

Episode Thirty-Three - More on The Implications of the Colorless Atoms

Post by "Don" of August 27, 2020 at 8:48 PM

[Cassius](#) and [Godfrey](#) brought to my mind an issue I want to ...resolve? Raise?

When Epicurus says "feelings" are a criteria of truth, I do not believe he meant that the truth of a fact can be determined by how we feel about it. Did he? I don't think we can be like "I feel it is true in my gut so it's true." Or an I saying that doesn't feel right? It pains me to think that?

We had a thread a while ago that went into the point that "feelings" were a translation of *pathē* which refers to how one reacts to something. It's important to my understanding that "the feelings/pathē are two: pleasure and pain." The feelings are how we react to something: with pleasure, or with pain. So am I just reacting with pain to the proposition I'm putting forward?

Objective facts (the sun rose in the east this morning, zebras are animals with black and white stripes, the sun is a star, etc.) are not dependent on "feeling" in the common usage as in "that doesn't feel right to me." They are or they're not based on objective, observable evidence. But does that mean that they elicit pleasure?

I admit I'm a little adrift here. What does having *pathē* be a criterion of truth mean? I can't (right now) accept it's a gut feeling. Or is it?

Help 😊