

19.0.8. (iii) The third objection is that Epicurus seems to be cheating. This is most obvious if we insist on a purely negative account of *aponia* and *ataraxia*. For in this case, as Cicero points out, many people would not agree to call these states pleasures simply in virtue of lacking pain, so that Epicurus would seem to be trading on using 'pleasure' in a new sense while relying on its old sense for part of his argument. But even if we take *aponia* and *ataraxia* to be joy, or the realization that pain is absent, if Epicurus is insisting on the difference between these and the kinetic pleasures of sense, then we have the following oddity: what the senses reveal as good is in fact something quite different from what really is good, for they give experience of kinetic pleasures whereas it is the quite different katastematic kind that is the good.

19.0.9. (iv) Finally, it would be somewhat surprising to find Epicurus allowing the existence of a state of a living thing lacking both pain and sensory pleasure. For according to *PD* 2 there is no life without perception, and, according to the *Letter to Menoeceus* (DL X.124) it is in perception that good and evil are to be found: 'Get used to the thought that death has no relation to us; because every good and evil is in perception; and death is the deprivation of perception.' Good and evil are pleasure and pain respectively and these (DL X.34) are the only *pathē*. One would expect every good state to be a mode of perception, and perception to be the form of life. This is reinforced by the *Letter to Herodotus* (DL X.64-6) where after asserting that the soul brings perception to a body he writes: 'this is why so long as the soul is present, even if some other part is lost, perception never ceases'. As the passage goes on it is clear that this life and perception is a function of motions of the soul-atoms made possible by the protective sheath of the body. The picture is of a living thing in a state of constant motion of its atoms in interaction with its environment, the congenial motions being pleasures (DL X.34), the uncongenial ones pains. There is no place for a static or non-perceptive condition of pleasure.

Aside from showing what Gosling and Taylor are concluding (that katastematic pleasure is not a "greatest pleasure" or goal of life) the implicit presumption in these passages is that all

pleasures which are "perceived" or "sensed" are kinetic, and that katastematic pleasures are not "perceived" or "sensed."

I still need to find the passage where G&T explain that, but I am afraid it is buried deep in a prior chapter.

So the point I am presenting is not that ataraxia and aponia are not wonderful things. The point I am presenting, and that G&T are arguing, is that experiences of ataraxia and aponia are \*perceptions\* and therefore do not meet the definition of "katastematic pleasure" in the authorities who devote time to talking about that term.

It seems apparent that Epicurus was not himself someone who spent a great deal of time talking about the term "Katastematic" and so for the accepted definition of that term among other groups we are going to have to look elsewhere. (We'll find it eventually in G&T, perhaps using the cites in the [Nikolsky](#) or Wenham articles.)