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Yes Matt I think that would be a good idea. The Something From Nothing issue is definitely an example of what we are talking about, but if we focus on it too much it might get the thread off track. It certainly deserves a thread of its own. I will take care of it now.

Maybe more elaborate title for the thread Matt? What would you suggest? Post it here and I will make the change and then delete some of these housekeeping comments.

So is Parmenides the one who advocated a "plenum" and that there is no such thing as void? Or is this more of a formal logical proof? And if so, of what? If you're really into this Matt and would like to explain the background to those of us who don't know, that would be a good use of this thread in the forum. Whether it would be a good use of your time might be another question But if you'd enjoy writing it I feel sure that some of us would benefit from / enjoy reading your summary of it.

(Quote from Matt) And at the very least Parmenides represents (as I understand it) one of the major views at the time of Epicurus, so his students would have been aware of it and thus some of his positions may be directed at it -- we can't recognize that if we don't know what Parmenides argued.

It seems to me that Epicurus/Lucretius' version is clearly enough based at least in part on the observation that we do not see things being created from nothing, and therefore there is no reason to think that anything could be created from nothing by a god or by any other means. This kind of reasoning is discussed fairly clearly if I recall in "On Methods of Inference." To me that whole chain of reasoning is a fairly understandable inference of a deduction based on that which has been observed t…

(Quote from Matt) But when you say it is sound it IS purely "word-play" based on definitions -- or No? Is any "observation" involved?

Ha ha -- this is where I would think we would be better off saying "formal logical grounds" or "abstract logical grounds" because what you are saying is that he is relying on logic (word-play; concepts) alone without any evidence, correct?

Matt how do you see this relating to the way Epicurus analyzed the question. My gut reaction is that what you are describing is such high-level logic, based so strongly on the word definitions without any connections with observations in "this" world, that Epicurus would not recommend relying on such an argument. I could be wrong, but this might be a good example to show that Epicurean logic as described in Lucretius and Philodemus always starts with that which is observable and rests primarily …

(Quote from Matt) 1. I wonder if the Epicureans would use the word "inconceivable" rather than "impossible." 2. I wonder if the meaning of both of the words "impossible" and "inconceivable" would be discussed as part of a program of Epicurean instruction. 3. I wonder if, absent some form of "logic from first principles" it is even possible to use words like "impossible" or "inconceivable" in an understandable manner. 4. I wonder if the need to label things as "possible/impossible" or "conceivabl…

Matt this discussion takes me back to another passage of "A Few Days In Athens" I always questioned, from Chapter 14. where Wright has Epicurus say: (Quote) First, I don't think this accurately reflects Epicurus' position at all, and it seems mighty presumptuous to me that Wright put these words in Epicurus' mouth. But, having got that observation out of the way, we should ask: What should WE think of this? Is it correct? Is it the position we should take today? How does it fit with Epicurus' an…

Matt (or anyone) separate and apart from Parmenides, what do you think about these questions? (Quote from Cassius)

Remember the forum is "asynchronus" -- I am being called away to "real world" work right now myself!

(Quote from elli) Sounds like all of us, and not just Elayne would line up against Parmenides. The trick would be articulating exactly WHY and WhERE we think he went wrong. Tentatively I would say that we should apply the same analysis - that it is not Paermenides use of logic in general, but his specific application of logic and reasoning to the problem, in that he failed to ground his initial premises sufficiently in the observation of the senses, and to tie the steps in his chain or reasoning…

(Quote from Bryan) Bryan put "observation is everything" in quotes, and I do think that is a very fair summary of the Wright position. But since I want to be rigorously fair in the assertion (again I agree with Bryan) that this amounts to a form of skepticism. That's a serious charge, and anyone evaluating whether it is justified ought to consider this passage from Chapter 15 of A Few Days in Athens. There is more in her later "Course of Popular Lectures" but since these are the words she places…

(Quote from Matt) And the probable best response if you were to say that would be: "What weed are you smoking?"