

Does Happiness Require a Non-Epicurean Decision Procedure?

Post by "Cassius" of January 10, 2019 at 8:27 AM

Yes I think you are correct as to issue two, in that Epicurus would say that the only standard for what is "horrible" is ultimately pain and pleasure, and thus the appeal to any other standard makes no sense (as they do not exist). I think we are pretty clear on that one.

I am not clear, however, on your issue one, and the assertion that Epicureans cannot have deep friendships and strong ambitions. I think Epicurus would define deep friendships and strong ambitions by the intensity of the feelings involved, rather than by any other standard of what a friend "should do" under any particular situation. Same would go for ambitions. For a cite in support of depth of emotion I would include this from Diogenes Laertius: "He [the wise man] will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom."

So I presume that you are stating as the basis for your first assertion your definitions that you believe altruistic sacrifices are necessary for strong friendship and strong ambitions. I am familiar with the first part as to friendship, but I don't think I have ever seen anyone assert that altruistic sacrifices are necessary for strong ambitions.

Can you state with any greater clarity the basis for those assertions?

As for issue two, where you conclude that "certain horrible acts are not unjust" that is definitely the Epicurean viewpoint, and you could probably expand it from "certain" to "many." But just so I understand your point, to what authority or source are you appealing to argue that they *should* be considered "unjust?" Stating that source will bring us even more clearly to the point in dispute.