

# CICERO'S PRESENTATION OF EPICUREAN ETHICS

A STUDY BASED PRIMARILY ON  
DE FINIBUS I AND II

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## PREFACE

THE FOLLOWING STUDY of Cicero's interpretation of Epicurean philosophy is based primarily on *De Finibus* I and II, and is an attempt to compare Cicero's statements about Epicureanism with the statements of Epicurus himself where they are available. It would be desirable to pursue the matter further in a detailed study of the *De Natura Deorum* and the *Tusculan Disputations* to confirm or to question the conclusions reached in the present study. It would be interesting also to discover any information concerning Cicero's personality which might be obtained from a study of his references to Epicurean philosophy in his letters as well as in his philosophical works. For the present study, however, the first two books of the *De Finibus* offered a satisfactory unit, since it has seemed better to make a detailed study within these limitations than to include a range wider than it would be possible to examine in close detail.

The subject of this dissertation was suggested to me by Professor Nelson Glenn McCrea of Columbia University, to whom I am deeply indebted both for his lectures on Lucretius and Cicero, and for the scholarly and kindly assistance and criticism which he has generously given me; I am further indebted to Professor McCrea for his assistance in the reading of proof. I wish to thank both Professor McCrea and Professor Clinton W. Keyes for their reading and criticism of the manuscript. My thanks are due also to Professor Helen H. Tanzer of Brooklyn College for her continued interest and encouragement in the writing of the dissertation, and to the staff of the Columbia Library for the courteous and efficient service which has been given me. I wish to make acknowledgment of the kindness of the Oxford Press in permitting me to quote certain extended passages from the works of Cyril Bailey, appearing on pages 57 and 58 of this dissertation.

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## INTRODUCTION

*Qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est; . . .*<sup>1</sup>

CICERO, in the words just quoted, offers to us as to his contemporaries little encouragement in the effort to catalogue with precision his personal reaction to the various philosophical matters that he discusses. The difficulty has been increased by the insistence of some modern scholars on the theory that Cicero's philosophical works represent mere transcriptions from the works of earlier writers, although these scholars vary somewhat in their opinion regarding the extent to which Cicero exercised some liberty in the organization of the source material which he used. A more moderate view of the source problem finds in Cicero's books his own discussion of philosophical matters, based on an intelligent understanding of source material. The latter view is expressed by Professor J. S. Reid in the introduction to his edition of *De Finibus* I and II:

As to the Greek sources of Books I and II there has been much debate. The most natural suggestion is the one that has been most frequently made, viz., that Cicero used a work of Antiochus of Ascalon. . . . I must protest against the assumption, which has been often made, that Cicero had no first-hand knowledge of the writings of Epicurus. The hypothesis that he resorted to some Greek to give him an epitome of the Epicurean philosophy for the purposes of the *De Finibus* is in no way demonstrable, nor is it even probable. A judgment on this issue must depend mainly on a comparison of Cicero's statements with those in other ancient sources referring to the same topics, and this I have endeavoured to make in the course of my commentary<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero continues: *non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. De Nat. Deor. 1.10.*

<sup>2</sup> Reid, D. F. VII. In contrast to this statement, there may be noted a comment by the same scholar in the Introduction to his edition of Cicero's *Academica*:

When he [Cicero] wished to set before his readers the view taken by any school about any particular topic, he selected some one work relating to it, by an acknowledged master of the school. This he kept to very closely indeed; his writings are, in fact, to a great extent translations, though free translations, from the Greek sources.

Reid, *Acad.* 24.

Reid here refers to Att. 12. 52.3. It is not clear to me whether the difference in these expressions is due to the fact that the former deals with *De Finibus* particularly, while the latter is a more general statement, or whether Professor Reid somewhat modified



Assuming for Cicero, as seems only reasonable, an intelligent understanding of the matters of which he wrote, such as is possible to a person of culture and of literary training, who has maintained

his views between the years 1885 and 1925, the dates of publication of the *Academica* and the *De Finibus* respectively.

