

# Plutarch's Essays on Epicureanism

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That It Is not Possible to Live Pleasurably According to the  
Doctrine of Epicurus

Against Colotes, the Disciple and Favorite of Epicurus

Whether 'twere Rightly Said, Live Concealed



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# THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO LIVE PLEASURABLY ACCORDING TO THE DOCTRINE OF EPICURUS.

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## PLUTARCH, ZEUXIPPUS, THEON, ARISTODEMUS.

1. Epicurus's great confidant and familiar, Colotes, set forth a book with this title to it, that according to the tenets of the other philosophers it is impossible to live. Now what occurred to me then to say against him, in the defence of those philosophers, hath been already put into writing by me. But since upon breaking up of our lecture several things have happened to be spoken afterwards in the walks in further opposition to his party, I thought it not amiss to recollect them also, if for no other reason, yet for this one, that those who will needs be contradicting other men may see that they ought not to run cursorily over the discourses and writings of those they would disprove, nor by tearing out one word here and another there, or by falling foul upon particular passages without the books, to impose upon the ignorant and unlearned.

2. Now as we were leaving the school to take a walk (as our manner is) in the gymnasium, Zeuxippus began to us: In my opinion, said he, the debate was managed on our side with more softness and less freedom than was fitting. I am sure, Heraclides went away disgusted with us, for handling Epicurus and Aletrodorus more roughly than they deserved. Yet you may remember, replied Theon, how you told them that Colotes himself, compared with the rhetoric of those two gentlemen, would appear the complaisantest man alive; for when they have raked together the lewdest terms of ignominy the tongue of man ever used, as buffooneries, trollings, arrogancies, whorings, assassinations, whining counterfeits, black-guards, and blockheads, they faintly throw them in the faces of Aristotle, Socrates, Pythagoras, Protagoras, Theophrastus, Heraclides, Hipparchus, and which not, even of the best and most celebrated authorities. So that, should they pass for very knowing men upon all other accounts, yet their very calumnies and reviling

language would bespeak them at the greatest distance from philosophy imaginable. For emulation can never enter that godlike consort, nor such fretfulness as wants resolution to conceal its own resentments. Aristodemus then subjoined: Heraclides, you know, is a great philologist; and that may be the reason why he made Epicurus those amends for the poetic din (so, that party style poetry) and for the fooleries of Homer; or else, it may be, it was because Metrodorus had libelled that poet in so many books. But let us let these gentlemen pass at present, Zeuxippus, and rather return to what was charged upon the philosophers in the beginning of our discourse, that it is impossible to live according to their tenets. And I see not why we two may not despatch this affair betwixt us, with the good assistance of Theon; for I find this gentleman (meaning me) is already tired. Then Theon said to him,

Our fellows have that garland from us won;

therefore, if you please,

Let's fix another goal, and at that run.

— Odyss. XXII. 6.

We will even prosecute them at the suit of the philosophers, in the following form: We'll prove, if we can, that it is impossible to live a pleasurable life according to their tenets. Bless me! said I to him, smiling, you seem to me to level your foot at the very bellies of the men, and to design to enter the list with them for their lives, whilst you go about to rob them thus of their pleasure, and they cry out to you,

“Forbear, we're no good boxers, sir;

no, nor good pleaders, nor good senators, nor good magistrates either;

Our proper talent is to eat and drink.“

— Odyss. VIII. 246, 248.

and to excite such tender and delicate motions in our bodies as may chafe our imaginations to some jolly delight or gayety.“ And therefore you seem to me not so much to take off (as I may say) the pleasurable part, as to deprive the men of their very lives, while you will not leave them to live pleasantly. Nay then, said Theon, if you approve so highly of this subject, why do you not set in hand to it? By all means, said I, I am for this, and shall not only hear but answer you too, if you shall insist. But I must leave it to you to take the lead.

Then, after Theon had spoken something to excuse himself, Aristodemus said: When we had so short and fair a cut to our design, how have you blocked up the way before us, by preventing us from joining issue with the faction at the very first upon the single point of propriety! For you must grant, it can be no easy matter to drive men already possessed that pleasure is their utmost good yet to believe a life of pleasure impossible to be attained. But now the truth is, that when they failed of living becomingly they failed also of living pleasantly; for to live pleasantly without living becomingly is even by themselves allowed inconsistent.

3. Theon then said: We may probably resume the consideration of that in the process of our discourse; in the interim we will make use of their concessions. Now they suppose their last good to lie about the belly and such other conveyances of the body as let in pleasure and not pain; and are of opinion, that all the brave and ingenious inventions that ever have been were contrived at first for the pleasure of the belly, or the good hope of compassing such pleasure,—as the sage Metrodorus informs us. By which, my good friend, it is very plain, they found their pleasure in a poor, rotten, and unsure thing, and one that is equally perforated for pains, by the very passages they receive their pleasures by; or rather indeed, that admits pleasure but by a few, but pain by all its parts. For the whole of pleasure is in a manner in the joints, nerves, feet, and hands; and these are oft the seats of very grievous and lamentable distempers, as gouts, corroding rheums, gangrenes, and putrid

ulcers. And if you apply to yourself the exquisitest of perfumes or gusts, you will find but some one small part of your body is finely and delicately touched, while the rest are many times filled with anguish and complaints. Besides, there is no part of us proof against fire, sword, teeth, or scourges, or insensible of dolours and aches; yea, heats, colds, and fevers sink into all our parts alike. But pleasures, like gales of soft wind, move simpering, one towards one extreme of the body and another towards another, and then go off in a vapor. Nor are they of any long durance, but, as so many glancing meteors, they are no sooner kindled in the body than they are quenched by it. As to pain, Aeschylus's Philoctetes affords us a sufficient testimony:

The cruel viper ne'er will quit my foot;

Her dire envenomed teeth have there ta'en root.

For pain will not troll off as pleasure doth, nor imitate it in its pleasing and tickling touches. But as the clover twists its perplexed and winding roots into the earth, and through its coarseness abides there a long time; so pain disperses and entangles its hooks and roots in the body, and continues there, not for a day or a night, but for several seasons of years, if not for some revolutions of Olympiads, nor scarce ever departs unless struck out by other pains, as by stronger nails. For who ever drank so long as those that are in a fever are a-dry? Or who was ever so long eating as those that are besieged suffer hunger? Or where are there any that are so long solaced with the conversation of friends as tyrants are racking and tormenting? Now all this is owing to the baseness of the body and its natural incapacity for a pleasurable life; for it bears pains better than it doth pleasures, and with respect to those is firm and hardy, but with respect to these is feeble and soon palled. To which add, that if we are minded to discourse on a life of pleasure, these men won't give us leave to go on, but will presently confess themselves that the pleasures of the body are but short, or rather indeed but of a moment's continuance; if they do not design to banter us or else speak out of vanity, when Metrodorus tells us, We many times spit at the pleasures of the body,

and Epicurus saith, A wise man, when he is sick, many times laughs in the very extremity of his distemper.

With what consistence then can those that account the pains of the body so light and easy think so highly of its pleasures? For should we allow them not to come behind its pains either in duration or magnitude, they would not yet have their being without them. For Epicurus hath made the removal of all that pains the common definition of all pleasure; as if Nature had intended to advance the pleasurable part only to the destruction of the painful, but would not have it improved any further in magnitude, and as if she only diverted herself with certain useless diversifications after she hath once arrived to an abolition of pain. But now the passage to this, conjoined with an appetite which is the measure of pleasure, is extremely short and soon over. And therefore the sense of their narrow entertainment here hath obliged them to transplant their last end from the body, as from a poor and lean soil, to the mind, in hopes of enjoying there, as it were, large pastures and fair meadows of delights and satisfactions.

For Ithaca is no fit place

For mettled steeds to run a race.

— Odyss. IV. 605.

Neither can the joys of our poor bodies be smooth and equal; but on the contrary they must be coarse and harsh, and immixed with much that is displeasing and inflamed.

4. Zeuxippus then said: And do you not think then they take the right course to begin at the body, where they observe pleasure to have its first rise, and thence to pass to the mind as the more stable and sure part, there to complete and crown the whole?

They do, by Jove, I said; and if, after removing thither they have indeed found something more consummate than before, a course too as well agreeing with nature as becoming men adorned with both contemplative and civil

knowledge. But if after all this you still hear them cry out, and protest that the mind of man can receive no satisfaction or tranquillity from anything under Heaven but the pleasures of the body either in possession or expectance, and that these are its proper and only good, can you forbear thinking they make use of the soul but as a funnel for the body, while they mellow their pleasure by shifting it from one vessel to another, as they rack wine out of an old and leaky vessel into a new one and there let it grow old, and then imagine they have performed some extraordinary and very fine thing? True indeed, a fresh pipe may both keep and recover wine that hath thus been drawn off; but the mind, receiving but the remembrance only of past pleasure, like a kind of scent, retains that and no more. For as soon as it hath given one hiss in the body, it immediately expires, and that little of it that stays behind in the memory is but flat and like a queasy fume: as if a man should lay up and treasure in his fancy what he either ate or drank yesterday, that he may have recourse to that when he wants fresh fare. See now how much more temperate the Cyrenaics are, who, though they have drunk out of the same bottle with Epicurus, yet will not allow men so much as to practise their amours by candlelight, but only under the covert of the dark, for fear seeing should fasten too quick an impression of the images of such actions upon the fancy and thereby too frequently inflame the desire. But these gentlemen account it the highest accomplishment of a philosopher to have a clear and retentive memory of all the various figures, passions, and touches of past pleasure. We will not now say, they present us with nothing worthy the name of philosophy, while they leave the refuse of pleasure in their wise man's mind, as if it could be a lodging for bodies; but that it is impossible such things as these should make a man live pleasurably, I think is abundantly manifest from hence.

For it will not perhaps seem strange if I assert, that the memory of pleasure past brings no pleasure with it if it appeared but little in the very enjoyment, or to men of such abstinence as to account it for their benefit to retire from its first approaches; when even the most amazed and sensual admirers of corporeal delights remain no longer in their gaudy and pleasant humor than their pleasure lasts them. What remains is but an empty shadow and dream of



that pleasure that hath now taken wing and is fled from them, and that serves but for fuel to foment their untamed desires. Like as in those that dream they are a-dry or in love, their unaccomplished pleasures and enjoyments do but excite the inclination to a greater keenness. Nor indeed can the remembrance of past enjoyments afford them any real contentment at all, but must serve only, with the help of a quick desire, to raise up very much of outrage and stinging pain out of the remains of a feeble and befooling pleasure. Neither doth it befit men of continence and sobriety to exercise their thoughts about such poor things, or to do what one twitted Carneades with, to reckon, as out of a diurnal, how oft they have lain with Hedia or Leontion, or where they last drank Thasian wine, or at what twentieth-day feast they had a costly supper. For such transport and captivatedness of the mind to its own remembrances as this is would show a detestable and bestial restlessness and raving towards the present and hoped-for acts of pleasure. And therefore I cannot but look upon the sense of these inconveniences as the true cause of their retiring at last to a freedom from pain and a firm state of body; as if living pleasurably could lie in bare imagining this either past or future to some persons. True indeed it is, “that a sound state of body and a good assurance of its continuing must needs afford a most transcending and solid satisfaction to all men capable of reasoning.”

5. But yet look first what work they make, while they course this same thing—whether it be pleasure, exemption from pain, or good health—up and down, first from the body to the mind, and then back again from the mind to the body, being compelled to return it to its first origin, lest it should run out and so give them the slip. Thus they place the pleasure of the body (as Epicurus says) upon the complacent joy in the mind, and yet conclude again with the good hopes that complacent joy hath in bodily pleasure. Indeed what wonder is it if, when the foundation shakes, the superstructure totter? Or that there should be no sure hope nor unshaken joy in a matter that suffers so great concussion and changes as continually attend a body exposed to so many violences and strokes from without, and having within it the origins of such evils as human reason cannot avert? For if it could, no understanding man would ever fall under stranguries, gripes, consumptions, or dropsies;

with some of which Epicurus himself did conflict and Polyænus with others, while others of them were the deaths of Neocles and Agathobulus. And this we mention not to disparage them, knowing very well that Pherecydes and Heraclitus, both very excellent persons, labored under very uncouth and calamitous distempers. We only beg of them, if they will own their own diseases and not by noisy rants and popular harangues incur the imputation of false bravery, either not to take the health of the whole body for the ground of their content, or else not to say that men under the extremities of dolours and diseases can yet rally and be pleasant. For a sound and hale constitution of body is indeed a thing that often happens, but a firm and steadfast assurance of its continuance can never befall an intelligent mind. But as at sea (according to Aeschylus)

Night to the ablest pilot trouble brings,

— Aeschylus, *Suppliants*, 770.

and so will a calm too, for no man knows what will be,—so likewise is it impossible for a soul that dwells in a healthful body, and that places her good in the hopes she hath of that body, to perfect her voyage here without frights or waves. For man's mind hath not, like the sea, its tempests and storms only from without it, but it also raises up from within far more and greater disturbances. And a man may with more reason look for constant fair weather in the midst of winter than for perpetual exemption from afflictions in his body. For what else hath given the poets occasion to term us ephemeral creatures, uncertain and unfixed, and to liken our lives to leaves that both spring and fall in the lapse of a summer, but the unhappy, calamitous, and sickly condition of the body, whose very utmost good we are warned to dread and prevent? For an exquisite habit, Hippocrates saith, is slippery and hazardous. And

He that but now looked jolly, plump, and stout,

Like a star shot by Jove, is now gone out;

as it is in Euripides. And it is a vulgar persuasion, that very handsome persons, when looked upon, oft suffer damage by envy and an evil eye; for a body at its utmost vigor will through delicacy very soon admit of changes.

6. But now that these men are miserably unprovided for an undisturbed life, you may discern even from what they themselves advance against others. For they say that those who commit wickedness and incur the displeasure of the laws live in constant misery and fear, for, though they may perhaps attain to privacy, yet it is impossible they should ever be well assured of that privacy; whence the ever impending fear of the future will not permit them to have either complacency or assurance in their present circumstances. But they consider not how they speak all this against themselves. For a sound and healthy state of body they may indeed oftentimes possess, but that they should ever be well assured of its continuance is impossible; and they must of necessity be in constant disquiet and pain for the body with respect to futurity, never being able to reach that firm and steadfast assurance which they expect. But to do no wickedness will contribute nothing to our assurance; for it is not suffering unjustly but suffering in itself that is dismaying. Nor can it be a matter of trouble to be engaged in villanies one's self, and not afflictive to suffer by the villanies of others. Neither can it be said that the tyranny of Lachares was less, if it was not more, calamitous to the Athenians, and that of Dionysius to the Syracusans, than they were to the tyrants themselves; for it was disturbing that made them be disturbed; and their first oppressing and pestering of others gave them occasion to expect to suffer ill themselves. Why should a man recount the outrages of rabbles, the barbarities of thieves, or the villanies of inheritors, or yet the contagions of airs and the concursions of seas, by which Epicurus (as himself writeth) was in his voyage to Lampsacus within very little of drowning? The very composition of the body—it containing in it the matter of all diseases, and (to use a pleasantry of the vulgar) cutting thongs for the beast out of its own hide, I mean pains out of the body—is sufficient to make life perilous and uneasy, and that to the good as well as to the bad, if they have learned to set their complacency and assurance in the body and the hopes they have of it,

and in nothing else; as Epicurus hath written, as well in many other of his discourses as in that of Man's End.

7. They therefore assign not only a treacherous and unsure ground of their pleasurable living, but also one in all respects despicable and little, if the escaping of evils be the matter of their complacency and last good. But now they tell us, nothing else can be so much as imagined, and nature hath no other place to bestow her good in but only that out of which her evil hath been driven; as Metrodorus speaks in his book against the Sophists. So that this single thing, to escape evil, he says, is the supreme good; for there is no room to lodge this good in where no more of what is painful and afflicting goes out. Like unto this is that of Epicurus, where he saith: The very essence of good arises from the escaping of bad, and a man's recollecting, considering, and rejoicing within himself that this hath befallen him. For what occasions transcending joy (he saith) is some great impending evil escaped; and in this lies the very nature and essence of good, if a man consider it aright, and contain himself when he hath done, and not ramble and prate idly about it. Oh, the rare satisfaction and felicity these men enjoy, that can thus rejoice for having undergone no evil and endured neither sorrow nor pain! Have they not reason, think you, to value themselves for such things as these, and to speak as they are wont when they style themselves immortals and equals to gods?—and when, through the excessiveness and transcendency of the blessed things they enjoy, they rave even to the degree of whooping and hollowing for very satisfaction that, to the shame of all mortals, they have been the only men that could find out this celestial and divine good that lies in an exemption from all evil? So that their beatitude differs little from that of swine and sheep, while they place it in a mere tolerable and contented state, either of the body, or of the mind upon the body's account. For even the more prudent and more ingenious sort of brutes do not esteem escaping of evil their last end; but when they have taken their repast, they are disposed next by fullness to singing, and they divert themselves with swimming and flying; and their gayety and sprightliness prompt them to entertain themselves with attempting to counterfeit all sorts of voices and notes; and then they make their caresses to one another, by skipping and dancing one towards another;

nature inciting them, after they have escaped evil, to look after some good, or rather to shake off what they find uneasy and disagreeing, as an impediment to their pursuit of something better and more congenial.

8. For what we cannot be without deserves not the name of good; but that which claims our desire and preference must be something beyond a bare escape from evil. And so, by Jove, must that be too that is either agreeing or congenial to us, according to Plato, who will not allow us to give the name of pleasures to the bare departures of sorrows and pains, but would have us look upon them rather as obscure draughts and mixtures of agreeing and disagreeing, as of black and white, while the extremes would advance themselves to a middle temperament. But oftentimes unskilfulness and ignorance of the true nature of extreme occasions some to mistake the middle temperament for the extreme and outmost part. Thus do Epicurus and Metrodorus, while they make avoiding of evil to be the very essence and consummation of good, and so receive but as it were the satisfaction of slaves or of rogues newly discharged the jail, who are well enough contented if they may but wash and supple their sores and the stripes they received by whipping, but never in their lives had one taste or sight of a generous, clean, unmixed and unulcerated joy. For it follows not that, if it be vexatious to have one's body itch or one's eyes to run, it must be therefore a blessing to scratch one's self, and to wipe one's eye with a rag; nor that, if it be bad to be dejected or dismayed at divine matters or to be discomposed with the relations of hell, therefore the bare avoiding of all this must be some happy and amiable thing. The truth is, these men's opinion, though it pretends so far to outgo that of the vulgar, allows their joy but a straight and narrow compass to toss and tumble in, while it extends it but to an exemption from the fear of hell, and so makes that the top of acquired wisdom which is doubtless natural to the brutes. For if freedom from bodily pain be still the same, whether it come by endeavor or by nature, neither then is an undisturbed state of mind the greater for being attained to by industry than if it came by nature. Though a man may with good reason maintain that to be the more confirmed habit of the mind which naturally admits of no disorder, than that which by application and judgment eschews it.

But let us suppose them both equal; they will yet appear not one jot superior to the beasts for being unconcerned at the stories of hell and the legends of the gods, and for not expecting endless sorrows and everlasting torments hereafter. For it is Epicurus himself that tells us that, had our surmises about heavenly phenomena and our foolish apprehensions of death and the pains that ensue it given us no disquiet, we had not then needed to contemplate nature for our relief. For neither have the brutes any weak surmises of the gods or fond opinion about things after death to disorder themselves with; nor have they as much as imagination or notion that there is anything in these to be dreaded. I confess, had they left us the benign providence of God as a presumption, wise men might then seem, by reason of their good hopes from thence, to have something towards a pleasurable life that beasts have not. But now, since they have made it the scope of all their discourses of God that they may not fear him, but may be eased of all concern about him, I much question whether those that never thought at all of him have not this in a more confirmed degree than they that have learned to think he can do no harm. For if they were never freed from superstition, they never fell into it; and if they never laid aside a disturbing conceit of God, they never took one up. The like may be said as to hell and the future state. For though neither the Epicurean nor the brute can hope for any good thence; yet such as have no forethought of death at all cannot but be less amused and scared with what comes after it than they that betake themselves to the principle that death is nothing to us. But something to them it must be, at least so far as they concern themselves to reason about it and contemplate it; but the beasts are wholly exempted from thinking of what appertains not to them; and if they fly from blows, wounds, and slaughters, they fear no more in death than is dismaying to the Epicurean himself.

9. Such then are the things they boast to have attained by their philosophy. Let us now see what those are they deprive themselves of and chase away from them. For those diffusions of the mind that arise from the body, and the pleasing condition of the body, if they be but moderate, appear to have nothing in them that is either great or considerable; but if they be excessive, besides their being vain and uncertain, they are also importune and petulant;

nor should a man term them either mental satisfactions or gayeties, but rather corporeal gratifications, they being at best but the simperings and effeminacies of the mind. But now such as justly deserve the names of complacencies and joys are wholly refined from their contraries, and are immixed with neither vexation, remorse, nor repentance; and their good is congenial to the mind and truly mental and genuine, and not superinduced. Nor is it devoid of reason, but most rational, as springing either from that in the mind that is contemplative and inquiring, or else from that part of it that is active and heroic. How many and how great satisfactions either of these affords us, no one can ever relate. But to hint briefly at some of them. We have the historians before us, which, though they find us many and delightful exercises, still leave our desire after truth insatiate and uncloyed with pleasure, through which even lies are not without their grace. Yea, tales and poetic fictions, while they cannot gain upon our belief, have something in them that is charming to us.

10. For do but think with yourself, with what a sting we read Plato's "Atlantic" and the conclusion of the "Iliad," and how we hanker and gape after the rest of the tale, as when some beautiful temple or theatre is shut up. But now the informing of ourselves with the truth herself is a thing so delectable and lovely as if our very life and being were for the sake of knowing. And the darkest and grimmest things in death are its oblivion, ignorance, and obscurity. Whence, by Jove, it is that almost all mankind encounter with those that would destroy the sense of the departed, as placing the very whole of their life, being, and satisfaction solely in the sensible and knowing part of the mind. For even the things that grieve and afflict us yet afford us a sort of pleasure in the hearing. And it is often seen that those that are disordered by what is told them, even to the degree of weeping, notwithstanding require the telling of it. So he in the tragedy who is told,

Alas I now the very worst must tell,

replies,

I dread to hear it too, but I must hear.

— Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1169, 1170.

But this may seem perhaps a sort of intemperateness of delight in knowing everything, and as it were a stream violently bearing down the reasoning faculty. But now, when a story that hath in it nothing that is troubling and afflictive treats of great and heroic enterprises with a potency and grace of style such as we find in Herodotus's Grecian and in Xenophon's Persian history, or in what,

Inspired by heavenly gods, sage Homer sung,

or in the Travels of Euxodus, the Foundations and Republics of Aristotle, and the Lives of Famous Men compiled by Aristoxenus; these will not only bring us exceeding much and great contentment, but such also as is clean and secure from repentance. And who could take greater satisfaction either in eating when a-hungry or drinking when a-dry amongst the Phaeacians, than in going over Ulysses's relation of his own voyage and rambles? And what man could be better pleased with the embraces of the most exquisite beauty, than with sitting up all night to read over what Xenophon hath written of Panthea, or Aristobulus of Timoclea, or Theopompus of Thebe?

11. But now these appertain all solely to the mind. But they chase away from them the delights that accrue from the mathematics also. Though the satisfactions we receive from history have in them something simple and equal; but those that come from geometry, astronomy, and music inveigle and allure us with a sort of nimbleness and variety, and want nothing that is tempting and engaging; their figures attracting us as so many charms, whereof whoever hath once tasted, if he be but competently skilled, will run about chanting that in Sophocles,

I'm mad; the Muses with new rage inspire me.



I'll mount the hill; my lyre, my numbers fire me.

— From the *Thamyras* of Sophocles, Frag. 225.

Nor doth *Thamyras* break out into poetic raptures upon any other score; nor, by *Jove*, *Euxodus*, *Aristarchus*, or *Archimedes*. And when the lovers of the art of painting are so enamoured with the charmingness of their own performances, that *Nicias*, as he was drawing the *Evocation of Ghosts* in *Homer*, often asked his servants whether he had dined or no, and when King *Ptolemy* had sent him threescore talents for his piece, after it was finished, he neither would accept the money nor part with his work; what and how great satisfactions may we then suppose to have been reaped from geometry and astronomy by *Euclid* when he wrote his *Dioptrics*, by *Philippus* when he had perfected his demonstration of the figure of the moon, by *Archimedes* when with the help of a certain angle he had found the sun's diameter to make the same part of the largest circle that that angle made of four right angles, and by *Apollonius* and *Aristarchus* who were the inventors of some other things of the like nature? The bare contemplating and comprehending of all these now engender in the learners both unspeakable delights and a marvellous height of spirit. And it doth in no wise beseem me, by comparing with these the fulsome debauchees of victualling-houses and stews, to contaminate *Helicon* and the *Muses*,—

Where swain his flock ne'er fed,

Nor tree by hatchet bled.

— Eurip. *Hippol.* 75.

But these are the verdant and untrampled pastures of ingenious bees; but those are more like the mange of lecherous boars and he-goats. And though a voluptuous temper of mind be naturally erratic and precipitate, yet never any yet sacrificed an ox for joy that he had gained his will of his mistress; nor did any ever wish to die immediately, might he but once satiate himself with the costly dishes and comfits at the table of his prince. But now *Eudoxus* wished he might stand by the sun, and inform himself of the figure, magnitude, and

beauty of that luminary, though he were, like Phaethon, consumed by it. And Pythagoras offered an ox in sacrifice for having completed the lines of a certain geometric diagram; as Apollodotus tells us,

When the famed lines Pythagoras devised,  
For which a splendid ox he sacrificed.

Whether it was that by which he showed that the line that regards the right angle in a triangle is equivalent to the two lines that contain that angle, or the problem about the area of the parabolic section of a cone. And Archimedes's servants were forced to hale him away from his draughts, to be anointed in the bath; but he notwithstanding drew the lines upon his belly with his strigil. And when, as he was washing (as the story goes of him), he thought of a manner of computing the proportion of gold in King Hiero's crown by seeing the water flowing over the bathing-stool, he leaped up as one possessed or inspired, crying, "I have found it;" which after he had several times repeated, he went his way. But we never yet heard of a glutton that exclaimed with such vehemence, "I have eaten," or of an amorous gallant that ever cried, "I have kissed," among the many millions of dissolute debauchees that both this and preceding ages have produced. Yea, we abominate those that make mention of their great suppers with too luscious a gust, as men overmuch taken with mean and abject delights. But we find ourselves in one and the same ecstasy with Eudoxus, Archimedes, and Hipparchus; and we readily give assent to Plato when he saith of the mathematics, that while ignorance and unskilledness make men despise them, they still thrive notwithstanding by reason of their charmingness, in despite of contempt.

12. These then so great and so many pleasures, that run like perpetual springs and rills, these men decline and avoid; nor will they permit those that put in among them so much as to take a taste of them, but bid them hoist up the little sails of their paltry cock-boats and fly from them. Nay, they all, both he and she philosophers, beg and entreat Pythocles, for dear Epicurus's sake, not to affect or make such account of the sciences called liberal. And when

they cry up and defend one Apelles, they write of him that he kept himself clean by refraining himself all along from the mathematics. But as to history—to pass over their aversedness to other kinds of compositions—I shall only present you with the words of Metrodorus, who in his treatise of the Poets writes thus: Wherefore let it never disturb you, if you know not either what side Hector was of, or the first verses in Homer's Poem, or again what is in its middle. But that the pleasures of the body spend themselves like the winds called Etesian or Anniversary, and utterly determine when once age is past its vigor, Epicurus himself was not insensible; and therefore he makes it a problematic question, whether a sage philosopher, when he is an old man and disabled for enjoyment, may not still be recreated with having handsome girls to feel and grope him, being not, it seems, of the mind of old Sophocles, who thanked God he had at length escaped from this kind of pleasure, as from an untamed and furious master. But, in my opinion, it would be more advisable for these sensual lechers, when they see that age will dry up so many of their pleasures, and that, as Euripides saith,

Dame Venus is to ancient men a foe,

— Eurip. *Aeolus*, Frag. 23.

in the first place to collect and lay up in store, as against a siege, these other pleasures, as a sort of provision that will not impair and decay; that then, after they have celebrated the venereal festivals of life, they may spend a cleanly after-feast in reading over the historians and poets, or else in problems of music and geometry. For it would never have come into their minds so much as to think of these purblind and toothless gropings and spurtings of lechery, had they but learned, if nothing more, to write comments upon Homer or Euripides, as Aristotle, Heraclides, and Dicaerchus did. But I verily persuade myself that their neglecting to take care for such provisions as these, and finding all the other things they employed themselves in (as they use to say of virtue) but insipid and dry, and being wholly set upon pleasure, and the body no longer supplying them with it, give them occasion to stoop to do things both mean and shameful in themselves and unbecoming their age; as

well when they refresh their memories with their former pleasures and serve themselves of old ones (as it were) long since dead and laid up in pickle for the purpose, when they cannot have fresh ones, as when again they offer violence to nature by suscitating and inflaming in their decayed bodies, as in cold embers, other new ones equally senseless, they having not, it seems, their minds stored with any congenial pleasure that is worth the rejoicing at.

13. As to the other delights of the mind, we have already treated of them, as they occurred to us. But their aversedness and dislike to music, that affords us so great delights and such charming satisfactions, a man could not forget if he would, by reason of the inconsistency of what Epicurus saith, when he pronounceth in his book called his Doubts that his wise man ought to be a lover of public spectacles and to delight above any other man in the music and shows of the Bacchanals; and yet he will not admit of music problems or of the critical inquiries of philologists, no, not so much as at a computation. Yea, he advises such princes as are lovers of the Muses rather to entertain themselves at their feasts either with some narration of military adventures or with the importune scurrilities of drolls and buffoons, than to engage in disputes about music or in questions of poetry. For this very thing he had the face to write in his treatise of Monarchy, as if he were writing to Sardanapalus, or to Nanarus ruler of Babylon. For neither would a Hiero nor an Attalus nor an Archelaus be persuaded to make a Euripides, a Simonides, a Melanippides, a Crates, or a Diodotus rise up from their tables, and to place such scaramuchios in their rooms as a Cardax, an Agrias, or a Callias, or fellows like Thrasonides and Thrasyleon, to make people disorder the house with hollowing and clapping. Had the great Ptolemy, who was the first that formed a consort of musicians, but met with these excellent and royal admonitions, would he not, think you, have thus addressed himself to the Samians:

O Muse, whence art thou thus maligned?

For certainly it can never belong to any Athenian to be in such enmity and hostility with the Muses. But

No animal accurst by Jove

Music's sweet charms can ever love.

— Pindar, *Pyth.* I. 25.

What sayest thou now, Epicurus? Wilt thou get thee up betimes in the morning, and go to the theatre to hear the harpers and flutists play? But if a Theophrastus discourse at the table of Concords, or an Aristoxenus of Varieties, or if an Aristophanes play the critic upon Homer, wilt thou presently, for very dislike and abhorrence, clap both thy hands upon thy ears? And do they not hereby make the Scythian king Ateas more musical than this comes to, who, when he heard that admirable flutist Ismenias, detained then by him as a prisoner of war, playing upon the flute at a computation, swore he had rather hear his own horse neigh? And do they not also profess themselves to stand at an implacable and irreconcilable defiance with whatever is generous and becoming? And indeed what do they ever embrace or affect that is either genteel or regardable, when it hath nothing of pleasure to accompany it? And would it not far less affect a pleasurable way of living, to abhor perfumes and odors, like beetles and vultures, than to shun and abhor the conversation of learned, critics and musicians? For what flute or harp ready tuned for a lesson, or

What sweetest concerts e'er with artful noise,

Warbled by softest tongue and best tuned voice,

ever gave Epicurus and Metrodorus such content as the disputes and precepts about concerts gave Aristotle, Theophrastus, Hieronymus, and Dicaerchus? And also the problems about flutes, rhythms, and harmonies; as, for instance, why the longer of two flutes of the same longitude should speak flatter?—why, if you raise the pipe, will all its notes be sharp; and flat again, if you depress it?—and why, when clapped to another, will it sound flatter; and sharper again, when taken from it?—why also, if you scatter chaff or dust about the orchestra of a theatre, will the sound be deadened?—and

why, when one would have set up a bronze Alexander for a frontispiece to a stage at Pella, did the architect advise to the contrary, because it would spoil the actors' voices? and why, of the several kinds of music, will the chromatic diffuse and the harmonic compose the mind? But now the several humors of poets, their differing turns and forms of style, and the solutions of their difficult places, have conjoined with a sort of dignity and politeness somewhat also that is extremely agreeable and charming; insomuch that to me they seem to do what was once said by Xenophon, to make a man even forget the joys of love, so powerful and overcoming is the pleasure they bring us.

14. Of all this these gentlemen have not the least share, nor do they so much as pretend or desire to have any. But while they are sinking and depressing their contemplative part into the body, and dragging it down by their sensual and intemperate appetites, as by so many weights of lead, they make themselves appear little better than hostlers or graziers that still ply their cattle with hay, straw, or grass, looking upon such provender as the properest and meetest food for them. And is it not even thus they would swill the mind with the pleasures of the body, as hogherds do their swine, while they will not allow it can be gay any longer than it is hoping, experiencing, or remembering something that refers to the body; but will not have it either to receive or seek for any congenial joy or satisfaction from within itself? Though what can be more absurd and unreasonable than—when there are two things that go to make up the man, a body and a soul, and the soul besides hath the prerogative of governing—that the body should have its peculiar, natural, and proper good, and the soul none at all, but must sit gazing at the body and simper at its passions, as if she were pleased and affected with them, though indeed she be all the while wholly untouched and unconcerned, as having nothing of her own to choose, desire, or take delight in? For they should either pull off the vizor quite, and say plainly that man is all body (as some of them do, that take away all mental being), or, if they will allow us to have two distinct natures, they should then leave to each its proper good and evil, agreeable and disagreeable; as we find it to be with our senses, each of which is peculiarly adapted to its own sensible, though they all very

strangely intercommune one with another. Now the intellect is the proper sense of the mind; and therefore that it should have no congenial speculation, movement, or affection of its own, the attaining to which should be matter of complacency to it, is the most irrational thing in the world, if I have not, by Jove, unwittingly done the men wrong, and been myself imposed upon by some that may perhaps have calumniated them.

15. Then I said to him: If we may be your judges, you have not; yea, we must acquit you of having offered them the least indignity; and therefore pray despatch the rest of your discourse with assurance. How! said I, and shall not Aristodemus then succeed me, if you are tired out yourself? Aristodemus said: With all my heart, when you are as much tired as he is; but since you are yet in your vigor, pray make use of yourself, my noble friend, and don't think to pretend weariness. Theon then replied: What is yet behind, I must confess, is very easy; it being but to go over the several pleasures contained in that part of life that consists in action. Now themselves somewhere say that there is far more satisfaction in doing than in receiving good; and good may be done many times, it is true, by words, but the most and greatest part of good consists in action, as the very name of beneficence tells us and they themselves also attest. For you may remember, continued he, we heard this gentleman tell us but now what words Epicurus uttered, and what letters he sent to his friends, applauding and magnifying Metrodorus,—how bravely and like a spark he quitted the city and went down to the port to relieve Mithrus the Syrian,—and this, though Metrodorus did not then do anything at all. What and how great then may we presume the pleasures of Plato to have been, when Dion by the measures he gave him deposed the tyrant Dionysius and set Sicily at liberty? And what the pleasures of Aristotle, when he rebuilt his native city Stagira, then levelled with the ground, and brought back its exiled inhabitants? And what the pleasures of Theophrastus and of Phidias, when they cut off the tyrants of their respective countries? For what need a man recount to you, who so well know it, how many particular persons they relieved, not by sending them a little wheat or a measure of meal (as Epicurus did to some of his friends), but by procuring restoration to the banished, liberty to the imprisoned, and restitution of wives and children

to those that had been bereft of them? But a man could not, if he were willing, pass by the sottish stupidity of the man who, though he tramples under foot and vilifies the great and generous actions of Themistocles and Miltiades, yet writes these very words to his friends about himself: “You have given a very gallant and noble testimony of your care of me in the provision of corn you have made for me, and have declared your affection to me by signs that mount to the very skies.” So that, should a man but take that poor parcel of corn out of the great philosopher’s epistle, it might seem to be the recital of some letter of thanks for the delivery or preservation of all Greece or of the commons of Athens.

16. We will now forbear to mention that Nature requires very large and chargeable provisions to be made for accomplishing the pleasures of the body; nor can the height of delicacy be had in black bread and lentil pottage. But voluptuous and sensual appetites expect costly dishes, Thasian wines, perfumed unguents, and varieties of pastry works,

And cakes by female hands wrought artfully,

Well steep’d in th’ liquor of the gold-wing’d bee;

— From the Cressae of Euripides, Frag. 470.

and besides all this, handsome young lassies too, such as Leontion, Boidion, Hedia, and Nicedion, that were wont to roam about in Epicurus’s philosophic garden. But now such joys as suit the mind must undoubtedly be grounded upon a grandeur of actions and a splendor of worthy deeds, if men would not seem little, ungenerous, and puerile, but on the contrary, bulky, firm, and brave. But for a man to be elated by happiness, as Epicurus is, like sailors upon the festivals of Venus, and to vaunt himself that, when he was sick of an ascites, he notwithstanding called his friends together to certain collations and grudged not his dropsy the addition of good liquor, and that, when he called to remembrance the last words of Neocles, he was melted with a peculiar sort of joy intermixed with tears,—no man in his right senses would call these true joys or satisfactions. Nay, I will be bold to say that, if such



a thing as that they call a sardonic or grinning laughter can happen to the mind, it is to be found in these artificial and crying laughters. But if any will needs have them still called by the name of joys and satisfactions, let him but yet think how far they are exceeded by the pleasures that here ensue:

Our counsels have proud Sparta's glory clipt;

and

Stranger, this is his country Rome's great star;

and again this,

I know not which to guess thee, man or god.

Now when I set before my eyes the brave achievements of Thrasybulus and Pelopidas, of Aristides engaged at Platea and Miltiades at Marathon, I am here constrained with Herodotus to declare it my opinion, that in an active state of life the pleasure far exceeds the glory. And Epaminondas herein bears me witness also, when he saith (as is reported of him), that the greatest satisfaction he ever received in his life was that his father and mother had lived to see the trophy set up at Leuctra when himself was general. Let us then compare with Epaminondas's Epicurus's mother, rejoicing that she had lived to see her son cooping himself up in a little garden, and getting children in common with Polyaenus upon the strumpet of Cyzicus. As for Metrodorus's mother and sister, how extravagantly rejoiced they were at his nuptials appears by the letters he wrote to his brother in answer to his; that is, out of his own books. Nay, they tell us bellowing that they have not only lived a life of pleasure, but also exult and sing hymns in the praise of their own living. Though, when our servants celebrate the festivals of Saturn or go in procession at the time of the rural bacchanals, you would scarcely brook the hollowing and din they make, if the intemperateness of their joy and

their insensibleness of decorum should make them act and speak such things as these:

Lean down, boy! why dost sit I let's tope like mad!

Here's belly-timber store; ne'er spare it, lad.

Straight these huzza like wild. One fills up drink;

Another plaits a wreath, and crowns the brink

O' th' teeming bowl. Then to the verdant bays

All chant rude carols in Apollo's praise;

While one the door with drunken fury smites,

Till he from bed his loving consort frights.

And are not Metrodorus's words something like to these when he writes to his brother thus: It is none of our business to preserve the Greeks, or to get them to bestow garlands upon us for our wit, but to eat well and drink good wine, Timocrates, so as not to offend but pleasure our stomachs. And he saith again, in some other place in the same epistles: How gay and how assured was I, when I had once learned of Epicurus the true way of gratifying my stomach; for, believe me, philosopher Timocrates, our prime good lies at the stomach.

17. In brief, these men draw out the dimensions of their pleasures like a circle, about the stomach as a centre. And the truth is, it is impossible for those men ever to participate of generous and princely joy, such as enkindles a height of spirit in us and sends forth to all mankind an unmade hilarity and calm serenity, that have taken up a sort of life that is confined, unsocial, inhuman, and uninspired towards the esteem of the world and the love of mankind. For the soul of man is not an abject, little, and ungenerous thing, nor doth it extend its desires (as polyps do their claws) unto eatables only,—yea, these are in an instant of time taken off by the least plenitude, but when its efforts towards what is brave and generous and the honors and caresses

that accrue therefrom are now in their consummate vigor this life's duration cannot limit them, but the desire of glory and the love of mankind grasp at whole eternity, and wrestle with such actions and charms as bring with them an ineffable pleasure, and such as good men, though never so fain, cannot decline, they meeting and accosting them on all sides and surrounding them about, while their being beneficial to many occasions joy to themselves.

As he passes through the throngs in the city,

All gaze upon him as some deity.

— Odyss. VIII. 173.

For he that can so affect and move other men as to fill them with joy and rapture, and to make them long to touch him and salute him, cannot but appear even to a blind man to possess and enjoy very extraordinary satisfactions in himself. And hence it comes that such men are both indefatigable and undaunted in serving the public, and we still hear some such words from them

Thy father got thee for the common good;

and

Let's not give off to benefit mankind.

But what need I instance in those that are consummately good? For if to one of the middling rank of bad men, when he is just a-dying, he that hath the power over him (whether his god or prince) should but allow one hour more, upon condition that, after he hath spent that either in some generous action or in sensual enjoyment, he should then presently die, who would in this time choose rather to accompany with Lais or drink Ariusion wine, than to despatch Archias and restore the Athenians to their liberties? For my part I believe none would. For I see that even common sword-players, if they

are not utter brutes and savages, but Greek born, when they are to enter the list, though there be many and very costly dishes set before them, yet take more content in employing their time in commanding their poor wives to some of their friends, yea, and in conferring freedom on their slaves, than in gratifying their stomachs. But should the pleasures of the body be allowed to have some extraordinary matter in them, this would yet be common to men of action and business.

For they can eat good meat, and red wine drink,

— See Il. V. 341.

aye, and entertain themselves with their friends, and perhaps with a greater relish too, after their engagements and hard services,—as did Alexander and Agesilaus, and (by Jove) Phocion and Epaminondas too,—than these gentlemen who anoint themselves by the fireside, and are gingerly rocked about the streets in sedans. Yea, those make but small account of such pleasures as these, as being comprised in those greater ones. For why should a man mention Epaminondas's denying to sup with one, when he saw the preparations made were above the man's estate, but frankly saying to his friend, "I thought you had intended a sacrifice and not a debauch," when Alexander himself refused Queen Ada's cooks, telling her he had better ones of his own, to wit, travelling by night for his dinner, and a light dinner for his supper, and when Philoxenus writing to him about some handsome boys, and desiring to know of him whether he would have him buy them for him, was within a small matter of being discharged his office for it? And yet who might better have them than he? But as Hippocrates saith that of two pains the lesser is forgot in the greater, so the pleasures that accrue from action and the love of glory, while they cheer and refresh the mind, do by their transcendancy and grandeur obliterate and extinguish the inferior satisfactions of the body.

18. If, then, the remembering of former good things (as they affirm) be that which most contributes to a pleasurable living, not one of us will then credit Epicurus when he, tells us that, while he was dying away in the midst of the strongest agonies and distempers, he yet bore himself up with the memory of

the pleasures he formerly enjoyed. For a man may better see the resemblance of his own face in a troubled deep or a storm, than a smooth and smiling remembrance of past pleasure in a body tortured with such lancing and rending pains. But now the memories of past actions no man can put from him that would. For did Alexander, think you, (or indeed could he possibly) forget the fight at Arbela? Or Pelopidas the tyrant Leontiadas? Or Themistocles the engagement at Salamis? For the Athenians to this very day keep an annual festival for the battle at Marathon, and the Thebans for that at Leuctra; and so, by Jove, do we ourselves (as you very well know) for that which Daiphantus gained at Hyampolis, and all Phocis is filled with sacrifices and public honors. Nor is there any of us that is better satisfied with what himself hath either eaten or drunk than he is with what they have achieved. It is very easy then to imagine what great content, satisfaction, and joy accompanied the authors of these actions in their lifetime, when the very memory of them hath not yet after five hundred years and more lost its rejoicing power. The truth is, Epicurus himself allows there are some pleasures derived from fame. And indeed why should he not, when he himself had such a furious lechery and wriggling after glory as made him not only to disown his masters and scuffle about syllables and accents with his fellow-pedant Democritus (whose principles he stole verbatim), and to tell his disciples there never was a wise man in the world besides himself, but also to put it in writing how Colotes performed adoration to him, as he was one day philosophizing, by touching his knees, and that his own brother Neocles was used from a child to say, "There neither is, nor ever was in the world, a wiser man than Epicurus," and that his mother had just so many atoms within her as, when coming together, must have produced a complete wise man? May not a man then—as Callicratidas once said of the Athenian admiral Conon, that he whored the sea as well say of Epicurus that he basely and covertly forces and ravishes Fame, by not enjoying her publicly but ruffling and debauching her in a corner? For as men's bodies are oft necessitated by famine, for want of other food, to prey against nature upon themselves, a like mischief to this does vainglory create in men's minds, forcing them, when they hunger after praise and cannot obtain it from other men, at last to commend themselves.

19. And do not they then that stand so well affected towards applause and fame themselves own they cast away very extraordinary pleasures, when they decline, magistrature, public offices, and the favor and confidences of princes, from whom Democritus once said the grandest blessings of human life are derived? For he will never induce any mortal to believe, that he that could so highly value and please himself with the attestation of his brother Neocles and the adoration of his friend Colotes would not, were he clapped by all the Greeks at the Olympiads, go quite out of his wits and even hollow for joy, or rather indeed be elated in the manner spoken of by Sophocles,

Puffed like the down of a gray-headed thistle.

If it be a pleasing thing then to be of a good fame, it is on the contrary afflictive to be of an ill one; and it is most certain that nothing in the world can be more infamous than want of friendship, idleness, atheism, debauchery, and negligence. Now these are looked upon by all men except themselves as inseparable companions of their party. But unjustly, some one may say. Be it so then; for we consider not now the truth of the charge, but what fame and reputation they are of in the world. And we shall forbear at present to mention the many books that have been written to defame them, and the blackening decrees made against them by several republics; for that would look like bitterness. But if the answers of oracles, the providence of the gods, and the tenderness and affection of parents to their issue,—if civil policy, military order, and the office of magistracy be things to be looked upon as deservedly esteemed and celebrated, it must of necessity then be allowed also, that they that tell us it is none of their business to preserve the Greeks, but they must eat and drink so as not to offend but pleasure their stomachs, are base and ignominious persons, and that their being reputed such must needs extremely humble them and make their lives untoward to them, if they take honor and a good name for any part of their satisfaction.

20. When Theon had thus spoken, we thought good to break up our walk to rest us awhile (as we were wont to do) upon the benches. Nor did we continue any long space in our silence at what was spoken; for Zeuxippus,

taking his hint from what had been said, spake to us: Who will make up that of the discourse which is yet behind? For it hath not yet received its due conclusion; and this gentleman, by mentioning divination and providence, did in my opinion suggest as much to us; for these people boast that these very things contribute in no way to the providing of their lives with pleasure, serenity, and assurance; so that there must be something said to these too. Aristodemus subjoined then and said: As to pleasure, I think there hath been enough said already to evince that, supposing their doctrine to be successful and to attain its own design, it yet doth but ease us of fear and a certain superstitious persuasion but helps us not to any comfort or joy from the gods at all; nay, while it brings us to such a state as to be neither disquieted nor pleased with them, it doth but render us in the same manner affected towards them as we are towards the Scythians or Hyrcanians, from whom we look for neither good nor harm. But if something more must be added to what hath been already spoken, I think I may very well take it from themselves. And in the first place, they quarrel extremely with those that would take away all sorrowing, weeping, and sighing for the death of friends, and tell them that such unconcernedness as arrives to an insensibility proceeds from some other worse cause, to wit, inhumanity, excessive vainglory, or prodigious fierceness, and that therefore it would be better to be a little concerned and affected, yea, and to liquor one's eyes and be melted, with other pretty things of the like kind, which they use artificially to affect and counterfeit, that they may be thought tender and loving-hearted people. For just in this manner Epicurus expressed himself upon the occasion of the death of Hegesianax, when he wrote to Dositheus the father and to Pyrson the brother of the deceased person; for I fortun'd very lately to run over his epistles. And I say, in imitation of them, that atheism is no less an evil than inhumanity and vainglory, and into this they would lead us who take away with God's anger the comfort we might derive from him. For it would be much better for us to have something of the unsuiting passion of dauntedness and fear conjoined and intermixed with our sentiments of a deity, than while we fly from it, to leave ourselves neither hope, content, nor assurance in the enjoyment of our good things nor any recourse to God in our adversity and misfortunes.

