

# Episode 275 - TD05 - Does Motion Provide Evidence For The Existence of God And Divinity Of The Soul?

Post by "Cassius" of April 6, 2025 at 8:16 AM

AETIUS has this:

1.23 On Motion

§1 Pythagoras Plato: motion is a difference or alteration in matter qua matter. This is the shared definition of every (form of) motion.

§2 Aristotle: (motion is) [entelechy](#) of the movable.

§3 Democritus: (there is) one kind of motion, that which (occurs) through vibration.

§4 Epicurus (says there are) two kinds of motion, that which (occurs) perpendicularly and that which (occurs) through deviation.

[a lemma on three kinds of motion seems to have fallen out]

§5 But there are some who introduce a fourth kind, that which (occurs) substantially, i.e. that which (occurs) in terms of coming to be.

§6 Yet others add intellectual (motion) as well, so in fact they have advanced up to the (number) five.

§7 Diodorus Cronus (says that) things have moved to some extent, but that nothing is moving (sc. in actuality).

§8 Heraclitus removed rest and standing still from the whole of things, for this belongs to corpses; to everlasting things he assigned everlasting motion and to perishable things (he assigned) perishable (motion).


§9 Herophilus (says that there is) motion that is observable by reason and (there is) motion that is sense-perceptible. (P5,S8)

§10 (But) Asclepiades declared that all motion is sense-perceptible. (S9)

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So "entelechy" is the way Aristotle seeks to preserve Plato's forms and suggests that they are "essences" within a thing, rather than in some higher dimension.

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### [Entelechy | Definition, Example, Aristotle, & Leibniz | Britannica](#)

Entelechy, that which realizes or makes actual what is otherwise merely potential. The concept is intimately connected with Aristotle's distinction between...

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**entelechy**, (from Greek *entelecheia*), in philosophy, that which realizes or makes actual what is otherwise merely potential. The [concept](#) is intimately connected with [Aristotle's](#) distinction between matter and form, or the potential and the actual. He analyzed each thing into the stuff or elements of which it is composed and the form which makes it what it is (see [hylomorphism](#)). The mere stuff or matter is not yet the real thing: it needs a certain form or essence or function to complete it. Matter and form, however, are never separated; they can only be distinguished. Thus, in the case of a living organism, for example, the sheer matter of the organism (viewed only as a [synthesis](#) of inorganic substances) can be distinguished from a certain form or function or inner activity, without which it would not be a living organism at all, and this "soul" or "vital function" is what Aristotle in his *De anima* ([On the Soul](#)) called the entelechy (or first entelechy) of the living organism. Similarly, rational activity is what makes human beings human and distinguishes them from other animals.

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The link to hylomorphism is very interesting, and contains this:

Opposed to hylomorphism are [atomism](#), [mechanism](#), and dynamism, all of which deny the intrinsic [composition](#) of metaphysical principles in bodies and recognize only physical principles, such as corpuscles, pure mathematical extension, or forces and energies. These theories agree also in denying the hylomorphist's claim that intrinsic change can occur in the

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ultimate realities of which the physical world is composed and, further, in reducing the phenomenon of becoming to a simple local movement or to purely accidental changes of a single selfsame reality.