The passage (Att. 12. 52.3) to which Reid refers should be interpreted with some latitude; it might indeed be well to use concerning it the expression which Cicero uses concerning Lucilius' self-deprecatory remark: "*Facete is quidem, sicut alia.*" (D.F. 1.7.) Some such suggestion is made by Dr. Henry (2, n. 8), who in her dissertation (*ibid.* 1-3) defends the independence of Cicero's judgments, against those who would see in him merely a translator.

The scholars who have tried to determine the sources of the first two books of the *De Finibus* are by no means agreed in their results. Thus, Madvig (LXII) holds that Phaedrus or some other late Epicurean was the source of *De Fin.* I; and that the second book was directly or indirectly influenced by Chrysippus, although here he concedes more independence to Cicero (cf. the much quoted words, p. 820, *in libro secundo, ubi suo Marte Epicurum refellit* . . .). Hartfelder concludes (17) that Zeno was the source of Book I, and (45-48) that Antiochus was probably the source of Book II. Hirzel (2) thinks that Zeno the Epicurean or Philodemus was the source of *De Fin.* I (689-690), and that Antiochus was probably the source of *De Fin.* II (638). Usener (LXVI) thinks that in Book I Cicero followed with a good deal of freedom the summary of a Greek scribe. Lörcher (F & E 23-24) refers Book I (in so far as the discourse of Torquatus is concerned) to Cicero's independent treatment based upon three works of Epicurus himself: *Περὶ Τέλους*, the Letter to Herodotus, and the *Κύρια Δόγματα*; he agrees with Hirzel that Antiochus is the source for 1. 17-26 (p. 77), and in Book II finds the use of both Antiochus and Chrysippus, together with large sections of Cicero's own composition (pp. 29-77, esp. 74-77). Bignone (Cicero 80-85) thinks that for the Torquatus speech of Book I Cicero used his own notes gathered years before from the lectures of Zeno and Phaedrus. Uri, who grants considerable liberty to Cicero in his use of sources, assigns (113-114) Book I to Cicero's knowledge gathered either from the works of Epicurus or from late Epicurean sources, and Book II largely to the use of Antiochus.

Merrill, 244-245, sums up the whole matter thus:

Hunting for sources will never cease, for probability and not certainty is the usual result of such speculation. Scholars are agreed that Cicero's knowledge of Epicureanism is derived from Greek sources, but beyond that there is no agreement and there cannot be . . . Most people will be satisfied with the supposition that Book I of the *De Finibus* was founded on a compendium and Book II on Antiochus, so far as Cicero needed an authority. Whether Cicero used one or two or three of these pamphlets is really of little consequence.

In a similar vein, Professor Shorey (Shorey, Cicero 885) says of Cicero's philosophical writing:

The determination of his precise procedure in any given case is a problem that philology can neither solve nor renounce.

The same scholar, after a discussion of Cicero's personal position as expressed in connection with his presentation of the ethical doctrine of the schools, adds (*ibid.* 886) as follows:

. . . And there are other divergences from Plato and Aristotle due to the elaboration of ethical terminology in the discussions of the schools, and the accumulation of political and social experience, and the imperfect equivalence of Greek and Latin ethical terms. Much industry that might have cleared up all these complexities has been wasted on the conjectural philology of Cicero's lost sources.

a lifelong interest in philosophical discussion<sup>3</sup>, and has had considerable opportunity of association with the best philosophical thought of his time<sup>4</sup>, it is hardly possible that he would write his long philosophical treatises without exercising his own critical judgment as to whether his presentation accurately represents the school of which he writes. It is therefore reasonable to assign to Cicero the responsibility for the adequacy of his report, whatever may be the extent of his indebtedness to earlier writers<sup>5</sup>.

