "God" he says, "either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants to and cannot, then he is weak – and this does not apply to god. If he can but does not want to, then he is spiteful – which is equally foreign to god's nature. If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful, and so not a god. If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fitting for a god, where then do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them?" I know that most of the philosophers who defend [divine] providence are commonly shaken by this argument and against their wills are almost driven to admit that god does not care, which is exactly what Epíkouros is looking for. But when the reasoning has been examined, we easily bring this formidable argument to dissolution. ... unless we first recognize evil, we shall not be able to recognize the good. But Epíkouros did not see this, nor anyone else, that if evils are taken away, wisdom is equally removed; nor do any vestiges of virtue remain in man, the nature of which consists in sustaining and overcoming the bitterness of evils.

[U375]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.29.5 [p. 326.3 Diels]: Epíkouros says that all things happen by necessity, by choice, and/or by chance.

[U376]

Cicero *Academica* 2.30.97 (Lucullus): They will not get Epíkouros, who despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic, to admit the validity of a proposition of the form "Hermárchos will either be alive tomorrow or not alive" while dialecticians demand that every disjunctive proposition of the form "either x or not-x" is not only valid but even necessary, See how on his guard the man is whom your friends think slow; for "If" he says, "I admit either of the two to be necessary, it will follow that Hermárchos must either be alive tomorrow or not alive; but as a matter of fact in the nature of things no such necessity exists." Therefore let the dialecticians, that is, Antiochus and the Stoics, do battle with this philosopher, for he overthrows the whole of dialectic.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.25.70 ^(Cotta) Epíkouros did the same sort of thing in his argument with the logicians. It is an axiom of the traditional logic that in every disjunctive proposition of the form "X either is ... or is not ..." one of the alternatives must be true. He was afraid that if he admitted anything of this sort, then in a proposition such as "Tomorrow Epíkouros will either be alive or he will not be alive" one or the other of the statements would be a necessary truth: so to avoid this he denied that there was any logical necessity at all in a disjunction proposition, which is too stupid for words!

Cicero, *On Fate*, 10.21: Now here, first of all, if it were my desire to agree with Epíkouros and deny that every proposition is either true or false, I would rather accept that blow than agree that all things come about through fate; for the former opinion gives some scope for discussion, but the latter is intolerable. So Chrysippus strains every sinew in order to convince us that every proposition is either true or false. Epíkouros is afraid that, if he concedes this, he will have to concede that whatever comes about does so through fate; for if either the assertion or the denial is true from eternity, it will also be certain – and if certain, also necessary. [cf. *Ibid.*, 9.19]

[U377]

Simplicius of Cilicia, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics, Beta-8"* p. 198b 29: In cases where everything happened as though it were for the sake of some goal, these creatures were preserved because, although they were formed by chance, they were formed as suitable compounds; but in other cases [the creature] perished and still do perish, as Empedocles refers to "ox-like creatures with human faces." ; [fr. 84u Ald.; p. 372.9 Diels]: The ancient natural philosophers who said that material necessity determines the cause of things which come to be, seem to hold this opinion, and among later thinkers so do the Epicureans. Their error, as Alexander says, comes from thinking that everything which comes to be for the sake of a goal comes to be by intention and calculation, and observing that things which come about by nature do not come to be in this way.

[U378]

Plutarch, *On the Contradictions of the Stoics*, 32, p 1050C: And Epíkouros, for his part, twists about and exercises his ingenuity in conniving to free and liberate voluntary action from the necessity of eternal motion, in order not to leave vice immune to blame.

Cicero, *On Fate*, 10.22: Epíkouros, however, thinks that the necessity of fate is avoided by the swerve of the atom;

Ibid., 23: Epíkouros introduced this theory because he was afraid that, if the atom was always carried along by its weight in a natural and necessary way, we would have no freedom, since our mind would be moved in the way in which it was constrained by the movement of the atoms. ... More acutely, Carneades taught that the Epicureans could have maintained their position without this fictitious swerve. For, seeing that [Epíkouros] taught that there could be some voluntary movement of the mind, it would have been better to defend that than to introduce the swerve, especially as they cannot find a cause for it. ... For in having admitted that there was no movement without a cause, they would not be admitting that all things that came about did so through antecedent causes. For (they could have said), there are no external and antecedent causes of our will.

[U380]

Aetius, *Doxography*, I.29.6 [p. 326 Diels] (Plutarch, I.29.2; Stobaeus *Anthology*, *Physics* 7.9): Epíkouros says that chance is a cause which is uncertain with respect to persons, times, and places.

[U381]

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, VI.14 [p. 571- K.]: I would not wish to tell how Nature corrected this fault {the relative isolation of some muscles from the nervous system} by inventing a clever device unless I first permitted the disciples of Asclepiades and Epíkouros to search out the way in which they would have conferred nerves on these muscles if they were placed in the role of the Creator of animals; for I am in the habit of doing this sometimes and of granting them as many days or even months as they wish for deliberation. One cannot do so, however, when writing a book and cannot compare the wisdom of these gentlemen with Nature's lack of skill or show how the Nature rebuke as being unskillful is so much more ingenious than they are with all their cleverness that they are unable to conceive of the skill with which she works. Hence, I find it necessary to tell now about the devices Nature has employed in order to give the muscles in question their share of nerves and motion.

Galen, *On the Construction of the Embryo*, 6 t. IV [p. 688 K., Singer]: It will certainly not be admitted that the substance of this 'Nature' {of the cause and formation of the embryo} – whether that is something incorporeal or corporeal – reaches this peak of intelligence by people who declare that they cannot believe it in any way possible that this entity functions in such skilful manner in the construction of the embryo. But we, on hearing this assertion from Epíkouros and from those who maintain that everything happens without design, do not stand convinced of it.

[U382]

Aetius, *Doxography*, 2.3- [p. 329 Diels] (Plutarch, 2.3; Stobaeus *Anthology*, *Physics* 21.3): All the other philosophers considered that the world is alive and governed by providence. Leucippus, Dēmókritos, and Epíkouros, by contrast, say that neither is so; rather, it is made up of atoms, by nature and without reason.

Galen, *On the Use of Parts*, XI.8 t. 3, [p. 873 K.]: Moreover, would not one also marvel that the teeth are bound to the phatnia with strong ligaments {the periosteum}, especially at the roots where the nerves are inserted, and marvel the more if this is the work of chance, not skill? But the thing a person would marvel at most of all is the ordered disposition of the teeth – something that, even granting all the aforesaid good fortune of the Epicurean atoms and the particles of Asclepiades, he would not allow, balking and saying that it was the work of a just Governor and not of fortunate motion.

Ibid., p. 874: Nevertheless, let us grant even this to the most fortunate atoms, which those men say move without reason, but which are in more danger of doing everything according to reason than are Epíkouros and Asclepiades.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, VII.3.23: Let them make the case, if they can, either why [the world] was made in the beginning or should afterwards be destroyed. Since Epíkouros, or Dēmókritos, was not able to show this, he said that it was begun of its own accord, seeds coming together here and there. And when these were again loosened, separation and dissolution would follow. Therefore, he corrupted what he had rightly seen, and completely overturned the whole plan by his ignorance of the plan; and he reduced the world and all things which go on in it to the likeness of a certain very empty dream since no plan subsists in human affairs.

Flavius Claudius Julianus (Julian the Emperor), Orations, V, "Hymn to the Mother of the Gods" [p. 162A Pet.; 210.6 Hertlein]: We assert that matter exists and also form, embodied in matter. But if no cause be assigned prior to these two, we should be introducing, unconsciously, the Epicurean doctrine. For if there be nothing of higher order than these two principles, then spontaneous motion and chance brought them together.

Dionysius the Episcopalian, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 24, 1 p. 773D: How are we to bear with them {the atomists} when they assert that the wise and therefore beautiful works of creation are accidental coincidences?

Proclus Lycaeus, Commentary on Plato's "Timeas" p. 80 midway: This axiom {of Aristotle, that each 'particular' is generated by a certain cause}, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures, to be the work of chance.

Ibid., p. 81 below: Some doubt, however, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged that there is a Demiurge {i.e., a creator} of the world who pursues a plan: for they say there is not a Demiurge of it who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. Any many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion; particularly the Epicureans, who entirely deny that there is Demiurge and, even generally, a cause of all things.

Ibid., p. 82.5: Every body, as [Aristotle] says, has limited power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epíkouros says it is?

Cf., p. 108.33: It is intelligence, in fact, which is creator and god – not chance, as certain others maintain.

Ibid., p. 19.14: The atoms of Epíkouros, when encountering each other, succeed in forming a tidy universe more easily than a bunch of names and words, all mixed together, would happen to form coherent speech! {Cf., Cicero, De Natura Deorum 2.37.93; Plutarch, The Oracles at Delphi, 11 p. 399E}

§ 3.32 On Divination

Laértios 10.135: Elsewhere he rejects divination entirely, such as in the Small Summary.

Aetius (Plutarch), Doxography, V.1.2 [p. 415 Diels]: Xenophanes and Epíkouros dismissed the art of divination.

Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 2.65.162: Prediction of future events is a favorite target for the wit of Epíkouros.

Cicero, On Divination, I.3.5: All the rest, except for Epíkouros, who spoke nonsense about the nature of the gods, endorsed divination.

Ibid., 2.17.40: Hence, while [Epíkouros] takes a roundabout way to destroy the gods, he does not hesitate to take a short road to destroy divination. [cf. Ibid., I.39.87; 49.109; 2.17.39; 23.51]

Scholion on Aeschylus, Prometheus, 624: Epicureanism is the doctrine that abolishes divination; indeed, they say "Given that destiny rules all, you ‹predicting a disgrace› have procured pain ahead of time; predicting instead something positive, you have wiped out the pleasure of its realization. On the other hand, they also say "That which must happen, will still happen."

Origen, Against Celsus, VII.3, [p. 343 Hoesch.]: In regard to the oracles here enumerated, we reply that it would be possible for us to gather from the writings of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school not a few things to overthrow the authority of the Pythian and the other oracles. From Epíkouros also, and his followers, we could quote passages to show that even among the Greeks themselves there were some who utterly discredited the oracles which were recognized and admired throughout the whole of Greece.

Cf. Loukianós, *Alexander the Oracle Monger*, 17: It was an occasion for a Dēmókritos, nay, for an Epíkouros or a Mētródōros, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

Ibid., 25: Well, it was war to the knife between [Alexander] and Epíkouros, and no wonder. What fitter enemy for a charlatan who patronized miracles and hated truth, than the thinker who had grasped the nature of things and was in solitary possession of that truth? ... The unmitigated Epíkouros, as he used to call him, could not but be hateful to him, treating all such pretensions as absurd and puerile.

Ibid., 61: My object, dear [Celsus], ... has been ... to strike a blow for Epíkouros, that great man whose holiness and divinity of nature were not shams, who alone had and imparted true insight into the good, and who brought deliverance to all that consorted with him.

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, VI.9:

For when he saw that whatever men's needs demanded,
so far as may be, to keep their lives in safety,
was there at hand already for their use,
that men had all they could want in the way of wealth
and honor and praise, and pride in successful children;
Yet, at home each was perpetually disquieted
and the mind was enslaved by all its bitter complaints;
He understood that the trouble was in the container
and because of some flaw in it, everything would go bad
no matter how many excellent things were put into it:
Partly because there were holes and things flowed through them
and there was no possibility of filling it up,
And partly because what did get in was spoiled,
so to speak, by the nauseous taste there was inside.

The truth was what he used to purify hearts with
and he set a limit to fear as to desire;
He explained what it is that all of us really want
and showed us the way along a little path
which makes it possible for us to go straight there.

Cf. Horace, Epistles, I.2.54:

Jars left contaminated will carry their taint to any contents whatsoever.
Spurn all delights; any joy that is purchased with pain will be harmful.
Greed is forever unsatisfied – vow to keep definite limits.

Cicero, De Finibus, I.9.29 - 19.62, (Torquatus to Cicero): (Translated elsewhere)

§ 4.1 On the Chief Good & Evil

Saint Augustine, Against the Academicians, 3.7.16, t. I, p. 281B [p. 53F Venice edition, 1719]: {Attributed to Cicero} "If Zénō or Chrysippus were asked who the wise man is, he'll reply that the wise man is the one whom he himself has described. In return, Epíkouros or another adversary will deny this and maintain instead that the wise man is the one most skilled at catching pleasures. And so the fight is on! The whole Porch is in an uproar! Zénō is shouting that man is naturally apt for nothing but virtue, which attracts mind to itself by its own grandeur without offering any extrinsic advantage and rewarded as a kind of enticement; Epíkouros' 'pleasure' is common only among brute animals, and to push man – and the wise man! – into an association with them is abominable. Epíkouros, like Bacchus, has called together a drunken mob from his Gardens to aid him against this onslaught! The mob is searching for someone to tear to pieces with their long fingernails and savage fangs in their Bacchic fury. Elevating the name of pleasure as agreeableness and calm, with popular support, Epíkouros passionately insists that without pleasure nobody could seem happy."

[Cf. Saint Augustine, Sermon, 150.5-, t. V p. 713-]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.10.31: For the origin of the Chief Good, he {Epíkouros} goes back, I understand, to the birth of living things. As soon as an animal is born, it delights in pleasure and seeks it as a good, but shuns pain as an evil. Creatures as yet uncorrupted are according to him the best judges of Good and Evil... 33: For proof of this, however, Epíkouros cannot have gone to children nor yet to animals, which according to him hold a mirror up to nature; he could hardly say that natural instinct guides the young to desire the pleasure of freedom from pain. This cannot excite sexual desire; the 'static' condition of feeling no pain exerts no driving-power, supplies no impulse to the will (so that Hieronymus also is wrong here); it is the positive sensation of pleasure and delight that furnishes a motive. Accordingly Epíkouros' standing argument to prove that pleasure is naturally desired is that infants and animals are attracted by the 'kinetic' sort of pleasure, not the 'static' kind which consists merely in freedom from pain.

Cf. Ibid., 13.109: Let us leave pleasures to the lower animals, to whose evidence on this question of the Chief Good your school is fond of appealing.

Cicero, *Academica*, I.2.6: Even this department of ethics, and the subject of moral choice and avoidance, that school handles quite simply, for it frankly identifies the good of man with the good of beasts, but what a vast amount of what minute precision the teachers of our school display is not unknown to you.

Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, 3.194: Hence, the Epicureans suppose themselves to have proved that pleasure is naturally choice-worthy; for animals, they say, as soon as they are born, when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid pains.

Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists*, (*Against the Dogmatists*, XI) 96: Some of those who belong to the school of Epíkouros, in answer to these objections {that folly is not evil by nature, and so forth}, are wont to argue that the animal avoids pain and pursues pleasure naturally and without teaching. Thus when it is born, and is not as yet a slave to opinions, it cries and screams as soon as it is smitten by first puff of chilly air. But if it naturally has an inclination for pleasure and a disinclination for toil, it naturally avoids pain and chooses pleasure.

Cf., Maximus of Tyre, *Dissertations*, 3.2- [p. 30- Reiske]

Varro, *On Philosophy*, by way of Saint Augustine, *City of God*, XIX.1: "There are four things that men naturally seek, without a master and without the support of any instruction, without effort and without any art of living ... naturally, they seek pleasure, which is an agreeable activity of physical perception, or repose, the state in which the individual suffers no bodily discomfort, or both of these (which Epíkouros calls by the single name of pleasure), or taking everything together, the primary wants of nature..."

Cf. Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, V.5, t. V [p. 460 K.; 438.16 Muell.; V.5.8 De Lacy] : Epíkouros saw only the kinship {oikeíosis} felt by the worst part of the soul.

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, 2.20, p. 177.23: For the feeling of pleasure is not at all a necessity, but the accompaniment of certain natural needs – hunger, thirst, cold, sexual union. Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.15.17; 2.11.33 {Cf. U200}

Cicero, *De Finibus*, V.25.74: Even the devotees to pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, *On the Soul*, 2.19 f. 154r: The Epicureans held that what is first congenial to us, without qualification, is pleasure. But they say that as we get older, this pleasure articulates itself in many ways.

[U399]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.1.3: Epíkouros himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous.

Ibid., 2.12.36: {Epíkouros} ... says that the verdict of the senses themselves decides pleasure to be good and pain evil.

[U400]

Cicero *Academica* 2.46.140 (Lucullus): Hear on the opposite side those who say that they do not even understand what the word "virtue" means, unless indeed we choose to give the name "moral" to what looks well with the mob: that the source of all things good is in the body – this is nature's canon and rule and injunction, to stray away from which will result in a man's never having an object to follow in life.

Cicero, *Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso*, 28.68: You have of course heard it said that Epicurean philosophers assess the desirability of anything by its capacity to give pleasure.

[U401]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.6.15: Arístippos the Socratic had no hesitation in pronouncing pain to be the chief evil; next Epíkouros lent himself quite obediently to the support of this spineless, unmanly view.

Ibid., V.9.26: ...after saying that pain is not only the chief evil, but the only evil as well... [Cf. Ibid., 2.12.28; 19.44-45; V.10.31]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.33: Why, rather, do you not consider that pain might not be an evil? Because [Epíkouros] says it is the greatest of all evils.

Ibid., 3.17.5: {Epíkouros says} to the impatient and delicate that pain is the greatest of all evils; to the strong, that the Sage is blessed even in torments.

Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.195: ... and pain, according to them, is a natural evil.

[U402]

Loukianós, The Double Indictment, 21 (Epíkouros portrayed as speaking): "{Suppose that Dionysius, the Apostate} ran away to Pleasure of his own free will, cutting the meshes of [Stoic] logic as if they were bonds, because he had the spirit of a human being, not of a dolt, and thought pain painful, as indeed it is, and pleasure pleasant..."

Stoa: Do you consider pain bad?

Epíkouros: Yes.

Stoa: And pleasure good?

Epíkouros: Certainly so!

[U403]

Plotinus, Dissertations, 30 (Aeneids, 2.9), 15: For there are two schools of thought about attaining the [ethical] end. One which puts forward the pleasure of the body as the end, and another which chooses nobility and virtue ... Epíkouros, who abolishes providence, exhorts to pursue all that remains: pleasure and its enjoyment.

Cf. Scholion on Lucian, The Double Indictment, 20 [t. IV p. 209 lac.]: The Epicureans, being atheists, used to only honor pleasure.

[U404]

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics" p. 9:

Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, IV.4, t. V [p. 388 K.; p. 359.14 Muell.; De Lacy IV.4.29]: ...thus the belief that pleasure is a good, as Epíkouros would have it, is a mistaken and false teaching.

[U405]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B: So I think you are not "removing the springtime from their year" as the saying goes, but depriving these men of life, if you are not going to leave them the possibility of living pleasurably.

[U406]

Antiochus of Ascalon, by way of Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 2.21 p. 178.46: Epíkouros also says that the removal of pain is pleasure; and says that that is to be preferred, which first attracts from itself to itself, being, that is, wholly in motion.

[U407]

Laértios 10.121: Two kinds of happiness are conceivable: one being the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be increased; the other subject to increases or decreases of pleasures.

St. Augustine, Confessions, VI.16: I argued in those days with my friends Alypius and Nebridius concerning the limits of good and evil. Determining, in my judgment, that Epíkouros should have won the garland, had I not verily believed that there remained a life for the soul after the body was dead, and the fruits of our deservings, which Epíkouros would not believe. And so I put the question: suppose we were to be immortal, and were to live in perpetual enjoyment of bodily pleasures, and that without fear of losing – why should we not then be fully happy, and wherefore should we seek for any other thing?

§ 4.2 On Kinetic Pleasure

[U408]

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, I.20.17: If Epíkouros should come and say that the good ought to be in the flesh, again the explanation becomes lengthy, and you must be told what is the principal faculty within us, and what our substantial versus what our essential nature is. Since it is not probable that the good of a snail lies in its shell, is it then probable that the good of man lies in his flesh? But take your own case, Epíkouros; what more masterful faculty do you yourself possess? What is that thing within you which takes counsel, which examines into all things individually, and which, after examining the flesh itself, decides that it is the principal matter?

Cf. Ibid., 2.23.20: Therefore, since the faculty of choice is so great, and has been set over everything else, let it come before us and say that the flesh is of all things the most excellent.

[U409]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546F: And Epíkouros says, "The principle and the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; even wisdom and culture must be referred to this."

Ibid., VII p. 280A: The master of these men, indeed, was Epíkouros, who loudly proclaimed... ["The principle" etc., cited above].

Mētródōros, Letter to his Brother Timokrátes, fr. 13 [p. 51 Duen.], by way of Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1098D: {We are not called to save the nation or get crowned by it for wisdom; what is called for, my dear Timokrátes, is to eat and to drink wine, gratifying the belly without harming it.} ... It made me both happy and confident to have learned from Epíkouros how to gratify the belly properly. ... {The belly, Timokrátes, my man of wisdom, is the region that contains the highest end.}

Cf. Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 30, p. 1125A: For it is the men who look with contempt on all these things as old wives' tales, and think that our good is to be found in the belly and the other passages by which pleasure makes her entry...

Ibid., 2, p. 1108C: ...by those who keep shouting that the good is to be found in the belly...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 17, p. 1098D: Indeed these people, you might say, describing a circle with the belly as center and radius, circumscribe within it the whole area of pleasure...

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.66: It is his habit in all his discussions to attach higher value to the pleasures of the belly than to the delights of the eye and the ear.

Cf. Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B: "Oho!" I said laughing. "It looks as if you are going to hop on their belly and make them run for their flesh when you take pleasure away..."

Cf. Hegesippus, by way of Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VII p. 279D (Com. IV p. 481)

[U410]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 9, p. 1092D: As for the melting away of the mind that occurs in the expectation or on the occasion of pleasure of the flesh, this when moderate has nothing about it that is great or appreciable, and when extreme is not only unfounded and unstable but strikes us coarse and immodest.

Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, IV.2, t. V [p. 367 K.; p. 337.6 Muell.]: {De Lacy ca. pg. 250}

[U411]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 27, p. 1122E: No teacher is needed. By themselves, these glorious smooth and agreeable movements of the flesh (as they themselves assert) call to action even one who stoutly denies and refuses to acknowledge that he unbends and turns soft in response to them.

Cf. Plutarch, Old Men in Public Affairs, 5 p. 786C: In view of these examples, do we not perceive how great are the pleasures the virtues provide, for those who practice them ... and that also without tickling or enervating them as do the smooth and gentle motions made on the body? Those have a frantic, unsteady titillation mixed with convulsive throbbing...

Plutarch, Non Posse, 22, p. 1087E: ... you will find that area which experiences a 'smooth and gentle motion' ...

[U412]

If I intend to ... "spit on noble action" and place the good in the "flesh" and in "titillations" – these rites require darkness, these require night, and for these let us have concealment and oblivion.

Cf. Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 92.6: The second kind of pleasure is simply animalistic. We are but adding the irrational to the rational, the dishonorable to the honorable. A pleasant physical sensation affects this life of ours; why therefore, do you hesitate to say that all is well with a man just because all is well with his appetite? And do you rate, I will not say among heroes, but among men, the person whose Supreme Good is a matter of flavors and colors and sounds? {cf. U67}

[U413]

Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546E: {Arístippos and his followers were not alone} in welcoming kinetic pleasure ... Epíkouros and his followers did the same. And not to enter on account of his "tempests" and his "transportations" all of which Epíkouros cites many times, also the "titillations" and "stimulations" ...

Cf. Plutarch, Non Posse, 5, p. 1090B: {the future, like the weather, is always uncertain} so the mind that has stowed the ultimate good in a body that is in a stable condition and in expectations for the body cannot continue to the end without fear and the prospect of tempestuous weather.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, 3.48, t. I [p. 115 Mang.]: Indeed, he who finds himself on the way of the moral progress is not in a position to reject every pleasure, but it will still be a wonderful thing that he succeeds rejecting the pleasures of the belly, that is those [??] which the lovers of the pleasure say that the means of increasing the chief pleasure is owed to the skill of cooks and [???].

[U414]

Cleomedes, Lectures on Astronomy, 2.1 [p. 112 Bak.] {p. 492 Bowen and Todd}: On top of everything else his mode of expression is also elaborately corrupt. ... [he] speaks of "sacred ululations" and "titillations of the body" and "debaucheries" and other such dreadful horrors. {c.f. above}

Ibid., [p. 113 Bak.] {p. 516 Bowen and Todd}: So will you not be off, "most brazen and shameless soul" routed from Philosophy, to Leóntion, Philainis, and the other whores, and to your "sacred ululations" with Mindyrides, Sardanapalus and all your boon companions?

