Frequently Asked Questions

This is a question that comes up frequently. You will do yourself a big favor if you start with \"Epicurus and His Philosophy\" by Norman DeWitt, but below are several links to lists of books and discussions of reading suggestions that are freely available.

There are many controversies as to the proper interpretation of Epicurus. If, instead of starting with DeWitt or the primary sources, you choose to read a modern book written in the last 30 years, you will find Epicurus presented to you from the perspective that Epicurus was primarily interested in \"absence of pain\" rather than \"pleasure.\" That is why many of us at this forum recommend Norman DeWitt's \"Epicurus and His Philosophy\" as a starting point. DeWitt's perspective is found in the opening chapter of his book which can be read for free here. An article - \"Philosophy For The Millions\" - summarizing DeWitt's perspective is here.

As an initial list for a new student of Epicurus start, I would suggest the following, in order of priority:

1. \"Epicurus and His Philosophy\" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. \"On The Nature of Things\" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' \"On Nature\"
4. \"Epicurus on Pleasure\" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's \"The Greeks On Pleasure.\"
6. Cicero's \"On Ends\" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's \"On The Nature of the Gods\" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens\" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus \"On Methods of Inference\" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

Here is a \"library\" page at NewEpicurean.com with links to where many additional translations are available for free on the internet.

Discussion of this FAQ is here.

Update 10/21/19: Consult this thread for more thoughts on reading list and proper order of approach: Profile of Past Reading

Update 11/21/20: After you have read DeWitt's book, here are additional comments I would make to someone asking where to read next:

Have you read the full bio of Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius which includes all Epicurus' letters? I would be sure to read that so you have it down first hand.

Have you read Lucretius? If you are interested in that then I would stick with the Martin Ferguson Smith edition, which has good footnotes, though there are a couple of sections I have issues with. But overall its the best and most current.

Have you read the Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda? The best version of that is on the dedicated website based in Catalonia.

I do also recommend A Few Days In Athens, especially if you read through these criticisms of it. Despite the issues there is still a lot of good material in it, if you can get past the 18th-century flowery language in the opening chapters.

If you are at all interested in the epistemology issues, I highly recommend the de Lacy version of Philodemus \"On Methods of Inference\" but start at the back with DeLacey's commentary before you read any of the text. There is a lot of good material there about how Epicurean epistemology contrasts with the others.

On the right margin of the home page of the EpicureanFriends website you will see the list of a couple of articles in the paragraph entitled \"Don't be a Stoic in Disguise.\" I would first read the Nikolsky and Wentham articles referenced there, and then go for the chapters on Epicurus in \"The Greeks on Pleasure.\" That book (Greeks on Pleasure) is really the monumentally best-researched work that provided the foundation for the Nikolsky article and shows the errors in the \"absence of pain\" argument.

If you want some entertainment as part of your study, be sure to include the works of Lucian of Samosata, especially those listed here. Lucian is not thought of as a totally orthodox Epicurean, but his Epicurean sympathies are clear in these essays.

If those ideas and sequence don't help, please ask on the forum, especially if you have specific areas you want to target first.

Here's a recent (May 2021) discussion of reading lists at the Facebook Epicurean Group.

Discussion of this FAQ entry at EpicureanFriends.com is here.

1. The Universe Operates on Natural Principles And There Are No Supernatural Gods
   1. Gods Are Never Observed to Create Something From Nothing Or Destroy Anything to Nothing
   2. The Universe Operates Through Natural Processes Based On Combinations Of Matter And Void
   3. The Universe As A Whole Is Eternal And Was Never Created From Nothing
   4. The Universe Is Infinite In Size And There Are No "Gods" Outside Of it
   5. True Gods Would Be Self-Sufficient And Would Not Meddle In the Affairs Of Men
2. There Is No Life After Death
   1. All Things In The Universe Which Come Together Eventually Break Apart
   2. The Soul Is Born With The Body And Cannot Survive Without It
   3. Death Is The End of All Sensation, And There Is No Consciousness Without Sensation
   4. There Is After Death No Heaven or Hell For Reward or Punishment
   5. Life Is Short And Therefore Our Time Is Too Precious To Waste
3. The Standards of Truth Are the Senses, The Anticipations, and the Feelings, Assisted By Reason
   1. He Who Argues That Nothing Can Be Known Contradicts His Own Argument
   2. Reasoning Is Based On The Senses And Is Not Valid Without Them
   3. The Sensations Are Without Reason, Incapable of Memory, And Do Not Inject Error Through Opinion
   4. The Reality Of Separate Sensations Is the Guarantee of The Truth Of Our Senses
   5. Not Only Reason, But Life Itself, Fails Unless We Have the Courage To Trust The Senses
4. The Guide of Life is Pleasure
   1. Pleasure, Along With Pain, Is A Feeling, One Of The Three Standards Of Truth
   2. Pleasure and Pain Include All Types of Physical And Mental Experiences
   3. The Mental Pleasures And Pains Are Frequently More Intense Than The Physical
   4. Feelings Of Pleasure Are Desirable And Serve As The Guide of Life
   5. Pain Is To Be Avoided But Is Accepted For The Sake of Greater Pleasure Or Lesser Pain
5. The Goal of Life Is Happiness
   1. Happiness Is a Life In Which Pleasure Predominates Over Pain
   2. If We Have Happiness We Have All We Need; If We Lack Happiness We Do Everything To Gain It
   3. There Is No Absolute Virtue, Piety, Reason, Or Justice To Serve As the Goal of Life
   4. Virtue, Piety, Reason and Justice Are Valuable Only Insofar As They Bring Happiness
   5. All Actions Are To Be Judged According To Whether They Bring Happiness

Discussion of this FAQ Entry is here.

1. Knowledge Of Things That Are Relevant To Us Is Attainable If We Pursue That Knowledge In Ways Consistent With The Nature of The Universe Therefore it is an error to think that knowledge must be based on "forms" or "models" or "ideals" that are held to exist in another reality. This error leads to the belief that the things we experience around us originate from and are to be understood according to those nonexistent "forms." (Plato and others) It is an error to think that knowledge must be based on "essences" that are held to exist as a part within the things we experience around us, This error leads to the belief that the things we experience around us originate and are to be understood according to these nonexistent "essences." (Aristotle and others) It is an error to think that knowledge must be based on divine revelation or by reference to "gods" or "prime movers" who create all things according to their divine will. This error leads to the belief that the things around us originated and are to be understood according to religion. (Judaism, Christianity, and others)
2. Knowledge should be pursued by studying the facts of nature, which means that we must remember that we ourselves, as well as the subject of our knowledge, and our means of considering that knowledge, derive from (1) the eternal properties of the elementary matter, and (2) the temporary qualities of the bodies that are formed by the combinations of elementary matter and void.
3. The Faculties of Observation Provided By Nature Are The Tools By Which We Measure Truth. These are three in number and are collectively referred to as the Epicurean "Canon of Truth." They are (1) the "five senses," (2) the "feeings" of pleasure and pain, and (3) the "anticipations.
4. We should not seek to understand everything equally well, nor should we expect to understand that which is not possible for us to understand. We should seek to have firm convictions about those things which are necessary for our peace of mind. From the Letter to Pythocles: "In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind and firm convictions. We do not seek to wrest by force what is impossible, nor to understand all matters equally well, nor make our treatment always as clear as when we discuss human life or explain the principles of physics in general—for instance, that the whole of being consists of bodies and intangible nature, or that the ultimate elements of things are indivisible, or any other proposition which admits only one explanation of the phenomena to be possible."
5. "Reason" and "logic" are not in themselves faculties of observation like the three categories of the Canon of Truth. Diogenes Laertius - Biography of Epicurus: Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto or take anything therefrom. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning.
6. Therefore the opinions derived from "reason" or "logic" must constantly be tested against the data obtained from the canonical faculties. Opinions formed by reason should be concluded to be "true" when clear available evidence supports the conclusion, and no clear evidence contradicts the conclusion. Opinions formed by reason should be concluded to be "false" when clear available evidence contradicts the conclusion, and no clear evidence supports the conclusion. Opinions formed by reason which are not based on data from our faculties of observation, or on which the data from our faculties of observations is unclear, must not be considered "true," but considered "speculative" at best, and we must "wait" for additional evidence before concluding that the assertion is either true or false.

References and additional detail for this list may be found here.

Discussion of this FAQ entry is here.

1. Nothing comes from nothing and nothing goes to nothing, and therefore the universe as a whole has existed eternally, and the universe was not created at any single point in time, neither by a god nor by any other single event.
2. Everything in the universe is composed of combinations of elementary matter and void. Therefore nothing else exists - no Religious "heaven" or "hell," no spiritual or other dimension, no Platonic "ideals," no Aristotelian "essences." Nothing exists except elementary matter, void, and their combinations.
3. The amount of elementary matter and void in the universe is unlimited in extent. Therefore the universe as a whole is unlimited in extent, and the universe as a whole has no center and no edge, and the earth is not uniquely positioned at the center of the universe.
4. The elementary matter is always in motion, and therefore the universe is constantly changing, but not so fast that we are unable to grasp the truths that are relevant to us.
5. The elementary matter moves through the void at a uniform speed, but vibrates in compounds due to collisions, and therefore the change in the universe is not chaotic, but subject to laws of motion.
6. The elementary matter is capable of swerving from its path at no fixed place or time, and therefore not everything in the universe is predetermined from the beginning of time.
7. The elementary matter has varying weights, shapes, and sizes, but the number of these variations not infinite, only innumerable. Therefore the properties of elementary matter and the combinations formed by elementary matter and void are not unlimited, but limited by the properties of the elementary matter and its combinations.
8. Combinations of elementary matter and void are not by nature eternal but are created and destroyed. Therefore while the universe as a whole is eternal, the combinations of elementary matter and void, including the Earth, are not eternal.
9. To the extent that "perfect" combinations of elementary matter and void exist, such perfect things (including perfect beings) neither cause nor receive trouble, because causing and receiving trouble are characteristics only of things which are weak. Therefore to the extent that any life forms, or any combinations of elementary matter and void, have developed the capacity to live without end, they neither cause change to us nor or are they changed by any actions we may take.
10. Nature never creates only a single instance of any kind of thing. Therefore life exists throughout the universe, as the Earth cannot possibly be the only place where life exists.
11. In the Universe as a whole, every thing has its match and counterpart. This principle of uniform distribution is known as "isonomia." Therefore, for example, there are a comparable number of "immortal" beings as "mortal" beings in the universe.