Certainly for *De Finibus* I, Cicero himself assures us (D.F. 1. 12-13) that his object is the presentation of a faithful account of the Epicurean system, as such an account might have been given by a well-informed Epicurean. The present investigation, which undertakes to determine the honesty and adequacy of Cicero's treatment of Epicurean ethics in the first two books of the *De Finibus*, is therefore a study of the method and attitude of Cicero himself rather than of his sources.

This study consists of a detailed comparison of Cicero's presentation and criticism of Epicurean ethics in *De Finibus* I and II with the statements of Epicurus as found in the extant remains of his works. As a result of such a comparison, I have endeavored (1) to determine the adequacy of Cicero's understanding and interpretation of the doctrine point by point; (2) to consider whether or not his presentation is sincere; (3) to observe any indications of his personal attitude toward the doctrine; (4) to arrive at any available explanation of Cicero's success or failure in achieving an impartial treatment that would be satisfactory to an orthodox Epicurean.

As authority for the statements of Epicurus, I have used the edition of Cyril Bailey: *Epicurus, the Extant Remains*. In respect to interpretation, I have been considerably influenced by the notes and translations of this edition, and by the following works: Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*; Bignone, *Epicuro*; Guyau, *La Morale d'Epicure*, and Philippson, *Die Rechtsphilosophie der*

<sup>3</sup> Madvig, LXI-LXII, finds considerable limitation of the trustworthiness of Cicero's knowledge, on the ground that his philosophical interests had been cultural rather than professional, that his unhappiness at the time of writing was not the ideal condition for thorough investigation, and that his way of life had not given him experience in philosophical reasoning. Behncke (5-7) expresses similar opinions.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., *Brutus* 315; *T. D.* 5. 5-6; *Off.* 1.1-4; *De Nat. Deor.* 1. 6-8.

<sup>5</sup> Shorey (op. cit. 885): "It is no impairment of the value of his writings or disparagement of his intelligence that he did not invent a system of his own, or swear superstitious adherence to the words of any one of his teachers."

Epicureer<sup>6</sup>. The Epicurea of Usener was replaced for my purposes<sup>7</sup> by the edition of Bailey; and Usener's position in regard to the interpretation of the *Κύρια Δόξαι*, particularly in their relation to each other, seems to me less satisfactory than that of Bignone<sup>8</sup>.

Previous studies of the fidelity of Cicero's presentation of Epicurean ethics have been made for the most part either in incidental comparisons occurring in the commentaries of editions of the *De Finibus*, or in investigations contributory to the study of sources. Among these there should be especial mention of the editions of Madvig and Reid, both of which give careful attention to the quotation of parallel passages from Epicurean sources, with comments on the interpretation given by Cicero; these quotations and comments constitute, however, only one of the interests of the editors, amid matters of grammar, textual criticism, etc., and no clearly drawn conclusion is reached in regard to the adequacy of Cicero's interpretation in general. Of the studies regarding Cicero's sources for his discussion of Epicurean ethics, those of Bignone, Hirzel, Lörcher, Thiaucourt, and Uri give considerable attention to the justice of Cicero's treatment. Although the conclusions thus reached are mostly incidental to the main problem of sources, and are not supported by full and complete evidence drawn from Epicurus and Cicero, they must be taken into account in any evaluation of Cicero's presentation.

Attention should also be given to three dissertations which are concerned with Cicero's treatment of Epicureanism, those of Behncke (1879), Schneidewin (1893), and Kaussen (1903)<sup>9</sup>. Behncke's aims (as stated on p. 11 of his treatise) are somewhat similar to those which I have stated above; but his method of procedure is almost entirely different from that which I have used. Behncke (1-10) discusses Cicero's unphilosophical attitude as shown by his hostility toward Epicureanism; gives a detailed criticism (11-13) of

<sup>6</sup> Bignone's new work, *L'Aristotle perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, at many points supports my interpretation of Epicureanism. It was available for my use only after my paper had been written. I have added several annotations calling attention to Bignone's comments on matters under discussion in the body of the paper.

