

# Episode 335 - EATAQ 17 - Epicurean Analysis Of Stoic Claims About Notions And Memory

Post by “Cassius” of May 23, 2026 at 8:24 AM

Last week we incorporated material from Wikipedia and Diogenes Laertius on the Stoics.

This week we will likely jump off from this short section of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "[Ancient Greek Skepticism](#)", as this is largely what we are about to hear from Cicero when Lucullus finishes speaking:

## ii. Attack on the Stoics

In general, the [Stoics](#) were the ideal target for the skeptics; for, their confidence in the areas of metaphysics, ethics and epistemology was supported by an elaborate and sophisticated set of arguments. And, the stronger the justification of some theory, the more impressive is its skeptical refutation. They were also an attractive target due to their prominence in the Hellenistic world. Arcesilaus especially targeted the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, for refutation. Zeno confidently claimed not only that knowledge is possible but that he had a correct account of what knowledge is, and he was willing to teach this to others. The foundation of this account is the notion of *katalépsis*: a mental grasping of a sense impression that guarantees the truth of what is grasped. If one assents to the proposition associated with a kataleptic impression, i.e. if one experiences katalépsis, then the associated proposition cannot fail to be true. The Stoic sage, as the perfection and fulfillment of human nature, is the one who assents only to kataleptic impressions and thus is infallible.

Arcesilaus argued against the possibility of there being any sense-impressions which we could not be mistaken about. In doing so, he paved the way for future Academic attacks on Stoicism. To summarize the attack: for any sense-impression *S*, received by some observer *A*, of some existing object *O*, and which is a precise representation of *O*, we can imagine circumstances in which there is another sense-impression *S'*, which comes either (i) from something other than *O*, or (ii) from something non-existent, and which is such that *S'* is indistinguishable from *S* to *A*. The first possibility (i) is illustrated by cases of indistinguishable twins, eggs, statues or imprints in wax made by the same ring (*Lucullus* 84-87). The second possibility (ii) is illustrated by the illusions of dreams and madness (*Lucullus* 88-91). On the strength of these examples, Arcesilaus apparently concluded that we may, in principle, be deceived about any sense-impression, and consequently that the Stoic account of empirical knowledge fails. For the Stoics were thorough-going empiricists and believed that sense-impressions lie at the foundation of all of our knowledge. So if we could not be certain of ever having grasped any sense-impression, then we cannot be certain of any of the more complex impressions of the world, including what strikes us as valuable. Thus, along with the failure to establish the possibility of katalépsis goes the failure to establish the possibility of Stoic wisdom (see Hankinson [1995], Annas [1990] and

Frede [1983/1987] for detailed discussions of this epistemological debate).