References for this list may be found here.

Discussion of this FAQ entry is here.

1. Epicurean Philosophy had this to say about the best life to live:
   1. "If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point." - Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda
   2. "We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil." Torquatus, in Cicero's "On Ends"
2. Epicurean Philosophy had this to say about the ultimate pleasure(s):
   1. "That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good."- Usener Fragment 423
   2. "The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement." - Torquatus, in Cicero's "On Ends
3. Men need not be concerned about "gods" - supernatural beings do not exist, and any higher beings which are "perfect" are not concerned with men. Therefore it is false to believe that gods favor and reward their friends and disfavor and punish their enemies. Therefore it is foolish to ask the gods to do things for us that we can do for ourselves.
4. Men cease to exist at death and thereafter experience no sensations whatsoever. Therefore there is no reward or punishment after death. Therefore all the pleasure that we want to experience must be experienced in life.
5. Pleasurable living is the ultimate goal of life set by nature. The highest degree of pleasurable living possible to us (the "limit of pleasure") is attained by filling our experience with pleasures and expelling all pains. But men who lack knowledge of the nature of the universe are troubled by fear of supernatural forces, and men who are not independent of other men fear their enemies. Men by nature are troubled by these concerns, so they must study of nature and pursue independence. It is not possible to live to the limit of pleasure unless we study nature and attain the power to live safely and apart from our enemies. Therefore knowledge is indispensable for happy living, but knowledge is not an end in itself.
6. The pursuit of pleasure as the guide of life does not lead is not endless and is not in vain, because there is no goal higher than seeking the limit of mental and physical pleasure possible to you as an individual. You can experience that goal by filling your experience with pleasures and expelling all pains. Even if you are not able to expel every pain, pleasurable living is possible to most men because pain that is strong is generally short, and pain that is long is generally mild. Therefore pleasurable living is the goal of life. Therefore the escape from pain is not the goal of life, because the only means of total escape from pain is death, and the experience of pleasure, which is the goal of life, is only possible to the living.
7. It is possible for us to attain the limit of pleasure (the maximum pleasure possible to us) if we pursue pleasure intelligently. Therefore we must not think that we can increase our limit of pleasure past the limit which we experience when we are living most pleasurably and also experiencing as little pain as possible. Therefore we must not regret that we cannot live forever, because the limit of pleasure is not measured by the time available to us, but by our capacity to live as pleasurably as possible while also experiencing as little pain as possible, and the mind is capable of understanding this and eliminating the fear of death and regret that we are not immortal. Therefore we must learn also that it is not necessary to compete with others in seeking pleasure, as it is easy to live a complete life without comparing ourselves with other men. Therefore we must also learn to analyze our desires so as to pursue those which bring the most pleasure with the least accompanying pain. Therefore we must learn that it is as great an error to live too simply as it is to live too extravagantly, as the goal of life is pleasant living, and different circumstances will require and allow different levels of simplicity and luxury.
8. In pursuing pleasure we must remember that no pleasure is bad in itself, but some pleasures frequently bring more pain than the pleasure justifies. Therefore in all actions we choose to pursue we must ask: "What will be the result if I pursue this and what will be the result if I do not?" Therefore we must remember that it is not the faculty of pleasure that is to blame when some men pursue actions we consider to be evil, it is the unintelligent or malicious mind of the individual that employs the faculty of pleasure in a way likely to bring more pain to him than pleasure.
9. In pursuing pleasure we must remember that no single pleasure can be pursued to the point where it consumes our lives, because if it did so there would never be any room for any other pleasures. Therefore do not seek to pursue one pleasure to the exclusion of all others.
10. Protecting yourself from other men is something that is naturally to be desired, and any action necessary to achieve this is justifiable. But fame and power frequently do not achieve this result for us, and those who pursue fame and power frequently do so in vain. Therefore pursuit of fame and power can be justified in particular circumstances, but frequently the results do not justify the effort.
11. "Virtue" is not the goal of life, but simply the name we give to the necessary tools by which pleasurable living can be attained. It is not possible to live pleasurably without these tools, nor is it possible to employ these tools properly without living pleasurably. Therefore it is essential to see that "virtue" is an empty word when divorced from the goal of pleasurable living, as other philosophers attempt to do.
12. The only way to dismiss superstition and other fears from life is to live intelligently, and therefore confidently, and this requires that we study nature and employ the faculties of observation given us by Nature (the Epicurean Canon of Truth). Therefore we must always keep our minds clearly focused on the goal of pleasurable living. Therefore we must never allow ourselves to repress our faculties of observation, including our faculties of anticipations and our faculty of pain and pleasure, because if we abandon these we have no ability to judge what is true and what is false.
13. It is possible for men to live wisely and pursue pleasure intelligently, for men are free agents and their actions are not wholly determined by outside forces. Therefore we should reject both those who teach determinist views that men are nothing more than pawns of outside forces, and those who teach that men are playthings of chance.
14. If we live wisely we will see that our most important tool of happiness and security is friendship. Therefore we will cultivate and protect our friends.
15. As with any other virtue, "Justice" is not the goal of life, but justice is essential to happy living because the just man is the most free from trouble, and the unjust is the most full of trouble. Therefore we should seek arrangement with other men that are just.
16. The only true foundation of Justice is mutually advantageous agreement among intelligent beings to neither do or receive harm from each other. Therefore when possible we should pursue agreements with other men that are mutually advantageous.
17. There is no such thing as absolute or universal justice or injustice. Therefore what some men label "injustice" is never evil in and of itself, no matter how intensely we may dislike the activity. The penalty of injustice is only the pain that it brings to the men who are unjust.
18. Because justice is founded on mutually advantageous agreements, relationships which change over time so as to no longer be mutually advantageous are no longer to be considered just. Therefore human relationships must constantly be reexamined and reconstituted to fit circumstances in order for them to be labeled "just" or "unjust."
19. The man who pursues happy living most intelligently will live among friends, and he will refrain from mixing with, and expel from his life, all those who are not his friends, or who are his enemies. Therefore happy living requires us to constantly examine our circumstances and take action to pursue friendly relationships and separate ourselves from unfriendly relationships.

References and additional detail for this list may be found here.

Discussion of this FAQ entry is here.

Short Answer: This is a contentious question and you will find widely differing answers to this question. However it is undisputed that Epicurus classified all feelings under two categories: (1) Pleasure, and (2) Pain. Because all feelings are either one or the other, the necessary implication is that the quantity of one by definition equals the absence of the other. The quantify of "absence of pain" is therefore by definition pleasure, just as the quantity of "absence of pleasure" is the same as the quantity of pain. See PD3: "The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain." This is a statement of quantity only, and not a definition of the qualitative aspects and qualities of pleasure and pain. Under this formulation "Absence of pain" is not a statement of type of pleasure, just as "absence of pleasure" is not a statement of a type of pain. However you will frequently see commentators state that "Absence of pain" is the Epicurean definition of the highest type of pleasure. This conclusion should be scrutinized for consistency with the weight of the body of the surviving texts. For more discussion of this issue see here.

Long Answer: Excerpt from Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" Chapter 12: "The New Hedonism"

THE TRUE NATURE OF PLEASURE

While the identity of the end or telos is declared to have been established by Nature, recourse must be had to observation and reflection to determine what can be truthfully predicated of it. Tied in with this problem is the question of the true relation of pleasure to pain.

On both these points the findings of Epicurus, though clear and explicit, are regularly misrepresented. Pleasure, he declares, is cognate and connate with us, and by this he means not only that the interconnection between life and pleasure manifests itself simultaneously with birth and by actions that precede the capacity to choose and understand; he means also that pleasure is of one nature with normal life, an ingredient or component of it, and not an appendage that may be attached and detached; it is a normal accompaniment of life in the same sense that pain and disease are abnormal.

It follows from this that pleasure is not to be opposed to pain on the ground alone that all creatures pursue the one and avoid the other; the two are true opposites because they stand in the same relation as health which preserves and disease which destroys. It is for this reason that the one is good and the other is evil, Vatican Saying 37: "Human nature is vulnerable to evil, not to the good, because it is preserved by pleasures, destroyed by pains." This may be taken to mean that pleasure, as it were, is nutriment to the human being, as food is, and that human nature reaches out for it just as each living thing by some natural impulse seeks its appropriate food. It is no accident that the following statement of Aristotle is to be found in his discussion of pleasure: "And it may well be that in the lower animals there is some natural good, superior to their scale of existence, which reaches out for the kindred good." 9 With this surmise Epicurus would have concurred: all creatures seek pleasure as if food; they avoid pain as if poison.

Discussion about this answer is here.

From Norman Dewitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" Chapter 10 - "The New Freedom"

Since Epicurus was the first to view the rational pursuit of happiness as a practical problem, it was naturally he who first came to grips with the problem of freedom and determinism. Having once assumed that happiness is the goal of life and that the rational pursuit of it presumes both the freedom of the individual and the possibility of planning the whole life, he was bound to single out all those external compulsions to which antecedent and contemporary thought had yielded belief and one by one to demonstrate them to be nonexistent, escapable, or conquerable. In this he was a natural pragmatist, assuming both the need and feasibility of controlling experience.

To begin, as usual, with the synoptic view, this is adequately set forth in a scholium. It should be noted that the problem of freedom arises as part of the problem of causation and that three causes are here presumed, necessity, chance, and human volition: "And he says in other books that some things happen of necessity, some from chance and others through our own choice." To this statement are added supporting reasons, which apply to the three causes respectively: "because necessity is subject to no correction and chance is a fickle thing but the part that is left to us is free of control, to which, incidentally, blame and the opposite naturally attach themselves." Thus in outline the limits of freedom and of moral responsibility are clearly recognized.