21. We ought, it is true, to remove superstition from the persuasion we have of the gods, as we would the gum from our eyes; but if that be impossible, we must not root out and extinguish with it the belief which the most have of the gods; nor is that a dismaying and sour one either, as these gentlemen feign, while they libel and abuse the blessed Providence, representing her as a witch or as some fell and tragic fury. Yea, I must tell you, there are some in the world that fear God in an excess, for whom yet it would not be better not so to fear him. For, while they dread him as a governor that is gentle to the good and severe to the bad, and are by this one fear, which makes them not to need many others, freed from doing ill and brought to keep their wickedness with them in quiet and (as it were) in an enfeebled languor, they come hereby to have less disquiet than those that indulge the practice of it and are rash and daring in it, and then presently after fear and repent of it. Now that disposition of mind which the greater and ignorant part of mankind, that are not utterly bad, are of towards God, hath, it is very true, conjoined with the regard and honor they pay him, a kind of anguish and astonished dread, which is also called superstition; but ten thousand times more and greater is the good hope, the true joy, that attend it, which both implore and receive the whole benefit of prosperity and good success from the gods only. And this is manifest by the greatest tokens that can be; for neither do the discourses of those that wait at the temples, nor the good times of our solemn festivals, nor any other actions or sights more recreate and delight us than what we see and do about the gods ourselves, while we assist at the public ceremonies, and join in the sacred balls, and attend at the sacrifices and initiations. For the mind is not then sorrowful depressed, and heavy, as if she were approaching certain tyrants or cruel torturers; but on the contrary, where she is most apprehensive and fullest persuaded the divinity is present, there she most of all throws off sorrows, tears, and pensiveness, and lets herself loose to what is pleasing and agreeable, to the very degree of tipsiness, frolic, and laughter. In amorous concerns, as the poet said once,

When old man and old wife think of love's fires,  
Their frozen breasts will swell with new desires;



but now in the public processions and sacrifices not only the old man and the old wife, nor yet the poor and mean man only, but also

The dusty thick-legged drab that turns the mill,

and household-slaves and day-laborers, are strangely elevated and transported with mirth and joviality. Rich men as well as princes are used at certain times to make public entertainments and to keep open houses; but the feasts they make at the solemnities and sacrifices, when they now apprehend their minds to approach nearest the divinity, have conjoined with the honor and veneration they pay him a much more transcending pleasure and satisfaction. Of this, he that hath renounced God's providence hath not the least share; for what recreates and cheers us at the festivals is not the store of good wine and roast meat, but the good hope and persuasion that God is there present and propitious to us, and kindly accepts of what we do. From some of our festivals we exclude the flute and garland; but if God be not present at the sacrifice, as the solemnity of the banquet, the rest is but unhallowed, unfeast-like, and uninspired. Indeed the whole is but ungrateful and irksome to such a man; for he asks for nothing at all, but only acts his prayers and adorations for fear of the public, and utters expressions contradictory to his philosophy. And when he sacrifices, he stands by and looks upon the priest as he kills the offering but as he doth upon a butcher; and when he hath done, he goes his way, saying with Menander,

To bribe the gods I sacrificed my best,

But they ne'er minded me nor my request.

For such a mien Epicurus would have us to put on, and neither to envy nor to incur the hatred of the common herd by doing ourselves with disgust what others do with delight. For, as Evenus saith,

No man can love what he is made to do.

For which very reason they think the superstitious are not pleased in their minds but in fear while they attend at the sacrifices and mysteries; though they themselves are in no better condition, if they do the same things out of fear, and partake not either of as great good hope as the others do, but are only fearful and uneasy lest they should come to be discovered as cheating and abusing the public, upon whose account it is that they compose the books they write about the Gods and the Divine Nature,

Involved, with nothing truly said.

But all around enveloped;

hiding out of fear the real opinions they contain.

22. And now, after the two former ranks of ill and common men, we will in the third place consider the best sort and most beloved of the gods, and what great satisfactions they receive from their clean and generous sentiments of the deity, to wit, that he is the prince of all good things and the parent of all things brave, and can no more do an unworthy thing than he can be made to suffer it. For he is good, and he that is good can upon no account fall into envy, fear, anger, or hatred; neither is it proper to a hot thing to cool, but to heat; nor to a good thing to do harm. Now anger is by nature at the farthest distance imaginable from complacency, and spleenishness from placidness, and animosity and turbulence from humanity and kindness. For the latter of these proceed from generosity and fortitude, but the former from impotency and baseness. The deity is not therefore constrained by either anger or kindnesses; but that is because it is natural to it to be kind and aiding, and unnatural to be angry and hurtful. But the great Jove, whose mansion is in heaven, is the first that descends downwards and orders all things and takes the care of them. But of the other gods one is surnamed the Distributor, and another the Mild, and a third the Averter of Evil. And according to Pindar,

Phoebus was by mighty Jove designed

Of all the gods to be to man most kind.

And Diogenes saith, that all things are the gods', and friends have all things common, and good men are the gods' friends; and therefore it is impossible either that a man beloved of the gods should not be happy, or that a wise and a just man should not be beloved of the gods. Can you think then that they that take away Providence need any other chastisement, or that they have not a sufficient one already, when they root out of themselves such vast satisfaction and joy as we that stand thus affected towards the deity have? Metrodorus, Polyaenus, and Aristobulus were the confidence and rejoicing of Epicurus; the better part of whom he all his lifetime either attended upon in their sicknesses or lamented at their deaths. As did Lycurgus, when he was saluted by the Delphic prophetess,

Dear friend to heavenly Jove and all the gods.

And did Socrates when he believed that a certain divinity was used out of kindness to discourse him, and Pindar when he heard Pan sing one of the sonnets he had composed, but a little rejoice, think you? Or Phormio, when he thought he had treated Castor and Pollux at his house? Or Sophocles, when he entertained Aesculapius, as both he himself believed, and others too, that thought the same with him by reason of the apparition that then happened? What opinion Hermogenes had of the gods is well worth the recounting in his very own words. "For these gods," saith he, "who know all things and can do all things, are so friendly and loving to me that, because they take care of me, I never escape them either by night or by day, wherever I go or whatever I am about. And because they know beforehand what issue everything will have, they signify it to me by sending angels, voices, dreams, and presages."

23. Very amiable things must those be that come to us from the gods; but when these very things come by the gods too, this is what occasions vast satisfaction and unspeakable assurance, a sublimity of mind and a joy that, like a smiling brightness, doth as it were gild over our good things with a glory. But now those that are persuaded otherwise obstruct the very sweetest part of their prosperity, and leave themselves nothing to turn to in their

adversity; but when they are in distress, look only to this one refuge and port, dissolution and insensibility; just as if in a storm or tempest at sea, some one should, to hearten the rest, stand up and say to them: Gentlemen, the ship hath never a pilot in it, nor will Castor and Pollux come themselves to assuage the violence of the beating waves or to lay the swift careers of the winds; yet I can assure you there is nothing at all to be dreaded in all this, for the vessel will be immediately swallowed up by the sea, or else will very quickly fall off and be dashed in pieces against the rocks. For this is Epicurus's way of discourse to persons under grievous distempers and excessive pains. Dost thou hope for any good from the gods for thy piety? It is thy vanity; for the blessed and incorruptible Being is not constrained by either angers or kindnesses. Dost thou fancy something better after this life than what thou hast here? Thou dost but deceive thyself; for what is dissolved hath no sense, and that which hath no sense is nothing to us. Aye; but how comes it then, my good friend, that you bid me eat and be merry? Why, by Jove, because he that is in a great storm cannot be far off a shipwreck; and your extreme danger will soon land you upon Death's strand. Though yet a passenger at sea, when he is got off from a shattered ship, will still buoy himself up with some little hope that he may drive his body to some shore and get out by swimming; but now the poor soul, according to these men's philosophy,

Has no escape beyond the hoary main.

— Odyss. V. 410.

Yea, she presently evaporates, disperses, and perishes, even before the body itself; so that it seems her great and excessive rejoicing must be only for having learned this one sage and divine maxim, that all her misfortunes will at last determine in her own destruction, dissolution, and annihilation.

24. But (said he, looking upon me) I should be impertinent, should I say anything upon this subject, when we have heard you but now discourse so fully against those that would persuade us that Epicurus's doctrine about the soul renders men more disposed and better pleased to die than Plato's doth. Zeuxippus therefore subjoined and said: And must our present debate be left

then unfinished because of that? Or shall we be afraid to oppose that divine oracle to Epicurus? No, by no means, I said; and Empedocles tells us that

What's very good claims to be heard twice.

Therefore we must apply ourselves again to Theon; for I think he was present at our former discourse; and besides, he is a young man, and needs not fear being charged by these young gentlemen with having a bad memory.

25. Then Theon, like one constrained, said: Well then, if you will needs have me to go on with the discourse, I will not do as you did, Aristodemus. For you were shy of repeating what this gentleman spoke, but I shall not scruple to make use of what you have said; for I think indeed you did very well divide mankind into three ranks; the first of wicked and very bad men, the second of the vulgar and common sort, and the third of good and wise men. The wicked and bad sort then, while they dread any kind of divine vengeance and punishment at all, and are by this deterred from doing mischief, and thereby enjoy the greater quiet, will live both in more pleasure and in less disturbance for it. And Epicurus is of opinion that the only proper means to keep men from doing ill is the fear of punishments. So that we should cram them with more and more superstition still, and raise up against them terrors, chasms, frights, and surmises, both from heaven and earth, if their being amazed with such things as these will make them become the more tame and gentle. For it is more for their benefit to be restrained from criminal actions by the fear of what comes after death, than to commit them and then to live in perpetual danger and fear.

26. As to the vulgar sort, besides their fear of what is in hell, the hope they have conceived of an eternity from the tales and fictions of the ancients, and their great desire of being, which is both the first and the strongest of all, exceed in pleasure and sweet content of mind that childish dread. And therefore, when they lose their children, wives, or friends, they would rather have them be somewhere and still remain, though in misery, than that they should be quite destroyed, dissolved, and reduced to nothing. And they are

pleased when they hear it said of a dying person, that he goes away or departs, and such other words as intimate death to be the soul's remove and not destruction. And they sometimes speak thus:

But I'll even there think on my dearest friend;

— Il. XXII. 390.

and thus:

What's your command to Hector? Let me know;

And to your dear old Priam shall I go?

— Eurip. Hecuba, 422.

And (there arising hereupon an erroneous deviation) they are the better pleased when they bury with their departed friends such arms, implements, or clothes as were most familiar to them in their lifetime; as Minos did the Cretan flutes with Glaucus,

Made of the shanks of a dead brindled fawn.

And if they do but imagine they either ask or desire anything of them, they are glad when they give it them. Thus Periander burnt his queen's attire with her, because he thought she had asked for it and complained she was a-cold. Nor doth an Aeacus, an Ascalaphus, or an Acheron much disorder them whom they have often gratified with balls, shows, and music of every sort. But now all men shrink from that face of death which carries with it insensibility, oblivion, and extinction of knowledge, as being dismal, grim, and dark. And they are discomposed when they hear it said of any one, he is perished, or he is gone or he is no more; and they show great uneasiness when they hear such words as these:

Go to the wood-clad earth he must,

And there lie shrivelled into dust,  
And ne'er more laugh or drink, or hear  
The charming sounds of flute or lyre;

and these:

But from our lips the vital spirit fled  
Returns no more to wake the silent dead.

— Il. IX. 408.

27. Wherefore they must needs cut the very throats of them that shall with Epicurus tell them, We men were born once for all, and we cannot be born twice, but our not being must last forever. For this will bring them to slight their present good as little, or rather indeed as nothing at all compared with everlastingness, and therefore to let it pass unenjoyed and to become wholly negligent of virtue and action, as men disheartened and brought to a contempt of themselves, as being but as it were of one day's continuance and uncertain, and born for no considerable purpose. For insensibility, dissolution, and the conceit that what hath no sense is nothing to us, do not at all abate the fear of death, but rather help to confirm it; for this very thing is it that nature most dreads,—

But may you all return to mould and wet,

— Il. VII. 99.

to wit, the dissolution of the soul into what is without knowledge or sense. Now, while Epicurus would have this to be a separation into atoms and void, he doth but further cut off all hope of immortality; to compass which (I can scarce refrain from saying) all men and women would be well contented to be worried by Cerberus, and to carry water into the tub full of holes, so they might but continue in being and not be exterminated. Though (as I said before) there are not very many that stand in fear of these things, they being

but the tenets of old women and the fabulous stories of mothers and nurses, —and even they that do fear them yet believe that certain rites of initiation and purgation will relieve them, by which after they are cleansed they shall play and dance in hell forever, in company with those that have the privilege of a bright light, clear air, and the use of speech,—still to be deprived of living disturbs all both young and old. For it seems that we

Impatient love the light that shines on earth,

— Eurip. Hippol. 193.

as Euripides saith. Nor are we easy or without regret when we hear this:

Him speaking thus th' eternal brightness leaves, Where night the wearied steeds of day receives.

28. And therefore it is very plain that with the belief of immortality they take away the sweetest and greatest hopes the vulgar sort have. And what shall we then think they take away from the good and those that have led pious and just lives, who expect no ill after dying, but on the contrary most glorious and divine things? For, in the first place, athletes are not used to receive the garland before they have performed their exercises, but after they have contested and proved victorious; in like manner is it with those that are persuaded that good men have the prize of their conquests after this life is ended; it is marvellous to think to what a pitch of grandeur their virtue raises their spirits upon the contemplation of those hopes, among the which this is one, that they shall one day see those men that are now insolent by reason of their wealth and power, and that foolishly flout at their betters, undergo just punishment. In the next place, none of the lovers of truth and the contemplation of being have here their fill of them; they having but a watery and puddled reason to speculate with, as it were, through the fog and mist of the body; and yet they still look upwards like birds, as ready to take their flight to the spacious and bright region, and endeavor to make their souls expedite and light from things mortal, using philosophy as a study for death.



Thus I account death a truly great and accomplished good thing; the soul being to live there a real life, which here lives not a waking life, but suffers things most resembling dreams. If then (as Epicurus saith) the remembrance of a dead friend be a thing every way complacent; we may easily from thence imagine how great a joy they deprive themselves of who think they do but embrace and pursue the phantoms and shades of their deceased familiars, that have in them neither knowledge nor sense, but who never expect to be with them again, or to see their dear father and dear mother and sweet wife, nor have any hopes of that familiarity and dear converse they have that think of the soul with Pythagoras, Plato, and Homer. Now what their sort of passion is like to was hinted at by Homer, when he threw into the midst of the soldiers, as they were engaged, the shade of Aeneas, as if he had been dead, and afterwards again presented his friends with him himself,

Coming alive and well, as brisk as ever;

at which, he saith,

They all were overjoyed.

— Il. V. 514 and 515.

And should not we then,—when reason shows us that a real converse with persons departed this life may be had, and that he that loves may both feel and be with the party that affects and loves him,—relinquish these men that cannot so much as cast off all those airy shades and outside barks for which they are all their time in lamentation and fresh afflictions?

29. Moreover, they that look upon death as the commencement of another and better life, if they enjoy good things, are the better pleased with them, as expecting much greater hereafter; but if they have not things here to their minds, they do not much grumble at it, but the hopes of those good and excellent things that are after death contain in them such ineffable pleasures and expectances, that they wipe off and wholly obliterate every defect and

every offence from the mind, which, as on a road or rather indeed in a short deviation out of the road, bears whatever befalls it with great ease and indifference. But now, as to those to whom life ends in insensibility and dissolution,—death brings to them no removal of evils, though it is afflicting in both conditions, yet is it more so to those that live prosperously than to such as undergo adversity? For it cuts the latter but from an uncertain hope of doing better hereafter; but it deprives the former of a certain good, to wit, their pleasurable living. And as those medicinal potions that are not grateful to the palate but yet necessary give sick men ease, but rake and hurt the well; just so, in my opinion, doth the philosophy of Epicurus; it promises to those that live miserably no happiness in death, and to those that do well an utter extinction and dissolution of the mind, while it quite obstructs the comfort and solace of the grave and wise and those that abound with good things, by throwing them down from a happy living into a deprivation of both life and being. From hence then it is manifest, that the contemplation of the loss of good things will afflict us in as great a measure as either the firm hope or present enjoyment of them delights us.

30. Yea, themselves tell us, that the thought of future dissolution leaves them one most assured and complacent good, freedom from anxious surmises of incessant and endless evils, and that Epicurus's doctrine effects this by stopping the fear of death through the soul's dissolution. If then deliverance from the expectation of infinite evils be a matter of greatest complacence, how comes it not to be afflictive to be bereft of eternal good things and to miss of the highest and most consummate felicity? For not to be can be good for neither condition, but is on the contrary both against nature and ungrateful to all that have a being. But those being eased of the evils of life through the evils of death have, it is very true, the want of sense to comfort them, while they, as it were, make their escape from life. But, on the other hand, they that change from good things to nothing seem to me to have the most dismayed end of all, it putting a period to their happiness. For Nature doth not fear insensibility as the entrance upon some new thing, but because it is the privation of our present good things. For to declare that the destruction of all that we call ours toucheth us not is untrue for it toucheth

us already by the very anticipation. And insensibility afflicts not those that are not, but those that are, when they think what damage they shall sustain by it in the loss of their being and in being suffered never to emerge from nothingness. Wherefore it is neither the dog Cerberus nor the river Cocytus that has made our fear of death boundless; but the threatened danger of not being, representing it as impossible for such as are once extinct to shift back again into being. For we cannot be born twice, and our not being must last forever; as Epicurus speaks. For if our end be in not being, and that be infinite and unalterable, then hath privation of good found out an eternal evil, to wit, a never ending insensibleness. Herodotus was much wiser, when he said that God, having given men a taste of the delights of life, seems to be envious, (Herod. VII. 46.) and especially to those that conceit themselves happy, to whom pleasure is but a bait for sorrow, they being but permitted to taste of what they must be deprived of. For what solace or fruition or exultation would not the perpetual injected thought of the soul's being dispersed into infinity, as into a certain huge and vast ocean, extinguish and quell in those that found their amiable good and beatitude in pleasure? But if it be true (as Epicurus thinks it is) that most men die in very acute pain, then is the fear of death in all respects inconsolable; it bringing us through evils unto a deprivation of good.

31. And yet they are never wearied with their brawling and dunning of all persons to take the escape of evil for a good, no longer to repute privation of good for an evil. But they still confess what we have asserted, that death hath in it nothing of either good hope or solace, but that all that is complacent and good is then wholly extinguished; at which time those men look for many amiable, great, and divine things, that conceive the minds of men to be unperishable and immortal, or at least to go about in certain long revolutions of times, being one while upon earth and another while in heaven, until they are at last dissolved with the universe and then, together with the sun and moon, sublimed into an intellectual fire. So large a field and one of so great pleasures Epicurus wholly cuts off, when he destroys (as hath been said) the hopes and graces we should derive from the gods, and by that extinguishes both in our speculative capacity the desire of knowledge, and in our active

the love of glory, and confines and abases our nature to a poor narrow thing, and that not cleanly neither, to wit, the content the mind receives by the body, as if it were capable of no higher good than the escape of evil.

## AGAINST COLOTES, THE DISCIPLE AND FAVORITE OF EPICURUS.

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1. Colotes, whom Epicurus was wont diminutively and by way of familiarity or fondness to call Colotaras and Colotarion, composed, O Saturninus, and published a little book which he entitled, "That according to the opinions of the other philosophers one cannot so much as live." This was dedicated to King Ptolemy. Now I suppose that it will not be unpleasant for you to read, when set down in writing, what came into my mind to speak against this Colotes, since I know you to be a lover of all elegant and honest treatises, and particularly of such as regard the science of antiquity, and to esteem the bearing in memory and having (as much as possible may be) in hand the discourses of the ancient sages to be the most royal of all studies and exercises.

2. Not long since, therefore, as this book was being read, Aristodemus of Aegium, a familiar friend of ours (whom you well know to be one of the Academy, and not a mere thyrsus-bearer, but one of the most frantic celebrators of Plato's orgies)<sup>1</sup>, did, I know not how, keep himself contrary to his custom very still all the while, and patiently gave ear to it even to the end. But the reading was scarce well over when he said: Well, then, whom shall we cause to rise up and fight against this man, in defence of the philosophers? For I am not of Nestor's opinion, who, when the most valiant of those nine warriors that presented themselves to enter into combat was to be chosen, committed the election to the fortune of a lot.

Yet, answered I, you see he so disposed himself in reference to the lot, that the choice might pass according to the arbitrament of the wisest man;

And th' lot drawn from the helmet, as they wished,

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<sup>1</sup>See Plato, *Phaed* p. 69 C, and Stallbaum's note. Here the proverb occurs, — *Ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ, Βάκχοι δὲ τε πανροί*, the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the true priests of Bacchus are few. (G.)

On Ajax fell.

But yet since you command me to make the election,

How can I think a better choice to make

Than the divine Ulysses?

— Il. VII. 182; X. 243.

Consider therefore, and be well advised, in what manner you will chastise this man.

But you know, replied Aristodemus, that Plato, when highly offended with his boy that waited on him, would not himself beat him, but requested Speusippus to do it for him, saying that he himself was angry. As much therefore may I say to you; Take this fellow to you, and treat him as you please; for I am in a fit of choler.

When therefore all the rest of the company desired me to undertake this office; I must then, said I, speak, since it is your pleasure. But I am afraid that I also shall seem more vehemently transported than is fitting against this book, in the defending and maintaining Socrates against the rudeness, scurrility, and insolence of this man; who, because Socrates affirmed himself to know nothing certainly, instead of bread (as one would say) present him hay, as if he were a beast, and asks him why he puts meat into his mouth and not into his ear. And yet perhaps some would make but a laughing matter of this, considering the mildness and gentleness of Socrates; “but for the whole host of the Greeks,” that is, of the other philosophers, amongst which are Democritus, Plato, Stilpo, Empedocles, Parmenides, and Melissus, who have been basely traduced and reviled by him, it were not only a shame to be silent, but even a sacrilege in the least point to forbear or recede from freedom of speech in their behalf, who have advanced philosophy to that honor and reputation it has gotten.

And our parents indeed have, with the assistance of the gods, given us our life; but to live well comes to us from reason, which we have learned from the

philosophers, which favors law and justice, and restrains our concupiscence. Now to live well is to live sociably, friendly, temperately, and justly; of all which conditions they leave us not one, who cry out that man's sovereign good lies in his belly, and that they would not purchase all the virtues together at the expense of a cracked farthing, if pleasure were totally and on every side removed from them. And in their discourses concerning the soul and the gods, they hold that the soul perishes when it is separated from the body, and that the gods concern not themselves in our affairs. Thus the Epicureans reproach the other philosophers, that by their wisdom they bereave man of his life; whilst the others on the contrary accuse them of teaching men to live degenerately and like beasts.

3. Now these things are scattered here and there in the writings of Epicurus, and dispersed through all his philosophy. But this Colotes, by having extracted from them certain pieces and fragments of discourses, destitute of any arguments whatever to render them credible and intelligible, has composed his book, being like a shop or cabinet of monsters and prodigies; as you better know than any one else, because you have always in your hands the works of the ancients. But he seems to me, like the Lydian, to open not only one gate against himself, but to involve Epicurus also in many and those the greatest doubts and difficulties. For he begins with Democritus, who receives of him an excellent and worthy reward for his instruction; it being certain that Epicurus for a long time called himself a Democritean, which as well others affirm, as Leonteus, a principal disciple of Epicurus, who in a letter which he writ to Lycophron says, that Epicurus honored Democritus, because he first attained, though a little at a distance, the right and sound understanding of the truth, and that in general all the treatise concerning natural things was called Democritean, because Democritus was the first who happened upon the principles and met with the primitive foundations of Nature. And Metrodorus says openly of philosophy, If Democritus had not gone before and taught the way, Epicurus had never attained to wisdom. Now if it be true, as Colotes holds, that to live according to the opinions of Democritus is not to live, Epicurus was then a fool in following Democritus, who led him to a doctrine which taught him not to live.

4. Now the first thing he lays to his charge is, that, by supposing everything to be no more individual than another, he wholly confounds human life. But Democritus was so far from having been of this opinion, that he opposed Protagoras the philosopher who asserted it, and writ many excellent arguments concluding against him, which this fine fellow Colotes never saw nor read, nor yet so much as dreamed of; but deceived himself by misunderstanding a passage which is in his works, where he determines that τὸ δέν is no more than τὸ μηδέν, naming in that place the body by δέν, and the void by μηδέν, and meaning that the void has its own proper nature and subsistence, as well as the body.

But he who is of opinion that nothing has more of one nature than another makes use of a sentence of Epicurus, in which he says that all the apprehensions and imaginations given us by the senses are true. For if of two saying, the one, that the wine is sour, and the other, that it is sweet, neither of them shall be deceived by his sensation, how shall the wine be more sour than sweet? And we may often see that some men using one and the same bath find it to be hot, and others find it to be cold; because those order cold water to be put into it, as these do hot. It is said that, a certain lady going to visit Berenice, wife to King Deiotarus, as soon as ever they approached each other, they both immediately turned their backs, the one, as it seemed, not being able to bear the smell of perfume, nor the other of butter. If, then, the sense of one is no truer than the sense of another, it is also probable, that water is no more cold than hot, nor sweet ointment or butter better or worse scented one than the other. For if any one shall say that it seems the one to one, and the other to another, he will, before he is aware, affirm that they are both the one and the other.

5. And as for these symmetries and proportions of the pores, or little passages in the organs of the senses, about which they talk so much, and those different mixtures of seeds, which, they say, being dispersed through all savors, odors, and colors, move the senses of different persons to perceive different qualities, do they not manifestly drive them to this, that things are no more of one nature than another? For to pacify those who think the sense is deceived and lies because they see contrary events and passions in such as use the



same objects, and to solve this objection, they teach,—that when almost everything was confused and mixed up together, since it has been arranged by Nature that one thing shall fit another thing, it was not the contact or the apprehension of the same quality nor were all parts affected in the same way by what was influencing them. But those only coalesced with anything to which they had a characteristic, symmetrical in a corresponding proportion; so that they are in error so obstinately to insist that a thing is either good or bad, white or not white, thinking to establish their own senses by destroying those of others; whereas they ought neither to combat the senses,—because they all touch some quality, each one drawing from this confused mixture, as from a living and large fountain, what is suitable and convenient,—nor to pronounce of the whole, by touching only the parts, nor to think that all ought to be affected after one and the same manner by the same thing, seeing that one is affected by one quality and faculty of it, and another by another. Let us investigate who those men are which bring in this opinion that things are not more of one quality than another, if they are not those who affirm that every sensible object is a mixture, compounded of all sorts of qualities, like a mixture of new wine fermenting, and who confess that all their rules are lost and their faculty of judging quite gone, if they admit any sensible object that is pure and simple, and do not make each one thing to be many?

6. See now to this purpose, what discourse and debate Epicurus makes Polyaenus to have with him in his Banquet concerning the heat of wine. For when he asked, “Do you, Epicurus, say, that wine does not heat?” some one answered, “It is not universally to be affirmed that wine heats.” And a little after: “For wine seems not to be universally a heater; but such a quantity may be said to heat such a person.” And again subjoining the cause, to wit, the compressions and disseminations of the atoms, and having alleged their commixtures and conjunctions with others when the wine comes to be mingled in the body, he adds this conclusion: “It is not universally to be said that wine is endued with a faculty of heating; but that such a quantity may heat such a nature and one so disposed, while such a quantity to such a nature is cooling. For in such a mass there are such natures and complexions of which cold might be composed, and which, united with others in proper

measure, would yield a refrigerative virtue. Wherefore some are deceived, who say that wine is universally a heater; and others, who say that it is universally a cooler.” He then who says that most men are deceived and err, in holding that which is hot to be heating and that which is cold to be cooling, is himself in an error, unless he should allow that his assertion ends in the doctrine that one thing is not more of one nature than another. He farther adds afterwards that oftentimes wine entering into a body brings with it thither neither a calefying nor refrigerating virtue, but, the mass of the body being agitated and disturbed, and a transposition made of the parts, the heat-effecting atoms being assembled together do by their multitude cause a heat and inflammation in the body, and sometimes on the contrary disassembling themselves cause a refrigeration.

7. But it is moreover wholly evident, that we may employ this argument to all those things which are called and esteemed bitter, sweet, purging, dormitive, and luminous, not any one of them having an entire and perfect quality to produce such effects, nor to act rather than to be acted on when they are in the bodies, but being there susceptible, of various temperatures and differences. For Epicurus himself, in his Second Book against Theophrastus, affirming that colors are not connatural to bodies, but are engendered there according to certain situations and positions with respect to the sight of man, says: “For this reason a body is no more colored than destitute of color.” And a little above he writes thus, word for word: “But apart from this, I know not how a man may say that those bodies which are in the dark have color; although very often, an air equally dark being spread about them, some distinguish diversities of colors, others perceive them not through the weakness of their sight. And moreover, going into a dark house or room, we at our first entrance see no color, but after we have stayed there awhile, we do. Wherefore we are to say that every body is not more colored than not colored. Now, if color is relative and has its being in regard to something else, so also then is white, and so likewise blue; and if colors are so, so also are sweet and bitter. So that it may truly be affirmed of every quality, that it cannot more properly be said to exist than not to exist. For to those who are in a certain manner disposed, they will be; but to those who are not so disposed, they will not

be.” Colotes therefore has bedashed and bespattered himself and his master with that dirt, in which he says those lie who maintain that things are not more of one quality than another.

8. But is it in this alone, that this excellent man shows himself

To others a physician, whilst himself

Is full of ulcers?

— Euripides, Frag. 1071.

No indeed; but yet much farther in his second reprehension, without any way minding it, he drives Epicurus and Democritus out of this life. For he affirms that the statement of Democritus—that the atoms are to the senses color by a certain human law or ordinance, that they are by the same law sweetness, and by the same law concretion<sup>2</sup>—is at war with our senses, and that he who uses this reason and persists in this opinion cannot himself imagine whether he is living or dead. I know not how to contradict this discourse; but this I can boldly affirm, that this is as inseparable from the sentences and doctrines of Epicurus as they say figure and weight are from atoms. For what is it that Democritus says? “There are substances, in number infinite, called atoms (because they cannot be divided), without difference, without quality, and passibility, which move, being dispersed here and there, in the infinite voidness; and that when they approach one another, or meet and are conjoined, of such masses thus heaped together, one appears water, another fire, another a plant, another a man; and that all things are thus properly atoms (as he called them), and nothing else; for there is no generation from what does not exist; and of those things which are nothing can be generated, because these atoms are so firm, that they can neither change, alter, nor suffer; wherefore there cannot be made color of those things which are without color, nor nature or soul of those things which are without quality and impassible.” Democritus then is to be blamed, not for confessing those things that happen upon his principles, but for supposing principles upon which such things happen.

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<sup>2</sup>The text is corrupt here. (G.)

For he should not have supposed immutable principles; or having supposed them, he should have seen that the generation of all quality is taken away; but having seen the absurdity, to deny it is most impudent. But Epicurus says, that he supposes the same principles with Democritus, but that he says not that color, sweet, white, and other qualities, are by law and ordinance. If therefore *not to say* is the same as *not to confess*, he does merely what he is wont to do. For it is as when, taking away divine Providence, he nevertheless says that he leaves piety and devotion towards the gods; and when, choosing friendship for the sake of pleasure, that he suffers most grievous pains for his friends; and supposing the universe to be infinite, that he nevertheless takes not away high and low.... Indeed having taken the cup, one may drink what he pleases, and return the rest. But in reasoning one ought chiefly to remember this wise apothegm, that where the principles are not necessary, the ends and consequences are necessary. It was not then necessary for him to suppose or (to say better) to steal from Democritus, that atoms are the principles of the universe; but having supposed this doctrine, and having pleased and glorified himself in the first probable and specious appearances of it, he must afterwards also swallow that which is troublesome in it, or must show how bodies which have not any quality can bring all sorts of qualities to others only by their meetings and joining together. As—to take that which comes next neither had heat when they came, nor are become hot after their being joined together? For the one presupposes that they had some quality, and the other that they were fit to receive it. And you affirm, that neither the one nor the other must be said to be congruous to atoms, because they are incorruptible.

9. How then? Do not Plato, Aristotle, and Xenocrates produce gold from that which is not gold, and stone from that which is not stone, and many other things from the four simple first bodies? Yes indeed; but with those bodies immediately concur also the principles for the generation of everything, bringing with them great contributions, that is, the first qualities which are in them; then, when they come to assemble and join in one the dry with the moist, the cold with the hot, and the solid with the soft,—that is, active bodies with such as are fit to suffer and receive every alteration and change,—then

is generation wrought by passing from one temperature to another. Whereas the atom, being alone, is alone, is deprived and destitute of all quality and generative faculty, and when it comes to meet with the others, it can make only a noise and sound because of its hardness and firmness, but nothing more. For they always strike and are stricken, not being able by this means to compose or make an animal, a soul, or a nature, nay, not so much as a mass or heap of themselves; for that as they beat upon one another, so they fly back again asunder.

10. But Colotes, as if he were speaking to some ignorant and unlettered king, again attacks Empedocles for expressing the same thought:

I've one thing more to say. 'Mongst mortals there

No Nature is; nor that grim thing men fear

So much, called death. There only happens first

A mixture, and mixt things asunder burst

Again, when them disunion does befall.

And this is that which men do Nature call.

For my part, I do not see how this is repugnant and contrary to life or living, especially amongst those who hold that there is no generation of that which is not, nor corruption of that which is, but that the assembling and union of the things which are is called generation, and their dissolution and disunion named corruption and death. For that he took Nature for generation, and that this is his meaning, he has himself declared, when he opposed Nature to death. And if they neither live nor can live who place generation in union and death in disunion, what else do these Epicureans? Yet Empedocles, gluing, (as it were) and conjoining the elements together by heats, softnesses, and humidifies, gives them in some sort a mixtion and unitive composition; but these men who hunt and drive together the atoms, which they affirm to be immutable and impassible, compose nothing proceeding from them, but indeed make many and continual percussions of them.

For the interlacement, hindering the dissolution, more and more augments the collision and concussion; so that there is neither mixtion nor adhesion and conglutination, but only a discord and combat, which according to them is called generation. And if the atoms do now recoil for a moment by reason of the shock they have given, and then return again after the blow is past, they are above double the time absent from one another, without either touching or approaching, so as nothing can be made of them, not even so much as a body without a soul. But as for sense, soul, understanding, and prudence, there is not any man who can in the least conceive or imagine how it is possible they should be made in a voidness, and atoms which neither when separate and apart have any quality, nor any passion or alteration when they are assembled and joined together, especially seeing this their meeting together is not an incorporation or congress, making a mixture or coalition, but rather percussions and repercussions. So that, according to the doctrine of these people, life is taken away, and the existence of an animal denied, since they posit principles void, impassible, godless, and soulless, and such as cannot admit or receive any mixture or incorporation whatever.

11. How then is it, that they admit and allow Nature, soul, and living creature? Even in the same manner as they do an oath, prayer, and sacrifice, and the adoration of the gods. Thus they adore by word and mouth, only naming and feigning that which by their principles they totally take away and abolish. If now they call that which is born Nature, and that which is engendered generation,—as those who are accustomed to call wood wood-work and the voices that accord and sound together symphony,—whence came it into his mind to object these words against Empedocles? “Why,” says he, “do we tire ourselves in taking such care of ourselves, in desiring and longing after certain things, and shunning and avoiding others? For we neither are ourselves, nor do we live by making use of others.” But be of good cheer, my dear little Colotes, may one perhaps say to him: there is none who hinders you from taking care of yourself by teaching that the nature of Colotes is nothing else but Colotes himself, or who forbids you to make use of things (now things with you are pleasures) by showing that there is no nature of tarts and marchpanes, of sweet odors, or of venereal delights, but

that there are tarts, marchpanes, perfumes, and women. For neither does the grammarian who says that the “strength of Hercules” is Hercules himself deny the being of Hercules; nor do those who say that symphonies and roofings are but absolute derivations affirm that there are neither sounds nor timbers; since also there are some who, taking away the soul and intelligence, do not yet seem to take away either living or being prudent.

And when Epicurus says that the nature of things is to be found in bodies and their place, do we so comprehend him as if he meant that Nature were something else than the things which are, or as if he insinuated that it is merely the things which are, and nothing else?—as, to wit, he is wont to call voidness itself the nature of voidness, and the universe, by Jupiter, the nature of the universe. And if any one should thus question him; What sayst thou, Epicurus, that this is voidness, and that the nature of voidness? No, by Jupiter, would he answer; but this transference of names is in use by law and custom. I grant it is. Now what has Empedocles done else, but taught that Nature is nothing else save that which is born, and death no other thing but that which dies? But as the poets very often, forming as it were an image, say thus in figurative language,

Strife, tumult, noise, placed by some angry God,

Mischief, and malice there had their abode;

— Il. XVIII. 535.

so do some authors attribute generation and corruption to things that are contracted together and dissolved. But so far has he been from stirring and taking away that which is, or contradicting that which evidently appears, that he casts not so much as one single word out of the accustomed use; but taking away all figurative fraud that might hurt or endamage things, he again restored the ordinary and useful signification to words in these verses:

When from mixed elements we sometimes see

A man produced, sometimes a beast, a tree,

Or bird, this birth and geniture we name;  
But death, when this so well compacted frame  
And juncture is dissolved. This use I do approve.

And yet I myself say that Colotes, though he alleged these verses, did not understand that Empedocles took not away men, beasts, trees, or birds, which he affirmed to be composed of the elements mixed together; and that, by teaching how much they are deceived who call this composition Nature and life, and this dissolution unhappy destruction and miserable death, he did not abrogate the using of the customary expressions in this respect.

12. And it seems to me, indeed, that Empedocles did not aim in this place at the disturbing the common manner of expression, but that he really, as it has been said, had a controversy about generation from things that have no being, which some call Nature. Which he manifestly shows by these verses:

Fools, and of little thought, we well may deem  
Those, who so silly are as to esteem  
That what ne'er was may now engendered be,  
And that what is may perish utterly.

For these are the words of one who cries loud enough to those which have ears, that he takes not away generation, but procreation from nothing; nor corruption, but total destruction that is, reduction to nothing. For to him who would not so savagely and foolishly but more gently calumniate, the following verses might give a colorable occasion of charging Empedocles with the contrary, when he says:

No prudent man can e'er into his mind  
Admit that, whilst men living here on earth  
(Which only life they call) both fortunes find,



They being have, but that before the birth

They nothing were, nor shall be when once dead.

For these are not the expressions of a man who denies those that are born to be, but rather of him who holds those to be that are not yet born or that are already dead. And Colotes also does not altogether accuse him of this, but says that according to his opinion we shall never be sick, never wounded. But how is it possible, that he who affirms men to have being both before their life and after their death, and during their life to find both fortunes (or to be accompanied both by good and evil), should not leave them the power to suffer? Who then are they, O Colotes, that are endued with this privilege never to be wounded, never to be sick? Even you yourselves, who are composed of atoms and voidness, neither of which, you say, has any sense. Now there is no great hurt in this; but the worst is, you have nothing left that can cause you pleasure, seeing an atom is not capable to receive those things which are to effect it, and voidness cannot be affected by them.

13. But because Colotes would, immediately after Democritus, seem to inter and bury Parmenides, and I have passed over and a little postponed his defence, to bring in between them that of Empedocles, as seeming to be more coherent and consequent to the first reprehensions, let us now return to Parmenides. Him, then, does Colotes accuse of having broached and set abroad certain shameful and villanous sophistries; and yet by these his sophisms he has neither rendered friendship less honorable, nor voluptuousness or the desire of pleasures more audacious and unbridled. He has not taken from honesty its attractive property or its being venerable or recommendable of itself, nor has he disturbed the opinions we ought to have of the gods. And I do not see how, by saying that the All (or the universe) is one, he hinders or obstructs our living. For when Epicurus himself says that the All is infinite, that it is neither engendered nor perishable, that it can neither increase nor be diminished, he speaks of the universe as of one only thing. And having in the beginning of his treatise concerning this matter said, that the nature of those things which have being consists of bodies and of vacuum, he makes a division (as it were) of one thing into two parts, one of which has in

reality no subsistence, being, as you yourselves term it, impalpable, void, and incorporeal; so that by this means, even with you also, all comes to be one; unless you desire, in speaking of voidness, to use words void of sense, and to combat the ancients, as if you were fighting against a shadow.

But these atomical bodies, you will say, are, according to the opinion of Epicurus, infinite in number, and everything which appears to us is composed of them. See now, therefore, what principles of generation you suppose, infinity and voidness; one of which, to wit, voidness, is inactive, impassible, and incorporeal; the other, to wit, infinity, is disorderly, unreasonable, and unintelligible, dissolving and confounding itself, because it cannot for its multitude be contained, circumscribed, or limited. But Parmenides has neither taken away fire, nor water, nor precipices, nor yet cities (as Colotes says) which are inhabited as well in Europe as in Asia; since he has both constructed an order of the world, and mixing the elements, to wit, light and dark, does of them and by them arrange and finish all things that appear in the world. For he has written very largely of the earth, heaven, sun, moon, and stars, and has spoken of the generation of man; and being, as he was, an ancient author in physiology, and one who in writing sought to save his own and not to destroy another's doctrine, he has overlooked none of the essential things in Nature. Moreover, Plato, and before him Socrates himself, understood that in Nature there is one part subject to opinion, and another subject to intelligence. As for that which is subject to opinion, it is always unconstant, wandering, and carried away with several passions and changes, liable to diminution and increase, and to be variously disposed to various men, and not always appearing after one manner even to the same person. But as to the intelligible part, it is quite of another kind,

Constant, entire, and still engenerable,

as himself says, always like to itself, and perdurable in its being.

Here Colotes, sycophant-like, catching at his expressions and drawing the discourse from things to words, flatly affirms that Parmenides in one word

destroys the existence of all things by supposing *ens* (or that which is) to be one. But, on the contrary, he takes away neither the one nor the other part of Nature; but rendering to each of them what belongs to it and is convenient for it, he places the intelligible in the idea of one and of “that which is,” calling it *ens* because it is eternal and incorruptible, and one because it is always like itself and admits no diversity. And as for that part which is sensible, he places it in the rank of uncertain, disorderly, and always moving. Of which two parts, we may see the distinct judgment:

One certain truth and sincere knowledge is,

as regarding that which is intelligible, and always alike and of the same sort;

The other does on men’s opinions rest, Which breed no true belief  
within our breast,

because it is conversant in things which receive all sorts of changes, passions, and inequalities. Now how he could have left sense and opinion, if he had not also left any sensible and opinable object, it is impossible for any man to say. But because to that which truly *is* it appertains to continue in its being, and because sensible things sometimes are, sometimes are not, continually passing from one being to another and perpetually changing their state, he thought they required some other name than that of *entia*, or things which always are. This speech therefore concerning *ens* (or that which is), that it should be but one, is not to take away the plurality of sensible things, but to show how they differ from that which is intelligible. Which difference Plato in his discussion of Ideas more fully declaring, has thereby afforded Colotes an opportunity of cavilling.

14. Therefore it seems not unreasonable to me to take next into our consideration, as it were all in a train, what he has also said against him. But first let us contemplate a little the diligence—together with the manifold and profound knowledge—of this our philosopher, who says, that Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and all the Peripatetians have followed these doctrines of Plato.

For in what corner of the uninhabitable world have you, O Colotes, written your book, that, composing all these accusations against such personages, you never have lighted upon their works, nor have taken into your hands the books of Aristotle concerning Heaven and the Soul, nor those of Theophrastus against the Naturalists, nor the Zoroaster of Heraclides, nor his books of Hell, nor that of Natural Doubts and Difficulties, nor the book of Dicaearchus concerning the Soul; in all which books they are in the highest degree contradictory and repugnant to Plato about the principal and greatest points of natural philosophy? Nay, Strato himself, the very head and prince of the other Peripatetics, agrees not in many things with Aristotle, and holds opinions altogether contrary to Plato, concerning motion, the understanding, the soul, and generation. In fine, he says that the world is not an animal, and that what is according to Nature follows what is according to Fortune; for that Chance gave the beginning, and so every one of the natural effects was afterwards finished.

Now as to the ideas,—for which he quarrels with Plato,—Aristotle, by moving this matter at every turn, and alleging all manner of doubts concerning them, in his Ethics, in his Physics, and in his Exoterical Dialogues seems to some rather obstinately than philosophically to have disputed against these doctrines, as having proposed to himself the debasing and undervaluing of Plato's philosophy; so far he was from following it. What an impudent rashness then is this, that having neither seen nor understood what these persons have written and what were their opinions, he should go and devise such things as they never imagined; and persuading himself that he reprehends and refutes others, he should produce a proof, written with his own hand, arguing and convincing himself of ignorance, licentiousness, and shameful impudence, in saying that those who contradict Plato agree with him, and that those who oppose him follow him?

15. Plato, says he, writes that horses are in vain by us considered horses, and men men. And in which of Plato's commentaries has he found this hidden? For as to us, we read in all his books, that horses are horses, that men are men, and that fire is by him esteemed fire, because he holds that every one of these things is sensible and subject to opinion. But this Colotes, as if he

were not a hair's breadth distance from wisdom, takes it to be one and the same thing to say, "Man is not" and "Man is a *non ens*."

Now to Plato there seems to be a wonderful great difference between not being at all and being a *non ens*; because the first imports an annihilation and abolishment of all substance, and the other shows the diversity there is between that which is participated and that which participates. Which diversity those who came after distinguished only into the difference of genus and species, and certain common and proper qualities or accidents, as they are called, but ascended no higher, falling into more logical doubts and difficulties. Now there is the same proportion between that which is participated and that which participates, as there is between the cause and the matter, the original and the image, the faculty and the result. Wherein that which is by itself and always the same principally differs from that which is by another and never remains in one and the same manner; because the one never was nor ever shall be non-existent, and is therefore totally and essentially an *ens*; but to the other that very being, which it has not of itself but happens to take by participation from another, does not remain firm and constant, but it goes out of it by its imbecility,—the matter always gliding and sliding about the form, and receiving several functions and changes in the image of the substance, so that it is continually moving and shaking. As therefore he who says that the image of Plato is not Plato takes not away the sense and substance of the image, but shows the difference of that which is of itself from that which is only in regard to some other, so neither do they take away the nature, use, or sense of men, who affirm that every one of us, by participating in a certain common substratum, that is, in the idea, is become the image of that which afforded the likeness for our generation. For neither does he who says that a red-hot iron is not fire, or that the moon is not the sun, but, as Parmenides has it,

A torch which round the earth by night

Does bear about a borrowed light,

take away therefore the use of iron, or the nature of the moon. But if he should deny it to be a body, or affirm that it is not illuminated, he would then contradict the senses, as one who admitted neither body, animal, generation, nor sense. But he who by his opinion imagines that these things subsist only by participation, and reflects how far remote and distant they are from that which always is and which communicates to them their being, does not reject the sensible, but affirms that the intelligible is; nor does he take away and abolish the results which are wrought and appear in us; but he shows to those who follow him that there are other things, firmer and more stable than these in respect of their essence, because they are neither engendered, nor perish, nor suffer anything; and he teaches them, more purely touching the difference, to express it by names, calling these *ὄντα* or *entia* (*things that have being*), and those *γινόμενα* or *fientia* (*things engendered*). And the same also usually befalls the moderns; for they deprive many—and those great things—of the appellation of *ens* or *being*; such as are voidness, time, place, and simply the entire genus of things spoken, in which are comprised all things true. For these things, they say, are not *entia* but *some things*; and they perpetually treat of them in their lives and in their philosophy, as of things having subsistence and existence.

16. But I would willingly ask this our fault-finder, whether themselves do not in their affairs perceive this difference, by which some things are permanent and immutable in their substances,—as they say of their atoms, that they are at all times and continually after one and the same manner, because of their impassibility and hardness,—but that all compound things are fluxible, changeable, generated, and perishing; forasmuch as infinite images are always departing and going from them, and infinite others as it is probable, repair to them from the ambient air, filling up what was diminished from the mass, which is much diversified and transvasated, as it were, by this change, since those atoms which are in the very bottom of the said mass can never cease stirring and reciprocally beating upon one another; as they themselves affirm. There is then in things such a diversity of substance. But Epicurus is in this wiser and more learned than Plato, that he calls them all equally *entia*,—to wit, the impalable voidness, the solid and resisting body, the principles,

and the things composed of them,—and thinks that the eternal participates of the common substance with that which is generated, the immortal with the corruptible, and the natures that are impassible, perdurable, unchangeable, and that can never fall from their being, with those which have their essence in suffering and changing, and can never continue in one and the same state. But though Plato had with all the justness imaginable deserved to be condemned for having offended in this, yet should he have been sentenced by these gentlemen, who use Greek more elegantly and discourse more correctly than he, only as having confounded the terms, and not as having taken away the things and driven life from us, because he named them *fientia* (or things engendered), and not *entia* (things that have being), as these men do.

17. But because we have passed over Socrates, who should have come next after Parmenides, we must now turn back our discourse to him. Him therefore has Colotes begun at the very first to remove, as the common proverb has it, from the sacred line; and having mentioned how Chaerephon brought from Delphi an oracle, well known to us all, concerning Socrates, he says thus: “Now as to this narration of Chaerephon’s, because it is odious and entirely sophistical, we will overpass it.” Plato, then, that we may say nothing of others, is also odious, who has committed it to writing; and the Lacedaemonians are yet more odious, who keep the oracle of Lycurgus amongst their most ancient and most authentic inscriptions. The oracle also of Themistocles, by which he persuaded the Athenians to quit their town, and in a naval fight defeated the barbarous Xerxes, was a sophistical fiction. Odious also were all the ancient legislators and founders of Greece who established the most part of their temples, sacrifices, and solemn festivals by the answer of the Pythian Oracle. But if the oracle brought from Delphi concerning Socrates, a man ravished with a divine zeal to virtue, by which he is styled and declared wise, is odious, fictitious, and sophistical, by what name shall we call your cries, noises, and shouts, your applauses, adorations and canonizations, with which you extol and celebrate him who incites and exhorts you to frequent and continual pleasures? For thus has he written in his epistle to Anaxarchus: “I for my part incite and call you to continual plea-

suers, and not to vain and empty virtues, which have nothing but turbulent hopes of uncertain fruits.” And yet Metrodorus, writing to Timarchus, says: “Let us do some extraordinarily excellent thing, not suffering ourselves to be plunged in reciprocal affections, but retiring from this low and terrestrial life, and elevating ourselves to the truly holy and divinely revealed ceremonies and mysteries of Epicurus.” And even Colotes himself, hearing one day Epicurus discoursing of natural things, fell suddenly at his feet and embraced his knees, as Epicurus himself, glorying in it, thus writes: “For as if you had adored what we were then saying, you were suddenly taken with a desire, proceeding not from any natural cause, to come to us, prostrate yourself on the ground, embrace our knees, and use all those gestures to us which are ordinarily practised by those who adore and pray to the gods. So that you made us also,” says he, “reciprocally sanctify and adore you.” Those, by Jupiter, well deserve to be pardoned, who say, they would willingly give any money for a picture in which should be presented to the life this fine story of one lying prostrate at the knees and embracing the legs of another, who mutually again adores him and makes his devout prayers to him. Nevertheless this devout service, how well soever it was ordered and composed by Colotes, received not the condign fruit he expected; for he was not declared wise; but it was only said to him: Go thy ways, and walk immortal; and understand that we also are in like manner immortal.

