

What if Kyriai Doxai was NOT a list?

Post by "Don" of August 2, 2023 at 12:00 AM

Following up on [a post of mine from Cassius' thread about PDs in narrative form](#) on a list of 44 PDs in a 1739 Greek/Latin translation:

I used a 1739 Greek with Latin translation to compare with the text at Perseus Digital Library:

1739: <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nn...id=27021597768674761-1400>

Perseus Greek (DL, Book 10): <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h...3Abook%3D10%3Achapter%3D1>

Perseus English (DL, Book 10): <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h...3Abook%3D10%3Achapter%3D1>

I used the Greek text to compare with each other since 1739 had 44 [Principal Doctrines](#) and Perseus (i.e., Hicks, 1972) had the "normal" 40! I wanted to see what was different. And were there differences!! Starting at 44, I had to go all the way back to [PD18](#) to get the lists to coincide! Note that right there, [PD18](#) is split into two by the 1739 list. Some Hicks were divided by the 1739, a couple 1739's were combinations of Hicks, and so on. To follow the numbers, capital Roman numerals are the 1739 list, Arabic numerals are the Hicks (usual) translation PD numbers. So, XXIII/21 means that XXIII (i.e., 23) in the 1739 translation = [PD21](#) in the usual list we're all accustomed to. I also want to go back and research some more, because I seem to remember that an earlier book (16th century CE?) also had 44 in their list. My primary reason for posting this here is that the list of 40 that we're used to is by no means sacrosanct or was it originally the way to divide them up. And, I would contend, precisely because *Kyriai Doxai* was NOT divided into a list of discrete sayings. Also, the only reason I'm using Hicks is because it's easy to copy/paste. I don't necessarily agree with his translations.

For now, enjoy...

I/1. through XVII/17.

XVIII/18. Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed ; after that it only admits of variation.

XIX. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms.

XX/19. Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.

XXI/20. [If] the flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time.

XXII. [If] the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.

XXIII/21. through XXV/23. then...

XXVI/24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether.

XXVII. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.

XXVIII/25.

NOTE: [PD26](#) appears as alternative text for XXXII below!

(ALTERNATE TEXT for XXIX, combines text from [PD27](#). and [PD28](#). from Perseus: Ὦν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὄλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγισόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὠρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλισα κτησεὶ δεῖ νομιζεῖν συντελουμένην. XXIX. Ex iis, quae ad totius vitae beatitudinem sapientia comparat, longe maxima est amicitiae possessio. Et in mediocribus opibus securitatem, amicitiae possessione maxime perfici putandum est. Google Translate: Of those which wisdom brings to the happiness of the whole life, the possession of friendship is by far the greatest. And in moderate wealth security is to be thought best accomplished by the possession of friendship.)

(ALTERNATE TEXT for XXX: λ'. Ἡ αὐτὴ γνῶμη θάρρειν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθεν αἰωνιον εἶναι δεινον, μηδε πολυχρονιον. XXX. Eadem sententia confidentiam parit, quod nullum sit aeternum malum, neque diuturnum. Google Translate: The same sentence gives birth to confidence that there is no eternal evil, nor long-lasting.)

XXXI/29. Of our desires some are natural and necessary ; others are natural, but not necessary ; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion. [Epicurus regards as natural and necessary desires which bring relief from pain, as e.g. drink when we are thirsty ; while by natural and not necessary he means those which merely diversify the pleasure without removing the pain, as e.g. costly viands ; by the neither natural nor necessary he means desires for crowns and the erection of statues in one's honour.--Schol.]

(ALTERNATIVE TEXT for XXXII from [PD26](#): λβ'. Των επιθυμιων ὄσαι μη ἐπ' ἀλγουν ἐπαναγοῦσιν εἰαν μὴ συμπληρωθῶσιν οὐκ εἰσιν ἀναγκαιαί, ἀλλ' ἐθδιαχῦτον τὴν ὄρεξιν ἐχοῦσιν, ὅταν δυστοριζοί, ἡ βλαβῆς ἀπργαζικαί, δοξῶσιν εἶναι. XXXII. Cupiditates illae; quae dolorem non inducunt, si consummatae non fuerint, non sunt necessariae: sed adpetitum habent, qui facile dissipetur, quoties paratu difficiles, aut detrimenti effectrices esse videantur. Google Latin translate: Those desires; which do not cause pain, if they have not been completed, they are not necessary: but they have an appetite, which is easily dissipated, whenever they appear to be difficult in preparation, or productive of harm.)

XXXIII/30. Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion ; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's illusory opinion.

XXXIV/31. through XXXIX/36.

XL/37. Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all.

XLI. For in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediencies of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

XLII/38. through XLIV/40.