[U415]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.21.68 (Cicero to Torquatus): When one argues with your friends, one has to listen to a great deal about even the grosser forms of pleasure! Epíkouros is always harping upon them!

§ 4.3 On Katastematic Pleasure

[U416]

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato's "Philebus" [p. 274 Stallb.]: Epíkouros, referring to natural pleasure, says that it is katastematic.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, 3.54, t. I [p. 118 Mang.]: ... to those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

[U417]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 3, p. 1088C: Epíkouros has imposed a limit on pleasures that applies to all of them alike: the removal of all pain. For he believes that our nature adds to pleasure only up to the point where pain is abolished and does not allow it any further increase in magnitude (although the pleasure, when the state of painlessness is reached, admits of certain unessential variations). But to proceed to this point, accompanied by desire, is our stint of pleasure, and the journey is indeed short and quick. Hence it is that becoming aware of the poverty here they transfer their final good from the body, as from an unproductive piece of land, to the soul, persuaded that there they will find pastures and meadows lush with pleasures.

Ibid., 4 (1088D) (Zeuxippus speaking): Why, do you not hold that that gentlemen do well to begin with the body, where pleasure first appears, and then pass to the soul as having more stability and bringing everything to perfection within itself?

[U418]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 31, p. 1107B: It is a space like this, with pleasures so ample, pleasures of such magnitude that the surgery of Epíkouros cuts out of our lives. Not content with removing all hope of help from Heaven and all bestowal of grace, as we said, he kills the love of learning in our soul and the love of honor in our heart, and thus constructs our nature and casts it down into a narrow space indeed and not a clean one either, where the mind delights in nothing but the flesh, as if human nature had no higher good than escape from evil.

[U419]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.47: Epíkouros also says that pleasure does not increase when pain has been removed, and that the highest pleasure is the absence of pain.

Ibid., (47): He says that the highest pleasure is freedom from pain.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.9.28: He asserts that nothing can enhance the pleasure of freedom from pain.

Cf. Ibid., 2.13.41 (Cicero to Torquatus): Hieronymus' Chief Good is the same as that occasionally, or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves: freedom from pain.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 7, p. 1091B: Oh the great pleasure and blessed state this company {the Epicureans} enjoy, as they revel in suffering no hardship or anxiety or pain! Is this not a thing to make them proud and use the language they do, when they style themselves "imperishable" and "equal to the gods" and from excess and preeminence of blessings explode in their pleasure into wild cries of rapture and ecstasy because they alone, scorning all other blessings, have discovered one as great as it is godlike, to wit, not to suffer an ill?

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.8.10: To think that the highest good is the absence of pain is surely not characteristic of the Peripatetics or Stoics but of the bedridden philosophers. For who would not understand that this is the point discussed by the sick and those placed in some state of pain? What is so ridiculous as to consider that which a physician can give, as the highest good?

[U420]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 33, p. 1123A: Do you {Epicureans} not, in defiance of the experience of all mankind, affirm the absence of any mean between pain and pleasure when you say that it is a pleasure to feel no pain, in other words: that not to be acted upon is to be acted upon?

[U421]

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato's "Philebus" [p. 275 Stallb.]: ... since Epíkouros does not believe that pain is mixed with pleasure, nor indeed the bad with the good.

[U422]

Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVII 35 (after fragment 181): "We need pleasure when we are in pain because of its absence; but when we are not in this condition, and are in a stable state of sense-perception, then there is no need for pleasure. For it is not the needs of nature which produce injustice from without, but the desire based on groundless opinions."

[U423]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their "thing delighted" – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. ... Epíkouros too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: "That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good."

Ibid., 8, p. 1091E: Thus Epíkouros, and Mētródōros too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.

[U424]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 5, p. 1090A: My judgment is that ... they ought to refrain from taking the position that the "stable condition of the flesh" is the source of all delight, ...

[U425]

Epictetus, fragment 52, by way of Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, IV.50:

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.6.16: Thus, just as the sea is understood to be calm when not even the lightest breath of air ruffles its waves, so too a peaceful condition of the soul is discernible when there is no disturbance of strength enough to be able to ruffle it.

[U426]

Plutarch, Stoic Self-Contradictions, 2, p. 1033C: ...that tranquility (ῥοιχία) which is commended by Epíkouros and Hieronymus.

Cf. Plutarch, Table Talk, 3.6.4, p. 655C: {All men, my friend, do not possess} ... Epíkouros' leisure and equanimity ... {which has been provided in everlasting abundance by reason and philosophy} ... [Cf. Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power, 3, p. 778D]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 68.10: "Is it retirement, oh Seneca, that you are recommending to me? You will soon be falling back upon the maxims of Epíkouros!"

Tertullian, On Shows, 28: Some philosophers have given the name of pleasure to quietude and tranquility; in it they rejoice, take their ease in it – yes, glory in it.

Horace, Odes, 2.16, 1-:

Peace – can purple buy it, Grosphus? Nay,
Nor gold, nor jewel.

No pomp, no lictor clears the way
Amid rabble-routs of troublous feelings,
Nor quells the cares that sport and play
Round gilded ceilings.

[U427]

Baton the Comic, (t. IV p. 502 Meineke), by way of Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, 3 p. 103C; VII p. 279A: "Epíkouros, anyhow, says that pleasure is the highest Good; everybody knows that. You cannot have it any other way. By living well, of course, everyone lives happily."

[U428]

Laértios 10.120: {Among Epicurean Sages, they hold that} health is in some cases regarded as a good – for others: something indifferent.

Saint Augustine, City of God, V.20: {The Epicureans say that Pleasure demands Temperance}... lest some harmful consequence of overindulgence should interfere with health – which Epicureans place largely in the health of the body – and seriously hinder Pleasure.

§ 4.4 On Peace of Mind

[U429]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 4, p. 1088E: But when you hear their loud protest that the soul is so constituted as to find joy and tranquility in nothing in the world but pleasures of the body either present or anticipated, and that this is its good, do they not appear to you to be using the soul as a decanter of the body, and to imagine that by decanting pleasure, like wine, from a worthless and leaky vessel and leaving it to age in its new container, they are turning it into something more respectable and precious?

Ibid., 14 p. 1096C: They place the contemplative part of the soul right inside body and use the appetites of the flesh as leaden weights to hold it down. In this they are no better than stable hands or shepherds who serve their charges with hay or straw or grass of one kind or the other as the proper food for them to crop and chew. Do they not in similar fashion play swineherd to the soul, feeding it only on this swill of the bodily pleasures, permitting it to delight only in the hope or experience or recollection of some carnal thing, and forbidding it to take or seek from itself any pleasure or gratification of its own?

[U430]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.30.98: You {Epíkouros}, have always maintained that no one feels either pleasure or pain except on account of the body. ... your doctrine is that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately referable to the body..

Cf. Ibid., 2.33.107: The dictum of your school: all mental pleasures and pains alike are based on pleasures and pains of the body.

Cf. Ibid., 2.32.106: {Cicero disputes that} mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.7-: For what, then, are we going to feel this pleasure of the soul? If it is for the good of the soul itself, then the essence of the good has already been discovered. For it is impossible, if one thing be good, to justify taking delight in something else; ... But you Epicureans ought to deny this, if you are in your right mind – otherwise you will be saying something inconsistent with both Epíkouros and the rest of your doctrines. The only thing left for you to say is that pleasure of soul is pleasure in the things of the body, and then they become matters of prime importance, and the true nature of the good.

[U431]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 5, p. 1089D: Now first observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body, compelled, since pleasure is not retained in the mind but leaks and slips away, to attach it to its source, shoring up "the pleasure of the body with the delight of the soul" as Epíkouros puts it, but in the end passing once more by anticipation from the delight to the pleasure.

[U432]

Alciphron, Letters, 3.55.8 (Autocletus to Hetoemaristus {"Gatecrasher" to "Prompt-to-breakfast"}): Zénōcrates the Epicurean took the harp-girls in his arms, gazing upon them from half-closed eyes with a languishing and melting look, and saying that this was "tranquility of the flesh" and "the full intensity of pleasure."

(Cf. Epíkouros, Principal Doctrine 9)

[U433]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B: those people who shout, "We ever hold the table dear instead" {Homer, Odyssey, VIII 246, 248} and "every agreeable stirring of the flesh that is transmitted upward to give some pleasure and delight to the mind."

[U434]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66.45: We find mentioned in the works of Epíkouros two goods, of which his Supreme Good, or blessedness, is composed, namely, a body free from pain and a soul free from disturbance. These goods, if they are complete, do not increase; for how can that which is complete increase? The body is, let us suppose, free from pain; what increase can there be to this absence of pain? The soul is composed and calm; what increase can there be to this tranquility? Just as fair weather, purified into the purest brilliancy, does not admit of a still greater degree of clearness, so too, when a man takes care of his body and of his soul, weaving the texture of his good from both, his condition is perfect, and he has found the consummation of his prayers, if there is no commotion in his soul or pain in his body. Whatever delights fall to his lot over and above these two things do not increase his Supreme Good; they merely season it, so to speak, and add spice to it. For the absolute good of man's nature is satisfied with peace in the body and peace in the soul.

Cf. Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 2, X.75 c. VIII: He who keeps goods and evils within natural limits, has already made his escape from every trouble of the soul.

[U435]

Seneca, On Benefits, 3.4.1: Here I must do Epíkouros the justice to say that he constantly complains of our ingratitude for past benefits, because we cannot bring back again, or count among our present pleasures, those good things which we have received long ago, although no pleasures can be more undeniable than those which cannot be taken from us.

[U436]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 18, p. 1099D: {Now suppose that, as they say} the recollection of past blessings is the greatest factor in a pleasant life.

Cf. Cicero, De Finibus, 2.32.106 (at the beginning)

[Plutarch, Non Posse, 4, p. 1089C: It is also quite unlikely that persons of moderation and temperance should dwell on such thoughts {the memory of pleasures} and on the sort of thing with which Carneades taunted Epíkouros – as if from an official journal of statistics how about "how often I had a meeting with Hedeia or Leóntion" or "Where I drank Thasian wine" or "what twentieth of the month I had the most sumptuous dinner."]

[U437]

St. Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah, 11, 38, t. IV [p. 473E Vall.]: For this reason, Epíkouros' opinion is foolish: he asserts that the ills of the present are mitigated by the memory of blessings of the past.

Ibid., 18, 65, p. 788C: ... for those who find themselves in a state of anxiety cannot in any way rejoice in their souls from past pleasures – regardless of Epíkouros' erroneous theory.

Saint Augustine, Sermon, 348.3 t. V [p. 1344A Venice Edition 1719]:

[U438]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.32.104: And again, what is the sense of the maxim that the Sage will not let past blessings fade from memory, and that it is a duty to forget past misfortunes?

[U439]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.34.95: The whole teaching of [Epíkouros] about pleasure is that pleasure is, he thinks, always to be wished and sought for in and for itself because it is pleasure, and that on the same principle pain is always to be avoided for the simple reason that it is pain, and so the wise man will employ a system of counter-balancing which enables him both to avoid pleasure, should it be likely to ensure greater pain, and submit to pain where it ensures greater pleasure; and all pleasurable things, although judged of by the bodily senses, are notwithstanding transmitted on again to the soul; and for this reason while the body feels delight for the time that it has the sensation of present pleasure, it is the soul which has both the realization of present pleasure conjointly with the body and anticipates coming pleasure, and does not suffer past pleasure to slip away: thus the wise man will always have a perpetual continuation of pleasures, as the expectation of pleasures hoped for is combined with the recollection of pleasures already realized.

§ 4.5 On Proper Measurement of Pleasure and Pain

[U440]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.46: Someone will say: "So? Do you think that Epíkouros meant that sort of thing – that his views were licentious?" I certainly do not. For I see that many of his utterances breathe an austere and many a noble spirit. Consequently, as I have often said, the question at issue is his intelligence, not his morality. However much he may scorn the pleasures he has just approved, yet I shall remember what it was that he thinks the highest good.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.10.30: The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure... at one moment he so disparages it that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius!

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.33.94: On this point, the disciples of Epíkouros enter upon a long argument. Those pleasures belonging to the kinds that they despise, they thoroughly belittle. Yet all the same, they look out for a plentiful supply of them. For obscene pleasures (about which they linger at length) are, as they say, easy to satisfy, common, and within reach of all. Should nature call for them, the standard of value (which they think should not be birth, position or rank, but beauty, age, physical constitution) is by no means difficult to abstain from, even when health or duty or reputation are not at stake. In general this kind of pleasure is desirable – but is never of benefit.

Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, I.40.113 ^(Cotta) Perhaps you will say that all these pleasures are merely trifling "titillations of the senses" in Epíkouros' words. If so, you must be joking, Our friend Philo would never concede that the Epicureans despised the pleasures of luxury and sensuality. He used to quote from memory many sayings of Epíkouros, in the exact words of the written texts.

[U441]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, IV.12.29: Regarding pleasure, Epíkouros himself says that the smallest pleasures are often eclipsed and forgotten.

[Galen wrote two books "On the obscure pleasure of Epíkouros" (c. 17 t. XIX) [p. 48 K.]]

[U442]

Aristocles, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel*, XIV 21.3 p. 769A: It is better to endure these particular pains, so that we might experience greater pleasures; and it is advantageous to refrain from these particular pleasures so that we might not suffer from more burdensome pains.

Seneca, *On Leisure* (to Serenus), 7.3: Thus, even this pleasure-loving sect is itself committed to action – and why not? Since Epíkouros himself declares that he will at times withdraw from pleasure, will even seek pain if he foresees that he will either regret that pleasure, or will be able to substitute a lesser pain for one that is greater.

[U443]

Maximus of Tyre, *Dissertations*, 3.3 [p. 32 Reiske; 32.3 Trapp]: "Is Pleasure really worthless? In that case, it would not come naturally, nor be the most venerable of all the forces that promote our survival. As for the well-worn reproaches that sophists bring against it – Sarandapallus' luxury, and the extravagance of the Medes, and Ionian decadence, and Sicilian gourmandizing, and Subaritic dances and Corinthian courtesans – all this, and anything yet more elaborate, is not the work of Pleasure, but of artifice and calculation, as men have used their recently acquired abundance of technical resources to break Pleasure's laws. Just as nobody abuses Reason and says that it does not possess natural beauty, even if someone diverts its application to an end that is not naturally noble, so you should not abuse Pleasure either, rather than those who put it to bad uses. Of these two elements in the human soul, Pleasure and Reason, Pleasure when mixed with Reason removes none of Reason's power to compel, but adds pleasures, increases their tendency to moderation by making them easier to come by, while removing the element of compulsiveness from what is naturally pleasant.

[U444]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 3.13.28: Epíkouros holds that the distress which the idea of evil produces is a natural effect, in the sense that anyone who contemplates some considerable evil at once feels distress, should he imagine that it has befallen him.

Ibid., 3.15.32: Epikouros supposes that all men must necessarily feel distress if they think themselves encompassed by evils, whether previously foreseen and anticipated, or long established. For according to him, evils are not lessened by duration nor lightened by previous consideration, and besides, he thinks it folly to dwell upon an evil which has still to come or maybe will not come at all; all evil, he says, is hateful enough when it has come, but the man who is always thinking a mishap may come is making that evil perpetual. But if it is not destined to come at all, he is needlessly the victim of a wretchedness he has brought upon himself; thus he is always tortured either by undergoing or by reflecting on the evil. 33: Alleviation of distress, however, Epíkouros finds in two directions, namely in calling the soul away from reflecting upon vexation and in a "recall" to the consideration of pleasures. For he thinks the soul able to obey reason and follow its guidance. Reason therefore (in his view) forbids attention to vexations, withdraws the soul from morose reflections, blunts its keenness in dwelling upon wretchedness and, sounding a retreat from such thoughts, eagerly urges it on again to discover a variety of pleasures and engage in them with all the powers of the mind; and according to this philosopher the wise man's life is packed with the recollection of past and the prospect of future pleasures. This view we have stated in our usual style, the Epicureans state it in theirs. But let us look at their meaning – let us ignore their style.

[U445]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 29, [p. 208.25 Nauck]: "Let us neither censure the flesh as a cause of great evils nor attribute our distress to external circumstances." Rather, let us seek their causes in the soul, and by breaking away from every vain yearning and hope for fleeting fancies, let us become totally in control of ourselves.

[U446]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.19.44: Epíkouros steps forward – in no sense an ill-meaning person, but rather a gentleman of the best intentions. He gives advice to the extent of his ability. "Ignore pain" he admonishes. Who says this? The same thinker who pronounces pain the highest evil. This is not quite consistent. Let us listen. "If pain is at its highest" says he, "it must be short." ... "By at the highest I mean that which has nothing higher; by short I mean that which has nothing shorter. I scorn a degree of pain from which a brief space of time will deliver me almost before it has come."

Cicero, On Duties, 3.33.117: However many passages there are in which Epíkouros speaks with proper courage in regards to pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but what is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.

Tertullian, Apologetics, 45: So indeed Epíkouros renders every pain and torment a little less frightening, declaring that a moderate pain is trifling, while a severe one is not long-lasting.

Cf. Zénō the Epicurean (Zénō of Sidon), by way of Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.17.38: "Blessed is he who has the enjoyment of present pleasure and the assurance that he would have enjoyment either throughout life or for a great part of life without the intervention of pain, or should pain come, that it would be short-lived if extreme, but if prolonged it would still allow more that was pleasant than evil."

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 78.7: Illness involves considerable physical torments. These are made bearable by their intermittency. For when pain is at its most sever the very intensity finds means of ending it. Nobody can be in acute pain and feel it for long. Nature in her unlimited kindness to us has so arranged things as to make pain either bearable or brief.

[U447]

Plutarch, On How to Study Poetry, c. 14, p. 36B: Upon the words of Aeschylus, "Fear not! Great stress of pain is not for long" we ought to remark that this is the oft-repeated and much admired statement originating with Epíkouros, namely, "great pains shortly expend their force, and long-continued pains have no magnitude."

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII.33: Of pain: "When unbearable, it destroys us, when lasting, it is bearable"

Ibid., 64: With most pains, however, call to your rescue even Epíkouros, when he says that a pain is "never unbearable or interminable" so that that you remember its limitations and add nothing to it by imagination.

[U448]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 23, p. 1103D: This is in fact the Epicurean argument for perilous disease and excruciating pain: you hope for some kind of treatment from the gods for all your piety? You are deluded – "what is blessed and imperishable is neither vulnerable to feelings of anger nor indebtedness." {Principal Doctrine 1} You conceive of something after this life better than what you found in it? You are deceived – "for what is dissipated has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us." {Principal Doctrine 2} So why, poor fellow, do you tell me to eat and rejoice? Why else but because for you, who are laboring in the storm, shipwreck imminent: "excessive pain leads straight to death."

[U449]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66.47: I can show you at this moment in the writings of Epíkouros a graded list of goods just like that of our own school. For there are some things, he declares, which he prefers should fall to his lot, such as bodily rest free from all inconvenience, and relaxation of the soul as it takes delight in the contemplation of its own goods. And there are other things which, though he would prefer that they did not happen, he nevertheless praises and approves – for example, the kind of resignation, in times of ill-health and serious suffering, to which I alluded a moment ago, and which Epíkouros displayed on his famous "last and most blessed day" of his life. {cf. U138} ... We therefore find mentioned, even by Epíkouros, those goods which one would prefer not to experience; which, however, because circumstances have decided thus, must be welcomed and approved and placed on a level with the highest goods.

§ 4.6 Against the School of Arístippos

Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XIV 18.31 p. 763D: Now Arístippos was a companion of Socrates, and was the founder of the so-called Cyrenaic sect, from which Epíkouros has taken occasion for his exposition of man's proper {ethical} end.

Cf. *ibid.*, 20.13, p. 768C; Plutarch, Non Posse, 4, p. 1089A: The Cyrenaics ... who have drunk from the same jug as Epíkouros...

[U450]

Laértios 10.136 (see U2); *ibid.*, 2.87 (Arístippos): {The Cyrenaics say} that bodily pleasure is the End-Goal, according to Panaetius in his work On the Philosophical Schools, and not the static pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of 'freedom from discomfort' which Epíkouros accepts and maintains to be the end.

Ibid., 2.89 (Arístippos): The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epíkouros, seems to them {the Cyrenaics} not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one is, as it were, asleep.

Antiochus of Ascalon, by way of Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 2.21 p. 178.43: For of those that are ruled by pleasure are the Cyrenaics and Epíkouros; for these expressly said that to live pleasantly was the chief end, and that pleasure was the only perfect good. Epíkouros also says that the removal of pain is pleasure.

[U451]

Antiochus of Ascalon, by way of Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 2.21 p. 179.36: These Cyrenaics reject Epíkouros' definition of pleasure, i.e., the removal of pain, calling that the condition of a corpse; because we rejoice not only on account of pleasures, but companionships and distinctions; while Epíkouros thinks that all joy of the soul arises from previous sensations of the flesh.

Diogenes Laértios, Lives of Philosophers, 2.89 (Arístippos): {The Cyrenaics assert that} not all mental pleasures and pains, however, are derived from bodily counterparts. For instance, we take disinterested delight in the prosperity of our country which is as real as our delight in our own prosperity.

[U452]

Laértios 10.137: {Epíkouros} further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains; at all events evil-doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epíkouros holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body.

Ibid., 2.90 (Arístippos): {The Cyrenaics} insist that bodily pleasures are a far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.7.7: Epíkouros thinks that the highest good is in the pleasure of the mind. Arístippos holds that it is in the pleasure of the body.

Ibid., 8.5: That man was not wise, then, who believed that pleasure of the mind was the highest good, since whether that is security or joy, it is common to all.

[U453]

Diogenes Laértios, *Lives of Philosophers*, 2.89 (Arístippos): {The Cyrenaics} do not admit that pleasure can be derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epíkouros. And because of this they assert that movements affecting the mind are exhausted in the course of time.

§ 4.7 On the Limits of Desires

[U454]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.9.27: For my own part, I cannot cordially approve – I merely tolerate – a philosopher who talks of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to be kept with bounds? 28: This classification of the desires is then a subject on which Epíkouros is found of enlarging. Not that I find fault with him for that – we expect so great and famous a philosopher to maintain his dogmas boldly.

[U455]

Seneca, *Moral Dialogs*, VII, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 13.4: He who follows pleasure is seen to be weakly, broken, losing his manliness, and on the sure path to baseness unless someone shall establish for him some distinction between pleasures, so that he may know which of them lie within the bounds of natural desire, and which of them sweep headlong onward and are unbounded, being all the more insatiable the more they are satisfied.

[U456]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.33.93: You are, I take it, aware that Epíkouros has distinguished different kinds of desire, not perhaps with too much exactness, but nevertheless in a way that is of service. In part, they are, he says natural and necessary, in part natural and not necessary, in part neither one nor the other; scarcely anything is required to satisfy the necessary pleasures, for the stores of nature are available; and the second kind of desires is, he thinks, neither hard to satisfy nor indeed hard to go without; the third kind he thought should be utterly rejected, because they were completely meaningless and so far from counting as necessary, had no relation to nature either.

Scholion on Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 3.13, p. 1118b 8 [fr. 48v Ald.]:

Plutarch, *Beasts are Rational*, c. 6 p. 989B: Temperance, then, is a curtailment and an ordering of the desires that eliminate those that are extraneous or superfluous and discipline in modest and timely fashion those that are necessary. You can, of course, observe countless differences in the desires ... and the desire to eat and drink is at once natural and necessary, while the pleasures of love, which, though they find their origin in nature, yet may be forgone and discarded without much inconvenience, have been called natural but unnecessary. But there are desires of another kind, neither necessary nor natural, that are imported in a deluge from without as a result of your inane illusions and because you lack true culture. So great is their multitude that the natural desires are, every one of them, all but overwhelmed, as though an alien rabble were overpowering the native citizenry. But beasts have souls completely inaccessible and closed to these adventitious passions and live their lives as free from empty illusions as though they dwelt far from the sea. They fall short in the matter of delicate and luxurious living, but solidly protect their sobriety and the better regulation of their desires since those that dwell within them are neither numerous nor alien.