The content of the scholium admits of expansion through particulars that are available. Various kinds of necessity were recognized. One of these was observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies; mechanistic causes were assigned to these and no significance for human conduct was recognized.2 Another sort of necessity was that of infinite physical causation, sponsored by Democritus, from which escape was discovered through postulating the swerve of the atoms, that is, a degree of free play sufficient to permit of free will in the individual. Still another sort of necessity was that arising from the interference of the gods in the affairs of men. This was eliminated by declaring the gods to be exclusively concerned with their own happiness. A fourth kind of necessity was dialectical. This was simply ignored. For example, when the disjunctive proposition, "Tomorrow Hermarchus will either be alive or dead," was put up to Epicurus, he declined to give an answer. He was too wary a dialectician himself to swallow a dialectical bait.

Discussion about this question is here.

See the answers provided in this thread.

For an in-depth treatment of this issue with many quotations, see "Not All Politicians Are Sisyphus - What Roman Epicureans Were Taught About Politics" by Jeffrey Fish. Fish states: "Epicurus and his followers did not discourage the possession of power per se, only the ambitious pursuit of it. Their position was much more nuanced than Cicero and Plutarch or their modern counterparts would have us believe." Further:

"I maintain ... that On the Good King itself constitutes a positive case for a form of Epicurean statesmanship. Although Philodemus’ analysis of Homeric kings makes use of several stock elements from kingship literature,he concentrates on one theme especially compatible with Epicureanism,and one, I think, especially articulated within the school. KD 7 identifies glory as a risky pleasure, but adds that there would be no reason not to enjoy it were it risk-free. A ruler’s virtuous exercise of power leads to, or at least tends to promote, his safety. I suggest that, with the help of Philodemus and others like him, Roman statesmen were able to connect two strands of Epicurean thought in order to justify their political life: one, that a person’s virtues are productive of the good will and love of others, actual pleasures in themselves; the other, that power can in fact lead to safety.Combining the two could result in the claim that the virtuous exercise of political power can sometimes provide safety as well as pleasure to a ruler. Epicurean statesmen in previous generations likely held a similar point of view."

...

"Instructions on the subject of political prominence, like those regarding education, must have been situational rather than dogmatic.“ That is to say, they were not maxims at all. Their basic message was that individuals born into obscurity should he grateful for that fact and should not strive for fame or attract unnecessary attention to themselves. The kind of person at whom this message was directed would have been quite opposite to someone who, to borrow a phrase from Cicero, had been ‘consul-designate from birth.’ The Epicureans had advice for both kinds of people, and a method for evaluating options that promised to maximize happiness Whatever the relevant circumstances. There is no suggestion in any surviving source that a person born to the kind of station referred to by Cicero would be expected to go through the tumultuous process of trying to dismantle all of his inherited privileges and responsibilities."

...

"Lucretius acknowledges both the nobility by birth of the poem’s addressee (Memmi clara propago), and the need for him to attend to politics more than philosophy in the trying times Rome currently faces (patriai tempore iniquo) (1.41–3). Ex hypothesi, the purpose of the poem cannot have been to withdraw Memmius from politics."

From the Principal Doctrines:

PD07 - Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature.

PD39 - The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life.40. Those who possess the power to defend themselves against threats by their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee of security, live the most pleasant life with one another; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy is such that if one of them dies prematurely, the others do not lament his death as though it called for pity.

Philodemus On Flattery: ". . . the argument demonstrates that they endure to pay such a great price in evils on account of . . . ; so therefore, good repute was pursued according to nature for the sake of security (from men), good repute which is open to non-philosophical men and philosophers alike; not for the sake of any vice, among which [sc. vices] flattery plays the first role, and recklessly puts upon one greater disrepute whenever it is supposed to accomplish good repute . . ."

Philodemus On The Good King: "Departing therefore from such topics, let us again recommend that which is good for a king, to be averse to a harsh, austere and bitter character, and to practise gentleness, goodness and a king’s mildness and leniency as much as possible, since these lead to a sound monarchy and not arbitrary rule based on fear of a despot. (Col. 24,6–18 Dorandi, with minor changes)"

Metrodorus Fragment (see Fish article): 'It is necessary to tell how a person will best uphold the purpose of his nature and how, as far as it depends on his own will, he is not to present himself for public office in the first place'.

Plutarch (see Fish article): " Not even Epicurus thought men who were in love with fame and honour should lead a quiet life, but they should indulge their nature by taking part in politics and public life, on the grounds that they are constitutionally more likely to be disturbed and corrupted by inactivity, if they do not obtain what they want. But he is a fool to encourage to participate in public affairs, not those who are most able, but those who cannot live a quiet life."

From Cicero’s De Finibus:

"Holding as I do this theory, what reason should I have for fearing that I may not be able to bring our Torquati into accord with it? ... I shall maintain this, that if they performed those actions, which are beyond question noble, from some motive, their motive was not virtue apart from all else. He stripped the foe of his necklet. Yes, and he donned it himself to save his own life. But he faced a grave danger. Yes, with the whole army looking on. What did he gain by it? Applause and affection, which are the strongest guarantees for passing life in freedom from fear.

...

“There remains a topic that is pre-eminently germane to this discussion, I mean the subject of Friendship. Your school maintains that if pleasure be the Chief Good, friendship will cease to exist. Now Epicurus’ pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct. How great a thing such friendship is, is shown by the mythical stories of antiquity. Review the legends from the remotest ages, and, copious and varied as they are, you will barely find in them three pairs of friends, beginning with Theseus and ending with Orestes. Yet Epicurus in a single house and that a small one maintained a whole company of friends, united by the closest sympathy and affection; and this still goes on in the Epicurean school.”

Vatican Saying 66. We show our feeling for our friends’ suffering, not with laments, but with thoughtful concern.

Vatican Saying 78. The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one.

Discussion of this question is here.

Short Answer: The differences between Stoicism and Epicurean philosophy are deep and profound. Modern advocates of variations of Stoicism tend to blur the differences, but the ancient authorities who knew both systems well considered them to be totally incompatible, especially in terms of the goal of life and the role of reason in the determination of truth.

For a detailed treatment of many aspects of the differences, complete with cites to the ancient authorities, please see the comparison chart here.

Another useful comparison chart, this one focused on the different Stoic and Epicurean views of the goal of life, is here:

Discussion of this question is here.

First and foremost, make sure you understand the fundamentals of what Epicurean philosophy really means before you attempt to implement anything. There are major controversies between modern commentators as to what Epicurus meant in important areas of his philosophy. For example, did Epicurus advocate any form of asceticism? What is the meaning of the "natural and necessary" classification of desires? What is the meaning of "pleasure" and how does it relate to "absence of pain?" What did Epicurus advocate as to the goal of living? What role does "simplicity" have in Epicurean living? What is the meaning and use of "virtue" in Epicurean philosophy? What was Epicurus talking about when he referred to "gods"? A chart of some of these issues and the divergent opinions is here.

Until you understand these and other fundamental points, it is a major mistake to think that you can implement what Epicurus taught on the question of how to live.

So first, familiarize yourself with basic Epicurean doctrine through reliable foundational material. Don't just read Wikipedia and other short summaries, many of which are unreliable. Don't just read the list of Principal Doctrines, or even Epicurus' own letters, and think that you can take material written for educated students of philosophy in Athens 2000 years ago and understand at first glance how they apply to philosophical issues today.

A reliable introduction in easily readable textbook form is Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy." A reliable introduction in fictional dialog form is Frances Wright's "A Few Days In Athens." Other reading ideas can be found here.

Beyond that, start with two specific pieces of practical advice given by Epicurus himself:

1. From his letter to Herodotus: "Those who have made some advance in the survey of the entire system ought to fix in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view is often required, the details but seldom.To the former, then—the main heads—we must continually return, and must memorize them so far as to get a valid conception of the facts, as well as the means of discovering all the details exactly when once the general outlines are rightly understood and remembered; since it is the privilege of the mature student to make a ready use of his conceptions by referring every one of them to elementary facts and simple terms. For it is impossible to gather up the results of continuous diligent study of the entirety of things, unless we can embrace in short formulas and hold in mind all that might have been accurately expressed even to the minutest detail." This means prepare your own outline of Epicurean principles. Tips on preparing your own outline can be found in the forum here.
    
2. From his letter to Menoeceus: "Exercise yourself in these and related precepts day and night, both by yourself and with one who is like-minded; then never, either in waking or in dream, will you be disturbed, but will live as a god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings." This means communicate and study Epicurean principles with other like-minded Epicureans. This you are already in the process of doing by your presence here at the Epicureanfriends.com Forum. Better yet, if you are able, work on forming your own local Meetup or similar local group. Another option is to start your own blog or website on Epicurean principles - and of course if you do that please let us know so we can help publicize it. No matter which direction you choose, there is much good information available on the internet at the list of links recommended here.

After you are confident that you understand the basic ideas of Epicurean philosophy, there are several modern books which can provide practical tips on developing an Epicurean lifestyle. Two are:

1. Hiram Crespo's "Tending the Epicurean Garden."
2. Haris Dimitriadis' "Epicurus and the Pleasant Life."

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Discussion of this FAQ Entry is here.

Epicurus held that gods are totally natural. They are in no way supernatural, in no way omnipotent, in no way omnipresent. They are totally incapable of creating something from nothing. This is very different from modern use of the term. This is a very complex subject so please see additional discussion here and throughout this website.

Epicurus spoke of pleasure both in specific terms, mentioning numbers of specific instances of pleasures, but also more widely as a general term, as one of the two "feelings" given to living things by Nature for purpose of allowing them to determine what to choose and what to avoid.

One major controversy is whether "absence of pain" was held by Epicurus to be the equivalent of "pleasure" or to be "the highest pleasure." This website is administered from the point of view that Epicurus did not view "absence of pain" as either a type of pleasure, as "the highest pleasure," or as term that is fully equivalent or interchangeable with "pleasure."

Epicurus held that pleasure and pain are the only two categories of feelings, and as a result the presence of one type of feeling is by definition the absence of the other. This is illustrated in Principal Doctrine 3, which states that "The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."

