

Episode Fifty-Five - Reason Is Dependent On The Senses (Part 2)

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Elayne, hello! It has been a great to hear you on the podcasts, and I am happy to be speaking with you now.

[Quote from Elayne](#)

I think we should not find ourselves saying "these observations don't fit my model so I'm going to disregard them because I like my model", but instead say "my model no longer fits my observations as well, so I'll either make a new model or wait for more observations-- and in the meantime I'll continue to have confidence that I can make observations of reality."

This is a thoroughly scientific and most reasonable position to take. This is our position for the first class of things mentioned in KD 24, but Epicurus would differentiate between those inferences which we consider subject to correction and those inferences which we consider to be fully confirmed and certain conclusions.

MODELS FOR THE UNINSPECTED

(1) *"that which is believed regarding what is still pending confirmation (τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον)"* -- These are observable things which we have not yet fully observed. For all the things in this class we are totally open to the possibility for future correction if (when we have the opportunity for closer and repeated examination) we receive observations that contradict any theories we may have previously considered regarding them. This view in line with most modern scientific approaches.

FOUNDATION (THE INSPECTED AND EXPERIENCED)

The second class are all the things we are able to directly observe (2) *"that which is actually present to sensation, feelings, or the whole visual focus of the mind (τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας)"* -- These are things which can be sensed and inspected and form the basis of all our clear thinking.

MODELS FOR THE UNINSPECTABLE

The third class are all the things we cannot directly observe (3) *"that which is unobservable (τὰ ἄδηλα)"* -- These invisible things must be tested by their observable interactions with class (2) *things actually present (τὸ παρὸν ἤδη)*. Because our conclusions about things in this class are

based upon their visible interactions with (2) what is directly observable and not based upon (1) that which is pending confirmation, we are certain about the conclusions we have reached regarding them. Clearly, this final view is antagonistic to most modern scientific approaches.