Cf. Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, I.49: But otherwise, insofar as one has fallen into extravagance, they say that one has a desire that is not necessary and does not arise by necessity from something that causes pain, but from something which causes distress or discomfort only by being absent, or else from delight, or wholly from empty and misleading beliefs; and such a desire does not refer back to any natural lack or to something which by its absence ruins our constitution. Ordinary foods suffice to provide what nature necessarily requires, and because they are simple and small in quantity, they are easy to get. Hence, {Porphyry's own inference:} a meat-eater needs inanimate foods as well, but someone satisfied with inanimate food needs half as much, and that easy to get and needing small expense to prepare.

[U457]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 31, [p. 209, 21 Nauck]: The love of true philosophy dissolves every anxious and painful longing.

[U458]

Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, 1.54: From causes like these, and from analogous causes, there arises an insatiable desire for longevity, wealth, money and fame, because people think that with these they will, given a longer time, increase their sum of good, and because they fear the terror of death as something without limit. The pleasure experienced from luxury comes nowhere near the pleasure experienced from self-sufficiency; it is very pleasant to think just how little one needs. Take away luxury, take away sexual excitement and the desire for external recognition, and what further need is there for inert wealth, which is useful to us for nothing but only weighs us down? This is the way to be filled full, and the pleasure from this kind of satiety is unmixed. We must also make the body unaccustomed, so far as is possible, to the pleasures of excess, but accustomed to the fulfillment which comes from satisfying hunger; we must eat in order to get through everything, and must take as our limit not the unlimited, but the necessary. Thus it too, by self-sufficiency and assimilation to the divine, can obtain the good that is possible for it. Thus it will be genuinely rich, measuring its wealth by the natural limit, not by empty beliefs. Thus it will not be suspended on hopes of the greatest pleasure, without being sure of getting it; for that pleasure causes maximum disruption. But it will be self-sufficient in what is present and in what has already happened, and will not be tormented by the thought of not remaining for longer.

[U459]

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.34.97: Similar reasoning [cf. U439] is applied to food, and the costly splendor of banquets is belittled, because they say nature is contented with little effort. For who does not see that need is the seasoning for all such things? [cf. Horace, *Satires*, 2.2.70-88] 99: And yet, if nature should feel the need of something yet more savory, what a quantity of things are provided by earth and trees in ready abundance and of excellent savor! Add dryness which follows upon restraint in diet, add unimpaired health; contrast with this, sweating, belching men stuffed with food like fattened oxen – then you will understand that those who are in hottest pursuit of pleasure are furthest from catching it, and that the pleasantness of food lies in appetite, not in repletion. [Cf. Epikouros, *Letter to Menoeceus*, 132; Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.8.22] 35.102: Time would fail me should I wish to maintain the cause of poverty; for the matter is evident and nature herself teaches us daily how few, how small her needs, are, how cheaply satisfied.

Ibid., V.9.26: He praises plain living – that is indeed worthy of a philosopher, but only in the mouth of Socrates or Antisthenes, not of the man who can say that pleasure is the supreme good. 3.20.49: He prefers plain to a rich diet.

Cf. Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XVII.43:

[U460]

Seneca, *Moral Dialogs*, VII, *To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life*, 13.1: Personally I hold the opinion – I shall express it though the members of our school may protest – that the teachings of Epikouros are upright and holy and, if you consider them closely, austere; for his famous doctrine of pleasure is reduced to small and narrow proportions, and the rule that we Stoics lay down for virtue, this same rule he lays down for pleasure – he bids that it obey Nature. But it takes a very little luxury to satisfy Nature! What then is the case? ... And so I shall not say, as do most of our school, that the school of Epikouros is an academy of vice, but this is what I say – it has a bad name, is of ill-repute, and yet undeservedly.

Ibid., 12.4: Those who have plunged into pleasures ... they hide their debauchery in the lap of philosophy and flock to the place where they may hear the praise of pleasure and they do not consider how sober and abstemious the "pleasure" of Epíkouros really is – so by Hercules, I think it is – but they fly to a mere name seeking some justification and screen for their lusts.

[U461]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.50-: So when using philosophy one must consider food too, insofar as that school's attentive concern allows; and when something is removed by that school because it will not authorize complete assurance, it should not be added to the provision of wealth and foods. Philosophy, then, should be used to handle such matters, and it will immediately turn out that pursuing a minimal, simple and light diet is far better; for least disturbance comes from least. Preparing food brings many impediments in its wake, from the weighing down of the body, from the trouble of preparation, from disrupting the sustained activity of reason about the most important principles, or from some other cause. So preparation immediately becomes unprofitable, and cannot compensate for the disturbances it entails.

[U462]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.51: Pain caused by hunger is much milder than pain caused by eating to excess, unless someone deludes himself with empty beliefs.

[U463]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.51: Diversity in one's diet not only fails to relieve the troubles of the soul, it will not even increase pleasure in the flesh. For pleasure has limits, which is the point at which removal of pain is achieved.

[U464]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.51-: Meat-eating does not remove any trouble from our nature, or any want which, if not satisfied, leads to pain. The gratification it provides is violent, and is quickly mixed with the opposite. For it contributes not to the maintenance of life but to the variation of pleasures: it resembles sex or drinking imported wines, and our nature can survive without these. The things without which nature could not survive are small in every way and can be got easily, with justice and liberal-mindedness, tranquility and the utmost ease. Moreover, meat does not contribute to health either, but rather impedes it. Health is maintained by the same things through which it is acquired; and it is acquired by a very light and fleshless diet, so that must be how it is sustained.

[U465]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.53: Epíkouros rightly surmised that we should beware of food which we want to enjoy and which we pursue, but find disagreeable once we get it. All rich, heavy food is like this, and when people are carried away by wanting it, they land in expense, illness, glut, or worry. For this reason we should guard against excess even of simple things, and in all cases we must examine what happens as a result of enjoyment or possession, how big a thing it is, and whether it relieves any trouble of body or soul. Otherwise, in every case, tension, such as life engenders, will arise from gratification. We must not go beyond the bounds, but keep within the boundary and measure that applies to such things.

[U466]

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.48-: For most of the Epicureans, starting with their leader, appear to be satisfied with barley-bread and fruit, and they have filled treatises with arguments that nature needs little and that its requirements are adequately met by simple, available food. Riches in accordance with nature, they say, are limited and easy to get; riches in accordance with empty beliefs are unlimited and hard to get [= Principle Doctrine 15]. Disturbance caused to the body by want is well and sufficiently removed by things which are easy to get, which have the simple nature of fluid and dry.

St. Jerome, *Against Jovinianus*, 2.11 t. 2 [p. 340C Vall.]: Epíkouros, the defender of pleasure, in all his books speaks of nothing but vegetables and fruits; and he says that we ought to live on cheap food because the preparation of sumptuous banquets of flesh involves great care and suffering, and greater pains attend the search for such delicacies than pleasures the consumption of them. Our bodies need only something to eat and drink. Where there is bread and water, and the like, nature is satisfied. Whatever more there may be does not go to meet the wants of life, but are ministers to vicious pleasure. Eating and drinking does not quench the longing for luxuries, but appeases hunger and thirst. Persons who feed on flesh want also gratifications not found in flesh. But they who adopt a simple diet do not look for flesh. Further, we cannot devote ourselves to wisdom if our thoughts are running on a well-laden table, the supply of which requires an excess of work and anxiety. The wants of nature are soon satisfied: cold and hunger can be banished with simple food and clothing.

[U467]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.5: One who is too stingy learns [from Epíkouros] that life can be endured on water and barley.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 16, p. 1097D: Now the point that even for the pleasures of the body our nature requires costly provision, and that the most pleasant enjoyment is not to be found in barley-cake and lentil soup, but that the appetite of the sensualist demands succulent viands and Thasian wine and perfumes ... and not only this, but young and attractive women ... this point let us waive.

[U468]

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.28.90: "Come" you will say, "these are trivial objections. The Sage is endowed with Nature's own riches, and these as Epíkouros has shown, are easy to obtain" {cf. Principal Doctrine 16}

Ibid., 2.28.91: He said that natural wealth is easily won, because nature is satisfied with little.

[U469]

Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, XVII.23: "Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy unnecessary."

[U470]

Porphyry, *On Abstinence*, 1.51: The hope of lacking nothing must be with the philosopher throughout his life. Things which are easy to get safeguard this hope sufficiently; expensive things make it a vain hope. That is why most people, even though they have many possessions, make endless efforts because they think they will lack enough. We are satisfied with available, simple things if we keep in mind that all the wealth in the world is not strong enough to give the soul a worthy release from disturbance, but the trouble of the flesh is removed by very moderate, ordinary things which are very easy to get. And if even things on this level fall short, that does not disturb the person who rehearses death. {c.f. U205}

[U471]

Porphyry, *Letter to Marcella*, 27, [p. 208, 2 Nauck]: It is rare to find a man who is <poor> with regard to the goal set by nature and rich with regard to groundless opinions. For no imprudent man is satisfied by what he has, but rather is distressed by what he does not have. So just as people with a fever are always thirsty and desire the most unsuitable things because of the malignancy of their <diseases>, so too those whose souls are in a bad condition always feel that they are totally impoverished and enmeshed in all sorts of desire as a result of their gluttony.

Athēnaîos, *by way of Laértios* 10.12:

Oh men, you labor for pernicious ends;
And out of eager avarice, begin
Quarrels and wars. And yet the wealth of nature
Fixes a narrow limit for desires,
Though empty judgment is insatiable.
This lesson the wise child of Neoklês
Had learnt by ear, instructed by the Muses,
Or at the sacred shrine of Delphi's God.

Plutarch, *On the Desire for Wealth*, 4 p. 524F: ... since for men of sense natural wealth does have a limit and boundary, which is drawn around it by utility as by a compass.

Byzantine Gnomologion [Wachsmuth, Studien zu den griechischen Florilgien, p. 197 n 189]: Wealth in accordance with nature reaches fulfillment with bread, water and ordinary shelter for the body; excess wealth, in accordance with the cravings of the soul, brings this also: afflictions of desire without end.

Juvenal, Satires, 14.316: Yet if any should ask of me what measure of fortune is enough, I will tell him: as much as thirst, cold and hunger demand; as much as sufficed you, Epikouros, in your little garden; as much as in earlier days was to be found in the house of Socrates.

Horace, Epistles, I.12.3:

Cease your complaints: no one ever is poor if his needs are supplied, and
Once all is well with your stomach, your chest, and your feet, there is nothing
More that the treasure of kings could possibly add to your riches.

[U472]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.32.89: Nay, with how little is Epikouros himself contented! No one has said more about plain living. For take the things which make men desire money to provide the means for love, for ambition, for their daily expenditure – as he is far removed from all such things, why should he feel much need of money or rather why should he trouble about it at all?

Ibid., V.31.89: Do you think that Epikouros and the rest of the philosophers are not adequately prepared to meet all others things that are considered evil? What man is not sorely afraid of poverty? And yet not a single philosopher is so.

Horace, Epistles, I.10.32:

Flee grand things. A life can be lived in a poor man's
Cottage surpassing the lives of a king or a king's friends

[U473]

Aelian, Various Histories, IV.13 (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVII.30): Epikouros, of the burgh of Gargettus, had shouted, saying: "Nothing satisfies the man who is not satisfied with a little."

Cf. Horace, Epistles, I.2.46: He who happens to have enough does not desire anything else.

[U474]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 9.20: Epikouros himself, the reviler of Stilpo, used similar language. Put it down to my credit, though I have already wiped out my debt for the present day. He says "Whoever does not regard what he has as most ample wealth, is unhappy, even if he was master of the entire world." Or, if the following seems better-worded to you (for we must try to render meaning and not the mere words): "A man may rule the world and still be unhappy, if he does not feel that he is supremely happy."

[U475]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 2.5: My thought for today is something which I found in Epikouros (yes, I actually make a practice of going over to the enemy's camp – by way of reconnaissance, not as a deserter!). "A cheerful poverty" he says, "is an honorable state." But if it is cheerful it is not poverty at all. It is not the man who has too little who is poor, but the one who hankers after more.

Cf. Horace, Odes, 2.16.13 (below)

[U476]

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, VI.2, p. 266.38: Further, as Euripides wrote: "For the temperate, enough is sufficient" {Fenicie, 554}, Epikouros expressly says, "Sufficiency is the greatest riches of all." {cf. U202}

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 28, [p. 208, 19 Nauck]: Self-sufficiency is the greatest of all wealth.

Saint Augustine, On the Utility of Faith, 4, 10, t. VIII [p. 52A Venice edition, 1719]:

[U477]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 4.10: But I must end my letter. Let me share with you the saying which pleased me today. It too is culled from another man's Garden: "Poverty, brought into conformity with the law of nature, is great wealth." Do you know what limits that law of nature ordains for us? Merely to avert hunger, thirst, and cold. ... Nature's needs are easily provided and ready at hand. It is the superfluous things for which men sweat...

Ibid., 27.9: But let me pay off my debt and say farewell: "Real wealth is poverty adjusted to the law of Nature." Epíkouros has this saying in various ways and contexts; but it can never be repeated too often, since it can never be learned too well.

Cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1117:

But if anyone were to conduct his life by reason,
he would find great riches in living a peaceful life
and being contented, one is never short of a little.

Horace, Odes, 2.16.13: "On little one lives well."

Horace, Epistles, I.10.39:

Fearful of poverty rather than fearful of riches, he must forfeit
Liberty, and in his greed must forever be serving a master.

Horace, Satires, 2.2.1: "Values of simple and frugal existence, good friends, is my subject."

[U478]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 28, [p. 208, 15 Nauck]: Most men fear frugality in their lifestyle and through their fear are led to actions most likely to produce fear.

[U479]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 28, [p. 208, 17 Nauck]: Many men when they have acquired riches have not found the escape from their problems but have only exchanged them for greater problems.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 17.11: I cannot say farewell without paying a price. But what of it? I shall borrow from Epíkouros: "The acquisition of riches has been for many, not an end, but a change, of troubles."

[U480]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 29, [p. 209, 5 Nauck]: By means of occupations worthy of a beast, abundance of riches is heaped up, but a miserable life results.

[U481]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 28, [p. 208, 23 Nauck]: "Therefore they {the philosophers} exhort us to practice not how we must provide for some necessity, but how we will remain secure when it is not provided."

Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.50: What one must do, the Epicureans say, is not to gather together the necessities of life and add philosophy as an accessory, but to provide for genuine assurance of soul and then deal with daily needs. We entrust our concerns to a bad manager if we assess and provide what nature needs without the help of philosophy.

[U482]

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.15: {deriding Epicureanism} Now wealth is a good, and when it comes to pleasures is, so to speak, the thing most productive of them. Why should you not acquire it?

[U483]

Hermias, Commentary on Plato's "Phaedrus" p. 76: Some, in fact, consider love to be absolutely bad, defining it as an intense craving for carnal pleasure, united with frenzy and disquietude.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics" p. 75 (= Suda under "eros" {?-?}, [p. 535, 14 Bernh.]):

Cf. Scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, The Art of Grammar, [p. 667, 13 Bekk.]: The Epicureans define love as an intense craving for carnal pleasures.

[U484]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 18.14: It's time I started wrapping up this letter. "Not till you've settled your account" you say. Well, I'll refer you to Epíkouros for payment: "Anger carried to excess begets madness." How true this is you're bound to know, since you have had not only slaves, but also enemies.

Cf. Horace, Epistles, I.2.62:

Rage is but madness in shorter duration; your temper must either
Bend to your will or bend you, so control it with chain or with bridle.

Apollonius, by way of Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XX.49: The flower of hot-temperedness is folly.

§ 4.8 On Rational Living

[U485]

Porphry, Letter to Marcella, 29, [p. 208.30 Nauck]: Unhappiness comes either through fear or through vain and unbridled desire: but if a man curbs these, he can win for himself the blessedness of wisdom.

[U486]

Porphry, Letter to Marcella, 31, [p. 209.19 Nauck]: "Pain does not consist in lacking the goods of the masses, but rather in enduring the unprofitable suffering that comes from empty false opinions."

[U487]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 12.10: What could be more splendid than the following saying which I'm entrusting to this letter of mine for delivery to you: "To live under constraint is a misfortune, but there is no constraint to live under constraint." Of course not, when on every side there are plenty of short and easy roads to freedom there for the taking... You protest: "It was Epíkouros who said that! What business have you got with someone else's property?" Whatever is true is my property. And I shall persist in inflicting Epíkouros on you, in order to bring it home to people who take an oath of allegiance to someone and never afterward consider what is being said but only who said it, that the things of greatest merit are common property.

Cf. Maximus of Tyre, Dissertations, 3.10 [p. 45 Reiske]: What, then, is more painful than necessity?

[U488]

Gnomolgion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115 (Maxims of Epíkouros): The crude soul is puffed up by prosperity and cast down by misfortune.

[U489]

Porphry, Letter to Marcella, 30, [p. 209.12 Nauck]: "Nature also teaches us to regard the outcomes of fortune of little account and to know how to face misfortune when we are favored by fortune, but not to consider the favors of fortune important when we experience misfortune. And Nature teaches us to accept, unperturbed, the good outcomes of fortune, while standing prepared in the face of the seeming evils which come from fate. For all that the masses regard as good is a fleeting fancy, but wisdom and knowledge have nothing in common with fortune."

Cf. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.3.8 [U604]: Shall we allow this man ... to be forgetful of himself and be disdainful of fortune at the moment when all that he holds good and evil is at fortune's disposal?

[U490]

Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 16 p. 474C: "He who has least need of tomorrow" as Epíkouros says, "most gladly rises to greet tomorrow."

Cf. Horace, Epistles, I.4.13:

Believe that each day which breaks is your last,
Then you will find your delight in another one's rising unhopd for.

[U491]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 15.10: ... a striking maxim that comes from Greece – here it is: "The life of folly is empty of gratitude and full of anxiety – it is focused wholly on the future." "Who said that?" you ask. The same man as before. {Epíkouros}

Cf. Horace, Epistles, l.18.110: "I do not dangle in air like a leaf with my hopes all uncertain."

Horace, Odes, 2.16.25:

If the present moment contents you, never
Mind the future, temper unpleasant things with
Quiet smiles...

Ibid., l.11.8:

Even as we now talk.
Harvest this day, {"Carpe Diem"}
discount tomorrow's gains.

Horace, Odes, 2.16.17:

Why, in life's brief span,
Do we bravely fight for man things?

Ibid., l.4.15:

Briefness of lifespan forbids us
To open a long-range hope's investment.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.38: [Epíkouros says, in effect:] "Let us serve pleasure, then, in whatever way we can, for in a short time we will be nothing whatsoever. Let us suffer no day, therefore, no point of time to flow by for us without pleasure, lest, since we ourselves are at sometime to perish, the very fact that we live may perish." Although he does not say this in so many words, however, he teaches this is fact.

[U492]

Uncertain Author, Vol. Herc. 2, X.74 col. VI: Among mortal men, there is no one who can escape death. And indeed, seeing that everyone, as Epíkouros says, from the very moment of birth remain for a certain time ...

[U493]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 23.9: Now is the time for me to pay my debt. I can give you a saying of your friend Epíkouros and thus clear this letter of its obligation: "It is bothersome always to be beginning life." Or another, which will perhaps express the meaning better: "They live unwell – those who are always beginning to live." You are right in asking why – the saying certainly stands in need of commentary. It is because the life of such persons is always incomplete.

[U494]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 13.16: But now, to close my letter, Have only to stamp the usual seal upon it, in other words, to commit thereto some noble message to be delivered to you: "The fool, with all his other faults, has this also: he is always getting ready to live." Consider what this maxim means ... and you will understand how revolting is the fickleness of men who lay down every day new foundations of life, and begin to build up fresh hopes even at the brink of the grave. ... I should not name the author of this motto, except that it is somewhat unknown and is not one of those popular sayings of Epíkouros which I have myself to praise and to appropriate.

[U495]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 22.13: ... and lo, here is [a maxim] that occurs to my mind; I do not know whether its truth or its nobility of utterance is the greater. "Spoken by whom?" you ask. By Epíkouros; for I am still appropriating other men's belongings. The words are: "Everyone goes out of life just as if he had but lately entered it." Take anyone off his guard, young, old, or middle-aged; you will find that all are equally afraid of death, and equally ignorant of life. No one has anything finished, because we have kept putting off into the future all our undertakings. No thought in the quotation given above pleases me more than that it taunts old men with being infants. "No one" he says, "leaves this world in a different manner from one who has just been born." That is not true; for we are worse when we die than when we were born; but this our fault, and not that of Nature.

Cf. Pseudo-Plato, Axiochus, p. 365D: Indeed Axiochus, you confound lack of sensation with sensations in an irrational way. You invent and say incoherent things, without thinking that, in the meanwhile, you cause yourself suffering by the lack of sensibility, and you cause yourself sorrow by the despoilment and privation of pleasures, as if you were dying to live another life, and would not change your condition of total insensibility – the same as it was before your birth. How, then, since the time of the rule of Dracon and Cleisthenes have you not suffered a single evil?

Plutarch, A Letter to Apollonius, 15 p. 109E: Those who have died return to the same state in which they were before birth; therefore, as nothing was either good or evil for us before birth, even so will it be with us after death. And just as all events before our lifetime were nothing to us, even so will all events subsequent to our lifetime be nothing to us. ... For the condition after the end of life is the same as that before birth.

[U496]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 24.22: Epíkouros criticizes those who crave, as much as those who shrink from death: "It is absurd" he says, "to run towards death because you are tired of life, when it is your manner of life that has made you run towards death."

[U497]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 24.23: To these thoughts {= U496 & U498} you may add a third, of the same stamp: "Men are so thoughtless, nay, so mad, that some, through fear of death, force themselves to die."

Cf. Plutarch, A Letter to Apollonius, 15 p. 110A: As a matter of fact, many people, because of their utter fatuity and their false opinion regarding death, die in their effort to keep from dying.

[U498]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 24.23: Epíkouros says ... in another passage: "What is so absurd as to seek death, when it is through fear of death that you have robbed your life of peace?"

[U499]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.40.117: Let everything be piled up on one single man so that he loses together sight and hearing, suffers too the most acute bodily pains – these, in the first place, commonly finish off a man just by themselves. But if, maybe, they are indefinitely prolonged and torture him nevertheless, more violently than he sees reason for enduring, what reason have we, gracious heaven, for continuing to suffer? For there is haven close at hand, since death is at the same time an eternal refuge where nothing is felt. ... 41.118: For my part, I think that in life we should observe the rule which is followed at Greek banquets – "Let him either drink" it says, "or go!" And rightly, for either he should enjoy the pleasure of tippling along with the others or get away early, so that a sober man may not be a victim to the violence of those who are heated with wine. Thus by running away one can escape the assaults of fortune which one cannot face. This is the same advice as Epíkouros gives and Hieronymus repeats it in as many words.

[U500]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 23, p. 1103E: ... this most sage and divine doctrine: that the end of the soul's troubles is to be destroyed and perish and be nothing.

Ibid., 23, p. 1103C: Those who do not experience this {good fortune as divine providence} amputate the greatest pleasure of prosperity, while in misfortune they leave themselves no source of help. They can see but one haven of refuge in adversity: dissolution, and the loss of all sensation.

Ibid., 27, p. 1105A: For the doctrine that goes "what is dissipated has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us" {Principal Doctrine 2} does not remove the terror of death, but rather confirms it by adding what amounts to a proof. For this is the very thing our nature dreads: "May all of you be turned to earth and water" {Homer, Iliad, IX 408-409} i.e., the dissolution of the soul into what has neither thought nor feeling. Epíkouros, by making the dissolution a scattering into emptiness and atoms, does still more to root out our hope of preservation.

Ibid., 29, p. 1106B: To those, on the other hand, who hold that life comes in the end to insentience and dissolution...

Ibid., 29, p. 1106C: So the doctrine of Epíkouros promises the wretch no very happy relief from adversity, only the extinction and dissolution of his soul. But from the prudent and wise and those who abound in all good things it takes away all cheer by altering their condition from blissful living to not living or being at all.

Saint Augustine, Letter 104 Letter to Nectarius, 3, t. 2 [p. 290C Venice edition, 1719]: What I have read in your literature is more like this: that the life itself which we enjoy is brief, yet you think and you maintain it as a common saying that there can be eternal loss in this life. It is true that some of your authors consider death as the end of all misfortune, but not all of them; it is chiefly the opinion of the Epicureans and those who think the soul is mortal.

[U501]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 30, p. 1106D: Nevertheless, they assert that when the foreboding of incessant evils to which no period is appointed is dispelled, they are left with a benefit that is in the highest degree assured and pleasant – the thought of release – and that is done by Epíkouros' doctrine when it terminates the fear of death with the dissolution of the soul.

