

Discussion of Article - 25 Mind Viruses Cured By Epicurean Philosophy

Post by “Cassius” of April 10, 2026 at 4:04 PM

There are several major omissions in the existing list and I will eventually revise it. In the meantime and while I think about the existing structure and consider any incoming comments, here are four more that I am going to add:

26. A life that does not last forever is not worth living.

Epicurus cures this by showing that the length of a life and the quality of a life are two entirely different things. As he states directly in the [Principal Doctrines](#), "Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure." The pleasure of a good meal is complete when hunger is satisfied; the pleasure of a deep friendship is complete in the living of it; neither of these is improved by being repeated forever. The demand for immortality as a condition of a meaningful life is therefore a confusion — it mistakes duration for value and treats the good life as something that can only be justified if it never ends, which is precisely the kind of thinking that prevents people from fully inhabiting and appreciating the life they actually have.

27. No matter how much pleasure I have, I always need more to stay satisfied.

Epicurus cures this by drawing a precise and liberating distinction between the removal of pain — which is the actual goal — and the endless addition of more stimulation on top of it. He states in the [Principal Doctrines](#) that "the limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful," and further that once the pain of want is removed, pleasure is not increased by adding more — it is only varied. Once hunger is fully satisfied, you are not in a state that requires ever-larger meals to maintain your happiness; you are already at the natural limit of that pleasure. This matters enormously because the belief that pleasure is always deficient and always demands more to sustain it is the very engine of insatiable desire — the endless pursuit of wealth, novelty, and stimulation that Epicurus identified as one of the chief sources of human misery.

28. The pains of life will always make it impossible to be happy.

Epicurus cures this by showing first that happiness is not a moment-by-moment condition but a property of a whole life, and second that a whole life well-lived is fully capable of including pain without being destroyed by it. The question is never whether any particular day is free from suffering, but whether your life as a whole — looked at honestly from beginning to end — contains more pleasure than pain, and whether you are able to appreciate and enjoy that life as the complete thing it is. Just as a good day is not ruined by a difficult hour, a good life is not cancelled by periods of pain, and the mind has a remarkable capacity to draw on the entire span of one's experience — on the memory of past pleasures, on the pleasures of friendship and reflection available right now, and on the confidence that what lies ahead holds no terrors — in a way that can outweigh even serious physical suffering. In the [Principal Doctrines](#) Epicurus states that extreme pain tends to be brief, and that pain which does persist over time does not typically hold its most intense levels for long. More importantly, Epicurus himself demonstrated the whole argument at his own death: writing in his final hours while in severe physical pain, he reported that the joy he felt in remembering his philosophical conversations with friends set itself against all of it. He was not claiming to feel no pain. He was showing that a life rich enough in genuine pleasure — built over years through friendship, thought, and the practice of living well — carries resources that physical suffering alone cannot take away.

29. Justice is absolute — the same rules should apply to everyone, everywhere, at all times.

Epicurus cures this by showing that justice is not a set of eternal rules handed down by a god from above but something that real people create for themselves through agreements made under specific circumstances. In the [Principal Doctrines](#) he states plainly that Justice as a single thing in itself does not exist in nature. What exists are agreements among people in particular places and times about how to avoid harming one another for their mutual benefit. This means that what counts as just can and does change as circumstances change: an agreement that served mutual protection under one set of conditions may need to be revised or replaced when those conditions shift, and clinging to old arrangements simply because they once worked is not justice but rigidity. The demand for a single, timeless, universal standard of justice — whether grounded in divine law, abstract reason, or natural right — is itself a source of harm, because it blinds people to the actual human purpose that justice serves and makes it harder to adapt agreements to the real conditions of real communities.