It also is widely contended by commentators that Epicurus was concerned with categories of pleasure described as "kinetic" and "katastematic." This contention is primarily based on discussion of this distinction by Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, as the surviving texts of core Epicurean leaders do not mention these categories as of any importance whatsoever. In support of the contention that this terminology was not significant to Epicurus and originates from Stoic sources, see the material on this website including Boris Nikolsky's "Epicurus on Pleasure" , Matthew Wenham's "On Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure In Epicurus," and excerpts from "The Greeks on Pleasure" by Gosling & Taylor.

The position on pleasure discussed by Norman DeWitt in his "Epicurus On Pleasure" (primarily Chapter 12) is consistent with the Nikolsky / Gosling & Taylor position, and this website is administered with the DeWitt/Nikoslky viewpoint as the preferred and most accurate reflection of the classical Epicurean position.

Discuss this FAQ response here, and see the answer to this related FAQ here.

Additional articles of significance to this question on this website are:

Cassius' "The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model"

Elayne's "On Pleasure, Pain, And Happiness"

Epicurus was considered a "dogmatist" because he held that confidence in certain conclusions is possible. Epicurus did not consider it necessary to have omniscience in order to be confident is stating that something can be known. He was very careful, however, to point out the limitations of the senses and the need to verify conclusions and to be open to new facts. Please see the discussion of epistemology in the FAQ here.

The Epicurean terms "anticipations" is much-discussed and much disputed. Please see the discussions here.

In his letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus makes many relevant statements, but he himself does not provide a precise definition of "happiness," and the choice not to provide a precise definition of the term should itself be considered significant. Later Epicureans, however, provided direct statements that are found in other primary sources, such as Diogenes of Oinoanda's Inscription and Epicurean sections of Cicero's On Ends. Here is a direct statement from the Epicurean Diogenes of Oinoanda in response to the question "What is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?" -

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into "what is the means of happiness?" and they wanted to say "the virtues" (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not "what is the means of happiness?" but "what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?", I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

Also, from Cicero's On Ends, the Epicurean Torquatus says:

Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.

...

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

To the extent that happiness is identifiable with the best life, Torquatus also provides this description of a life which admits of no further improvement:

The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

For an article on this issue check here, and to discuss this FAQ response go here.

This is a complicated calculation which has been much discussed over the years. Our current best discussion of this calculation is on this lexicon page, which is based on the latest discussion thread here which is itself contain in this section of the "Epicurus" subforum. The short answer current consensus thought seems to be as calculated on this table prepared by Nate with this conclusion:

Quote from Nate from the post linked above

I think celebrating Epicurus' Ceremonial Birthday (Gamelion 20) on January 20th is the way to go for anyone using the Julian calendar. Furthermore, it is the case that in 1987, 1998, 2006, 2017, 2025, 2036, and 2063, Gamelion 20 actually did/does fall on January the 20th, so there are a handful of days when Greeks who practiced according to the Attic calendar, and modern Twentiers who practice with the Julian calendar would have simultaneous celebrations.

Kalosyni, I note that while the Panhellenic Symposium of Epicurean Philosophy (PSEP) is held in February, it occurs on different days every year. For example, this year it was held on the 19-20th. In 2017, it was the 10-11th. In 2016, it was the 6-7th. In 2015, it was the 7-8th. These dates do not correspond with a consistent date on the Attic calendar.

Additionally, while the ceremonial celebration of Epicurus Birthday (on mid-Winter Eikas) sometimes falls in February, it falls in January more often than February. According to my calculations, Epicurus' birth year (Year 3 of the 109th Olympiad, which corresponds with Summer 342 BCE to Summer 341 BCE) would host Gamelion 7 on January 11, 341 BCE and would host Gamelion 20 on January 24, 341 BCE). Either way, during the year of Epicurus' birth, both Gamelion 7 and Gamelion 20 fell in the Julian month of January, so I respectfully disagree with the PSEP (and Wikipedia).

I am curious which Attic Year it is that the PSEP considers to be "the first ceremonial celebration of Epicurus' Birthday". It probably was not until 310 BCE or later that the annual celebration of Epicurus birth date (Gamelion 7) was re-oriented toward the celebration of mid-Winter Eikas (Gamelion 20) because this represents the beginning of friendship with the Lampsacus crew who would go on to carry his torch; Gamelion 20 of that year fell on February 11th 310 BCE.

This is a work in progress. For now refer to here: RE: Episode One Hundred Forty-Nine - "Epicurus And His Philosophy" Part 05 - The Early Years of Epicurus

For this please refer to Famous Epicureans Throughout History (Including Nate's Summary of Historic Epicureans)

Short Answer: Epicurus taught that it was important to have confidence in conclusions about matters which are clear. He advised "waiting" to form opinions about things which are not clear. Much of Epicurean doctrine is a reaction against radical skepticism, and in fact one of Epicurus' sayings was "The wise man will teach things that are definite, rather than doubtful musings." (Bailey translation of passage from the Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius.")

Further examples are:

Book Four of Lucretius (Bailey):

[469] Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain? [478] You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true.

Diogenes of Oinoanda (Smith):

Fragment 5 - Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

Thread for discussion of this topic is here.

From Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" Chapter 4: "The Canon, Reason, & Nature"


THE Canon was not an afterthought, as the Stoics asserted,1 but occupied the first place in the triad of Canon, Physics, and Ethics. This arrangement is unalterable, because the Ethics were deduced from the Physics and the truth of both Physics and Ethics was subject to the test of the Canon, which included Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings.

The task of expounding the Canon would be much simpler were it not for ancient and modern confusions and ambiguities that beset the topic. Epicurus disposed of it in a single roll. The word canon denotes a rule or straightedge but metaphorically includes all the instruments employed by a builder. A perspicuous account of it is presented by Lucretius, who mentions also the square and the plumb line.2 Apart from this passage, however, Lucretius misleads the reader, because he gives exclusive prominence to the Sensations and seems to have lacked a clear understanding of the workings of Anticipations and Feelings as criteria.

These last two criteria, it is manifest, were not discussed in the Big Epitome which Lucretius had before him. In the graded textbooks of Epicurus the topic must have been reserved for advanced students. It is doubtful whether Lucretius was even acquainted with the roll that treated of the Canon. This is unfortunate, because his own one-sided treatment is largely to blame for the classification of Epicurus as an empiricist and for the ascription to him of belief in "the infallibility of sensation."

It is an even worse mistake to have confused the tests of truth with the content of truth, that is, the tools of precision with the stones of the wall. This was the blunder of Pierre Gassendi, who revived the study of Epicurus in the seventeenth century. It was his finding "that there is nothing in the intellect which has not been in the senses." From this position John Locke, in turn, set out as the founder of modern empiricism. Thus a misunderstanding of Epicurus underlies a main trend of modern philosophy. This astonishing fact begets an even greater concern for a correct interpretation, which may cause Locke to appear slightly naive.

The institution of the Canon reflects a contemporary striving for an increase of precision in all the arts, sculpture, architecture, music, and mathematics, but the immediate provocation is to be found in the teachings of Pyrrho the skeptic and of Plato. Pyrrho's rejection of both reason and the sensations as criteria rendered acute the need of establishing a canon of truth. In the judgment of Epicurus Plato also ranked as a skeptic, because he belittled the sensations as undependable and phenomena as deceptive, the only real and eternal existences being the ideas. Thus in his system reason became the only contact between man and reality, and human reason was crippled by the imprisonment of the soul in the body.

Epicurus denied the existence of Platonic ideas on the ground that the only existences were atoms and empty space. Thus to his thinking man stood face to face with physical reality and his sensations constituted the sole contact with this reality. Had he stopped at this point he would have been an empiricist, but he did not. He made room also for a kind of intuition, which is incompatible with empiricism. He postulated that man was equipped in advance by Nature for living in his prospective environment, and not in his physical environment alone but also in his social environment. In addition to the five senses this equipment included innate ideas, such as that of justice, and these ideas, because they existed in advance of experience, were called Anticipations. Moreover, as Epicurus postulated, each experience of the individual, the sensations included, is accompanied by a secondary reaction of pleasure or pain. These pleasures and pains are the Feelings, which also rank as criteria, being Nature's Go and Stop signals.

Thus Nature, having equipped man with a triple contact with his environment, becomes a norm, while the Platonic Reason is eliminated along with the Platonic Ideas. It now remains to explain in more detail the dethronement of Reason and the recognition of Nature as the norm.

Discussion about this answer is here.

What are the central differences that separate Epicurus from other philosophers on the nature of Truth?

Discussion of this question is here.

Here's an example of this question: "What is the Epicurean physics view of energy? Instead of "matter and void", shouldn't it be "mass-energy and void"? How strongly do we hold to the idea that atoms are indestructible and immutable? What would Epicurus think if he knew about matter-antimatter annihilation?"

But first, the general way this question is often asked comes down to something like this: "Don't we now know about subatomic particles and other phenomena smaller than atoms, and since Epicurus said atoms were indivisible then Epicurus was wrong, his philosophy fails, he can't be trusted, so shouldn't we just muse about how interesting it is to consider pleasure the goal of life, and how cute he was to talk about pleasure as "absence of pain?" Shouldn't we just discuss Epicurus for an hour while we have a beer and eat some exotic food and after that go back to studying Plato and the Stoics?"

And the general answer to that question is "No."

That's because the Epicurean view of nature was built on an approach to knowledge that is first and foremost geared toward adapting to and incorporating all observations that can reliably judged to be correct. The philosopher known for the viewpoint that "all sensations are true" (in the sense of honestly reported) is never going to ignore new observations in physics which are repeatedly and reliably observed. Read Lucretius and you will see the most detailed presentation of Epicurean physics left to us, and you will see that the physics is built on a step by step series of observations that remain persuasive today. No doubt some will want to argue about this, but the general starting points that (1) nothing ever truly comes from nothing, and (2) nothing ever truly goes to nothing remain persuasive today. Even more certainly, neither of those phenomena are ever observed to occur at the whim or will of any supernatural god. All of the rest of Epicurean physics are derivative conclusions intended to produce a working model of how this fundamental observation is most likely to be "explainable" given the knowledge that we have. And one part of Epicurus' working model was that at some point in nature we arrive at an irreducible limit where things can no longer be divided further, and that this are of limit is where nature gets its stability and reliability and continuity that we see around us every day, which exists by nature and not because a supernatural god is watching it and willing it into existence.

