

How to argue against the Kalam Cosmological Argument?

Post by "Eikadistes" of April 7, 2026 at 10:57 AM

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Essentially, it argues that the universe could not be eternal

This point is consistent with Epicurean physics, which teaches that each *kósmos* is temporary.

In the *Epistle to Herodótos*, Epíkouros describes the creation of a *kósmos*: "**concerning the intercepting of the amalgamations out of [the] beginning of these [cosmic cycles] during the generation of a kósmou**" (10.77). Likewise, each *kósmos* has an inevitable end.

Lucretius elaborates on the life cycle of a *kósmos*. He writes that "**the chiefest members and parts of the world are destroyed and begotten anew, I may be sure that for heaven and earth as well there has been a time of beginning and there will be a time of destruction.**" (5.245)

However, "**the All is not destined to be destroyed into non-being**".

We can further flesh out what constitutes a *kósmos* and what constitutes "the All" beyond our own *kósmos*. Epíkouros defines this for Pythoklēs: "**[The] kósmos is a slice of heaven, encompassing both glowers [stars], [the] earth, and all [observable] phenomena, [and] containing [a] partition away from the infinite**". Generally, that definition covers (at least) anything the JWST can measure. "The All", then, is everything in addition to *the aforementioned*. He further writes in the case of "**intercosmic [space] — I mean the [spatial] distance between [each] of the kósmōn, within permeable space, and not [as] in large, sterile, and empty [space]**" (10.88-89).

(I caution anyone from directly translating *kósmos* as either "world" or "universe". These are ancient concepts that do not directly correspond to our own, technical definitions.)

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we can't have an infinite past, because this would require an actual infinite set to be constructed through successive addition of finite elements, since the past is just previously present moments added onto each other. And in the same way you can't count and reach infinity, only keep counting infinitely, you can't have an infinite past.

I may not understand this correctly, so I apologize in advance. I'm speaking personally here, but I disagree with this on the premise of Karl Popper's delineation between verification versus falsifiability. Verification says that we have to experimentally verify things for statements to be true. Karl Popper says this is limited. Let's use the proposition that *all swans are white*. You don't need to capture and record every single swan. You just need to find one black swan.

We don't need to map infinity (which would be logistically impossible, as it keeps stretching every way), all we need to do is find a point where "the All" begins. When you find that, please let us know. I guarantee that you will be awarded a Nobel Prize in Physics.

In a fashion, the above process is loosely related to how Epíkouros argues. Here is a familiar approach to his reasoning. '*I observe A to be the case. If A were not the case, then B would be the case. Since we do not observe B, then A is the case*'. In this regard, Epíkouros might argue that "If 'the All' has a beginning, then we'll find a beginning. Or, perhaps we'll find an end. Thus far, no compounds have ever popped into existence in front of our eyes without a preceding cause, and, likewise, reality has never collapsed into pure nothingness while we were in it, so the notion that the intercosmic void (in which *kósmoi* develop) has a hard beginning, or a hard end has not been observed, and would contradict the fact that every compound anyone has ever observed comes from something else.

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Another way to reframe the argument is that for you to reach the present moment, you'd have to first wait for an infinite number of past moments to occur, which is analogous to waiting for an infinite time to pass, or walking an infinite distance and eventually getting to the end.

This strikes as a sort of modern analogue to the Eleatic argument by Zeno and others that we receive as the old "Tortoise and the Hare" story. (I just realize that [Cassius](#) mentioned this above, so I know apologize for the redundancy). The Eleatics set out to prove that motion was impossible through the concept of infinite divisibility. So they argue, to get from A [start] to Z [finish] you have to pass through B [mid point]. To then get from B from Z, you have to get to C, *ad infinitum*. Thus, to get to Z [finish], you have to pass through an endless series of mid-points, and *you can't*.

We Epicureans disqualify this entire argument by simply walking to Z. *You can*.

Likewise, skeptical speculation aside, we know we exist because we feel things, so we have to assume that our existence, which is real, comes from a previous state, because, observably, things have never popped into existence like in *I Dream of Jeanie*. If compounds could randomly pop into existence without a preceding cause, then we might have observed it by now.

I'm about to talk out of my league ([Martin](#)), but just writing from a philosophical perspective, even if contemporary particles are modeled as 0-dimensional points that condensed from a hot soup of early universe, or some kind of intersection between energetic fields, or that space is a

continuum of entangled particles, or that cosmology eventually finds a sort of Moment Zero, the way humans study nature, as soon as we identify Moment Zero, we'll start looking for Moment -1.

Like I said though, if anyone finds some kind of Moment Zero to "the All" itself, please let us know! Epicureans take observational evidence very, very seriously. But, here again, it might be better not to use ancient categories to organize the concepts we derive from modern observations.