18. These men, knowing well in their consciences that they have used such foolish speeches, have had such motions, and such passions, dare nevertheless call others odious. And Colotes, having shown us these fine first-fruits and wise positions touching the natural senses,—that we eat meat, and not hay or forage; and that when rivers are deep and great, we pass them in boats, but when shallow and easily fordable, on foot,—cries out, “You use vain and arrogant speeches, O Socrates; you say one thing to those who come to discourse with you, and practise another.” Now I would fain know what these vain and arrogant speeches of Socrates were, since he ordinarily said that he knew nothing, that he was always learning, and that he went inquiring and searching after the truth. But if, O Colotes, you had happened on such expressions of Socrates as are those which Epicurus writ to Idomeneus,



“Send me then the first-fruits for the entertainment of our sacred body, for ourself and for our children: for so it comes upon me to speak;” what more arrogant and insolent words could you have used? And yet that Socrates spake otherwise than he lived, you have wonderful proofs in his gests at Delium, at Potidaea, in his behavior during the time of the Thirty Tyrants, towards Archelaus, towards the people of Athens, in his poverty, and in his death. For are not these things beseeming and answerable to the doctrine of Socrates? They would indeed, good sir, have been indubitable testimonies to show that he acted otherwise than he taught, if, having proposed pleasure for the end of life, he had led such a life as this.

19. Thus much for the calumnies he has uttered against Socrates. Colotes besides perceives not that he is himself found guilty of the same offences in regard to theory and practice which he objects against Socrates. For this is one of the sentences and propositions of Epicurus, that none but the wise man ought irrevocably and unchangeably to be persuaded of anything. Since then Colotes, even after those adorations he performed to Epicurus, became not one of the sages, let him first make these questions and interrogatories his own: How is it that being hungry he eats meat and not hay, and that he puts a robe about his body and not about a pillar, since he is not indubitably persuaded either that a robe is a robe or that meat is meat? But if he not only does these things, but also passes not over rivers, when they are great and high, on foot, and flies from wolves and serpents, not being irrevocably persuaded that any of these things is such as it seems, but yet doing everything according to what appears to him; so likewise the opinion of Socrates concerning the senses was no obstacle to him, but that he might in like manner make use of things as they appeared to him. For it is not likely that bread appeared bread and hay hay to Colotes, because he had read those holy rules of Epicurus which came down from heaven, while Socrates on account of his vanity imagined that hay was bread and bread hay. For these wise men use better opinions and reasons than we; but to have sense, and to receive an impression from objects as they appear, is common as well to the ignorant as to the wise, as proceeding from causes where there needs not the discourse of reason. And the proposition which affirms that the natural

senses are not perfect, nor certain enough to cause an entire belief, hinders not that everything may appear to us; but leaving us to make use of our senses in our actions according to that which appears, it permits us not so to give credit to them as if they were exactly true and without error. For it is sufficient that in what is necessary and commodious for use there is nothing better. But as for the science and knowledge which the soul of a philosopher desires to have concerning everything, the senses have it not.

20. But as to this, Colotes will farther give us occasion to speak of it hereafter, for he brings this objection against several others. Furthermore, whereas he profusely derides and despises Socrates for asking what man is, and in a youthful bravery (as he terms it) affirming that he was ignorant of it, it is manifest that he himself, who scoffs at it, never so much as thought of this matter; but Heraclitus on the contrary, as having done some great and worthy thing, said, I have been seeking myself. And of the sentences that were written in Apollo's temple at Delphi, the most excellent and most divine seems to have been this, Know thyself. And this it was which gave Socrates an occasion and beginning of doubting and inquiring into it, as Aristotle says in his *Platonics*. And yet this appears to Colotes ridiculous and fit to be scoffed at. And I wonder that he derides not also his master himself, who does as much whenever he writes concerning the substance of the soul and the creation of man. For if that which is compounded of both, as they themselves hold,—of the body, to wit, and the soul,—is man, he who searches into the nature of the soul consequently also searches into the nature of man, beginning from his chiefest principle. Now that the soul is very difficult to be comprehended by reason, and altogether incomprehensible by the exterior senses, let us not learn from Socrates, who is a vainglorious and sophistical disputer, but let us take it from these wise men, who, having forged and framed the substance of the soul of somewhat hot, spiritual, and aerial, as far as to the faculties of the flesh, by which she gives heat, softness and strength to the body, proceed not to that which is the principal, but give over faint and tired by the way. For that by which she judges, remembers, loves, hates,—in a word, that which is prudent and rational, is,—say they, made afterwards of I know not what nameless quality. Now we well know,

that this nameless thing is a confession of their shameful ignorance, whilst they pretend they cannot name what they are not able to understand or comprehend. But let this, as they say, be pardoned them. For it seems not to be a light and easy matter, which every one can at the first attempt find out and attain to, but has retired itself to the bottom of some very remote place, and there lies obscurely concealed. So that there is not, amongst so many words and terms as are in use, any one that can explain or show it. Socrates therefore was not a fool or blockhead for seeking and searching what himself was; but they are rather to be thought shallow coxcombs, who inquire after any other thing before this, the knowledge of which is so necessary and so hard to find. For how could he expect to gain the knowledge of other things, who has not been able to comprehend the principal part even of himself?

21. But granting a little to Colotes, that there is nothing so vain, useless, and odious as the seeking into one's self, let us ask him, what confession of human life is in this, and how it is that a man cannot continue to live, when he comes once thus to reason and discourse in himself: "Go to now, what am I? Am I a composition, made up of soul and body; or rather a soul, serving itself and making use of the body, as an horseman using his horse is not a subject composed of horse and man? Or is every one of us the principal part of the soul, by which we understand, infer, and act; and are all the other parts, both of soul and body, only organs and utensils of this power? Or, to conclude, is there no proper substance of the soul at all apart, but is only the temperature and complexion of the body so disposed, that it has force and power to understand and live?" But Socrates does not by these questions overthrow human life, since all natural philosophers treat of the same matter. But those perhaps are the monstrous questions and inquiries that turn everything upside down, which are in *Phaedrus*,<sup>3</sup> where he says, that every one ought to examine and consider himself, whether he is a savage beast, more cautelous, outrageous, and furious than ever was the monster Typhon; or on the contrary, an animal more mild and gentle, partaking by Nature of a certain divine portion, and such as is free from pride. Now by these discourses and reasonings he overturns not the life of man, but drives from it presumption

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<sup>3</sup>Plato, "*Phaedrus*," p. 230 A.

and arrogance, and those haughty and extravagant opinions and conceits he has of himself. For this is that monster Typhon, which your teacher and master has made to be so great in you by his warring against the Gods and divine men.

22. Having done with Socrates and Plato, he next attacks Stilpo. Now as for those his true doctrines and good discourses, by which he managed and governed himself, his country, his friends, and such kings and princes as loved him and esteemed him, he has not written a word; nor yet what prudence and magnanimity was in his heart, accompanied with meekness, moderation, and modesty. But having made mention of one of those little sentences he was wont in mirth and raillery to object against the sophisters, he does, without alleging any reason against it or solving the subtlety of the objection, stir up a terrible tragedy against Stilpo, saying that the life of man is subverted by him, inasmuch as he affirms that one thing cannot be predicated of another. “For how,” says he, “shall we live, if we cannot style a man good, nor a man a captain, but must separately name a man a man, good good, and a captain a captain; nor can say ten thousand horsemen, or a fortified town, but only call horsemen horsemen, and ten thousand ten thousand, and so of the rest?” Now what man ever was there that lived the worse for this? Or who is there that, hearing this discourse, does not immediately perceive and understand it to be the speech of a man who rallies gallantly, and proposes to others this logical question for the exercise of their wits? It is not, O Colotes, a great and dangerous scandal not to call any man good, or not to say ten thousand horsemen; but not to call God God, and not to believe him to be God,—as you and the rest do, who will not confess that there is a Jupiter presiding over generation, or a Ceres giving laws, or a Neptune nourishing the plants,—it is this separation of names that is pernicious, and fills our life with audaciousness and an atheistical contempt of the gods. When you pluck from the gods the names and appellations that are tied to them, you abolish also the sacrifices, mysteries, processions, and feasts. For to whom shall we offer the sacrifices preceding the tilling of the ground? To whom those for the obtaining of preservation? How shall we celebrate the Phosphoria or torch-festivals, the Bacchanals, and the ceremonies that go before marriage,

if we admit neither Bacchantes, gods of light, gods who protect the sown field, nor preservers of the state? For this it is that touches the principal and greatest points, being an error in things,—not in words, in the structure of propositions, or use of terms.

Now if these are the things that disturb and subvert human life, who are there that more offend in speech than you? For you take utterly away the whole category of namable things, which constitute the substance of language; and leave only words and their accidental objects, while you take away in the meantime the things particularly signified by them, by which are wrought disciplines, doctrines, preconceptions, intelligences, inclination, and assent, which you hold to be nothing at all.

23. But as for Stilpo, thus his argument stands. “If of a man we predicate good, and of an horse running, the predicate or thing predicated is not the same with the subject or that of which it is predicated, but the essential definition of man is one, and of good another. And again, to be a horse differs from to be running. For being asked the definition of the one and of the other, we do not give the same for them both; and therefore those err who predicate the one of the other. For if good is the same with man, and to run the same with a horse, how is good affirmed also of food and medicine, and again (by Jupiter) to run of a lion and a dog? But if the predicate is different, then we do not rightly say that a man is good, and a horse runs.” Now if Stilpo is in this exorbitant and grossly mistaken, not admitting any copulation of such things as are in the subject, or affirmed of the subject, with the subject itself; but holding that every one of them, if it is not absolutely one and the same thing with that to which it happens or of which it is spoken, ought not to be spoken or affirmed of it,—no, not even as an accident; it is nevertheless manifest, that he was only offended with some words, and opposed the usual and accustomed manner of speaking, and not that he overthrew man’s life, and turned his affairs upside down.

24. Colotes, then, having got rid of the old philosophers, turns to those of his own time, but without naming any of them; though he would have done better either to have reproved by name these moderns, as he did the ancients,

or else to have named neither of them. But he who has so often employed his pen against Socrates, Plato, and Parmenides, evidently demonstrates that it is through cowardice he dares not attack the living, and not for any modesty or reverence, of which he showed not the least sign to those who were far more excellent than these. But his meaning is, as I suspect, to assault the Cyrenaics first, and afterwards the Academics, who are followers of Arcesilaus. For it was these who doubted of all things; but those, placing the passions and imaginations in themselves, were of opinion that the belief proceeding from them is not sufficient for the assuring and affirming of things but, as if it were in the siege of a town, abandoning what is without, they have shut themselves up in the passions, using only *it seems*, and not asserting *it is*, of things without. And therefore they cannot, as Colotes says of them, live or have the use of things. And then speaking comically of them, he adds: "These deny that there is a man, a horse, a wall; but say that they themselves (as it were) become walls, horses, men," or "take on the images of walls, horses, or men." In which he first maliciously abuses the terms, as caluminators are usually wont to do. For though these things follow from the sayings of the Cyrenaics, yet he ought to have declared the fact as they themselves teach it. For they affirm that things then become sweet, bitter, lightsome, or dark, when each thing has in itself the natural unobstructed operation of one of these impressions. But if honey is said to be sweet, an olive-branch bitter, hail cold, wine hot, and the nocturnal air dark, there are many beasts, things, and men that testify the contrary. For some have an aversion for honey, others feed on the branches of the olive-tree; some are scorched by hail, others cooled with wine; and there are some whose sight is dim in the sun but who see well by night. Wherefore opinion, containing itself within these sensations, remains safe and free from error; but when it goes forth and attempts to be curious in judging and pronouncing concerning exterior things, it often deceives itself, and opposes others, who from the same objects receive contrary impressions and different imaginations.

25. And Colotes seems properly to resemble those young children who are but beginning to learn their letters. For, being accustomed to learn them where they see them in their own horn-books and primers, when they see

them written anywhere else, they doubt and are troubled; so those very discourses, which he praises and approves in the writings of Epicurus, he neither understands nor knows again, when they are spoken by others. For those who say that the sense is truly informed and moulded when there is presented one image round and another broken, but nevertheless permit us not to pronounce that the tower is round and the oar broken, confirm their own sensations and imaginations, but they will not acknowledge and confess that the things without are so affected. But as the Cyrenaics must say that they are imprinted with the figure of a horse or of a wall, but refuse to speak of the horse or the wall; so also it is necessary to say that the sight is imprinted with a figure round or with three unequal sides, and not that the tower is in that manner triangular or round. For the image by which the sight is affected is broken; but the oar whence that image proceeds is not broken. Since, then, there is a difference between the sensation and the external subject, the belief must either remain in the sensation, or else—if it maintains the being in addition to the appearing—be reproved and convinced of untruth. And whereas they cry out and are offended in behalf of the sense, because the Cyrenaics say not that the thing without is hot, but that the effect made on the sense is such; is it not the same with what is said touching the taste, when they say that the thing without is not sweet, but that some function and motion about the sense is such? And for him who says that he has received the apprehension of an human form, but perceives not whether it is a man, whence has he taken occasion so to say? Is it not from those who affirm that they receive an apprehension of a bowed figure and form, but that the sight pronounces not that the thing which was seen is bowed or round, but that a certain image of it is such? Yes, by Jupiter, will some one say; but I, going near the tower or touching the oar, will pronounce and affirm that the one is straight and the other has many angles and faces; but he, when he comes near it, will confess that it seems and appears so to him, and no more. Yes, certainly, good sir, and more than this, when he sees and observes the consequence, that every imagination is equally worthy of belief for itself, and none for another; but that they are all in like condition. But this your opinion is quite lost, that all the imaginations are true and none false or to be disbelieved, if you think that these ought to pronounce positively of that

which is without, but those you credit no farther than that they are so affected. For if they are in equal condition as to their being believed, when they are near or when they are far off, it is just that either upon all of them, or else not upon these, should follow the judgment pronouncing that a thing is. But if there is a difference in the being affected between those that are near and those that are far off, it is then false that one sense and imagination is not more express and evident than another. Therefore those they call attestations and counter-attestations are nothing to the sense, but are concerned only with opinion. So, if they would have us following these to pronounce concerning exterior things, making being a judgment of opinion, and what appears an affection of sense, they transfer the judicature from which is totally true to that which often fails.

26. But how full of trouble and contradiction in respect of one another these things are, what need is there to say at present? But the reputation of Arcesilaus, who was the best beloved and most esteemed of all the philosophers in his time, seems to have been no small eyesore to Epicurus; who says of him that delivering nothing peculiar to himself or of his own invention, he imprinted in illiterate men the opinion and esteem of his being very knowing and learned. Now Arcesilaus was so far from desiring any glory by being a bringer-in of new opinions, and from arrogating to himself those of the ancients, that the sophisters of that time blamed him for attributing to Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, and Heraclitus the doctrines concerning the retention of assent, and the incomprehensibility of things; having no need so to do, but only that he might strengthen them and render them recommendable by ascribing them such illustrious personages. For this, therefore, thanks to Colotes, and to every one who declares that the academic doctrine was from a higher times derived to Arcesilaus. Now as for retention of assent and the doubting of all things, not even those who have much labored in the manner, and strained themselves to compose great books and large treatises concerning it, were ever able to stir it; but bringing at last out of the Stoa itself the cessation from all actions, as the Gorgon to frighten away the objections that came against them, they were at last quite tired and gave over. For they could not, what attempts and stirs soever they made, obtain so much from



the instinct by which the appetite is moved to act, as to suffer itself to be called an assent, or to acknowledge sense for the origin and principle of its propension, but it appeared of its own accord to present itself to act, as having no need to be joined with anything else. For against such adversaries the combat and dispute is lawful and just. And

Such words as you have spoke, the like you may

Expect to hear.

— Il. XX. 250.

For to speak to Colotes of instinct and consent is, I suppose, all one as to play on the harp before an ass. But to those who can give ear and conceive, it is said that there are in the soul three sorts of motions,—the imaginative, the appetitive, and the consenting. As to the imaginative or the apprehension, it cannot be taken away, though one would. For one cannot, when things approach, avoid being informed and (as it were) moulded by them, and receiving an impression from them. The appetite, being stirred up by the imaginative, effectually moves man to that which is proper and agreeable to his nature, just as when there is made a propension and inclination in the principal and reasonable part. Now those who withhold their assent and doubt of all things take not away this, but make use of the appetition or instinct naturally conducting every man to that which seems convenient for him. What, then, is the only thing that they shun? That in which is bred falsehood and deceit,—that is, opining, and haste in giving consent,—which is a yielding through weakness to that which appears, and has not any true utility. For action stands in need of two things, to wit, the apprehension or imagination of what is agreeable to Nature, and the instinct or appetition driving to that which is so imagined; of which, neither the one nor the other is repugnant to the retention of assent. For reason withdraws us from opinion, and not from appetition or imagination. When, therefore, that which is delectable seems to us to be proper for us, there is no need of opinion to move and carry us to it, but appetition immediately exerts itself, which is nothing else but the motion and inclination of the soul.

27. It is their own saying, that a man must only have sense and be flesh and blood and pleasure will appear to be good. Wherefore also it will seem good to him who withholds his assent. For he also participates of sense, and is made of flesh and blood, and as soon as he has conceived an imagination of good, desires it and does all things that it may not escape from him; but as much as possibly he can, he will keep himself with that which is agreeable to his nature, being drawn by natural and not by geometrical constraints. For these goodly, gentle, and tickling motions of the flesh are, without any teacher, attractive enough of themselves—even as these men forget not to say—to draw even him who will not in the least acknowledge and confess that he is softened and rendered pliable by them. “But how comes it to pass,” perhaps you will say, “that he who is thus doubtful and withholds his assent hastens not away to the mountain, instead of going to the bath? Or that, rising up to go forth into the market-place, he runs not his head against the wall, but takes his way directly to the door?” Do you ask this, who hold all the senses to be infallible, and the apprehensions of the imagination certain and true? It is because the bath appears to him not a mountain, but a bath; and the door seems not a wall, but a door; and the same is to be said of every other thing. For the doctrine of retention does not pervert the sense, nor by absurd passions and motions work in it an alteration disturbing the imaginative faculty; but it only takes away opinions, and for the rest, makes use of other things according to their nature.

But it is impossible, you will say, not to consent to things that are evident; for to deny such things as are believed is more absurd than neither to deny nor affirm. Who then are they that call in question things believed, and contend against things that are evident? They who overthrow and take away divination, who say that there is not any government of Divine Providence, who deny the sun and the moon—to whom all men offer sacrifices and whom they honor and adore—to be animated. And do not you take away that which is apparent to all the world, that the young are contained in the nature of their parents? Do you not, contrary to the sense of all men, affirm that there is no medium between pleasure and pain, saying that not to be in pain is to be in

the fruition of pleasure, that not to do is to suffer, and that not to rejoice is to be grieved?

28. But to let pass all the rest, what is more evident and more generally believed by all men, than that those who are seized with melancholy distempers, and whose brain is troubled and whose wits are distracted, do, when the fit is on them and their understanding altered and transported, imagine that they see and hear things which they neither see nor hear? Whence they frequently cry out:

Women in black arrayed bear in their hands,  
To burn mine eyes, torches and fiery brands.

And again:

See, in her arms she holds my mother dear.

— Eurip. *Iph. Taur.* 289.

These, and many other illusions more strange and tragical than these,—resembling those mormos and bugbears which they themselves laugh at and deride, as they are described by Empedocles to be, “with sinuous feet and undeveloped hands, bodied like ox and faced like man,”—with certain other prodigious and unnatural phantoms, these men have gathered together out of dreams and the alienations of distracted minds, and affirm that none of them is a deception of the sight, a falsity, or inconsistency; but that all these imaginations are true, being bodies and figures that come from the ambient air. What thing then is there so impossible in Nature as to be doubted of, if it is possible to believe such reveries as these? For these men, supposing that such things as never any mask-maker, potter, designer of wonderful images, or skilful and all-daring painter durst join together, to deceive or make sport for the beholders, are seriously and in good earnest existent,—nay, which is more, affirming that, if they are not really so, all firmness of belief, all certainty of judgment and truth, is forever gone,—do by these their

suppositions and affirmations cast all things into obscurity, and bring fears into our judgments, and suspicions into our actions,—if the things which we apprehend, do, are familiarly acquainted with, and have at hand are grounded on the same imagination and belief with these furious, absurd, and extravagant fancies. For the equality which they suppose to be in all apprehensions rather derogates from the credit of such as are usual and rational, than adds any belief to those that are unusual and repugnant to reason. Wherefore we know many philosophers who would rather and more willingly grant that no imagination is true than that all are so, and that would rather simply disbelieve all the men they never had conversed with, all the things they had not experimented, and all the speeches they had not heard with their own ears, than persuade themselves that any one of these imaginations, conceived by these frantic, fanatical, and dreaming persons, is true. Since then there are some imaginations which may, and others which may not be rejected, it is lawful for us to retain our assent concerning them, though there were no other cause but this discordance, which is sufficient to work in us a suspicion of things, as having nothing certain and assured, but being altogether full of obscurity and perturbation. For in the disputes about the infinity of worlds and the nature of atoms and individuum and their inclinations, although they trouble and disturb very many, there is yet this comfort, that none of all these things that are in question is near us, but rather every one of them is far remote from sense. But as to this diffidence, perplexity, and ignorance concerning sensible things and imaginations, found even in our eyes, our ears, and our hands, what opinion does it not shock? What consent does it not turn upside down? For if men neither drunk, intoxicated, nor otherwise disturbed in their senses, but sober, sound in mind, and professedly writing of the truth and of the canons and rules by which to judge it, do in the most evident passions and motions of the senses set down either that which has no existence for true, or that which is existent for false, it is not strange that a man should be silent about all things, but rather that he assent to anything; nor is it incredible that he should have no judgment about things which appear, but rather that he should have contrary judgments. For it is less to be wondered, that a man should neither affirm the one nor the other but keep himself in a mean between two opposite things, than that he should set down

things repugnant and contrary to one another. For he that neither affirms nor denies, but keeps himself quiet, is less repugnant to him who affirms an opinion than he who denies it, and to him who denies an opinion than he who affirms it. Now if it is possible to withhold one's assent concerning these things, it is not impossible also concerning others, at least according to your opinion, who say that one sense does not exceed another, nor one imagination another.

29. The doctrine then of retaining the assent is not, as Colotes thinks, a fable or an invention of rash and light-headed young men who please themselves in babbling and prating; but a certain habit and disposition of men who desire to keep themselves from falling into error, not leaving the judgment at a venture to such suspected and inconstant senses, nor suffering themselves to be deceived by those who hold that in doubtful matters things which do not appear to the senses are credible and ought to be believed, when they see so great obscurity and uncertainty in things which do appear. But the infinity you assert is a fable, and so indeed are the images you dream of: and he breeds in young men rashness and self-conceitedness who writ of Pythocles, not yet eighteen years of age, that there was not in all Greece a better or more excellent nature, that he admirably well expressed his convictions, and that he was in other respects behaved like a women,—praying that all these extraordinary endowments of the young man might not work him hatred and envy. But these are sophists and arrogant, who write so impudently and proudly against great and excellent personages. I confess indeed, that Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus and Democritus contradicted those who went before them; but never durst any man besides Colotes set forth with such an insolent title as this against all at once.

30. Whence it comes to pass that, like to such as have offended some Divinity, confessing his fault, he says thus towards the end of His book: “Those who have established laws and ordinances and instituted monarchies and other governments in towns and cities, have placed human life in great repose and security and delivered it from many troubles; and if any one should go about to take this away, we should lead the life of savage beasts, and should be every one ready to eat up one another as we meet.” For these

are the very words of Colotes, though neither justly nor truly spoken. For if any one, taking away the laws, should leave us nevertheless the doctrines of Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Heraclitus, we should be far from mutually devouring one another and leading the life of beasts. For we should fear dishonest things, and should for honesty alone venerate justice, the gods our superiors, and magistrates, believing that we have spirits and daemons who are the guardians and superintendents of human life, esteeming all the gold that is upon and within the earth not to be equivalent to virtue; and doing that willingly by reason, as Xenocrates says, which we now do by force and through fear of the law. When then will our life become savage, uncivilized, and bestial? When, the laws being taken away, there shall be left doctrines inciting men to pleasure; when the world shall be thought not to be ruled and governed by Divine Providence; when those men shall be esteemed wise who spit at honesty if it is not joined with pleasure; and when such discourses and sentences as these shall be scoffed at and derided:

For Justice has an eye which all things sees;

and again:

God near us stands, and views whate'er we do;

and once more: "God, as antiquity has delivered to holding the beginning, middle, and end of the universe, makes a direct line, walking according to Nature. After him follows Justice, a punisher of those who have been deficient in their duties by transgressing the divine law."

For they who condemn these things as if they were fables, and think that the sovereign good of man consists about the belly, and in those other passages by which pleasure is admitted, are such as stand in need of the law, and fear, and stripes, and some king, prince, or magistrate, having in his hand the sword of justice; to the end that they may not devour their neighbors through their gluttony, rendered confident by their atheistical impiety. For this is the life of brutes, because brute beasts know nothing better nor more honest than

pleasure, understand not the justice of the gods, nor revere the beauty of virtue; but if Nature has bestowed on them any point of courage, subtlety, or activity, they make use of it for the satisfaction of their fleshly pleasure and the accomplishment of their lusts. And the sapient Metrodorus believes that this should be so, for he says: "All the fine, subtle, and ingenious inventions of the soul have been found out for the pleasure and delight of the flesh, or for the hopes of attaining to it and enjoying it, and every act which tends not to this end is vain and unprofitable." The laws being by such discourses and philosophical reasons as these taken away, there wants nothing to a beast-like life but lions' paws, wolves' teeth, oxen's paunches, and camels' necks; and these passions and doctrines do the beasts themselves, for want of speech and letters, express by their bellowings, neighings, and brayings, all their voice being for their belly and the pleasure of their flesh, which they embrace and rejoice in either present or future; unless it be perhaps some animal which naturally takes delight in chattering and garrulity.

31. No sufficient praise therefore or equivalent to their deserts can be given those who, for the restraining of such bestial passions, have set down laws, established policy and government of state, instituted magistrates and ordained good and wholesome laws. But who are they that utterly confound and abolish this? Are they not those who withdraw themselves and their followers from all part in the government? Are they not those who say that the garland of tranquillity and a reposed life are far more valuable than all the kingdoms and principalities in the world? Are they not those who declare that reigning and being a king is a mistaking the path and straying from the right way of felicity? And they write in express terms: "We are to treat how a man may best keep and preserve the end of Nature, and how he may from the very beginning avoid entering of his own free will and voluntarily upon offices of magistracy, and government over the people." And yet again, these other words are theirs: "There is no need at all that a man should tire out his mind and body to preserve the Greeks, and to obtain from them a crown of wisdom; but to eat and drink well, O Timocrates, without prejudicing, but rather pleasing the flesh." And yet in the constitution of laws and policy, which Colotes so much praises, the first and most important article is the belief

and persuasion of the Gods. Wherefore also Lycurgus heretofore consecrated the Lacedaemonians, Numa the Romans, the ancient Ion the Athenians, and Deucalion universally all the Greeks, through prayers, oaths, oracles, and omens, making them devout and affectionate to the Gods by means of hopes and fears at once. And if you will take the pains to travel through the world, you may find towns and cities without walls, without letters, without kings, without houses, without wealth, without money, without theatres and places of exercise; but there was never seen nor shall be seen by man any city without temples and Gods, or without making use of prayers, oaths, auguries, and sacrifices for the obtaining of blessings and benefits, and the averting of curses and calamities. Nay, I am of opinion, that a city might sooner be built without any ground to fix it on, than a commonweal be constituted altogether void of any religion and opinion of the Gods,—or being constituted, be preserved. But this, which is the foundation and ground of all laws, do these men, not going circularly about, nor secretly and by enigmatical speeches, but attacking it with the first of their most principal opinions directly subvert and overthrow; and then afterwards, as if they were haunted by the Furies, they come and confess that they have grievously offended in thus taking away the laws, and confounding the ordinances of justice and policy, that they may not be capable of pardon. For to err in opinion, though it be not the part of wise men, is at least human; but to impute to others the errors and offences they commit themselves, how can any one declare what it is, if he forbears to give it the name it deserves?

32. For if, in writing against Antidorus or Bion the sophister, he had made mention of laws, policy, order, and justice, might not either of them have said to him, as Electra did to her mad brother Orestes:

Lie still at ease, poor wretch; keep in thy bed,

— Eurip. Orest. 258.

and there cherish thy bit of body, leaving those to expostulate and find fault with me who have themselves lived a civil and domestic life? Now such are all those whom Colotes has reviled and railed at in his book. Amongst



whom, Democritus in his writings advises and exhorts to the learning of the science of politics, as being the greatest of all, and to the accustoming one's self to bear fatigues, by which men attain to great wealth and honor. And as for Parmenides, he beautified and adorned his native country with most excellent laws which he there established, so that even to this day the officers every year, when they enter first on the exercise of their charges, are obliged to swear that they will observe the laws and ordinances of Parmenides. Empedocles brought to justice some of the principal of his city, and caused them to be condemned for their insolent behavior and embezzling of the public treasure, and also delivered his country from sterility and the plague—to which calamities it was before subject—by immuring and stopping up the holes of certain mountains, whence there issued an hot south wind, which overspread all the plain country and blasted it. And Socrates, after he was condemned, when his friends offered him, if he pleased, an opportunity of making his escape, absolutely refused to make use of it, that he might maintain the authority of the laws, choosing rather to die unjustly than to save himself by disobeying the laws of his country. Melissus, being captain general of his country, vanquished the Athenians in a battle at sea. Plato left in his writings excellent discourses concerning the laws, government, and policy of a commonweal; and yet he imprinted much better in the hearts and minds of his disciples and familiars, which caused Sicily to be freed by Dion, and Thrace to be set at liberty by Pytho and Heraclides, who slew Cotys. Chabrias also and Phocion, those two great generals of the Athenians, came out of the Academy. As for Epicurus, he indeed sent certain persons into Asia to chide Timocrates, and caused him to be removed out of the king's palace, because he had offended his brother Metrodorus; and this is written in their own books. But Plato sent of his disciples and friends, Aristonymus to the Arcadians, to set in order their commonweal, Phormio to the Eleans, and Menedemus to the Pyrrhaeans. Eudoxus gave laws to the Cnidians, and Aristotle to the Stagirites, who were both of them the intimates of Plato. And Alexander the Great demanded of Xenocrates rules and precepts for reigning well. And he who was sent to the same Alexander by the Grecians dwelling in Asia, and who most of all inflamed and stimulated him to embrace and undertake the war against the barbarian king of Persia, was Delius the

Ephesian, one of Plato's familiars. Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides, having attempted to kill the tyrant Demylus, and failing in his design, maintained the doctrine of Parmenides, like pure and fine gold tried in the fire, that there is nothing which a magnanimous man ought to dread but dishonor, and that there are none but children and women, or effeminate and women-hearted men, who fear pain. For, having with his own teeth bitten off his tongue, he spit it in the tyrant's face.

33. But out of the school of Epicurus, and from among those who follow his doctrine, I will not ask what tyrant-killer has proceeded, nor yet what man valiant and victorious in feats of arms, what lawgiver, what prince, what counsellor, or what governor of the people; neither will I demand, who of them has been tormented or has died for supporting right and justice. But which of all these sages has for the benefit and service of his country undertaken so much as one voyage at sea, gone of an embassy, or expended a sum of money? What record is there extant of one civil action in matter of government, performed by any of you? And yet, because Metrodorus went down one day from the city as far as the haven of Piraeus, taking a journey of forty stadia to assist Mithres a Syrian, one of the king of Persia's court who had been arrested and taken prisoner, he writ of it to every one and in all his letters, Epicurus also highly magnifying and extolling this wonderful voyage. What value then, think you, would they have put upon it, if they had done such an act as Aristotle did, who procured the restoration and rebuilding of Stagira, the town of his nativity, after it had been destroyed by King Philip? Or as Theophrastus, who twice delivered his city, when possessed and held by tyrants? Would not the river Nile sooner have given over to bear the paper-reed, than they have been weary of writing their brave exploits?

And it is not the greatest indignity, that, of so many sects of philosophers as have been extant, they alone should enjoy the benefits that are in cities, without having ever contributed to them anything of their own; but far more serious is it that, while there are not even any tragical or comical poets who do not always endeavor to do or say some good thing or other in defence of the laws and policy these men, if peradventure they write, write of policy, that we may not concern ourselves in the government of the commonweal,

—of rhetoric, that we may not perform an act of eloquence,—and of royalty, that we may shun the living and conversing with kings. Nor do they ever name any of those great personages who have intermeddled in civil affairs, but only to scoff at them and abolish their glory. Thus they say that Epaminondas had something of good, but that very little, or *μικρόν*, for that is the very word they use. They moreover call him iron-hearted, and ask what ailed him that he went marching his army through all Peloponnesus, and why he did not rather keep himself quiet at home with a garland on his head, employed only in cherishing and making much of his body. But methinks I ought not in this place to omit what Metrodorus writ in his book of Philosophy, when, utterly abjuring all meddling in the management of the state, he said thus: “Some, through an excess of vanity and arrogance, have so deep a comprehension into the business of it, that in discussing the precepts of good life and virtue, they allow themselves to be carried away with the very same desires as were Lycurgus and Solon.” What is this? Was it then vanity and abundance of vanity, to set free the city of Athens, to render Sparta well-policed and governed by wholesome laws, that young men might do nothing licentiously, nor get children upon common courtesans and whores, and that riches, delights, intemperance, and dissolution might no longer bear sway and have command in cities, but law and justice? For these were the desires of Solon. To this Metrodorus, by way of scorn and contumely, adds this conclusion: “It is then very well beseeming a native born gentleman to laugh heartily, as at other men, so especially at these Solons and Lycurguses.” But such a one, O Metrodorus, is not a gentleman, but a servile and dissolute person, and deserves to be scourged, not with that whip which is for free-born persons, but with that scourge made with ankle-bones, with which those eunuch sacrificers called Galli were wont to be chastised, when they failed of performing their duty in the ceremonies and sacrifices of the Goddess Cybele, the great Mother of the Gods.

34. But that they made war not against the lawgivers but against the laws themselves, one may hear and understand from Epicurus. For in his questions, he asks himself, whether a wise man, being assured that it will not be known, will do anything that the laws forbid. To which he answers: “That is

not so easy to settle simply,”—that is “I will do it indeed, but I am not willing to confess it.” And again, I suppose writing to Idomeneus, he exorts him not to make his life a slave to the laws or to the options of men, unless it be to avoid the trouble they prepare, by the scourge and chastisement, so near at hand. If those who abolish laws, governments, and polices of men subvert and destroy human life, and if Metrodorus and Epicurus do this, by dehorting and withdrawing their friends from concerning themselves in public affairs, by hating those who intermeddle in them, by reviling the first most wise lawgivers, and by advising contempt of the laws provided there is no fear and danger of the whip punishment. I do not see that Colotes has brought so many false accusations against the other philosophers as he has alleged and advanced true ones against the writings and doctrines of Epicurus.

## WHETHER 'TWERE RIGHTLY SAID, LIVE CONCEALED.

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1. It is sure, he that said it had no mind to live concealed, for he spoke it out of a design of being taken notice of for his very saying it, as if he saw deeper into things than every vulgar eye, and of purchasing to himself a reputation, how unjustly soever, by inveigling others into obscurity and retirement. But the poet says right:

I hate the man who makes pretence to wit,

Yet in his own concerns waives using it.

— From Euripides, Frag. 897.

For they tell us of one Philoxenus the son of Eryxis, and Gnatho the Sicilian, who were so over greedy after any dainties set before them, that they would blow their nose in the dish, whereby, turning the stomachs of the other guests, they themselves went away fuller crammed with the rarities. Thus fares it with all those whose appetite is always lusting and insatiate after glory. They bespatter the repute of others, as their rivals in honor, that they themselves may advance smoothly to it and without a rub. They do like watermen, who look astern while they row the boat ahead, still so managing the strokes of the oar that the vessel may make on to its port. So these men who recommend to us such kind of precepts row hard after glory, but with their face another way. To what purpose else need this have been said? — why committed to writing and handed down to posterity? Would he live incognito to his contemporaries, who is so eager to be known to succeeding ages?

2. But besides, doth not the thing itself sound ill, to bid you keep all your lifetime out of the world's eye, as if you had rifled the sepulchres of the dead, or done such like detestable villany which you should hide for? What! is it grown a crime to live, unless you can keep all others from knowing you do so? For my part, I should pronounce that even an ill-liver ought not to

withdraw himself from the converse of others. No; let him be known, let him be reclaimed, let him repent; so that, if you have any stock of virtue, let it not lie unemployed, or if you have been viciously bent, do not by flying the means continue unreclaimed and uncured. Point me out therefore and distinguish me the man to whom you adopt this admonition. If to one devoid of sense, goodness, or wit, it is like one that should caution a person under a fever or raving madness not to let it be known where he is, for fear the physicians should find him, but rather to skulk in some dark corner, where he and his diseases may escape discovery. So you who labor under that pernicious, that scarce curable disease, wickedness, are by parity of reason bid to conceal your vices, your envyings, your superstitions, like some disorderly or feverous pulse, for fear of falling into the hands of them who might prescribe well to you and set you to rights again. Whereas, alas! in the days of remote antiquity, men exhibited the sick to public view, when every charitable passenger who had labored himself under the like malady, or had experienced a remedy on them that did, communicated to the diseased all the receipts he knew; thus, say they, skill in physic was patched up by multiplied experiments, and grew to a mighty art. At the same rate ought all the infirmities of a dissolute life, all the irregular passions of the soul, to be laid open to the view of all, and undergo the touch of every skilful hand, that all who examine into the temper may be able to prescribe accordingly. For instance, doth anger transport you? The advice in that case is, Shun the occasions of it. Doth jealousy torment you? Take this or that course. Art thou love-sick? It hath been my own case and infirmity to be so too; but I saw the folly of it, I repented, I grew wiser. But for those that lie, denying, hiding, mincing, and palliating their vices, it makes them but take the deeper dye, it rivets their faults into them.

3. Again, if on the other hand this advice be calculated for the owners of worth and virtue, if they must be condemned to privacy and live unknown to the world, you do in effect bid Epaminondas lay down his arms, you bid Lycurgus rescind his laws, you bid Thrasybulus spare the tyrants, in a word, you bid Pythagoras forbear his instructions, and Socrates his reasonings and discourses; nay, you lay injunctions chiefly upon yourself, Epicurus, not to

maintain that epistolary correspondence with your Asiatic friends, not to entertain your Egyptian visitants, not to be tutor to the youth of Lampsacus, not to present and send about your books to women as well as men, out of an ostentation of some wisdom in yourself more than vulgar, not to leave such particular directions about your funeral. And in fine, to what purpose, Epicurus, did you keep a public table? Why that concourse of friends, that resort of fair young men, at your doors? Why so many thousand lines so elaborately composed and writ upon Metrodorus, Aristobulus, and Chaerodemus, that death itself might not rob us of them; if virtue must be doomed to oblivion, art to idleness and inactivity, philosophy to silence, and all a man's happiness must be forgotten?

4. But if indeed, in the state of life we are under, you will needs seclude us from all knowledge and acquaintance with the world (as men shut light from their entertainments and drinking-bouts, for which they set the night apart), let it be only such who make it the whole business of life to heap pleasure upon pleasure; let such live recluses all their days. Were I, in truth, to wanton away my days in the arms of your miss Hedeia, or spend them with Leontium, another dear of yours, — were I to bid defiance to virtue, or to place all that's good in the gratification of the flesh or the ticklings of a sensual pleasure, — these accursed actions and rites would need darkness and an eternal night to veil them; and may they ever be doomed to oblivion and obscurity. But what should they hide their heads for, who with regard to the works of nature own and magnify a God, who celebrate his justice and providence, who in point of morality are due observers of the law, promoters of society and community among all men, and lovers of the public-weal, and who in the administration thereof prefer the common good before private advantage? Why should such men cloister up themselves, and live recluses from the world? For would you have them out of the way, for fear they should set a good example, and allure others to virtue out of emulation of the precedent? If Themistocles's valor had been unknown at Athens, Greece had never given Xerxes that repulse. Had not Camillus shown himself in defence of the Romans, their city Rome had no longer stood. Sicily had not recovered her liberty, had Plato been a stranger to Dion. Truly (in my mind)

to be known to the world under some eminent character not only carries a reputation with it, but makes the virtues in us become practical like light, which renders us not only visible but useful to others. Epaminondas, during the first forty years of his life, in which no notice was taken of him, was an useless citizen to Thebes; but afterwards, when he had once gained credit and the government amongst the Thebans, he both rescued them from present destruction, and freed even Greece herself from imminent slavery, exhibiting (like light, which is in its own nature glorious, and to others beneficial at the same time) a valor seasonably active and serviceable to his country, yet interwoven with his own laurels. For

Virtue, like finest brass, by use grows bright.

— Sophocles, Frag. 779.

And not our houses alone, when (as Sophocles has it) they stand long untenanted, run the faster to ruin; but men's natural parts, lying unemployed for lack of acquaintance with the world, contract a kind of filth or rust and craziness thereby. For sottish ease, and a life wholly sedentary and given up to idleness, spoil and debilitate not only the body but the soul too. And as close waters shadowed over by bordering trees, and stagnated in default of springs to supply current and motion to them, become foul and corrupt; so, methinks, is it with the innate faculties of a dull unstirring soul, — whatever usefulness, whatever seeds of good she may have latent in her, yet when she puts not these powers into action, when once they stagnate, they lose their vigor and run to decay.

5. See you not how on night's approach a sluggish drowsiness oft-times seizes the body, and sloth and inactiveness surprise the soul, and she finds herself heavy and quite unfit for action? Have you not then observed how a man's reason (like fire scarce visible and just going out) retires into itself, and how by reason of its inactivity and dulness it is gently agitated by divers fantastical imaginations, so that nothing remains but some obscure indications that the man is alive.



But when the orient sun brings back the day,  
It chases night and dreamy sleep away.

It doth, as it were, bring the world together again, and with his returned light call up and excite all mankind to thought and action; and, as Democritus tells us, men setting themselves every new-spring day to endeavors of mutual beneficence and service one towards another, as if they were fastened in the straitest tie together, do all of them, some from one, some from another quarter of the world, rouse up and awake to action.

6. For my own part, I am fully persuaded that life itself, and our being born at the rate we are, and the origin we share in common with all mankind, were vouchsafed us by God to the intent we should be known to one another. It is true, whilst man, in that little part of him, his soul, lies struggling and scattered in the vast womb of the universe, he is an obscure and unknown being; but, when once he gets hither into this world and puts a body on, he grows illustrious, and from an obscure becomes a conspicuous being; from an hidden, an apparent one. For knowledge does not lead to essence (or being), as some maintain; but the essence of things rather conducts us into the knowledge and understanding thereof. For the birth or generation of individuals gives not any being to them which they had not before, but brings that individual into view; as also the corruption or death of any creature is not its annihilation or reduction into mere nothing, but rather a sending the dissolved being into an invisible state. Hence is it that many persons (conformably to their ancient country laws), taking the Sun to be Apollo, gave him the names of Delius and Pythius (that is, conspicuous and known). But for him, be he either God or Daemon, who hath dominion over the opposite portion, the infernal regions, they call him Hades (that is, invisible),

Emperor of gloomy night and lazy sleep,

for that at our death and dissolution we pass into a state of invisibility and beyond the reach of mortal eyes. I am indeed of opinion, that the ancients called man Phos (that is, light), because from the affinity of their natures

strong desires are bred in mankind of continually seeing and being seen to each other. Nay, some philosophers hold the soul itself to be essentially light; which they would prove by this among other arguments, that nothing is so insupportable to the mind of man as ignorance and obscurity. Whatever is destitute of light she avoids, and darkness, the harbor of fears and suspicions, is uneasy to her; whereas, on the other hand, light is so delicious, so desirable a thing, that without that, and wrapped in darkness, none of the delectables in nature are pleasing to her. This makes all our very pleasures, all our diversions and enjoyments, charming and grateful to us, like some universal relishing ingredients mixed with the others to make them palatable. But he that casts himself into obscure retirements, he that sits surrounded in darkness and buries himself alive, seems, in my mind, to repine at his own birth and grudge he ever had a being.

7. And yet it is certain, in the regions prepared for pious souls, they conserve not only an existence in (or agreeable to) nature, but are encircled with glory.

There the sun with glorious ray,  
Chasing shady night away,  
Makes an everlasting day;  
Where souls in fields of purple roses play;  
Others in verdant plains disport,  
Crowned with trees of every sort,  
Trees that never fruit do bear,  
But always in the blossom are.

— From Pindar.

The rivers there without rude murmurs gently glide, and there they meet and bear each other company, passing away their time in commemorating and running over things past and present.

A third state there is of them who have led vicious and wicked lives, which precipitates souls into a kind of hell and miserable abyss,

Where sluggish streams of sable night

Spout floods of darkness infinite.

— From Pindar.

This is the receptacle of the tormented; here lie they hid under the veils of eternal ignorance and oblivion. For vultures do not everlastingly gorge themselves upon the liver of a wicked man, exposed by angry Gods upon the earth, as poets fondly feign of Prometheus. For either rottenness or the funeral pile hath consumed that long ago. Nor do the bodies of the tormented undergo (as Sisyphus is fabled to do) the toil and pressure of weighty burdens;

For strength no longer flesh and bone sustains.

— Odyss. XI. 219.

There are no reliques of the body in dead men which stripes and tortures can make impressions on; but in very truth the sole punishment of ill-livers is an inglorious obscurity, or a final abolition, which through oblivion hurls and plunges them into deplorable rivers, bottomless seas, and a dark abyss, involving all in uselessness and inactivity, absolute ignorance and obscurity, as their last and eternal doom.

## ΟΤΙ ΟΥΔ' ΗΔΕΩΣ ΖΗΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΚΑΤ' ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΝ.

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[1086] [b] Κωλώτης ὁ Ἐπικούρου συνήθης βιβλίον ἐξέδωκεν ἐπιγράψας “Ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν”. ὅσα τοίνυν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ ἤλθεν εἰπεῖν πρὸς [c] αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἐγράφη πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῆς σχολῆς διαλυθείσης ἐγένοντο <λόγοι> πλείονες ἐν τῷ περιπάτῳ πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἔδοξέ μοι καὶ τούτους ἀναλαβεῖν, εἰ καὶ δι’ ἄλλο μὴθὲν ἄλλ’ ἐνδείξεως ἔνεκα τοῖς εὐθύνουσιν ἐτέρους, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἕκαστον ὧν ἐλέγχει καὶ τὰ γράμματα μὴ παρέργως διελθεῖν, μηδὲ φωνὰς ἀλλαχόθεν ἄλλας ἀποσπῶντα καὶ ῥήμασιν ἄνευ πραγμάτων ἐπιτιθέμενον παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς ἀπείρους.

