

Voula Tsouna Zoom Presentation This Thursday, May 27, at 12 Noon EDT

Post by "Cassius" of May 26, 2021 at 7:18 AM

[Quote from Don](#)

I see LSJ gives intuition as a definition. I could see that. You just "feel" something about an event or topic.

Or also, someone who has such a command even of an action, like a virtuoso piano or other musical instrument player who can make something seem effortless. I suppose playing the piano is itself a very mental thing too, but I presume that someone could have a purely mental command of a subject that is so complete that this person has the equivalent grasp of a subject, in the same way that a Beethoven or whoever can manipulate a piano.

[Quote from Don](#)

That's why I'm still not convinced - although Tsouna may clarify - that this faculty doesn't in some way clarify the prolepses. It's not a fourth leg of the Canon but simply a refining of one of the three already there.

Yep that's where I am on the subject. "Clarify" or "refine" or "manipulate" or simply "use" -- all words that we would employ if we're trying to describe how the conscious mind processes data from all sources it receives. Obviously this is a hugely important process - it's basically the process of 'thinking.' I continue to think that the source of the issue is the tendency that people have to combine "the act of thinking" with "testing the accuracy of the result of the thinking." Seems to me Epicurus was saying, in response to skepticism, that the act of thinking can't include its own test of accuracy. A test or criteria or canon, in order to be useful, must be something external to the thought process, like a "ruler" which provides the external objective reference point that our mind itself has not produced. The eyes and ears and the rest can fulfill that role because they function automatically without injection of opinion. Most definitions of this alleged "fourth leg" seem to me to be full of things which are shot through with 'opinion.'

Can there be some mental process which is so automatic in its function (intuition?) that it deserves status as a criteria of "truth" for that individual? I don't rule that out entirely, and maybe I even agree with it to some degree in terms of personality or similar issues, but i would not put that in the same category of significance as the classic five senses which are so basic to most forms of higher life.

Unless you want to go down the road of saying that inbred genetic dispositions / intuitions / instincts (the dam-buiding beavers we discussed), or the different personality traits of cats, dogs, most animal species, etc. qualify **to them** as criteria of "truth."

I would say it's possible that Epicurus did indeed go there, but i think he would have seen that as outside the task of dealing with human skepticism, and something that he would have worked very hard to prevent creating the "feedback loop" that ought to be a huge concern. If you start thinking that the results of your deliberations are themselves 'standards of truth' equal to what you see and hear and touch, and you think that you can't go behind your thoughts and just need to accept them as primaries -- that seems to me to be a position Epicurus would not have taken.