[U502]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 30, p. 1107A: And if, as Epíkouros imagines, for most people the process of dying is painful, the fear of death is quite beyond any comfort, since death ushers us through misery to loss of every good.

[U503]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 30.14: He {Aufidius Bassus, an elderly friend} often said, in accordance with the counsels of Epíkouros: "I hope, first of all, that there is no pain at the moment when a man breaths his last; but if there is, one will find an element of comfort in its very shortness. For no great pain lasts long. And at all events, a man will find relief at the very time when should and body are being torn asunder, even though the profess be accompanied by excruciating pain, in the thought that after this pain is over he can feel no more pain. I am sure, however, that an old man's soul is on his very lips, and that only a little force is necessary to disengage it from the body. A fire which has seized upon a substance that sustains it needs water to quench it, or sometimes, the destruction of the building itself; but the fire which lacks sustaining fuel dies away of its own accord." ... 16: Bassus kept saying: "It is due to our own fault that we feel this torture, because we shrink from dying only when we believe that our end is near at hand." But who is not near death? It is ready for us in all places and at all times. "Let us consider" he went on to say, "when some agency of death seems imminent, how much nearer are other varieties of dying, which are not feared by us." A man is threatened with death by an enemy, but this form of death is anticipated by an attack of indigestion.

§ 4.9 On the Virtues

[U504]

Laértios 10.138: {Epíkouros maintains that} we choose the virtues too for the sake of pleasure and not for their own sake, as we take medicine for the sake of health. So too in the twentieth book of his Epilecta says Diogenes, who also calls education 'recreation.'

Seneca, Moral Dialogs, VII, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 9.1: "But even you" <Epíkouros> retorted, "cultivate virtue for no other reason than because you hope for some pleasure from it." But, in the first place, even though virtue is sure to bestow pleasure, it is not for this reason that virtue is sought; for it is not this, but something more than this that she bestows, nor does she labor for this, but her labor, while directed toward something else, achieves this also.

Alexander of Aphrodisia, Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics" p. 12 {Van Ophusijsen 19.8}: There is then, among philosophical opinions, first, those which are shared by all who are wise ... that the virtues are goods; or by the majority of them, such as that virtue is choiceworthy for its own sake – even if Epíkouros disagrees – and that happiness comes into being by virtue.

[U505]

Maximus of Tyre, Dissertations, 3.5 [p. 34 Reiske; 32.5 Trapp]: Since our task is to compare Virtue with Pleasure, I will not abuse Virtue, but I will say this much: if you deprive Virtue of what is pleasant in it, you will also deprive it of its practicability. No good thing is made the object of choice in the absence of Pleasure; the man who labors virtuously labors willingly because of his affection for Pleasure, present or anticipated. Just as in financial transactions no one willingly exchanges a talent for a drachma, unless "Zeus has stolen his wits" {Iliad, 6.234}, but such exchanges, however evenly balanced, must benefit the giver in a manner consistent with the interest of the receiver; just so in our dealings with hard work, no one labors for love of labor (what could be less desirable, after all), but instead bargains his present labors against what a more urbane commentator might call "the Good" but a more veracious one would call Pleasure – because even if you say 'the Good,' you mean Pleasure; goodness would hardly be goodness were it not also supremely pleasurable. 6: I believe this whole argument can be turned around: these very considerations suffice to prove that Pleasure is more worthy of choice than all other things, since for its sake men are prepared to accept death and injuries and labors and countless other vexations.

Ibid., 3.10 [p. 44 Reiske; 32.10 Trapp]: At the cost of trivial pains, you have paved the way for great pleasures.

[U506]

Laértios 10.138: Epíkouros describes virtue as indispensable for pleasure – the one thing without which pleasure cannot exist. Everything else (food, for instance) are separable – not indispensable to pleasure.

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.49: Epíkouros says a pleasurable life is impossible unless accompanied by virtue.

Seneca, Moral Dialogs, VII, To Gallio, or On the Blessed Life, 6.3: And so they say that it is not possible to separate pleasure from virtue, and they profess that no one can live virtuously without also living pleasantly, nor pleasantly without also living virtuously.

Ibid., 9.4: Why do you recommend pleasure to me? It is the good of man that I am searching for, not that of his belly, which is more insatiable than the belly of domestic or wild beasts. "You are misrepresenting what I say" you retort, "for I admit that no man can live pleasantly without at the same time living virtuously as well, and this is patently impossible for dumb beasts and for those who measure their good by mere food. Distinctly, I say, and openly I testify that the life that I call pleasant is impossible without the addition of virtue."

Ibid., 12.3: Let them cease, therefore, to join irreconcilable things and to link pleasure with virtue – a vicious procedure which flatters the worst class of men. The man who has plunged into pleasures, in the midst of his constant belching and drunkenness, because he knows that he is living with pleasure, believes that he is living with virtue as well; for he hears first that pleasure cannot be separated from virtue, then dubs his vices wisdom, and parades what ought to be concealed.

[U507]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.48: Epíkouros has disconnected the highest good from virtue. "Yes, he but often praises virtue."

[U508]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 85.18: Epíkouros also asserts that one who possesses virtue is happy, but that virtue of itself is not sufficient for a happy life, because the pleasure that results from virtue, and not virtue itself, makes one happy.

[U509]

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.21, [p. 178.51 Sylb.]: Epíkouros indeed, and the Cyrenaics, say that pleasure is the first duty; for it is for the sake of pleasure, they say, that virtue was introduced, and produced pleasure.

[U510]

Cicero, On Divination, I.39.87: ... [Epíkouros'] view that there is no such thing as disinterested virtue.

[U511]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, IV.26.73: Epíkouros, who ... makes a mockery of our notions of virtuous and depraved and says we are preoccupied with words and uttering sounds empty of meaning...

Ibid., IV.26.73: The [Epicurean] philosophers hold the view that virtue in and by itself is quite ineffective. Everything that we say is honorable and praiseworthy, they say is mere emptiness – tricked out in a sounding phrase that has no meaning. Nevertheless they think that the Sage is always happy.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.15.48: [= U69]

Ibid., 2.16.51 (Cicero to Torquatus): When you informed us that Epíkouros proclaims "It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly" [= Principal Doctrine 5], your words derived potency from the grandeur of the things that they denoted. You drew yourself up to your full height, and kept stopping and fixing us with your gaze, as if solemnly stating that Epíkouros does occasionally commend morality and justice. Were those names never mentioned by philosophers, we should have no use for philosophy; how well they sounded on your lips!

Cicero, Laelius, or An Essay on Friendship, 23.86: Even virtue itself is regarded with contempt by many, and is said to be mere pretense and display.

Porphyrio, Commentary on Horace's "Epistles" I.17.41: Either virtue is a mere empty name... Epíkouros said that virtue is a vain and empty name, as he linked all actions to how well they consummate pleasure.

Commentary on Lucan, Pharsalia (The Civil War), IX.563: The Epicureans say that virtue is devoid of substance and is an empty name and that because of this, no one can become wise conforming to the precepts of the Stoics, but can only make promises.

Lucian, The Double Indictment, 21 (Epíkouros {portrayed as defending the cause of Dionysius the Apostate}): "... hating the tedium of life with her {i.e., Stoicism), and considering as nonsense that happiness which, she says, accompanies pain..."

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.25: "Learn now how righteousness is nothing, how reverence is folly, how a father is nothing, how a son is nothing."

Himerius, Speeches, by way of Photius I, library codex 243, p. 356A 13: All virtue is lost, by the reasoning and the doctrine of Epíkouros; stop the courts, due process, the rewarding of good people and the punishment of the bad.

[U512]

Aetius, Doxography, XII p. 547A: And in his work On the End-Goal, he says again: "{=U70}" And in other passages, he says "I spit upon the honorable and those who vainly admire it, whenever it produces no pleasure."

Plutarch, Against Kōlôtēs, 30, p. 1124E: ... and when men take for sages those who "spit on excellence, unless pleasure attends it." [c.f. 1124E @ U368]

Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129B:

... to live together with Leóntion and "spit on noble action" and place the good in the "flesh" and in "titillations."

Plutarch, Against Kōlôtēs, 2, p. 1108C: ... those who keep shouting that the good is to be found in the belly and that they would not give a copper coin with a hole in it for all the virtues in bulk apart from pleasure.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 13, p. 1095F: Do they not confess that they are waging war without truce or negotiation on all that is beautiful, so long as it is not pleasurable as well? What holy and pure thing do they welcome and cherish?

[U513]

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.22.21: So then, this will be in my interest: to keep my good faith, my self-respect, my forbearance, my abstinence, and my cooperation, and to maintain my relations with other men. But if I put what is mine in one scale, and what is honorable in the other, then the statement of Epíkouros assumes strength, in which he declares that "the honorable is either nothing at all, or at best only what people hold in esteem."

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.15.48 [= U69]; ibid., 49: Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what moral worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure – unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude.

Idem., Cicero Academica 2.46.140 (Lucullus): [= U400]

Cicero, *On Duties*, 3.33.117: If I should listen to him, I should find that in many passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control; but "the water ill not run" as they say. For how can he commend self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? ... And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, these philosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for enduring pain. They even bring temperance in – not every easily, to be sure, but still as best they can; for they hold that the height of pleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters, or rather I should say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, anymore than friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are cultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.

Cicero, *De Finibus*, 2.12.37: ... the Virtues, which Reason would have in charge of all things, but you considered as the handmaids and subordinates of the pleasures.

Cf. Seneca, *Moral Dialogs*, VII, To Gallio, or *On the Blessed Life*, 13.5: To hand over virtue, the loftiest of mistresses, to be the handmaid of pleasure is the part of a man who has nothing great in his soul.

[U515]

Plutarch, *Stoic Self-Contradictions*, 26, p. 1046E: Now if [Chrysippus] held prudence to be a good productive of happiness, as Epíkouros did...

[U516]

Origen, *Against Celsus*, V.47, [p. 270 Hoesch.]: And so too the "courage" of Epíkouros is one sort of thing, who would undergo some pains in order to escape from a greater number; and a different thing for the philosopher of the Stoa, who would choose all virtue for its own sake.

[U517]

Laértios 10.120: {The Epicurean school teaches that} courage is not a natural gift but arises from circumstances.

[U518]

Origen, *Against Celsus*, V.47, [p. 270 Hoesch.]: ... but righteousness is shown to be one thing according to the view of Epíkouros, and another according to the Stoics (who deny the threefold division of the soul), and yet a different thing according to the followers of Plato, who hold that righteousness is the proper business of the parts of the soul.

Saint Augustine, *Sermon* 348.3, t. V [p. 1343- Venice edition, 1719]:

[U519]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, VI.2 [p. 441 Stählin]: And again, if Aristophanes writes:

"You will have a secure life, being just
and without anxiety nor fear
you will live well"

{Aristophanes, uncertain fragment 19, in Mein., *Greek Comics*, 2 p. 1181}

... Epíkouros says "The greatest fruit of justice is peace of mind."

[U520]

Plutarch, *Virtue and Vice*, 3, p. 101B: Where, then, is the pleasure in vice, if in no part of it is to be found freedom from care and grief or contentment or tranquility or calm? For a well-balanced and healthy condition of the body gives room for engendering the pleasures of the flesh; but in the soul lasting joy and gladness cannot possibly be engendered, unless it provided itself first with cheerfulness, fearlessness, and courageousness as a basis to rest upon, or as a clam tranquility that no billows disturb; otherwise, even though some hope or delectation lure us with a smile, anxiety suddenly breaks forth, like a hidden rock appearing in fair weather and the soul is overwhelmed and confounded.

[U521]

Laértios 10.120: The school holds that not all sins are equal.

Horace, Satires, I.3.96 (criticizing the Stoics):

People who rate all offences as equally wicked are brought up
Short when they face reality: private and public opinions
Find it abhorrent and hardly useful for the general welfare –
Usefulness, one may say, is the mother of justice and fairness.

[U522]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 28.9: It is time I left off – not before I have paid the usual duty though! "A consciousness of wrongdoing is the first step to salvation." This remark of Epíkouros' is to me a very good one. For a person who is not aware that he is doing anything wrong has no desire to be put right. You have to catch yourself doing it before you can reform.

Cf. Horace, Epistles, I.1.41:

Virtue begins with avoidance of vice,
And the first rule of wisdom
Is to abstain from one's folly.

§ 4.10 On Human Society

[U523]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.42: [Epíkouros maintains that] pleasure is the greatest good; there is no human society – each one takes thought for himself. {Cf. U581}

Cf. Cicero, Letters to Atticus, VII.2.4: ...Carneades {spoke} with more wisdom than our philosophers Lucius and Patron, who in sticking to selfish hedonism and denying altruism, and saying that man must be virtuous for fear of the consequences of vice and not because virtue is an end in itself, fail to see that they are describing a manner not of goodness but of craftiness.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 2.20.6: So too Epíkouros, when he wishes to abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what does he say? "Don't be deceived, men, or misled or mistaken: there is no natural fellowship of rational beings with each other. Believe me: those who say otherwise are deceiving you and reasoning falsely."

Ibid., 2.20.20: So with Epíkouros: he cut off everything that characterizes a man, the head of a household, a citizen, and a friend, but he did not succeed in cutting off the desires of human beings; for that he could not do.

[U524]

Horace, Satires, I.3.98:

Usefulness, one may say, is the mother of justice and fairness.

Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1129B:

But consider one who in natural philosophy extols God and justice and providence, in ethics: law and society and participation in public affairs, and in political life the upright and not the utilitarian act, what need has he to live unknown?

[U525]

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, I.23.1: [done above] Even Epíkouros understands that we are by nature social beings, but having once set our good in the husk which we wear, he cannot go on and say anything inconsistent with this. For, he next insists emphatically upon the principle that we ought neither to admire nor to accept anything that is detached from the nature of the good; and he is right in so doing. But how, then can we still be social beings, if affection for our own children is not a natural sentiment? Why do you dissuade the wise man from bring up children? Why are you afraid that sorrow will come to him on their account? ... 5: Nay, he knows, that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it or to care for it. For the same reason Epíkouros says that a man of sense does not engage in politics either... 7: Yet, despite the fact that he knows this, he still has the audacity to say, "Let us not bring up children."

Ibid., IV.11.1: Some people raise doubts whether the social instinct is a necessary element in the nature of man.

Ibid., 3.7.19: In the name God, I ask you, can you imagine an Epicurean State? One man says, "I do not marry." "Neither do I" says another, "for people ought not to marry." No, nor have children; no, nor perform the duties of a citizen. What will happen then? Where are the citizens to come from? Who will educate them? ... Yes, and what will they teach them?

[U526]

Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies*, 2.23, p. 181.25: Dēmókritos repudiates marriage and the procreation of children, on account of the many annoyances arising thereby, and the detraction from more necessary things. Epíkouros agrees, as do those who place good in pleasure, and in the absence of trouble and pain.

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.5: One who hates women has enumerated for him [by Epíkouros] the benefits of celibacy, and childlessness is proclaimed to one who has bad children.

[U527]

Plutarch, *On Affection for Offspring*, 2, p. 495A: Are we, then, to believe that Nature has implanted these emotions in these creatures because she is solicitous for the offspring of hens and dogs and bears, and not, rather, because she is striving to make us ashamed and to wound us, when we reflect that these instances are examples to those of us who would follow the lead of Nature, but to those who are callous, as rebukes for their insensibility, by citing which they disparage human nature as being the only kind that has no disinterested affection and that does not know how to love without prospect of gain? In our theaters, indeed, people applaud the verse of the poet who said, "What man will love his fellow-man for pay?" {Uncertain comic author, t. V p. 122 Mein.} And yet, according to Epíkouros, it is for pay that a father loves his son, a mother her child, and children their parents.

[U528]

Plutarch, *Against Kōlótēs*, 27, p. 1123A: Do you people not dismiss the instinctive love of parents for their offspring – a fact accepted by all?

Cicero, *Letters to Atticus*, VII.2.4: I am glad you take delight in your baby daughter, and have satisfied yourself that a desire for children is natural. For if it is not, there can be no natural tie between people; remove that tie and social life is destroyed. "Heaven bless the consequence" says Carneades, but with more with more wisdom than our philosophers Lucius and Patron...

[U529]

Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, 3.17.5: For one who is irreverent toward his parents there is [from Epíkouros] the idea that there is no bond in nature.

[U530]

Johannes Stobaeus, *Anthology*, 43.139: "Laws are made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent them from inflicting wrong but to secure them from suffering it."

Porphry, *Letter to Marcella*, 27: "The written laws are laid down for the sake of temperate men, not to keep them from doing wrong but from being wronged."

[U531]

Seneca, *Letters to Lucilius*, 97.15: Let us disagree with Epíkouros on one point, when he declares that there is no natural justice, and that crime should be avoided because one cannot escape the fear which results therefrom; let us agree with him on the other – that bad deeds are lashed by the whip of conscience, and that conscience is tortured to the greatest degree because unending anxiety drives and whips it on, and it cannot rely upon the guarantors of its own peace of mind. For this, Epíkouros, is the very proof that we are by nature reluctant to commit crime, because even in circumstances of safety there is no one who does not feel fear.

Horace, *Satires*, I.3.113:

Nature, however, can not differentiate just things from unjust,
As she distinguishes things to be shunned from the things to be sought for.

[U532]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 6, p. 1090C: That their general prospects are poor even for a life without mental anguish you may also judge in the light of the remarks they address to others. Criminals and transgressors of the laws, says Epíkouros, pass their entire lives in misery and apprehension, since even though they may succeed in escaping detection, they can have no assurance of doing so. Consequently, fear of the next moment weighs heavy on them and precludes any delight or confidence in their present situation.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 97.13: Hence I hold Epíkouros' saying to be most apt: "That the guilty may happen to remain hidden is possible" or, if you think that the meaning can be made more clear in this way: "The reason that there is no advantage for wrong-doers to remain hidden is that (even though they got lucky) they have not the assurance of remaining so."

Cf. Atticus, by way of Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel, XV 5.5: It is not impossible to feel assurance of being undetected in wrong-doing, if indeed it be necessary to avoid detection by men: it is not necessary, however, on every occasion even to seek to avoid detection, where a man has power to overmaster those who have discovered him. So the disbelief in providence is a ready way to wrong-doing. For a very worthy person indeed is he, who after holding out pleasure to us as a good, and granting us security from the gods, still thinks to provide a plan to prevent wrong-doing. He acts like a physician who, having neglected to give help while the sick man was yet alive, attempts after death to devise certain contrivances for curing the dead man.

Arrian, Discourses on Epictetus, 3.7.11: A man acts foolishly {according to Epictetus' derisive portrayal of Epicureanism}, if, when he is a Judge and able to take the property of other men, he keeps his hands off it. But, if you please, let us consider this point only, that the theft be done secretly, safely, without anybody's knowledge. For even Epíkouros himself does not declare the act of theft evil – only getting caught. Only because it is impossible for one to be certain that he will not be detected, does he say, "Do not steal."

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1152:
Hence, the fear of punishment spoils the {ill-gotten} prizes.
Violence and wrong catch people in their own nets
and those who start such things are most often entangled.
It is not easy to pass a peaceful life
if you act in a way that disturbs the general peace.
Although you elude the gods and the human race
you still must wonder whether your secret will be kept forever.

[U533]

Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 2, VII.21 col. XXVIII: The chief of all goods, even if there weren't any other, is that by which he who possesses it advances toward virtue.

[U534]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 25, p. 1104B: Epíkouros supposes that fear of punishment is the only motive to which we can properly appeal in deterring from crime.

[U535]

Origen, Against Celsus, VII.63, [p. 385 Hoesch.]: For example, the philosophers who follow Zénō of Citium abstain from committing adultery, the followers of Epíkouros do so too, as well as others again who do so on no philosophical principles; but observe what different reasons determine the conduct of these different classes. The first consider the interests of society, and hold it to be forbidden by nature that a man who is a reasonable being should corrupt a woman whom the laws have already given to another, and should thus break up the household of another man. The Epicureans do not reason in this way; but if they abstain from adultery, it is because, regarding pleasure as the chief end of man, they perceive that one who gives himself up to adultery, encounters for the sake of this one pleasure a multitude of obstacles to pleasure, such as imprisonment, exile, and death itself. They often, indeed, run considerable risk at the outset, while watching for the departure from the house of the master and those in his interest. So that, supposing it possible for a man to commit adultery, and escape the knowledge of the husband, of his servants, and of others whose esteem he would forfeit, then the Epicurean would yield to the commission of the crime for the sake of pleasure.

Theophilus of Antioch, To Autolycus, 3.6, p. 120B: And Epíkouros himself, too, as well as teaching atheism, teaches along with it incest with mothers and sisters, and this in transgression of the laws which forbid it; Ibid., p 120C: Why, then, do Epíkouros and the Stoics teach incest and sodomy, with which doctrines they have filled libraries, so that from boyhood this lawless intercourse is learned?

Cf. St. Justin Martyr, Apology, 2.12 p. 50E: And imitating Jupiter and the other gods in sodomy and shameless intercourse with woman, might we not bring as our apology the writings of Epíkouros and the poets?

§ 4.11 On Security Among Men

[U536]

Laértios 10.117: There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt. These the wise man overcomes by reason.

[U537]

Gnomologion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115u (Maxims of Epíkouros): It is not possible for he who incites fear upon others to lack fear within himself.

[U538]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.26.84: Hatred and envy will be easy to avoid – Epíkouros gives rules for doing so.

[U539]

Cicero, De Finibus, I.20.65 (Torquatus to Cicero): On the subject of friendship... Epíkouros' pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct.

Cf., Ibid., 2.25.80 (Cicero to Torquatus): The system you uphold... undermines the very foundations of friendship, however much Epíkouros may, as he does, praise friendship up to the heavens.

Ibid., 2.25.80 (Cicero to Torquatus): It does you not good to repeat Epíkouros' admirable remarks in praise of friendship – I am not asking what Epíkouros actually says, but what he can say consistently while holding the theory he professes.

[U540]

Laértios 10.120: {The Epicurean school teaches that} friendship is prompted by our needs. One of the friends, however, must make the first advances (just as one has to cast seed into the earth), but it is maintained by a partnership in the enjoyment of life's pleasures.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.42: Epíkouros says... there is no one who loves another but for his own sake.

[U541]

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.26.82 (Cicero to Torquatus): Let us return to what you said about friendship. In one of your remarks I seemed to recognize a saying of Epíkouros himself – that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated for the reason that without it we cannot live secure and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live pleasantly.

Cf., Ibid., 2.26.84 (Cicero to Torquatus): "Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility." {The Epicureans says} "Friends are protection."

[U542]

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 19.10: Epíkouros says "you should be more concerned about inspecting whom you eat and drink with, than what you eat and drink. For feeding without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf." This privilege will not be yours unless you withdraw from the world. Otherwise, you will have as guests only those whom your slave-secretary sorts out from the throng of callers. It is, however, a mistake to select your friend in the reception-hall or to test him at the dinner-table.

[U543]

Laértios 10.11: {Diocles} further says that Epíkouros did not think it right that their {the Epicureans'} property should be held in common, as required by the doctrine of Pythagoras regarding the goods of friends; such a practice in his opinion implied mistrust, and without confidence there is no friendship.

Cicero, Letters to Friends, VII.12: {February, 53 B.C.} My dear friend Pansa {Caius Vibius Pansa} has informed me that you {Caius Trebatius Testa} have become an Epicurean ... What will be your legal ruling on Communi Dividundo {dividing what is held in common}, when nothing can be held in common among those whose one standard of conduct is their own pleasure?

[U544]

Plutarch, Philosophers and Men in Power, 3, p. 778E: And yet, Epíkouros, who places happiness in the deepest tranquility, as in a sheltered and landlocked harbor, says that it is not only nobler, but also pleasanter, to confer than to receive benefits.

[U545]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment. 55: ... and they present for frank criticism what concerns themselves in the presence of the students, to be put before Epíkouros and for the sake of correction. Nevertheless, if it is pleasing to someone, let it be said: "Why is it that the purifier of everyone {i.e., Epíkouros} for the sake of correction of the errors arising from foolishness, would not present even one ..." {sc., perhaps, "...of his errors as an example"}

[U546]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 8, p. 1111B: Epíkouros chooses friends for the pleasure he gets, but says that he assumes the greatest pains on their behalf.

[U547]

Philódēmos, On Frank Criticism, Vol. Herc. 1, V.2, fragment. 45 (part): And the overall and most important thing is, we shall obey Epíkouros, according to whom we have chose to live, as even....

