

# Article: Nietzsche's Overcoming of Humanism - Kuldasi

Post by "Cassius" of September 14, 2021 at 8:51 AM

Given Nietzsche's antipathy to Stoicism and his somewhat embrace of at least some aspects of Epicurus, I expect this article to have relevant material on what separates Epicurus from humanism.

and the death of God (2.2). These discussions will enable us to see that humanism is rooted in nihilism in the sense that it shares the same life-denying perspective that has produced nihilistic values throughout the history of metaphysics. Then, I will elaborate humanism in the context of Nietzsche's notion of reactivity in order to enable us to see how humanism and nihilism reinforce each other, and will argue that it is possible to diagnose a latent humanism in nihilism (2.3). Next, I will investigate the series of replacements that have taken place on the level of values in the epoch of the death of God, replacements that lead to a transition from the God-instantiated version of the nihilistic paradigm to its human-instantiated version (2.4). In doing so, I will argue that the central organizing function of the idea of God in the nihilistic structure, and the ontological superiority granted to this idea, are assumed by a certain evaluation of human being, i.e., the subject. Nietzsche's critique of

nature with his thought of the will to power. Firstly, I will discuss the anthropomorphic (metaphysical) conceptions of nature which reinforce the false ontological superiority given to the human being vis-a-vis other natural beings (3.1). Secondly, I will present the significance of Nietzsche's Dionysian perspective and discuss his Dionysian worldview which shows itself as the will to power (3.2). This discussion will enable us to see that Nietzsche's thought operates outside both theological and anthropocentric instantiations of the nihilistic paradigm and provides us with an interpretation of nature which emphasizes the radical multiplicity of existence that is irreducible to human terms. Thirdly, I will investigate the perspectivism of the will to power and Nietzsche's emphasis on the impersonality of the phenomenon of interpretation, which, in my view, have significant implications concerning Nietzsche's dehumanization of the world through decentering the subject (3.3). Then, I will draw the conclusions of the Nietzschean notions of the will to power and perspectivism in an attempt to indicate how they destabilize traditional

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**Post by “Cassius” of September 14, 2021 at 11:23 AM**

I believe Epicurus would agree with this characterization of Plato, which the writer posits to be Nietzsche's analysis. And so I think this viewpoint is helpful to us in assessing Plato from Epicurus' viewpoint:

is, for Nietzsche, Platonism is a structural and ontological issue that has not only found its expression but also has established itself in the history of Western philosophy through life-denying values. Thus, throughout this work, the expression “Platonism” will only signify this structure and associated values that will be discussed in the next paragraph.

From Nietzsche’s perspective, Platonism can be briefly defined as a mode of thinking in which values are distributed in a hierarchical manner according to the law of the excluded middle, i.e., according to an either/or logic. In distributing values, Platonism operates according to the principle of identity. It introduces a line between phenomena and separates them in terms of ontological superiority and inferiority. It needs to be said that this line operates in absolute terms and does not allow any transition or gradation. That is, the Platonist structure opposes phenomena to each other in an oppositional and hierarchical manner, generating dichotomies such as good and evil, spirit and matter, etc. In Platonism, one side is posited to be superior, absolute and meaningful whereas the other constituent of the dichotomy is seen as deficient in comparison to the former, is posited to exist in dependence of the former and to derive its entire meaning from the superior constituent. This structure constitutes the essence of the two-world theory, which for Nietzsche is interchangeable with Platonism. In the two-world theory, existence is divided into two realms – upper and lower ones – according to the aforementioned structure. The upper realm is the domain of absolute ontological superiority whereas the lower one is conceived to be in a state of absolute deficiency. This can become clearer if we briefly remind ourselves of the salient features of Plato’s theory of the Forms in

## Post by “Cassius” of September 14, 2021 at 11:27 AM

I don't think there's anything unique or novel in this summary of Plato's position, but it strikes me as accurate and a very good summary to keep in mind as we think about Epicurus' viewpoint, and how it is a direct response to and attack on this perspective:

In his theory of the Forms, Plato posits eternal, perfect and unchangeable Forms which are located in a 'true world' outside and beyond 'this world', which is said to consist of appearances, i.e., mere copies of the Forms, which alone possess the quality of 'true being'. The Forms represent perfection, in contradistinction to the fundamental deficiency of appearances, and, consisting of these appearances, this

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world is conceived to be deficient in itself. In other words, perceived existence is marked by its ontological inferiority with respect to the absolute superiority of the realm of the Forms. Being perfect, eternal, and unchangeable, Forms are exempt from becoming, for they remain outside temporality and materiality that pertain to appearances. Conceived in these terms, the Forms accrue all meaning and value to themselves, constituting a solid centre in this regard. As a result, appearances are evaluated as relatively meaningless, for they cannot have any meaning in themselves since they come into being and, after an interval, cease to be. They are also regarded as valueless, because they are essentially only bad copies of what *truly* is. In short, from such a perspective, 'this' world irretrievably remains devoid of meaning and value.