

The Axiology of Pain and Pleasure (are they intrinsic good/bad ?)

Post by "Onenski" of May 29, 2024 at 5:45 PM

Hi guys, I share my point of view:

In philosophy there's something called the "naturalistic fallacy" which consists in affirming that you can't derive a normative proposition from factual ones. Naturalistic fallacy establishes a categorical distinction between the Good and how the world is. All platonic, stoic and kantian positions need this distinction to establish that the Form of the Good, Virtue or Duty are intrinsic values.

All naturalistic projects (including Utilitarianism, Epicureanism and other hedonisms) are the object of accusations of naturalistic fallacy. Now, curiously, Pigliucci is committing a form of the fallacy by trying to reject ethical (normative) hedonism by using evolutionary biology arguments.

Let me say it clearly: science **can** falsify Epicurus' psychological hedonism, but not his ethical hedonism. The arguments against ethical hedonism **must be** philosophical (presumably ethical and metaethical).

Epicurus thought that ethical hedonism can be derived from psychological hedonism (and I consider that this is more or less clear in Torquatus' reasonings in *On Ends*). How well this works is an open question. A better argument for Pigliucci's position would be to attack this derivation, but even if it works, ethical hedonism can have more arguments on its base.