Προελθόντων γὰρ ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν ἐκ τῆς διατριβῆς, Ζεύξιππος ‘ἐμοὶ μὲν’ ἔφη ‘δοκεῖ πολὺ τῆς προσηκούσης ὁ λόγος εἰρῆσθαι παρρησίας [d] μαλακώτερον· ἀπίασι δ’ ἡμῖν ἐγκαλοῦντες οἱ περὶ Ἡρακλείδην <ὡς> τοῦ Ἐπικούρου καὶ τοῦ Μητροδώρου [ἡμῶν] μὴδὲν αἰτίων ὄντων θρασύτερον καθαψάμενοις.’ καὶ ὁ Θέων ‘εἴτ’ οὐκ ἔλεγες’ εἶπεν ‘ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνων ὁ Κωλώτης παραβαλλόμενος εὐφημότατος ἀνδρῶν φαίνεται; τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἵσχιστα ῥήματα, βωμολοχίας ληκυθισμοὺς ἀλαζονείας ἐταιρήσεις ἀνδροφονίας, βαρυστόνους πολυφθόρους βαρυεγκεφάλους συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἰππαρχίας καὶ τίνας γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν κατεσκέδασαν, ὥστ’, [e] εἰ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα σοφῶς εἶχεν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὰς βλασφημίας ταύτας καὶ κατηγορίας πορρωτάτῳ σοφίας ἂν εἴργεσθαι· ‘φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ’ καὶ ζηλοτυπία δι’ ἀσθένειαν ἀποκρύψαι μὴ δυναμένη τὸ ἀλγοῦν.’ ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀριστόδημος “Ἡρακλείδης οὖν” ἔφη ‘γραμματικὸς [1087] [a] ὢν ἀντὶ τῆς ‘ποιητικῆς τύρβης’, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσι, καὶ τῶν “Ὀμήρου μωρολογημάτων” ἀποτίνει ταύτας Ἐπικούρῳ χάριτας, ἢ ὅτι Μητρόδωρος ἐν γράμμασι τοσούτοις <τῷ> ποιητῇ λελοιδόρηκεν; ἄλλ’ ἐκείνους μὲν ἐῷμεν, ὦ Ζεύξιππε· τὸ δ’ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν λόγων ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν <εὖ> ζῆν κατ’ αὐτούς, τί οὐ μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ κέκμηκεν οὗτος, αὐτοὶ δι’ ἑαυτῶν περαίνομεν ἅμα καὶ Θέωνα παραλαβόντες;’ καὶ ὁ Θέων πρὸς

αὐτόν ‘ἄλλ’ οὗτος μὲν’ ἔφη ‘ὁ ἄθλος ἑτέροις ἐκτετέλεσται πρὸ ἡμῶν, ‘νῦν αὖτε σκοπὸν ἄλλον’ (χ 5. 6), εἰ δοκεῖ, θέμενοι τοιαύτη τινὶ δίκη μετίωμεν ὑπὲρ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ἄνδρας· [b] ἀποδεῖξαι γάρ, ἄνπερ ἦ δυνατόν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὅτι μηδὲ ζῆν ἡδέως ἔστιν κατ’ αὐτούς.’ ‘παπαί’ εἶπον ἔγωγε γελάσας, ‘εἰς τὴν γαστέρα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἔοικας ἐναλεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν κρεῶν ἐπάξειν, ἀφαιρούμενος ἡδονὴν ἀνθρώπων βοώντων· ‘οὐ γὰρ πυγμάχοι εἰμὲν ἀμύμονες’ οὐδὲ ῥήτορες οὐδὲ προστάται δῆμων οὐδ’ ἄρχοντες, ‘ἀεὶ δ’ ἡμῖν δαίς τε φίλη’ (θ 246. 248) καὶ πᾶσα διὰ σαρκὸς ἐπιτερπὴς κίνησις ἐφ’ ἡδονὴν τινα καὶ χαρὰν ψυχῆς ἀναπεμπομένη. δοκεῖς οὖν μοι μὴ τὸ ἔαρ ἐξαίρειν, ὡς φασιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως μὴ ἀπολείψεις αὐτοῖς.’ ‘τί οὖν’ εἶπεν ὁ Θέων, ‘εἰ [c] δοκιμάζεις τὸν λόγον, αὐτὸς οὐ χρῆ παρόν;’ ‘χρήσομαι’ εἶπον ‘ἀκροώμενος καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἂν δέησθε· τὴν δ’ ἡγεμονίαν ὑμῖν παραδίδωμι.’ μικρὰ δὲ προφασισαμένου τοῦ Θέωνος Ἀριστόδημος ‘ὡς σύντομον’ ἔφη ‘καὶ λείαν ἔχων ὁδὸν ἀπετάφρευσας ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἔάσας περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ πρότερον εὐθύνας ὑποσχεῖν τὴν αἴρεσιν. ἀνθρώπους γὰρ ἡδονὴν ὑποτιθεμένους τέλος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξελάσαι τοῦ ἡδέως ζῆν ῥάδιον· τοῦ δὲ καλῶς ἐκπεσόντες ἅμ’ <ἂν> καὶ τοῦ ἡδέως συνεξέπιπτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ καλῶς ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι.’

Καὶ ὁ Θέων ‘ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν’ εἶπεν, ‘ἂν δόξη, τοῦ [d] λόγου προϊόντος ἀναθησόμεθα· νῦν δὲ χρησώμεθα τοῖς διδομένοις ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. οἶονται δὲ περὶ γαστέρα τάγαθόν εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πόρους τῆς σαρκὸς ἅπαντας, δι’ ὧν ἡδονὴ καὶ μὴ ἀλγηδὼν ἐπείσέρχεται· καὶ πάντα <τὰ> καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἐξευρήματα τῆς περὶ γαστέρα ἡδονῆς ἔνεκα γεγονέναι καὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ ταύτης ἐλπίδος ἀγαθῆς, ὡς ὁ σοφὸς εἶρηκε Μητρόδωρος (fr. 7). αὐτόθεν μὲν οὖν, ὧς ἔταῖρε, φαίνονται γλίσχρον τι καὶ σαθρόν καὶ οὐ βέβαιον αἴτιον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λαμβάνοντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πόροις τούτοις, δι’ ὧν ἡδονὰς ἐπείσάγονται, καὶ πρὸς ἀλγηδόνας [e] ὁμοίως κατατετρημένον, μᾶλλον δ’ ἡδονὴν μὲν ὀλίγοις ἀλγηδόνα δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς μορίοις δεχόμενον. ποία γὰρ ἡδονὴ περὶ ἄρθρα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας, οἷς ἐνοικίζεται τὰ δεινὰ πάθη καὶ σχέτλια, ποδαγρικὰ καὶ ῥευματικὰ καὶ φαγεδαινικὰ καὶ διαβρώσεις καὶ ἀποσῆψεις; ὁσμῶν τε καὶ χυμῶν τὰ ἥδιστα προσαγαγὼν τῷ σώματι μικρὸν εὐρήσεις χωρίον ἐν αὐτῷ παντάπασι τὸ κινούμενον λείως καὶ προσηνῶς, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα

πολλάκις δυσχεραίνει καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ· πυρὶ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ καὶ δήγματι καὶ ὑστρίχισιν οὐδὲν ἀπαθὲς οὐδ’ ἀναίσθητον ἀλγηδόνης, ἀλλὰ καὶ καῦμα καὶ ῥῖγος εἰς ἅπαντα καταδύεται καὶ πυρετός, αἱ δ’ [f] ἡδοναὶ καθάπερ αὔραι πρὸς ἐτέραις ἕτεραι τοῦ σώματος ἄκραις ἐπιγελῶσαι διαχέονται. καὶ χρόνος ὁ μὲν τούτων οὐ πολὺς ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ διὰττοντες ἕξαψιν ἅμα καὶ σβέσιν ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λαμβάνουσιν, ἐκείνων δὲ τοῦ πόνου μάρτυς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Φιλοκτῆτης ἱκανός· οὐ γὰρ ὁ δράκων, φησὶν, ἀνῆκεν, ἀλλ’ ‘ἐνώκισε †δεινὴν στομάτων ἔμφυσιν, [1088] [a] ποδὸς λαβεῖν’ (fr. 252). ὀλισθη... ἀλγηδὼν † οὐδ’ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα κινουσα καὶ γαργαλίζουσα τοῦ σώματος· ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς μηδικῆς σπέρμα πολυκαμπὲς καὶ σκαληνὸν ἐμφύεται τῇ γῇ καὶ διαμένει πολὺν χρόνον ὑπὸ τραχύτητος, οὕτως ὁ πόνος ἄγκιστρα καὶ ρίζας διασπείρων καὶ συμπλεκόμενος τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ παραμένων οὐχ ἡμέρας οὐδὲ νύκτας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥρας ἐτῶν ἐνίοις καὶ περιόδους ὀλυμπιακὰς μόλις ὑπ’ ἄλλων πόνων ὥσπερ ἤλων σφοδροτέρων ἐκκρουόμενος ἀπαλλάττεται. τίς γὰρ ἔπιε χρόνον τοσοῦτον ἢ ἔφαγεν, ὅσον διψῶσιν οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ πεινῶσιν οἱ πολιορκούμενοι; ποῦ δ’ ἔστιν ἄνεσις καὶ συνουσία [b] μετὰ φίλων, ἐφ’ ὅσον κολάζουσι καὶ στρεβλοῦσι τύραννοι; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς τοῦ σώματος φαυλότητος καὶ ἀφυΐας πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν ἐστίν, ὅτι τοὺς πόνους ὑπομένει μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἔχει ῥώμην καὶ δύναμιν, ἐν δὲ ταύταις ἀσθενὲς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀψίκορον. τὸ δ’ ἡδέως ζῆν † ἂν ἄπτωνται, πλείονα περὶ τούτου λέγειν οὐκ ἐῷσιν ἡμᾶς, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοῖς μικρὸν εἶναι τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡδύ, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀκαρές, εἴ γε δὴ μὴ κενολογοῦσι μηδ’ ἀλαζονεύονται, Μητρόδωρος μὲν λέγων ὅτι ‘πολλάκις προσεπτύσαμεν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναῖς’ (fr. 62), Ἐπίκουρος [c] δὲ καὶ γελᾶν φησι ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματος πολλάκις κάμνοντα τὸν σοφόν. οἷς οὖν οἱ πόνοι τοῦ σώματος οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐλαφροὶ καὶ ῥάδιοι, πῶς ἔνεστί τι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀξιόλογον; καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ χρόνῳ μηδὲ μεγέθει τῶν πόνων ἀποδέουσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ πόνους ἔχουσι, καὶ πέρας αὐταῖς κοινὸν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσιν ἐπιτέθεικεν, ὥς τῆς φύσεως ἄχρι τοῦ λῦσαι τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐξούσης τὸ ἡδύ, περαιτέρω δὲ μὴ ἐώσης προελθεῖν κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ ποικιλμούς τινας οὐκ ἀναγκαίους, ὅταν [οὐκ] ἐν τῷ μὴ πονεῖν γένηται, δεχομένης· ἢ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦτο μετ’ ὀρέξεως [d] πορεία, μέτρον ἡδονῆς οὔσα, κομιδῇ βραχεῖα καὶ σύντομος. ὅθεν αἰσθόμενοι τῆς ἐνταῦθα

γλισχρότητος ὥσπερ ἐκ χωρίου λυπροῦ τοῦ σώματος μεταφέρουσι τὸ τέλος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς ἐκεῖ νομὰς καὶ λειμῶνας ἀμφιλαφεῖς ἡδονῶν ἔχοντες,

‘ἐν δ’ Ἰθάκῃ οὐτ’ ἄρ’ δρόμοι εὐρέες <οὔτε τι λειμῶν>’

(δ 605),

οὔτε λείη περὶ τὸ σαρκίδιον ἢ ἀπόλαυσις ἀλλὰ τραχεῖα, μεμιγμένη πρὸς πολὺ τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ σφυγματῶδες.’

Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ζεύξιππος ‘εἴτ’ οὐ καλῶς’ ἔφη ‘δοκοῦσί σοι ποιεῖν οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀρχόμενοι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἐν ᾧ πρῶτον ἐφάνη γένεσις ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν [e] ὡς βεβαιότεραν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐν ταύτῃ τελειοῦντες;’ ‘καλῶς νῆ Δί’ ἔφη Θέων ‘καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, εἴ τι κρεῖττον ἐνταῦθα μετιόντες καὶ τελειότερον ἀληθῶς ἀνευρίσκουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ θεωρητικοὶ καὶ πολιτικοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν. εἰ δ’ ἀκούεις αὐτῶν μαρτυρομένων καὶ βοώντων, ὡς ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ ψυχὴ τῶν ὄντων πέφυκε χαίρειν καὶ γαληνίζειν πλήν ἐπὶ σώματος ἡδοναῖς παρούσαις ἢ προσδοκωμέναις, καὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτῆς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, ἄρ’ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι διεράματι τοῦ σώματος χρῆσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ, <καὶ> καθάπερ οἶνον ἐκ πονηροῦ καὶ μὴ στέγοντος ἀγγείου τὴν ἡδονὴν διαχέοντες ἐνταῦθα καὶ παλαιοῦντες οἶεσθαι σεμνότερόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ [f] τιμιώτερον; καίτοι γ’ οἶνον μὲν χρόνος διαχυθέντα τηρεῖ καὶ συνηδύνει, τῆς δ’ ἡδονῆς ἡ ψυχὴ παραλαβοῦσα τὴν μνήμην ὥσπερ ὁσμὴν ἄλλο δ’ οὐδὲν φυλάσσει· ζέσασα γὰρ ἐπὶ σαρκὶ κατασβέννυται, καὶ τὸ μνημονευόμενον αὐτῆς ἀμαυρόν ἐστὶ καὶ κνισῶδες, ὥσπερ ἐώλων ὧν τις [1089] [a] ἔπιεν ἢ ἔφαγεν ἀποτιθεμένου καὶ ταμιεύοντος ἐπινοίας ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ χρωμένου δηλονότι ταύταις προσφάτων μὴ παρόντων. ὅρα δ’ ὅσω μετριώτερον οἱ Κυρηναῖκοί, καίπερ ἐκ μιᾶς οἰνοχόης Ἐπικούρῳ πεπωκότες, οὐδ’ ὁμιλεῖν ἀφροδισίοις οἶονται δεῖν μετὰ φωτὸς ἀλλὰ σκότος προθεμένους, ὅπως μὴ τὰ εἰδῶλα τῆς πράξεως ἀναλαμβάνουσα διὰ τῆς ὀψεως ἐναργῶς ἢ διάνοια πολλάκις ἀνακαίῃ τὴν ὄρεξιν. οἱ δὲ τούτῳ μάλιστα τὸν σοφὸν ἡγούμενοι διαφέρειν, τῷ μνημονεύειν ἐναργῶς καὶ συνέχειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς φάσματα καὶ πάθη καὶ κινήσεις, εἰ μὲν οὐθὲν ἄξιον σοφίας παρεγγυῶσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀσώτων οἰκίᾳ [b] τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ σοφοῦ τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐκκλύσματα μένειν ἐῶντες, μὴ λέγωμεν· ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τούτων ἡδέως ζῆν, αὐτόθεν πρόδηλον. οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς εἶναι μέγα τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ μνημονευόμενον, εἰ μικρόν

ἐδόκει τὸ παρόν· οὐδ' οἷς συνεξεφέρετο μετρίως γινομένοις, ὑπερχαίρειν γενομένων· ὅπου οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοις τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ θαυμάζουσιν ἐμμένει τὸ χαίρειν παυσαμένοις, ἀλλὰ σκιά τις ὑπολείπεται καὶ ὄναρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀποπταμένης, οἷον ὑπέκκαυμα τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν ὕπνοις διψῶντος ἢ ἐρῶντος ἀτελεῖς ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀπολαύσεις δριμύτερον [c] ἐγείρουσι τὸ ἀκόλαστον. οὔτε δὴ τούτοις ἐπιτερπῆς ἡ μνήμη τῶν ἀπολελαυσμένων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑπολείμματος ἡδονῆς ἀμυδροῦ καὶ διακένου πολὺ τὸ οἰστρῶδες καὶ νύττον ἐναργοῦς ἀναφέρουσα τῆς ὀρέξεως, οὔτε τοὺς μετρίους καὶ σῶφρονας εἰκὸς ἐνδιατρίβειν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδ', ἅπερ ἔσκωπτε τὸν <Ἐπίκουρον> Καρνεάδης, πράττοντας οἷον ἐξ ἐφημερίδων ἀναλέγεσθαι, ποσάκις Ἡδεῖα καὶ Λεοντίῳ συνῆλθον ἢ ποῦ Θάσιον ἔπιον <ἢ> ποίας εἰκάδος ἐδείπνησαν πολυτελέστατα. δεινὴν γὰρ ἐμφαίνει καὶ θηριώδη περὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ προσδοκώμενα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔργα ταραχὴν καὶ λύσσαν ἢ τοσαύτη πρὸς [d] ἀναμνήσεις αὐτῆς βάκχευσις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πρόστηξις.

Ὅθεν αὐτοὶ μοι δοκοῦσι τούτων αἰσθόμενοι τῶν ἀτοπημάτων εἰς τὴν ἀπονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐστάθειαν ὑποφεύγειν τῆς σαρκός, ὥς ἐν τῷ ταύτην ἐπινοεῖν περὶ τινος ἐσομένην καὶ γεγεννημένην τοῦ ἡδέως ζῆν ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιωτάτην ἔχειν τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις. ὅρα δὴ πρῶτον μὲν οἷα ποιοῦσι, τὴν εἴθ' ἡδονὴν ταύτην εἴτ' ἀπονίαν ἢ εὐστάθειαν ἄνω καὶ κάτω μετερῶντες ἐκ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, εἴτα πάλιν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς ἐκεῖνο τῷ μὴ στέγειν ἀπορρέουσιν [e] καὶ διολισθάνουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τῇ ἀρχῇ συνάπτειν, καὶ 'τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον', ὥς φησι, 'τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερείδοντες, αὐθις δ' <ἐκ> τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι τελευτῶντες.' καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε τῆς βάσεως τινασσομένης μὴ συντινάσσεσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ ἢ βέβαιον ἐλπίδα καὶ χαρὰν ἀσάλευτον εἶναι περὶ πράγματος σάλον ἔχοντος τοσοῦτον καὶ μεταβολάς, ὅσαι σφάλλουσι τὸ σῶμα, πολλαῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν ὑποκείμενον ἀνάγκαις καὶ πληγαῖς ἐν αὐτῷ δ' ἔχον ἀρχὰς κακῶν, ἃς οὐκ ἀποτρέπει λογισμός; οὐδὲ γὰρ προσέπιπτεν <ἄν> ἀνδράσι νοῦν ἔχουσι στραγγουρικὰ πάθη καὶ δυσεντερικὰ καὶ φθίσεις καὶ [f] ὕδρωπες, ὧν τοῖς μὲν αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος συνηνέχθη τοῖς δὲ Πολύαινος τὰ δὲ Νεοκλέα καὶ Ἀγαθόβουλον ἐξήγαγε. καὶ ταῦτ' οὐκ ὀνειδίζομεν, εἰδότες καὶ Φερεκύδην



καὶ Ἡράκλειτον ἐν νόσοις χαλεπαῖς γενομένους, ἀλλ' ἀξιοῦμεν αὐτούς, εἰ τοῖς πάθεσι βούλονται τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ὁμολογεῖν [1090] [a] καὶ μὴ κεναῖς φωναῖς θρασυνόμενοι καὶ δημαγωγοῦντες ἀλαζονείαν προσοφλισκάνειν, ἢ μὴ λαμβάνειν χαρᾶς ἀρχὴν ἀπάσης <τὴν> τῆς σαρκὸς εὐστάθειαν ἢ μὴ φάναι χαίρειν καὶ ὑβρίζειν τοὺς ἐν πόνοις ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ νόσοις γινομένους. κατάστημα μὲν γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς γίνεται πολλάκις, ἔλπισμα δὲ πιστὸν ὑπὲρ σαρκὸς καὶ βέβαιον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦν ἐχούσῃ γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν θαλάσῃ κατ' Αἰσχύλον (Suppl. 770) 'ὠδῖνα τίκτει νῦξ κυβερνήτῃ σοφῶ' καὶ γαληνῇ (τὸ γὰρ μέλλον ἄδηλον), οὕτως ἐν σώματι ψυχὴν εὐσταθοῦντι καὶ ταῖς περὶ σώματος [b] ἐλπίσι τάγαθόν θεμένην οὐκ ἔστιν ἄφοβον καὶ ἀκύμονα διεξαγαγεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ θάλασσα, χειμῶνας ἴσχει καὶ καταιγισμούς· τὸ σῶμα, πλείονας δὲ ταραχὰς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ μείζονας ἀναδίδωσιν· εὐδίαν δὲ χειμερινὴν μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἢ σαρκὸς ἀβλάβειαν ἐλπίσειεν αὐτῷ παραμενεῖν βεβαίως. τὸ γὰρ ἐφήμερα <τὰ ἡμέτερα> καλεῖν καὶ ἀβέβαια καὶ ἀστάθμητα φύλλοις τε γινομένοις ἔτους ὥρα καὶ φθίνουσιν εἰκάζειν τὸν βίον τί παρέσχηκεν ἄλλο τοῖς ποηταῖς ἢ τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπίκηρον καὶ πολυβλαβὲς καὶ νοσῶδες, ἧς δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄκρον ἀγαθὸν δεδιέναι καὶ κολοῦειν παρεγγυῶσι· 'σφαλερὸν γὰρ αἰ εἰς ἄκρον [c] εὐεξία' φησὶν Ἰπποκράτης (Aph. I 3), 'ὁ δ' ἄρτι θάλλων σαρκὶ διοπετὴς ὅπως ἀστήρ ἀπέσβη' κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην (fr. 971)· ὑπὸ δὲ βασκανίας καὶ φθόνου βλάπτεσθαι προσορωμένους οἶονται τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅτι τάχιστα τὸ ἀκμάζον ἴσχει μεταβολὴν τοῦ σώματος δι' ἀσθένειαν.

Ὅτι δ' ὅλως μοχθηρὰ τὰ πράγματα [καὶ] πρὸς βίον ἄλυπὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, σκόπει καὶ ἀφ' ὧν πρὸς ἐτέρους λέγουσι. τοὺς γὰρ ἀδικοῦντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ἀθλίως φασὶ καὶ περιφόβως ζῆν τὸν πάντα χρόνον, ὅτι, κὰν λαθεῖν δύνωνται, πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν· ὅθεν [d] ὁ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰεὶ φόβος ἐγκείμενος οὐκ ἔῃ χαίρειν οὐδὲ θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς εἰρηκότες λελήθασιν. εὐσταθεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν τῷ σώματι πολλάκις, πίστιν δὲ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ διαμενεῖν ἀμήχανον· ἀνάγκη δὴ ταραττεσθαι καὶ ὠδίνειν αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος, ἣν περιμένουσιν ἐλπίδα πιστὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ βέβαιον οὐδέποτε κτήσασθαι δυναμένους. τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ θαρρεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ δικαίως παθεῖν ἀλλὰ τὸ παθεῖν φοβερόν, οὐδὲ συνεῖναι

μὲν αὐτὸν ἀδικίαις ἀνιαρὸν περιπεσεῖν δὲ ταῖς [e] ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ μεῖζον, οὐκ ἔλαττον γε τὸ κακὸν ἦν Ἀθηναίοις ἢ Λαχάρους καὶ Συρακοσίοις ἢ Διονυσίου χαλεπότης ἥπερ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις· ταράττοντες γὰρ ἐταράττοντο καὶ πείσεσθαι κακῶς προσεδόκων ἐκ τοῦ προαδικεῖν καὶ προλυμαίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας. ὄχλων δὲ θυμοὺς καὶ ληστῶν ὤμότητας καὶ κληρονόμων ἀδικίας, ἔτι δὲ λοιμοὺς ἀέρων καὶ θάλασσαν τεύβραγκήν, ὑφ' ἧς Ἐπίκουρος ὀλίγον ἐδέησε καταποθῆναι πλέων εἰς Λάμψακον, ὡς γράφει, τί ἂν λέγοι τις; ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἡ φύσις τῆς σαρκός, ὕλην ἔχουσα νόσων ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ [f] παιζόμενον 'ἐκ τοῦ βοὸς τοὺς ἱμάντας' λαμβάνουσα τὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ὁμοίως τοῖς τε φαύλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐπεικέσι τὸν βίον ἐπισφαλῇ ποιεῖν καὶ φοβερόν, ἄνπερ ἐπὶ σαρκὶ καὶ τῇ περὶ σάρκα ἐλπίδι μάθωσιν ἄλλω δὲ [1091] [a] μηθενὶ χαίρειν καὶ θαρρεῖν, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τ' ἄλλοις πολλοῖς γέγραφε καὶ τούτοις ἃ ἔστι περὶ Τέλους.

Οὐ μόνον τοίνυν ἄπιστον καὶ ἀβέβαιον ἀρχὴν λαμβάνουσι τοῦ ἡδέως ζῆν ἀλλὰ καὶ παντάπασιν εὐκαταφρόνητον καὶ μικράν, εἴπερ αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀποφυγὴ τὸ χαρτὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν διανοεῖσθαι φασιν, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ὅποι τεθήσεται τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ μὴ μόνον, ὅθεν ἐξελαύνεται τὸ κακὸν αὐτῆς, ὥς φησι Μητρόδωρος ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Σοφιστάς (fr. 28). 'ὥστε τοῦτ' αὐτὸ <τὸ> ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ, τὸ φυγεῖν τὸ κακόν· ἐνθα γὰρ τεθήσεται τὰγαθόν, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅταν μηθὲν ἔτι ὑπεξίη μήτ' [b] ἀλγεινὸν μήτε λυπηρόν.' ὅμοια δὲ καὶ τὰ Ἐπικούρου λέγοντος τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φυγῆς τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τῆς μνήμης καὶ ἐπιλογίσεως καὶ χάριτος, ὅτι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, γεννᾶσθαι· 'τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν' φησὶν 'ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ ἴπαρ' αὐτὸν πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν· καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἂν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ, ἔπειτα σταθῇ καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ θρυλῶν.' φεῦ τῆς μεγάλης ἡδονῆς τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ μακαριότητος, ἣν καρποῦνται χαίροντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ κακοπαθεῖν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι μηδ' ἀλγεῖν. ἄρ' οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν ἃ λέγουσιν, ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἰσοθέους [c] ἀποκαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς καὶ δι' ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἀκρότητας ἀγαθῶν εἰς βρόμους καὶ ὀλολυγμοὺς ἐκβακχεύοντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων περιφρονοῦντες ἐξευρήκασιν μόνοι θεῖον ἀγαθόν καὶ μέγα τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν κακόν; ὥστε μήτε συῶν

ἀπολείπεσθαι μήτε προβάτων εὐδαιμονία, τὸ τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ἱκανῶς ἔχειν μακάριον τιθεμένους. ἐπεὶ τοῖς γε κομψοτέροις καὶ γλαφυρωτέροις τῶν ζώων οὐκ ἔστι φυγὴ κακοῦ τέλος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὧδ' ἀπὸ κόρου τρέπεται καὶ νήξεσι χαίρει καὶ πτήσεσι καὶ ἀπομιμεῖσθαι παίζοντα φωνάς τε παντοδαπὰς καὶ [d] ψόφους ὑφ' ἡδονῆς καὶ γαυρότητος ἐπιχειρεῖ· καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα χρῆται φιλοφροσύναις καὶ σκιρτήσεσιν, ὅταν ἐκφύγῃ τὸ κακόν, τ' ἀγαθὸν πεφυκότα ζητεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως πᾶν τὸ ἀλγεινὸν καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον ὡς ἐμποδὼν ὄντα τῇ διώξει τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ κρείττονος ἐξωθοῦντα τῆς φύσεως.

Τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα τῆς φυγῆς τῶν κακῶν κεῖται τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ νῆ Δία τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ οἰκεῖον, ὡς Πλάτων ἔλεγε, καὶ ἀπηγόρευε τὰς λυπῶν καὶ πόνων ἀπαλλαγὰς ἡδονὰς μὴ νομίζειν, ἀλλ' οἷόν τινα σκιαγραφίαν ἢ μῖξιν οἰκείου καὶ ἀλλοτρίου, καθάπερ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, ἀπὸ τοῦ κάτω πρὸς τὸ [e] μέσον ἀναφερομένων, ἀπειρία δὲ τοῦ ἄνω καὶ ἀγνοία τὸ μέσον ἄκρον ἡγουμένων εἶναι καὶ πέρας· ὥσπερ Ἐπίκουρος ἡγεῖται καὶ Μητρόδωρος, οὐσίαν τ' ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀκρότητα τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φυγὴν τιθέμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἀνδραπόδων τινὰ χαρὰν ἢ δεσμίων ἐξ εἰργμοῦ λυθέντων ἀσμένως ἀλειψαμένων καὶ ἀπολουσαμένων μετ' αἰκίας καὶ μάστιγας, ἐλευθέρας δὲ καὶ καθαρὰς καὶ ἀμιγοῦς καὶ ἀμωλωπίστου χαρᾶς ἀγεύστων καὶ ἀθεάτων. οὐ γάρ, εἰ τὸ ψωριᾶν τὴν σάρκα καὶ λημᾶν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἀλλότριον, ἤδη καὶ τὸ κνᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπομάττεσθαι θαυμάσιον· οὐδ' [f] εἰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὰ θεῖα καὶ ταραττεσθαι τοῖς ἐν Ἄιδου κακόν, ἢ τούτων ἀποφυγὴ μακάριον καὶ ζηλωτόν. ἀλλὰ μικρόν τινα τόπον καὶ γλίσχρον ἀποφαίνουσι τῆς χαρᾶς, ἐν ᾧ στρέφεται καὶ κυλινδεῖται, μέχρι τοῦ μὴ ταραττεσθαι τοῖς ἐν Ἄιδου κακοῖς [ἢ τούτων] παρὰ τὰς κενὰς δόξας προῖοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο ποιουμένη τῆς σοφίας [1092] [a] τέλος, ὃ δόξειεν <ἂν> αὐτόθεν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀλόγοις. εἰ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἀπονίαν τοῦ σώματος οὐ διαφέρει πότερον δι' αὐτὸ ἢ φύσει τοῦ πονεῖν ἐκτός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀταραξίαν τῆς ψυχῆς μεῖζόν ἐστι τὸ δι' αὐτὴν ἢ κατὰ φύσιν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε μὴ ταραττεσθαι. καίτοι φήσειεν ἂν τις οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐρρωμενεστέραν εἶναι διάθεσιν τὴν φύσει μὴ δεχομένην τὸ ταραττον ἢ τὴν ἐπιμελείᾳ καὶ λόγῳ διαφεύγουσαν. ἔστω δ' ἔχειν ἐπίσης· καὶ γὰρ οὕτως φανοῦνται τῶν θηρίων πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ μὴ ταραττεσθαι τοῖς ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ <τοῖς>

περὶ θεῶν λεγομένοις μηδὲ [b] προσδοκᾶν λύπας μηδ' ἀλγηδόνας ὅρον  
 «οὐκ» ἐχούσας. αὐτὸς γοῦν Ἐπίκουρος εἰπὼν ὡς «εἰ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ ὑπὲρ τῶν  
 μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν ἔτι τε τὰ περὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, οὐκ  
 ἂν ποτε προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας» (Κ. δ. 11) εἰς τοῦτ' ἄγειν ἡμᾶς οἶεται  
 τὸν λόγον, ἐν ᾧ τὰ θηρία φύσει καθέστηκεν. οὔτε γὰρ ὑποψίας ἔχει φαύλας  
 περὶ θεῶν οὔτε δόξαις κεναῖς ἐνοχλεῖται «περὶ» τῶν μετὰ θάνατον οὐδ' ὅλως  
 ἐπινοεῖ τι δεινὸν ἐν τούτοις οὐδ' οἶδε. καίτοι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ προλήψει τοῦ  
 θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀπέλιπον, ἐφαίνοντ' ἂν ἐλπίσι χρησταῖς πλέον ἔχοντες  
 οἱ φρόνιμοι τῶν θηρίων πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τέλος ἦν τοῦ περὶ  
 θεῶν λόγου τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι θεὸν ἀλλὰ παύσασθαι [c] ταραττομένους,  
 βεβαιότερον οἶμαι τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ὅλως μὴ νοοῦσι θεὸν ἢ τοῖς νοεῖν  
 μὴ βλάπτοντα μεμαθηκόσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπήλλακται δεισιδαιμονίας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ  
 περιπέπτωκεν, οὐδ' ἀποτέθεται τὴν ταραττούσαν ἔννοιαν περὶ τῶν θεῶν  
 ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἵληφε. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου λεκτέον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίζειν  
 χρηστὸν ἀπ' ἐκείνων οὐδετέροις ὑπάρχει, τοῦ δ' ὑποπτεῦειν καὶ φοβεῖσθαι  
 «τὰ» μετὰ θάνατον ἥττον μέτεστιν οἷς οὐ γίνεται θανάτου πρόληψις ἢ τοῖς  
 προλαμβάνουσιν ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ θάνατος. πρὸς μὲν γε τούτους ἐστίν,  
 ἐφ' ὅσον διαλογίζονται τι καὶ σκοποῦσι, [d] τὰ δ' ὅλως ἀπήλλακται τοῦ  
 φροντίζειν τῶν οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτά, πληγὰς δὲ φεύγοντα καὶ τραύματα καὶ φόνους  
 τοῦτο τοῦ θανάτου δέδοικεν, ὃ καὶ τούτοις φοβερόν ἐστιν.

Ἄ μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ σοφίας παρεσκευασμένα, τοιαῦτά ἐστιν·  
 ὧν δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἀπελαύνουσιν, ἤδη σκοπῶμεν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ  
 ἐπὶ σαρκὸς εὐπαθείᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς διαχύσεις, ἐὰν ὧσι μέτρια, μὴτὲν ἐχούσας  
 μέγα μηδ' ἀξιόλογον, ἂν δ' ὑπερβάλλωσι, πρὸς τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἀβεβαίῳ  
 φορτικὰς φαινομένας καὶ θρασείας οὐδὲ ψυχικὰς ἂν τις οὐδὲ χαράς, ἀλλὰ  
 σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς [e] καὶ οἷον ἐπιμειδιάσεις καὶ συνεπιθρύψεις προσείποι  
 τῆς ψυχῆς. ἃς δ' ἄξιον καὶ δίκαιον εὐφροσύνας καὶ χαράς νομίζεσθαι,  
 καθαφαὶ μὲν εἰσι τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ σφυγμὸν οὐδένα κεκραμένον οὐδὲ δηγμὸν  
 οὐδὲ μετάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ψυχικὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ γνήσιον  
 καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσακτον αὐτῶν τάγαθόν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄλογον, ἀλλ' εὐλογώτατον ἐκ  
 τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ καὶ φιλομαθοῦς ἢ πρακτικοῦ καὶ φιλοκάλου τῆς διανοίας  
 φυόμενον. ὧν ὅσας ἐκάτερον καὶ ἡλίκας ἡδονὰς ἀναδίδωσιν, οὐκ ἂν τις  
 ἀνύσειε διελθεῖν προθυμούμενος· ὑπομνήσαι δὲ βραχέως «αἱ τε μαθήσεις»

αἱ θ' ἱστορίαι πάρεισι πολλὰς μὲν ἐπιτερπεῖς [f] διατριβὰς ἔχουσαι τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμοῦν αἰετῆς ἀληθοῦς ἀκόρεστον καταλείπουσαι καὶ ἄπληστον ἡδονῆς· δι' ἣν οὐδὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀμοιρεῖ χάριτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλάσμασι καὶ ποιήμασι τοῦ πιστεύεσθαι μὴ προσόντος ἔνεστιν ὅμως [1093] [a] τὸ πείθον. ἐννόει γάρ, ὥς δακνόμενοι τὸν Πλάτωνος ἀναγινώσκομεν Ἀτλαντικὸν καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα τῆς Ἰλιάδος, οἷον ἱερῶν κλειομένων ἢ θεάτρων ἐπιποθοῦντες τοῦ μύθου τὸ λειπόμενον. αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ μάθησις οὕτως ἐράσμιόν ἐστι καὶ ποθεινὸν ὥς τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ γινώσκειν· τοῦ δὲ θανάτου τὰ σκυθρωπότερα λήθη καὶ ἄγνοια καὶ σκότος. ἥ καὶ νῆ Δία μάχονται τοῖς φθείρουσι τῶν ἀποθανόντων τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀλίγου δεῖν ἅπαντες, ὥς ἐν μόνῳ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ καὶ γινώσκοντι τῆς ψυχῆς τιθέμενοι τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ χαίρειν. ἔστι [b] γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἀνιῶσι τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς τινος ἀκούεσθαι· καὶ ταραττόμενοι πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων καὶ κλαίοντες ὅμως λέγειν κελεύομεν, ὥσπερ οὗτος·

‘οἵμοι πρὸς αὐτῷ γ' εἰμὶ τῷ δεινῷ λέγειν.’ -

‘κ'ἄγωγ' ἀκούειν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀκουστέον’

(Soph. O. R. 1169).

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἔοικε τῆς περὶ τὸ πάντα γινώσκειν ἡδονῆς ἀκρασία τις εἶναι καὶ ῥύσις ἐκβιαζομένη τὸν λογισμόν, ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ἔχουσα βλαβερόν ἢ λυπηρόν ἱστορία καὶ διήγησις ἐπὶ πράξεσι καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις προσλάβῃ λόγον ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ χάριν, ὥς τὸν Ἡροδότου τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ τὰ Περσικὰ τὸν Ξενοφῶντος, ‘ὅσσα θ' Ὅμηρος [c] ἐθέσπισε θέσκελα εἰδώς’, ἢ ἄς Περιόδους Εὐδοξος ἢ Κτίσεις καὶ Πολιτείας Ἀριστοτέλης ἢ Βίους ἀνδρῶν Ἀριστόξενος (fr. 10a W.) ἔγραψεν, οὐ μόνον μέγα καὶ πολὺ τὸ εὐφραῖνον ἀλλὰ καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμεταμέλητόν ἐστι. τίς δ' ἂν φάγοι πεινῶν καὶ πόσι διψῶν τὰ Φαιάκων ἥδιον ἢ διέλθοι τὸν Ὀδυσσέως ἀπόλογον τῆς πλάνης; τίς δ' ἂν ἡσθεῖη συναναπαυσάμενος τῇ καλλίστῃ γυναικὶ μᾶλλον ἢ προσαγρυπνήσας οἷς γέγραφε περὶ Πανθείας Ξενοφῶν ἢ περὶ Τιμοκλείας Ἀριστόβουλος ἢ Θήβης Θεόπομπος;

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐξωθοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς [d] ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων. καίτοι ταῖς μὲν ἱστορίαις ἀπλοῦν τι καὶ λεῖον ἔστιν, αἱ δ' ἀπὸ γεωμετρίας

καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ ἀρμονικῆς δριμὺ καὶ ποικίλον ἔχουσαι τὸ δέλεαρ οὐθὲν  
τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἀποδέουσιν, ἔλκουσαι καθάπερ ἵυγξι τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· ὧν  
ὁ γευσάμενος, ἄνπερ ἔμπειρος ἦ, τὰ Σοφοκλέους περίεισιν ἄδων (fr. 224)

‘μουσομανεῖ †δὲ λάφθην δαν καὶ τὸ ποτιδειραν,

εὖχομαι δ’ ἔκ τε λύρας ἔκ τε νόμων,

οὓς Θαμύρας περὶάλλα μουσοποιεῖ’

καὶ νῆ Δί’ Εὐδοξος καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ Ἀρχιμήδης. ὅπου γὰρ οἱ  
φιλογραφοῦντες οὕτως ἄγονται τῇ πιθανότητι τῶν [e] ἔργων, ὥστε Νικίαν  
γράφοντα τὴν Νεκυίαν ἐρωτᾶν πολλάκις τοὺς οἰκέτας εἰ ἠρίστηκε,  
Πτολεμαίου δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐξήκοντα τάλαντα τῆς γραφῆς συντελεσθείσης  
πέμψαντος αὐτῷ, μὴ λαβεῖν μηδ’ ἀποδόσθαι τὸ ἔργον, τίνας οἰόμεθα καὶ  
πηλίκας ἡδονὰς ἀπὸ γεωμετρίας δρέπεσθαι καὶ ἀστρολογίας Εὐκλείδην  
γράφοντα τὰ διοπτικά καὶ Φίλιππον ἀποδεικνύοντα περὶ τοῦ σχήματος  
τῆς σελήνης καὶ Ἀρχιμήδην ἀνευρόντα τῇ γωνίᾳ τὴν διάμετρον τοῦ  
ἡλίου τηλικούτου τοῦ μεγίστου κύκλου μέρος οὔσαν, ἡλίκον ἢ γωνία  
τῶν τεσσάρων ὀρθῶν, καὶ Ἀπολλώνιον καὶ Ἀρίσταρχον ἐτέρων τοιούτων  
εὐρετὰς γενομένους, ὧν νῦν [f] ἡ θεὰ καὶ κατανόησις ἡδονὰς τε μεγάλας καὶ  
φρόνημα θαυμάσιον ἐμποιεῖ τοῖς μανθάνουσιν; καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδαμῇ τὰς  
ἐκ ‘τῶν ὀπτανίων καὶ ματρυλείων ἡδονὰς’ [1094] [a] ἐκείνας παραβάλλοντα  
ταύταις καταισχύνειν τὸν Ἑλικῶνα καὶ τὰς Μούσας,

‘ἐνθ’ οὔτε ποιμὴν ἀξιοῖ φέρβειν βοτὰ

οὔτ’ ἦλθέ πω σίδαρος’ (Eur. Hipp. 75)·

ἀλλ’ αὗται μὲν εἰσιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ‘ἀκήρατοι’ νομαὶ ‘μελισσῶν’, ἐκεῖνα  
δὲ συῶν καὶ τράγων κνησμοῖς ἔοικε, προσαναπιμπλάντα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ  
παθητικώτατον. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ποικίλον καὶ ἰταμὸν τὸ φιλήδονον, οὐπω δέ  
τις ἐρωμένη πλησιάσας ὑπὸ χαρᾶς ἐβουθύτησεν οὐδ’ ἠὔξατό τις ἐμπλησθεὶς  
ὄψων ἢ πεμμάτων βασιλικῶν εὐθὺς ἀποθανεῖν· Εὐδοξος δ’ ἠύχετο παραστὰς  
τῷ ἡλίῳ καὶ καταμαθὼν τὸ [b] σχῆμα τοῦ ἄστρου καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ  
εἶδος ὡς ὁ Φαέθων καταφλεγῆναι, καὶ Πυθαγόρας ἐπὶ τῷ διαγράμματι βοῦν  
ἔθυσεν, ὡς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος·

‘ήνίκα Πυθαγόρης τὸ περικλεές εὔρετο γράμμα,

κεῖνος ἐφ’ ᾧ λαμπρὴν ἤγαγε βουθυσίην,’

εἴτε περὶ τῆς ὑποτεिनούσης ὡς ἴσον δύναται ταῖς περιεχούσαις τὴν ὀρθήν, εἴτε [πρόβλημα] περὶ τοῦ χωρίου τῆς παραβολῆς. Ἀρχιμήδην δὲ βία τῶν διαγραμμάτων ἀποσπῶντες ὑπήλειφον οἱ θεράποντες· ὁ δ’ ἐπὶ τῆς κοιλίας ἔγραφε τὰ σχήματα τῇ στλεγγίδι, καὶ λουόμενος ὥς [c] φασιν ἐκ τῆς ὑπερχύσεως ἐννοήσας τὴν τοῦ στεφάνου μέτρησιν οἷον ἔκ τινος κατοχῆς ἢ ἐπιπνοίας ἐξήλατο βοῶν ‘εὔρηκα’, καὶ τοῦτο πολλάκις φθεγγόμενος ἐβάδιζεν. οὐδενὸς δ’ ἀκηκόαμεν οὔτε γαστριμάργου περιπαθῶς οὕτως ‘βέβρωκα’ βοῶντος οὔτ’ ἐρωτικοῦ ‘πεφίληκα’, μυρίων μυριάκις ἀκολάστων γεγονότων καὶ ὄντων· ἀλλὰ καὶ βδελυττόμεθα τοὺς μεμνημένους δείπνων ἐμπαθέστερον, ὡς ἐφ’ ἡδοναῖς μικραῖς καὶ μηδενὸς ἀξίαις ὑπερασμενίζοντας. Εὐδόξω δὲ καὶ Ἀρχιμήδει καὶ Ἰππάρχῳ συνενθουσιῶμεν, καὶ Πλάτωνι πειθόμεθα περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων, [d] ὡς ἀμελούμενα δι’ ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπειρίαν ‘ὅμως βία ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξάνεται’ (Rep. 528c).

Ταύτας μέντοι τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἡδονὰς ὥσπερ ἀεννάους <ποταμοὺς> ἐκτρέποντες οὗτοι καὶ ἀποστρέφοντες οὐκ ἐῷσι γεύεσθαι τοὺς πλησιάσαντας αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ‘ἐπαραμένους τὰ ἀκάτια’ φεύγειν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν κελεύουσι, Πυθοκλέους δὲ πάντες καὶ πᾶσαι δέονται δι’ Ἐπικούρου καὶ ἀντιβολοῦσιν, ὅπως οὐ ζηλώσει τὴν ἐλευθέριον καλουμένην παιδείαν· Ἀπελλῆν δὲ τινα θαυμάζοντες καὶ ὑπερασπαζόμενοι γράφουσιν ὅτι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀποσχόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθαρὸν ἑαυτὸν ἐτήρησε.

[e] περὶ δὲ τῆς ἱστορίας, ἵνα τὴν ἄλλην ἀνηκοίαν ἐάσω, παραθήσομαι μόνα τὰ Μητροδώρου, γράφοντος ἐν τοῖς περὶ Ποιημάτων (fr. 24)· ‘ὅθεν μὴδ’ εἰδέναι φάσκων, μεθ’ ὁποτέρων ἦν ὁ Ἔκτωρ, ἢ τοὺς πρώτους στίχους τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως ἢ πάλιν τὰ ἐν μέσῳ, μὴ ταρβήσης.’

Ὅτι τοίνυν αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἐτησίαι μαραίνονται μετὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν καὶ ἀπολήγουσιν, οὐ λέληθε τὸν Ἐπίκουρον. διαπορεῖ γοῦν, εἰ γέρων ὁ σοφὸς ὢν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν καλῶν ἀφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσειν, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ μέντοι Σοφοκλεῖ διανοούμενος ἀσμένως ἐκφυγόντι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ὥσπερ [f] ἄγριον καὶ

λυττῶντα δεσπότην. ἀλλ' ἔδει γε τοὺς ἀπολαυστικούς ὀρῶντας ὅτι πολλὰς ἀφαινεῖ τῶν ἡδονῶν τὸ γῆρας 'ἢ τ' Ἀφροδίτῃ τοῖς γέρονσιν ἄχθεται' κατ' Εὐριπίδην [1095][a] (fr. 23), ταύτας μάλιστα συνάγειν τὰς ἡδονάς, ὥσπερ εἰς πολιορκίαν ἄσπητα σιτία καὶ ἄφθαρτα παρατιθεμένους, εἴτ' ἄγειν ἀφροδίσια τοῦ βίου καὶ μεθεόρτους καλὰς ἐν ἱστορίαις καὶ ποιήμασι διατρίβοντας ἢ προβλήμασι μουσικοῖς καὶ γεωμετρικοῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς εἰς νοῦν βαλέσθαι τὰς τυφλὰς καὶ νωδὰς ἐκείνας ψηλαφήσεις καὶ ἐπιπηδήσεις τοῦ ἀκολάστου μεμαθηκόσιν, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, γράφειν περὶ Ὀμήρου καὶ περὶ Εὐριπίδου, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Δικαίάρχος. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τοιούτων ἐφοδίων μὴ φροντίσαντες, τῆς δ' [b] ἄλλης αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀτερποῦς καὶ ξηρᾶς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν λέγουσιν, οὕσης ἡδεσθαι πάντως ἐθέλοντες, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ἀπαγορεύοντος, αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄωρα πράττειν ὁμολογοῦσι, τῶν τε προτέρων ἡδονῶν ἀναμνησκόντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ χρώμενοι ταῖς παλαιαῖς ἀπορίᾳ προσφάτων ὥσπερ τεταριχευμέναις, καὶ νεκρὰς ἄλλας πάλιν καὶ τεθνηκυίας οἷον ἐν τέφρᾳ ψυχρᾷ τῇ σαρκὶ κινουντες παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀναζωπυροῦντες, ἅτε δὴ μηδὲν οἰκεῖον ἡδὺ μηδὲ χαρὰς ἄξιον ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παρεσκευασμένον.

Καίτοι τὰ ἄλλα μὲν ὡς ἡμῖν ἐπῆλθεν εἴρηται, [c] μουσικὴν δ' ὅσας ἡδονὰς καὶ χάριτας οἷας φέρουσιν ἀποστρέφονται καὶ φεύγουσι, <καὶ> βουλόμενος οὐκ ἂν τις ἐκλάθοιτο, δι' ἀτοπίαν ὣν Ἐπίκουρος λέγει, φιλοθέωρον μὲν ἀποφαίνων τὸν σοφὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις καὶ χαίροντα παρ' ὄντιν' ἕτερον ἀκροάμασι καὶ θεάμασι Διονυσιακοῖς, προβλήμασι δὲ μουσικοῖς καὶ κριτικῶν φιλολόγοις ζητήμασιν οὐδὲ παρὰ πότον διδοὺς χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς φιλομούσοις τῶν βασιλέων παραινῶν στρατιωτικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἢ λόγους περὶ μουσικῶν καὶ ποιητικῶν [d] προβλημάτων περαιομένους. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἐτόλμησε γράφειν ἐν τῷ περὶ Βασιλείας, ὥσπερ Σαρδαναπάλῳ γράφων ἢ Νανάρῳ τῷ σατραπεύσαντι Βαβυλῶνος. οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἰέρων γ' ἂν οὐδ' Ἀτταλος οὐδ' Ἀρχέλαος ἐπείσθησαν Εὐριπίδην καὶ Σιμωνίδην καὶ Μελανιππίδην καὶ Κράτητα καὶ Διοδότους ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῶν συμποσίων κατακλῖναι Κάρδακας καὶ Ἀγριάνας μεθ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ Καλλίας γελωτοποιοὺς καὶ Θρασωνίδας τινὰς καὶ Θρασυλέοντας, ὀλολυγμοὺς καὶ κροτοθορύβους ποιοῦντας. εἰ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ πρῶτος συναγαγὼν τὸ μουσεῖον τούτοις



ένετυχε τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ βασιλικοῖς παραγγέλμασιν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν εἶπε 'τοῖς Σαμίοις, ὦ Μοῦσα, τίς ὁ φθόνος;' Ἀθηναίων γὰρ οὐδενὶ πρέπει ταῖς Μούσαις οὕτως ἀπεχθάνεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν,

‘ὅσσα δὲ μὴ πεφίληκε Ζεὺς, ἀτύζονται βοᾶν

Πιερίδων αἶοντα' (Pind. Pyth. 1, 13).

