

## 2. How this interpretation meets the earlier difficulties

19.2.1. If we look at the objections which we held that some styles of interpretation have to meet, it should be clear that this interpretation does not have to meet them. So far as the first objection is concerned it would be no oddity on our view that Epicurus insisted on the importance of sensory pleasure. On the contrary, that is just what he thinks we should be after, with the proviso that we also secure absence of pain.

19.2.2. As to the second objection, on our view aponia is not a non-sensory pleasure but a condition of sensory pleasure. What perception reveals to us directly is the goodness of pleasure and the badness of pain and thereby that the only unqualified good is pleasure without pain. Since any painless perception is pleasant, perception reveals the goodness, though not, of course, the achievability, of aponia<sup>1</sup>. The value of ataraxia is parasitic upon that of aponia, since the only ataraxia worth having on Epicurus' view is that which comes from pleasant memories and confident expectations of sensory pleasures of a painless kind. These extend, as it were, present pleasures or modify present pains by surrounding them with a pleasurable ambience. Thus the body's pleasures have pride of place.

19.2.3. As to the third objection, Epicurus is clearly not, on our view, using 'pleasure' in a strained sense in applying it to katastematic pleasure. The most that could be claimed is that he is inclined to use 'ataraxia' and 'aponia' of conditions of life rather than particular pleasures, but this sort of use had been familiar at least since Plato's *Protagoras*, and is derived from the application of the word to particular pleasures. Whether our view is altogether free from criticism along these lines depends on what account we can give of kinetic pleasure, but at least Epicurus is not straining language, or obviously cheating in calling katastematic pleasures pleasures.

<sup>1</sup> Nor does it reveal the choiceworthiness of individual pleasures (see 20.1.1).

The aponia statement is particularly important.

The question we are talking about is whether there is any form of "non-sensory pleasure" that was of importance to Epicurus, and they are arguing that there was *\*not\** a "non-sensory" form of pleasure.

I perceive however that the real reason that we are having this discussion is that people are considering "katastematic pleasure" to be a form of sensory pleasure, and that's what Gosling and Taylor deny is the case based on their extensive study of PRE-Epicurean thought, during which these terms were apparently developed. Given that Epicurus did not take the time so far as we know it to offer his own discussion of "katastemic pleasure," if he cared about the term at all, it is a fair inference that we and he and everyone concerned with the issue should use the standard meaning of katastematic pleasure, which G&T assert to mean to be "non-sensory."