It is therefore fundamental to observe that if new instrumentation gives us the ability to prove to our satisfaction the existence of "mass-energy" or anything else then that would be incorporated into the overall consistent world-view.

One also has to consider that the use of words varies between languages and over the centuries. When Epicurus was referring to "atoms" the Greek translates most generally into "things that are indivisible. What we refer to today as atoms made up of subatomic particles would easily be incorporated into Epicurean physics by observing that what Epicurus was really saying was that at SOME point you come to a level where existence is indivisible.

Various philosophers of Epicurus day and before had asserted that matter was theoretically infinitely divisible, and they carried those observations to ridiculous conclusions such as that movement is impossible. Epicurean physics is largely devoted to philosophical approach that prioritizes observation and practical experience over abstract theory, meaning for just one example that when we observe that motion is going on everywhere around us, we do not accept speculative abstractions which assert that motion does not exist. The entire issue of supernatural gods and supernatural realms is essentially on this same level - it is the assertion of the existence of profoundly important things that (if true) would lead to an entirely different set of ethics and moral values than is otherwise the case.

You could apply the same analysis to "mass-energy" or "matter-antimatter" or astrophysics or any other science. Epicurus was committed to living in the real world that we experience as human beings, and if a speculative theory led in his own time to a conclusion that contradicts human experience, as we experience it through our human faculties, then such theories are slated for rejection. That doesn't mean that we are ever wedded to the details of any one theory of physics, and in fact sometimes we have to "wait" in choosing between theories that seem consistent with the facts but for which we don't have enough facts to be sure which is correct.

This attitude showed Epicurus' commitment to using a reasonable approach to what we can be confident of and what we cannot, because Epicurus knew that if we don't consciously separate the things about which we are confident from those that we aren't then there is no essential difference between us and a fanatical religionist, because we would be accepting things on "Faith" rather than on rigorous commitment to following the evidence.

That's a start at the general answer but there's a lot more to say.

Thread for discussion of this FAQ is here.

Short Answer: That depends on your definition of the word “atheist.” The American Heritage Dictionary defines “atheism” as “Disbelief in or denial of the existence of God or gods.” Under this definition, which does not specify that gods are “all-powerful” or that gods created the universe, Epicurus was not an atheist. Epicurus held there to be a race of perfect, immortal gods living in distant parts of the universe who neither created the universe, control it, or have any concern for the happenings on Earth.

From the opening of Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus: “First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, you shall not affirm of him anything that is foreign to his immortality or that is repugnant to his blessedness. Believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the man who denies the gods worshiped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favorable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in men like themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.”

The answer is different if your definition of “atheist” requires that gods be all-powerful or responsible for creation and direction of the universe – in other words that god is a “supreme being.” For example, Dictionary.com defines “atheist” as: “a person who denies or disbelieves the existence of a supreme being or beings.” By this definition, Epicurus does qualify as an atheist, as all Epicurean texts refer to gods as “a part” of Nature, and not as “supreme above” or “superior to” or “creator of” Nature itself.

From Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy":

ISONOMY AND THE GODS

In spite of a supercilious opinion to the contrary, Epicurus was not a muddled thinker but a very systematic one. He enunciated his Twelve Elementary Principles and adhered to them closely. Two of these, the fifth and sixth, asserted the infinity of the universe in respect of matter and space. To this idea of infinity he ascribed fundamental importance. He exhorted the young Pythocles to study it as one of those master principles which would render easy the recognition of causation in details.68 Cicero must have been recalling some similar exhortation when he wrote: "But of the very greatest importance is the significance of infinity and in the highest degree deserving of intense and diligent contemplation." He was quoting Epicurus.

It was from this principle that Epicurus deduced his chief theoretical confirmation of belief in the existence of gods. It was from this that he arrived at knowledge of their number and by secondary deduction at knowledge of their abode. He so interpreted the significance of infinity as to extend it from matter and space to the sphere of values, that is, to perfection and imperfection. In brief, if the universe were thought to be imperfect throughout its infinite extent, it could no longer be called infinite. This necessity of thought impelled him to promulgate a subsidiary principle, which he called isonomia, a sort of cosmic justice, according to which the imperfection in particular parts of the universe is offset by the perfection of the whole. Cicero rendered it aequabilis tributio, "equitable apportionment." The mistake of rendering it as "equilibrium" must be avoided.

The term isonomia itself, which may be anglicized as isonomy, deserves a note. That it is lacking in extant Epicurean texts, all of them elementary, and is transmitted only by Cicero is evidence of its belonging to higher doctrine and advanced studies. Epicurus switched its meaning slightly, as he did that of the word prolepsis. To the Greeks it signified equality of all before the law, a boast of Athenians in particular. It was a mate to eunomia, government by law, as opposed to barbaric despotism, a boast of Greeks in general. That Epicurus thought to make capital of this happy connotation may be considered certain. He was vindicating for Nature a sort of justice, the bad being overbalanced by the good. It is also possible that he was remotely influenced by the teachings of Zoroaster, well known in his day through the conquests of Alexander, according to whom good and evil, as represented by Ormazd and Ahriman, battled for the upper hand in mundane affairs.

Whatever may be the facts concerning this influence, Epicurus discovered a reasonable way of allowing for the triumph of good in the universe, which seemed impossible under atomic materialism. Thus in his system of thought isonomy plays a part comparable to that of teleology with Plato and Aristotle. Teleology was inferred from the evidences of design, and design presumes agencies of benevolence, whether natural or divine. Epicurus was bound to reject design because the world seemed filled with imperfections, which he listed, but by extending the doctrine of infinity to apply to values he was able, however curiously, to discover room for perfection along with imperfection.

That he employed isonomy as theoretical proof of the existence of gods is well documented. For example, Lactantius, who may have been an Epicurean before his conversion to Christianity, quotes Epicurus as arguing "that the divine exists because there is bound to be something surpassing, superlative and blessed." The necessity here appealed to is a necessity of thought, which becomes a necessity of existence. The existence of the imperfect in an infinite universe demands belief in the existence of the perfect. Cicero employs very similar language: "It is his doctrine that there are gods, because there is bound to be some surpassing being than which nothing is better." Like the statement of Lactantius, this recognizes a necessity of existence arising from a necessity of thought; the order of Nature cannot be imperfect throughout its whole extent; it is bound to culminate in something superior, that is, in gods.

It is possible to attain more precision in the exposition. Cicero, though brutally brief, exhibits some precision of statement. The infinity of the universe, as usual, serves as a major premise. This being assumed, Cicero declares: "The nature of the universe must be such that all similars correspond to all similars." One class of similars is obviously taken to be human beings, all belonging to the same grade of existence in the order of Nature. As Philodemus expresses it in a book about logic, entitled On Evidences, "It is impossible to think of Epicurus as man and Metrodorus as non-man." Another class of similars is the gods. This being understood, the truth of Cicero's next statement follows logically: "If it be granted that the number of mortals is such and such, the number of immortals is not less." 75 This reasoning calls for no exegesis, but two points are worthy of mention: first, Cicero is not precise in calling the gods immortals; according to strict doctrine they are not deathless, only incorruptible of body; the second point is that Epicurus is more polytheistic in belief than his own countrymen.

The next item, however, calls for close scrutiny. Just as human beings constitute one set of similars and the gods another, so the forces that preserve constitute one set and the forces that destroy constitute another.

At this point a sign of warning is to be raised. There is also another pair of forces that are opposed to each other, those that create and those that destroy.76 The difference is that the latter operate in each of the innumerable worlds, while the former hold sway in the universe at large. For example, in a world such as our own, which is one of many, the forces of creation have the upper hand during its youthful vigor. At long last, however, the forces of destruction gradually gain the superiority and eventually the world is dissolved into its elements.

In the universe at large, on the contrary, the situation is different and the forces opposed to each other are not those that destroy and those that create but those that destroy and those that preserve. Moreover, a new aspect of infinity is invoked, the infinity of time. The universe is eternal and unchanging. Matter can neither be created nor destroyed. The sum of things is always the same, as Lucretius says. This truth is contained in the first two of the Twelve Elementary Principles. In combination they are made to read: "The universe has always been the same as it now is and always will be the same." This can be true only on the principle that the forces that preserve are at all times superior to the forces that destroy.

It follows that Cicero was writing strictly by the book when he made his spokesman draw the following conclusion from the doctrine of isonomy: "And if the forces that destroy are innumerable, the forces that preserve must by the same token be infinite." This doctrine, it is essential to repeat, holds only for the universe at large. It is not applicable to the individual world and it does not mean that the prevalence of elephants in India is balanced by the prevalence of wolves in Russia. Isonomy does not mean "equal distribution" but "equitable apportionment." It does not denote balance or equilibrium. No two sets of similar forces are in balance; in the individual world the forces of destruction always prevail at last, and in the universe at large the forces of preservation prevail at all times.

By this time three aspects of the principles of isonomy have been brought forward: first, that in an infinite universe perfection is bound to exist as well as imperfection; that is, "that there must be some surpassing being, than which nothing is better"; second, that the number of these beings, the gods, cannot be less than the number of mortals; and third, that in the universe at large the forces of preservation always prevail over the forces of destruction.

All three of these are direct inferences from the infinity and eternity of the universe. There remains to be drawn an indirect inference of primary importance. Since in the individual worlds the forces of destruction always prevail in the end, it follows that the incorruptible gods can have their dwelling place only outside of the individual worlds, that is, in the free spaces between the worlds, the so-called intermundia, where the forces of preservation are always superior. There is more to be said on this topic in the section that follows.

Discussion of this answer is here.

Short Answer: Epicurus held that the elements from which the universe is composed are eternal. Although the atoms are constantly in motion and changing positions, such that the things we see now are not permanent, the elements themselves were never created at any point in time by any god or by any other means:

Letter to Herodotus: “To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs. And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.”

Discussion of this question is here.

Short Answer: Epicurus definitely held that there is no such thing as an eternal or supernatural soul, because nothing is eternal in Epicurean physics other than matter and void, and nothing is supernatural - period. On the other hand, Epicurus devoted considerable attention to explaining the phenomena that is generally called "soul" or "spirit" as referenced in the cites below.