τί λέγεις, ὦ Ἐπίκουρε; κιθαρωδῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν ἔωθεν ἀκροασόμενος εἰς τὸ θέατρον βαδίζεις, ἐν δὲ συμποσίῳ Θεοφράστου περὶ συμφωνιῶν διαλεγόμενου καὶ Ἀριστοξένου περὶ μεταβολῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ Ὀμήρου τὰ ὦτα καταλήψη ταῖς χερσὶ δυσχεραίνων καὶ βδελυττόμενος; εἴτ' οὐκ ἐμμελέστερον ἀποφαίνουσι τὸν Σκύθην [e] Ἀτέαν, ὃς Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ληφθέντος αἰχμαλώτου καὶ παρὰ πότον αὐλήσαντος ὤμοσεν ἥδιον ἀκούειν τοῦ ἵππου χρεμετίζοντος; οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι δὲ τῷ καλῷ πολεμεῖν τὸν ἄσπονδον καὶ ἀκήρυκτον πόλεμον, εἰ μηδεμία ἡδονὴ πρόσεστι; τί σεμνὸν καὶ καθάριον ἀσπάζονται καὶ [1096] [a] ἀγαπῶσιν; οὐκ ἦν δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν ἐπεικέστερον μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα δυσχεραίνειν ὥς κάνθαροι καὶ γῦπες ἢ κριτικῶν καὶ μουσικῶν λαλιὰν βδελύττεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν; ποῖος γὰρ ἂν αὐλὸς ἢ κιθάρα διηρμοσμένη πρὸς ᾧδὴν ἢ τίς χορός 'εὐρύοπα κέλαδον ἀκροσόφων ἀγνύμενον διὰ στομάτων' φθεγγόμενος οὕτως εὐφρανεν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Μητρόδωρον, ὥς Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ Δικαίαρχον καὶ Ἱερώνυμον οἱ περὶ χορῶν λόγοι καὶ διδασκαλιῶν καὶ τὰ [δι'] αὐλῶν προβλήματα καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν; οἷον διὰ τί τῶν ἴσων αὐλῶν ὁ στενότερος <ὀξύτερον, ὁ δ' εὐρύτερος> βαρύτερον φθέγγεται· καὶ [b] διὰ τί, τῆς σύριγγος ἀνασπωμένης, πᾶσιν ὀξύνεται τοῖς φθόγγοις, κλινομένης δὲ πάλιν βαρύνεται, καὶ συναχθεὶς πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον <βαρύτερον>, διαχθεὶς δ' ὀξύτερον ἤχεϊ· καὶ τί δήποτε τῶν θεάτρων ἂν ἄχυρα τῆς ὀρχήστρας κατασκεδάσης, ὁ ἦχος τυφλοῦται, καὶ χαλκοῦν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν Πέλλῃ βουλόμενον ποιῆσαι τὸ προσκηνίον οὐκ εἶασεν ὁ τεχνίτης ὥς διαφθεροῦντα τῶν ὑποκριτῶν τὴν φωνήν· καὶ τί δήποτε τῶν γενῶν διαχεῖ τὸ χρωματικόν, ἢ δ' ἁρμονία συνίστησιν. ἦθη δὲ ποιητῶν καὶ πλάσματα καὶ διαφοραὶ χαρακτήρων καὶ λύσεις ἀποριῶν ἐν τῷ [c] πρέποντι καὶ γλαφυρῷ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἅμα καὶ πιθανὸν ἔχουσαι τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος ἐκεῖνο

μοι δοκοῦσι (Cyn. 5, 33) καὶ τὸν ἐρῶντα ποιεῖν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι· τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ κρατοῦσιν.

Ἦς οὐ μέτεστι τούτοις, ὥς δέ φασιν οὐδὲ βούλονται μετεῖναι· κατατείναντες δὲ τὸ θεωρητικὸν εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατασπάσαντες ὥσπερ μολιβδίσι ταῖς τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπιθυμίαις οὐδὲν ἀπολείπουσιν ἵπποκόμων ἢ ποιμένων χόρτον ἢ καλάμην ἢ τινα πόαν προβαλλόντων, ὥς ταῦτα βόσκεσθαι καὶ τρώγειν προσῆκον αὐτῶν τοῖς θρέμμασιν. ἢ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἀξιοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος [d] ἡδοναῖς κατασβωτεῖν, ὅσον ἐλπίσαι τι περὶ σαρκὸς ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μνημονεῦσαι χαίρουσαν, οἰκεῖον δὲ μηδὲν ἢδὲ μηδὲ τερπνὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς λαμβάνειν μηδὲ ζητεῖν ἐῶντες; καίτοι τί γένοιτ' ἂν ἀλογώτερον ἢ δυοῖν ὄντοι, ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἄνθρωπος πέφυκε, σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν ἡγεμονικωτέραν ἐχούσης, σώματος μὲν ἰδιόν τι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ψυχῆς δὲ μηθέν, ἀλλὰ τῷ σώματι καθῆσθαι προσβλέπουσαν αὐτὴν καὶ τοῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος πάθεσιν ἐπιμειδιῶσαν καὶ συνηδομένην καὶ συγχαίρουσαν, αὐτὴν δ' ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ μηδὲν αἰρετὸν ἔχουσαν μηδ' ὀρεκτὸν ὅλως μηδὲ χαρτόν; [e] ἢ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀποκαλυψαμένους ἔδει σαρκοποιεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅλον, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν ἀναιροῦντες, ἢ δύο φύσεις ἐν ἡμῖν διαφόρους ἀπολιπόντας ἴδιον ἀπολιπεῖν ἐκατέρας καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἀλλότριον· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐκάστη πρὸς ἴδιόν τι πέφυκεν αἰσθητόν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ συμπαθοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις. ἔστι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αἰσθητήριον ὁ νοῦς, ὃ μηθέν οἰκεῖον ὑποκεῖσθαι, μὴ θέαμα μὴ κίνημα μὴ πάθος συγγενὲς οὗ τυγχάνουσα χαίρειν πέφυκε, πάντων ἀλογώτατόν ἐστιν· εἰ μὴ τι νῆ Δία λέληθα [f] συνεπισυκοφαντῶν τοὺς ἄνδρας.

Κάγώ πρὸς αὐτόν ‘οὐχ ἡμῖν γε κριταῖς’ ἔφην, ‘ἀλλὰ πάσης ἀφεῖσαι τῆς ἐπηρείας, ὥστε θαρρῶν τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ λόγου πέραινε.’ ‘πῶς;’ εἶπεν· ‘οὐ γὰρ Ἀριστόδημος ἡμᾶς, εἰ σὺ παντάπασιν ἀπηγόρευκας, διαδέξεται;’ [1097] [a] ‘πάνυ μὲν οὖν’ εἶπεν ὁ Ἀριστόδημος, ‘ὅταν ἀποκάμῃς ὥσπερ οὗτος· ἔτι δ' ἀκμάζων, ὦ μακάριε, χρῆσαι σεαυτῷ, [καὶ] μὴ δοκῆς ἀπομαλθακίζεσθαι.’ ‘καὶ μὴν’ ὁ Θέων εἶπε ‘πάνυ ῥάδιόν ἐστι τὸ λειπόμενον· λείπεται δὲ τὸ πρακτικὸν ὅσας ἡδονὰς ἔχει διελθεῖν. αὐτοὶ δὲ δήπου λέγουσιν ὥς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἡδιόν ἐστι τοῦ <εὖ> πάσχειν. εὖ δὲ ποιεῖν ἔστι μὲν ἀμέλει καὶ διὰ

λόγων, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον ἐν πράξει καὶ μέγιστον, ὡς τοῦνομα τῆς εὐεργεσίας ὑφηγεῖται καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν αὐτοί. μικρῷ γὰρ ἔμπροσθεν ἠκούομεν' ἔφη 'τούτου λέγοντος, οἷας φωνὰς ἀφῆκεν Ἐπίκουρος, [b] οἷα δὲ γράμματα τοῖς φίλοις ἔπεμψεν, ὑμνῶν καὶ μεγαλύνων Μητροδώρον, ὡς εὖ τε καὶ νεανικῶς ἐξ ἄστεως ἄλαδε κατέβη Μιθρῇ τῷ Σύρῳ βοηθήσων, καὶ ταῦτα πράξαντος οὐθὲν τότε τοῦ Μητροδώρου. τίνας οὖν οἰόμεθα καὶ πηλίκας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τὰς Πλάτωνος, ὁπηνίκα Δίων ὀρμήσας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κατέλυσε Διονύσιον καὶ Σικελίαν ἡλευθέρωσε; τίνας δ' Ἀριστοτέλους, ὅτε τὴν πατρίδα κειμένην ἐν ἐδάφει πάλιν ἀνέστησε καὶ κατήγαγε τοὺς πολίτας; τίνας δὲ Θεοφράστου καὶ Φαινίου τοὺς τῆς πατρίδος ἐκκοψάντων τυράννους; ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ ὅσοις ἐβοήθησαν [c] ἀνδράσιν, οὐ πυροὺς διαπέμποντες οὐδ' ἀλφίτων μέδιμνον, ὡς Ἐπίκουρος ἐνίοις ἔπεμψεν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντας διαπραξάμενοι κατελθεῖν καὶ δεδεμένους λυθῆναι καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας ἐστερημένους ἀπολαβεῖν, τί ἂν λέγοι τις ὑμῖν ἀκριβῶς εἰδόσιν; ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν οὐδὲ βουλόμενον ἔστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παρελθεῖν, τὰς μὲν Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ Μιλτιάδου πράξεις ὑπὸ πόδας τιθεμένου καὶ κατευτελίζοντος, ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ δὲ ταυτὶ τοῖς φίλοις γράφοντος· 'δαιμονίως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κομιδὴν καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας.' ὥστ', [d] εἴ τις ἐξεῖλε τὸ σιτάριον ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου, δόξαν ἂν παραστήσαι τὰ ῥήματα τῆς χάριτος ὡς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅλης ἢ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερωθέντος ἢ σωθέντος γραφομένης.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς ἡ φύσις δεῖται χορηγίας πολυτελοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν μάζῃ καὶ φακῇ τὸ ἥδιστον, ἀλλ' ὅψα καὶ Θάσια καὶ μύρα 'καὶ πεπτὰ καὶ κροτητὰ τῆς ξουθοπτέρου πελάνῳ μελίσσης ἀφθόνως δεδευμένα' (Eur. fr. 467) ζητοῦσιν αἱ τῶν ἀπολαυστικῶν ὀρέξεις, καὶ πρὸς γε τούτοις εὐπρεπεῖς καὶ νέας γυναῖκας, οἷα Λεόντιον καὶ Βοίδιον καὶ Ἡδεῖα καὶ [e] Νικίδιον ἐνέμοντο περὶ τὸν κῆπον, ἀφῶμεν. ταῖς μέντοι τῆς ψυχῆς χαραῖς ὁμολογουμένως μέγεθος ὑποκεῖσθαι δεῖ πράξεων καὶ κάλλος ἔργων ἀξιολόγων, εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ διάκενοι μῆδ' ἀγεννεῖς καὶ κορασιώδεις ἀλλ' ἐμβριθεῖς ἔσεσθαι καὶ βέβαιοι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς. τὸ δὲ ἵπερ τοῦ πρὸς εὐπαθείας ἐπαίρεσθαι ναυτῶν δίκην ἀφροδίσια ἀγόντων καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν, 'ὅτι νοσῶν νόσον ἀσκήτην τινὰς ἐστιάσεις φίλων συνῆγε καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῷ ὕδρωπι καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων Νεοκλέους

λόγων [f] μεμνημένος ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ δακρύων ἰδιοτρόπῳ ἡδονῇ, ταῦτ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑγαινόντων εὐφροσύνας ἀληθεῖς ἢ χαρὰς ὀνομάσειεν, ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἔστι καὶ ψυχῆς Σαρδάνιος γέλως, ἐν τούτοις ἔστι τοῖς παραβιασμοῖς καὶ κλαυσιγέλωσιν. εἰ δ' οὖν ταῦτα φήσκει τις εὐφροσύνας καὶ χαρὰς, σκόπει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκείνων·

[1098]

[a] 'ἡμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν' καὶ

'οὗτός τοι Ῥώμης ὁ μέγας, ξένε, πατρίδος ἀστήρ'

καὶ

'δίζω, ἢ σε θεὸν μαντεύσομαι ἢ ἄνθρωπον.'

ὅταν δὲ λάβω τὰ Θρασυβούλου καὶ Πελοπίδου πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν κατορθώματα καὶ τὸν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς Ἀριστείδην ἢ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι Μιλτιάδην, ἐνταῦθα κατὰ τὸν Ἡρόδοτον (VII 139) 'ἐξείργομαι' γνώμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τῷ πρακτικῷ βίῳ τὸ ἡδὺ πλεον ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἔστι. μαρτυρεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Ἑπαμεινώνδας εἰπὼν, ὥς φασιν, ἡδιστον αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τὸ τοὺς τεκόντας ζῶντας ἐπιδεῖν τὸ ἐν Λεύκτροις τρόπαιον αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος. παραβάλωμεν οὖν [b] τῇ Ἑπαμεινώνδου μητρὶ τὴν Ἐπικούρου, χαίρουσαν ὅτι τὸν υἱὸν ἐπεῖδεν εἰς τὸ κηπίδιον ἐνδεδυκότα καὶ κοινῇ μετὰ τοῦ Πολυαίνου παιδοποιούμενον ἐκ τῆς Κυζικηνῆς ἐταίρας. τὴν μὲν γὰρ Μητροδώρου μητέρα καὶ τὴν ἀδελφὴν ὥς ὑπερέχαιρον ἐπὶ τοῖς γάμοις αὐτοῦ <καὶ> ταῖς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀντιγραφαῖς, ἐκ τῶν βιβλίων δήπου δῆλόν ἐστιν. 'ἀλλ' ἡδέως τε βεβιωκέναι καὶ βρυάζειν καὶ καθυμνεῖν τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον ἐκκραυγάζοντες λέγουσι.' καὶ γὰρ οἱ θεράποντες ὅταν Κρόνια δειπνῶσιν ἢ Διονύσια κατ' ἀγρὸν ἄγωσι περιόντες, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῶν τὸν ὀλολυγμὸν [c] ὑπομείναις καὶ τὸν θόρυβον, ὑπὸ χαρμονῆς καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας τοιαῦτα ποιοούντων καὶ φθεγγομένων

'κλίθητι καὶ πίωμεν· οὐ καὶ σιτία

πάρεστιν; ὧ δύστηνε, μὴ σαυτῷ φθόνει.'

οἱ δ' εὐθὺς ἡλάλαξαν, ἐν δ' ἐκίρνατο

οἶνος· φέρων δὲ στέφανον ἀμφέθηκέ τις·

ὕμνεϊτο δ' αἰσchrῶς κλῶνα πρὸς καλὸν δάφνης

ὁ Φοῖβος οὐ προσφδά· †τὴν τ' ἐναύλιον

ὠθῶν τις ἐξέκλαγξε †σύγκοιτον φίλην.‘

ἡ γὰρ οὐ τούτοις ἔοικε τὰ Μητροδώρου πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν γράφοντος (fr. 41). ‘οὐδὲν δεῖ σῶζειν τοὺς Ἑλληνας οὐδ' ἐπὶ σοφία στεφάνων παρ' αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν οἶνον, ὃ Τιμόκρατες, ἀβλαβῶς τῇ [d] γαστρὶ καὶ κεχαρισμένως.‘ καὶ πάλιν πού φησιν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς γράμμασιν ὡς ‘καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθαρσυνάμην, ὅτι ἔμαθον παρ' Ἐπικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι’ (fr. 42). καὶ ‘περὶ γαστέρα γάρ, ὃ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθόν’ (fr. 40). καὶ γὰρ ὅλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ μέγεθος καθάπερ κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι τῇ γαστρὶ περιγράφουσι, λαμπρᾶς δὲ καὶ βασιλικῆς καὶ φρόνημα ποιούσης μέγα καὶ φῶς καὶ γαλήνην ἀληθῶς εἰς ἅπαντας ἀναχεομένην χαρᾶς οὐκ ἔστι μετασχεῖν βίον ἀνέξοδον καὶ ἀπολίτευτον καὶ ἀφιλόνητον καὶ ἀνενθουσίαστον εἰς τιμὴν καὶ χάριν ἀνελομένους. οὐ γάρ τι φαῦλον [e] ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ μικρὸν οὐδ' ἀγεννές ἐστίν οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολυπόδες ἄχρι τῶν ἐδωδίμων ἐκτείνει τὰς <πλεκτάνας τῆς> ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν ὀξύτατος ἀποκόπτει κόρος ἀκαρὲς ὥρας μόριον ἀκμάσασαν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὁρμῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ τιμὴν καὶ χάριν ‘οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μέτρον ὁ τοῦ βίου χρόνος’, ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐπιδραττόμενον τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόνητον ἐξαμιλλᾶται ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς χάρισιν ἡδονὰς ἀμηχάνους ἐχούσαις, ἃς οὐδὲ φεύγοντες οἱ χρηστοὶ διαφεύγειν δύνανται, πανταχόθεν αὐτοῖς ἀπαντώσας καὶ περιεχομένας, ὅταν εὐφραίνωσι πολλοὺς εὐεργετοῦντες,

[f] ‘ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνὰ ἄστρῳ θεὸν ὥς εἰσορόωσιν’ (θ 173).

ὁ γὰρ οὕτω διαθεῖς ἐτέρους, ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν καὶ γάνυσθαι καὶ ποθεῖν ἄψασθαι καὶ προσαγορευῆσαι, δηλὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τυφλῷ μεγάλας ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ καρπούμενος [1099] [a] ἡδονάς. ὅθεν οὐδὲ κάμνουσιν ὠφελοῦντες οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτας αὐτῶν ἀκούομεν φωνάς ‘πολλοῦ σε θνητοῖς ἄξιον τίκει πατήρ’ καὶ ‘μή γε παυσώμεσθα δρῶντες εὖ βροτούς’ (Trag. adesp. 410). καὶ τί δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἄκρως ἀγαθῶν λέγειν; εἰ γάρ τινι τῶν μέσως φαύλων μέλλοντι θνήσκειν ὁ κύριος, ἥτοι θεὸς ἢ βασιλεὺς, ὥραν

ἐπιδοίη μίαν, ὥστε χρησάμενον αὐτῇ πρὸς τινὰ καλὴν πρᾶξιν ἢ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν εὐθὺς τελευτᾶν, τίς ἂν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ βούλοιτο μᾶλλον Λαΐδι συγγενέσθαι καὶ πιεῖν οἶνον Ἀριούσιον ἢ κτείνας Ἀρχίαν ἐλευθερῶσαι τὰς [b] Θήβας; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα νομίζω. καὶ γὰρ τῶν μονομάχων ὁρῶ τοὺς μὴ παντάπασι θηριώδεις ἀλλ' Ἑλληνας, ὅταν εἰσιέναι μέλλωσι, προκειμένων πολλῶν ἐδεσμάτων καὶ πολυτελῶν ἥδιον τὰ γύναια τοῖς φίλοις ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ παρακατατιθεμένους καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐλευθεροῦντας ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαριζομένους.

Ἀλλὰ καί, εἴ τι μέγα περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς, κοινόν ἐστι δῆπου τοῦτο τοῖς πρακτικῶν πράγμασι· καὶ γὰρ 'σῖτον ἔδουσιν' καὶ 'πίνουσιν αἶθοπα οἶνον' καὶ μετὰ φίλων ἐστιῶνται πολὺ γ' οἶμαι προθυμότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγώνων καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Ἀγησίλαος [c] καὶ νῆ Δία Φωκίων καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ἢ καθάπερ οὗτοι πρὸς πῦρ ἀλειψάμενοι καὶ τοῖς φορείοις ἀτρέμα διασεισθέντες, ἀλλὰ καταφρονοῦσι τούτων ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς μείζουσιν ὄντες. τί γὰρ ἂν λέγοι τις Ἐπαμεινώνδαν οὐκ ἐθέλησαντα δειπνεῖν, ὡς ἑώρα πολυτελέστερον τῆς οὐσίας τὸ δεῖπνον, ἀλλ' εἰπόντα πρὸς τὸν φίλον 'ἐγὼ σ' ὦμην θύειν οὐχ ὑβρίζειν'; ὅπου καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπεώσατο τῆς Ἄδας τοὺς μαγεῖρους αὐτὸς εἰπὼν ἔχειν ἀμείνονας ὀψοποιούς, πρὸς μὲν ἄριστον τὴν νυκτοπορίαν πρὸς δὲ δεῖπνον τὴν ὀλιγαριστίαν· Φιλόξενον δὲ γράψαντα περὶ παίδων [d] καλῶν, εἰ πρίηται, μικρὸν ἐδέησε τῆς ἐπιτροπῆς ἀποστῆσαι. καίτοι τίνι μᾶλλον ἐξῆν; ἀλλ', ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἱπποκράτης (Aph. II 46) δυοῖν πόνων τὸν ἥττονα ὑπὸ τοῦ μείζονος ἀμαυροῦσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τὰς σωματικὰς αἱ πρακτικαὶ καὶ φιλότιμοι τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς δι' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἐναφανίζουσι καὶ κατασβεννύουσιν.

Εἰ τοίνυν, ὥσπερ λέγουσι, τὸ μεμνησθαι τῶν προτέρων ἀγαθῶν μέγιστόν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, Ἐπικούρῳ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἡμῶν πιστεύσειεν ὅτι ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀλγηδόσι καὶ νόσοις ἐναποθνήσκων ἀντιπαρεπέμπετο [e] τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν ἀπολελαυσμένων πρότερον ἡδονῶν. εἰκόνα γὰρ ὅψεως ἐν βυθῷ συνταραχθέντι καὶ κλύδωνι μᾶλλον ἂν τις ἢ μνήμην ἡδονῆς διαμειδιῶσαν ἐν σφυγμῷ τοσοῦτῳ καὶ σπαραγμῷ σώματος ἐπινοήσειε. τὰς δὲ τῶν πράξεων μνήμας οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ βουλευθεὶς ἐκστήσειεν ἑαυτοῦ. πότε[ρον] γὰρ ἢ πῶς οἶόν τ' ἦν ἐπιλαθέσθαι τῶν Ἀρβήλων τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἢ τοῦ Λεοντιάδου τὸν Πελοπίδαν ἢ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα; τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐν Μαραθῶνι

μάχην ἄχρι νῦν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις Θηβαῖοι καὶ νῆ Δί' ἡμεῖς τὴν Δαϊφάντου περὶ Ὑάμπολιν ἐορτάζομεν, ὡς ἴστε, καὶ θυσιῶν καὶ τιμῶν ἢ Φωκὶς ἐμπέπλησται, [f] καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ἡμῶν, ἐφ' οἷς αὐτὸς βέβρωκεν ἢ πέπωκεν οὕτως ἡδόμενος ὡς ἐφ' οἷς ἐκεῖνοι κατῶρθωσαν. ἐννοεῖν οὖν πάρεστι, πόση τις εὐφροσύνη καὶ χαρὰ καὶ γηθοσύνη συνεβίωσεν αὐτοῖς τοῖς τούτων δημιουργοῖς, ὧν ἐν ἔτεσι πεντακοσίοις καὶ πλείοσιν οὐκ ἀποβέβληκεν ἡ μνήμη τὸ εὐφραῖνον.

‘Καὶ μὴν ἀπὸ δόξης γίνεσθαι τινὰς ἡδονὰς Ἐπίκουρος [1100] [a] ὠμολόγει.’ τί δ' οὐκ ἔμελλεν αὐτὸς οὕτως σπαργῶν περιμανῶς καὶ σφαδάζων πρὸς δόξαν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀπολέγεσθαι τοὺς καθηγητὰς μηδὲ Δημοκρίτῳ τῷ τὰ δόγματα ῥήμασιν αὐτοῖς ἀφαιρουμένῳ ζυγομαχεῖν περὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ κεραιῶν, σοφὸν δὲ μηδένα φάναι πλὴν αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν, ἀλλὰ γράφειν ὡς Κωλώτης μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα προσκυνήσειε γονάτων ἀψάμενος, Νεοκλῆς δ' ὁ ἀδελφὸς εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀποφαίνοιτο μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου γεγονέναι μηδ' εἶναι, ἡ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοιαύτας, οἷαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὸν [b] ἂν ἐγέννησαν; εἴτ' οὐχ ὥσπερ Καλλικρατίδας ἔλεγε τὸν Κόνωνα μοιχεύειν τὴν θάλασσαν, οὕτως ἂν τις εἴποι τὸν Ἐπίκουρον αἰσχρῶς καὶ κρύφα πειρᾶν καὶ παραβιάζεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, οὐ τυγχάνοντα φανερώς ἀλλ' ἐρῶντα καὶ κατατεινόμενον; ὥσπερ γὰρ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τὰ σώματα τροφῆς μὴ παρούσης ἀναγκάζεται παρὰ φύσιν ὑφ' αὐτῶν τρέφεσθαι, τοιοῦτον ἡ φιλοδοξία ποιεῖ κακὸν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὅταν ἐπαίνων πεινῶντες παρ' ἐτέρων μὴ τυγχάνωσιν, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς ἐπαινεῖν· ἀλλ' οἱ γε πρὸς ἔπαινον οὕτως καὶ δόξαν ἔχοντες ἄρ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι μεγάλας ἡδονὰς προΐεσθαι δι' ἀσθένειαν ἢ μαλακίαν φεύγοντες ἀρχὰς καὶ πολιτείας [c] καὶ φιλίας βασιλέων, ἀφ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ εἰς τὸν βίον γίνεσθαι ἔφη Δημόκριτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν τινα πείσειεν ἀνθρώπων ὁ τὴν Νεοκλέους μαρτυρίαν καὶ τὴν Κωλώτου προσκύνησιν ἐν τοσοῦτῳ λόγῳ τιθέμενος καὶ ἀγαπῶν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κροτηθεῖς Ὀλυμπίασιν ἐξεμάνη καὶ ἀνωλόλυξε, μᾶλλον δ' ὄντως ὑπὸ χαρᾶς ἦρθη κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα (fr. 784) ‘γρᾶίας ἀκάνθης πάππος ὧς φυσώμενος’. εἴ γε μὴν τὸ εὐδοξεῖν ἡδύ, τὸ ἀδοξεῖν δῆπου λυπηρόν· ἀδοξότερον δ' ἀφιλίας ἀπραξίας ἀθεότητος ἡδυπαθείας ὀλιγωρίας οὐθέν ἐστι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντες ἄνθρωποι πλὴν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τῇ αἰρέσει προσεῖναι νομίζουσιν.

[d] ‘ἀδίκως’ φήσει τις. ἀλλὰ τὴν δόξαν οὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοποῦμεν. καὶ βιβλία μὲν μὴ λέγωμεν μηδὲ ψηφίσματα βλάσφημα πόλεων, ὅσα γέγραπται πρὸς αὐτούς (φιλαπεχθῆμον γάρ). εἰ δὲ χρησμοὶ καὶ μαντική καὶ θεῶν πρόνοια καὶ γονέων πρὸς ἔκγονα στοργή καὶ ἀγάπησις καὶ πολιτεία καὶ ἡγεμονία καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἔνδοξόν ἐστι καὶ εὐκλεές, οὕτως ἀνάγκη τοὺς λέγοντας, ὡς οὐ δεῖ σῶζειν τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἀλλ’ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἀβλαβῶς τῇ γαστρὶ καὶ κεχαρισμένως, ἀδοξεῖν καὶ κακοὺς νομίζεσθαι, νομιζομένους δὲ τοιούτους ἀνιᾶσθαι καὶ ζῆν ἀτερπῶς, εἴ γε δὴ τὸ καλὸν ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν εὐδοξίαν ἡγοῦνται.’

[e] Ταῦτ’ εἰπόντος τοῦ Θέωνος, ἐδόκει καταπαῦσαι τὸν περίπατον, καὶ καθάπερ εἴωθειμεν ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων καθεζόμενοι πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἤμεν σιωπῇ, χρόνον οὐ πολύν. ὁ γὰρ Ζεύξιππος ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐννοήσας ‘τίς’ ἔφη ‘τὰ λειπόμενα τῷ λόγῳ προσαποδίδωσι; καὶ γὰρ οὐπω <τὸ> προσῆκον ἔχει τέλος. αὐτὸς <δ>’ ἄρτι μαντικῆς μνησθεὶς καὶ προνοίας ὑποβέβληκε ταῦτα γὰρ οὐχ ἥκιστα φασιν οἱ ἄνδρες ἡδονὴν καὶ γαλήνην καὶ θάρσος αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζειν εἰς τὸν βίον, ὥστε δεῖ τι λεχθῆναι καὶ περὶ τούτων.’ ὑπολαβὼν δ’ ὁ Ἀριστόδημος ‘ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡδονῆς μὲν εἴρηται σχεδόν’ εἶπεν, ‘ὡς εὐτυχῶν καὶ κατορθῶν ὁ [f] λόγος αὐτῶν φόβον ἀφαιρεῖ τινα καὶ δεισιδαιμονίαν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ καὶ χαρὰν ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν οὐκ ἐνδίδωσιν· ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἔχειν ποιεῖ πρὸς αὐτούς τῷ μὴ ταραττεσθαι [1101] [a] μηδὲ χαίρειν, ὡς πρὸς τοὺς Ὑρκανοὺς ἢ Ἰχθυοφάγους ἔχομεν, οὔτε χρηστὸν οὐθὲν οὔτε φαῦλον ἀπ’ αὐτῶν προσδοκῶντες. εἰ δὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐκεῖνό μοι δοκῶ λήψεσθαι παρ’ αὐτῶν πρῶτον, ὅτι τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ἀφ’ ἐτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν, ὡμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης· διὸ πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ νῆ Δία λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τήκεσθαι, καὶ ὅσα δὴ παθαινομένοις γράφοντες [b] ὑγροὶ τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἶρηκε καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἥγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Σωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα γράφων καὶ Πύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος. ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολάς διῆλθον αὐτοῦ· καὶ λέγω μιμούμενος, ὡς οὐχ ἥττον ἐστὶ κακὸν ἀθεότης ὡμότητος καὶ δοξοκοπίας, εἰς ἣν ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ τὴν χάριν ἐκ τοῦ θείου μετὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀναιροῦντες.



βέλτιον γὰρ ἐνυπάρχειν τι καὶ συγκεκριᾶσθαι τῇ περὶ θεῶν δόξῃ κοινὸν αἰδοῦς καὶ φόβου πάθος, ἢ [που] τοῦτο φεύγοντας μήτ' ἐλπίδα μήτε [c] χάριν ἑαυτοῖς μήτε θάρσος ἀγαθῶν παρόντων μήτε τινὰ δυστυχοῦσιν ἀποστροφὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἐναπολείπεσθαι.

Δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέλει τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης ὥσπερ ὄψεως λήμνην ἀφαιρεῖν τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, μὴ συνεκκόπτειν μηδὲ τυφλοῦν τὴν πίστιν, ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐ φοβερὰ τις οὐδὲ σκυθρωπή, καθάπερ οὔτοι πλάττουσι, διαβάλλοντες τὴν πρόνοιαν ὥσπερ παισὶν Ἑμπουσαν ἢ Ποινὴν ἀλιτηριώδη καὶ τραγικὴν ἐπικρεμαμένην. ἀλλ' <οὐκ> ὀλίγοι μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεδίασι τὸν θεόν, οἷς οὐκ ἄμεινον μὴ [d] δεδιέναι· δεδιότες γὰρ ὥσπερ ἄρχοντα χρηστοῖς ἥπιον ἐπαχθῇ δὲ φαύλοις ἐνὶ φόβῳ, δι' ὃν οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι, πολλῶν ἐλευθεροῦνται τῶν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀτρέμα τὴν κακίαν ἔχοντες οἷον ἀπομαραινομένην ἦττον ταραττονται τῶν χρωμένων αὐτῇ καὶ τολμώντων εἴτ' εὐθύς δεδιότων καὶ μεταμελομένων. ἡ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀμαθῶν καὶ οὐ πάνυ μοχθηρῶν διάθεσις πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἔχει μὲν ἀμέλει τῷ σεβομένῳ καὶ τιμῶντι μεμιγμένον τινὰ σφυγμὸν καὶ φόβον, ἢ καὶ δεισιδαιμονία κέκληται, μυριάκις δὲ πλεῖόν ἐστι καὶ μεῖζον αὐτῇ τὸ εὐέλπι καὶ περιχαρὲς καὶ πᾶσαν εὐπραξίας ὄνησιν ὥς ἐκ θεῶν οὔσαν [e] εὐχόμενον καὶ δεχόμενον. δῆλον δὲ τεκμηρίοις τοῖς μεγίστοις· οὔτε γὰρ διατριβαὶ τῶν ἐν ἱεροῖς οὔτε καιροὶ τῶν ἐορτασμῶν οὔτε πράξεις οὔτ' ὄψεις εὐφραίνουσιν ἕτεραι μᾶλλον ὢν ὁρῶμεν ἢ δρῶμεν αὐτοὶ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὀργιάζοντες ἢ χορεύοντες ἢ θυσίαις παρόντες καὶ τελεταῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὥς τυράννοις τισὶν ἢ δεινοῖς κολασταῖς ὁμιλοῦσα τηνικαῦτα ἢ ψυχὴ περίλυπός ἐστι καὶ ταπεινὴ καὶ δύσθυμος, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ἦν· ἀλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα δοξάζει καὶ διανοεῖται παρεῖναι τὸν θεόν, ἐκεῖ μάλιστα λύπας καὶ φόβους καὶ τὸ φροντίζειν ἀπωσαμένη τῷ ἡδομένῳ μέχρι μέθης καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ γέλωτος ἀφίησιν ἑαυτήν. ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, [f] ὥς ὁ ποιητὴς εἶρηκε (Callim. fr. an. 386 Schn.)

‘καὶ τε γέρων καὶ γρῆς, ἐπὴν χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης

μνήσωνται, καὶ τοῖσιν ἐπήερθη φίλον ἦτορ,’

ἐν δὲ πομπαῖς καὶ θυσίαις οὐ μόνον γέρων καὶ γρῆς οὐδὲ πένης καὶ ιδιώτης ἀλλὰ ‘καὶ παχυσκελὴς ἀλετρις πρὸς [1102] [a] μύλην κινουμένη’ (fr.

iamb. adesp. 28 D.) καὶ οἰκότριβες καὶ θῆτες ὑπὸ γήθους καὶ χαρμοσύνης ἀναφέρονται· πλουσίοις τε καὶ βασιλευσιν ἐστιάσεις καὶ πανδαισίαι τινὲς πάρεισιν <αἰ>, αἱ δ' ἐφ' ἱεροῖς καὶ θυηπολίαις, καὶ ὅταν ἔγγιστα τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ψαύειν δοκῶσι μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ σεβασμοῦ, πολὺ διαφέρουσιν ἡδονὴν καὶ χάριν ἔχουσι. ταύτης οὐδὲν ἀνδρὶ μέτεστιν ἀπεγνωκότι τῆς προνοίας. οὐ γὰρ οἴνου πλῆθος οὐδ' ὄπτησις κρεῶν τὸ εὐφραῖνόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς ἐορταῖς, ἀλλ' ἐλπίς ἀγαθὴ καὶ δόξα τοῦ παρεῖναι τὸν θεὸν εὐμενῇ καὶ δέχεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα κεχαρισμένως.

[b] αὐλὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐνίων ἐορτῶν καὶ στέφανον ἀφαιροῦμεν, θεοῦ δὲ θυσία μὴ παρόντος πρὸς ἱερῶν ἀποδοχὴν ἄθεόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνεόρταστον καὶ ἀνενθουσίαστον τὸ λειπόμενον· μᾶλλον δὲ <τὸ> ὅλον ἀτερπὲς αὐτῷ καὶ λυπηρόν· ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις οὐθὲν δεόμενος διὰ φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ· καὶ θύων μὲν ὡς μαγεῖρῳ παρέστηκε τῷ ἱερεῖ σφάττοντι, θύσας δ' ἅπεισι λέγων τὸ Μενάνδρειον (fr. 750)

‘ἔθυον οὐ προσέχουσιν οὐδὲν μοι θεοῖς’.

οὕτως γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἶεται δεῖν σχηματίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ [c] καταφρονεῖν μηδ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς χαίρουσιν ἕτεροι πράττοντας, αὐτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας·

‘πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ὀδυνηρὸν ἔφυ’

κατὰ τὸν Εὐήνων (fr. 8). ἥ καὶ τοὺς δεισιδαίμονας οὐ χαίροντας ἀλλὰ φοβουμένους οἶονται θυσίαις καὶ τελεταῖς ὁμιλεῖν, μηθὲν ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες, εἴ γε δὴ διὰ φόβον τὰ αὐτὰ δρῶσιν, οὐδ' ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μεταλαγχάνοντες, ἀλλὰ μόνον δεδιότες καὶ ταραττόμενοι μὴ φανεροὶ γένωνται τοὺς πολλοὺς παραλογιζόμενοι καὶ φενακίζοντες· ἐφ' οὓς καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν καὶ ὁσιότητος αὐτοῖς βιβλία συντέτακται, ‘ἐλικτὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ’ (Eur. Andr. 448) ἐπαμπεχομένοις καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένοις [d] διὰ φόβον ἃς ἔχουσι δόξας. καὶ μὴν μετὰ γε τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τρίτον ἤδη σκεψώμεθα τὸ βέλτιστον ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοφιλέστατον γένος ἐν ἡλίκαις ἡδοναῖς <καθεστᾶσιν> καθαραῖς περὶ θεοῦ δόξαις συνόντες, ὡς πάντων μὲν ἡγεμῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντων δὲ πατὴρ

καλῶν ἐκεῖνός ἐστι, καὶ φαῦλον οὐθὲν ποιεῖν αὐτῷ θέμις ὥσπερ οὐδὲ πάσχειν. ‘ἀγαθὸς γάρ ἐστιν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐγγίνεται φθόνος’, οὔτε φόβος οὔτ’ ὀργὴ ἢ μῖσος· οὐδὲ γὰρ θερμοῦ τὸ ψύχειν ἀλλὰ <τὸ> θερμαίνειν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ βλάπτειν. ὀργὴ δὲ χάριτος [e] καὶ χόλος εὐμενείας καὶ τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ φιλόφρονος τὸ δυσμενὲς καὶ ταρακτικὸν ἀπωτάτω τῇ φύσει τέτακται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ δυνάμεως τὰ δ’ ἀσθενείας ἐστὶ καὶ φαυλότητος. οὐ τοίνυν ὀργαῖς, <ὅτι> καὶ χάρισι, συνέχεται τὸ θεῖον, ἀλλ’ ὅτι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν πέφυκεν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐ πέφυκεν. ἀλλ’ ‘ὁ μὲν μέγας ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς πτηνὸν ἄρμα ἐλαύνων ἄνω πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος’, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων θεῶν ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν Ἐπιδῶτης ὁ δὲ Μειλίχιος ὁ δ’ Ἀλεξίκακος· ὁ δ’ Ἀπόλλων ‘κατεκρίθη θνατοῖς ἀγανώτατος ἔμμεν’ ὡς Πίνδαρός φησι (fr. 149). πάντα δὲ [f] τῶν θεῶν κατὰ τὸν Διογένη, καὶ κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, καὶ φίλοι τοῖς θεοῖς οἱ ἀγαθοί, καὶ τὸν θεοφιλῇ μή τι εὖ πράττειν ἢ θεοφιλῇ <μὴ> εἶναι τὸν σῶφρονα καὶ δίκαιον ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. ἄρά γε δίκης ἐτέρας οἶεσθε δεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναι[1103][a]ροῦντας τὴν πρόνοιαν, οὐχ ἱκανὴν ἔχειν ἐκκόπτοντας ἑαυτῶν ἡδονὴν καὶ χαρὰν τοσαύτην, ὅση πάρεστι τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον; ἢ τῷ μὲν Ἐπικούρῳ καὶ Μητρόδωρος καὶ Πολύαινος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος ‘ἐκθάρσημα’ καὶ ‘γῆθος’ ἦσαν, ὧν τοὺς πλείστους θεραπεύων νοσοῦντας ἢ καταθρηγῶν ἀποθνήσκοντας διετέλεσε, Λυκοῦργος δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς Πυθίας προσαγορευθεὶς ‘Ζηνὶ φίλος καὶ πᾶσιν Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχουσι’ καὶ Σωκράτης οἰόμενος αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι τὸ δαιμόνιον ὑπ’ εὐμενείας καὶ Πίνδαρος ἀκούων ὑπὸ τοῦ Πανὸς ἄδεσθαί τι μέλος ὧν αὐτὸς [b] ἐποίησε μετρίως ἔχαιρεν; ἢ Φορμίων τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἢ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν Σοφοκλῆς ξενίζειν αὐτός τε πειθόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἐχόντων διὰ τὴν γενομένην ἐπιφάνειαν; ἃ δ’ Ἑρμογένης ἐφρόνει περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἄξιόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι διαμνημονεῦσαι. ‘οὔτοι γάρ’ φησὶν ‘οἱ πάντα μὲν εἰδότες πάντα δὲ δυνάμενοι θεοὶ οὕτω μοι φίλοι εἰσίν, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαί μου οὔποτε λήθω αὐτοὺς οὔτε νυκτὸς οὔθ’ ἡμέρας ὅποι ἂν ὀρμῶμαι οὔθ’ ὅ τι ἂν μέλλω πράττειν· διὰ δὲ τὸ προειδέναι καὶ ὅ τι ἐξ ἐκάστου ἀποβήσεται σημαίνουσι, πέμποντες ἀγγέλους φήμας καὶ ἐνύπνια καὶ οἰωνούς.’

Καλὰ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς εἶναι καὶ τὰ γινόμενα παρὰ τῶν [c] θεῶν· τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν θεῶν ταῦτ' αὐτὸ μεγάλην ἡδονὴν ποιεῖ καὶ θάρσος ἀμήχανον καὶ φρόνημα καὶ χαρὰν οἷον αὐγὴν ἐπιγελῶσαν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. οἱ δ' ἄλλως ἔχοντες τῆς μὲν εὐτυχίας τὸ ἡδιστον κολούουσι, ταῖς δὲ δυστυχίαις ἀποστροφὴν οὐκ ἀπολείπουσιν, ἀλλ' εἰς μίαν καταφυγὴν καὶ λιμένα πράττοντες κακῶς τὴν διάλυσιν καὶ τὴν ἀναισθησίαν ἀποβλέπουσιν· ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἐν πελάγει καὶ χειμῶνι θαρρυνῶν ἐπιστὰς λέγοι μήτε τινὰ τὴν ναῦν ἔχειν κυβερνήτην μήτε τοὺς Διοσκόρους αὐτοῖς ἀφίξεσθαι 'ἐπερχόμενόν τε μαλάζοντας βίαιον πόντον ὠκείας τ' ἀνέμων [d] ῥιπάς', οὐδὲν δ' ὅμως εἶναι δεινόν, ἀλλ' ὅσον οὐδέπω καταποθήσεσθαι τὴν ναῦν ὑπὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἢ συντριβήσεσθαι ταχὺ πρὸς πέτρας ἐκπεσοῦσαν. οὗτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Ἐπικούρειος λόγος ἐν νόσοις δειναῖς καὶ πόνοις ὑπερβάλλουσιν· 'ἐλπίζεις τι χρηστὸν παρὰ θεῶν δι' εὐσέβειαν; τετύφωσαι· τὸ γὰρ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὐτ' ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται. βέλτιόν τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετὰ τὸν βίον ἐπινοεῖς; ἐξηπάτησαι· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ τὸ δ' ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.' πῶς οὖν, ἄνθρωπε, φαγεῖν με καὶ χαίρειν κελεύεις; ὅτι νῆ Δία χειμαζομένῳ τὸ ναυάγιον ἐγγὺς ἐστίν· 'ὁ γὰρ πόνος ὁ ὑπερβάλλων συνάψει [e] θανάτῳ.' καίτοι νεῶς μὲν ἐκπεσὼν ἐπιβάτης διαλυθείσης ἐπ' ἐλπίδος ὀχεῖται τινος ὡς γῆ προσέζων τὸ σῶμα καὶ διανηζόμενος, τῆς δὲ τούτων φιλοσοφίας 'ἐκβασίς οὔπη φαίνεθ' ἄλως πολιοῖο θύραζε' (ε 410) τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἠφάνισται καὶ διέσπαρται καὶ προαπόλωλε τοῦ σώματος· ὥσθ' ὑπερχαίρειν τὸ πάνσοφον τοῦτο δόγμα καὶ θεῖον παραλαβοῦσαν, ὅτι τοῦ κακῶς πράττειν πέρας ἐστὶν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀπολέσθαι καὶ φθαρῆναι καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι.

Ἀλλὰ γάρ' ἔφη πρὸς ἐμὲ βλέψας 'εὐηθὲς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τούτου λέγειν ἡμᾶς, σοῦ πρῶην ἀκηκοότας ἱκανῶς [f] διαλεγομένου πρὸς τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας τὸν Ἐπικούρου λόγον τοῦ Πλάτωνος περὶ ψυχῆς ῥάονας καὶ ἡδίους ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν πρὸς θάνατον.' ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ζεύξιππος 'εἶθ' οὗτος' ἔφη 'δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀτελεῖς ὁ λόγος ἔσται, καὶ φοβηθησόμεθα ταυτολογεῖν πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον λέγοντες; 'ἥκιστα' ἔφην ἐγώ· 'καὶ δις γὰρ ὁ δεῖ καλόν ἐστὶν ἀκοῦσαι κατ' Ἐμπε[1104][a]δοκλέα (B 25). πάλιν οὖν ὁ Θέων ἡμῖν παρακλητέος· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸν οἶμαι <παρέργως> παρεῖναι τοῖς τότε λεχθεῖσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νέος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ δέδιδε μὴ λήθης εὐθύνας ὑπόσχη τοῖς νέοις.'

Καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ὥσπερ ἐκβιασθεὶς ‘ἄλλ’ εἰ δοκεῖ ταῦτα’ ἔφη ‘ποιεῖν, οὐ μιμήσομαί σε, ὦ Ἀριστόδημε. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβήθης τὰ τούτου λέγειν, ἐγὼ δὲ χρήσομαι τοῖς σοῖς. ὀρθῶς γὰρ μοι διαίρειν ἔδοξας εἰς τρία γένη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ πονηρῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν, τρίτον δὲ τὸ τῶν ἐπαικῶν καὶ νοῦν ἔχόντων. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄδικοι καὶ πονηροὶ τὰς καθ’ Ἑλίου [b] δίκας καὶ τιμωρίας δεδιότες καὶ φοβούμενοι κακουργεῖν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντες ἥδιον βιώσονται καὶ ἀταρακτότερον. οὐ γὰρ Ἑλίου ἄλλω τινὶ τῆς ἀδικίας οἶεται δεῖν ἀπείργειν ἢ φόβῳ κολάσεων. ὥστε καὶ προσεμφορητέον ἐκείνοις τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ κινητέον ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἅμα τὰ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς δείματα καὶ χάσματα καὶ φόβους καὶ ὑπονοίας, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες ὑπὸ τούτων ἐπαικέστερον ἔχειν καὶ πραότερον. λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον φοβουμένοις μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικοῦσιν ἐπισφαλῶς ἐν τῷ βίῳ διάγειν καὶ περιφόβως. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς <ικανή> καὶ ἄνευ φόβου περὶ τῶν ἐν [c] Ἑλίου ἢ παρὰ τὸ μυθῶδες τῆς αἰδιότητος ἐλπίς. καὶ ὁ πόθος τοῦ εἶναι, πάντων ἐρώτων πρεσβύτατος ὢν καὶ μέγιστος, ἡδοναῖς ὑπερβάλλει καὶ γλυκυθυμίαις τὸ παιδικὸν ἐκεῖνο δέος. ἥ καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ φίλους ἀποβάλλοντες εἶναί που μᾶλλον ἐθέλουσι καὶ διαμένειν κακοπαθοῦντας ἢ παντάπασιν ἐξηρῆσθαι καὶ διεφθάρθαι καὶ γεγονέναι τὸ μηθέν· ἡδέως δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῦ μεθίστασθαι τὸν θνήσκοντα καὶ μεταλλάττειν καὶ ὅσα δηλοῖ μεταβολὴν ὄντα τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ φθορὰν τὸν θάνατον ἀκροῶνται καὶ λέγουσιν οὕτως

‘αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κάκειθι φίλου μεμνήσομ’ ἐταίρου’ (X 390)

καί

[d] ‘τί σοι πρὸς Ἑκτορ’ ἢ γέροντ’ εἶπω πόσιν;’ (Eur. Hec. 422).