<sup>7</sup> Since I have endeavored to show Cicero's position in comparison only with the statements of Epicurus himself, I have not quoted the wider Epicurean literature which Usener gives.

<sup>8</sup> Bignone's treatment (Epicuro, esp. 2-32) is more sympathetic than that of Usener, whose attitude is explained in part by his own statement, *Intr. V*:

Epicuro ut operam darem, non philosophiae Epicureae me admiratio commovit, sed ut accidit homini grammatico, librorum a Laertio Diogene servatorum obscuritas et difficultas.

<sup>9</sup> For complete reference see List of Abbreviations.

D.F. I. 13-26; makes a detailed organization (14-21) of Torquatus' discourse, with occasional critical remarks; and concludes on pp. 23-24 without entering upon any discussion of the second book of *De Finibus*. Behncke finds Cicero's interpretation of Epicureanism inadequate, but from a point of view different from that which I have taken.

Schneidewin is chiefly concerned with *De Fin.* II, of which (5-8) he offers an elaborate organization, followed (8-12) by an interesting study of the bases of Cicero's criticisms; he concludes (13-24) with a study of the ethical principles thus involved, as they are seen from the point of view of his own time.

Kaussen bases his study on *De Finibus* I-II. He considers (3-5) Cicero's relations with the actual Torquatus, who is made the spokesman for Epicureanism; and concludes (5-10) with a discussion of Cicero's effort to draw his friend away from a false philosophy.

My own study differs in being a more detailed study of both books, setting Cicero's discussion point by point against the statements of Epicurus available on the same topic: I have tried also to interpret each book in the light of the other. I have found no study making such detailed comparison as a basis for reaching conclusions as to Cicero's attitude toward Epicureanism. A detailed investigation such as mine seems to me to offer some contribution toward a further study of Epicureanism, further investigation of Cicero's sources, and, perhaps most interesting of all, further acquaintance with the personality of Cicero.

In general, scholars who have commented on the treatment of Epicureanism in *De Finibus* I express more satisfaction with Torquatus' presentation of Epicurean ethics than it seems to me to deserve<sup>10</sup>. It is commonly said that Cicero's criticism (D.F.II) is unduly severe, but I find no detailed study which undertakes to

<sup>10</sup> Usener (264-273), because of the loss of certain works of Epicurus in the field of ethics, quotes in their place *De Fin.* I. 29-62. See Usener 264 n. and Schneidewin 3. Lecky (i. 176n.) says:

But probably the most beautiful picture of the Epicurean system is the first book of the *De Finibus*, in which Cicero endeavors to paint it as it would have been painted by its adherents. When we remember that the writer of this book was one of the most formidable and unflinching opponents of Epicureanism in all the world, it must be owned that it would be impossible to find a grander example of that noble love of truth, that sublime and scrupulous justice to opponents, which was the pre-eminent glory of ancient philosophers, and which after the destruction of the ancient philosophy was almost unknown in the world.

It should be said, however, that such approval is not universal.

measure it by the statements of Epicurus, as well as to interpret it by any errors or omissions observable in the discourse of Torquatus.

In the matter of interpretation of the ethical doctrines of Epicurus, it would be desirable to carry the study beyond the limits of this paper, especially to include the material found in the inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda and in the Herculanean papyri.<sup>11</sup>

The interpretation which I offer in the following discussion seems to me to have at least the merit of attempting to see the Epicurean system as a consistent whole. It is of course true that the founder of a doctrine may be guilty of inconsistency in the organization of his system. The challengers of Epicurus (among whom Cicero is conspicuous) have repeatedly accused him of this fault. Such accusation, however, seems to me unsound unless the critics have first made every effort to secure the point of view from which the system was seen by its author. By a fair-minded critic, detached from any personal preferences, an apparent inconsistency in the doctrine which he studies may well be regarded as a challenge of his own interpretation, and only after most careful investigation can be pronounced a weakness in the system under consideration. I have therefore tried to guard against my own personal preference which might lead me to say with A. and M. of Cicero's *Tusculans* (I. 39-40):

A. Errare mehercule malo cum Platone . . . quam cum istis verasentire.

M. Macte virtute! ego enim ipse cum eodem isto non invitus erraverim.

It is in the effort to look at Epicureanism objectively that I have been impressed with the value of the interpretation given by Bailey, Bignone, and Guyau (who are for my purposes virtually in agreement); it seems to me that their interpretation can be challenged only by one who can offer a better explanation of the fragments of Epicurus' writing which are available for us.