Long Answer:

In his letter to Herodotus, Epicurus wrote that the “soul” is composed of a particularly fine type of atoms of a unique type which themselves have no sensation apart from the body, but which carry the potentiality of sentience in combination with the body. Neither these particles, nor any other particles, can combine except according to the laws of Nature: “Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death. Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation. Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable conditions for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighborhood and interconnection between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also. Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheaths may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same notions; hence it does not possess sentience either. For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements. There is the further point to be considered, what the incorporeal can be, if, I mean, according to current usage the term is applied to what can be conceived as self-existent. But it is impossible to conceive anything that is incorporeal as self-existent except empty space. And empty space cannot itself either act or be acted upon, but simply allows body to move through it. Hence those who call soul incorporeal speak foolishly. For if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon. But, as it is, both these properties, you see, plainly belong to soul. If, then, we bring all these arguments concerning soul to the criterion of our feelings and perceptions, and if we keep in mind the proposition stated at the outset, we shall see that the subject has been adequately comprehended in outline: which will enable us to determine the details with accuracy and confidence.

We have a further explanation of these matters in Lucretius. In Book III, Lucretius wrote (translation by HAJ Munro):“Therefore, again and again I say, you are to know that the nature of the mind and the soul has been formed of exceedingly minute seeds, since at its departure it takes away none of the weight. We are not however to suppose that this nature is single. For a certain subtle spirit mixed with heat quits men at death, and then the heat draws air along with it; there being no heat which has not air too mixed with it: for since its nature is rare, many first beginnings of air must move about through it. Thus the nature of the mind is proved to be threefold; and yet these things all together are not sufficient to produce sense; since the fact of the case does not admit that any of these can produce sense-giving motions and the thoughts which a man turns over in mind. Thus some fourth nature too must be added to these: it is altogether without name; than it nothing exists more nimble or more fine, or of smaller or smoother elements: it first transmits the sense-giving motions through the frame; for it is first stirred, made up as it is of small particles; next the heat and the unseen force of the spirit receive the motions, then the air; then all things are set in action, the blood is stirred, every part of the flesh is filled with sensation; last of all the feeling is transmitted to the bones and marrow, whether it be one of pleasure or an opposite excitement. No pain however can lightly pierce thus far nor any sharp malady make its way in, without all things being so thoroughly disordered that no room is left for life and the parts of the soul fly abroad through all the pores of the body. But commonly a stop is put to these motions on the surface as it were of the body: for this reason we are able to retain life. Now though I would fain explain in what way these are mixed up together, by what means united, when they exert their powers, the poverty of my native speech deters me sorely against my will: yet will I touch upon them and in summary fashion to the best of my ability: the first-beginnings by their mutual motions are interlaced in such a way that, none of them can be separated by itself, nor can the function of any go on divided from the rest by any interval; but they are so to say the several powers of one body.

In Book II Lucretius had previously written:

“Wherefore the bodies of the first-beginnings in time gone by moved in the same way in which now they move, and will ever hereafter be borne along in like manner , and the things which have been wont to be begotten will be begotten after the same law and will be and will grow and will wax in strength so far as is given to each by the decrees of nature. And yet we are not to suppose that all things can be joined together in all ways ; for then you would see prodigies produced on all hands, forms springing up half man half beast and sometimes tall boughs sprouting from the living body, and many limbs of land-creatures joined with those of sea-animals, nature too throughout the all-bearing lands feeding chimeras which breathed flames from noisome mouth. It is plain however that nothing of the sort is done, since we see that all things produced from fixed seeds and a fixed mother can in growing preserve the marks of their kind. This you are to know must take place after a fixed law . …. To come to another point, whatever things we perceive to have sense, you must yet admit all composed of senseless first-beginnings: manifest tokens which are open to all to apprehend, so far from refuting or contradicting this, do rather themselves take us by the hand and constrain us to believe that, as I say, living things are begotten from senseless things. …Therefore nature changes all foods into living bodies and engenders out of them all the senses of living creatures, much in the same way as she dissolves dry woods into flames and converts all things into fires. Now do you see that it is of great moment in what sort of arrangement the first-beginnings of things are severally placed and with what others they are mixed up, when they impart and receive motions? Then again what is that which strikes your mind, affects that mind and constrains it to give utterance to many different thoughts, to save you from believing that the sensible is begotten out of senseless things? Sure enough it is because stones and wood and earth however mixed together are yet unable to produce vital sense.”

Discussion of this question is here.

In the letter to Pythocles, Epicurus specifically makes clear before he starts discussing astronomy that: "But this is not the case with celestial phenomena: these at any rate admit of manifold causes for their occurrence and manifold accounts, none of them contradictory of sensation, of their nature. For in the study of nature we must not conform to empty assumptions and arbitrary laws, but follow the promptings of the facts; for our life has no need now of unreason and false opinion; our one need is untroubled existence. All things go on uninterruptedly, if all be explained by the method of plurality of causes in conformity with the facts, so soon as we duly understand what may be plausibly alleged respecting them. But when we pick and chooseamong them, rejecting one equally consistent with the phenomena, we clearly fall away from the study of nature altogether and tumble into myth. Some phenomena within our experience afford evidence by which we may interpret what goes on in the heavens. We see bow the former really take place, but not how the celestial phenomena take place, for theiroccurrence may possibly be due to a variety of causes. However, we must observe each fact as presented, and further separate from it all the facts presented along with it, the occurrence of which from various causes is not contradicted by facts within our experience."

Then when he addresses the size of the sun, he says "The size of the sun and the remaining stars relatively to us is just as great as it appears. But in itself and actually it maybe a little larger or a little smaller, or precisely as great as it is seen to be. For so too fires of which we have experience are seen by sense when we see them at a distance. And every objection brought against this part of the theory will easily be met by anyone who attends to plain facts, as I show in my work On Nature. "

Now his reason for this conclusion is clear from this — he says that on earth, things that give off light do not appear to recede in the distance as much as those things that don't. So applying that rule here, there's no reason to think that the sun is a huge distance away, any further than the moon, so no reason to think it is huge in size. Of course a major reason he leaned toward this conclusion is that he was battling the platonists, who said they were gods, and who were trying to reduce nature down to a series of calculations. He chose incorrectly, but he was motivated by good reasons. I believe much the same explanation goes to the earth as well, which I gather they did think was round, but that since everything falls down you would fall off thebottom if you were on the other side. So there were good solid reasons the Epicureans chose the positions they did, and definitely not go along just because Epicurus said so.

Also (Credit to Joshua for this):

It's important to consider the whole proposition. Epicurus thought that the sun was;

1. Wholly material

2. In constant but not uniform motion

3. In a centerless cosmos

4. Governed by the same laws as things on Earth

5. Arose out of matter, and has a finite period of existence

5a. But its matter will recombine into other things

6. About as big as it seems.

Compare Aristotle's sun;

1. Made of aether, an element that didn't exist on earth

2. In constant and uniform motion (because aetherial)

2a. Set in motion by unmoved mover (god)

3. Orbiting a stationary earth that was the center of everything

4. Governed by different laws than Earth (the laws of the aether)

5. Exists in perpetuity (because aetherial)

6. Size uncertain (not mentioned, as far as I can tell)

Discussion of this issue is here.

Vatican Saying 49. (PD 12) It is impossible for someone to dispel his fears about the most important matters if he doesn’t know the nature of the universe but still gives some credence to myths. So without the study of nature there is no enjoyment of pure pleasure.

Vatican Saying 72. (PD 13) There is no advantage to obtaining protection from other men so long as we are alarmed by events above or below the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.

Short Answer: The terms "good" and "greatest good" are ambiguous and must be carefully considered. Pleasure and pain have no meaning to the dead, so life is a man's greatest possession, and in that sense the "greatest good." Pleasure, however, is the guide of life, and the reason for living, and so Epicurus identified pleasure as "the alpha and omega of the blessed life," and "the end and aim."

Long Answer:

From Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" Chapter 12: "The New Hedonism"

The "Summum Bonum" Fallacy

The first step toward understanding rightly the new hedonism of Epicurus is to discern and eliminate this summum bonum fallacy. Since the Latin language lacks the definite article, the Romans were unable to say "the good," which is in Greek an alternative way of denoting the end or telos of an art or activity. Neither could the word finis be equated with telos, because it means end in the sense of limit or termination and not in the sense of fulfillment or consummation. Consequently the Romans were forced to adopt a makeshift, which happened to be summum bonum. Only by convention was this employed to denote the telos, but so inveterate did the convention become that the ambiguity of summum bonum was overlooked. Literally it means the highest or greatest good but this was not necessarily the telos. To Epicurus pleasure was the telos and life itself was the greatest good. Thus the hedonism of Epicurus must be explained from the beginning.

The belief that life itself is the greatest good conditions the whole ethical doctrine of Epicurus. He sees life as narrowly confined between the limits of birth and death. Soul and body are born together and perish together. Metrodorus gave telling expression in figurative language to this melancholy belief, Vatican Saying 30: "The potion mixed at birth for all of us is a draught of death." There was for Epicureans no pre-existence, as Plato believed, and no afterlife, as the majority of mankind believed. Epicurus himself expressed the thought with stark directness, Vatican Saying 14: "We are born once and we cannot be born twice but to all eternity must be no more." Thus the supreme values must be sought between the limits of birth and death.

The specific teaching that life itself is the greatest good is to be drawn from Vatican Saying 42: "The same span of time includes both beginning and termination of the greatest good." If this seems to be a dark saying, the obscurity is dispelled by viewing it as merely a denial of belief in either pre-existence or the afterlife. As Horace wrote, concluding Epistle i.16 with stinging abruptness, "Death is the tape-line that ends the race of life." Editors, however, misled by the summum bonum fallacy, equate "the greatest good" with pleasure and so are forced to emend. The change of a single letter does the trick but fundamental teaching is obliterated.1

While this quoted statement is first-hand evidence of the Epicurean attitude, the syllogistic approach is also known from an extant text, of which the significance has been overlooked. The major premise is the assumption that the greatest good must be associated with the most powerful emotions, that is, the worst of all fears and the greatest of all joys. Now the worst of all fears is that of a violent death and the greatest of all joys is escape from the same. The supporting text runs as follows: "That which occasions unsurpassable joy is the bare escape from some dreadful calamity; and this is the nature of 'good,' if one apprehend it rightly and then stand by his finding, and not go on walking round and round and harping uselessly on the meaning of 'good'." 2 This passage marks the summary cutting of a Gordian knot, the meaning of "good," upon which Plato had harped so tediously. Epicurus finds a quick solution by appealing to the Feelings, that is to Nature, as the criterion; it is their verdict that the supreme good is life itself, because the strongest emotions are occasioned by the threat of losing it or the prospect of saving it.

