

Consequentialism & Moral Relativism within the context of Pleasure-filled Philosophy

Post by “Cassius” of March 14, 2020 at 12:56 PM

[Quote from Eugenios](#)

Living pleurably is not the same as feeling pleasure. A prisoner (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleurably. Someone living in abject poverty (who is not an Epicurean) can feel pleasure intermittently, but I would contend that they aren't living pleurably. The feeling of pleasure alone is not a sufficient reason to contend that someone is living a pleurable life.

As I reread your post I don't know that we really have much disagreement on the fundamental points as much as we are on that conclusion and the implications of it. On this "Living pleurably is not the same as feeling pleasure." I would say that clearly seems to be a problem, maybe mostly because of the implications it raises without answering them. Because this sentence "The feeling of pleasure alone is not a sufficient reason to contend that someone is living a pleurable life" can hardly mean anything other than that there is some reason OTHER than the feeling of pleasure to contend that someone is living a pleurable life. Clearly the person asserting such a position has something OTHER than the feeling of pleasure to assert as the standard of a pleurable life.

Maybe it would help if you would explain what that standard might be, but I cannot imagine that asserting that "the standard of a pleurable life is something other than pleasure" could lead to much that would be consistent with Epicurus.

But I am all ears 🙄