§ 4.12 On Honor & Glory

[U548]

Plutarch, On How to Study Poetry, 14, p. 37A: "It is not great sums of money nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor offices of authority which produce happiness and blessedness, but rather freedom from pain and calmness and a disposition of the soul that sets its limitations in accordance with nature."

[U549]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 18, p. 1100A: Epíkouros admitted that some pleasures come from fame.

[U550]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 2.12.28: Put the same question to Epíkouros: he will say that a moderate degree of pain is worse evil than the deepest disgrace, for no evil is involved in disgrace alone, unless it should be attended by painful circumstances. What pain then does Epíkouros feel when he actually affirms that pain is the greatest evil? And yet I cannot look to find any worse disgrace than such a sentiment in the mouth of a philosopher.

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 27.65: Pain is an evil, according to your view. Reputation, infamy, disgrace, degradation – these are mere words, mere trifles.

[U551]

Plutarch, An Recte Dictum Sit Latenter Esse Vivendum, 1128F-:

"Live unknown."

Flavius Claudius Julianus (Julian the Emperor), Letter to Themistius the Philosopher, [p. 471 Pet.; 330.15 Hertlein]: Do you think that such a man, upon hearing these arguments ... would he not ... approve the wisdom of the son of Neoklês, who bid us to "live unknown?" Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epíkouros you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epíkouros was mistaken in that view of his, {but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration.}

Ibid., [p. 478 Pet.; 335.19 Hertlein]: To admire the Epicureans' lack of engagement in political life, and their gardens...

Themistius, Discourses, XXVI, [p. 390.21 Dind.; 324.2 Penella]: In theory, we expel Epíkouros, son of Neoklês, and exclude him from our list [of philosophers] because he approved of the injunction "live unnoticed" and was responsible for the doctrine that human beings are not sociable and civilized by nature; but in reality we approve of his opinion...

Cf. Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana, VIII.28 p. 368: All through his life, [Apollonius] is said often to have exclaimed: "Live unobserved, and if that cannot be, slip unobserved from life."

Horace, Epistles, I.18.102:

Is serenity found amid honors and neat little profits
Or does it wait on the untraveled road and the hidden byway?

Ibid., I.17.10:

Nor is a life badly spent, which from birth until death goes unnoticed.

Ovid, Tristia, 3.4.25: Believe me, he who keeps himself well-hidden has lived well.

Seneca, Thyestes, 393-403:

Let me be filled with sweet repose
In humble station fixed.
Let me enjoy untroubled ease, and
To my fellow citizens, unknown.
Let my life's stream flow in silence,
So when my days have passed noiselessly away,
Lowly may I die and full of years.
Death lies heavily on he,
Who is too well known by all,
And dies to himself unknown.

[U552]

Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, 20.3: They {Epíkouros and his school} would have nothing to do with civil government on the ground that it was injurious and the ruin of happiness.

Saint Augustine, Against the Academicians, 3.16.35 t. I [p. 290F Venice Edition, 1719]: {Rhetorically addressing Cicero} If we are to live according to what is plausible to another, then you shouldn't have governed the Roman Republic, since it seemed to Epíkouros that one ought not do this.

Plutarch, Non Posse, 2, p. 1087B: ... the people who shout "No manly boxers are we" or orators, or champions of the commonwealth, or magistrates; "We ever hold the table dear instead." {Homer, Odyssey, VIII 246-248} and "every agreeable stirring of the flesh that is transmitted upward to give some pleasure and delight to the mind."

Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, V.1127:

It is indeed much better to obey in peace
Than to desire to hold the world in fee and to rule kingdoms.

The Comic Sotion of Alexandria, by way of Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 336F: "Ethics, embassies, military tactics – fine pretenses that sound hollow, like dreams."

Cf. Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. (2) VII.176:

[U553]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.3: The teaching of Epíkouros ... speaks according to the natural bent of each individual. ... He prohibits the cowardly from an advance to public life, the lazy from exercise, the timid from engaging in military service.

[U554]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 31, p. 1125C: ... who write in these very words: "We must proceed to tell how a person will best uphold the purpose of his nature and how of his own free will he is not to present himself for public office at all."

[U555]

Plutarch, On Peace of Mind, 2 p. 465F (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 29.79): For this reason not even Epíkouros believes that men who are eager for honor and glory should lead an inactive life, but that they should fulfill their natures by engaging in politics and entering public life, on the ground that, because of their natural dispositions, they are more likely to be disturbed and harmed by inactivity if they do not obtain what they desire.

[U556]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 31, p. 1125C: But who are the men that nullify these things, overthrowing the state and utterly abolishing the laws? Is it not those who withdraw themselves and their disciples from participation in the state? Is it not those who say that the crown of an untroubled spirit is a prize beyond all comparison with success in some great command? Is it not those who say that to be king is a fault and a mistake?

[U557]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.6: He who is eager for fame and power is instructed [by Epíkouros] to cultivate kings and royal acquaintances; he who cannot bear annoyance to shun the palace.

[U558]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 34, p. 1127D: Epíkouros and Mētródōros ... speak spitefully of the earliest and wisest lawgivers.

Ibid., 21, p. 1119C: For this is what Typhon {a mythological monster} signifies, and your master has implanted plenty of him in you with his war against the gods and godlike men.

The Comic Sotion of Alexandria, by way of Athēnaîos, Deipnosophists, VIII p. 336F: "You will only have what you eat and drink. All the rest is dust – Pericles, Codrus, Cimon"

[U559]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 15, p. 1097C: But even if one wished, one could not pass over the man's absurd inconsistency: He treads underfoot and belittles the actions of Themistocles and Miltiades, and yet writes this to his friends about himself... "{=U183}"

[U560]

Plutarch, Against Kōlótēs, 33, p. 1127A: They mention statesmen only to deride them and belittle their fame, for instance Epaminondas, who they say had but one good thing about him, and even that 'mikkon' {Boeotian dialect for 'micron' = 'small'; i.e., the one good thing about him, his abstention from unnecessary pleasures, was an example of the Boeotian insensibility} for this is their expression, and dubbing the man himself 'iron guts' and asking what possessed him to go walking across the Peloponnese and not sit at home with a nice felt cap on his head {his campaign took place in winter}, wholly concerned – we must suppose – with the care and feeding of his belly.

5. On the Sage

§ 5.1 On the Studies of the Sage

[U561]

Laértios 10.121: It is not possible for one Sage to be wiser than another.

[U562]

Laértios 10.121: He will formulate beliefs and not be a pure skeptic.

[U563]

Laértios 10.119: He will leave written words behind him.

[U564]

Laértios 10.121: He will found a school.

[U565]

Laértios 10.118: The Sage will not give rhetorical speeches.

[U566]

Laértios 10.119: He will not compose panegyric {a formal public speech delivered in high praise of someone or something}.

[U567]

Laértios 10.121: He will earn money, if he should be in poverty, but only for his wisdom.

[U568]

Laértios 10.121: {...the Sage will be able to converse correctly about music and poetry} without however actually writing poems himself.

[U569]

Laértios 10.121: Only the Sage will be able to converse correctly about music and poetry.

[U570]

Laértios 10.120: He will be fond of the country.

[U571]

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.5: For one fleeing the crowd, solitude is praised [by Epíkouros].

§ 5.2 On Duties

[U572]

Laértios 10.120: {The Sage, according to Epíkouros,} will mind his property and plan for the future.

[U573]

Laértios 10.120: He will pay only as much regard to his reputation as needed to be not looked down upon.

[U574]

Laértios 10.118: The Epicureans believe the Sage should not fall in love; ... according to them, love does not come by divine inspiration – so Diogenes says in his twelfth book.

Chrysippus, by way of Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, LXIII.31:

[U575]

Laértios 10.121: The Sage will set up votive images.

Laértios 10.119: He is willing to take a suit to court.

Laértios 10.121: He will pay court to a king if need be.

Uncertain Epicurean Author, Vol. Herc. 2, VII.15 col. XIX

§ 5.3 The Attitude of the Sage

Plutarch, Non Posse, 4, p. 1089A: Whether the other set {i.e., the Epicureans, in contrast with the Cyrenaics} who hold that the superiority of the Sage lies above all in this: vividly remembering and keeping intact in himself the sights and feelings and movements associated with pleasure – are thus recommending a practice unworthy of the name of wisdom by allowing the slops of pleasure to remain in the soul of the Sage as in the house of a spendthrift, let us not say.

Cicero, In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. ... He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. But those who said that men should aim at an honorable position, should consult the public interest, should think of duty throughout life not of self-interest, should face danger for their country, receive wounds, welcome death – these he called visionaries and madmen.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.17.39: For when [Epíkouros] holds that a Sage does all things for his own sake, he considers his own advantage in everything he does. Ibid., 17.4: [Epíkouros] counsels the Sage to bestow nothing on any man, for all things that are his own concerns make him wise.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, IV.22, [p. 228.7 Sylb.]: Even Epíkouros says that a man who he esteemed wise "would not do wrong to anyone for the sake of gain; for he could not persuade himself that he would escape detection." So then, if he knew he would not be detected, he would, accordingly, do evil.

Laértios 10.118: In regards to women, he will obey legal restrictions, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epíkouros' ethical doctrines.

Laértios 10.120: He will guard himself against chance.

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 3.20.49: Epíkouros says ... that fortune has no power over the Sage.

Seneca, On the Integrity of the Sage (to Serenus), 16.1: Even if Epíkouros, who most of all indulged the flesh, is up in arms against injury, how can such an attitude on our part seem incredible or to be beyond the bounds of human nature? He says that injuries are tolerable for the Sage; we {Stoics} say that injuries do not exist for him.

Cicero, Tuscultanae Disputationes, V.36.103: Will obscurity, insignificance, or unpopularity prevent the Sage from being happy? ... 104: It must be understood that popular acclaim is neither to be coveted for its own sake, nor is obscurity to be sorely feared. "I came to Athens" said Dēmókritos, "and no one knew me." What dignified resoluteness for a man to glorify having no glory! As flute-players and harpists follow their own tastes – not the tastes of the multitude – in regulating the rhythm of music, should not the wise man, gifted as he is with a far higher art, seek out what is truest, rather than the pleasure of the populace? Can anything be more foolish than to suppose that those, whom individually one despises as illiterate mechanics, are worth anything collectively? The wise man will in fact despise our worthless ambitions and reject the distinctions bestowed by the people even if they come unsought. ... 105: What anguish they escape who have no dealings whatever with the people! For what is more delightful than leisure devoted to literature? That literature I mean which gives us the knowledge of the infinite greatness of nature, and I, in this actual world of ours, of the sky, the lands, and the seas. 106: Now when honors are despised, and money also despised, what is there left to be dreaded? Exile, I suppose, which is reckoned among the greatest evils. ... 108: In facing all mishaps, the easiest is the method of those who refer the aims they follow in life to the standard of pleasure, and this means that they can live happily wherever this is provided; Teucer's saying can be fitted to every condition: "One's county is wherever one's happy."

[U587]

Laértios 10.117: {susceptibility to emotion} will be no hindrance to exercising his wisdom {the wisdom of the Sage}.

[U588]

Laértios 10.121: Whether or not he is well off will be a matter of indifference to him.

[U589]

Laértios 10.118: He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 81.11: "Do you maintain then that only the wise man knows how to return a favor?" ... In order not to bring any odium upon myself, let me tell you that Epíkouros says the same thing. At any rate, Mētródōros remarks that only the wise man knows how to return a favor.

[U590]

Laértios 10.121: For the sake of a friend, on such occasion, he is prepared to die.

[U591]

Laértios 10.119: Some he will try to dissuade {from marriage}.

[U592]

Laértios 10.121: He will be grateful to anyone when he is corrected.

[U593]

Laértios 10.120: He will be more delighted than others at festivals.

[U594]

Laértios 10.118: Nor will he punish his servants; rather, he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character.

[U595]

Laértios 10.121: He will be like himself even while asleep.

[U596]

Laértios 10.117: He will be more susceptible to emotion than other men.

[U597]

Laértios 10.119: The Sage will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta.

[U598]

Laértios 10.118: When tortured, he will give vent to cries and groans.

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V.38.110: Emotions of the soul, anxieties and distresses are alleviated by forgetfulness when the thoughts of the soul are diverted to pleasure. Not without reason therefore, Epíkouros ventured to say that the Sage always has more of good than evil because he always has pleasures; and from this he thinks there follows the conclusion we are in search of: that the Sage is always happy. 111: "Even if he is to go without the sense of sight, or of hearing?" Even then – for he doesn't love such things for themselves. For to begin with, what pleasures, pray tell, does the blindness you dread so much have to go without? Seeing that some even argue that all the other pleasures reside in the actual sensations, while the perceptions of sight do not go along with any delight felt in the eyes, in the same way as the perceptions of taste, smell, touch, hearing are confided to the actual organ of sensation – nothing of the sort takes place with the eyes. It is the soul which receives the objects we see. Now the soul may have delight in many different ways, even without the use of sight; for I am speaking of an educated and instructed man with whom life is thought; and the thought of the wise man scarcely ever calls in the support of the eyes to aid his researches. For if night does not put a stop to happy life, why should a day that resembles night stop it? ... 39.114: Dēmókritos lost his sight – he could not, to be sure, distinguish blank from white; but all the same he could distinguish good from bad, just from unjust, honorable from disgraceful, expedient from inexpedient, great from small, and it allowed him to live happily without seeing changes of color; it was not possible to do so without true ideas. And this man believed that the sight of the eyes was an obstacle to the piercing vision of the soul and, while others often failed to see what lay at their feet, he ranged freely into the infinite without finding any boundary that brought him to a halt. 40, 116: Is there any evil really in deafness? ... all of us ... are assuredly deaf in so many foreign languages which we do not understand. "But the deaf do not hear the voice of a good singer." No, nor the screech of a saw either, when it is being sharpened, nor the grunting of a pig when its throat is being cut, nor the thunder of the roaring sea when they want to sleep. And if, perhaps, music has charms for them, they should first reflect that many wise men lived happily before music was invented, secondly, that far greater pleasure can be derived from reading than hearing verse. Next, as a little while ago we diverted the blind to the pleasure of hearing, so we may divert the deaf to the pleasure of sight; for the man who can converse with himself will not need the conversation of another.

Plutarch, *Non Posse*, 3, p. 1088B: By attaching the pleasurable life to painlessness they preclude us from dwelling longer on the point, since they admit themselves that pleasure of the flesh is a slight or rather an infinitesimal thing – that is, if this is not mere empty and pretentious talk ... Epíkouros asserts that in illness the Sage often actually laughs at the paroxysms of the disease.

Ibid., 5, p. 1090A: My judgment is that if they would take a tone more in keeping with their own bitter experience {of terrible diseases} and not incur in addition the odium of ranting, by courting applause with a bold display of hollow words, they ought either to refrain from taking the position that the "stable condition of the flesh" {cf. U424 & U68} is the source of all delight, or from asserting that persons in the throes of an excruciating disease feel delight and treat the affliction with insolent contempt.

Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, 2.7.17: As for Epíkouros, however, he speaks in a way that makes him seem laughable to my mind. For in one passage he asserts that if the wise man be burnt, if he be tortured – you are waiting perhaps for him to say, "he will submit, will endure, will not yield." High praise, by Hercules! – and worthy of the great god Hercules whose name I invoked. But this is not enough for Epíkouros – that hard stern spirit. If the wise man finds himself inside Phalaris' bull {description}, he will say "How sweet; how indifferent I am to this!" ... And yet those philosophers {the Stoics} who deny that pain is an evil do not generally go so far as to say that it is sweet to be tortured; they say that it is unpleasant, difficult, horrible, contrary to nature, and yet that it is not an evil. Epíkouros, who says that pain is the only evil and the worst of all evils, thinks that the Sage will call it sweet. For my part I do not require you to describe pain in the same words as Epíkouros, that devotee, as you know, of pleasure. Let him, if he likes, say the same inside the bull of Phalaris as he would have said, had he been in his own bed; I do not consider wisdom so wonderfully powerful against pain.

Ibid., V.10.31: Epíkouros too, note well, insists that the Sage always happy. He is caught by the grandeur of the thought; but he would never say so if he paid attention to his own words – for what is less consistent than for the man who says that pain is either the highest or the only evil, to suppose also that the Sage, at the moment he is tortured by pain, will say "How sweet this is!"

Ibid., V.26.75: For my part, I should say, let the Peripatetics also and the Old Academy make an end some time or other of their stuttering and have the courage to say openly and loudly that happy life will reach down even into the bull of Phalaris.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.27.88 (Cicero to Torquatus): {Epíkouros} thinks nothing of pain; for tells us that if he were being burnt to death, he would claim, "how delightful this is!"

Ibid., V.28.85: {it is doubtful} whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris.

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 18.42: Well, these same philosophers who define evil as pain and good as pleasure assert that the wise man, even were he to be shut up in the bull of Phalaris and roasted above a fire, would assert that he was happy and felt perfect calm of mind. What they meant as that the power of virtue is so great that the good man can never be otherwise than happy.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66.18: {I might say} "Epíkouros even maintains that the wise man, though he is being burned in the bull of Phalaris, will cry out 'This is pleasant, and concerns me not at all.'" Why need you wonder, if I maintain that he who reclines at a banquet and the victim who stoutly withstands torture possess equal goods, when Epíkouros maintains a thing that is harder to believe, namely, that it is pleasant to be roasted in this way?

Ibid., 67.15: "If I am tortured, but bear it bravely, all is well; if I die, but die bravely, it is also well." Listen to Epíkouros – he will tell you that it is actually pleasant. I myself shall never pronounce an unmanly word to an act so honorable and austere.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.27.5: Epíkouros was much more strong in saying "The Sage is always happy, and even enclosed in the bull of Phalaris, he will utter this pronouncement 'It is pleasant and I care nothing.'" Who would not mock him, especially because a voluptuary placed upon himself the character of a strong man, and beyond measure at that!

Ibid., 3.17.42: [Epíkouros says] death should not be feared by a strong man, nor any pain, because even if he is tortured, if he burns, he may say that he cares not at all about it.

Ibid., 3.17.5: [=U401]

[U602]

Aelian, Various Histories, IV.13 (Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVII.30): Epíkouros said that he was ready to rival Zeus for happiness, as long as he had a barley cake and some water.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.21 [p. 178.41 Sylb.]: Epíkouros, in placing happiness in not being hungry, or thirsty, or cold, uttered that godlike word, saying impiously that he would thereby vie even with Father Jove; teaching, as it were, that the life of pigs devouring rubbish and not of rational philosophers, was supremely happy.

[Cf. Theodoretus, Remedies for the Errors of the Greeks, XI [p. 154.2 Sylb.; p. 420 Gaisf.]]

Flavius Claudius Julianus (Julian the Emperor), Orations, VI, "To the Uneducated Cynics" [p. 366 Pet.]: Then does he {Diogenes of Sinope} not seem to you of no importance, this man who was "cityless, homeless, a man without a country, owning not an obol, not a drachma, not a single slave" nay, not even a loaf of bread – while Epíkouros says that if he have bread enough and to spare he is not inferior to the gods on the score of happiness.

Cicero, De Finibus, 2.27.88: Isn't pleasure more desirable the longer it lasts? On what ground then does Epíkouros speak of a deity (for so he always does) as happy and immortal? Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epíkouros. Each of them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure. Wherein then is he inferior to a god, except that a god lives forever?

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 25.4: Let us return to the law of nature; for then riches are laid up for us. The things which we actually need are free for all, or else cheap; nature craves only bread and water. No one is poor according to this standard; when a man has limited his desires within these bounds, he can challenge the happiness of Jove himself, as Epíkouros says.

[U603]

Cicero, De Finibus, V.31.93: The very people who measure all things by pleasure and pain – do they not cry aloud that the Sage always has more things that he likes than that he dislikes? Thus when so much importance is assigned to virtue by those who confess that they would not raise a hand for the sake of virtue if it did not produce pleasure, what are we to do?

[U604]

Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, V.26.73: Is Epíkouros, who merely puts on the mask of a philosopher and has bestowed the title on himself, to be allowed to say ... that there is no circumstance in which the Sage, even if burnt, racked, cut into pieces, cannot cry out: "I count it all as nothing" – particularly as Epíkouros restricts evil to pain and good to pleasure, makes a mockery of our notions of virtuous and depraved and says we are preoccupied with words and uttering sounds empty of meaning, and that nothing interests us except the bodily sensation of either rough or smooth. Shall we allow this man ... to be forgetful of himself and be disdainful of fortune at the moment when all that he holds good and evil is at fortune's disposal? 75: ...he maintains that the Sage is always happy.

Ibid., 3.20.49: He says that there is not time when the wise man is not happy.

Ibid., V.10.31: [@ U601]

[U605]

Plutarch, Non Posse, 16, p. 1098B: But, it is objected, they shout that "they have had a pleasant life" "revel in it" and "hymn the praises" of their own "way of living." {c.f., U181 & U600}

[U606]

Philódēmos, Vol. Herc. 2, I.158

[U607]

Apollonius Dyskolus, The Adverb, [p. 566.3 Bekk.]

Gnomologium Vaticanum Epicureum

Ἐπικούρου Γνωμολογία

Ἐπικούρου Προσφώνησεις

SV 4. Perception of Pain

Πᾶσα ἀλγηδὼν εὐκαταφρόνητος: ἡ γὰρ σύντονον ἔχουσα τὸ πονοῦν σύντομον ἔχει τὸν χρόνον – ἡ δὲ χρονίζουσα περὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀβληχρὸν ἔχει τὸν πόνον.

* All pain is completely easy to regard: because the experience of flaring pain has a sparing duration – but the long enduring in the body has a mild pain.

[Bailey] All bodily suffering is negligible; for that which causes acute pain has short duration, and that which endures long in the flesh causes but mild pain.

Every pain is easy to disregard; for that which is intense is of brief duration, and those bodily pains that last long are mild.

πᾶς <i>(πάσα, πᾶν)</i>	whole	ΠΑΣ <i>all</i>
λυπηρός <i>(ἀ, ὄν)</i>	distressing	ΛΥΠΗΡΟΣ <i>distress</i>
ἡ ἀλγηδὼν αἱ ἀλγηδόνες	pain	ΑΛΓΗΔΩΝ <i>sensed pain</i>
ἡ φροντίς αἱ φροντίδες	concern	ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣ <i>mind</i>
καταφρονεῖν <i>+ gen</i>	to disregard	ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΕΙΝ <i>mind down upon</i>
ὁ εὐφρονοῦν οἱ εὐφρονοῦντες	he who thinks well	ΕΥΦΡΟΝΟΥΝ <i>good mind</i>
εὐκαταφρόνητος <i>(ον)</i>	easy to disregard	ΕΥΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΟΣ <i>good mind down upon</i>

SV 7. Detection & Concealment

Ἀδικοῦντα λαθεῖν μὲν δύσκολον – πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαθεῖν ἀδύνατον

although it is difficult for the Unjust to escape notice – it is impossible to gain confidence concerning the deception

[Seneca, Epistles 9.13] Potest nocenti contingere ut lateat – latendi Fides non potest

It can happen for the guilty that they may hide – but Trust in concealment cannot exist

[add U532]

x	vvv	x

This is a summary of Principle Doctrine 35 "It is not possible that he who secretly does something (among those things agreed with each other for not harming and not being harmed) to believe that he will evade [notice] – even if he evades thousands of times up to now – for until his death it is unclear if he will evade notice."

SV 9. No Need to Live in Need

Κακὸν ἀνάγκη – ἀλλ' οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ζῆν μετὰ ἀνάγκης.

* Natural need is **harmful** – but there is **no** natural need to live **with natural need**.

[Bailey] Necessity is **an evil** – but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.

x	v v v	x

SV 10. Eternal Contemplation

Μέμνησο ὅτι, **θνητός** ὦν **τῇ φύσει** καὶ λαβὼν **χρόνον ὠρισμένον**, ἀνέβης **τοῖς** περὶ φύσεως **διαλογισμοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα** καὶ κατεῖδες "**τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα**."

* Remember that, being **mortal by nature** and having received **finite time**, you ascended **to the considerations** concerning nature **to infinity and eternity**, and you have seen "**the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before**."

[Bailey] Remember that you are of mortal nature and have a limited time to live and have devoted yourself to discussions on nature for all time and eternity, and have seen “things that are now and are to come and have been."

x	v v v	x

"declaring the things that exist, the things that will exist, and the things existing before (**εἰρεῦσαι τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα**)" is line 38 of Hesiod's *Theogony*.

Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, 5.138

Μητροδώρου τε καίτοι Ἐπικουρείου γενομένου, **ἐνθέως ταῦτά γε** εἰρηκότος: "Μέμνησο, Μενέστρατε, **διότι θνητός** φύς καὶ λαβὼν **βίον ὠρισμένον**, ἀναβάς **τῇ ψυχῇ ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων**, κατεῖδες καὶ "**τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ' ἔοντα**.""

Although Metrodorus became an Epicurean, he said **these things** piously: "Menestratus, remember **that**, having been born **mortal** and having received a **finite life**, and having ascended **with your soul** up **until the eternity and the infinity of circumstances**, you have even seen '**the things that will exist, and the things existing before**.'"

SV 11. Behavioral Extremes

Τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων: τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ – τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

* With most people: the one being quiet is numb – but the one being active is frantic.

Most men are insensible when they rest, and mad when they act.

[Bailey] For most men, rest is stagnation and activity is madness.

x	v v v	x

SV 14. No Second Life

Γεγόναμεν **ἄπαξ** – **δὺς** δὲ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι: δεῖ δὲ **τὸν αἰῶνα μηκέτι** εἶναι. σὺ δὲ, οὐκ ὦν **τῆς αὔριον** κύριος, ἀναβάλλη **τὸ χαῖρον!** ὁ δὲ βίος **μελλησμῶ** παραπόλλυται – καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος **ἡμῶν**, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνήσκει.

* We have been born **once** – **twice** it is not possible to be born: it is necessary to **no longer** exist **for eternity**. But you, not being master **of tomorrow**, you delay **joy**! Life is lost **by this delay** – and each one **of us**, while occupied, dies.

[Bailey] We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not [master] of tomorrow, postpone your happiness: life is wasted in procrastination and each one of us dies without allowing himself leisure.

x	v v v	x

Plutarch, Non Posse, 27, 1104E

Ἴη καὶ προεπισφάπτουσιν οἱ ταυτὶ λέγοντες "Ἄπαξ ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν – **δὺς** δ' οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι, δεῖ δὲ **τὸν αἰῶνα** **μηκέτ'** εἶναι." καὶ γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ὥς μικρὸν μᾶλλον δὲ μηδ' ὅτιοῦν πρὸς τὰ σύμπαν ἀτιμάσαντες ἀναπόλαυστον προΐενται, καὶ ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ πράξεως οἷον ἐξαθυμοῦντες καὶ καταφρονοῦντες ἑαυτῶν, ὥς ἐφημέρων καὶ ἀβεβαίων.

About which also those who say these things predict in advance: "**once** we humans have been born – **twice** it is not possible to be born, it is necessary to **no longer** exist **for eternity**." Indeed by discounting the present moment as a minute fraction, or rather as nothing at all, in comparison with all time, men let it pass fruitlessly. They think poorly of virtue and manly action, as if being disheartened and despising themselves as ephemeral and uncertain.

Stobaeus, Florilegium 16.28

Ἐπικούρου "Γεγόναμεν **ἄπαξ** – **δὺς** οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι. δεῖ δὲ **τὸν αἰνῶνα** **μκέτ'** εἶναι. σὺ δὲ, τῆς αὔριον οὐκ ὦν κύριος, ἀναβάλλη **τὸν καιρόν**! ὁ δὲ πάντων βίος **μελλησμῶ** παραπόλλυται – καὶ **διὰ τοῦτο** ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀσχολούμενος, ἀποθνήσκει."

Of Epíkouros "We have been born **once** – **twice** it is not possible to be born: it is necessary to **no longer** exist **for eternity**. But you, not being master of tomorrow, you delay **joy**! Life of all is lost **by this delay** – and **because of it** each of us, while occupied, dies."

Horatius, Carmina 1.11

Tū – nē quaesíerīs – scíre néfās! **quem míhi, quem tíbī**
fínem Dī **déderint**, Λευκονοή. Nec **Babylóniōs**
temptáris **númerōs**. ut **mélius** (quídquid érit) **pátī**,
seu **plúrīs Híemēs** seu **tríbuit** Iúppiter **últimam**,
(quae nunc **oppósītīs** **dēbílitat** **pūmícibus máre**
Tyrrhénum). **Sápiās**: **vína** líquēs et **spátíō brévī**
spem lóngam résecēs! dum **lóquimur**, **fúgerit ínvida**
áetās: **cárpe** **díem quam mínimum** **crédula pósterō**

* You – do not seek – it is not to be found! **What** to me, **what** to you the Gods will give **as an end**, Leuconoë. Nor should you tamper with **Babylonian numbers**. How much better (whatever will be) to endure, whether Jupiter grants **more winters** or the **last**, (which now **with opposing pumice** weakens the **Tyrrhenian sea**). Be wise: you should filter **the wine** and **in short time** you should cut back **long hope**! While we speak, **envious** age will have fled: harvest **the day which expects the least in tomorrow**

SV 15. Appreciating Others

Ἦθη ὥσπερ **τὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἴδια** τιμῶμεν – ἂν τε **χρηστὰ** ἔχωμεν, καὶ **ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων** ζηλώμεθα, ἂν τε μή: οὕτω χρή καὶ **τὰ τῶν πέλας**, ἂν ἐπιεικεῖς ᾖσιν.

* [Our] **dispositions** we appreciate as **things particular to ourselves** – whether we possess **good ones**, and we are admired **by people**, or not: thus it is necessary also [to appreciate] **the** [dispositions] **of those nearby**, if they are tolerable.

We place a high value on our characters as if they were our own possessions whether or not we are virtuous and praised by other men. So, too, we must regard the characters of those around us if they are our friends.

[Bailey] We value our characters as something peculiar to ourselves, whether they are good and we are esteemed by men or not, so ought we value the characters of others, if they are well-disposed to us.

x	v v v	x

Horatius, Saturae 1.3.29-37

Īrācúndior est **paúlō**, **minus** aptus **acūtīs**
nāribu^s **hōr^{um}** **hóminum**: rīdérī póssit éō quod
rustícus tōnsō, **toga** dēfluit et **mále** **lāxus**
in péde cálceus haeret – **at** est **bónus**, ut **mélior** vir
nōn **álius** quisquam – at **tíbi** ^a**mícus** – **at** **ingén^{um}** **íngēns**
incúltō látet **hoc sub córpore**. **dēnique** tē **ípsum**
cóncute, **númqua** **tíbī** **vitiō^r** **inséverit** **ólim**
nātúr^a aut **étiam** consuetúdō **mála**; námque
negléctīs **urénda** **fílix** innāscitur **ágrīs**.

[he is] More quick-tempered **by a little**, **less** suited **to the critical observations** *^[lit. sharp noses] of these men: he might be laughed at because with a **rougher** haircut, the toga slips and the **badly loose** shoe clings **on his foot** – but he is **good**, as a **better** man there is no other – but he is a friend to you – but and a **great** genius lies **hidden under this unrefined body**. Finally, shake **yourself** and see whether nature or even **bad** habit has **never** instilled **vices** in you; for **in neglected fields**, the fern **that must be burned** grows.

[A certain person] is a little too hasty in his temper; not well calculated for the sharp-witted sneers of these men: he may be made a jest of because his gown hangs awkwardly, he [at the same time] being trimmed in a very rustic manner, and his wide shoe hardly sticks to his foot. But he is so good, that no man can be better; but he is your friend: but an immense genius is concealed under this unpolished person of his. Finally, sift yourself thoroughly, whether nature has originally sown the seeds of any vice in you, or even an ill habit [has done it]. For the fern, fit [only] to be burned, overruns the neglected fields.

SV 16. Harmful Temptation

Οὐδείς, βλέπων **τὸ κακὸν**, αἰρεῖται **αὐτό** – ἀλλὰ δελεασθεὶς **ὡς ἀγαθῷ** πρὸς **τὸ μείζον** αὐτοῦ **κακὸν**, ἐθηρεύθη.

* No one, seeing **what is harmful**, chooses **it** – but is lured **as if by a benefit towards** his **greater harm**, and is caught.

[Bailey] No one when he sees evil deliberately chooses it, but is enticed by it as being good in comparison with a greater evil, and so pursues it.

No one who sees what is bad chooses it, but being lured [by it] as being good compared to what is even worse that it he is caught in the snare.

x	v v v	x

SV 17. Anchored with Age

Οὐ νέος μακαριστὸς ἀλλὰ γέρων βεβιωκῶς καλῶς: ὁ γὰρ νέος, ἀκμῇ, πολὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, ἑτεροφρονῶν πλάζεται· ὁ δὲ γέρων, καθάπερ ἐν λιμένι τῷ γήρᾳ καθώρμικεν, τὰ πρότερον δυσελπιστούμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀσφαλεῖ κατακλείσας χάριτι.

* [It is] not the young man who is blessed but the old who has lived well: for the young, in his prime, is greatly influenced by fortune, being shaped by having different thoughts. But the old, as if moored in the harbor with old age, has locked away the formerly uncertain goods in security with gratitude.

We should not view the young man as happy, but rather the old man whose life has been fortunate. The young man at the height of his powers is often befuddled by chance and driven from his course; but the old man has dropped anchor in old age as in a harbor, since he secures in sure and thankful memory goods for which he was once scarcely confident of.

[Bailey] It is not the young man who should be thought happy, but the old man who has lived a good life. For the young man at the height of his powers is unstable, and is carried this way and that by fortune, like a headlong stream. But the old man has come to anchor in old age, as though in port, and the good things for which before he hardly hoped he has brought into safe harbourage in his grateful recollections.

x	v v v	x

SV 18. Separation Effect

Ἀφαιρουμένης προσόψεως – καὶ ὁμιλίας – καὶ συναναστροφῆς: ἐκλύεται τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος.

* With sight removed – and interaction – and cohabitation: erotic feeling is relaxed.

If sight, association, and intercourse are removed, the passion of love is ended.

[Bailey] Remove sight, association, and contact, and the passion of love is at an end.

x	v v v	x

SV 19. Regenerating Gratitude

Τοῦ γεγονότος ἀμνήμων ἀγαθοῦ – γέρων τήμερον γεγένηται.

* When he is forgetful of the good that has happened – on this day he becomes an old man.

He has become an old man on the day on which he forgot his past blessings.

[Bailey] Forgetting the good that has been, he has become old this very day.

x	v v v	x

SV 21. (Persuade/Obey Nature)

Οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον: πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες τὰς τε φυσικὰς, ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι – τὰς δὲ βλαβεράς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.

One should not fight **nature** but instead should persuade: we will persuade **by completely fulfilling the necessary desires which are natural**, if they do not harm – but by **harshly** discarding **the harmful ones**.

[Bailey] We must not violate nature but obey her; and we shall obey her if we fulfil the necessary desires and also the physical, if they bring no harm to us, but sternly reject the harmful.

x	v v v	x

SV 23. Advantages of Friendship

Πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἐαυτὴν αἰρετὴ· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.

Every friendship in itself is to be desired; but the foundation of friendship is from its advantages.

[Inwood] Every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits.

[Bailey] All friendship is desirable in itself, though it starts from the need of help.

x	v v v	x

SV 24. Reception of Dreams

Ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θείαν οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν – ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπρωσιν εἰδώλων.

Dreams have not obtained **a divine nature** nor **prophetic power** – but happen **by the pressure of images**.

Dreams have neither a divine nature nor a prophetic power, but they are the result of images that impact on us.

[Bailey] Dreams have no divine character nor any prophetic force, but they originate from the influx of images.

x	v v v	x

SV 25. Natural Abundance

Ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὀριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.

Poverty, if measured by the natural end, is great wealth; but wealth, if not limited, is great poverty.

[Bailey] Poverty, when measured by the natural purpose of life, is great wealth, but unlimited wealth is great poverty.

x	v v v	x

SV 26. Functional Equivalence

Δεῖ διαλαβεῖν ὅτι καὶ ὁ πολὺς λόγος καὶ ὁ βραχὺς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνει.

One must presume that long and short arguments contribute to the same end.

[Bailey] You must understand that whether the discourse be long or short it tends to the same end.

x	v v v	x

SV 27. Pleasure in Learning

Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων μόλις τελειωθεῖσιν ὁ καρπὸς ἔρχεται, ἐπὶ δὲ φιλοσοφίας συντρέχει τῇ γνώσει τὸ τερπνόν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ μάθησιν ἀπόλαυσις, ἀλλὰ ἅμα μάθησις καὶ ἀπόλαυσις.

The benefits of other activities come only to those who have already become, with great difficulty, complete masters of such pursuits, but in the study of philosophy pleasure accompanies growing knowledge; for pleasure does not follow learning; rather, learning and pleasure advance side by side.

In the case of other occupations the fruit (of one's labors) comes upon completion of a task while (in the case) of philosophy pleasure is concurrent with knowledge because enjoyment does not come after learning but at the same time (with) learning.

In other activities, the rewards come only when people have become, with great difficulty, complete [masters of the activity]; but in philosophy the pleasure accompanies the knowledge. For the enjoyment does not come after the learning but the learning and the enjoyment are simultaneous.

[Bailey] In all other occupations the fruit comes painfully after completion, but, in philosophy, pleasure goes hand in hand with knowledge; for enjoyment does not follow comprehension, but comprehension and enjoyment are simultaneous.

x	v v v	x

SV 28. Friendship Moderation

Οὔτε τοὺς προχείρους εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε τοὺς ὀκνηροὺς δοκιμαστέον· δεῖ δὲ καὶ παρακινδυνεῦσαι χάριν φίλιας.

Those who are overly eager to make friends are not to be approved; nor yet should you approve those who avoid friendship, for risks must be run for its sake.

[Bailey] We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship's sake we must even run risks.

x	v v v	x

SV 29. Honesty Over Popularity

Παρρησία γὰρ ἔγωγε χρώμενος φυσιολογῶν χρησμῶδεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἢ βουλοίμην, κἂν μηδεὶς μέλλη συνήσειν, ἢ συγκατατιθέμενος ταῖς δόξαις παρποῦσθαι τὸν πυκνὸν παραπίπτοντα παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον.

To speak frankly as I study nature I would prefer to speak that which is of advantage to all men in oracles even though it be understood by none, rather than to conform to popular opinion and thus gain the constant praise that comes from the many.

[Bailey] In investigating nature I would prefer to speak openly and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the mob.

[Yapijakis] For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many.

x	v v v	x

SV 30. Life's Mortal Drink

Ἐτοιμάζονται τινες διὰ βίου τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον, οὐ συνορῶντες ὡς πᾶσιν ἡμῖν θανάσιμον ἐγκέχυται τὸ τῆς γενέσεως φάρμακον.

Some men spend their whole life furnishing for themselves the things proper to life without realizing that at our birth each of us was poured a mortal brew to drink.

Some men, throughout their lives, spend their time gathering together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.

[Bailey] Some men throughout their lives gather together the means of life, for they do not see that the draught swallowed by all of us at birth is a draught of death.

x	v v v	x

Attributed to Metrodorus.

SV 31. Defenseless Against Death

Πρὸς μὲν ἄλλα δυνατόν ἀσφάλειαν πορίσασθαι, χάριν δὲ θανάτου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οἰκοῦμεν.

It is possible to provide security against other things, but as far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls.

[Bailey] Against all else it is possible to provide security, but as against death all of us mortals alike dwell in an unfortified city.

x	v v v	x

SV 32. Benefit of Reverence

ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ Σεβασμός ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί

the Veneration of a wise man is a great good for venerator

[Bailey] The veneration of the wise man is a great blessing to those who venerate him

ὁ σοφός οἱ σοφοί	wise man	ΣΟΦΟΣ <i>knowledge</i>
ὁ σεβασμός οἱ σεβασμοί	veneration	ΣΕΒΑΣΜΟΣ <i>revering</i>

ὁ σεβόμενος οἱ σεβόμενοι	venerator	
ἀγαθός (ή, όν)	good	ΑΓΑΘΟΣ <i>great</i>

SV 33. Basic Needs Met

Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξειν κἂν <Διὶ> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο.

The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, thirsty, or cold; for he who is free of these and is confident of remain so might vie even with Zeus for happiness.

[Bailey] The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst, and cold. For if a man possess this safety, and hope to possess it, he might rival even Zeus in happiness.

x	v v v	x

SV 34. Assurance Over Assistance

Οὐχ οὕτως χρεῖαν ἔχομεν τῆς χρείας <τῆς> παρὰ τῶν φίλων ὥς τῆς πίστεως τῆς περὶ τῆς χρείας.

We do not so much need the assistance of our friends as we do the confidence of their assistance in need.

[Bailey] It is not so much our friends' help that helps us, as the confidence of their help.

x	v v v	x

SV 35. Gratitude Over Desire

Οὐ δεῖ λυμαίνεσθαι τὰ παρόντα τῶν ἀπόντων ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλ' ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα τῶν εὐκταίων ἦν.

Don't spoil what you have by desiring what you don't have; but remember that what you now have was once among the things only hoped for.

[DeWitt] We must not spoil the enjoyment of the blessings we have by pining for those we have not, but rather reflect that these too are among the things desirable.

[St. Andre] Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.

[Bailey] We should not spoil what we have by desiring what we do not have, but remember that what we have too was the gift of fortune.

x	v v v	x

SV 36. A Model Life

Ὁ **Ἐπικούρου** βίος **τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων συγκρινόμενος** ἔνεκεν **ἡμερότητος** καὶ **αὐταρκείας** **μῦθος** ἂν νομισθεῖη.

* life of **Epíkouros**, **compared with those of others**, because of his calmness and independence, might be considered **a myth**.

[Bailey] Ερίkouros' life when compared to that of other men with respect to gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend.

x	v v v	x

SV 37. Natural Vulnerability

Ἀσθενὴς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ κακόν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἡδοναῖς μὲν γὰρ σὴζεται, ἀλγηδόσι δὲ διαλύεται.

When confronted by evil, nature is weak, but not when faced with good; for pleasures make it secure but pains ruin it.

[Bailey] Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

x	v v v	x

SV 38. Appreciating Life

Μικρὸς παντάπασιν ὧ πολλὰι αἰτίαι εὖλογοι εἰς ἐξαγωγήν βίου.

* insignificant entirely [is he] for whom [there are] many causes reasonable for life's departure.

He is of very small account for whom there are many good reasons for ending his life.

[Bailey] He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life.

x	v v v	x

SV 39. Balanced Support

Οὐθ' ὁ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος – οὐθ' ὁ μηδέποτε συνάπτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ καπηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν – ὁ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν.

* Neither the one who always asks for what is needed is a friend – nor the one who never engages: for the one trades repayment with favor – but the other removes confidence for the future.

Neither he who is always seeking material aid from his friends nor he who never considers such aid is a true friend; for one engages in petty trade, taking a favor instead of gratitude, and the other deprives himself of hope for the future.

[Bailey] He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barter kindly feeling for a practical return, and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.

x	v v v	x

The use of καπηλεύει (peddles) implies a mercenary or self-serving attitude, suggesting that such a person is not a true friend, but rather someone who offers favor with the expectation of receiving a reward or benefit in return.

SV 40. Irony of Determinism

Ὁ λέγων πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχει τῷ λέγοντι μὴ πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό φησι κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι.

He who asserts that everything happens by necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that everything happens by necessity; by his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity.

[Bailey] The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity.

x	v v v	x

SV 41. Balanced Living

Γελᾶν ἄμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι – καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας.

* One must at the same time laugh and philosophize and manage the household and engage in other personal responsibilities – and in no way give up the words that come from correct philosophy.

At one and the same time we must philosophize, laugh, and manage our household and other business – while never ceasing to proclaim the words of true philosophy.

[Bailey] We must laugh and philosophize at the same time, and do our household duties, and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy.

x	v v v	x

SV 42. Pleasure is the Removal of Pain

Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως τοῦ κακοῦ.

* The same time is both the genesis of the greatest good and the release of evil.

[DeWitt] The same span of time embraces both the beginning and the end of the greatest good.

[Bailey] The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment.

x	v v v	x

SV 43. The Shame of Greed

Φιλαργυρεῖν ἄδिका μὲν ἀσεβές – δίκαια δὲ αἰσχρόν· ἀπρεπές γὰρ ῥυπαρῶς φεΐδεσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου.

* To love money unjustly is impious – and justly is disgraceful: for it is improper to be filthily frugal even with justice.

[Bailey] The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly, shameful; for it is unseemly to be merely parsimonious even with justice on one's side.

x	v v v	x

SV 44. Self-Sufficiency

Ὁ σοφὸς, εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα συγκριθεὶς, μᾶλλον ἐπίσταται μεταδιδόναι ἢ μεταλαμβάνειν· τηλικοῦτον αὐταρκείας εὔρε θησαυρόν.

*The wise man, in regards to to the necessary things, knows more to give than to receive – he found so great a treasure of self-sufficiency

The wise man who has become accustomed to necessities knows better how to share with others than how to take from them, so great a treasure of self-sufficiency has he found.

[Bailey] The wise man, when he has accommodated himself to straits, knows better how to give than to receive: so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency which he has discovered.

x	v v v	x

SV 45. Quiet Confidence

Οὐ κομποὺς οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἐργαστικούς οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδείαν ἐνδεικνυμένους φυσιολογία παρασκευάζει, ἀλλὰ σοβαροὺς καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα φρονοῦντας.

The study of nature does not create men who are fond of boasting and chattering or who show off the culture that impresses the many, but rather men who are strong and self-sufficient, and who take pride in their own personal qualities not in those that depend on external circumstances.

[Bailey] The study of nature does not make men productive of boasting or bragging, nor apt to display that culture which is the object of rivalry with the many, but high-spirited and self-sufficient, taking pride in the good things of their own minds and not of their circumstances.

x	v v v	x

SV 46. Banish Detrimental Habits

Τὰς φαύλας συνηθείας ὥσπερ ἄνδρας πονηροὺς πολὺν χρόνον μέγα βλάψαντας τελείως ἐκδιώκομεν.

Let us completely rid ourselves of our bad habits as if they were evil men who have done us long and grievous harm.

Let us utterly drive from us our bad habits, as if they were evil men who have long done us great harm.

[Bailey] Our bad habits, like evil men who have long done us great harm, let us utterly drive from us.

x	v v v	x

SV 47. Defiance of Fortune

Προκατείλημμαί σε, ὦ τύχη, καὶ πᾶσαν σὴν παρείσδυσιν ἐνέφραξα, καὶ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε ἀλλῇ οὐδεμίᾳ περιστάσει δώσομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδότους· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡμᾶς τὸ χρεῶν ἐξάγη, μέγα προπτύσαντες τῷ ζῆν καὶ τοῖς αὐτῷ κενῷ περιπλαττομένοις – ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὥς [εὔ] ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

[Yarrijakis] I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and I have closed off every one of your devious entrances. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who cling to it maundering, we will leave from life singing aloud a glorious triumph-song on how nicely we lived.

[Bailey] I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

x	v v v	x

Attributed to Metrodorus.

[Bailey] ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὥς [εὔ] ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

[Bailey] ...we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

We shall depart from life with a beautiful song shouting out that it has been lived well for us.

The word "παιῶνος" (paionos) is the genitive form of "παιών" (paion), which means "paean" or "song.". A paean is a song or chant of triumph, praise, or thanksgiving, often associated with celebrations and victories in ancient Greek culture.

[Vat.gr.1950] ἄπιμεν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ πλείονος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὥς εὔ ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

[Vat.gr.1950] we shall depart from life with more beauty, proclaiming that we have lived well.

CHORUS: You triumph then, brave champion; thine is the wine-skin!

DICAEOPOLIS: Follow me, singing "Triumph! Triumph!"

CHORUS: Aye! we will sing of thee, thee and thy sacred wine-skin, and we all, as we follow thee, will repeat in thine honour, "Triumph, Triumph!"

SV 48. Improving Life's Journey

Πειρᾶσθαι τὴν ὑστέραν τῆς προτέρας κρείττω ποιεῖν, ἕως ἂν ἐν ὁδῷ ὦμεν· ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐπὶ πέρας ἔλθωμεν, ὁμαλῶς εὐφραίνεσθαι.

While we are on the road, we must try to make what is before us better than what is past; when we come to the road's end, we feel a smooth contentment.