The two principles of Epicureanism which are emphasized in the following pages as essential to an understanding of the philosophy are 1) the fundamental doctrine of the infallibility of sense perception, as a basis for a theory of knowledge and a standard of conduct; and 2) the establishment of the *limits* of pleasure<sup>12</sup>.

Finally, in all discussion of Epicureanism it should be remembered

<sup>11</sup> The importance of the latter is repeatedly emphasized by Philippson in articles mentioned in the List of Abbreviations.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Bignone Aristotle 2. 18-23 et passim.

that our knowledge of Epicurus, like our knowledge of Hannibal, has been transmitted to us in great part by his enemies. Both Stoic philosophy and early Christianity were fundamentally opposed to a doctrine of pleasure. Neither Stoics nor early Christians would have liked Epicureanism, even in its noblest and most ascetic phases, if they had understood it; and they seem not to have been too careful to see it in its highest terms. For this reason the accusations of baseness and inconsistency which have often been made against the Epicurean philosophy must be examined with the greater care before they are accepted.

# 1: TORQUATUS

## CICERO'S PRESENTATION OF EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY IN DE FINIBUS I

CICERO'S TREATISE *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* was written in the year 45 B.C.<sup>1</sup> In this volume Cicero undertook the discussion of ethical problems from the standpoint of each of the three prominent philosophical schools of his day with the addition of his own personal criticism<sup>2</sup>. His medium of expression is a somewhat informal dialogue falling into long passages of exposition which retain some of the informality of a conversational style.

The first two books of the *De Finibus* contain a study of Epicurean ethics presented in the form of a conversation taking place at Cicero's villa at Cumae about the year 50 B.C.<sup>3</sup> The Epicurean view is defended by Lucius Torquatus, a learned Epicurean, who speaks in the presence of Cicero and Triarius, the latter a man of fine character and training and of Stoic inclinations<sup>4</sup>. In the first book Torquatus discusses Epicurean ethics in detail; in the second, Cicero, speaking in his own person, offers a detailed criticism of Torquatus' speech and of the doctrine which he has presented.

The conversation is opened by Torquatus, who asks Cicero to state the reasons for his disapproval of Epicurus. Cicero's reply to the query is admirably summarized by Triarius, who gleans from it the following points<sup>5</sup>:

Epicurus was not a philosopher<sup>6</sup>.

He has received from Cicero only the doubtful credit of being intelligible notwithstanding his manner of speech.

He borrowed a doctrine of physics in itself unacceptable, and altered it only for the worse.

He rejected the science of dialectics.

He declared that pleasure is the highest good, a doctrine unsatisfactory and unoriginal: it was better stated by Aristippus.

He was not a man of learning.

<sup>1</sup> Schanz 503.

<sup>2</sup> D. F. I. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Schanz 503; D. F. I. 14.

<sup>4</sup> D. F. I. 13; 2. 119.

<sup>5</sup> D. F. I. 26.

<sup>6</sup> This point is supported by those that follow.

Torquatus in reply to Cicero's criticisms decides to limit his discussion to the doctrine of pleasure, as the most important phase of the teaching of Epicurus; he states a preference for the method of continued discourse rather than that of question and answer<sup>7</sup>.

