


# Do Pigs Value Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)

Post by "Cassius" of July 1, 2022 at 1:06 PM

IT's this kind of thing that is the problem:



[Reading Epicurus: Pleasure and pain](#)

For Epicurus, pleasure is nothing but the absence of pain. Pain can further be subdivided into pain of the body and trouble in the soul. This negative...

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For Epicurus, pleasure is nothing but the absence of pain. Pain can further be subdivided into pain of the body and trouble in the soul. This negative description of happiness is surprising at first sight, but is a necessary component of the Epicurean philosophy of happiness.

This article is part of [The Ultimate Guide to Epicurus](#).

## Epicurus on pleasure and pain

Epicurus has this to say about pleasure:

The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together. – Epicurus, [Principal Doctrines, #3](#) (transl. Hicks)

But what does this mean? As [previously discussed here](#), Epicurus does not think that there are any positive pleasures. What Epicurus calls pleasure is just the absence of pain. If we can reach a state of mind where all pain is totally absent, then we call state 'happiness'.

Another example which implies that katastematic pleasure is the real objective above Kinetic:

### [Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus' Hedonism Through Plato's Philebus Open Access](#)

**Arenson, Kelly E. (2009)**

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## Abstract

Abstract Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus' Hedonism Through Plato's [Philebus](#) By Kelly E. Arenson

Epicurus made a name for himself in the ancient world when he identified pleasure with the absence of pain and proceeded to distinguish it from a second, seemingly different variety of pleasure--that found 'in motion' (kinetic). I interpret Epicurus' distinction through the lens of Plato's [Philebus](#) and the ancient debates concerning that dialogue. At issue in these debates and the theories that arise from them is whether pleasure is a process or an end and how pleasure ought to be conceived in terms of the harmonious functioning of a living organism. I argue that Plato identifies pleasure with the perceived process of restoration of an organism's natural harmony and that he uses this description to deny that pleasure is the good. Aristotle, rebuking the Platonic position, counters that pleasures are not processes of replenishment but are associated with the activity of an organism's unimpeded functioning. In the Epicurean development of these ideas, kinetic pleasure is the perceived restoration of the natural functioning of a living organism, and katastematic pleasure is painless, natural functioning itself, or health. On this reading, Epicurus considers any perceived affection that does not involve pain to be katastematic and thus the highest pleasure, including everyday sensory pleasures, such as taste. I show that Epicurus' distinction between pleasures serves as a dialectical response to the [Philebus](#) and bears the marks of Aristotle's response to the dialogue as well.