[Bailey] We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content.

x	v v v	x

SV 51. Managing Passion

Πυνθάνομαί σου τήν κατὰ σάρκα κίνησιν ἀφθονώτερον διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τήν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἔντευξιν. Σὺ δὲ ὅταν μήτε τοὺς νόμους καταλύης μήτε τὰ καλῶς ἔθη κείμενα κινῇς μήτε τῶν πλησίον τινὰ λυπῇς μήτε τήν σάρκα καταξαίνης μήτε τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καταναλίσκης, χρῶ ὡς βούλει τῇ σεαυτοῦ προαιρέσει. Ἀμήχανον μέντοι γε τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἐνί γέ τινα τούτων συνέχεσθαι· ἀφροδίσια γὰρ οὐδέποτε ὤνησεν· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ μὴ ἔβλαψεν.

I understand from you that your natural disposition is too much inclined toward sexual passion. Follow your inclination as you will, provided only that you neither violate the laws, disturb well-established customs, harm any one of your neighbors, injure your own body, nor waste your possessions. That you be not checked by one or more of these provisos is impossible; for a man never gets any good from sexual passion, and he is fortunate if he does not receive harm.

[Bailey] You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws, or good customs, and do not distress any of your neighbours, or do harm to your body, or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please. Yet it is impossible not to come up against one or other of these barriers, for the pleasures of love never profited a man and he is lucky if they do him no harm.

x	v v v	x

SV 52. The Joy of Friendship

Ἡ φιλία περιχορεύει τήν οἰκουμένην κηρύττουσα δὴ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐγείρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸν μακαρισμόν.

Friendship dances around the world bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.

[Bailey] Friendship goes dancing round the world proclaiming to us all to awake to the praises of a happy life.

x	v v v	x

SV 53. The Futility of Envy

Οὐδενὶ φθονητέον· ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἄξιοι φθόνου, πονηροὶ δὲ ὅσω ἂν μᾶλλον εὐτυχῶσι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς λυμαίνονται.

We must envy no one; for the good do not deserve envy and as for the bad, the more they prosper, the more they ruin it for themselves.

[Bailey] We must envy no one: for the good do not deserve envy, and the bad, the more they prosper, the more they injure themselves.

x	v v v	x

SV 54. Authentic Pursuit of Wisdom

Οὐ προσποιεῖσθαι δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλοσοφεῖν· οὐ γὰρ προσδεόμεθα τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑγιαίνειν.

It is not the pretense but the real pursuit of philosophy that is needed; for we do not need the semblance of health but rather true health.

[Bailey] We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality: for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health.

x	v v v	x

SV 55. Gratitude for the Unalterable Past

Θεραπευτέον τὰς συμφορὰς τῇ τῶν ἀπολλυμένων χάριτι καὶ τῷ γινώσκειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπρακτον ποιῆσαι τὸ γεγονός.

We should find solace for misfortune in the happy memory of what has been and in the knowledge that what has been cannot be undone.

[Bailey] We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been, and by the recognition that it is impossible make undone what has been done.

x	v v v	x

SV 56. Loyalty & Shared Pain

Ἄλγεϊ μὲν ὁ σοφὸς οὐ μᾶλλον στρεβλούμενος ἢ στρεβλουμένου τοῦ φίλου, καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τεθνήσκει· εἰ γὰρ προήσεται τὸν φίλον ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πᾶς δι' ἀπιστίαν συγχυθήσεται καὶ ἀνακεχαιτισμένος ἔσται.

The wise man feels no more pain when being tortured himself than when his friend tortured, and will die for him; for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.

[Bailey] The wise man is not more pained when being tortured [himself, than when seeing] his friend [tortured]: [but if his friend does him wrong], his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.

x	v v v	x

SV 58. Political & Academic Conformity

Ἐκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσμωτηρίου.

We must free ourselves from the prison of public education and politics.

[Bailey] We must release ourselves from the prison of affairs and politics.

x	v v v	x

SV 59. Misconception of Insatiability

ῥᾶπληστον οὐ γαστήρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, ἀλλ' ἡ δόξα ψευδῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ <τῆς> γαστρὸς ἀορίστου πληρώματος.

What cannot be satisfied is not a man's stomach, as most men think, but rather the false opinion that the stomach requires unlimited filling.

[Bailey] It is not the stomach that is insatiable, as is generally said, but the false opinion that the stomach needs an unlimited amount to fill it.

x	v v v	x

SV 60. Life's Brief Journey

Πᾶς ὥσπερ ἄρτι γεγονὼς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπέρχεται.

[Bailey] Every man passes out of life as though he had just been born.

x	v v v	x

SV 61. Beautiful Harmony

Καλλίστη καὶ ἡ τῶν πλησίων ὄψις τῆς πρώτης συγγενήσεως ὁμονοούσης ἢ καὶ πολλήν εἰς τοῦτο ποιουμένης σπουδήν.

Most beautiful is the sight of those close to us, when our original contact makes us of one mind or produces a great incitement to this end.

[Bailey] Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is great incitement to this end.

x	v v v	x

SV 62. Avoiding Escalation

Εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δέον ὀργαὶ γίνονται τοῖς γεννήσασι πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα, μάταιον δῆπουθέν ἐστι τὸ ἀντιτείνειν καὶ μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι συγγνώμης τυχεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ δέον, ἀλλὰ ἀλογώτερον, γελοῖον πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἑκκλησιν ἐκκαλεῖν τὴν ἀλογίαν θυμῷ κατέχοντα, καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν μεταθεῖναι κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους εὐγνωμονοῦντα.

If the anger of parents against their children is justified, it is quite pointless for the children to resist it and to fail to ask forgiveness. If the anger is not justified but is unreasonable, it is folly for an irrational child to appeal to someone deaf to appeals and not to try to turn it aside in other directions by a display of good will.

[Bailey] Now if parents are justly angry with their children, it is certainly useless to fight against it, and not to ask for pardon; but if their anger is unjust and irrational, it is quite ridiculous to add fuel to their irrational passion by nursing one's own indignation, and not to attempt to turn aside their wrath in other ways by gentleness.

x	v v v	x

SV 63. Balance

Ἦστι καὶ ἐν λεπτότητι καθαριότης, ἥς ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιστος παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχει τῷ δι' ἀοριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι.

There is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance.

[Bailey] Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is in like case with him who errs through excess.

x	v v v	x

SV 64. Prioritize Self-Improvement

ἀκολουθεῖν Δεῖ τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἐπαινον αὐτόματον, Ἡμᾶς δὲ γενέσθαι περὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἰατρείαν

It is necessary that the Praise from others follows as automatic, but that [primarily] We should become [focused] on our own healing

ἀκολουθεῖν	to follow	ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙΝ <i>following</i>
αὐτόματος <i>(η, ον)</i>	automatic	ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΣ <i>self</i>
γενέσθαι	to become	ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>beget</i>
ἡ ἰατρεία αἱ ἰατρεῖαι	healing	ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ <i>curing</i>

SV 65. Self-Reliance

μάταιόν ἐστι παρὰ θεῶν Αἰτεῖσθαι ἅ Τις ἑαυτῷ χορηγῆσαι ἱκανός ἐστι

it is pointless Begging from the gods for what One is sufficiently [able] to obtain for himself

μάταιος <i>(α, ον)</i>	pointless	ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ <i>folly</i>
αἰτέειν	to beg	ΑΙΤΕΙΝ <i>requesting</i>
αἰτεῖσθαι	to beg [for oneself]	
χορηγεῖν	to supply	ΧΟΡΗΓΕΙΝ <i>providing</i>
χορηγῆσαι	to have supplied	
ἱκανός <i>(ή, όν)</i>	sufficient	ΊΚΑΝΟΣ <i>fitting / proper</i>

SV 66. Supportive Consideration

Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες.

We show our feeling for our friends' suffering, not with laments, but with thoughtful concern.

[Bailey] Let us show our feeling for our lost friends, not by lamentation, but by meditation.

x	v v v	x

SV 67. Natural Abundance

Ἐλεύθερος βίος οὐ δύναται κτήσασθαι χρήματα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα «μὴ» ῥάδιον εἶναι χωρὶς θητείας ὄχλων ἢ δυναστῶν, ἀλλὰ συνεχεῖ δαψιλείᾳ πάντα κέκτηται· ἂν δέ που καὶ τύχη χρημάτων πολλῶν, καὶ ταῦτα ῥαδίως ἂν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίον εὖνοιαν διαμετρήσαι.

A free life cannot acquire much wealth because it is not an easy issue without the service of crowds or rulers, but it possesses everything with continuous abundance; and if by chance it acquires much wealth, it can easily distribute it for the goodwill of neighbors.

[Bailey] A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs, yet it possesses all things in unfailing abundance; and if by chance it obtains many possessions, it is easy to distribute them so as to win the gratitude of neighbors.

x	v v v	x

SV 68. Insatiability's Trap

Οὐδέν ικανὸν ᾧ ὀλίγον τὸ ικανόν.

Nothing is enough to someone for whom what is enough is little.

Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems too little.

[Bailey] Nothing is sufficient from him to whom what is sufficient seems little.

x	v v v	x

SV 69. Ingratitude's Trap

Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχάριστον λίχνον ἐποίησε τὸ ζῶον εἰς ἄπειρον τῶν ἐν διαίτῃ ποικιλμάτων.

The thankless nature of the soul makes the creature endlessly greedy for variations in its lifestyle.

[Bailey] The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties of dainty food.

x	v v v	x

SV 70. Live As Though You Are Seen

Μηδέν σοι ἐν βίῳ πραχθεῖη ὃ φόβον παρέξει σοι εἰ γνωσθήσεται τῷ πλησίον.

Do nothing in your life that will cause you to fear if it is discovered by your neighbor.

[Bailey] Let nothing be done in your life which will cause you fear if it becomes known to your neighbour.

x	v v v	x

SV 71. Interrogate Your Desires

πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας Προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο: Τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ Τὸ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ Τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;

It is necessary to apply **this interrogation** to every desire: What will be produced **for me** if This, which is pursued **according to desire** is fulfilled? and What if it is not fulfilled?

ἡ ἐπιθυμία αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι	desire	ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ <i>toward spirit</i>
προσακτεῖν προσακτέειν	to apply	ΠΡΟΣΑΚΤΕΙΝ <i>applying</i> <i>towards</i>
τὸ ἐπερώτημα τὰ ἐπερώτηματα	interrogation	ΕΠΕΡΩΤΗΜΑ <i>asking toward</i>

γίνεσθαι	to be produced	ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ <i>come into being</i>
τελεῖν	to fulfill	ΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing</i>
συντελεῖν	to mutually fulfill	ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΙΝ <i>completing together</i>
ἐπιζητεῖν	to pursue	ΕΠΙΖΗΤΕΙΝ <i>seek after</i>
τὸ ἐπιζητούμενον τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα	that which is pursued	

SV 73. Learning from Pain

Καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τινὰς ἀλγηδόνας περὶ σῶμα λυσιτελεῖ πρὸς φυλακὴν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν.

That we have suffered certain bodily pains aids us in preventing others like them.

[Bailey] The occurrence of certain bodily pains assists us in guarding against others like them.

x	v v v	x

SV 74. Learning from Defeat

Ἐν φιλολόγῳ συζητήσει πλεῖον ἤνυσεν ὁ ἡττηθεὶς καθ' ὃ προσέμαθεν.

In a philosophical dispute, he gains most who is defeated, since he learns the most.

[Bailey] In a philosophical discussion he who is worsted gains more in proportion as he learns more.

x	v v v	x

SV 75. Gratitude for Past Fortune

Εἰς τὰ παρωχηκότα ἀγαθὰ ἀχάριστος φωνὴ ἢ λέγουσα· τέλος ὄρα μακροῦ βίου.

The saying, “look to the end of a long life,” shows small thanks for past good fortune.

[Bailey] Ungrateful towards the blessings of the past is the saying, 'Wait till the end of a long life.'

x	v v v	x

SV 76. Individual Benefit

Τοιοῦτος εἶ γηράσκων ὅποῖον ἐγὼ παραινῶ, καὶ διέγνωκας ὅποῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἑαυτῷ φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ οἷον τὸ τῇ Ἑλλάδι· συγχαίρω σοι.

As you grow old you are such as I urge you to be, and you have recognized the difference between studying philosophy for yourself and studying it for Greece. I rejoice with you.

[Bailey] You are, in your old age, just such as I urge you to be, and you have seen the difference between studying philosophy for oneself and proclaiming it to Greece at large; I rejoice with you.

x	VVV	x

SV 77. Independence

Τῆς αὐταρκείας καρπὸς μέγιστος ἐλευθερία.

Freedom is the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency.

[Bailey] The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.

x	VVV	x

SV 78. Noble Priorities

Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.

The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one.

The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal.

[Bailey] The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these, the one is a mortal good, the other immortal.

x	VVV	x

SV 79. Be a Peaceful Presence

Ὁ ἀτάραχος ἐαυτῷ – καὶ ἐτέρῳ ἀόχλητος

He who is untroubled **within himself** – is also **undisturbing to another**

ὁ τάραχος = ἡ ταραχή	disturbance	ΤΑΡΑΧΗ ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ <i>agitating</i>
ἀτάραχος = ἀτάρακτος <i>(ας, ον)</i>	undisturbed	ΑΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ ΑΤΑΡΑΚΤΟΣ <i>without</i> <i>agitating</i>
ἡ ἀταραξία αἱ ἀταραξίαι	undisturbedness	ΑΤΑΡΑΞΙΑ <i>without</i> <i>agitating</i>
ὁ ὄχλος οἱ ὄχλοι	crowd	ΟΧΛΟΣ <i>crowd of people</i>
ἀόχλητος <i>(ον)</i>	undisturbing	ΑΟΧΛΗΤΟΣ <i>without a crowd</i> <i>of people</i>

SV 80. Guard Against Desires

νέψ, σωτηρίας Μοῖρα τῆς ἡλικίας τήρησις καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν πάντα μολυνόντων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς οἰστρώδεις

to a young man, a Part of salvation is the preservation of youth and guarding from all defiling things according to the desires that are raging

[Bailey] The first measure of security is to watch over one's youth, and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

x	v v v	x

SV 81. Futility of Wealth & Praise

Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν οὔτε Πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος – οὔθ' ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς Τιμὴ καὶ Περίβλεψις – οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας.

* Neither the greatest wealth – nor honor among the public and admiration – nor any other thing of those among the undefined causes reduces the disturbance of the soul or produces significant joy.

[Bailey] The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended, nor true joy created, either by the possession of the greatest wealth, or by honour and respect in the eyes of the mob, or by anything else that is associated with, or caused by, unlimited desire.

x	v v v	x

Tetraphármakos
Τετραφάρμακος

ἄφοβον ὁ Θεός

God is not dreadful

ἀνύποπτον ὁ Θάνατος

Death is not concerning

καὶ Τάγαθόν μὲν εὖκτητον

what is Good is well attainable

τὸ δὲ Δεινὸν εὐεκκατέρητον

what is Awful is well enduring

ἄφοβος (ος, ον)	not dreadful	ΑΦΟΒΟΣ <i>not fleeing</i> <i>[in fear]</i>
ὁ Θεός οἱ Θεοί	god	ΘΕΟΣ <i>[divine entity]</i>
ὑποπτεύειν	to be concerned [by]	ὙΠΟΠΤΕΥΕΙΝ <i>looking</i> <i>[suspiciously] under</i>
ἀνύποπτος (ος, ον)	not concerning	ΑΝΥΠΟΠΤΟΣ <i>not looking</i> <i>[suspiciously] under</i>
ὁ Θάνατος οἱ Θάνατοι	death	ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ <i>disappearing</i>
τὸ ἀγαθόν τὰ ἀγαθὰ	what is good	ΑΓΑΘΟΝ <i>brave/noble/useful</i>
κτᾶσθαι	to possess	ΚΤΑΣΘΑΙ <i>acquire</i>
κεκτημένος (η, ον)	having possessed	ΚΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΟΣ <i>acquired</i>
εὖκτητος (ος, ον)	well attainable	ΕΥΚΤΗΤΟΣ <i>acquiring easily</i>
δεινός (ή, όν)	awful	ΔΕΙΝΟΣ <i>fearing</i>
τὸ δεινόν τὰ δεινά	what is awful	
εὐεκκατέρητος (ος, ον)	well enduring	ΕΥΕΚΚΑΡΤΕΡΗΤΟΣ <i>fully easily enduring</i>

The Tetraphármakos is found in P.Herc. 1005.

Entrepreneurial Epicureans

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 1/2

...πα[ρά]γουσίγ [τι] γόν[ιμ]ον [κα]ὶ γινώσκουσιν πλεῖστ[α] πιθαν[ών], τ[ότε] δ[ὲ] παρανακάμ[ψομ]εν· ὁμολογῶ τοί[νυ]ν, ὡς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔφην, τὸ τῶν χρηματιζόντων τινὰς Ἐπικουρείων πολλὰ μὲν συμφορητὰ καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν, πολλὰ δ' αὐτῶν ἴδια τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν ἀσύμφωνα, τινὰ δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἐσπαραγμένα φλοιωδῶς καὶ ταχέως, χωρίσω [δὲ τῶν] [ὑπ' αὐτῶν]...

...Παράγουσιν **τι γόνιμον** καὶ γινώσκουσιν **πλεῖστα πιθανῶν**, τότε δὴ Παρανακάμψομεν – Ὅμολογῶ, τοίνυν, ὡς καὶ **κατ' ἀρχὰς** ἔφην, τὸ **τῶν χρηματιζόντων τινὰς Ἐπικουρείων πολλὰ μὲν συμφορητὰ καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν – πολλὰ δ' αὐτῶν ἴδια τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πραγματείαν ἀσύμφωνα, τινὰ δ' ἐκεῖθεν ἐσπαραγμένα φλοιωδῶς καὶ ταχέως**, Χωρίσω δὲ **τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν**...

...They introduce something productive and they know a lot about what is persuasive, then indeed We will turn away [from this topic] – I agree, therefore, as I said from the beginning, that some of the business-minded Epicureans say and write many things that are suitable – but many of their idiosyncratic [sayings] are inconsistent in the things related to [their business] efforts, while some of these [sayings] are superficially and quickly ripped out from [the writings], but I will separate those [writings] made by them...

[about 22 words missing]

Hérmarchos with Experience and Followers

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 2/3

...ἀλλ' ἔ[στα]ι δυν[ατὸν ἐὰν τοῦτ]ο καὶ ἃ μ[ὲν εἰρ]γάσαν[το πάντες οἱ] μεθ' "Ἑ[ρ]μαρχον [ἐ]μβάντες εἰς [τ]ὴν αἴρεσιν, ὁμοιότρο[πι]ά τις παρ[α]στήσῃ καὶ βε[βο]ύλη[μ]ένους καὶ πεπραχότας, ὅπερ οὐ πρότερον οἶομαι τοῦ πάντας ἀνθρώπους μέλανα[ς] εἶναι καὶ μικροῦς καὶ δι[εσ]τραμμένους· εἰ [δὲ] μὴ πρ[ο]σηγόρευσα[ν αὐ]τοὺς ἀνα[λό]γως τ[οῖς]...

...ἀλλ' ἔσται δυνατόν ἐὰν τοῦτο καὶ ἃ μὲν εἰργάσαντο πάντες Οἱ μεθ' Ἑρμαρχον ἐμβάντες εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν ὁμοιότροπά Τις παραστήσῃ· καὶ βεβουλημένους καὶ πεπραχότας, ὅπερ οὐ πρότερον Οἶομαι – τοῦ πάντας ἀνθρώπους μέλανας εἶναι καὶ μικροῦς καὶ διεστραμμένους – εἰ δὲ μὴ Προσηγόρευσαν αὐτοὺς ἀναλόγως τοῖς...

...but it will be possible if Someone were to present this in a similar way and also those things that all the [Epicureans] accomplished who entered into [our] school along with Hérmarchos: [presenting them] as those who had intended [to do something] and also as those who had accomplished [that thing], which I do not think [was the case] in times before [them] – with all humanity [before then] being obscure [in their expressions], small [minded], and corrupted [in their actions] – but if They did not address them in proportion to the...

[about 9 words missing]

Inexperienced "Helmsman Navigating from the Book"

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 3/4

...τῶν Ἐπικουρεῖ[ων] προσαγο[ρευ]ομένων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐγνωσμένος ἦ καὶ διιστορημένος ὕφ' ἡμῶν, ὃς καὶ φησι εἶν[α]ι ὁ γνήσιος ἀναγνώ[στης] ἐπὶ γραφὰς [ἐγ]λεκτάς κα[ὶ] π[λ]ήθ[η] συγγρα[μμάτων], κἂν βάληι [γ]ε φαύλως, ἀνείληφε πολ[λὰ]ς ἐγλογὰς καὶ τῶν μ[ε]ν ἐπὶ μέρους διανο[η]μάτων ἀπειρότατός ἐστιν. ἃ δὲ προστάττεται ποιεῖν, ἐπὶ κεφάλαια [α] βλέπει, καθάπερ ὃν λ[έ]γουσιν ἐκ βυβλίου κυβ[ερνήτην] καὶ διὰ παντ[ὸς]...

...τῶν Ἐπικουρείων προσαγορευομένων· Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐγνωσμένος ἦ καὶ διιστορημένος ὕφ' ἡμῶν, Ὃς καὶ φησι εἶναι ὁ γνήσιος ἀναγνώστης" ἐπὶ γραφὰς ἐγλεκτάς καὶ πλήθη συγγραμμάτων – κἂν βάλη γε φαύλως, ἀνείληφε πολλές ἐγλογὰς – καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους διανοιημάτων ἀπειρότατός ἐστιν! ἃ δὲ Προσάττεται ποιεῖν, ἐπὶ κεφάλαια Βλέπει – καθάπερ ὃν λέγουσιν "ἐκ βυβλίου κυβερνήτην" καὶ διὰ παντός...

...of those who are called Epicureans. while Someone known or even described in detail by us, Who also claims to be "the authentic reader" on select writings and on a multitude of compositions – even if he performs poorly, he has selected many passages – but in individual thoughts he is the most inexperienced! in fact, for what He must do, He looks only at the main points – just like [someone] whom they say is "a helmsman [navigating] from the book" and through all...

[about 6 words missing]

"The Fourfold Remedy"

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 4/5

...μνη[σθεῖς τῶν λόγων δεδειγ]μέν[ω]ν καὶ τῶν [σοι] εὖ γε[γ]ονότων τόδε π[άλλιν] ἐπιλογίζου καὶ κ[ενὰ] περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντο[ς νό]μιζε καὶ... καὶ πανταχῇ παρειρ[ημένο]ν ἢ τετραφάρμακος· ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, ἀν[ύ]ποπτον ὁ θάνατος καὶ τάγαθὸν μὲν

εὐκτητον, τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκα[ρ]τέρητον.' οὐς δ' ἐκ τῶν βυβλίων φησὶν ἐκφέρειν ἀν[α]λογισμούς, ταύτας εἴσει τὰς λέξεις ἀγταποδόσεις δώδε[ε]κ' [ῆ] πεντ[ε]καίδεκα...

...μνησθεῖς τῶν λόγων δεδειγμένων καὶ τῶν σοι εὖ γεγονότων – τόδε πάλιν Ἐπιλογίζου καὶ κενὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος Νόμιζε καὶ... καὶ πανταχῇ παρειρημένον "ἡ Τετραφάρμακος" "ἄφοβον ὁ Θεός, ἀνύποπτον ὁ Θάνατος – καὶ Τάγαθὸν μὲν εὐκτητον, τὸ δὲ Δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον." οὐς δ' ἐκ τῶν βυβλίων Φησὶν ἐκφέρειν ἀναλογισμούς, ταύτας Εἴσει τὰς λέξεις ἀνταποδόσεις δώδεκ' ἢ πεντεκαίδεκα...

...remembering the reasonings that have been demonstrated and those good things that have happened to you – You should even reflect upon this again and You should even consider [your concerns] about what is going to happen to be void [*i.e., having no content, and therefore "meaningless"*]...
[about three words missing] ...and everywhere "The Fourfold Remedy" is mentioned, that "God is not dreadful, Death is not concerning – and while what is Good is well attainable, what is Awful is also well enduring." as for those reflections He claims to extract from the books, You will know these phrases as responses [in] twelve or fifteen [words]...

[alternative] You will find those words as responses twelve or fifteen [times]...