Such is the framework which Cicero prepares for his presentation of Epicurean philosophy. As one reads, one must constantly bear in mind that Torquatus' long discourse is but a dramatic form which Cicero employs in expressing his own conception of the doctrine of Epicurus as it might have been presented by an Epicurean. In his introduction to the first book of the *De Finibus*, Cicero states that it is his intention to explain the Epicurean doctrine with the utmost accuracy, and that it is his desire to seek the truth rather than to refute an adversary:

Quam [Epicuri rationem] a nobis sic intelleges expositam ut ab ipsis qui eam disciplinam probant non soleat accuratius explicari. Verum enim invenire volumus, non tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere. (I.13)

It is the purpose of the present inquiry to consider the extent of Cicero's success in achieving the standard of fairness which he thus sets for himself. It seems necessary therefore to examine Cicero's choice of topics in his discussion of Epicurean ethics, to consider his treatment of these topics in comparison with that of Epicurus himself, and finally to consider the general effect of Cicero's whole treatment of the subject as it appears in *De Finibus* I in comparison with the general effect of Epicurus' writings on the same subject. As a standard for such comparison, there are available two writings of Epicurus concerning the conduct of life, the Letter to Menoeceus and the *Kύριαὶ Δόξαι*<sup>8</sup>. In so far as his treatment is adequate in comparison with these documents, Cicero would seem to have justified his claim to accuracy and fairness.

In order to study the choice of topics included in Torquatus' discourse, it seems best to compare a topical outline of his speech with a similar outline of the Letter to Menoeceus and of the *Kύριαὶ Δόξαι*. Such comparison is therefore indicated in the outlines which follow<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> D. F. I. 28-29.

<sup>8</sup> These writings are especially useful for this purpose in that they present, as it is thought, in the one case, a statement for the general reader; in the other, a manual for the Epicurean disciple. See Bailey, *Remains* 327, 346-7.

<sup>9</sup> Such outlines cannot give an exhaustive summary of the documents concerned; they are used to indicate the trend of the major points of the discussion, unencumbered by matters of detail. The detailed development of the various topics will be studied later in comparing Cicero's treatment of these topics with that of Epicurus.



TOPICS DISCUSSED IN THE LETTER OF EPICURUS  
TO MENOECEUS 122-135 (82-92)

TORQUATUS  
PARALLELS FROM CICE-  
RO DE FIN. I. 29-72

	MEN.		
I The value of philosophy and of happiness	122	—	Sec. 57, 71, 72
II The nature of the gods	123-124	—	62
III Right attitude toward death	124-127	—	62
IV Pleasure as the highest good	127-133	—	29-42
1 The nature of desires	127-128	—	43-45
2 Pleasure as a guide to choice	127-128	—	31-42
3 Absence of pain as the highest good	128	—	37-39, 43, 56
4 The doctrine of choice in relation to pleasure and pain	129-132	—	32-36, 55
5 Definition of pleasure as the end	131-132	—	37-39, 43
V The virtues as aids to pleasure	132	—	42-54, 57-59
VI Results of the Epicurean way of life	133-135	—	57-63
1 Reverence of the gods	133	—	62
2 Freedom from fear of death	133	—	62
3 Preponderance of pleasure over pain	133	—	62
4 Control of the important issues of life vs. chance	133-134	—	63
VII The blessings of friendship and meditation in the enjoyment of a life of peace	135	—	57, 62, 65-72
TOPICS INCLUDED BY EPICURUS IN THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES I-XL (94-104)			
(The following classification is taken from Bailey, Remains 346) <sup>10</sup>			
	K. Δ.		D. F. I. 29-72
(1) The four principles of the tranquil life	I-IV		62, 37-39, 43, 56
(2) The relation of pleasure and virtue	V		42-54, 57-59
(3) Protection from external disturbance	VI, VII		51-53
(4) The selection of pleasures	VIII-X		32-36, 55
(5) The ethical value of physical science	XI-XIII		63-64

<sup>10</sup> The outline of the *Kύριαι Δόξαι* is quoted from Bailey, for the reason that the organization and the possibility of such organization are disputed points; the various positions taken by scholars are discussed by Bailey, Remains 344-347. In the presence of such controversy it seems best to use as a standard for comparison an outline which has so reasonable a defense as that presented in the pages here noted. (I have in some cases condensed the wording of Bailey's outline.)

