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As I recall from a while ago, one of my conclusions from reading The Greeks On Pleasure was that the considered katastematic pleasure to be obtained when you absorb and understand the conclusions from natural science that we need not fear the gods or death. PD18: As soon as the pain produced by the lack of something is removed, pleasure in the flesh is not increased but only embellished. Yet the limit of enjoyment in the mind is produced by thinking through these very things and similar things, …

Here are some of my notes from TGOP which reinforce Don 's post above: 19.2.3 Ataraxia and aponia are considered conditions of life, not particular pleasures. 19.2.4 Since aponia is just a condition of painless perception it does not mean that Epicurus thought of a non-perceiving state as pleasurable. 19.3.2 Katastematic pleasures refer to "the well-established katastema (condition) of the flesh. Not to replenishment, movement, or katastasis eis phusin (restoration to the natural state). The lat…

(Quote from Cassius, of Arenson) As I've been struggling to express above, I'm beginning to have what I think is an answer to this argument. FWIW I'll try to clarify it here. 1. Pleasure and pain are, first and foremost, feelings. 2. Pleasure and pain are opposing feelings, so absence of either of them implies the maximum quantity of the other by definition. 3. Properly understanding natural science results in an abiding absence of pains which are due to fears of the gods, fears of death, and ot…

OK abiding probably isn't a great word choice I'm having trouble coming up with a correct word; background condition is one attempt, maybe underlayment is another. I'm trying to express it from experience, not texts, so it's challenging. (Quote from Don) Thanks for this quote Don . it's been some time since I read Nikolsky, Wenham or Gosling and Taylor; how does this square with their arguments? Isn't their point that katastematic and kinetic weren't terms used by Epicurus? This would seem to co…

(Quote from Don) Reading it in this context and considering the source, it strikes me as quite a sarcastic and misleading description of that. As we often discuss, "a life of ease", of otiosus, might be absolute pleasure to some people yet entirely odius to others. And "crammed full of pleasures" seems to indicate disdain for prudent choices and avoidances.

So we don't have much to go on from Epicurus himself, including this fragment: The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity." Can any significance be derived from the fact that he wrote that peace of mind and freedom from pain imply a state of rest, whereas joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity? Could he have been suggesting that a …

If you haven't already, take a look at Long and Sedley's commentary in the Pleasure section of The Hellenistic Philosophers. They devoted a page or so to this topic.

Don for a 2000 year sidestep, does your interest in homeostasis come from reading Dopamine Nation? That book has been on my list for quite a while but I haven't got around to reading it. Just curious. I don't want to derail this thread! Great research!

Thanks for that compilation Don ! (Quote from Don) I tend to agree with this statement. I think it's a slippery slope from "not sensed" to "neutral state". But I would say that it's a different quality of pleasure: quieter, more subtle.

(Quote from Cassius) Yes, this is a very useful discussion. Painful at times but great for getting clarity. Thanks Cassius and Don ! (Quote from Cassius) (Quote from Don) This discussion has me thinking further about pleasures v desires. Whether with nefarious intent or through misunderstanding, it seems to me that the Platonic/Ciceronian treatment conflates and confuses pleasure with desire, and that this is a major cause or the katastematic-kinetic brouhaha. Don's quote seems to hit on a key: …

(Quote from Cassius) Also something along the lines of "perception/sensations are our primary means of understanding. Reason can only be an effective tool in evaluating information that the senses provide: it cannot provide correct information about the world if it seeks to undermine the senses."

If Liebersohn was correct in his assertions (in his paper on Kinetic-katastematic pleasure) that the Letter to Menoikos was written around 296 or 295 BCE and that it was written for people new to the philosophy, does this have any relevance in placing LM in relation to other passages on pleasure? More or less developed due to being written when he was older or younger? More broad brushed for a newbie reader? Or are the contexts of the other passages too vague to make any reasonable assumptions?

Don enjoy the pleasure of feeling better!

(Quote from Don) And the experience of pleasure, as well as pain, also provides feedback regarding our choices and avoidances. The process is a loop.

(Quote from Don) Practically speaking I don't think there's a neutral state. Neurologically speaking I'm not qualified to answer that. But of course I'm happy to toss out an opinion. The affective circumplex and the teeter totter are both conceptual models or analogies and therefore it could be assumed that they don't fully represent the biological processes at work. They seem to imply a neutral state at 0,0 or at perfectly level, respectively. But it could be that these implied states are a fai…

Don I'm coming to the idea that the detailed discussions of types of pleasure, such as katastematic and kinetic, are a misunderstanding and obfuscation of what Epicurus was saying. The way I read the PDs and the letters, pleasure is pleasure. Sure there are varieties of pleasures, but they are of very minor concern. What I see as the problem is conflating pleasures and desires. It's very easy to do, and in conflating them, one can then imply that there are greater and lesser pleasures and hence…

(Quote from Don) This seems to make perfect sense based on practical day-to-day experience. It also strikes me as a correction of the Stoic inner citadel idea.

(Quote from reneliza) reneliza to me that sounds exactly right!

(Quote from Don) Definitely a good read with lots of good information, particularly concerning Epicurus' reworking of Aristotle as I recall. The major negative, for me, was that Farrington considers Epicurus to be a popularizer and an evangelist rather than an original thinker. Also, because of the title I was expecting the book to be about the Epicurean gods, but that's not the case. I highlighted a lot in the book, but haven't gotten around to digesting the ideas yet.