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That is a great find and an important paper to take note of, Don, thanks. Lots of good information in it - it even discusses the Nikolsky paper. But after scanning through it what strikes me is it is almost a debate with himself, and notes that he has changed his own views over the years. I doubt a general reader is going to be able to read that and be anything but confused over the point he is making. To me this one is probably an illustration of how you can talk yourself into a circle if you g…
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One thing more - as to a conclusion from all this. After reading that, my view remains with Nikolsky that the kinetic-katastematic distinction, to the extent it was of significance to Epicurus at all (which is very unclear) arose as a response (as Konstan says) to positions taken by Plato about the nature of pleasure, and needs to be viewed primarily in that context. Most all of us agree that pleasure is a sweeping word that contains every form of good feeling anyone can describe, and that it is…
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Gosh one more comment. I think this issue HAS to be considered in context of PD18 and PD19, which we hardly ever see discussed. How can a finite life contain as much pleasure as one that is not time limited? To me the answer to that clearly derives from a way of looking at pleasures ("by reason!") that indicates that we are engaged in a logical battle (presumably with Plato et al) at an abstract level, rather than taking a pure "feeling" comparison of the pleasures of one against the other as we…
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Maybe one of the most productive ways to grapple with this involves being very clear what kinetic(active) and katastematic(static) really means, using examples. What Kalosyni said is part of the problem: unless you take the time to study what the Greeks were saying, as Gosling and Taylor do in detail, it is natural to think that "katastematic/static/ataraxia" translates into something like: "I'm sitting on my porch meditating and clearing my mind and just feeling good without any troubles at all…
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Godfrey's suggestion makes sense as a particular type of feeling of pleasure, and may be workable IF katastematic pleasure can indeed be "felt" under the authorities that talked about these issues. The real rub is getting a consensus on whether it can be felt and then clearly delineating it from any other type of mental pleasure. This is one of those areas where I think we just have to be flexible and realize that talking about it rather casually is one thing, but wrestling with the "experts" wh…
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(Quote from Don) Yes and that is definitely the starting point of the analysis, and why most of the academic statements strike me as wrong. What I am really talking about are these articles, for existence the Konstan articles you've cited. I know what these recent writers are saying, and mainly I am trying to figure how to deal with the fact that what they are saying appears wrong, and yet we don't want to be a "ghetto" here where we talk only to ourselves and therefore appear "stupid" to people…
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IT's this kind of thing that is the problem: https://daily-philosophy.com/r…icurus-pleasure-and-pain/ Another example which implies that katastematic pleasureis the real objective above Kinetic: Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus' HedonismThrough Plato's Philebus Open Access Arenson, Kelly E. (2009) Permanent URL: https://etd.library.emory.edu/…/etds/1r66j156t?locale=en Published Abstract Abstract Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus' Hedonism Through Plato's Phileb…
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All of which leads to this kind of statement at wikipedia: that Epicurus "idiosyncraticlly defined pleasure as absenced of suffering and that the goal of life is not "pleasure" but "atraxia meaning untroubledness.....' No real statement of PLEASURE as the goal either here or in the opening paragraphs of the wikipedia article on epicurus himself. Plus THIS which identifies katastematic pleasures "as the focal ones to Epicurus."
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So what we face here as people interested not only in understanding Epicurus ourselves but popularizing it for others is that out there in the wide world anyone who reads about Epicurus is going to conclude that katastematic pleasure (which DL has mentioned to tell us only that Epicurus held it to be just one type of pleasure) should be considered to be the equivalent of "absence of pain" (which implies nothingness unless you define it much further) and thus that some counterintuitive and epheme…
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Godfrey I very much like the direction you are going in, but I unfortunately have to demur on "abiding.". I know some people who like that word ( ) but I do not think it adds anything to the discussion. If all it means is "long lasting" then that would be simply the time element that is a part of every pleasure - some last longer than others. But I detect that it is being suggested as a good word (not tagging you personally) because it has a sort of Biblical flavor to it that implies it means so…
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So to keep harping on what I think is probably the key point - it is the modern commentators who are equating "pleasures of rest" with "absence of pain" and that is how they are arguing that this "absence of pain /katastematic pleasure" is not what we should consider to be a "real pleasure" at all, but in fact as Elayne says in her article a "fancy pleasure" which is very difficult for normal people to understand, but which is in fact the "true goal" of life rather than pleasure itself. That lin…
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I've never been happy that we have a full statement of the problem in this website. Elayne's article On Pain Pleasure and Happiness is good, and I have my collection of cites in the Fullness of Pleasure article. At the moment the only cite I would put here is one I always thought was the most clear - from Cicero in a moment of honesty when he was attacking an Epicurean:. That the Epicureans held "that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures."". Which means to me…
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Now on the last comment there Godfrey I think probably Cicero's description is literally true but the sarcastic tone (which really was present) comes from the cultural bias against pleasure. This is also very similar to what Torquatus says in the "proof" sequence where he says imagine the life filled with pleasures of every kind and no pain - can we imagine anything better? As for abiding to some extent maybe the issue is "confidence" or "attitude" which is something that seems to stay on over t…
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Someone said to me recently something that I think is an important part of this discussion: "To an introvert, everything that the extrovert likes would seem to create anxiety and pain." I think that's correct, and similarly: To an extrovert, everything that the introvert likes would seem trifling and oppressively boring. You can come up with all sorts of Mars v. Venus analogies. The point is that the pleasures of one nature are going to pains to another nature, and vice versa, and that is why we…
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(Quote from Godfrey) It's always dangerous to put too much weight on a few words without additional backup, but if the text supports the "imply" distinction as being something that has to be reasoned out, then your suggestion makes sense. Clearly Epicurus did in fact state in other circumstances that, for example, we can understand that a limited life can have as great a pleasure as an unlimited life but it takes reasoning to reach that conclusion. So that suggestion ould not be unreasonable at …
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My two cents is that I agree with the idea that Epicurus found pleasure in life itself and that helps explain his full attitude towards the availability of pleasure all the time.
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(Quote from Don) Unfortunately i cannot agree even with this statement. There is not doubt that Diogenes Laertius makes the assertion that that K/K distinction was significant to Epicurus, but there is strong reason to believe that Diogenes Laertius is wrong. And to "account for" the references that are cited is exactly what Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky go through in great detail. The issue is not whether DL said what he said, but whether DL was right in saying it, and that's the crux of the …
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This is probably a good place to repeat and repost the "abstract" from Nikolsky's article, which very clearly and succinctly states the issue in two short paragaphs: The real issue here comes down to whether (1) the term "Pleasure" as the goal of life needs to be replaced with "katastematic pleasure" as Wikipedia's commentators would do, or (2) the term "Pleasure" as the goal of life is perfectly adequate, but needs to be stated clearly to include ALL pleasurable aspects of life of any kind, men…
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(Quote from Don) This is where you and i completely agree. The issue is not the direction you are going, the issue is that the direction the "Wikipedia Worldview" of Epicurus is going, which (if accepted) would make Epicurean philosophy completely unacceptable to most of the world, especially (in Cicero's words) "the Senate" and "the Camp." If we take the wider view of pleasure on which both you and I agree, then these difficulties dissolve and Epicurean philosophy is seen to be completely and v…
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1 - Unfortunately there is really no way for me to summarize their argument satisfactorily, because they dive deep into all the specific cites you are raising above. Butt I think the general answers are: A -- YES - that is their ultimate position B -- NO - In fact their chapter is right after the main chapter on Epicurus. 2 - Despite what might appear to some that this discussion is distracting or unnecessary, I realized in recording the podcast this morning that pursuing the details on difficul…