(6)	The wise man's life in relation to nature, his fellow-men, and true pleasure	XIV-XXI	51-63
(7)	The tests and standards of moral (i.e., truly pleasant) action	XXII-XXVI	30, 63-64
(8)	Friendship	XXVII-XXVIII	65-70
(9)	The classification of desires	XXIX-XXX	43-45
(10)	Justice and injustice	XXXI-XXXVIII	50-53
(11)	The wise man's life in the Epicurean community	XXXIX-XL	57-63
TOPICS INCLUDED IN TORQUATUS' DISCUSSION OF EPICUREANISM		PARALLELS IN EPICURUS	
DE FIN. I. 29-72		D.F. I.	MEN. K. Δ.
	Definition of the phrase <i>summum et ultimum bonorum</i>	29	122
II	The doctrine of pleasure		
	Natural guidance given by pleasure and pain		
	Instinctive choice of young animals	30	—
	Axiomatic truth vs. logical proof	30	—
	Man's dependence on sensation	30, 64	XXII-XXV
	Division of opinion in the Epicurean school as to methods of argument	31, 55	
		66-70	—
	The doctrine of choice in relation to pleasure and pain	32-36, 55	129-132 VIII-X
	Epicurean conception of pleasure	37-39, 43	131-132 III, XVIII-XXI
	Illustration and application of the definition	40-41	
	Conclusion that pleasure is the highest good	42	127-133
	The virtues as aids to pleasure	42-54, 57-59	132 { V, XVII
	The four virtues	42-54	132 { XXXI-XXXVIII
	The nature of desires	43-45	127-128 XXVI-XXX
	Certain related topics	55-57	
	Evils resulting from ignorance of the sources of pain and pleasure	55	129-132 VIII-X, XXI
	Relation between physical and mental pain and pleasure	55-56	— XVIII-XX
	Great pleasure in the absence of pain	56	128 III

d Pleasures arising from memory	57, 62	135	
7 Results of the Epicurean way of life	57-63	133-135	XXXIX-XL
a The healing of extravagant desires of the mind	57-61	127-132	{ XXV-XXVI XXIX-XXX
b Common ground between Stoic and Epicurean	62-63		
(1) Limitation of desires		130-132	XXIX-XXX
(2) Indifference to death		133	II
(3) Knowledge of the nature of the gods which destroys fear		{ 123-124 133	I
(4) Preponderance of pleasure over pain		133	III, IV
(5) Control of the important issues of life vs. chance		133-135	XVI
(6) Knowledge that happiness is not dependent on the infinite duration of life		124-126	XIX-XX
c Differences between Stoic and Epicurean	63-72		
(1) Natural philosophy and the canon of Epicurus vs. Stoic logic	63-64	—	{ XI-XIII XXII-XXIV
(2) Foundations of friendships	65-72	135	XXVII-XXVIII
III Praise of Epicurus	62-63, 71-72	—	—

(Uri (10) organizes 55-64 as a series of corollaries; so, for the most part, Hirzel and Lörcher, Lörcher, F & E 22-24).

In examining the outlines here presented, we may note that all the topics discussed by Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus and the Principal Doctrines appear in the discourse of Torquatus, that is, in Cicero's presentation of Epicurean ethics. On the other hand, all but four of the topics discussed by Torquatus appear in these writings of Epicurus. Of the four exceptions no one is un-Epicurean; they are as follows:

- 1) Pleasure as the instinctive choice of young animals.  
(See Vita 137 (170))<sup>11</sup>
- 2) Axiomatic statement vs. logical proof.  
(Hdt. 73 (44))
- 3) Division of opinion within the Epicurean school.  
(Vita 26 (158))
- 4) Praise of Epicurus.  
(Vita 9-12 (146, 148); Lucr. 3. 1-30)

<sup>11</sup> The references here given are not exhaustive, but are noted as examples of those that may be given.