ἐκ δὲ τούτου παρατροπῆς γενομένης καὶ ὅπλα καὶ σκεύη καὶ ἱμάτια συνήθη τοῖς τεθνηκόσι καὶ ὡς ὁ Μίνως τῷ Γλαύκῳ, ‘Κρητικούς αὐλοὺς θανοῦσι κῶλα ποικίλης νεβροῦ’ (Trag. adesp. 419) συνθάπτοντες ἥδιον ἔχουσι. κἂν τι δόξωσιν αἰτεῖν καὶ ποθεῖν ἐκείνους, χαίρουσιν ἐπιδιδόντες· ὥσπερ ὁ Περίανδρος τῇ γυναικὶ τὸν κόσμον ὡς δεομένη καὶ ῥιγοῦν λεγούσῃ συγκατέκαυσεν. οἱ δ’ Αἰάκοι καὶ Ἀσκάλαφοι καὶ Ἀχέροντες οὐ πάνυ διαταράττουσιν, οἷς γε καὶ χοροὺς καὶ θέατρα καὶ μοῦσαν

τήδομένοις παντοδαπὴν γενομένου δεδώκασιν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τοῦ θανάτου [e] τὸ πρόσωπον ὡς φοβερὸν καὶ σκυθρωπὸν καὶ σκοτεινὸν ἅπαντες ὑποδειμαίνουσι, τὸ τῆς ἀναισθησίας καὶ λήθης καὶ ἀγνοίας· καὶ πρὸς τὸ 'ἀπόλωλε' καὶ τὸ 'ἀνήρηται' καὶ τὸ 'οὐκ ἔστι' ταράσσονται καὶ δυσανασχετοῦσι τούτων λεγομένων· (fr. mel. chor. adesp. 16 D.)

‘τὸ ἔπειτα κείσεται βαθυδένδρῳ

ἐν χθονὶ συμποσίων τε καὶ λυρᾶν ἄμοιρος

ἰαχᾶς τε παντερπέος αὐλῶν·’

καί (I 408)

‘ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λειστή

οὔθ' ἐλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἔρκος ὀδόντων’.

ἦν καὶ προεπισφάττουσιν οἱ ταυτὶ λέγοντες ‘ἅπαξ ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν, δις δ' οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι· δεῖ δὲ τὸν [f] αἰῶνα μηκέτ' εἶναι.’ καὶ γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ὡς μικρὸν μᾶλλον δὲ μηδ' ὅτιοῦν πρὸς τὸ σύμπαν ἀτιμάσαντες ἀναπόλαυστον προΐενται, καὶ ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ πράξεως οἷον ἐξαθυμοῦντες καὶ καταφρονοῦντες ἑαυτῶν ὡς ἐφημέρων καὶ ἀβεβαίων καὶ πρὸς οὐθὲν ἀξιόλογον γεγονότων. [1105] [a] τὸ γὰρ ‘ἀναισθητεῖν τὸ διαλυθὲν καὶ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ ἀναισθητοῦν’ οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ τοῦ θανάτου δέος ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ προστίθησιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ δέδοικεν ἡ φύσις·

‘ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε’ (H 99),

τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ φρονοῦν μηδ' αἰσθανόμενον διάλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἦν Ἐπίκουρος εἰς κενὸν καὶ ἀτόμους διασπορὰν ποιῶν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκκόπτει τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ἀφθαρσίας, δι' ἣν ὀλίγου δέω λέγειν πάντας εἶναι καὶ πάσας προθύμους τῷ Κερβέρῳ διαδάκνεσθαι καὶ φορεῖν εἰς τὸν τρητόν, ὅπως ἐν τῷ εἶναι μόνον διαμένωσι μηδ' ἀναιρεθῶσι. καίτοι [b] ταῦτα μὲν, ὥσπερ ἔφην, οὐ πάνυ πολλοὶ δεδίασι, μητέρων ὄντα καὶ τιτθῶν δόγματα καὶ λόγους μυθώδεις, οἱ δὲ καὶ δεδιότες τελετάς τινας αὖ πάλιν καὶ καθαρμοὺς οἷονται βοηθεῖν, οἷς ἀγνισάμενοι διατελεῖν ἐν Ἄιδου παίζοντες καὶ χορεύοντες ἐν τόποις αὐγὴν

καὶ πνεῦμα καθαρὸν καὶ φέγγος ἔχουσιν. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν στέρησις ἐνοχλεῖ καὶ νέους καὶ γέροντας·

‘δυσέρωτες γὰρ φαινόμεθ’ ὄντες

τοῦδ’, ὅ τι τόδε στίλβει κατὰ γῆν’

ὡς Εὐριπίδης φησὶν (Hipp. 193). οὐδὲ ῥαδίως οὐδ’ ἀλύπως ἀκούομεν

‘ὥς ἄρ’ εἰπόντα μιν τηλαυγὲς ἀμβρόσιον

ἐλασίππου πρόσωπον

ἀπέλιπεν ἀμέρας’ (fr. mel. chor. adesp. 29 D.).

[c]διὸ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ἀθανασίας συναναιροῦσι τὰς ἡδίστας ἐλπίδας καὶ μεγίστας τῶν πολλῶν. τί δῆτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἴομεθα καὶ βεβιωκότων ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως, <οἷ> κακὸν μὲν οὐθὲν ἐκεῖ τὰ δὲ κάλλιστα καὶ θειότατα προσδοκῶσι; πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, <ὡς> ἀθληταὶ στέφανον οὐκ ἀγωνιζόμενοι λαμβάνουσιν ἀλλ’ ἀγωνισάμενοι καὶ νικήσαντες, οὕτως ἡγούμενοι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τὰ νικητήρια τοῦ βίου μετὰ τὸν βίον ὑπάρχειν θαυμάσιον οἷον φρονοῦσι τῇ ἀρετῇ πρὸς ἐκείνας τὰς ἐλπίδας· ἐν αἷς ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς νῦν ὑβρίζοντας ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ καταγελῶντας ἀνοήτως τῶν κρειττόνων ἐπιδεῖν ἀξίαν δίκην τίνοντας.

[d] ἔπειτα τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ θεάς τοῦ ὄντος οὐδεὶς ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἐρώντων ἐνέπλησεν ἑαυτὸν ἱκανῶς, οἷον δι’ ὁμίχλης ἢ νέφους τοῦ σώματος ὑγρῷ καὶ ταραττομένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ χρώμενος, ἀλλ’ ὄρνιθος δίκην ἄνω βλέποντες ὡς ἐκπησόμενοι τοῦ σώματος εἰς μέγα τι καὶ λαμπρόν, εὐσταλῇ καὶ ἐλαφρὰν ποιοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν θνητῶν, τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν μελέτη χρώμενοι τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν. οὕτως μέγα τι καὶ τέλεον ὄντως ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦνται τὴν τελευτήν, ὡς βίον ἀληθῆ βιωσομένην ἐκεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχ ὕπαρ νῦν ζῶσαν ἀλλ’ ὀνειράσιν ὅμοια πάσχουσιν. εἰ τοίνυν ‘ἡδὺ [e] πανταχόθεν ἡ φίλου μνήμη τεθνηκότος’, ὥσπερ Ἐπίκουρος εἶπε, καὶ ἤδη νοεῖν πάρεστιν ἡλικίας ἑαυτοὺς χαρὰς ἀποστεροῦσι φάσματα <μὲν> καὶ εἶδωλα τεθνηκότων ἐταίρων οἴομενοι δέχεσθαι καὶ θηρεύειν, οἷς οὔτε νοῦς ἐστὶν οὔτ’ αἴσθησις, αὐτοῖς δὲ συνέσεσθαι πάλιν ἀληθῶς καὶ τὸν φίλον πατέρα καὶ τὴν φίλην μητέρα καὶ πού γυναικα χρηστὴν ὄψεσθαι μὴ προσδοκῶντες μηδ’ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα

τῆς ὁμιλίας ἐκείνης καὶ φιλοφροσύνης, ἣν ἔχουσιν οἱ τὰ αὐτὰ Πυθαγόρα καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ὀμήρῳ περὶ ψυχῆς δοξάζοντες. ὥ δ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος, Ὅμηρος [f] ὑποδεδήλωκεν, εἶδωλον τοῦ Αἰνείου καταβαλὼν εἰς μέσον τοῖς μαχομένοις ὡς τεθνηκός, εἴθ' ὕστερον αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀναδείξας 'ζῶν καὶ ἀρτεμέα προσιόντα καὶ μένος ἐσθλὸν ἔχοντα' τοῖς φίλοις, 'οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν' φησί, καὶ [1106] [a] τὸ εἶδωλον μεθέμενοι περιέσχον αὐτόν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῦ λόγου δεικνύοντος, ὡς ἔστιν ἐντυχεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῖς τεθνεῶσι καὶ τῷ «φρονοῦντι καὶ» φιλοῦντι τοῦ φρονοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλοῦντος ἄψασθαι καὶ συγγενέσθαι, μὴ δυναμένους μηδ' ἀπορρῖψαι τὰ εἶδωλα πάντα καὶ τοὺς φλοιούς, ἐφ' οἷς ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ κενοπαθοῦντες διατελοῦσιν.

Ἄνευ δὲ τούτου, οἱ μὲν ἐτέρου βίου τὸν θάνατον ἀρχὴν κρείττονος νομίζοντες, ἐάν τ' ἐν ἀγαθοῖς ᾧσι, μᾶλλον ἡδονταὶ μείζονα προσδοκῶντες· ἂν τε μὴ κατὰ γνώμην τῶν ἐνταῦθα τυγχάνωσιν, οὐ πάνυ δυσχεραίνουσιν, ἀλλ' αἱ τῶν μετὰ τὸν θάνατον ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐλπίδες [b] ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς καὶ προσδοκίας ἔχουσαι πᾶν μὲν ἔλλειμμα πᾶν δὲ πρόσκρουσμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξαλείφουσι καὶ ἀφανίζουσιν ὥσπερ ἐν ὁδῷ μᾶλλον δ' ὁδοῦ παρατροπῇ βραχεῖα ῥαδίως τὰ συντυγχάνοντα καὶ μετρίως φερούσης. οἷς δ' ὁ βίος εἰς ἀναισθησίαν περαίνει καὶ διάλυσιν, τούτοις ὁ θάνατος οὐ τῶν κακῶν μεταβολὴν «ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀποβολὴν» ἐπιφέρων, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἐστὶ λυπηρός, μᾶλλον «δὲ» τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσιν ἢ τοῖς ἐπιπόνως ζῶσι; τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἀποκόπτει τὴν ἄδηλον ἐλπίδα τοῦ πράξειν ἄμεινον, ἐκείνων δὲ βέβαιον ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἀφαιρεῖται. καὶ καθάπερ οἶμαι τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν φαρμάκων [c] ἄλλ' ἀναγκαῖα, κουφίζοντα τοὺς νοσοῦντας ἐπιτρίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας, οὕτως ὁ Ἐπικούρου λόγος τοῖς μὲν ἀθλίως ζῶσιν οὐκ εὐτυχῇ τοῦ κακῶς πράσσειν τελευτὴν ἐπαγγέλλεται τὴν διάλυσιν καὶ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς, τῶν δὲ φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν καὶ βρυόντων ἀγαθοῖς παντάπασιν κολοῦει τὸ εὐθυμον, ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν μακαρίως εἰς τὸ μὴ ζῆν μηδ' εἶναι καταστρέφων. αὐτόθεν μὲν «οὔν» ἐστὶ δῆλον, ὡς ἀγαθῶν ἀποβολῆς ἐπίνοια λυπεῖν πέφυκεν, ὅσον ἐλπίδες βέβαιοι καὶ ἀπολαύσεις εὐφραίνουσι παρόντων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγουσιν αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαύστων «καὶ» ἀορίστων λυθεῖσαν ὑποψίαν [d] ἀγαθὸν βεβαιότατον καὶ ἡδιστον ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ λελύσθαι· καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν τὸν Ἐπικούρου λόγον, ἰστάντα



τοῦ θανάτου τὸ δέος ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς ψυχῆς. εἵπερ οὖν ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἀπαλλαγὴ προσδοκίας κακῶν ἀπειρῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἀνιαρὸν αἰωνίων ἀγαθῶν ἐλπίδος στερεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀκροτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν; ἀγαθὸν μὲν γὰρ οὐδετέροις, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς οὕσι τὸ μὴ εἶναι παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀλλότριον· ὧν δ' ἀφαιρεῖ τὰ τοῦ βίου κακὰ τῷ τοῦ θανάτου κακῷ, τὸ ἀναίσθητον ἔχουσι παραμύθιον ὥσπερ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τούναντίον, οἷς [e] ἐξ ἀγαθῶν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν μεταβολή, φοβερώτατον ὁρῶσι τέλος, ἐν ᾧ παύσεται τὸ μακάριον. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀρχὴν ἑτέρου τὴν ἀναισθησίαν δέδιεν ἡ φύσις, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν παρόντων ἀγαθῶν στέρησις ἐστὶ. τὸ γὰρ 'οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς' παντὸς ἀναιρέσει τοῦ ἡμετέρου γινόμενον ἤδη πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐστὶ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ, καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον οὐ λυπεῖ τότε τοὺς μὴ ὄντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὄντας εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι βαπτομένους ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδαμῶς ἐκδυσομένους. ὅθεν οὐδ' ὁ Κέρβερος οὐδ' ὁ Κωκυτὸς ἀόριστον ἐποίησε τοῦ θανάτου τὸ δέος, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπειλή, μεταβολὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάλιν οὐκ ἔχουσα τοῖς φθαρεῖσι· 'δὶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι, δεῖ [f] δὲ τὸν αἰῶνα μὴ εἶναι' κατ' Ἐπίκουρον. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ πέρας τῷ <εἶναι τὸ> μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἀπέραντον καὶ ἀμετάστατον, εὐρηται κακὸν αἰώνιον ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν στέρησις ἀναισθησίᾳ μηδέποτε παυσομένη. καὶ σοφώτερος Ἡρόδοτος εἰπὼν ὡς 'ὁ θεὸς γλυκὺν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα φθονερός ἐν [1107] [a] αὐτῷ ὧν φαίνεται' (VII 46), καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εὐδαιμονεῖν δοκοῦσιν, οἷς δέλεαρ ἐστὶ λύπης τὸ ἡδύ, γευομένοις ὧν στερήσονται. τίνα γὰρ εὐφροσύνην ἢ ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ βρυασμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐκκρούσειε καὶ καταποντίσειεν ἐμπίπτουσα συνεχῶς ἡ ἐπίνοια τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ εἰς πέλαγος ἀχανὲς τὸ ἄπειρον ἐκχεομένης, τῶν ἐν ἡδονῇ τιθεμένων τὸ καλὸν καὶ μακάριον; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνης, ὥσπερ Ἐπίκουρος οἶεται, τοῖς πλείστοις ἀπόλλυσθαι συμβαίνει, παντάπασιν ἀπαρηγόρητός ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος, εἰς ἀγαθῶν στέρησιν διὰ κακῶν ἄγοντος.

Καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ ἀποκαμοῦνται μαχόμενοι [b] καὶ βιαζόμενοι πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν κακῶν ἀποφυγὴν, κακὸν δὲ μηκέτι νομίζειν τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν στέρησιν· ἐκεῖνο δ' ὁμολογοῦσι, τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐλπίδα μηδὲ χαρὰν ἔχειν τὸν θάνατον ἀλλ' ἀποκεκόφθαι πᾶν τὸ ἡδύ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ θεῖα προσδοκῶσιν οἱ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνωλέθρους εἶναι διανοούμενοι καὶ ἀφθάρτους ἢ μακρὰς τινὰς χρόνων περιόδους νῦν μὲν ἐν γῇ νῦν δ' ἐν οὐρανῷ

περιπολούσας, ἄχρῖς οὗ συνδιαλυθῶσι τῷ κόσμῳ, μεθ' ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης εἰς πῦρ νοερὸν ἀναφθεῖσαι. τοιαύτην χώραν ἡδονῶν [c] τοσούτων Ἐπίκουρος ἐκτέμνεται, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐλπίσιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ χάρισιν ἀναιρεθείσαις τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τὸ φιλομαθές καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ φιλότιμον ἀποτυφλώσας εἰς στενὸν τι κομιδῇ καὶ οὐδὲ καθαρὸν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τῆς ψυχῆς χαῖρον συνέστειλε καὶ κατέβαλε τὴν φύσιν, ὥς μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τὸ κακὸν φεύγειν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν.‘

## ΠΡΟΣ ΚΩΛΩΤΗΝ

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[1107] Κωλώτης, ὃν Ἐπίκουρος εἰώθει Κωλωταρᾶν ὑποκορίζεσθαι καὶ Κωλωτάριον, ὃ Σατορνῖνε, βιβλίον ἐξέδωκεν ἐπιγράψας ‘Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων [e] φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν’. ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ προσπεφώνηται· ἃ δ’ ἡμῖν ἐπῆλθεν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν Κωλώτην, ἡδέως ἂν οἴμαί σε γεγραμμένα διελθεῖν, φιλόκαλον καὶ φιλότατον ὄντα καὶ τὸ μεμνησθαι καὶ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχειν ὡς μάλιστα δυνατόν ἐστι τοὺς λόγους τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλικωτάτην διατριβὴν ἡγούμενον.

Ἐναγχος οὖν ἀναγινωσκομένου τοῦ συγγράμματος εἰς τῶν ἐταίρων, Ἀριστόδημος ὁ Αἰγιεύς (οἶσθα γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας οὐ ναρθηκοφόρον ἀλλ’ ἐμμανέστατον ὀργιαστήν Πλάτωνος), οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως παρὰ τὸ εἰώθος ἐγκαρτερήσας σιωπῇ καὶ παρασχὼν ἑαυτὸν ἀκροατὴν ἄχρι τέλους κόσμιον, ὡς τέλος ἔσχεν ἡ ἀνάγνωσις, [f] ‘εἶεν’ ἔφη, ‘τίνα τούτῳ μαχομένον ἀνίσταμεν ὑπὲρ τῶν φιλοσόφων; οὐ γὰρ ἄγαμαι τὸ τοῦ Νέστορος ἐλέσθαι δέον ἐκ τῶν ἐννέα τὸν ἄριστον ἐπὶ τῇ τύχῃ ποιουμένου καὶ διακληροῦντος.’ ‘ἀλλ’ ὁρᾷς’ ἔφην ‘ὅτι κάκεῖνος ἐπὶ τὸν κλῆρον ἑαυτὸν ἔταξεν, ὥστε τοῦ φρονιμωτάτου βραβεύοντος [1108] [a] γενέσθαι τὸν κατάλογον, ‘ἐκ δ’ ἔθορε κλῆρος κυνέης, ὃν ἄρ’ ἤθελον αὐτοί, Αἴαντος’ (H 182). οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ σὺ προστάτεις ἐλέσθαι, ‘πῶς ἂν ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆος ἐγὼ θεῖοιο λαθοίμην;’ (K 243) ὅρα δὴ καὶ σκόπει, πῶς ἀμυνῇ τὸν ἄνδρα.’ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστόδημος ‘ἀλλ’ οἶσθα’ ἔφη ‘τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι τῷ παιδὶ χαλεπήνας οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐνέτεινε πληγὰς ἀλλὰ Σπεύσιππον ἐκέλευσεν, εἰπὼν αὐτὸς ὀργίζεσθαι. καὶ σὺ τοίνυν παραλαβὼν κόλαζε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅπως βούλει· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὀργίζομαι.’ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παρακελευομένων ‘λεκτέον μὲν’ ἔφην ‘ἄρα, [b] φοβοῦμαι δὲ μὴ δόξω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσπουδακέναι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὸ βιβλίον ὑπ’ ὀργῆς, δι’ ἀγροικίαν καὶ βωμολοχίαν καὶ ὕβριν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου χόρτον τινὰ προβάλλοντος ...ήσεως Σωκράτει καί, πῶς εἰς τὸ στόμα τὸ σιτίον οὐκ εἰς τὸ οὖς ἐντίθησιν, ἐρωτῶντος. ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἂν ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ γελάσειέ τις ἐννοήσας τὴν Σωκράτους πραότητα καὶ χάριν, ‘ὑπὲρ γε μέντοι παντὸς Ἑλλήνων στρατοῦ’ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, ἐν οἷς Δημόκριτός ἐστι καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Στίλπων καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ

Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, οὕτω κακῶς ἀκηκοότων, οὐ μόνον ‘αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν’, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὅσιον ἐνδοῦναί τι καὶ ὑφελέσθαι τῆς ἄκρας ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν παρρησίας εἰς τοῦτο δόξης [c] φιλοσοφίαν προαγαγόντων. καίτοι τὸ μὲν ζῆν οἱ γονεῖς μετὰ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν ἔδωκαν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων δίκης καὶ νόμου συνεργὸν οἰόμεθα λόγον ἐπιθυμιῶν κολαστὴν λαβόντες εὖ ζῆν· τὸ δ’ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κοινωνικῶς ζῆν καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως. ὧν οὐθὲν ἀπολείπουσιν οἱ περὶ γαστέρα τάγαθὸν εἶναι βοῶντες, οὐκ ἂν δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὁμοῦ πάσας τετρημένου χαλκοῦ πριάμενοι δίχα τῆς ἡδονῆς πάσης πανταχόθεν ἐξελαθείσης· ἐνδεῖν δ’ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ θεῶν καὶ ψυχῆς λόγων, ὥς ἢ μὲν ἀπόλλυται διαλυθεῖσα, τοῖς δ’ οὐθενὸς μέλει τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις ἐγκαλοῦσιν [d] οὗτοι, διὰ <τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τοῦτο> τὸ σοφὸν ὥς τὸ ζῆν ἀναιροῦσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι ζῆν ἀγεννῶς καὶ θηριωδῶς διδάσκουσι.

Καίτοι ταῦτα μὲν ἐγκέκραται τοῖς Ἐπικούρου λόγοις καὶ διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας. ὁ δὲ Κωλώτης ὅτι φωνάς τινας ἐρήμους πραγμάτων ἀποσπῶν καὶ μέρη λόγων καὶ σπαράγματα κωφὰ τοῦ βεβαιουῦντος καὶ συνεργουῦντος πρὸς νόησιν καὶ πίστιν ἔλκων ὥσπερ ἀγορὰν ἢ πίνακα τεράτων συντίθησι τὸ βιβλίον, ἵστε δήπου παντὸς μᾶλλον ὑμεῖς’ ἔφην ‘τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντες. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ καθάπερ ὁ Λυδὸς ἐφ’ αὐτὸν ἀνοίγειν οὐ θύραν μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν ἀποριῶν [e] καὶ μεγίσταις περιβάλλειν τὸν Ἐπίκουρον.

Ἄρχεται γὰρ ἀπὸ Δημοκρίτου, καλὰ καὶ πρέποντα διδασκάλια κομιζομένου παρ’ αὐτοῦ. καίτοι πολὺν χρόνον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀνηγόρευε Δημοκρίτειον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ὥς ἄλλοι τε λέγουσι καὶ Λεοντεύς, εἷς τῶν ἐπ’ ἄκρον Ἐπικούρου μαθητῶν, πρὸς Λυκόφρονα γράφων τιμᾶσθαι τέ φησι τὸν Δημόκριτον ὑπ’ Ἐπικούρου διὰ τὸ πρότερον ἄψασθαι τῆς ὀρθῆς γνώσεως, καὶ τὸ σύνολον τὴν περὶ φύσεως πραγματείαν Δημοκρίτειον προσαγορεύεσθαι διὰ τὸ περιπεσεῖν αὐτὸν πρότερον ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. ὁ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἀντικρυς <ἐν τῷ> περὶ Φιλοσοφίας εἴρηκεν (fr. 33), [f] ὥς, εἰ μὴ προκαθηγήσατο Δημόκριτος, οὐκ ἂν προῆλθεν Ἐπίκουρος ἐπὶ τὴν σοφίαν. ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τὰ Δημοκρίτου δόγματα ζῆν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥς οἴεται Κωλώτης, γελοῖος ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ζῆν ἄγοντι Δημοκρίτῳ κατακολουθῶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος.

Ἐγκαλεῖ δ' αὐτῷ πρῶτον, ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον εἰπὼν οὐ μᾶλλον τοῖον ἢ τοῖον εἶναι συγκέχυκε τὸν [1109] [a] βίον. ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτόν γε Δημόκριτος ἀποδεῖ τοῦ νομίζειν μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, ὥστε Πρωταγόρα τῷ σοφιστῇ τοῦτ' εἰπόντι μεμαχῆσθαι καὶ γεγραφέναι πολλὰ καὶ πιθανὰ πρὸς αὐτόν. οἷς οὐδ' ὄναρ ἐντυχὼν ὁ Κωλώτης ἐσφάλη περὶ λέξιν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἐν ᾗ διορίζεται μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ 'δέν' ἢ τὸ 'μηδέν' εἶναι, 'δέν' μὲν ὀνομάζων τὸ σῶμα 'μηδέν' δὲ τὸ κενόν, ὡς καὶ τούτου φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ἔχοντος. ὁ δ' οὖν δόξας τὸ 'μηδέν μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον' Ἐπικουρεῖω δόγματι κέχρηται, τῷ 'πάσας εἶναι τὰς δι' αἰσθήσεως [b] φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς'. εἰ γὰρ δυοῖν λεγόντων τοῦ μὲν αὐστηρὸν εἶναι τὸν οἶνον τοῦ δὲ γλυκὺν οὐδέτερος ψεύδεται τῇ αἰσθήσει, τί μᾶλλον ὁ οἶνος αὐστηρὸς ἢ γλυκύς ἐστι; καὶ μὴν λουτρῷ γε τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς μὲν ὡς θερμῷ τοὺς δ' ὡς ψυχρῷ χρωμένους ἰδεῖν ἔστιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ψυχρὸν οἱ δὲ θερμὸν ἐπιβάλλειν κελεύουσι. πρὸς δὲ Βερρονίκην τὴν Δηϊοτάρου τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τινὰ γυναικῶν ἀφικέσθαι λέγουσιν· ὡς δ' ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων προσῆλθον, εὐθὺς ἀποστραφῆναι τὴν μὲν τὸ μύρον ὡς ἔοικε τὴν δὲ τὸ βούτυρον δυσχεράνασαν. εἴπερ οὖν μὴ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας ἀληθοῦς αἴσθησις, εἰκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ [c] ὕδωρ μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ μύρον καὶ τὸ βούτυρον μὴ μᾶλλον εὐῶδες ἢ δυσῶδες. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ φαινόμενον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ φάσκει τις «ἀμφοτέροις τοιοῦτον εἶναι», ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι λέγων λέληθεν.

Αἱ δὲ πολυθρύλητοι συμμετρίαι καὶ ἀρμονίαι τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια πόρων αἵ τε πολυμιξίαι τῶν σπερμάτων, ἃ δὴ πᾶσι χυμοῖς καὶ ὁσμαῖς καὶ χροιαῖς ἐνδισπαρμένα λέγουσιν ἑτέραν ἑτέρῳ ποιότητος κινεῖν αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ἄντικρυς εἰς τὸ 'μὴ μᾶλλον' τὰ πράγματα συνελαύνουσιν αὐτοῖς; τοὺς γὰρ οἰομένους ψεύδεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία πάθη γινόμενα τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀπὸ [d] τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρῶσι, παραμυθούμενοι διδάσκουσιν, ὡς ἀναπεφυρμένων καὶ συμμεμιγμένων ὁμοῦ τι πάντων, ἄλλου δ' ἄλλω πεφυκότος ἐναρμόττειν οὐκ ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς «πᾶσι» ποιότητος ἐπαφὴ καὶ ἀντίληψις οὐδὲ πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι κινεῖ πάντας ὡσαύτως τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ' ἐκείνοις ἕκαστοι μόνοις ἐντυχάνοντες, πρὸς ἃ σύμμετρον ἔχουσι τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διαμάχονται περὶ τοῦ χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὰς αὐτῶν οἰόμενοι βεβαιοῦν αἰσθήσεις τῷ

τάς ἄλλων ἀναιρεῖν· δεῖ δ' αἰσθήσει μὲν μηδεμιᾷ μάχεσθαι (πᾶσαι γὰρ ἄπτονται τινος, οἶον ἐκ πηγῆς τῆς πολυμιξίας ἐκάστη [e] λαμβάνουσα τὸ πρόσφορον καὶ οἰκεῖον), ὅλου δὲ μὴ κατηγορεῖν ἀπτομένους μερῶν, μηδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ δεῖν οἶεσθαι πᾶσχειν ἅπαντας, ἄλλους κατ' ἄλλην ποιότητα καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ πᾶσχοντας. ὥρα δὴ σκοπεῖν, τίνες μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι τό 'μὴ μᾶλλον' ἐπάγουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἢ οἱ πᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰσθητὸν κρᾶμα παντοδαπῶν ποιότητων ἀποφαίνουσι, 'σύμμικτον ὥστε γλεῦκος αὐλητήριον' (Trag. adespr. 420), ἔρρειν δ' ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς κανόνας αὐτοῖς καὶ παντάπασιν οἷχεσθαι τὸ κριτήριο, ἄνπερ εἰλικρινὲς αἰσθητὸν ὀτιοῦν καὶ μὴ πολλὰ ἕκαστον ἀπολίπωσιν.

Ὅρα δὴ ἃ περὶ τοῦ οἴνου τῆς θερμότητος ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ Πολύαινον αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον Ἐπίκουρος πεποίηκε.

[f] λέγοντος γὰρ 'οὐ φῆς εἶναι, ὦ Ἐπίκουρε, τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου διαθερμασίας;' ὑπέλαβε †'τίς σε τοκαθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι'; καὶ μετὰ σμικρὸν 'φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸ καθόλου οὐκ εἶναι θερμαντικὸς ὁ οἶνος, τοῦδε δέ τινος ὁ τοσοῦτος εἶναι θερμαντικὸς ἂν ῥηθείη.' καὶ πάλιν αἰτίαν ὑπειπὼν θλίψεις τε καὶ διασπορὰς [1110] [a] ἀτόμων, ἐτέρων δὲ συμμίξεις καὶ παραζεύξεις αἰτιασάμενος ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καταμίζει τοῦ οἴνου, ἐπιλέγει 'διὸ δὴ καθόλου μὲν οὐ ῥητέον τὸν οἶνον εἶναι θερμαντικόν, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φύσεως καὶ τῆς οὕτω διακειμένης θερμαντικὸν τὸν τοσοῦτον ἢ τῆσδε τὸν τοσοῦτον εἶναι ψυκτικόν. ἔνεισι γὰρ καὶ τοιαῦται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀθροίσματι φύσεις, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ψυχρὸν συσταίῃ, <ἢ αἷ> εἰς δέον γε ἐτέραις παραζυγεῖσαι ψυχρασίας φύσιν ἀποτελέσειαν· ὅθεν ἐξαπατῶμενοι οἱ μὲν ψυκτικὸν τὸ καθόλου φασὶν εἶναι τὸν οἶνον οἱ δὲ θερμαντικόν.' ὁ δὲ λέγων ἐξηπατῆσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς τὸ θερμαῖνον θερμαντικόν [b] ἢ τὸ ψυχὸν ψυκτικὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντας, εἰ μὴ νομίζοι τό 'μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον ἕκαστον' ἀκολουθεῖν οἷς εἴρηκεν, αὐτὸς ἐξηπάτηται.

Προστίθῃσι δ' ὅτι 'πολλάκις οὐδ' ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σῶμα θερμαντικὴν ἐπιφέρων ἢ ψυκτικὴν δύναμιν ὁ οἶνος, ἀλλὰ κινηθέντος τοῦ ὄγκου καὶ γενομένης τῶν σωμάτων μεταστάσεως αἱ ποιοῦσαι τὸ θερμὸν ἄτομοι νῦν μὲν συνῆλθον εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ παρέσχον ὑπὸ πλήθους θερμότητα καὶ

πύρωσιν τῷ σώματι, νῦν δ' ἐκπεσοῦσαι κατέψυξαν. ὅτι δὲ τούτοις πρὸς  
 πᾶν ἔστι χρῆσθαι τὸ καλούμενον καὶ νομιζόμενον πικρὸν γλυκὺ καθαρτικὸν  
 ὑπνωτικὸν φωτεινόν, ὡς οὐδενὸς ἔχοντος αὐτοτελῆ ποιότητα [c] καὶ δύναμιν  
 οὐδὲ δρῶντος μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχοντος, ὅταν ἐγγένηται τοῖς σώμασιν, ἄλλην  
 δ' ἐν ἄλλοις διαφορὰν καὶ κρᾶσιν λαμβάνοντος, οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. αὐτὸς  
 γὰρ οὖν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν πρὸς Θεόφραστον οὐκ εἶναι  
 λέγων τὰ χρώματα συμφυῇ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιὰς τινὰς  
 τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ μᾶλλον φησι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον  
 ἀχρωμάτιστον σῶμα εἶναι ἢ χρῶμα ἔχον. ἀνωτέρῳ δὲ κατὰ λέξιν ταῦτα  
 γέγραφεν· ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τούτου τοῦ μέρους οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ  
 σκότει ταῦτ' ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα [d] ἔχειν. καίτοι πολλάκις ἀέρος ὁμοίως  
 σκοτώδους περιεχυμένου οἱ μὲν αἰσθάνονται χρωμάτων διαφορᾶς οἱ δ'  
 οὐκ αἰσθάνονται δι' ἀμβλύτητα τῆς ὄψεως· ἔτι δ' εἰσελθόντες εἰς σκοτεινὸν  
 οἶκον οὐδεμίαν ὄψιν χρώματος ὁρῶμεν ἀναμείναντες δὲ μικρὸν ὁρῶμεν.  
 οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα ῥηθήσεται τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον.  
 εἰ δὲ τὸ χρῶμα πρὸς τι, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἔσται πρὸς τι καὶ τὸ κυανοῦν, εἰ δὲ  
 ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν. ὥστε κατὰ πάσης ποιότητος ἀληθῶς τὸ  
 μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι κατηγορεῖσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ οὕτω πάσχουσιν ἔσται  
 τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται δὲ τοῖς μὴ πάσχουσι. τὸν οὖν βόρβορον [e] καὶ τὸν  
 «πηλόν», ἐν ᾧ φησι γίνεσθαι τοὺς τό «μηδὲν μᾶλλον» ἐπιφθεγγομένους τοῖς  
 πράγμασιν, ἑαυτοῦ κατασκεδάννυσι καὶ τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ὁ Κωλώτης.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐνταῦθα μόνον ὁ γενναῖος «ἄλλων ἱατρὸς αὐτὸς ἔλκεσιν βρύων»  
 ἀναπέφηνεν; οὐ μὲν οὖν· ἀλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν ἐπιτιμημάτων  
 λέληθε τῷ Δημοκρίτῳ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν συνεξωθῶν. τὸ γὰρ νόμῳ  
 χροίην εἶναι καὶ νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ σύγκρισιν «ἅπασαν, ἔτεῃ δὲ τὸ  
 κενὸν καὶ» τὰς ἀτόμους εἰρημένον φησὶν ὑπὸ Δημοκρίτου «μάχεσθαι» ταῖς  
 αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ τὸν ἐμμένοντα τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καὶ χρώμενον οὐδ' ἂν [f]  
 αὐτὸν ὡς «ἄνθρωπός» ἐστὶν ἢ ζῆ διανοηθῆναι. πρὸς τοῦτον ἀντειπεῖν μὲν  
 οὐδὲν ἔχω τὸν λόγον, εἰπεῖν δέ, ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν Ἐπικούρου δογμάτων οὕτως  
 ἀχώριστά ἐστιν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ βάρος αὐτοὶ τῆς ἀτόμου λέγουσι. τί γὰρ  
 λέγει Δημόκριτος; οὐσίας ἀπείρους τὸ πλῆθος ἀτόμους τε καὶ ἀδιαφθόρους,  
 ἔτι δ' ἀποίους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι διεσπαρμένους· ὅταν δὲ  
 πελάσωσιν [1111] [a] ἀλλήλαις ἢ συμπέσωσιν ἢ περιπλακῶσι, φαίνεσθαι

τῶν ἀθροιζομένων τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ πῦρ τὸ δὲ φυτὸν τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπον, εἶναι δὲ πάντα τὰς ἀτόμους, ιδέας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ εἶναι γένεσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ὄντων μηδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι τῷ μήτε πάσχειν μήτε μεταβάλλειν τὰς ἀτόμους ὑπὸ στερρότητος· ὅθεν οὔτε χροῖαν ἐξ ἀχρώστων οὔτε φύσιν ἢ ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀποίων καὶ «ἀψύχων» ὑπάρχειν. ἐγκλητέος οὖν ὁ Δημόκριτος οὐχὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὁμολογῶν ἀλλὰ λαμβάνων ἀρχὰς αἷς ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν. ἔδει γὰρ [b] ἀμετάβλητα μὴ θέσθαι τὰ πρῶτα, θέμενον δὲ δὴ συνορᾶν ὅτι ποιότητος οἷχεται πάσης γένεσις. ἀρνεῖσθαι δὲ συνορῶντα τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἀναισχυντότατον· «ὥστ' ἀναισχυντότατον», ὃ Ἐπίκουρός φησιν, ἀρχὰς μὲν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὰς αὐτάς, οὐ λέγειν δὲ «νόμῳ χροίην καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ λευκόν» καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας. εἰ μὲν οὖν τό «οὐ λέγειν τοιοῦτον» ἐστὶν «οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν», τῶν εἰθισμένων τι ποιεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν εὐσέβειαν ἀπολείπειν λέγει, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔνεκα τὴν φιλίαν αἰρούμενος ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων τὰς μεγίστας ἀλγηδόνας ἀναδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν πᾶν ἄπειρον ὑποτίθεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω [c] μὴ ἀναιρεῖν. †ἔστι δὲ οὐς... κύλικα μὲν λαβόντα καὶ πιεῖν ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀποδοῦναι τὸ λεῖπον, ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μάλιστα δεῖ τοῦ σοφοῦ τούτου μνημονεύειν ἀποφθέγματος «ὧν αἱ ἀρχαὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι, τὰ τέλη ἀναγκαῖα». οὐκ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑποθέσθαι μᾶλλον δ' ὑφελέσθαι Δημοκρίτου, ἀτόμους εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς· θεμένῳ δὲ τὸ δόγμα καὶ καλλωπισαμένῳ ταῖς πρώταις πιθανότησιν αὐτοῦ προσεκποτέον ἐστὶ τὸ δυσχερές, ἢ δεικτέον ὅπως ἅποια σώματα παντοδαπὰς ποιότητας αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ συνελθεῖν παρέσχεν. οἷον εὐθύς, τὸ καλούμενον θερμὸν ὑμῖν πόθεν ἀφίκται καὶ πῶς ἐπιγέγονε ταῖς [d] ἀτόμοις, αἱ μὴτ' ἦλθον ἔχουσαι θερμότητα μὴτ' ἐγένοντο θερμαὶ συνελθοῦσαι; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντος ποιότητα τὸ δὲ πάσχειν πεφυκότος, οὐδέτερον δὲ ταῖς ἀτόμοις ὑπάρχειν φατὲ προσῆκον εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν.

«Τί οὖν; οὐχὶ καὶ Πλάτωνι συνέβαινε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Ξενοκράτει χρυσὸν ἐκ μὴ χρυσοῦ καὶ λίθον ἐκ μὴ λίθου καὶ τᾶλλα γεννᾶν ἐκ τεσσάρων ἀπλῶν καὶ πρώτων ἅπαντα;» πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλ' ἐκείνοις μὲν εὐθύς τε συνίασιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου γένεσιν ὥσπερ συμβολὰς μεγάλας φέρουσαι τὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ποιότητας, καὶ [e] ὅταν συνέλθωσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συμπέσωσι ξηροῖς ὑγρὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ θερμοῖς καὶ στερεὰ μαλθακοῖς,



σώματα κινούμενα παθητικῶς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ μεταβάλλοντα δι' ὅλων, ἑτέραν ἀφ' ἑτέρας κράσεως συναποτίκτει γένεσιν. ἡ δ' ἄτομος αὐτὴ τε καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἔρημός ἐστι καὶ γυμνὴ πάσης γονίμου δυνάμεως, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην προσπεσοῦσα βρασμὸν ὑπὸ σκληρότητος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν ἔσχεν οὐδ' ἐποίησε πάθος, ἀλλὰ παίονται καὶ παίουσι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, οὐχ ὅπως ζῶον ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ φύσιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πλῆθος ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινὸν οὐδὲ σωρὸν ἓνα παλλομένων ἀεὶ καὶ [f] δισταμένων δυνάμεναι παρασχεῖν.

Ὁ δὲ Κωλώτης, ὥσπερ ἀγραμμάτῳ βασιλεῖ προσδιαλεγόμενος, πάλιν ἐξάπτεται τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους ταῦτ' οὖν πνέοντος (B 8).

‘ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἐκάστου

θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένη θανάτῳ γενέθλη·

ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων

ἔστι, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισι.’

ταῦτ' ἐγὼ μὲν οὐχ ὁρῶ καθ' ὃ τι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ὑπεναντιοῦται [1112] [a] τοῖς ὑπολαμβάνουσι μήτε γένεσιν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι μήτε φθορὰν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ὄντων τινῶν συνόδῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὴν γένεσιν διαλύσει δ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸν θάνατον ἐπονομάζεσθαι. ὅτι γὰρ ἀντὶ τῆς γενέσεως εἴρηκε τὴν φύσιν, ἀντιθεὶς τὸν θάνατον αὐτῇ δεδήλωκεν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. εἰ δ' οἱ μίξεις τὰς γενέσεις τιθέμενοι τὰς δὲ φθορὰς διαλύσεις οὐ ζῶσιν οὐδὲ δύνανται ζῆν, τί ποιοῦσιν ἕτερον οὗτοι; καίτοι ὁ μὲν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα κολλῶν καὶ συναρμόττων θερμότησι καὶ μαλακότησι καὶ ὑγρότησι μῖξιν αὐτοῖς καὶ συμφυΐαν ἐνωτικὴν ἀμωσγέπως ἐνδίδωσιν, οἱ [b] δὲ τὰς ἀτρέπτους καὶ ἀσυμπαθεῖς ἀτόμους εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνελαύνοντες ἐξ αὐτῶν μὲν οὐδέν, αὐτῶν δὲ πολλὰς ποιοῦσι καὶ συνεχεῖς πληγὰς. ἡ γὰρ περιπλοκὴ κωλύουσα τὴν διάλυσιν μᾶλλον ἐπιτείνει τὴν σύγκρουσιν, ὥστε μὴδὲ μῖξιν εἶναι μὴδὲ κόλλησιν ἀλλὰ ταραχὴν καὶ μάχην κατ' αὐτοὺς τὴν λεγομένην γένεσιν· εἰ δ' ἀκαρὲς ... νῦν μὲν ἀπίασι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν, νῦν δὲ προσίασι τῆς πληγῆς ἐκλυθείσης, πλεῖον ἢ διπλάσιον χωρὶς εἰσιν ἀλλήλων χρόνον, οὐ ψάφουσαι καὶ πλησιάζουσιν, ὥστε μὴδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖσθαι μὴδ' ἄψυχον, αἴσθησις δὲ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ νοῦς [c] καὶ φρόνησις οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἐπίνοιαν δίδωσιν ὡς γένοιτ' ἂν ἐν κενῷ καὶ ἀτόμοις. ὧν οὔτε καθ' ἑαυτὰ

ποιότης ἐστὶν οὔτε πάθος ἢ μεταβολὴ συνελθόντων, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ συνέλευσις ἢ σύγκρασις ποιοῦσα καὶ μῖξιν καὶ συμφυΐαν ἀλλὰ πληγὰς καὶ ἀποπηδήσεις. ὥστε τοῖς τούτων δόγμασι τὸ ζῆν ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ ζῶον εἶναι, κενὰς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀθέους καὶ ἀψύχους, ἔτι δ’ ἀμίκτους καὶ ἀσυγκράτους ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθεμένοις.

Πῶς οὖν ἀπολείπουσι φύσιν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ ζῶον; ὡς ὄρκον ὡς εὐχὴν ὡς θυσίαν ὡς προσκύνησιν, ῥήματι καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ φάναι καὶ προσποιεῖσθαι καὶ ὀνομάζειν, ἃ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἀναιροῦσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τὸ [d] πεφυκὸς αὐτοὶ φύσιν καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς γένεσιν ὀνομάζουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ξυλείαν τὰ ξύλα καὶ συμφωνίαν καλοῦντες ἐκφορικῶς τὰ συμφωνοῦντα, πόθεν ἐπῆλθεν αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα προβάλλειν ἐρωτήματα τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ; ‘τί κόπτομεν’ φησὶν ‘ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, σπουδάζοντες ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὀρεγόμενοί τινων πραγμάτων καὶ φυλαττόμενοί τινα πράγματα; οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν οὔτ’ ἄλλ’ οἷς χρώμενοι ζῶμεν.’ ἀλλὰ θάρρει, φαίη τις ἄν, ὃ φίλον Κωλωτάριον· οὐδεὶς σε κωλύει σπουδάζειν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, διδάσκων ὅτι ‘Κωλώτου φύσις’ αὐτὸς ὁ Κωλώτης ἐστὶν ἄλλο δ’ οὐθέν, [e] οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι (τὰ δὲ πράγματα ὑμῖν ἡδοναί εἰσιν), ὑποδεικνύων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμήτων φύσις οὐδ’ ὁσμῶν οὐδὲ πλησιάσεως, ἄμητες δ’ εἰσὶ καὶ μύρα καὶ γυναικες. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ γραμματικὸς λέγων τὸ ‘βίην Ἡρακλείην’ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν Ἡρακλέα <ἀναιρεῖ τὸν Ἡρακλέα>, οὐδ’ οἱ τὰς συμφωνίας καὶ τὰς δοκώσεις ἐκφορὰς μόνον εἶναι φάσκοντες οὐχὶ καὶ φθόγγους καὶ δοκοὺς ὑπάρχειν λέγουσιν· ὅπου καὶ ψυχὴν τινες ἀναιροῦντες καὶ φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ ζῆν ἀναιρεῖν οὔτε τὸ φρονεῖν δοκοῦσιν. Ἐπικούρου δὲ λέγοντος ‘ἢ τῶν ὄντων φύσις σώματά ἐστι καὶ τόπος’, πότερον οὕτως ἀκούωμεν ὡς ἄλλο τι τὴν φύσιν παρὰ τὰ ὄντα [f] βουλομένου λέγειν <ἢ> τὰ ὄντα δηλοῦντος ἕτερον δὲ μηθέν; ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ κενοῦ φύσιν αὐτὸ τὸ κενόν, καὶ νῆ Δία τὸ πᾶν ‘παντὸς φύσιν’ ὀνομάζειν εἴωθε. κἂν εἴ τις ἔροιτο ‘τί λέγεις, ὃ Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ μὲν τι κενὸν εἶναι τὸ δὲ φύσιν κενοῦ;’ ‘μὰ Δία’ φήσει, ‘νενόμισται δέ πως ἢ τοιαύτη τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμιλία, νόμῳ δ’ ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.’ τί οὖν ἕτερον ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πεποίηκεν [ἦ] διδάξας ὅτι φύσις παρὰ τὸ φυόμενον οὐθέν ἐστὶν οὐδὲ θάνατος παρὰ [1113] [a] τὸ θνησκον, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ πολλάκις ἀνειδωλοποιοῦντες λέγουσιν ‘ἐν δ’ Ἔρις, ἐν δὲ Κυδοιμὸς ὁμίλεον, ἐν δ’ ὀλοὴ Κήρ’ (Σ 535), οὕτως γένεσιν τινα καὶ φθορὰν καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ

τοῖς συνισταμένοις καὶ διαλυομένοις; τοσοῦτον <δ> ἐδέησε τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὄντα καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, ἀλλ' ὅσον εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλάπτουσιν ἀπάτην παρεῖχεν ἀφελὼν αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὸ νενομισμένον ἐν τούτοις (B 9).

‘οἱ δ’ ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα ἴμιγνεν φῶς αἰθέρι ...

ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων

[b] ἢ κατ’ οἰωνῶν, τότε μὲν τὸν ... γενέσθαι.

εὖτε δ’ ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ’ αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον.

ἢ θέμις, <οὐ> καλέουσι· νόμῳ δ’ ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.’

