

General Identification of the Argument in "On Methods of Inference"

Post by "Cassius" of October 28, 2020 at 10:34 PM

In the short transitional paragraph that follows (xxvii.28–xxviii.14), Philodemus' states that he will now set forth the fundamental and pervasive errors of the Stoic arguments against empirical inference. He gives two accounts of these fundamental errors. The first, taken from a work of Demetrius, forms the third section of the treatise. The errors are as follows:

1. The Stoics do not recognize inconceivability as a criterion of inference distinct from contraposition (xxviii.15–25).
2. They fail to recognize that not any chance similarity is used for inference (xxviii.25–29).
3. They do not recognize that even the variations and unique objects in experience are revealed by appearances, and support analogical inference (xxviii.29–37).
4. They do not recognize the empirical tests of inference (xxviii.37–xxix.4).
5. They do not recognize the possibility of establishing empirically the nature of things *as such* (xxix.4–15).

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