Discussion about this answer is here.

Short Answer:    Lucretius records that "Divine Pleasure [is] the guide of life."

Long Answer:

From Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" Chapter 12: The New Hedonism

PLEASURE IDENTIFIED AS THE TELOS

When once the summum bonum fallacy has been detected and the difference clearly discerned between the greatest good, which is life itself, and the end or telos, the next step is to apprehend clearly by what procedure the end or telos is identified as pleasure. The nature of this procedure and of the attitude which determined it was one thing in the time of Cicero and quite another in the time of Epicurus himself. In the space of the two centuries between these two men the study of formal logic had been forced into a dominating position in the curriculum through the aggressive genius of the Stoic Chrysippus, and after his time the incessant needling of Stoic adversaries had shaken the confidence of many Epicureans in the word of their founder.3 The faith of Epicurus himself had pinned itself upon Nature as the norm, not upon Reason. The faith of the Stoic, on the contrary, and of those Epicureans who wavered in their faith, while ostensibly pinned upon Reason, may more correctly be said to have been pinned upon argumentation and disputation.

When Epicurus himself identified pleasure as "the end of Nature" he was setting Reason aside and recognizing Nature as the norm or as furnishing the norm. In this he was merely following a trend of his time. The brilliant Eudoxus, for example, who had preceded him by no great interval, also declared pleasure to be the good and he took his start from the observation that all creatures, whether rational or irrational, pursued it.4 Confirmation for the truth of this observation was found in the behavior of all creatures toward pain. If we may accept as authentic the tradition as reported by Aristotle, it would seem that Eudoxus thought of the pursuit of pleasure as comparable to the instinct of wild creatures to seek their proper food and to avoid the opposite. This demonstrates clearly the incipient tendency to recognize Nature as furnishing the norm.5

Thus the originality of Epicurus did not consist in recognizing Nature as furnishing the norm but in working out this principle to its utmost limit, which he did by setting up his Canon, each item of which, Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings, was a separate appeal to the authority of Nature.

In identifying pleasure as the end or telos it is both possible and probable that Epicurus was taking up a suggestion of Aristotle, who dropped the hint in this instance that the evidence drawn from the behavior of irrational creatures is superior in value to the evidence drawn from the behavior of rational creatures.6 At any rate the declaration of Epicurus, as reported by Cicero, runs as follows: "Every living creature, the moment it is born, reaches out for pleasure and rejoices in it as the highest good, shrinks from pain as the greatest evil, and, so far as it is able, averts it from itself." 7

In the evaluation of this text the important words are "the moment it is born." By narrowing the field of observation to the newborn creature Epicurus was eliminating all differences between rational and irrational'creatures. In infancy even the creatures that by courtesy we call rational are as yet irrational. By narrowing the field to the newborn Epicurus was also reducing animate life to its minimum value, because at the moment of birth even some of the senses have not yet begun to function. Consequently, as Cicero says in the same context, "since nothing is left of a human being when the senses are eliminated, the question, what is according to Nature or contrary to Nature, is of necessity being judged by Nature herself."

It is doubtful whether any other item of Epicurean invention is the equal of this in logical acumen. Even if weight be allowed to the later objection of the Stoics that the behavior of the infant has its cause in what we now call the instinct of self-preservation, this interpretation would lead to the recognition of life as the greatest good, which was the doctrine of Epicurus, and it would still be left for pleasure and pain to function as the criteria.

Incidentally, this appeal to the evidence afforded by the newly born exercised its effect upon the terminology of Epicurus. The infant, being still in a state of nature, is "not yet perverted." These words afford a hint of the perversion ascribed to the study of rhetoric, dialectic, and mathematics, which a lad was judged lucky to have escaped. As for Nature herself, she speaks through the newly born "undefiled and uncontaminated." Her word is "true philosophy," the vera ratio so often invoked by Lucretius.

Discussion about this question is here.

The major textual references advise Epicureans not to pursue politics, riches, fame, or other activities that are essentially competitive in nature, or require obedience or cooperation from other people. The common thread of this advice is that you cannot be happy if you are going to depend on other people to provide your happiness, so it is not wise to pursue happiness by seeking to "excel" over other people in any competitive endeavor.

But there is another sense of "excelling" that most people also associate with the word, and that is the important sense of not passively "accepting one’s lot in life," and working hard to succeed in taking advantage of those natural and proper pleasures that are within your power to achieve without violating some rule of nature. Phrases such as "accepting one’s lot in life" connotes idea that are fatalistic, religious, (and predominantly Stoic) and go against every central theme of Epicureanism, which is the pursuit of happiness through (1) the study of Nature and (2) action based on the results of that study.

For a few of the significant references to this issue, see the following:

PD 5. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life. <<<< One CANNOT live happily unless one diligently pursues wisdom, honor, and justice.

VS 5. We place a high value on our characters as if they were our own possessions whether or not we are virtuous and praised by other men. So, too, we must regard the characters of those around us if they are our friends. <<< It DOES matter what we think of ourselves, and what others think of us.

PD 29. Of our desires some are natural and necessary, others are natural but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to groundless opinion. << And thus we diligently pursue those that are natural and necessary, and we judge and act wisely in pursuit of those that are only natural (but we do not ignore them).

VS 33. The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, thirsty, or cold; for he who is free of these and is confident of remain so might vie even with Zeus for happiness. << And thus we pursue diligently the goal of avoiding hunger, thirst, and cold.

VS 36. Epicurus’s life when compared to that of other men with respect to gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend. << Epicurus EXCELLED in gentleness and self-sufficiency.

VS 41. At one and the same time we must philosophize, laugh, and manage our household and other business, while never ceasing to proclaim the words of true philosophy. << We do NOT ignore or deprecate the value of the management of our household business.

VS 45. The study of nature does not create men who are fond of boasting and chattering or who show off the culture that impresses the many, but rather men who are strong and self-sufficient, and who take pride in their own personal qualities not in those that depend on external circumstances. << This one is VERY clear. We are to excel in our strength, our self-sufficiency, and our personal qualities that do not depend upon others.

VS 58. We must free ourselves from the prison of public education and politics. << This is very close to the key issue, for it is freedom from these that we require in order to secure our own happiness.

And for a reference that me be the most direct of all on this point:

VS 63. There is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance.

Discussion about this question is here.

There is a maddening discrepancy in the various translations of Diogenes Laertius in the crucial “Wise Man” sequence. CD Yonge’s 1853 translation reports that Epicurus thought marriage to be a bad idea: “Marriage, they say, is never any good to a man, and we must be quite content if it does no harm; and the wise man will never marry or beget children, as Epicurus himself lays down in his Doubts and in his treatises on Nature. Still, under certain circumstances in his life he will forsake these rules and marry.”

The Loeb Classical Library version of the R.D. Hicks translation, which dates from 1931, concurs: “Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry due to special circumstances in his life.”

But Cyril Bailey in his 1926 translation says the opposite: “Moreover, the wise man will marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems and in the work On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life.”

The more modern Epicurus Reader translation by Inwood and Gerson agrees with Bailey: “And indeed the wise man will marry and father children….” The 1963 text by George Strodach endorses the same view: “In addition, the wise man will marry and beget children…. but he will marry according to his station in life, whatever it may be.”

In my view, this question is best answered by the observation that Epicurus himself provided in his last will and testament that the child of his valued student Metrodorus be married off to an Epicurean when she came of age. As Yonge translates: “In the same way also, they [Amynomachus and Timocrates] shall be the guardians of the daughter of Metrodorus, and when she is of marriageable age, they shall give her to whomsoever Hermarchus shall select of his companions in philosophy, provided she is well behaved and obedient to Hermarchus.”

It seems clear to me, therefore, that Epicurus held that marriage and child-bearing are natural, proper, and beneficial activities in which to engage, so long as partners are properly educated in and devoted to Epicurean principles of living.

It seems to me that this conclusion is also a logical extension of the very clear Epicurean principle that “friendship” is central to living a happy life. As Cicero wrote in “On Ends,” Epicurus “pronounced in regard to friendship that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none is more fruitful, none is more delightful than friendship.” A happy marriage to one who is not only one’s mate but also one’s best friend would certainly seem to be a logical application of this principle.

We do, however, also have to consider the very strong cautions that abound in Epicurean literature against taking an unrealistic attitude toward romantic love. In addition to the admonitions stated in the Wise Man section cited above, there is the famous Vatican Saying 51, which contains what is widely regarded to be Epicurus’ advice to a young man: “You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbors or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please. Yet it is impossible not to come up against one or other of these barriers, for the pleasures of love never profited a man and he is lucky if they do him no harm.”

And again from Cicero’s On Ends, we see the Epicurean advocate listing those who are “enslaved to the follies of love” as among those men whose failings “render their lives one unbroken round of misery.”

And perhaps most famously of all, we have the long dissertation of Lucretius at the end of Book IV, which reminds us that the intense emotions involved in romantic love are ultimately derived from Nature’s call to procreation, and that the intensity of the emotion must be kept under control if we are to live happy lives and escape misery. Lucretius abounds with practical advice in this department, reminding us to keep our emotions under control, and that we can escape the mischief of unhappy romance if we do not stand in our own way: “And yet even when you are entangled and held fast, you may still escape the mischief, unless you stand in your own way and overlook all the defects of the mind and body of the person you woo. But men often do this, blinded by passion, and they attribute to the beloved advantages which are not really theirs.”

Please see the extended discussion here:

Discussion about this question is here.

Key Doctrine 27:

“Of all the things which the wise man seeks to acquire to produce the happiness of a complete life, by far the most important is the possession of friendship.”