<ἀ> ὁ Κωλώτης παραθέμενος οὐ συνέιδεν ὅτι φῶτας μὲν καὶ θήρας καὶ θάμνους καὶ οἰωνοὺς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ἀνήρηκεν, ἃ γέ φησι μιγνυμένων τῶν στοιχείων ἀποτελεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ τῇ συγκρίσει ταύτη καὶ διακρίσει ‘φύσιν’ τινὰ καὶ ‘πότμον δυσδαίμονα’ καὶ ‘θάνατον ἀλοίτην’ ἐπικατηγοροῦντας ἢ σφάλλονται διδάξας οὐκ ἀφείλετο τὸ χρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰθισμέναις φωναῖς περὶ αὐτῶν.

Ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ μὴ τοῦτο κινεῖν τὸ ἐκφορικὸν ὁ [c] Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἀλλ’, ὡς πρότερον εἴρηται, πραγματικῶς διαφέρεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γενέσεως, ἣν φύσιν τινὲς καλοῦσι· δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα διὰ τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν (B 11)

‘νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι·

οἳ δὲ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔδον ἐλπίζουσιν

ἢ τι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη.’

ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ ἔπη μέγα βοῶντός ἐστι τοῖς ὧτα ἔχουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ γενέσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθορὰν ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντη, τουτέστι τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπολλύουσιν. ἐπεὶ τῷ γε βουλομένῳ μὴ ἀγρίως οὕτω μηδ’ ἡλιθίως ἀλλὰ πρῶτον συκοφαντεῖν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἂν [d] αἰτιάσασθαι παράσχοι, τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους λέγοντος (B 15)

‘οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο,

ὥς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιώσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι,  
τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσιν καὶ σφιν πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,  
πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ <ἐπεὶ> λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσί.‘

ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἄρνούμενου μὴ εἶναι τοὺς γεγονότας καὶ ζῶντάς ἐστιν, εἶναι δὲ μᾶλλον οἰομένου καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας. ἀλλ' ὅμως ὁ Κωλώτης τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐγκέκληκε, λέγει δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν οὐδὲ νοσήσειν ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ τραυματισθήσεσθαι. καὶ πῶς ὁ πρὸ τοῦ βίου καὶ μετὰ τὸν βίον ἐκάστω λέγων παρεῖναι δεινὰ [e] καὶ ἐσθλά, περὶ τοὺς ζῶντας οὐκ ἀπολείπει τὸ πάσχειν; τίσιν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἔπεται τὸ μὴ τραυματίζεσθαι μηδὲ νοσεῖν, ὧ Κωλῶτα; ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐξ ἀτόμου καὶ κενοῦ συμπεπηγόσιν, ὧν οὐδετέρῳ μέτεστιν αἰσθήσεως. καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μηδ' ἡδονὴν τὸ ποιῆσον ὑμῖν ἔστι, τῆς μὲν ἀτόμου μὴ δεχομένης τὰ ποιητικά τοῦ δὲ κενοῦ μὴ πάσχοντος ὑπ' αὐτῶν. -

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν Κωλώτης ἐφεξῆς τῷ Δημοκρίτῳ τὸν Παρμενίδην ἐβούλετο συγκατορύσσειν, ἐγὼ δ' ὑπερβὰς τὰ ἐκείνου τὰ τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους προέλαβον διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγκλήμασιν αὐτοῦ, ἀναλάβωμεν [f] τὸν Παρμενίδην. ἃ μὲν οὖν αὐτόν φησιν αἰσχρὰ σοφίσματα λέγειν ὁ Κωλώτης, τούτοις ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνὴρ οὐ φιλίαν ἐποίησεν ἀδοξοτέραν, οὐ φιληδονίαν θρασυτέραν, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ ἀγωγὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ δι' ἑαυτὸ τίμιον ἀφεῖλεν, οὐ τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας συνετάραξε· τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐν εἰπὼν [1114] [a] οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ζῆν ἡμᾶς κεκώλυκε. καὶ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος, ὅταν λέγῃ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρον εἶναι καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ μῆτ' αὐξόμενον μῆτε μειούμενον, ὥς περὶ ἐνός τινος διαλέγεται τοῦ παντός. ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ τῆς πραγματείας ὑπειπὼν τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν σώματα εἶναι καὶ κενὸν ὥς μιᾶς οὔσης εἰς δύο πεποιήται τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὧν θάτερον ὄντως μὲν οὐθέν ἐστιν, ὀνομάζεται δ' ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀναφές καὶ κενὸν καὶ ἀσώματον· ὥστε καὶ ὑμῖν ἐν τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ βούλεσθε κεναῖς φωναῖς περὶ κενοῦ χρῆσθαι, σκιαμαχοῦντες πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους. ἀλλ' ἄπειρα νῆ Δία πλήθει τὰ σώματα κατ' Ἐπικούρον ἐστι, καὶ γίνεται τῶν φαινομένων [b] ἕκαστον ἐξ ἐκείνων. ὄρα μέντοι, ἃς ὑποτίθεσθε πρὸς γένεσιν ἀρχάς, ἀπειρίαν καὶ κενόν· ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄπρακτον ἀπαθές ἀσώματον, ἢ δ' ἄτακτος ἄλογος ἀπερίληπτος, αὐτὴν ἀναλύουσα καὶ ταραττούσα τῷ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι μηδ' ὀρίζεσθαι διὰ πλήθος.

ἀλλ' ὃ γε Παρμενίδης οὔτε πῦρ ἀνήρηκεν οὔθ' ὕδωρ οὔτε κρημνὸν οὔτε πόλεις, ὥς φησι Κωλώτης, ἐν Εὐρώπῃ καὶ Ἀσίᾳ κατοικουμένας· ὅς γε καὶ διάκοσμον πεποίηται, καὶ στοιχεῖα μινύς, τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ σκοτεινόν, ἐκ τούτων τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ. καὶ γὰρ περὶ γῆς εἶρηκε πολλὰ καὶ περὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἡλίου [c] καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρον καὶ γένεσιν ἀνθρώπων ἀφήγηται· καὶ οὐδὲν ἄρρητον, ὥς ἀνὴρ ἀρχαῖος ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ συνθεῖς γραφὴν ἰδίαν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν διαφορῶν, τῶν κυρίων παρήκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους ἔτι πρότερος συνεῖδεν, ὥς ἔχει τι δοξαστὸν ἢ φύσις ἔχει δὲ καὶ νοητόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δοξαστὸν ἀβέβαιον καὶ πλανητὸν ἐν πάθεσι πολλοῖς καὶ μεταβολαῖς τῷ φθίνειν καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ μηδ' ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὡσαύτως τῇ αἰσθήσει, τοῦ νοητοῦ δ' ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔστι γάρ

‘οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀγέννητον’,

[d] ὥς αὐτὸς εἶρηκε (B 8, 4), καὶ ὅμοιον ἑαυτῷ καὶ μόνιμον ἐν τῷ εἶναι, ταῦτα συκοφαντῶν ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς ὁ Κωλώτης καὶ τῷ ῥήματι διώκων οὐ τῷ πράγματι τὸν λόγον ἀπλῶς φησι πάντ' ἀναιρεῖν τῷ ἐν ὄν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸν Παρμενίδην. ὁ δ' ἀναιρεῖ μὲν οὐδετέραν φύσιν, ἑκατέρᾳ δ' ἀποδιδούς τὸ προσήκον εἰς μὲν τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὄντος ιδέαν τίθεται τὸ νοητόν, ὃν μὲν ὥς αἰδίων καὶ ἀφθαρτον ἐν δ' ὁμοιότητι πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ μὴ δέχεσθαι διαφορὰν προσαγορεύσας, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἄτακτον καὶ φερομένην τὸ αἰσθητόν. ὣν καὶ κριτήριον ἰδεῖν ἔστιν, ‘ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκλές [e] ἦτορ’, τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχοντος ὡσαύτως ἀπτόμενον, ‘ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας αἷς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθείης’ (Parmen. B 1, 29. 30) διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ πάθη καὶ ἀνομοιότητας δεχομένοις ὁμιλεῖν πράγμασι. καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἀπέλιπεν αἰσθησιν καὶ δόξαν, αἰσθητὸν μὴ ἀπολιπὼν μηδὲ δοξαστόν; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὄντως ὄντι προσήκει διαμένειν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, ταῦτα δὲ νῦν μὲν ἔστι νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐξίσταται δ' ἀεὶ καὶ μεταλλάσσει τὴν φύσιν, ἐτέρας ὥετο μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐκείνου τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ δεῖσθαι προσηγορίας. ἦν οὖν ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὥς ἐν εἴῃ λόγος οὐκ ἀναίρεσις τῶν πολλῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν, [f] ἀλλὰ δήλωσις αὐτῶν τῆς πρὸς τὸ νοητόν διαφορᾶς. ἦν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐνδεικνύμενος Πλάτων τῇ περὶ τὰ εἶδη πραγματείᾳ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντίληψιν τῷ Κωλώτῃ παρέσχε. -

Διὸ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον εἰρημένα δοκεῖ μοι λαβεῖν ἐφεξῆς. καὶ πρῶτόν γε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ πολυμάθειαν [1115] [a] τοῦ φιλοσόφου σκεψώμεθα, λέγοντος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς δόγμασι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπηκολουθήκασιν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί. ποῦ γὰρ ὢν τῆς ἀοικήτου τὸ βιβλίον ἔγραφες, ἵνα ταῦτα συντιθεῖς τὰ ἐγκλήματα μὴ τοῖς ἐκείνων συντάγμασιν ἐντύχης μηδ' ἀναλάβης εἰς χεῖρας Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ περὶ Οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὰ περὶ Ψυχῆς, Θεοφράστου δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Φυσικούς, Ἡρακλείδου δὲ τὸν Ζωροάστρην, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, τὸ περὶ τῶν Φυσικῶς ἀπορουμένων, Δικαιάρχου δὲ τὰ περὶ Ψυχῆς, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν φυσικῶν ὑπεναντιούμενοι τῷ Πλάτῳ καὶ [b] μαχόμενοι διατελοῦσι; καὶ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν ὁ κορυφαῖότατος Στράτων οὐτ' Ἀριστοτέλει κατὰ πολλὰ συμφέρεται καὶ Πλάτῳ τὰς ἐναντίας ἔσχηκε δόξας περὶ κινήσεως, περὶ νοῦ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ γενέσεως, τελευτῶν <τε> τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶν εἶναι φησι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην· ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶθ' οὕτως περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον. τὰς γε μὴν ιδέας, περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτῳ, πανταχοῦ κινῶν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ἐν τοῖς <λογικοῖς, ἐν τοῖς> φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν [c] διαλόγων φιλονεικότερον ἐνίοις ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἐκ τῶν δογμάτων τούτων, ὡς προθέμενος τὴν Πλάτωνος ὑπερείπειν φιλοσοφίαν· οὕτω μακρὰν ἦν τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν. τίνας οὖν εὐχερείας ἐστὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι μὴ μαθόντα καταψεύδεσθαι τὰ μὴ δοκοῦντα; καὶ πεπεισμένον ἐλέγχειν ἐτέρους αὐτόγραφον ἐξενεγκεῖν ἀμαθίας ἔλεγχον καθ' αὐτοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος, ὁμολογεῖν Πλάτῳ φάσκοντα τοὺς διαφορομένους καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας;

‘Ἀλλὰ δὴ Πλάτων φησὶ τοὺς ἵππους ὑφ' ἡμῶν ματαίως ἵππους εἶναι <νομίζεσθαι> καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους <ἀνθρώπους>.’ καὶ ποῦ τοῦτο τῶν Πλάτωνος συγγραμμάτων [d] ἀποκεκρυμμένον εὔρεν ὁ Κωλώτης; ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀναγινώσκομεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν ἵππον ἵππον καὶ πῦρ τὸ πῦρ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δοξαζόμενον· ἢ καὶ δοξαστὸν ὀνομάζει τούτων ἕκαστον. ὁ δ' οἷα δὴ σοφίας οὐδ' ἀκαρὲς ἀπέχων ὡς ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν ἔλαβε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. τῷ Πλάτῳ δὲ θαυμαστῶς ἐδόκει διαφέρειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄν εἶναι· τῷ μὲν γὰρ

ἀναίρεσιν οὐσίας πάσης τῷ δ' ἑτερότητα δηλοῦσθαι τοῦ μεθεκτοῦ καὶ τοῦ μετέχοντος. ἦν οἱ μὲν ὕστερον εἰς γένους καὶ εἶδους καὶ κοινῶς τινων καὶ ιδίως λεγομένων ποιῶν διαφορὰν ἔθεντο μόνον, ἀνωτέρω [e] δ' οὐ προῆλθον, εἰς λογικωτέρας ἀπορίας ἐμπεσόντες. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μεθεκτοῦ πρὸς τὸ μετέχον λόγος, ὃν αἰτία τε πρὸς ὕλην ἔχει καὶ παράδειγμα πρὸς εἰκόνα καὶ δύνამις πρὸς πάθος. ὧ γε δὴ μάλιστα τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ διαφέρει τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος· ὅτι τὸ μὲν οὐτ' ἔσται ποτὲ μὴ ὃν οὐτε γέγονε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως καὶ ὄντως ὃν ἔστι, τῷ δ' οὐδ' ὅσον ἀπ' ἄλλου συμβέβηκε μετέχειν τοῦ εἶναι βέβαιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐξίσταται δι' ἀσθένειαν, ἅτε τῆς ὕλης περὶ τὸ εἶδος ὀλισθανούσης καὶ πάθη πολλὰ καὶ μεταβολὰς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τῆς οὐσίας, [f] ὥστε κινεῖσθαι καὶ σαλεύεσθαι, δεχομένης. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ λέγων Πλάτωνα μὴ εἶναι τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν Πλάτωνος οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ὡς εἰκόνας αἰσθησιν αὐτῆς καὶ ὑπαρξιν, ἀλλ' ἐνδείκνυται καθ' αὐτὸ τινος ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἑτέρου γεγονότος διαφορὰν, οὕτως οὐτε φύσιν οὐτε χρῆσιν οὐτ' αἰσθησιν ἀνθρώπων ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ κοινῆς τινος οὐσίας [1116] [a] μετοχῇ καὶ ιδέας γινόμενον ἡμῶν ἕκαστον εἰκόνα τοῦ παρασχόντος τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῇ γενέσει προσαγορεύοντες. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πῦρ μὴ λέγων εἶναι τὸν πεπυρωμένον σίδηρον ἢ τὴν σελήνην ἥλιον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ Παρμενίδην (B 14) 'νυκτιφαῆς περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς', ἀναιρεῖ σιδήρου χρῆσιν ἢ σελήνης φύσιν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ λέγοι σῶμα μηδὲ πεφωτισμένον, ἥδη μάχεται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σῶμα καὶ ζῶον καὶ γένεσιν καὶ αἰσθησιν μὴ ἀπολείπων. ὁ δὲ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ μετεσχηκέναι καὶ ὅσον ἀπολείπεται τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρέχοντος αὐτοῖς ὑπονοῶν οὐ παρορᾷ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἀλλ' «οὐ» παρορᾷ τὸ νοητόν, οὐδ' [b] ἀναιρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φαινόμενα περὶ ἡμᾶς τῶν παθῶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι βεβαιότερα τούτων ἕτερα καὶ μονιμώτερα πρὸς οὐσίαν ἐστὶ τῷ μήτε γίνεσθαι μήτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι μήτε πάσχειν μηθέν, ἐνδείκνυται τοῖς ἐπομένοις καὶ διδάσκει καθαρώτερον τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀπτομένους τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ μὲν ὄντα τὰ δὲ γινόμενα προσαγορεύειν. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις συμβέβηκε· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ἀποστεροῦσι προσηγορίας, τὸ κενὸν τὸν χρόνον τὸν τόπον, ἀπλῶς τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν γένος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τάληθῇ πάντ' ἔνεστι. ταῦτα γὰρ ὄντα μὲν μὴ εἶναι τινὰ δ' εἶναι λέγουσι, χρώμενοι δ' αὐτοῖς ὡς [c] ὑφεστῶσι καὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν διατελοῦσιν.

Ἄλλ' αὐτὸν ἡδέως ἂν ἐροίμην τὸν κατήγορον, εἰ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πράγμασι τὴν διαφορὰν οὐκ ἐνορῶσι ταύτην, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν μόνιμα καὶ ἄτρεπτα <τὰ δὲ μεταβλητὰ καὶ τρεπτά> ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐστίν, ὡς λέγουσι καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ἀπαθεία καὶ στερρότητι πάντα χρόνον ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ συγκρίματα πάντα ῥευστὰ καὶ μεταβλητὰ καὶ γινόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα εἶναι, μυρίων μὲν εἰδώλων ἀπερχομένων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων, μυρίων δ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἐτέρων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐπιρρεόντων καὶ ἀναπληρούντων τὸ ἄθροισμα ποικιλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξαλλαγῆς ταύτης καὶ μετακεραυνύμενον, [d] ἅτε δὴ καὶ τῶν ἐν βάθει τοῦ συγκρίματος ἀτόμων οὐδέποτε λῆξαι κινήσεως οὐδὲ παλμῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας δυναμένων, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν. ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἡ τοιαύτη διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας, σοφώτερος δὲ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἧ πάντα ὁμοίως ὄντα προσαγορεύει, τὸ ἀναφές κενὸν τὸ ἀντερεῖδον σῶμα, τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰ συγκρίματα, κοινῆς καὶ μὴ διαφερούσης ἡγούμενος οὐσίας μετέχειν τὸ αἰδίων τῷ γινομένῳ, τὸ ἀνώλεθρον τῷ φθειρομένῳ, τὰς ἀπαθεῖς καὶ διαρκεῖς καὶ ἀμεταβλήτους καὶ μηδέποτε τοῦ εἶναι δυναμένας ἐκπεσεῖν φύσεις ταύταις ὧν ἐν τῷ πάσχειν καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὸ εἶναι, ταῖς [e] μηδένα χρόνον ὡσαύτως ἐχούσαις; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὡς ἐνὶ μάλιστα διήμαρτε τούτοις ὁ Πλάτων, ὀνομάτων ὥφειλε συγχύσεως εὐθύνας ὑπέχειν τοῖς ἀκριβέστερον ἐλληνίζουσι τούτοις καὶ καθαρώτερον διαλεγομένοις, οὐχ ὡς ἀναιρῶν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξάγων ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὰ γινόμενα <γινόμενα> καὶ οὐκ ὄντα, καθάπερ οὗτοι, προσηγόρευσε. -

Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸν Σωκράτην μετὰ τὸν Παρμενίδην ὑπερέβημεν, ἀναληπτέος ... . εὐθὺς οὖν τὸν ἀφ' ἱερᾶς κεκίνηκεν ὁ Κωλώτης, καὶ διηγησάμενος ὅτι χρησμὸν ἐκ Δελφῶν περὶ Σωκράτους ἀνήνεγκε Χαιρεφῶν, ὃν ἴσμεν [f] ἅπαντες, ταῦτ' ἐπείρηκε· 'τὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ Χαιρεφῶντος διὰ τὸ τελέως σοφιστικὸν καὶ φορτικὸν διήγημα εἶναι παρήσομεν.' φορτικὸς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ὁ τοῦτον ἀναγράψας τὸν χρησμὸν (Apol. 21a), ἵνα τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσω· φορτικώτεροι δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὸν περὶ Λυκούργου χρησμὸν ἐν ταῖς παλαιοτάταις ἀναγραφαῖς ἔχοντες· σοφιστικὸν δ' ἦν διήγημα τὸ Θεμιστοκλέους, ᾧ πείσας Ἀθηναίους τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπεῖν κατεναυμάχησε τὸν βάρβαρον· φορτικοὶ δ' οἱ τῆς [1117] [a] 'Ελλάδος νομοθέται τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλεῖστα τῶν ἱερῶν πυθόχρηστα καθιστάντες. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ περὶ



Σωκράτους, ἀνδρὸς εἰς ἀρετὴν θεολήπτου γενομένου, χρησμὸς ἀνενεχθεὶς ὡς σοφοῦ φορτικὸς ἦν καὶ σοφιστικός, τίνι προσείπωμεν ἀξίως ὀνόματι τοὺς ὑμετέρους ‘βρόμους’ καὶ ‘ὀλολυγμούς’ καὶ ‘κροτοθορύβους’ καὶ ‘σεβάσεις’ καὶ ‘ἐπιθειάσεις’, αἷς προστρέπεσθε καὶ καθυμνεῖτε τὸν ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς παρακαλοῦντα συνεχεῖς καὶ πυκνάς; ὃς ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον ἐπιστολῇ ταυτὶ γέγραφεν ‘ἐγὼ δ’ ἐφ’ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετάς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἐλπίδας.’ ἀλλ’ ὁμως ὁ [b] μὲν Μητρόδωρος τὸν Τίμαρχον παρακαλῶν φησι (fr. 38)· ‘ποιήσωμέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς, μόνον οὐ καταδύντες ταῖς ὁμοιοπαθείαις καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.’ Κωλώτης δ’ αὐτὸς ἀκροώμενος Ἐπικούρου φυσιολογοῦντος ἄφνω τοῖς γόνασιν αὐτοῦ προσέπεσε, καὶ ταῦτα γράφει σεμνυνόμενος αὐτὸς Ἐπίκουρος· ‘ὡς σεβομένῳ γάρ σοι τὰ τόθ’ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν λεγόμενα προσέπεσεν ἐπιθύμημα ἀφυσιολόγητον τοῦ περιπλακῆναι ἡμῖν γονάτων ἐφαπτόμενον καὶ πάσης τῆς εἰθισμένης ἐπιλήψεως γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς σεβάσεις τινῶν [c] καὶ λιτάς· ἐποίεις οὖν’ φησί ‘καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι.’ συγγνωστὰ νῆ Δία τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς παντὸς ἄν πρίαιντο τῆς ὄψεως ἐκείνης εἰκόνα γεγραμμένην θεάσασθαι, τοῦ μὲν προσπίπτοντος εἰς γόνατα καὶ περιπλεκομένου τοῦ δ’ ἀντιλιτανεύοντος καὶ ἀντιπροσκυνοῦντος. οὐ μέντοι τὸ θεράπευμα τοῦτο, καίπερ εὖ τῷ Κωλώτῃ συντεθέν, ἔσχε καρπὸν ἄξιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀνηγορεύθη σοφὸς ἀλλὰ μόνον ‘ἄφθαρτός μοι περιπάτει’ φησί, ‘καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτους διανοοῦ.’ τοιαῦτα μέντοι ῥήματα καὶ κινήματα καὶ πάθη συνειδότες αὐτοῖς ἑτέρους φορτικούς ἀποκαλοῦσι.

[d] Καὶ δῆτα καὶ προθεὶς ὁ Κωλώτης τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ καλὰ περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅτι ‘σιτία προσαγόμεθα καὶ οὐ χόρτον, καὶ τοὺς ποταμούς, ὅταν ὦσι μεγάλοι, πλοίοις διαπερῶμεν, ὅταν δ’ εὐδιάβατοι γένωνται, τοῖς ποσίν’ ἐπιπεφώνηκεν· ‘ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀλαζόνας ἐπετήδευσας λόγους, ὧ Σώκρατες· καὶ ἕτερα μὲν διελέγου τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἕτερα δ’ ἔπραττες.’ πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀλαζόνες οἱ Σωκράτους λόγοι μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἰδέναι φάσκοντος ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ἀεὶ καὶ ζητεῖν τὸ ἀληθές; εἰ δὲ τοιαύταις, ὧ Κωλῶτα, Σωκράτους φωναῖς περιέπεσες, οἷας Ἐπίκουρος γράφει πρὸς Ἰδομενέα· ‘πέμπε οὖν ἀπαρχὰς ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ [e] ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν ὑπὲρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τέκνων· οὕτω γὰρ μοι λέγειν ἐπέρχεται’, τίσιν ἂν ῥήμασιν ἀγροικοτέροις

ἐχρήσω; καὶ μὴν ὅτι Σωκράτης ἄλλα μὲν ἔλεγεν ἄλλα δ' ἔπραττε, θαυμαστῶς μαρτυρεῖ σοι τὰ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ τὰ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα τὰ πρὸς Ἀρχέλαον τὰ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἢ πενία ὁ θάνατος· οὐ γὰρ ἄξια ταῦτα τῶν Σωκρατικῶν λόγων. ἐκεῖνος ἦν, ὦ μακάριε, κατὰ Σωκράτους ἔλεγχος ἕτερα μὲν λέγοντος ἕτερα δὲ πράττοντος, εἰ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν τέλος ἐκθέμενος οὕτως ἐβίωσε.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὰς βλασφημίας. ὅτι δέ, οἷς [f] ἐγκαλεῖ περὶ τῶν ἐναργῶν, ἔνοχος αὐτός ἐστιν, οὐ συνεῖδεν. ἐν γάρ ἐστι τῶν Ἐπικούρου δογμάτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἀμεταπείστως πεπεῖσθαι μηδένα πλὴν τὸν σοφόν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁ Κωλώτης οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς οὐδὲ μετὰ τὰς σεβάσεις ἐκείνας, ἐρωτάτω πρῶτον «αὐτὸν» ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐρωτήματα, πῶς σιτία προσάγεται καὶ οὐ χόρτον ἔπιτήδειος ὢν καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ σώματι καὶ οὐ τῷ κίονι περιτίθησι, μήθ' ἱμάτιον εἶναι τὸ ἱμάτιον μήτε σιτίον τὸ σιτίον ἀμεταπείστως [1118] [a] πεπεισμένος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πράττει καὶ τοὺς ποταμούς, ὅταν ὦσι μεγάλοι, ποσὶν οὐ διέρχεται, καὶ τοὺς ὄφεις φεύγει καὶ τοὺς λύκους, μηδὲν εἶναι τούτων οἷον φαίνεται πεπεισμένος ἀμεταπείστως ἀλλὰ πράττων ἕκαστα κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, οὐδὲ Σωκράτει δῆπουθεν ἐμποδῶν ἦν ἢ περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δόξα τοῦ χρῆσθαι τοῖς φαινομένοις ὁμοίως. οὐ γὰρ Κωλώτη μὲν ὁ ἄρτος ἄρτος ἐφαίνετο καὶ χόρτος ὁ χόρτος, ὅτι τοὺς «διοπετεῖς» ἀνεγνώκει Κανόνας, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ὑπ' ἀλαζονείας ἄρτου μὲν ὡς χόρτου χόρτου δ' ὡς ἄρτου φαντασίαν ἐλάμβανε. δόγμασι γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ λόγοις οὔτοι χρῶνται βελτίοσιν οἱ [b] σοφοί, τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα κοινόν ἐστι πάθος ἀλόγοις περαινόμενον αἰτίαις. ὁ δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις λόγος ἐπαγόμενος ὡς οὐκ ἀκριβεῖς οὐδ' ἀσφαλεῖς πρὸς πίστιν οὔσας οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμῖν ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ χρωμένοις κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ πιστεύειν ὡς ἀληθέσι πάντη καὶ ἀδιαπτώτοις οὐ δίδωσιν αὐταῖς· τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρκεῖ καὶ χρειῶδες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ὅτι βέλτιον ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν· ἦν δὲ ποθεῖ φιλόσοφος ψυχὴ λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην περὶ ἐκάστου καὶ γινῶσιν, οὐκ ἔχουσι.

[c] Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων καὶ πάλιν ὁ Κωλώτης εἰπεῖν παρέξει, ταῦτα πολλοῖς ἐγκεκληκῶς. ἐν οἷς δὲ κομιδῇ διαγελᾶ καὶ φλαυρίζει τὸν Σωκράτην ζητοῦντα τί ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ νεανιευόμενον, ὡς φησιν, ὅτι μηδ' αὐτὸς «αὐτὸν» εἰδείη, δῆλος μὲν ἐστιν αὐτὸς οὐδέποτε πρὸς τούτῳ γενόμενος, ὁ

δ' Ἡράκλειτος ὡς μέγα τι καὶ σεμνὸν διαπεπραγμένος 'ἐδιζησάμην' φησὶν 'ἐμεωυτόν' (B 101), καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων θειότατον ἐδόκει τό 'γνώθι σαυτόν'. ὃ δὴ καὶ Σωκράτει <τῆς> ἀπορίας καὶ ζητήσεως ταύτης ἀρχὴν ἐνέδωκεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς εἴρηκε (fr. 1). Κωλώτη δὲ γελοῖον δοκεῖ. τί οὖν οὐ [d] καταγελᾷ καὶ τοῦ καθηγεμόνος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρᾶττοντος, ὅσάκις γράφοι καὶ διαλέγοιτο περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀθρόου τῆς καταρχῆς; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ὡς ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοί, σώματος τοιοῦδε καὶ ψυχῆς, ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὁ ζητῶν ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖ φύσιν ἐκ τῆς κυριωτέρας ἀρχῆς. ὅτι δ' αὕτη λόγῳ δυσθεώρητος αἰσθήσει δ' ἄληπτός ἐστι, μὴ παρὰ Σωκράτους 'σοφιστοῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνοιο ἀνδρός', ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων λάβωμεν, οἳ μέχρι τῶν περὶ σάρκα τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, αἷς θερμότητα καὶ μαλακότητα καὶ τόνον παρέχει τῷ σώματι, τὴν οὐσίαν [e] συμπηγνύντες αὐτῆς ἔκ τινος θερμοῦ καὶ πνευματικοῦ καὶ ἀερώδους οὐκ ἐξικνουῦνται πρὸς τὸ κυριώτατον ἀλλ' ἀπαγορεύουσι· τὸ γὰρ ὧ κρίνει καὶ μνημονεύει καὶ φιλεῖ καὶ μισεῖ, καὶ ὅλως τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ λογιστικὸν ἔκ τινός φησιν 'ἀκατονομάστου' ποιότητος ἐπιγίνεσθαι. καὶ ὅτι μὲν αἰσχυνομένης ἐστὶν ἀγνοίας τουτὶ τό 'ἀκατονόμαστον' ἐξομολόγησις οὐκ ἔχειν ὀνομάσαι φασκόντων ὃ μὴ δύνανται καταλαβεῖν, ἴσμεν· 'ἐχέτω δὲ συγγνώμην καὶ τοῦτο', ὡς λέγουσι. φαίνεται γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον οὐδὲ ῥάδιον οὐδὲ τοῦ τυχόντος εἶναι καταμαθεῖν ἀλλ' ἐνδεδικὸς ἀπόρῳ τινὶ τόπῳ [f] καὶ δεινῶς ἀποκεκρυμμένον, ὧ γ' ὄνομα μηδὲν ἐν τοσούτοις πρὸς δῆλωσιν οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν. οὐ Σωκράτης οὖν ἀβέλτερος, ὅστις εἶη ζητῶν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες, οἷς ἐπεισὶ τι τῶν ἄλλων πρὸ τούτου ζητεῖν, ὅτι τὴν γνῶσιν ἀναγκαίαν ἔχον οὕτως εὐρεθῆναι χαλεπὸν ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλπίσειεν ἑτέρου λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην, ὃν διαπέφευγε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ κυριώτατον καταλαβεῖν.

Ἀλλὰ διδόντες αὐτῷ τὸ μηδὲν οὕτως ἄχρηστον εἶναι [1119] [a] μηδὲ φορτικὸν ὡς τὸ ζητεῖν αὐτόν, ἐρώμεθα τίς αὕτη τοῦ βίου σύγχυσις ἐστὶν ἢ πῶς ἐν τῷ ζῆν οὐ δύναται διαμένειν ἀνὴρ, ὅτε τύχοι, πρὸς ἑαυτόν ἀναλογιζόμενος 'φέρε, τίς ὢν οὗτος ὁ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω; πότερον ὡς κρᾶμά τι μεμιγμένον ἔκ τε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι χρωμένη, καθάπερ ἵππεὺς ἀνὴρ ἵππῳ χρώμενος, οὐ τὸ ἐξ ἵππου καὶ ἀνδρός; ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κυριώτατον, ὧ φρονοῦμεν καὶ λογιζόμεθα καὶ πράττομεν, ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ καὶ ψυχῆς μόρια πάντα καὶ σώματος ὄργανα

τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ [b] ἔστιν οὐσία ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα κεκραμένον ἔσχηκε τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ ζῆν δύναμιν; ἀλλὰ τούτοις μὲν οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸν βίον ὁ Σωκράτης, ἃ δὲ πάντες οἱ φυσικοὶ ζητοῦσιν, ἐκεῖνα δ’ ἦν τὰ ἐν Φαίδρῳ (230a) δεινὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, αὐτὸν οἰομένου δεῖν ἀναθεωρεῖν, ‘εἴτε Τυφῶνός ἐστι θηρίον πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον εἴτε θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον’; ἀλλὰ τούτοις γε τοῖς ἐπιλογισμοῖς οὐ τὸν βίον ἀνήρει, τὴν δ’ ἐμβροντησίαν ἐκ τοῦ βίου καὶ τὸν τῦφον ἐξήλαυνε καὶ τὰς ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ ὑπερόγκους κατοιήσεις καὶ [c] μεγαλαυχίας. ταῦτα γὰρ ὁ Τυφὼν ἐστίν, ὃν πολὺν ὑμῖν ἐνεποίησεν ὁ καθηγεμὼν καὶ θεοῖς πολεμῶν καὶ θείοις ἀνδράσι. -

Μετὰ δὲ Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα προσμάχεται Στίλπωνι· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθινὰ δόγματα καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοῦ ἀνδρός, οἷς ἑαυτὸν τε κατεκόσμει καὶ πατρίδα καὶ φίλους καὶ τῶν βασιλέων τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν σπουδάσαντας, οὐ γέγραφεν, οὐδ’ ὅσον ἦν φρόνημα τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ πραότητος καὶ μετριοπαθείας, ὧν δὲ παίζων καὶ χρώμενος γέλωτι πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστὰς λογαρίων προύβαλλεν αὐτοῖς, ἐνὸς μνησθεὶς καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο μηδὲν εἰπὼν μηδὲ λύσας τὴν πιθανότητα τραγωδίαν ἐπάγει τῷ Στίλπωνι καὶ τὸν βίον [d] ἀναιρεῖσθαι φησιν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ἕτερον ἑτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. ‘πῶς γὰρ βιωσόμεθα μὴ λέγοντες ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν μὴδ’ ἄνθρωπον στρατηγὸν ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον καὶ χωρὶς ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ στρατηγὸν στρατηγόν, μὴδ’ ἵππεῖς μυρίους μὴδὲ πόλιν ἐχυράν, ἀλλ’ ἵππεῖς ἵππεῖς, καὶ μυρίους μυρίους, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως; τίς δὲ διὰ ταῦτα χεῖρον ἐβίωσεν ἀνθρώπων; τίς δὲ τὸν λόγον ἀκούσας οὐ συνῆκεν, ὅτι παίζοντός ἐστιν εὐμούσως ἢ γύμνασμα τοῦτο προβάλλοντος ἑτέροις διαλεκτικόν; οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, ὃ Κωλῶτα, μὴ λέγειν ἀγαθὸν οὐδ’ ἵππεῖς μυρίους [e] δεινόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν μὴ λέγειν θεὸν μὴδὲ νομίζειν, ὃ πράττετε ὑμεῖς μήτε Δία γενέθλιον μήτε Δήμητραν θεσμοφόρον εἶναι μήτε Ποσειδῶνα φυτάλμιον ὁμολογεῖν ἐθέλοντες. οὗτος ὁ χωρισμὸς τῶν ὀνομάτων πονηρός ἐστι καὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπίπλησιν ὀλιγωρίας ἀθέου καὶ θρασύτητος, ὅταν τὰς συνεζευγμένας τοῖς θεοῖς προσηγορίας ἀποσπῶντες συναναιρῇτε θυσίας μυστήρια πομπὰς ἑορτάς. τίνι γὰρ προτέλεια θύσομεν, τίνι σωτήρια; πῶς δὲ φωσφόρεια, βακχεῖα, προτέλεια γάμων ἄξομεν, μὴ ἀπολιπόντες μὴδὲ βακχεῖς καὶ φωσφόρους καὶ προηροσίους καὶ σωτῆρας; ταῦτα γὰρ ἄπτεται

τῶν κυριωτάτων καὶ μεγίστων [f] ἐν πράγμασιν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀπάτην, οὐ περὶ φωνάς τινας οὐδὲ λεκτῶν σύνταξιν οὐδ' ὀνομάτων συνήθειαν. ὥς εἴ γε καὶ ταῦτα τὸν βίον ἀνατρέπει, τίνες μᾶλλον ὑμῶν πλημμελοῦσι περὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, οἳ τὸ τῶν λεκτῶν γένος οὐσίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχον ἄρδην ἀναιρεῖτε, τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ τυγχάνοντα μόνον ἀπολιπόντες, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ σημαινόμενα πράγματα, δι' ὧν γίνονται μαθήσεις διδασκαλῖαι [1120] [a] προλήψεις νοήσεις ὁρμαὶ συγκαταθέσεις, τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' εἶναι λέγοντες;

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Στίλπωνος τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· εἰ περὶ ἵππου τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, οὗ φησι ταυτόν εἶναι τῷ περὶ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἄλλ' ἕτερον· <οὐδ' εἰ περὶ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἕτερον> μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἕτερον δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἵππον εἶναι τοῦ τρέχοντα εἶναι διαφέρειν· ἐκατέρου γὰρ ἀπαιτούμενοι τὸν λόγον οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδίδομεν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν. ὅθεν ἀμαρτάνειν τοὺς ἕτερον ἑτέρου κατηγοροῦντας ... . εἰ μὲν γὰρ ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ τρέχειν, πῶς καὶ [b] σιτίου καὶ φαρμάκου τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ νῆ Δία πάλιν λέοντος καὶ κυνὸς τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν; <εἰ> δ' ἕτερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἵππον τρέχειν λέγομεν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἐξαιμάξει πικρῶς ὁ Στίλπων, τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων μηδεμίαν ἀπολιπὼν συμπλοκὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, εἰ μὴ κομιδῇ ταυτόν ᾧ συμβέβηκε λέγεται, μηδ' ὥς συμβεβηκὸς οἰόμενος δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι, φωναῖς τισι δυσκολαίνων καὶ πρὸς τὴν συνήθειαν ἐνιστάμενος, οὐ τὸν βίον ἀναιρῶν οὐδὲ τὰ πράγματα δῆλός ἐστι. -

Γενόμενος δ' οὖν ὁ Κωλώτης ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν [c] τρέπεται πρὸς τοὺς καθ' ἑαυτὸν φιλοσόφους, οὐδενὸς τιθεὶς ὄνομα· καίτοι καλῶς εἶχε καὶ τούτους ἐλέγχειν ἐπ' ὀνόματος ἢ μηδὲ τοὺς παλαιούς. ὁ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην τοσαυτάκις θέμενος ὑπὸ τὸ γραφεῖον δῆλός ἐστιν ἀποδειλιάσας πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας, οὐ μετριάσας ὑπ' αἰδοῦς, ἦν τοῖς κρείττοσιν οὐκ ἔνειμε. βούλεται δὲ προτέρους μὲν, ὥς ὑπονοῶ, τοὺς Κυρηναῖκους ἐλέγχειν, δευτέρους δὲ τοὺς περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον Ἀκαδημαῖκούς. οὗτοι γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχοντες· ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς φαντασίας ἐν αὐτοῖς τιθέντες [d] οὐκ ᾔοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων πίστιν εἶναι διαρκῇ πρὸς τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων καταβεβαιώσεις,

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν πολιορκίᾳ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποστάντες εἰς τὰ πάθη κατέκλεισαν  
 αὐτούς, τὸ 'φαίνεται' τιθέμενοι τὸ δ' 'ἐστὶ' «μηκέτι» προσαποφαινόμενοι  
 περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς. διὸ φησιν αὐτοὺς ὁ Κωλώτης μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν μηδὲ  
 χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν· εἴτα κωμῳδῶν 'οὔτοι' φησὶν 'ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ  
 ἵππον καὶ τοῖχον οὐ λέγουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοιχοῦσθαι καὶ ἵπποῦσθαι καὶ  
 ἀνθρωποῦσθαι', πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὥσπερ οἱ συκοφάνται κακούργως χρώμενος  
 τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· ἔπεται μὲν γὰρ ἀμέλει καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἔδει δέ,  
 ὡς ἐκεῖνοι [e] διδάσκουσι, δηλοῦν τὸ γινόμενον. γλυκαίνεσθαι γὰρ λέγουσι  
 καὶ πικραίνεσθαι «καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι» καὶ φωτίζεσθαι καὶ  
 σκοτίζεσθαι, τῶν παθῶν τούτων ἐκάστου τὴν ἐνάργειαν οἰκείαν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ  
 ἀπερίσπαστον ἔχοντος· εἰ δὲ γλυκὺ τὸ μέλι καὶ πικρὸς ὁ θαλλὸς καὶ ψυχρὰ  
 ἢ χάλαζα καὶ θερμὸς ὁ ἄκρατος «καὶ φωτεινὸς ὁ ἥλιος» καὶ σκοτεινὸς ὁ  
 τῆς νυκτὸς ἀήρ, ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ θηρίων καὶ πραγμάτων  
 καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν μὲν δυσχεραίνοντων «τὸ μέλι», τῶν δὲ προσιεμένων  
 τὴν θαλλίαν καὶ ἀποκαομένων ὑπὸ τῆς χαλάζης καὶ καταψυχομένων ὑπ'  
 οἴνου καὶ πρὸς ἥλιον ἀμβλυωπτόντων καὶ [f] νύκτωρ βλεπόντων. ὅθεν  
 ἐμμένουσα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ δόξα διατηρεῖ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον, ἐκβαίνουσα  
 δὲ καὶ πολυπραγμονοῦσα τῷ κρίνειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς  
 αὐτὴν τε πολλάκις τaráσσει καὶ μάχεται πρὸς ἐτέρους ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν  
 ἐναντία πάθη καὶ διαφόρους φαντασίας λαμβάνοντας. ὁ δὲ Κωλώτης ἔοικε  
 τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν τοῖς νεωστὶ γράμματα μανθάνουσι τῶν παίδων, οἱ τοὺς  
 χαρακτῆρας ἐν τοῖς πυξίοις ἐθιζόμενοι λέγειν, ὅταν ἔξω γεγραμμένους ἐν  
 ἐτέροις ἴδωσιν, ἀμφιγνοοῦσι καὶ τaráττονται. [1121] [a] καὶ γὰρ οὗτος, οὓς  
 ἐν τοῖς Ἐπικούρου γράμμασιν ἀσπάζεται καὶ ἀγαπᾷ λόγους, οὐ συνήσιν  
 οὐδὲ γινώσκει λεγομένους ὑφ' ἐτέρων. οἱ γὰρ εἰδῶλου προσπίπτοντος ἡμῖν  
 περιφεροῦς ἐτέρου δὲ κεκλασμένου τὴν μὲν αἴσθησιν ἀληθῶς τυποῦσθαι  
 λέγοντες, προσαποφαίνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐῶντες ὅτι στρογγύλος ὁ πύργος ἐστὶν  
 ἢ δὲ κώπη κέκλασται, τὰ πάθη τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα βεβαιοῦσι  
 τὰ δ' ἐκτὸς οὕτως ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν· ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκείνοις τὸ  
 ἵπποῦσθαι καὶ τὸ τοιχοῦσθαι λεκτέον, οὐχ ἵππον οὐδὲ τοῖχον, οὕτως ἄρα  
 τὸ στρογγυλοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ σκαληνοῦσθαι τὴν [b] ὄψιν, οὐ σκαληνὸν οὐδὲ  
 στρογγύλον ἀνάγκη «τούτοις τὴν κώπην καὶ» τὸν πύργον λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ  
 εἶδωλον, ὑφ' οὗ πέπονθεν ἢ ὄψις, κεκλασμένον ἐστίν, ἢ κώπη δ' ἀφ'  
 ἧς τὸ εἶδωλον οὐκ ἐστὶ κεκλασμένη. διαφορὰν οὖν τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸ

ὑποκείμενον ἐκτὸς ἔχοντος ἢ μένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ πάθους δεῖ τὴν πίστιν ἢ τὸ εἶναι τῷ φαίνεσθαι προσapoφαινομένην ἐλέγχεσθαι. τὸ δὲ δὴ βοᾷν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, <ὥς> οὐ λέγουσι τὸ ἐκτὸς εἶναι θερμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι τοιοῦτον, ἄρ' οὐ ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ λεγομένῳ περὶ τῆς γεύσεως, ὅτι τὸ ἐκτὸς οὐ φησιν εἶναι γλυκύ, πάθος δέ τι καὶ κίνημα περὶ αὐτὴν [c] γεγενῆσθαι τοιοῦτον; ὁ δὲ λέγων ἀνθρωποειδῆ φαντασίαν λαμβάνειν, εἰ δ' ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πόθεν εἴληφε τὰς ἀφορμὰς; οὐ παρὰ τῶν λεγόντων καμπυλοειδῆ φαντασίαν λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ καμπύλον ἐστὶ, μὴ προσapoφαίνεσθαι τὴν ὅψιν μηδ' ὅτι στρογγύλον, ἀλλ' ὅτι φάντασμα περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τύπωμα στρογγυλοειδὲς γέγονε; 'νὴ Δία' φήσει τις, 'ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τῷ πύργῳ προσελθὼν καὶ τῆς κώπης ἀψάμενος ἀποφανοῦμαι τὴν μὲν εὐθεῖαν εἶναι τὸν δὲ πολύγωνον, ἐκεῖνος δέ, κἂν ἐγγὺς γένηται, τὸ δοκεῖν καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι, πλεον δ' οὐδὲν ὁμολογήσει.' ναὶ μὰ Δία [d] σοῦ γε μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ὁρῶν καὶ φυλάττων, τὸ πᾶσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν ὁμοίως ἀξιόπιστον ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῆς, ὑπὲρ ἄλλου δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἔχειν. σοὶ δ' οἴχεται τὸ πᾶσας ὑπάρχειν ἀληθεῖς, ἄπιστον δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ μηδεμίαν, εἰ ταύταις μὲν οἶει δεῖν προσapoφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς, ἐκείναις δὲ ... τοῦ πᾶσχειν πλεον οὐδὲν ἐπίστευες. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπίσης ἔχουσιν ἐγγὺς <τε> γενόμεναι καὶ μακρὰν οὔσαι πρὸς πίστιν, ἢ πᾶσαις δίκαιόν ἐστὶν ἢ μηδὲ ταύταις ἔπεσθαι τὴν προσapoφαινομένην τὸ εἶναι κρίσιν· εἰ δὲ γίνεται διαφορὰ τοῦ πάθους ἀποστᾶσι καὶ προσελθοῦσι, ψευδὸς ἐστὶ τὸ μήτε φαντασίαν μήτ' αἰσθῆσιν [e] ἐτέραν <ἐτέρας> ἐναργεστέραν ὑπάρχειν. καθάπερ ἂς λέγουσιν ἐπιμαρτυρήσεις καὶ ἀντιμαρτυρήσεις, οὐθέν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν αἰσθῆσιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν· ὥστ' εἰ ταύταις ἐπομένους ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς κελεύουσι, τῆς δόξης κρῖμα τὸ εἶναι τῆς δ' αἰσθήσεως πάθος τὸ φαινόμενον ποιοῦντες, ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντως ἀληθοῦς τὴν κρίσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διαπίπτειν πολλάκις μεταφέρουσιν. -

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὅσης ἐστὶ μεστὰ ταραχῆς καὶ μάχης πρὸς ἑαυτά, τί δεῖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι; τοῦ δ' Ἀρκεσιλάου τὸν Ἐπικούρειον οὐ μετρίως ἔοικεν ἢ δόξα παραλυπεῖν ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις μάλιστα τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀγαπηθέντος.