[about 19 words missing]

Clarity vs. Gossip

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 5/6

...τῶν βαθυτέρων ὡς ἐν [δέ]χεται φανότατα πέφρασ[θαι] καὶ νοεῖ ταυτό παν[ταχῇ] ἢ ὥδε ποῦ δυνησόμεθ' ἐκ βυβλί[ω]ν σοφώ[τατ'] ἐξενεγκεῖν; ἐπιδείκνυ[ται] δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν [ὄλων ἐν τοῖς] βυβλίοις, ταράττων καὶ θρυλῶν ὅτι Λεόντιον καὶ ἑτέρα ἑταίρα τις ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ μνημονεύεται – καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἑρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαρμάριον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημητρία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθοκλέους π[αιδ]αγωγὸς Πολύαινος...

...τῶν βαθυτέρων, ὡς Ἐνδέχεται φανότατα πέφρασθαι – καὶ Νοεῖ ταυτό πανταχῇ: ὥδε, ποῦ Δυνησόμεθ' ἐκ βυβλίων σοφώτατ' ἐξενεγκεῖν; Ἐπιδείκνυται δὲ τὴν κατοχὴν ὄλων ἐν τοῖς βυβλίοις, ταράττων καὶ θρυλῶν ὅτι Λεόντιον καὶ ἑτέρα ἑταίρα τις ἐν τῇ πραγματεία μνημονεύεται, καὶ Νικίδιον ἦν Ἰδομενέως ἑρωμένη, Λεοντέως δὲ Μαρμάριον, Ἑρμάρχου δὲ Δημητρία – καὶ τοῖος ἦν Πυθοκλέους παιδαγωγὸς Πολύαινος...

...regarding deeper matters, how They are able to have been expressed most clearly – He also perceives this everywhere: so, where will We be able to extract the wisest [insights] from books? while He displays [his mental] retention of everything within the books, he [also] stirs up and chatters that Leóntion and some other Courtesan are mentioned in the work, and that the lover of Idomeneús was Nikíðion, and of Leonteús was Mammáριον, and of Hérmarchos was Dēmētría – and such a kind also was Pythoclês' tutor Polýaenus...

[about 11 words missing]

Experience vs. Titles

Philódēmos, [Ad Contubernales], P.Herc. 1005, col. 6/7

...[εἰ μὲν τοῖς] ὄλον σ[οφῶν ὀνόμα]σιν προσαγορεύ[ονται] οὔτ' ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς ὑπ[ὸ] γε τῶν ἁξίων/ μνήμης [καὶ χάριτο]ς οὐ τινι [γ]εγονότ[ων ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ο]ὔτε τῶν φίλων τινὶ συνευχόμεθα γεγέσθαι, τρέπομεν πρὸς τὰς λεγομένας αἶγας ἀγρίας τὸ κακόν· εἰ δέ τις – καλεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις [τ]ὸν δεδιδαγμένον μεθοδικῶς [ς] συνιέναι τὰν τοῖς βυβλίοις τῶν καθη[γε]μόνων ὥστε [κ]αὶ προφέρεσθ[αι]...

...εἰ μὲν τοῖς "ὄλον σοφῶν" ὀνόμασιν Προσαγορεύονται – οὔτ' ἐσμὲν Ἡμεῖς ὑπὸ, γε, τῶν ἁξίων μνήμης καὶ χάριτος" οὐ τινι γεγονότων ἀλλ' ἡμῖν – οὔτε τῶν φίλων τινὶ Συνευχόμεθα γενέσθαι, Τρέπομεν πρὸς τὰς λεγομένας αἶγας ἀγρίας" τὸ κακόν· εἰ δέ Τις καλεῖ τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις τὸν δεδιδαγμένον μεθοδικῶς συνιέναι τὰν τοῖς βυβλίοις τῶν καθηγεμόνων, ὥστε καὶ προφέρεσθαι...

...if They are addressed by the names "of the wholly wise" – We are not, in any case, under the influence of those "deserving remembrance and thanks" nor has it happened to anyone but us – nor do We pray together with any of our friends for this to happen, We divert the bad towards the so-called "wild goats." but if Someone addresses by these names and similar [titles], the

person who has been methodically taught to understand the things in the books of [our] leaders, so that he may also bring forward...

Incorrect Perspective

P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 1-11

...γίν[ε]σ[θ]αι ὅταν καθ[ή]κ[η] [τ]ὸ τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἔλεγον, [οἰ]κεῖον, μηδ' ὅταν γε [ν]ῇ Δία οὕτω λέγῃται πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν
τυχόντων ["δ]έδο[ι]κα τοὺς θεοὺς πάν[τας οὐ]ς σέ[βο]μαι [κ]αὶ τοῦ[τοι]ς βο[ύ]λ[ο]μαι πάντα κα[τ]αθύειν καὶ τούτοις
[ἀν]ατιθέναι.

...Γίνεσθαι ὅταν καθήκη τὸ **τῆς φύσεως**, ὡς ἔλεγον, οἰκεῖον – μηδ' ὅταν γε, νῇ
δία, οὕτω λέγῃται πάλιν **ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων** "**δέδοικα τοὺς θεοὺς πάντας οὐς**
σέβομαι καὶ τούτοις βούλομαι πάντα καταθύειν καὶ **τούτοις ἀνατιθέναι**."

[col. 1, lines 1-11] ...to happen whenever what aligns **with nature**, as I mentioned,
is suitable – nor whenever, by god, it is spoken like this again **by the**
common people "I fear **all the gods whom** I revere and **to them** I wish to
sacrifice **all things** and to dedicate **to them**."

[Chilton] {It is no proof of piety to observe the customary religious obligations — though the offering of sacrifices}
on suitable occasions may be, as I have said, in keeping with nature — nor is
it, by Zeus, when someone or other goes about repeating, "I fear all the
gods, and honour them, and want to spend all my money in making
sacrifices and consecrating offerings to them."

[Grenfell] Nor, indeed, even when this further statement is made by the
ordinary man, “I fear all the gods and worship them, and to them I wish to
make every sacrifice and offering.”

Infirm Basis

col. 1, lines 11-16

χαπιέστε[ρο]ς μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ [ὁ τ]οιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιω[τῶ]ν ἐστίν, ὅμως δὲ οὐ[δέ] ταύτη πω τὸ βέβαιον [εὐ]σεβείας
ὑπάρχει

Χαριέστερος μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν ἐστίν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ
ταύτη πω τὸ βέβαιον εὐσεβείας ὑπάρχει.

[col. 1, lines 11-16] Indeed, **possibly** such a person **at times** is **more refined than**
other laymen, but still not **in this way at all** does the firmness **of piety** exist.

[Chilton] Such a man is perhaps more praiseworthy than other individuals, but
still it is not thus that a solid foundation for piety is laid.

[Grenfell] It may perhaps imply more taste on his part than the average,
nevertheless by this formula he has not yet reached the trustworthy
principle of religion.

Fear of the gods is an infirm basis for piety

Correct Perspective

col. 1, lines 16-26

σὺ [δ', ὦ] ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώ[τα]τον μὲν τι νόμιζε τὸ [διε]ληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ [παν]άριστον ἐν τοῖς οὐσι [δια]γοηθῆναι
δυνάμε[θα], κα[ὶ] [θ]αύμαζε ταύτην [τῇ]ν δ[ι]άληψιν καὶ σέβου [ἀδ]ε[ί]α τοῦτο, ἔπει[τα]...

Σὺ δ', ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώτατον μὲν τι νόμιζε τὸ διεληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ
πανάριστον ἐν τοῖς οὔσι διανοηθῆναι **δυνάμεθα, καὶ θαύμαζε ταύτην τὴν**
διάληψιν καὶ σέβου ἀδεία τοῦτο, ἔπειτα...

[col. 1, lines 16-26] And you, Sir, should consider **it something most blessed to**
have rightly grasped what is best of all among what exists that we are able
to conceive [for ourselves] – and you should marvel at **this understanding**
and you should revere it **with freedom from fear**.

[Chilton] You, my friend, must know that the most blessed gift is to have a clear perception of things; that is absolutely the best thing that we can conceive of here below. Admire this clear apprehension of the spirit, revere this divine gift.

[Grenfell] But do you, sir, consider that the most blessed state lies in the formation of a just conception concerning the best thing that we can possibly imagine to exist; and reverence and worship this idea.

Reason for our Reverence

col. 1, lines 27-35

...σέ[βεσ]θα[ι] νο[ι]ώσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον [μὴ] ὀλ[ιγ]ωρῶν τηλικού[του] σεμνώματος κατὰ [τῇ]ν θ[ε]ωρίαν πρὸς τὴν [σε] [αυ]τοῦ εὐ[δαιμ]ονίαν. καὶ [νῆ] Δία περὶ ταύ[την] τῇ[ν] [ἐν]τεῦθεν...

...σέβεσθαι νοῶσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον μὴ ὀλιγωρῶν τηλικούτου σεμνώματος κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν πρὸς τὴν σεαυτοῦ εὐδαιμονίαν. καὶ, νῆ δία, περὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐντεῦθεν...

[col. 1, lines 27-35] ...they intend to worship, but only that you are not neglectful of such great reverence according to the study for your own happiness. And, by god, concerning this which from here...

[Chilton] [After that you should not honour the gods because you think thus to gain their favour], as people will think when they see you performing acts of piety, but only because, in comparison with your own happiness, you see how the condition of the gods [is infinitely more august, according to our doctrine]

Honoring Yourself

col. 2, lines 1-8

{[πε]υτικόν} καὶ κεχα[ρισ]μένον, ἐὰν εὐκαιρῇ, τιμ[ᾷ]ν αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν σεαυτοῦ ταῖς συγγενέσιν κατὰ σάρκα ἡδοναῖς, αἱ ποτ' ἂν καθήκωσιν, ἀλλὰ ποτε καὶ τῇ τῶν νόμων συμπεριφορᾷ χρωμένου σοῦ.

...Καὶ κεχαρισμένον. ἐὰν εὐκαιρῇ: τιμᾶν αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν σεαυτοῦ ταῖς συγγενέσιν κατὰ σάρκα ἡδοναῖς, αἱ ποτ' ἂν καθήκωσιν – ἀλλὰ ποτε καὶ τῇ τῶν νόμων συμπεριφορᾷ χρωμένου σοῦ.

[col. 2, lines 1-8] ...and was grateful. If there is an opportunity: honor this very study of yourself with the innate pleasures of the flesh, whenever they may be appropriate – but also whenever by you acting in accordance with the laws.

[Chilton] [And certainly, by Zeus, {when you practice} this doctrine — the doctrine most worthy of belief, {as your reason should tell you — it is of course open to you to offer sacrifices to the gods. By doing so you perform} an act which gives confidence] and is a pleasure to see, if it is done at the proper time, because you honour your own doctrine by enjoying those pleasures of the senses which befit such occasions and besides you conform in some sense to religious traditions.

Fearlessness

col. 2, lines 8-16

Δέος δὲ μὴ πρόσα[γε] ἐνταῦθα μηδ' ὑπόληψιν χαριτωνίας θεοῖς, ὅτι ταῦτα πράττεις. τί γάρ, ὦ πρὸς Διός, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, δ[έ]δοικας; πότερα ἀδικεῖ[ν] ἐκείνους νομίζων; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς ἐλλατῶν.

Δέος δὲ μὴ πρόσαγε ἐνταῦθα μηδ' ὑπόληψιν χαριτωνίας θεοῖς ὅτι ταῦτα πράττεις. τί γάρ, ὦ πρὸς διός (τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον) δέδοικας; πότερα ἀδικεῖν ἐκείνους νομίζων; οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς ἐλλατῶν!

[col. 2, lines 8-16] Do not introduce fear here nor the assumption of grace from the gods because you do these things. For why "oh for god"(as it is said) were you afraid? Perhaps you think they act unjustly? Therefore, it is clear that how you are belittling [them]!

[Chilton] Only be careful that you do not permit any admixture of fear of the gods or of the supposition that in acting as you do you are winning the favour of the gods. For indeed, in the name of Zeus (as men affect to say) what have you to fear in this matter? Do you believe that the gods can do you harm? Is not that, on any showing, to belittle them?

[Grenfell] But let there be no question of fear in this, nor any assumption that your action will buy the favour of the gods. For why, 'by Zeus,' to use the vulgar phrase, do you fear them? Is it because you think that you do them an injury? Is it not plain in that case that you are making them inferior? Are you not then regarding the divine power as something mean, if it is inferior to you?

Fearing the divine denigrates the divine.

Comparison

col. 2, lines 16-24

πῶς οὐ[ν] οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμ[ό]νιον δοξάζε[ι]ς, εἴπερ ἐ[λατ]το[ῦ]ται πρὸς σέ; ἢ καὶ χά[ρι]ν ἀδ[ική]ματος[ς] ὑπείλ[η]φας ἐὰ[ν] τοιαῦτα πράττη[ς] πρ[α]γ[εῖν] θεόν; ἢ τὸν τα[ῦτα] λογ[ι]ζόμενον ἐ[ν]ίοτ' ἀνή[σειν] βλά[β]ας πρὸς ἀνθρώ[πους];

Πῶς οὖν οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμόνιον δοξάζεις, εἴπερ ἐλαττοῦται πρὸς σέ; ἢ καὶ χάριν ἀδ[ικήματος] ὑπείληφας ἐὰν τοιαῦτα πράττης, πραῦνεῖν θεόν; ἢ τὸν ταῦτα λογιζόμενον ἐνίοτ' ἀνήσειν βλάβας πρὸς ἀνθρώπους;

[col. 2, lines 16-24] How then do you not consider the divine as something lowly, if indeed it is belittled in relation to you? Or have you assumed that, because of [your wrongdoing], if you do such things, you appease a god? Or [have you assumed] that the one considering these things sometimes will forgive harms towards men?

[Chilton] How then will you not regard the Divinity as a miserable creature if it appears inferior in comparison to yourself? Or will you rather be of the opinion that by sacrificing [thousands of oxen] you can appease God if you have committed some evil deed? Can you think that he will take account of the sacrifice and, like a man, remit at some time or another a part of the penalty?

Fear

col. 2, lines 25-27

καὶ ἵ γὰρ οἷ[ον]ται δεῖν αὐτῶν δεδοικέναι καὶ τιμᾶν τινάς ἵνα κατεχόμενοι τῷ...

Καὶ γὰρ οἷονται δεῖν αὐτῶν δεδοικέναι καὶ τιμᾶν τινάς ἵνα κατεχόμενοι τῷ...

[col. 2, lines 25-27] And indeed, they think it necessary to have been fearful of them and to honor certain ones in order that they are held...

[Chilton] No doubt men tell each other that they should fear the gods and honour them with sacrifices so that, restrained by the tribute they receive, the gods will not attack them

Fear's gamble

col. 2, lines 28-32

μὴ ἐπιθ[ώ]νται αὐτοῖς[ς· ὥς] εἴτ' ὀρθῶς τοιοῖ[ων] καθόλου μὴ βλαβήσεσθ[αι] [εἴ]τ' ο[ὐ]κ ὀρθ[ῶς] τὸ δυνα[μικόν] θεῶν τ[μ]ώντων

...Μὴ ἐπιθώνται αὐτοῖς: ὥς εἴτ' ὀρθῶς τοῦτο οἰομένων, καθόλου μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι – εἴτ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς, τὸ δυναμικὸν θεῶν τιμώντων...

[col. 2, lines 28-32] ...Do not rely on them: whether thinking this rightly, not to be harmed at all – or not rightly, by honoring the power of the gods...

[Chilton] as a result they think that if their surmise is correct they will altogether escape injury and if it is not, all will be well because they pay homage to the power of the gods.

Fearful Expectations

col. 3, lines 2-4

καιηται. τὸ γὰρ κατα[θῦσαι] βλάβην ἔφερεν ἂν [εἴ τις] προσεδόκα τὸ ἐπ[ιτίμιον.]

...καίηται. τὸ γὰρ καταθῦσαι βλάβην ἔφερεν, ἂν εἴ τις προσεδόκα τὸ ἐπιτίμιον.

[col. 3, lines 2-4] ...would be set on fire. For sacrificing would have brought harm, if [someone] expected the penalty.

[Chilton] [*But if these close relations between gods and men were really to exist it would be a great misfortune, for the effect would make itself felt even beyond the grave after the funeral ceremonies, as soon as a man*] was cremated. For then men would suffer injury even beneath the earth and [everyone] would have to expect punishment.

A fearful mindset invites problems.

Expectations of Providence

col. 3, lines 5-10

καὶ χωρὶς τούτω[ν οἱ παραι]τούμενοι, μὴ παρ[ορῶντο, τὰ] σημεῖα τῆς χάριτ[ος καὶ νομί]ζοντες αὐτοὺς ῥα[δίως πρὸς] ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς [ἄλλους] ἀφικέσθαι καὶ...

καὶ χωρὶς τούτων, οἱ παραιτούμενοι μὴ παρῶντο τὰ σημεῖα τῆς χάριτος, καὶ νομίζοντες αὐτοὺς ῥαδίως πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ἀφικέσθαι καὶ...

[col. 3, lines 5-10] ...and apart from these, those who pray so that they would not pass by the signs of grace and thinking that they easily arrive for themselves and for others...

[Chilton] Moreover, I need not describe how men would have to beg for signs of favour from the gods in their fear of being neglected by them (for they would think to induce the gods in this way to communicate with them more readily and come down into their temples).

Many people incorrectly expect direct help from the gods.

Acting out of Fear

col. 3, lines 11-16

...ὅσους δὴποτε τρόπ[ους πάν]τες πρὸς τὸ τῆς βλάβ[ης ὑπό]πτειμα καὶ τὴν τιμωρί[ας] προφυλακὴν ἐγγ[υῶνται, λογι]στέον, πρὸς

...ὅσους δὴποτε τρόπους πάντες πρὸς τὸ τῆς βλάβης ὑπόπτειμα καὶ τὴν τιμωρίας προφυλακὴν ἐγγυῶνται. λογιστέον πρὸς...

[col. 3, lines 11-16] ...at any time as many as all the manners for the suspicion of harm and the prevention of punishment are guaranteed – then they give pledges. It must be calculated towards...

[Chilton] any more than I can tell of the diversity and number of the methods they would employ because of their fear of harm and so as to guard against punishment. For to speak the truth *⟨all this seems a pure illusion of these people when compared with the doctrine of those who think that a life of happiness exists for us in this world and do not admit that the dead live again — a marvel not less unlikely than those which Plato imagined⟩*.

Many people pray to avoid harm and not be punished.

Profiles

Mētródōros

Μητρόδωρος

"Mother's Gift"

- Wrote books about the absurdities in Homer
- Brother of the troublesome Timokráṭēs
- Husband of Leóntion, with whom he had a son Little Epíkouros I

Leóntion

Λεόντιον

"Little Lioness"

- Wife of Mētródōros
- Wrote a book against Theóphrastos
- Theorus the painter produced a well-known picture of her called "Leóntion In contemplation"

Leonteús

ΛΕΟΝΤΕΥΣ

"The Lion" of Lampsacus

- Tended towards atheism for a while, but was a devoted pupil of Epíkouros
- Had Mammáron as a courtesan
- Husband of Themísta, with whom he had a son Little Epíkouros II

Themísta

Θεμίστα

"Order-keeper"

- Wife of Leonteús
- Epíkouros wrote her letters and dedicated at dedicated least one book "On Neoklês" to her
- She was famous in antiquity for being praised by Epíkouros for her character and wisdom
- She and Leonteús together had a son little Epíkouros

Timeline

Lamian War Military Service

323–322 BC – Athens (Attica)
(18–19 years old)

The Lamian War was an unsuccessful attempt by Athens (along with a large coalition of Greek states) to end the hegemony of Macedonia over Greece just after the death of Alexander the Great.

Epíkouros was likely completing his obligatory military service in Athens during the Lamian War. While it is not specifically documented that Epíkouros fought in any battles, being in Athens at the time means he was involved in some form of military service, possibly in support roles or as part of the city’s defense efforts.

The Mytilene Misadventure

311 BC – Mytilene, Lesbos
(30 years old)

Mytilene was probably under Cassander's or Lysimachus' overall control during this period, but they were now being challenged by Antigonus I Monophthalmus’ territorial expansion.

Epíkouros was forced to leave Mytilene due to conflicts with the local authorities.

Founding the Garden

306 BC
(35 years old)

Athens was now...

Epíkouros....

Death

270 BC
(72 years old)

SETTING THE SCENE.

Epíkouros.

x
x BC
(x years old)

SETTING THE SCENE.

Epíkouros.

TESTIMONIA

CERTORUM LIBRORUM VESTIGIA

U1 – U218

INCERTAE SEDIS FRAGMENTA OPINIONUMQUE TESTIMONIA

U219 – U607

PROLEGOMENA PHILOSOPHIAE

U219 – U241

CANONICA

U242– U265

PHYSICA

U266 – U395

ETHICA

U396 – U607

...[με]τὰ πολλῆς πεπ[ο]ιθήσεως ἄλλους νουθετήσομεν – καὶ νῦν καὶ διαπρέψαντες οἱ καθηγητῶν ὅτως ἀπότομαι γενηθέντες. Καὶ τὸ συνέχον καὶ κυριώτατον – Ἐπικούρῳ καθ' ὃν ζῆν ἡρήμεθα, πειθαρχήσομεν...

With great confidence we will instruct others – both presently and [later] as distinguished leaders who have thus become strict. And the continuous and most important thing – to Epíkouros, according to whom we have chosen to live, we will be obedient."

summa vero Vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est – in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant; hanc ἰσονομίαν appellat Epicurus id est aequabilem tributionem. ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse immortalium non minorem, et si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere.

the greatest Power of infinity is indeed most worthy of great and diligent contemplation – in which it is necessary to understand that nature is such that all things correspond as equals to all things. This Epicurus calls "isonomía," that is, equal distribution. Therefore, from this it follows that, if the multitude of mortals is so great, the number of immortals must not be smaller, and if those that destroy are innumerable, those that preserve must also be infinite.

x	v v v	x

➡➡➡

Reliquiarum Quaesitor

Sandbox

Subject	ctrl U
Subject modifier	ctrl alt U
Object	ctrl shift D
Object modifier	ctrl alt D
Oblique	ctrl shift /
Oblique modifier	ctrl alt /
Prepositional/absolute	ctrl shift \
Prepositional modifier	ctrl alt \

*** = **

&&& = *

DRN 3.245	sēnsíferōs	"[the fourth nature of the soul] which
mōtūs	quae dīdit	first distributes <i>the sense-giving</i>
prīma	per ártūs	<i>motions through the limbs.</i> "

Plato, Timaeus ^[47B/C] God invented and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the perturbed; and that we, learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries.

We need practical observation of the consequences of actions. ὁ τοῦ τέλους ἐπιλογισμός explains what the 'hedonistic calculus' is, but in just one word, we also have ἡ Συμμέτρησις (“measuring by comparison”)

ὁ τοῦ Τέλους Ἐπιλογισμός	The Inductive Consideration of Fulfilment	<i>the "hedonic calculus"</i>
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▣ Cardo Font Test ▣

ATTESTATION		CONTESTATION	
[M] ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον attested	Λ and	[W] ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον contested	(Ο) προσμένον pending <i>(conflicting evidence → more observation needed)</i>
[¬M] οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον not attested	Λ and	[¬W] οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον not contested	(Ο) προσμένον pending <i>(no evidence → unknown)</i>
[¬M] <i>non-attestation alone is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment as long as there continues to be no attestation</i>	∨ or	[W] <i>contestation alone is sufficient to establish the falsity of a judgment long as there continues to be no attestation</i>	(¬α) FALSE
[M] <i>attestation alone is sufficient to establish truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation</i>	∨ or	[¬W] <i>non-contestation alone is sufficient to establish truth of a judgment as long as there continues to be no contestation</i>	(α) TRUE

Demetrius Laco, P.Herc. 831

καὶ μὴν ἐκάστου, καθά φησιν Ἐπίκουρος: "ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως πρὸς τινα χρόνον συστάντος, πλείω μὲν μὴ δύνασθαι βιώσαι, ἐλάττω δὲ δύνασθαι, τὴν ἀνάγκην τὴν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐποχῇ μεσολαβεῖν."

And indeed, for each [thing], as Epicurus says: "from its first generation, once it has come together for a certain time, it cannot live longer, but it can live shorter; it is not possible for any pause to intervene in the necessity according to that time."