Key Doctrine 28: “The same opinion that encourages us to trust that no evil will be everlasting, or even of long duration, shows us that in the space of life allotted to us the protection of friendship is the most sure and trustworthy.”

Key Doctrine 39: “He who desires to live tranquilly without having anything to fear from other men ought to make them his friends. Those whom he cannot make friends he should at least avoid rendering enemies, and if that is not in his power, he should avoid all dealings with them as much as possible, and keep away from them as far as it is in his interest to do so.

Key Doctrine 40: “The happiest men are those who have arrived at the point of having nothing to fear from their neighbors. Such men live with one another most pleasantly, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one another, enjoying the full advantages of friendship, and not lamenting the departure of their dead friends as though they were to be pitied.”

Vatican Saying 23. “All friendship is desirable in itself, though it starts from the need of help.”

Vatican Saying 28. “We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship’s sake we must run risks.”

Vatican Saying 34. “It is not so much our friends’ help that helps us as it is the confidence of their help.”

Vatican Saying 39. “He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barters kindly feeling for a practical return and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.”

Vatican Saying 52.

“Friendship dances around the world bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.”

Vatican Saying 56. “The wise man feels no more pain when being tortured himself than when his friend tortured.”

Vatican Saying 57. “On occasion a man will die for his friend, for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.”

Vatican Saying 61. “Most beautiful too is the sight of those near and dear to us, when our original kinship makes us of one mind; for such sight is great incitement to this end.”

Vatican Saying 66. “Let us show our feeling for our lost friends not by lamentation but by meditation.”

Vatican Saying 78. “The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these the one is a mortal good, the other immortal

Wise Man Saying 5. “The wise man shows gratitude, and constantly speaks well of his friends whether they are present or absent.”

Wise Man Saying 24. “The wise man will not mourn the death of his friends.”

Wise Man Saying 37. “The wise man will be willing even to die for a friend.”

Wise Man Saying 41. “The wise man holds that friendship is first brought about due to practical need, just as we sow the earth for crops, but it is formed and maintained by means of a community of life among those who find mutual pleasure in it.”

Cicero’s “On Ends” – the Defense of Epicurus delivered by Torquatus: “There remains a topic that is supremely relevant to this discussion – the subject of Friendship. Your [Platonic] school maintains that if pleasure is held to be the Chief Good, friendship will cease to exist. In contrast, Epicurus has pronounced in regard to friendship that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none is more fruitful, none is more delightful than friendship. Not only did Epicurus commend the importance of friendship through his words, but far more, through the example of his life and his conduct. How rare and great friendship is can be seen in the mythical stories of antiquity. Review the legends from the remotest of ages, and, many and varied as they are, you will barely find in them three pairs of friends, beginning with Theseus and ending with Orestes. Yet Epicurus in a single house (and a small one at that) maintained a whole company of friends, united by the closest sympathy and affection, and this still goes on today in the Epicurean school. … The Epicureans maintain that friendship can no more be separated from pleasure than can the virtues, which we have discussed already. A solitary, friendless life is necessarily beset by secret dangers and alarms. Hence reason itself advises the acquisition of friends. The possession of friends gives confidence and a firmly rooted hope of winning pleasure. And just as hatred, jealousy and contempt are hindrances to pleasure, so friendship is the most trustworthy preserver and also creator of pleasure for both our friends and for ourselves. Friendship affords us enjoyment in the present, and it inspires us with hope for the near and distant future. Thus it is not possible to secure uninterrupted gratification in life without friendship, nor to preserve friendship itself unless we love our friends as much as ourselves. … For we rejoice in our friends’ joy as much as in our own, and we are equally pained by their sorrows. Therefore the wise man will feel exactly the same towards his friends as he does towards himself, and he will exert himself as much for his friend’s pleasure as he would for his own. All that has been said about the essential connection of the virtues with pleasure must be repeated about friendship. Epicurus well said (and I give almost his exact words): “The same creed that has given us courage to overcome all fear of everlasting or long-enduring evil after death has discerned that friendship is our strongest safeguard in this present term of life. … All these considerations go to prove not only that the rationale of friendship is not impaired by the identification of the chief good with pleasure, but, in fact, without this, no foundation for friendship whatsoever can be found.

Discussion of this question is here.

Letter to Menoeceus: We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.

Vatican Saying 10. Remember that you are mortal and have a limited time to live and have devoted yourself to discussions on nature for all time and eternity and have seen “things that are now and are to me come and have been.”

Vatican Saying 17. We should not view the young man as happy, but rather the old man whose life has been fortunate. The young man at the height of his powers is often befuddled by chance and driven from his course; but the old man has dropped anchor in old age as in a harbor, since he secures in sure and thankful memory goods for which he was once scarcely confident of.

Vatican Saying 19. He has become an old man on the day on which he forgot his past blessings.

Vatican Saying 35. Don’t spoil what you have by desiring what you don’t have; but remember that what you now have was once among the things only hoped for.

Vatican Saying 41. At one and the same time we must philosophize, laugh, and manage our household and other business, while never ceasing to proclaim the words of true philosophy.

Vatican Saying 47. I have anticipated you, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all your secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to you or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.

Vatican Saying 48. While we are on the road, we must try to make what is before us better than what is past; when we come to the road’s end, we feel a smooth contentment.

Vatican Saying 55. We should find solace for misfortune in the happy memory of what has been and in the knowledge that what has been cannot be undone.

Vatican Saying 75. The saying, “look to the end of a long life,” shows small thanks for past good fortune.

Discussion of this question is here.

Let's first look at the Wikipedia entry for the Experience / Pleasure Machine thought experiment:

"The experience machine or pleasure machine is a thought experiment put forward by philosopher Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia.[1] It is one of the best known attempts to refute ethical hedonism, and does so by imagining a choice between everyday reality and an apparently preferable simulated reality. If the primary thesis of hedonism is that "pleasure is the good", then any component of life that is not pleasurable does nothing directly to increase one's well-being. This is a view held by many value theorists, but most famously by some classical utilitarians. Nozick attacks the thesis by means of a thought experiment. If he can show that there is something other than pleasure that has value and thereby increases our well-being, then hedonism is defeated."

This can be approached in many ways, but this is probably the most obvious:

First, we can quibble about application of the word "directly," but Epicurus is very clear that we sometimes choose pain in order to avoid worse pain, or to achieve greater pleasure. Therefore we start by noting that Epicurus does not maintain that "any component of life that is not pleasurable does nothing directly to increase one's wellbeing."

Ultimately, however, Epicurus does indeed say that there is nothing on is own that is desirable except pleasure. Pleasure, however, is widely and fully defined in scope to include all experiences of both body and mind that we find to be pleasurable. Epicurus in no way limits pleasure to immediate bodily sensations, and in fact it is stated specifically that mental pleasures are frequently of greater significance to us than physical ones. Anything in life that we find desirable - from food to sex to art to music to literature - is desirable because it brings us pleasure in some form.

The intent of the "Experience Machine" is to pose a logical trap much as did Plato in his "Philebus." Once you accept (as did Philebus, who started out as an advocate of pleasure) that anything in life is desirable of and for itself *other* than something we find pleasurable, then it makes logical sense to conclude that the best life would include not only pleasure but also that other thing. Further, the wisdom to know the right combination of pleasure and this other thing will be ultimately be seen to be more important than either pleasure or the other thing on its own. Thus the person who is beguiled into accepting the Philebus / Experience Machine argument, which is that there are things in life which are desirable but do not bring us pleasure, is led by logic to conclude that wisdom is the ultimate good, the standard Platonic conclusion. And that's just the start of discarding pleasure as any value at all, which is what the Stoics did in concluding that virtue is its own reward, and that to seek pleasure in compensation for virtue would negate any value in virtue.

Epicurus responds to this argument by consistently observing that pleasure alone is desirable in and of itself. This is the premise throughout the Epicurean texts but is stated particularly clearly by the Epicurean speaker in Cicero's "On Ends":

"We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?"

Of course the experience machine argument is intended to embarrass the listener into thinking "of course not," but it's really just another way of asking if you would indulge in sex drugs and rock'n'roll every moment if you could get away with it without painful repercussions.

And to this Epicurus answers very plainly, "Yes you would, but you CAN'T":

PD10: "If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life."

And ultimately it is the "can't" which is important, because Epicurus always looks to the facts of reality as established through the senses, feelings, and anticipations for all the proof that we need that a pleasure/experience machine is nonsense. "Experience machines" are suited only for purposes of confusing young philosophy students and persuading them to abandon the practical world that Nature makes available to us.

Also:

It is a trap, not totally unlike the experience machine itself, to accept as valid that there are objective standards of 'higher pleasure' and 'lower pleasure, because in order for that to be the case there would have to be an objective list somewhere outside of the scope of pleasure itself to serve as that reference point, and the Epicurean universe in which the only things that are eternal and unchanging are the ultimate particles does not allow for such an objective test of how everyone should judge pleasure and pain. The trouble with admitting such a list is that (as Plato will lead you) knowledge of that list becomes more important than pleasure itself (without that list, how would you know what pleasure to choose?) and so you end up seeing wisdom itself as the goal rather than pleasure.

This is likely why Epicurus held, according to Diogenes Laertius, that "the feelings are two, pleasure and pain..." and that all feelings fit within one designation of the other. And we know from the letter to Menoeceus explicitly that all good and evil come to us through sensations, which are things that are felt. Put it all together and you have the framework by which to analyze the experience machine or any other challenge to pleasure. Then, no Platonist logician will be able to trick you into thinking that "wisdom" (which of course they claim to be able to show you) or "virtue" (the Stoic specialty for those who are into "glory") are desirable in and of themselves.

If you keep in mind that (1) "pleasure" includes the full spectrum of human activity, not just the lower bodily pleasures that people ridicule as "base" but also "the highest mental pleasures that people praise as "sublime," with everything in between, and (2) that if a thing is desirable it is because it leads to pleasure, and that there is no other reason outside of pleasure to desire anything, and it is much easier to avoid confusion.

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Discussion of this FAQ is located here: Would An Epicurean Hook Himself Up To An "Experience Machine" or a "Pleasure Machine" If Possible?