[f] μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἴδιον λέγοντά φησιν ὑπόληψιν ἐμποιεῖν <καινοτομίας> καὶ δόξαν ἀνθρώποις ἀγραμμάτοις, ἅτε δὴ πολυγράμματος αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ

μεμουςωμένος. ὁ δ' Ἀρκεσίλαος τοσοῦτον ἀπέδει τοῦ καινοτομίας τινὰ δόξαν ἀγαπᾶν καὶ ὑποποιεῖσθαι <τι> τῶν παλαιῶν, ὥστ' ἐγκαλεῖν τοὺς [1122] [a] τότε σοφιστάς, ὅτι προστρίβεται Σωκράτει καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Παρμενίδη καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς δόγματα καὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας οὐδὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀναγωγὴν καὶ βεβαίωσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἄνδρας ἐνδόξους ποιούμενος. ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτου Κωλώτῃ χάρις καὶ παντὶ τῷ τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν λόγον ἄνωθεν ἤκειν εἰς Ἀρκεσίλαον ἀποφαίνοντι. τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ' οἱ πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ κατατείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς Στοᾶς αὐτῇ τελευτῶντες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγοντες ἀπηγόρευσαν, ὡς πάντα πειρῶσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ [b] ὑπήκουσεν ἢ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν πρόσθεσιν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη, μὴ δεομένη τοῦ προστίθεσθαι. νόμιμοι γὰρ οἱ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀγῶνές εἰσι, καὶ 'ὅπποῖόν κ' εἴπησθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσαις (Υ 250)'. Κωλώτῃ δ' οἶμαι τὰ περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ συγκαταθέσεως ὄνῳ λύρας ἀκρόασιν εἶναι. λέγεται δὲ τοῖς συνεπομένοις καὶ ἀκούουσιν, ὅτι τριῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κινήματων ὄντων, φανταστικοῦ καὶ ὁρμητικοῦ καὶ συγκαταθετικοῦ, τὸ μὲν φανταστικὸν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ἀνελεῖν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη προεντυγχάνοντας [c] τοῖς πράγμασι τυποῦσθαι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, τὸ δ' ὁρμητικὸν ἐγειρόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανταστικοῦ πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πρακτικῶς κινεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οἷον ῥοπῆς ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ νεύσεως γινομένης. οὐδὲ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχοντες, ἀλλὰ χρῶνται τῇ ὁρμῇ φυσικῶς ἀγούσῃ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον οἰκεῖον. τί οὖν φεύγουσι μόνον; ὃ μόνῳ ψεῦδος ἐμφύεται καὶ ἀπάτη, τὸ δοξάζειν καὶ προπίπτειν τὴν συγκατάθεσιν, εἴξιν οὖσαν ὑπ' ἀσθενείας τῷ φαινομένῳ, χρήσιμον δ' οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν. ἢ γὰρ πρᾶξις δυοῖν δεῖται, φαντασίας τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ πρὸς τὸ [d] φανέν οἰκεῖον ὁρμῆς, ὣν οὐδέτερον τῇ ἐποχῇ μάχεται. δόξης γάρ, οὐχ ὁρμῆς οὐδὲ φαντασίας ὁ λόγος ἀφίστησιν. ὅταν οὖν φανῇ τὸ ἡδὺ οἰκεῖον, οὐθὲν δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἐπ' αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ φορὰν δόξης, ἀλλ' ἦλθεν εὐθὺς ἡ ὁρμὴ, κίνησις οὖσα καὶ φορὰ τῆς ψυχῆς.

Καὶ μὴν αὐτῶν γε τούτων <ἀκούομεν βοῶντων>, ὡς 'αἰσθησιν ἔχειν δεῖ καὶ σάρκινον εἶναι, καὶ φανεῖται ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν'. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ἐπέχοντι ἀγαθὸν φανεῖται· καὶ γὰρ αἰσθήσεως μετέχει καὶ σάρκινός ἐστι, καὶ λαβὼν



ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίαν ὀρέγεται καὶ ὀρμᾷ, πάντα πράττων ὅπως οὐ διαφεύξεται αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀνυστὸν ἀεὶ συνέσται τῷ οἰκείῳ, φυσικαῖς οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς ἐλκόμενος ἀνάγκαις.

[e] 'ἄνευ διδασκάλου γὰρ αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται', τὰ καλὰ ταῦτα καὶ 'λεῖα καὶ προσηνῇ κινήματα τῆς σαρκός', ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν οὗτοι, καὶ τὸν πάνυ μὴ φάσκοντα μηδ' ὁμολογοῦντα κάμπτεσθαι καὶ μαλάσσεσθαι τούτοις. 'ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐκ εἰς ὄρος ἄπεισι τρέχων ὁ ἐπέχων ἀλλ' εἰς βαλανεῖον, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν τοῖχον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς θύρας ἀναστὰς βαδίζει, βουλόμενος εἰς ἀγορὰν προελθεῖν;' τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἀκριβῆ τὰ αἰσθητήρια λέγων εἶναι καὶ τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς; ὅτι φαίνεται δήπουθεν αὐτῷ βαλανεῖον οὐ τὸ ὄρος ἀλλὰ τὸ βαλανεῖον, καὶ θύρα οὐχ ὁ τοῖχος ἀλλ' ἡ θύρα, καὶ τῶν [f] ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἕκαστον. ὁ γὰρ τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγος οὐ παρατρέπει τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀλόγοις πάθεσιν αὐτῆς καὶ κινήμασιν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιεῖ διαταράττουσαν τὸ φανταστικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δόξας μόνον ἀναιρεῖ χρῆται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς πέφυκεν. 'ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι τοῖς [1123] [a] ἐναργέσι· τὸ γὰρ ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ πεπιστευμένα τοῦ μήτ' ἀρνεῖσθαι μήτε τιθέναι παραλογώτερον.' τίς οὖν κινεῖ τὰ πεπιστευμένα καὶ μάχεται τοῖς ἐναργέσιν; οἱ μαντικὴν ἀναιροῦντες καὶ πρόνοιαν ὑπάρχειν θεῶν μὴ φάσκοντες μηδὲ τὸν ἥλιον ἔμψυχον εἶναι μηδὲ τὴν σελήνην, οἷς πάντες ἄνθρωποι θύουσι καὶ προσεύχονται καὶ σέβονται. τὸ δὲ φύσει περιέχεσθαι τὰ τεκόντα τῶν γεννωμένων οὐχὶ πᾶσι φαινόμενον ἀναιρεῖτε; τὸ δὲ πόνου καὶ ἡδονῆς μηδὲν εἶναι μέσον οὐκ ἀποφαίνεσθε παρὰ τὴν πάντων αἴσθησιν, ἡδεσθαι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ μὴ <κινεῖσθαι> λέγοντες; ἀλλ' ἵνα τᾶλλα ἐάσω, τί μᾶλλον ἐναργὲς [b] οὕτως ἐστὶ καὶ πεπιστευμένον ὡς τὸ παρορᾶν καὶ παρακούειν ἐν πάθεσιν ἐκστατικοῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς ὄντα, ὅταν ἡ διάνοια τοιαῦτα πάσχη καὶ ταραττήται·

‘αἱ δέ με δαδοφόροι μελανείμονες ὄμμα πυροῦσι·’

καί

‘... μητέρ’ ἀγκάλαις ἐμήν

ἔχουσα’ (Eur. Iph. Taur. 289);

ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ πολλὰ τούτων ἕτερα τραγικώτερα, τοῖς Ἐμπεδοκλέους  
 εἰκότα ‘τεράσμασιν’ ὧν καταγελῶσιν, ‘εἰλίποδ’ ἀκριτόχειρα’ καὶ ‘βουγενῇ  
 ἀνδρόπρωρα’ καὶ τίνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄψιν ἢ φύσιν ἔκφυλον εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ  
 συνενεγκόντες ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπνίων καὶ τῶν παρακοπῶν οὐδὲν εἶναι [c] φασὶ  
 παρόραμα τούτων οὐδὲ ψεῦδος οὐδ’ ἀσύστατον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς  
 ἀπάσας καὶ σώματα καὶ μορφὰς ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀφικνουμένας. εἴτ’  
 ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον ἐπισχεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα πιστεύεσθαι δυνατόν  
 ἐστίν; ἃ γὰρ οὐδεὶς σκευοποιὸς ἢ πλάστης θαυμάτων ἢ γραφεὺς δεινὸς  
 ἐτόλμησε μῖξαι πρὸς ἀπάτην εἰκάσματα καὶ παίγνια, ταῦθ’ ὑπάρχειν ἀπὸ  
 σπουδῆς τιθέμενοι, μᾶλλον δ’ ὅλως, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ὑπάρχοι, πίστιν οἴχεσθαι  
 καὶ βεβαιότητα καὶ κρίσιν ἀληθείας φάσκοντες αὐτοὶ καταβάλλουσιν εἰς  
 ἀφασίαν πάντα πράγματα· καὶ ταῖς κρίσεσι φόβους καὶ ταῖς [d] πράξεσιν  
 ὑποψίας ἐπάγουσιν, εἰ τὰ πραττόμενα καὶ νομιζόμενα καὶ συνήθη καὶ ἀνὰ  
 χεῖρας ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φαντασίας καὶ πίστεως ὀχεῖται τοῖς μανικοῖς καὶ  
 ἀτόποις καὶ παρανόμοις ἐκείνοις φάσμασιν. ἢ γὰρ ἰσότης, ἣν ὑποτίθενται  
 πᾶσι, τῶν νενομισμένων ἀφίστησι μᾶλλον ἢ προστίθῃσι τοῖς παραλόγοις  
 τὴν πίστιν. ὅθεν ἴσμεν οὐκ ὀλίγους τῶν φιλοσόφων ἡδίων ἂν θεμένους τὸ  
 μηδεμίαν ἢ τὸ πάσας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς φαντασίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν οἷς ὕπαρ  
 ἐντυγχάνουσι διαπιστήσαντας ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἀπλῶς  
 ἅπασιν ἢ μίαν ἐκείνων ἀληθῆ καὶ ὑπάρχουσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν πεισθέντας,  
 ‘ἅς’ λυττῶντες [e] ἢ κορυβαντιῶντες ἢ κοιμώμενοι λαμβάνουσιν. ἃ τοίνυν  
 ἔστι μὲν ἀναιρεῖν, ἔστι δ’ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπέχειν περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ μηδὲν  
 ἄλλο, τὴν γε διαφωνίαν ταύτην λαβόντας αἰτίαν ἀποχρῶσαν ὑπονοίας πρὸς  
 τὰ πράγματα †καὶ οὐδὲ οὕτως ὑγιὲς οὐδέν, ἀσάφειαν δὲ καὶ ταραχὴν  
 ἔχοντα πᾶσαν; ταῖς μὲν γε περὶ κόσμων ἀπειρίας καὶ ἀτόμων φύσεως καὶ  
 ἀμερῶν καὶ παρεγκλίσεων διαφοραῖς, εἰ καὶ πάνυ πολλοὺς διαταράττουσιν,  
 ἔνεστιν ὅμως παραμυθία, τὸ μηδὲν ἐγγὺς εἶναι μᾶλλον δ’ ὅλως ἐπέκεινα  
 τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπωκίσθαι τῶν ζητουμένων ἕκαστον· ἢ δ’ [f] ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς  
 αὕτη καὶ ἀκοαῖς καὶ χερσὶν ἀπιστία καὶ ἄγνοια καὶ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ  
 αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰς φαντασίας, εἴτ’ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν εἴτε ψευδεῖς, τίνα δόξαν  
 οὐ σαλεύει; ποίαν δ’ οὐκ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποιεῖ συγκατάθεσιν καὶ κρίσιν;  
 εἰ γὰρ οὐ κραιπαλῶντες οὐδὲ φαρμακῶντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ παρακόπτοντες  
 ἀλλὰ νήφοντες καὶ ὑγιαίνοντες καὶ γράφοντες περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ κανόνων  
 καὶ κριτηρίων [1124] [a] ἐν τοῖς ἐναργεστάτοις πάθεσι καὶ κινήμασι τῆς

αίσθήσεως ἢ τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ἡγοῦνται τὸ ἀληθές, οὐκ εἰ περὶ πάντων ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀλλ' εἴ τισιν ὅλως ἄνθρωποι συγκατατίθενται, θαυμάζειν ἄξιον· οὐδ' ἄπιστον, εἰ μηδεμίαν κρίσιν ἔχουσι περὶ τῶν φαινομένων, ἀλλ' εἰ τὰς ἐναντίας ἔχουσι. τοῦ γὰρ ἐναντία λέγειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀντικείμενα τὸ «μὴ τιθέναι» μηδέτερον, ἀλλ' ἐπέχειν περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἥττον ἢ τις θαυμάσειεν. ὁ γὰρ μή<τε> τιθεὶς μήτ' ἀρνούμενος ἀλλ' ἡσυχάζων καὶ τῷ τιθέντι τὴν δόξαν ἥττον μάχεται τοῦ ἀρνούμενου καὶ τῷ ἀρνούμένῳ τοῦ τιθέντος. εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτων δυνατόν ἐστὶν ἐπέχειν, οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδύνατον, [b] κατὰ γ' ὑμᾶς αἰσθησιν αἰσθήσεως καὶ φαντασίαν φαντασίας οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν διαφέρειν ἡγουμένους.

Οὐ μῦθος οὖν οὐδὲ θήρα «μειρακίων λαμυρῶν καὶ προπετῶν» ὁ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγος ἐστίν, ὡς οἶεται Κωλώτης, ἀλλ' ἕξις ἀνδρῶν καὶ διάθεσις φυλάττουσα τὸ ἀδιάπτωτον καὶ μὴ προἰεμένη ταῖς διαβεβλημέναις οὕτω καὶ δυσστατούσαις αἰσθήσεσι τὴν κρίσιν μηδὲ συνεξαπατωμένη τούτοις, οἱ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων πίστιν ἔχειν φάσκουσιν, ἀπιστίαν τοσαύτην καὶ ἀσάφειαν ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις ὀρῶντες. ἀλλὰ μῦθος μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπειρία καὶ [c] τὰ εἰδῶλα, προπέτειαν δὲ καὶ λαμυρίαν ἐμποιεῖ νέοις ὁ περὶ Πυθοκλέους οὐπω γεγονότος ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἔτη γράφων οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ πάσχειν αὐτὸς τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα πάντα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τῷ νεανίσκῳ· «σοφισταί» δ' εἰσὶ καὶ «ἀλαζόνες» οἱ πρὸς ἄνδρας ἐλλογίμους οὕτως ἀσελγῶς καὶ ὑπερηφάνως γράφοντες. καίτοι Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ Δημόκριτος ἀντειρήκασιν τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν· βιβλίον δὲ τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχον ὁμοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντας οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐξενεγκεῖν ἐτόλμησεν.

[d] Ὅθεν ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον πλημμελήσαντες ἐξαγορεύων τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κακὰ τελευτῶντος ἤδη τοῦ βιβλίου φησὶν ὅτι «τὸν βίον οἱ νόμους διατάξαντες καὶ νόμιμα καὶ τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καταστήσαντες εἰς πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἔθεντο καὶ θορύβων ἀπήλλαξαν· εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα ἀναιρήσει, θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα καὶ ὁ προστυχὼν τὸν ἐντυχόντα μονονοῦ κατέδεται». τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ Κωλώτης αὐταῖς λέξεσιν ἐκπεφώνηκεν, οὐ δικαίως οὐδ' ἀληθῶς. ἂν γὰρ ἀνελὼν τις τοὺς νόμους τὰ Παρμενίδου καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἡρακλείτου [e] καὶ Πλάτωνος

ἀπολίπη δόγματα, πολλοῦ δεήσομεν ἀλλήλους κατεσθίειν καὶ θηρίων βίον ζῆν· φοβησόμεθα γὰρ τὰ αἰσχροῦ καὶ τιμήσομεν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ δικαιοσύνην, θεοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δαίμονας ἔχειν τοῦ βίου φύλακας ἡγούμενοι καὶ ‘τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν χρυσοῦν ἀρετῆς ἀντάξιον’ μὴ τιθέμενοι καὶ ποιοῦντες ἐκουσίως διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἣ φησι Ξενοκράτης (fr. 31), ἃ νῦν ἄκοντες διὰ τὸν νόμον. πότ’ οὖν ἔσται θηριώδης καὶ ἄγριος καὶ ἄμικτος ἡμῶν ὁ βίος; ὅταν ἀναιρεθῶσι μὲν οἱ νόμοι, μένωσι δ’ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν παρακαλοῦντες λόγοι, πρόνοια δὲ θεῶν μὴ νομίζεται, σοφοὺς δ’ ἡγῶνται τοὺς ‘τῷ καλῷ προσπύοντας, ἂν ἡδονὴ μὴ προσῇ’, χλευάζωσι [f] δὲ ταῦτα καὶ γελῶσιν (Trag. adesp. 421)

‘ἔστιν Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ὃς τὰ πάνθ’ ὀρᾷ’

καὶ (Trag. adesp. 496)

‘πέλας γὰρ ἐστὼς ὁ θεὸς ἐγγύθεν βλέπει’

καὶ ‘ὁ μὲν θεός, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχων τοῦ παντός εὐθεία περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δ’ ἔπεται Δίκη, τῶν [1125] [a] ἀπολειπομένων τιμωρὸς τοῦ θείου νόμου’. οἱ γὰρ τούτων καταφρονοῦντες ὡς μύθων καὶ περὶ γαστέρα τάγαθὸν ἡγούμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πόρους δι’ ὧν ἡδονὴ παραγίνεται, νόμου δέονται καὶ φόβου καὶ πληγῆς καὶ βασιλέως τινὸς καὶ ἄρχοντος ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἔχοντος, ἵνα μὴ τοὺς πλησίον κατεσθίωσιν ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἀθεότητι θρασυνομένης. καὶ γὰρ ὁ τῶν θηρίων βίος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὅτι τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἐπίσταται κάλλιον οὐδὲ δίκην θεῶν οἶδεν οὐδὲ σέβεται τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κάλλος, ἀλλ’ εἴ τι θαρραλέον αὐτοῖς ἢ πανοῦργον ἢ δραστήριον ἐκ φύσεως ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πρὸς ἡδονὴν σαρκὸς καὶ ἀποπλήρωσιν ὀρέξεως χρῆται.

[b] καθάπερ οἶεται δεῖν ὁ σοφὸς Μητρόδωρος (fr. 6), λέγων τὰ καλὰ πάντα καὶ σοφὰ καὶ περιττὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξευρήματα τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος τῆς ὑπὲρ ταύτης συνεστάναι καὶ πᾶν εἶναι κενὸν ἔργον, ὃ μὴ εἰς τοῦτο κατατείνει. τούτοις τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς καὶ φιλοσοφήμασιν ἀρθέντων <τῶν> νόμων ὄνυχες λύκων ἐνδέουσι καὶ ὀδόντες λεόντων καὶ γαστέρες βοῶν καὶ τράχηλοι καμήλων. καὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ δόγματα λόγων καὶ γραμμάτων ἀπορίᾳ τὰ θηρία βρυχήμασι καὶ

χρεμετισμοῖς καὶ <ὕλακαῖς σημαίνει>, καὶ πᾶσα φωνὴ γαστρός ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς  
 καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονὴν ἀσπαζομένη καὶ [c] σαίνουσα παροῦσαν ἢ μέλλουσαν,  
 εἰ μὴ τι φύσει φιλόφωνόν ἐστι καὶ κωτίλον. οὐδεὶς οὖν ἔπαινος ἄξιος ἂν  
 γένοιτο τῶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη τὰ θηριώδη νόμους θεμένων καὶ πολιτείας  
 καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ νόμων διάταξιν. ἀλλὰ τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ταῦτα συγγέοντες καὶ  
 καταλύοντες καὶ ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες; οὐχ οἱ πολιτείας ἀφιστάντες αὐτοὺς  
 καὶ τοὺς πλησιάζοντας; οὐχ οἱ τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον  
 εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τὸ βασιλεύειν ἀμαρτίαν  
 καὶ διάπτωσιν ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ γράφοντες αὐταῖς λέξεσιν, ὅτι ‘λέγειν δεῖ,  
 πῶς ἄριστα τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος συντηρήσει καὶ πῶς τις ἐκὼν εἶναι μὴ  
 πρόσσεισιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πληθῶν [d] ἀρχάς’· καὶ ἔτι ταῦτα πρὸς  
 ἐκείνοις· ‘οὐδὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ τοὺς Ἑλληνας σῶζειν οὐδ’ ἐπὶ σοφία στεφάνου  
 παρ’ αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν, ὧς Τιμόκρατες, ἀβλαβῶς τῇ  
 σαρκὶ καὶ κεχαρισμένως’ (Metrod. fr. 41); ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥς γε καὶ Κωλώτης  
 ἐπαινεῖ διατάξεως τῶν νόμων πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ θεῶν δόξα καὶ μέγιστον,  
 ἥ καὶ Λυκοῦργος Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Νομάς Ῥωμαίους καὶ Ἴων ὁ παλαιὸς  
 Ἀθηναίους καὶ Δευκαλίων Ἑλληνας ὁμοῦ τι πάντας καθωσίωσαν, εὐχαῖς  
 καὶ ὅρκοις καὶ μαντεύμασι καὶ φήμαις ἐμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα δι’ ἐλπίδων  
 ἅμα καὶ φόβων καταστήσαντες. εὖροις δ’ ἂν ἐπιὼν πόλεις ἀτειχίστους,  
 [e] ἀγραμμάτους, ἀβασιλεύτους, ἀοίκους, ἀχρημάτους, νομίσματος μὴ  
 δεομένας, ἀπείρους θεάτρων καὶ γυμνασίων· ἀνιέρου δὲ πόλεως καὶ ἀθέου,  
 μὴ χρωμένης εὐχαῖς μηδ’ ὅρκοις μηδὲ μαντείαις μηδὲ θυσίαις ἐπ’ ἀγαθοῖς  
 μηδ’ ἀποτροπαῖς κακῶν οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν οὐδ’ ἔσται γεγονῶς θεατῆς· ἀλλὰ  
 πόλις ἂν μοι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐδάφους χωρὶς ἢ πολιτεία τῆς περὶ θεῶν δόξης  
 ὑφαιρεθείσης παντάπασι σύστασιν λαβεῖν ἢ λαβοῦσα τηρῆσαι. τοῦτο μέντοι  
 τὸ συνεκτικὸν ἀπάσης κοινωνίας καὶ νομοθεσίας ἔρεισμα καὶ βάθρον οὐ  
 κύκλῳ περιόντες οὐδὲ κρύφα καὶ δι’ αἰνιγμάτων, [f] ἀλλὰ τὴν πρώτην  
 τῶν κυριωτάτων δοξῶν προσβαλόντες εὐθὺς ἀνατρέπουσιν. εἴθ’ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ  
 Ποινῆς ἐλαυνόμενοι δεινὰ ποιεῖν ὁμολογοῦσι συγγέοντες τὰ νόμιμα καὶ  
 τὰς διατάξεις τῶν νόμων ἀναιροῦντες, ἵνα μηδὲ συγγνώμης τύχωσι. τὸ μὲν  
 γὰρ ἀμαρτάνειν περὶ δόξαν, εἰ καὶ μὴ σοφῶν, ὅμως ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστι· τὸ  
 δ’ ἐγκαλεῖν ἑτέροις ἅπερ αὐτοὶ πράττουσι πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι φειδόμενος τῶν  
 ἀξίων ὀνομάτων;

[1126]

[a] Εἰ γὰρ πρὸς Ἀντίδωρον ἢ Βίωνα τὸν σοφιστὴν γράφων ἐμνήσθη νόμων καὶ πολιτείας καὶ διατάξεως, οὐκ ἂν [τις] εἶπεν αὐτῷ (Eur. Or. 258) ‘μέν’, ὧ ταλαίπωρ’, ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις’ περιστέλλων τὸ σαρκίδιον, ἐμοὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων <οἱ> οἰκονομικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς βεβιωκότες ἐγκαλείωσαν; εἰσὶ δὲ <τοι>οὔτοι πάντες οἷς Κωλώτης λελοιδόρηκεν. ὧν Δημόκριτος μὲν παραινεῖ τὴν τε πολιτικὴν τέχνην μεγίστην οὔσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πόνους διώκειν, ἀφ’ ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ γίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδα διεκόσμησε νόμοις ἀρίστοις, ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς καθ’ ἕκαστον [b] ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξορκοῦν τοὺς πολίτας ἐμμενεῖν τοῖς Παρμενίδου νόμοις. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τοὺς τε πρώτους τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρίζοντας καὶ διαφοροῦντας τὰ κοινὰ ἐξελέγξας τὴν τε χώραν ἀπήλλαξεν ἀκαρπίας καὶ λοιμοῦ διασφάγας ὄρους ἀποτειχίσας, δι’ ὧν ὁ νότος εἰς τὸ πεδῖον ὑπερέβαλλε. Σωκράτης δὲ μετὰ τὴν καταδίκην φυγῆς αὐτῷ μεμηχανημένης ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων οὐκ ἐχρήσατο, τοὺς νόμους βεβαιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀδίκως ἀποθανεῖν εἵλετο μᾶλλον ἢ σωθῆναι παρανόμως. Μέλισσος δὲ τῆς πατρίδος στρατηγῶν Ἀθηναίους κατεναυμάχησε. Πλάτων δὲ καλοὺς [c] μὲν ἐν γράμμασι λόγους περὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ἀπέλιπε, πολὺ δὲ κρείττονας ἐνεποίησε τοῖς ἐταίροις, ἀφ’ ὧν Σικελία διὰ Δίωνος ἠλευθεροῦτο καὶ Θράκη διὰ Πύθωνος καὶ Ἡρακλείδου Κότυν ἀνελόντων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ Χαβρίαὶ στρατηγοὶ καὶ Φωκίωνες ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας ἀνέβαινον. Ἐπίκουρος μὲν γὰρ εἰς Ἀσίαν ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς Τιμοκράτει λαιδορησομένους, [καὶ] τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐξελῶν αὐλῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι Μητροδώρῳ προσέκρουσεν ἀδελφὸς ὢν, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται τοῖς ἐκείνων. Πλάτων δὲ τῶν ἐταίρων ἐξαπέστειλεν Ἀρκάσι μὲν Ἀριστῶνυμον διακοσμήσοντα τὴν πολιτείαν, Ἡλείοις δὲ Φορμίωνα, [d] Μενέδημον δὲ Πυρραίοις. Εὐδοξος δὲ Κνιδίοις καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης Σταγειρίταις, Πλάτωνος ὄντες συνήθεις, νόμους ἔγραψαν· παρὰ δὲ Ξενοκράτους Ἀλέξανδρος ὑποθήκας ἤτησε περὶ βασιλείας· ὁ δὲ πεμφθεὶς πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ κατοικούντων Ἑλλήνων καὶ μάλιστα διακαύσας καὶ παροξύνας ἄψασθαι τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πολέμου Δήλιος ἦν Ἐφέσιος, ἐταῖρος Πλάτωνος. Ζήνων τοίνυν ὁ Παρμενίδου γνώριμος ἐπιθέμενος Δημύλῳ τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ δυστυχήσας περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐν πυρὶ τὸν Παρμενίδου λόγον ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἀκήρατον

καὶ δόκιμον παρέσχε, καὶ ἀπέδειξεν ἔργοις ὅτι τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀνδρὶ μεγάλῳ [e] φοβερὸν ἐστίν, ἀλγηδόνα δὲ παῖδες καὶ γυναῖα καὶ γυναιῶν ψυχὰς ἔχοντες ἄνδρες δεδίασι· τὴν γὰρ γλῶτταν αὐτοῦ διατραγῶν τῷ τυράννῳ προσέπτυσεν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ δογμάτων οὐ λέγω τίς τυραννοκτόνος ἢ τίς ἀριστεὺς ἢ τίς νομοθέτης ἢ τίς ἄρχων ἢ βασιλέως σύμβουλος ἢ δήμου προστάτης ἢ βεβασανισμένος ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἢ τεθνηκώς, ἀλλὰ τίς τῶν σοφῶν ἔπλευσεν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, ἐπρέσβευσεν, ἀνήλωσε, ποῦ γέγραπται πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις ὑμῖν; καίτοι ὅτι Μητρόδωρος εἰς Πειραιᾶ κατέβη σταδίους τεσσαράκοντα Μιθρῇ τινι [f] Σύρῳ τῶν βασιλικῶν συνειλημμένῳ βοηθήσων, πρὸς πάντας ἐγράφετο καὶ πάσας ἐπιστολαῖς, μεγαληγοροῦντος Ἐπικούρου καὶ σεμνύνοντος ἐκείνην τὴν ὁδόν. τί οὖν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἐπέπρακτο αὐτοῖς οἷον Ἀριστοτέλει, τὴν πατρίδα κτίσαι διεφθαρμένην ὑπὸ Φιλίππου, Θεοφράστῳ δὲ δις ἐλευθερῶσαι τυραννουμένην; οὐκ ἐπιλιπεῖν ἔδει πρότερον φέροντα βύβλους τὸν Νεῖλον ἢ τούτους ἀποκαμεῖν γράφοντας περὶ αὐτῶν; καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινὸν ἐστίν, ὅτι τοσούτων [1127] [a] ὄντων φιλοσόφων μόνοι σχεδὸν ἀσύμβολοι τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀγαθῶν κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ τραγωδιῶν ποιηταὶ καὶ κωμωδιῶν ἀεὶ τι πειρῶνται χρήσιμον παρέχεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας, οὗτοι δέ, κἂν γράφωσι, γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἵνα [μὴ] φεύγωμεν τὸ συμβιοῦν βασιλεῦσι· τοὺς δὲ πολιτικούς ἄνδρας ἐπὶ γέλῳτι καὶ καταλύσει τῆς δόξης ὀνομάζουσι μόνον ὥς τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν, ἐσχηκέναι τι λέγοντες ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ‘μικρόν’, οὕτωςι τῷ ῥήματι φράζοντες, αὐτὸν δὲ ‘σιδηροῦν σπλάγχχνον’ ἀποκαλοῦντες καὶ πυνθανόμενοι, τί παθὼν ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μέσης καὶ οὐ πιλίδιον ἔχων οἶκοι καθῆτο, δηλαδή περὶ τὴν τῆς γαστρὸς ἐπιμέλειαν ὅλος καθεστώς. ἃ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ περὶ Φιλοσοφίας ἐξορχούμενος πολιτείαν γέγραφεν (fr. 31), οὐκ ὥμην δεῖν παρεῖναι· λέγει δέ, ὅτι ‘τῶν σοφῶν τινες ὑπὸ δαψιλείας τύφου οὕτως καλῶς ἐνεῖδον τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς, ὥστ’ οἷχονται φερόμενοι πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς Λυκούργῳ καὶ Σόλῳ ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ βίων λόγους καὶ ἀρετῆς’. τῷφος οὖν ἦν καὶ δαψίλεια τύφου τὸ ἐλευθέρας εἶναι τὰς Ἀθήνας τὴν τε Σπάρτην εὐνομεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς νέους μὴ θρασύνεσθαι, [b] μὴδ’ ἐξ ἐταιρῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι μὴδὲ πλοῦτον καὶ τρυφήν καὶ ἀσέλγειαν ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ νόμον καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· αὗται

γὰρ ἦσαν ἐπιθυμίαι Σόλωνος «καὶ Λυκούργου». καὶ λοιδορῶν ὁ Μητρόδωρος ἐπιλέγει τοῖς εἰρημένοις (fr. 32) ‘διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει τὸν ἐλεύθερον ὡς ἀληθῶς γέλωτα γελάσαι ἐπὶ τε δὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς Λυκούργοις τούτοις καὶ Σόλῳσιν’. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐλεύθερος οὗτος, ὃ Μητρόδωρε, ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ ἀνελεύθερος καὶ ἀνάγωγος καὶ οὐδὲ μάλιστα ἐλευθέρας δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀστραγαλωτῆς ἐκείνης, ἥ τοὺς Γάλλους πλημμελοῦντας ἐν τοῖς Μητρώοις κολάζουσιν.

[c]      ‘Ὅτι δ’ οὐ νομοθέταις ἀλλὰ νόμοις ἐπολέμουν, ἔξεστιν ἀκούειν Ἐπικούρου· ἐρωτᾷ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς Διαπορίαις, εἰ πράξει τινὰ ὁ σοφὸς ὢν οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν, εἰδὼς ὅτι λήσει, καὶ ἀποκρίνεται· ‘οὐκ εὖοδον τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ κατηγόρημα,’ τουτέστι ‘πράξω μὲν, οὐ βούλομαι δ’ ὁμολογεῖν’. πάλιν δ’ οἶμαι γράφων πρὸς Ἰδομενέα διακελεύεται ‘μὴ νόμοις καὶ δόξαις δουλεύοντα ζῆν, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἂν μὴ τὴν διὰ τοῦ πέλας ἐκ πληγῆς ὄχλησιν παρασκευάζωσιν’. εἴπερ οὖν οἱ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας ἀναιροῦντες τὸν βίον ἀναιροῦσι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ καὶ Μητρόδωρος [d] τοῦτο ποιοῦσι, τοὺς μὲν συνήθεις ἀποτρέποντες τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν τοῖς δὲ πράττουσιν ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοὺς δὲ πρώτους καὶ σοφωτάτους τῶν νομοθετῶν κακῶς λέγοντες τῶν δὲ νόμων παρακελευόμενοι περιφρονεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ προσῇ φόβος πληγῆς καὶ κολάσεως, οὐκ οἶδα τί τηλικοῦτο κατέψευσται τῶν ἄλλων ὁ Κωλώτης, ἡλίκον ἀληθῶς τῶν Ἐπικούρου λόγων καὶ δογμάτων κατηγόρηκεν.’



## ΕΙ ΚΑΛΩΣ ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ ΤΟ ΛΑΘΕ ΒΙΩΣΑΣ

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[1128] Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὁ τοῦτ' εἰπὼν λαθεῖν ἠθέλησεν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτ' εἶπεν, ἵνα μὴ λάθῃ, ὥς τι φρονῶν περιττότερον, [b] ἐκ τῆς εἰς ἀδοξίαν προτροπῆς δόξαν ἄδικον ποριζόμενος.

‘μισῶ σοφιστήν, ὅστις οὐχ αὐτῷ σοφός’ (Eur. fr. 905).

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ περὶ Φιλόξενον τὸν Ἐρύξιδος καὶ Γνάθωνα τὸν Σικελιώτην ἐπτοημένους περὶ τὰ ὅψα λέγουσιν ἐναπομύττεσθαι ταῖς παροψίσιν, ὅπως τοὺς συνεσθίοντας διατρέψαντες αὐτοὶ μόνοι τῶν παρακειμένων ἐμφορηθῶσιν· οἱ δ' ἀκράτως φιλόδοξοι καὶ κατακόρως διαβάλλουσιν ἐτέροις τὴν δόξαν ὥσπερ ἀντερασταῖς, ἵνα τυγχάνωσιν αὐτῆς ἀνανταγωνίστως, καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐρέσσουσι ποιοῦσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι, πρὸς τὴν πρύμναν ἀφορῶντες τῆς [c] νεὼς τῇ κατὰ πρῶραν ὀρμῇ συνεργοῦσιν, ὥς ἂν ἐκ τῆς ἀνακοπῆς παλίσροια καταλαμβάνουσα συνεπωθῇ τὸ πορθμεῖον, οὕτως οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα παραγγέλματα διδόντες ὥσπερ ἀπεστραμμένοι τὴν δόξαν διώκουσιν. ἐπεὶ τί λέγειν ἔδει τοῦτο, τί δὲ γράφειν καὶ γράψαντα ἐκδιδόναι πρὸς τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον, εἰ λαθεῖν ἐβούλετο; <ἢ λαθεῖν ἐβούλετο> τοὺς ὄντας ὁ μὴδὲ τοὺς ἐσομένους;

Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν <ἔῶμεν>· αὐτὸ <δὲ> τὸ πρᾶγμα πῶς οὐ πονηρόν; ‘λάθε βιώσας’ - ὥς τυμβωρυχήσας; ἄρ' αἰσχρόν ἐστι τὸ ζῆν, ἵν' ἀγνοώμεθα πάντες; ἐγὼ δ' ἂν εἴποιμι· ‘μὴδὲ κακῶς βιώσας λάθε, ἀλλὰ γνώσθητι σωφρονίσθητι μετανόησον· εἴτ' ἀρετὴν ἔχεις, μὴ γένη [d] ἄχρηστος, εἴτε κακίαν, μὴ μείνης ἀθεράπευτος.’ μᾶλλον δὲ διελοῦ καὶ διόρισον, τίνι τοῦτο προστάττεις· εἰ μὲν ἀμαθεῖ καὶ πονηρῷ καὶ ἀγνώμονι, οὐδὲν διαφέρεις τοῦ λέγοντος ‘λάθε πυρέττων’ καὶ ‘λάθε φρενιτίζων, μὴ γινῶ σε ὁ ἰατρός· ἴθι ρίψας ποι κατὰ σκότους σεαυτόν, ἀγνοούμενος σὺν τοῖς πάθεσιν’. <φῆς γὰρ> καὶ σύ· ‘ἴθι τῇ κακίᾳ νόσον ἀνήκεστον νοσῶν καὶ ὀλέθριον, ἀποκρύπτων τοὺς φθόνους, τὰς δεισιδαιμονίας ὥσπερ τινὰς σφυγμούς, δεδιὼς παρασχεῖν τοῖς νουθετεῖν καὶ ἰᾶσθαι δυναμένοις.’ οἱ δὲ σφόδρα παλαιοὶ καὶ τοὺς νοσοῦντας φανερώς ἔπροσεῖχον· [e] τούτων δ' ἕκαστος εἴ τι πρόσφορον ἔχοι, παθὼν αὐτὸς ἢ παθόντα θεραπεύσας, ἔφραζε τῷ δεομένῳ· καὶ τέχνην οὕτω φασὶν ἐκ πείρας

συνερανιζομένην μεγάλην γενέσθαι. ἔδει δὴ καὶ τοὺς νοσώδεις βίους καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς παθήματα πᾶσιν ἀπογυμνοῦν, καὶ ἄπτεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ἕκαστον ἐπισκοποῦντα τὰς διαθέσεις· ‘ὀργίζη; τοῦτο φύλαξαι· ζηλοτυπεῖς; ἐκεῖνο ποίησον· ἐρᾷς; κἀγὼ ποτ’ ἠράσθην ἀλλὰ μετενόησα.’ νῦν δ’ ἀρνούμενοι ἀποκρυπτόμενοι περιστέλλοντες ἐμβαθύνουσι τὴν κακίαν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ μὴν εἴ γε τοῖς χρηστοῖς λανθάνειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖσθαι παραινεῖς, Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ λέγεις ‘μὴ στρατήγαι’ [f] καὶ Λυκούργῳ ‘μὴ νομοθέτει’ καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ ‘μὴ τυραννοκτόνει’ καὶ Πυθαγόρᾳ ‘μὴ παίδευε’ καὶ Σωκράτει ‘μὴ διαλέγου’, καὶ σεαυτῷ πρῶτον, Ἐπίκουρε ‘μὴ γράφε τοῖς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ φίλοις μηδὲ τοὺς ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου ξενολόγει [1129] [a] μηδὲ τοὺς Λαμψακηνῶν ἐφήβους δορυφόρει· μηδὲ διάπεμπε βίβλους, πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν σοφίαν, μηδὲ διατάσσου περὶ ταφῆς.’ τί γὰρ αἱ κοινὰ τράπεζαι; τί δ’ αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ καλῶν σύνοδοι; τί δ’ αἱ τοσαῦται μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον, ἐπ’ Ἀριστόβουλον, ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον γραφόμεναι καὶ συντασσόμεναι φιλοπόνως, ἵνα μηδ’ ἀποθανόντες λάθωσιν, ἂν ἀμνηστίαν νομοθετῆς ἀρετῇ καὶ ἀπραξίαν τέχνῃ καὶ σιωπῇ φιλοσοφία καὶ λήθην εὐπραγία;

Εἰ δ’ ἐκ τοῦ βίου καθάπερ ἐκ συμποσίου φῶς ἀναιρεῖς τὴν γνῶσιν, ὥς πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐξῇ λανθάνουσιν, [b] <λέγε μοι> ‘λάθε βιώσας’. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἂν μεθ’ Ἡδείας βιοῦν μέλλω τῆς ἐταίρας καὶ Λεοντίῳ συγκαταζῆν καὶ ‘τῷ καλῷ προσπτύειν’ καὶ τὰγαθόν ‘ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ γαργαλισμοῖς’ τίθεσθαι· ταῦτα δεῖται σκότους τὰ τέλη, ταῦτα νυκτός, ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὴν λήθην καὶ τὴν ἄγνοϊαν. ἐὰν δέ τις ἐν μὲν φυσικοῖς θεὸν ὑμνῇ καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν, ἐν δ’ ἠθικοῖς νόμον καὶ κοινωνίαν καὶ πολιτείαν, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν χρεῖαν, διὰ τί λάθῃ βιώσας; ἵνα μηδένα παιδεύσῃ, μηδενὶ ζηλωτὸς ἀρετῆς μηδὲ παράδειγμα καλὸν γένηται; εἰ Θεμιστοκλῆς [c] Ἀθηναίου ἐλάνθανεν, οὐκ ἂν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἀπεώσατο Ξέρξην· εἰ Ῥωμαίους Κάμιλλος, οὐκ ἂν ἡ Ῥώμη πόλις ἔμεινεν· εἰ Δίωνα Πλάτων, οὐκ ἂν ἡλευθερώθῃ ἡ Σικελία. ὥς γὰρ οἶμαι τὸ φῶς οὐ μόνον φανεροὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ χρησίμους καθίστησιν ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις, οὕτως ἡ γνῶσις οὐ μόνον δόξαν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρᾶξιν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς δίδωσιν. Ἐπαμεινώνδας γοῦν εἰς τεσσαρακοστὸν ἔτος ἀγνοηθεὶς οὐδὲν ὦνησε Θηβαίους· ὕστερον δὲ πιστευθεὶς καὶ ἄρξας τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἀπολλυμένην ἔσωσε, τὴν δ’ Ἑλλάδα δουλεύουσιν ἡλευθέρωσε, καθάπερ ἐν φωτὶ τῇ δόξῃ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργὸν ἐπὶ καιροῦ παρασχόμενος.

[d] ‘λάμπει γὰρ ἐν χρεΐαισιν ὥσπερ εὐγενῆς

χαλκός, χρόνῳ δ’ ἀργῆσαν ἤμυσεν’

οὐ μόνον ‘στέγος’ ὥς φησι Σοφοκλῆς (fr. 780), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἦθος ἀνδρός, οἶον εὐρῶτα καὶ γῆρας ἐν ἀπραξία δι’ ἀγνοίας ἐφελκόμενον. ἡσυχία δὲ κωφὴ καὶ βίος ἐδραῖος ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἀποκείμενος οὐ μόνον σώματα ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχὰς μαραίνει· καὶ καθάπερ τὰ λανθάνοντα τῶν ὑδάτων τῷ περισκιάζεσθαι καὶ καθῆσθαι μὴ ἀπορρέοντα σήπεται, οὕτω τῶν ἀκινήτων βίων, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἂν τι χρήσιμον ἔχωσι, [μὴ ἀπορρέόντων μηδὲ πινομένων] φθείρονται καὶ ἀπογηράσκουσιν αἱ σύμφυτοι δυνάμεις.

Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι νυκτὸς μὲν ἐπιούσης τὰ τε σώματα [e] δυσεργεῖς βαρύτητες ἴσχουσι καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὄκνοι καταλαμβάνουσιν ἀδρανεῖς, καὶ συσταλεῖς ὁ λογισμὸς εἰς αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πῦρ ἀμαυρὸν ὑπ’ ἀργίας καὶ κατηφείας μικρὰ διεσπασμέναις πάλλεται φαντασίαις, ὅσον αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑποσημαίνων, ‘ἦμος δ’ ἡπεροπῆας ἀπεπτοίησεν ὀνειρούς’ ὁ ἥλιος ἀνασχὼν καὶ καθάπερ εἰς ταῦτ’ οὐκ ἐπέστρεψε καὶ συνώρμησε τῷ φωτὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις τὰς ἀπάντων, ὥς φησι Δημόκριτος (B 158), ‘νέα ἐφ’ ἡμέρη φρονέοντες’ ἄνθρωποι, τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁρμῇ καθάπερ ἀρτήματι συντόνῳ σπασθέντες ἄλλος ἀλλαχόθεν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀνίστανται;

[f] Δοκῶ δ’ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ καὶ ὅλως τὸ φῦναι καὶ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ γενέσεως εἰς γνῶσιν ὑπὸ θεοῦ δοθῆναι. ἔστι δ’ ἄδηλος καὶ ἄγνωστος ἐν τῷ παντὶ πόλῳ [καὶ] κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ σποράδην φερόμενος· ὅταν δὲ γένηται, συνερχόμενος αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνων μέγεθος ἐκλάμπει καὶ καθίσταται δῆλος ἐξ ἀδήλου καὶ φανερός ἐξ ἀφανοῦς. οὐ γὰρ εἰς οὐσίαν ὁδὸς ἡ γένεσις, ὥς ἔνιοι λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐσίας εἰς γνῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τῶν γινομένων ἕκαστον [1130] [a] ἀλλὰ δείκνυσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἡ φθορὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἄρσις εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ἄδηλον ἀπαγωγὴ τοῦ διαλυθέντος. ὅθεν δὴ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον Ἀπόλλωνα κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας καὶ παλαιούς θεσμούς νομίζοντες Δῆλιον καὶ Πύθιον προσαγορεύουσι· τὸν δὲ τῆς ἐναντίας κύριον μοίρας, εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε δαίμων ἐστίν, ὀνομάζουσιν, ὥς ἂν εἰς ἀειδὲς καὶ ἀόρατον ἡμῶν, ὅταν διαλυθῶμεν, βαδίζόντων, ‘νυκτὸς αἰδνᾷς ἀεργηλοῖό θ’ ὕπνου κοίραν’ (fr. mel. chor. adesp. 13 D.). οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν οὕτως φῶτα καλεῖν τοὺς παλαιούς, ὅτι τοῦ γινώσκεσθαι

καὶ [b] γινώσκειν ἐκάστῳ διὰ συγγένειαν ἔρως ἰσχυρὸς ἐμπέφυκεν. αὐτὴν τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔνιοι τῶν φιλοσόφων φῶς εἶναι τῇ οὐσίᾳ νομίζουσιν, ἄλλοις τε χρώμενοι τεκμηρίοις καὶ ὅτι τῶν ὄντων μάλιστα τὴν μὲν ἄγνοιαν ἢ ψυχὴν δυσανασχετεῖ καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀφεγγές ἐχθαίρει καὶ ταραττεται «πρὸς» τὰ σκοτεινά, φόβου καὶ ὑποψίας ὄντα πλήρη πρὸς αὐτήν· ἡδὺ δ' αὐτῇ καὶ ποθινὸν οὕτω τὸ φῶς ἐστίν, ὥστε μηδ' ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν φύσει τερπνῶν ἄνευ φωτὸς ὑπὸ σκότους χαίρειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ πᾶσαν διατριβὴν καὶ ἀπόλαυσιν, ὥσπερ τι κοινὸν ἡδυσμα καταμιγνύμενον, ἰλαρὰν [c] ποιεῖ καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ὁ δ' εἰς τὴν ἄγνοιαν αὐτὸν ἐμβάλλων καὶ σκότος περιамπισχόμενος καὶ κενотаφῶν τὸν βίον ἔοικεν αὐτὴν βαρύνεσθαι τὴν γένεσιν καὶ ἀπαυδᾶν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι.

†Καίτοι τῆς γε δόξης καὶ τοῦ εἶναι φύσιν εὐσεβῶν χῶρον,

‘τοῖσι λάμπει μένος ἀελίου τὰν ἐνθάδε νύκτα κάτω,

φοινικορόδοις ἐνὶ λειμώνεσσι’ (Pind. fr. 129),

καὶ [τοῖσιν] †ἀκάρπων μὲν ἀνθηρῶν καὶ σκυθίων δένδρων ἄνθεσι τεθελὸς ἀναπέπταται πεδίον, καὶ ποταμοὶ τινες ἄκλυστοι καὶ λεῖοι διαρρέουσιν, καὶ διατριβὰς ἔχουσιν ἐν μνήμαις καὶ λόγοις τῶν γεγονότων καὶ ὄντων παραπέμποντες αὐτοὺς καὶ συνόντες. ἡ δὲ τρίτη τῶν ἀνοσίως [d] βεβιωκότων καὶ παρανόμως ὁδὸς ἐστίν, εἰς ἔρεβός τι καὶ βάραθρον ὠθοῦσα τὰς ψυχάς,

‘ἐνθεν τὸν ἄπειρον ἐρεύγονται σκότον

βληχροὶ δνοφερᾶς νυκτὸς ποταμοί’ (Pind. fr. 130),

δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀποκρύπτοντες ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ λήθῃ τοὺς κολαζομένους. οὐ γὰρ οὔτε γῦπες κειμένων ἐν γῇ τῶν πονηρῶν κείρουσιν ἀεὶ τὸ ἥπαρ (κατακέκαυται γὰρ ἢ κατασέσηπεν), οὔτε βαρῶν τινῶν ἀχθοφορίαι θλίβουσι καὶ καταπονοῦσι τὰ σώματα τῶν κολαζομένων (‘οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἴνες ἔχουσιν’, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὑπόλειμμα σώματος τοῖς τεθνηκόσι τιμωρίας ἀπέρεισιν ἀντιτύπου δέξασθαι δυνάμενον)· [e] ἀλλ' ἐν κολαστήριον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῶν κακῶς βιωσάντων, ἀδοξία καὶ ἄγνοια καὶ παντελῶς ἀφανισμός, αἴρων εἰς τὸν ἀμειδῆ ποταμὸν [ἀπὸ] τῆς Λήθης «καὶ» καταποντίζων εἰς

ἄβυσσον καὶ ἄχανές πέλαγος, ἀχρηστίαν καὶ ἀπραξίαν πᾶσάν τ' ἄγνοιαν καὶ  
ἀδοξίαν συνεφελκόμενον.

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