

Prolepsis and the Epicurean Gods (discussion split from earlier thread started by Titus)

Post by “Bryan” of June 15, 2026 at 4:19 PM

[Quote from Pacatus](#)

[Quote from Bryan](#)

false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (*ἀνεπίκριτα*).

We have the category "pending (*προσμένον*)" for things which are simultaneously not attested (*μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον*) and not contested (*μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον*), because indeed in that case there is no evidence either way.

We also have "pending" for phenomena that are apparently both attested and contested, because in that case there is conflicting evidence about the original source (*the hypokeimenon*) and more observation is needed.

The idealist position would have to argue there is no original source (*no hypokeimenon*). But according to Epicurus, if there is no original source, the object is not real -- and the proposition that it *is* real, is necessarily false (such as the proposition "minotaurs exist").

Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), *Against the Logicians*, 1.203 - 216

"While outlining what is true and false, [*Epicurus*] says 'what is true is that which exists in such a way as it is said to exist -- and what is false is that which does not exist in such a way as it is said to exist. And sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning -- yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists - just as that very thing exists by nature. But with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ - and some of them are true -- but others false'"