Any variation in the order of topics, if it seems to have significance, will be discussed later in connection with Cicero's treatment of the various topics, as will also the extent of development of the various points.

In general, with reference to Cicero's *choice of topics* in his presentation of Epicureanism, it may be said that his selection is adequate and unbiased. In so far then we may say that Cicero has succeeded in his effort *verum invenire*. He has omitted nothing from the range of topics studied in the Letter to Menoeceus and the *Kúptai Δόξαι* and has included only a few additional points, none of which is out of place in a discussion of Epicureanism.

In studying Cicero's *development* of the topics which he discusses, it is again desirable to use, as a basis for comparison, the writings of Epicurus, especially the Letter to Menoeceus and the *Kúptai Δόξαι*. Torquatus opens his discourse (I. 29) with the statement that it is in accordance with the ideas of his master to determine the nature of that which is to be investigated. He therefore proceeds to define the *extremum et ultimum bonorum*, stating that in the opinion of all philosophers it is necessarily that to which all other things must be referred, but which itself is never referred to any other thing.

For Torquatus' reference to Epicurus' approval of opening a discussion with the establishment of terminology, a satisfactory parallel may be found in Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus<sup>12</sup>. Epicurus here emphasizes the necessity of clearness in the meaning of terms in order to avoid ambiguity and long explanation. Although no literal parallel can be quoted for Torquatus' definition of the term *highest good*, the same implication is to be found in the Letter to Menoeceus<sup>13</sup>, where Epicurus states that when happiness is present we have everything, and when it is absent we do all things to obtain it. It should be noted in passing that Torquatus offers the definition not as that of his master, but as that in which all philosophers agree<sup>14</sup>. It would seem then that sufficient Epicurean support

<sup>12</sup> Hdt. 37 (20); noted also by Hutchinson, 17, n.

<sup>13</sup> Men. 122 (82); cf. also *ibid.* 128 (86).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Aristotle. Nic. Eth. 1. 3-4. Bignone (Cicero 59-60) notes the influence of Aristotle on Epicurus, and refers to Pascal, *Graecia Capta*, 47 ff., and Hirzel 1. 119, n. Cicero has been attacked here as employing a Stoic definition in his presentation of Epicurean philosophy. See esp. Madvig LXII-LXIII and 64, n.; Reid, 45, n. to l. 5, defends Cicero by reference to Epicurus' emphasis on accuracy in the use of terms; but he also notes that in D. F. 2.5 Cicero calls Torquatus *imprudens* in this definition. Bignone (op. cit.) defends Cicero both in Torquatus' speech and in his own, in that in 2.5 Cicero speaks from a Stoic standpoint. Bignone finds it probable that

can be found for Cicero in the matter of Torquatus' definition of the phrase *extremum et ultimum bonorum*.

The next statement of Torquatus, wherein he declares that Epicurus calls pleasure the highest good and pain the greatest evil, is quite accurately made<sup>15</sup>.

Torquatus then proceeds with Epicurus' doctrine of the instinctive choice of young animals as a satisfactory standard of natural good; later, in his peroration (71), he refers to the same doctrine<sup>16</sup>. At this point also a satisfactory parallel can be found in the teaching of Epicurus<sup>17</sup>.

There are however in these passages quoted from Cicero two words to which exception may be taken. In 1. 30, the phrase [*voluptatem*] *appetere* occurs as a parallel for the word *εὐαρεστεῖσθαι* in the passage from Epicurus, and the Latin phrase is inexact as measured by the Greek. Epicurus' word *εὐαρεστεῖσθαι* (*to be well pleased*) is in harmony with the whole Epicurean conception of the most desirable quality in life, a tranquillity which includes health of body and quietness of soul. Epicurus says elsewhere that the living creature, secure in such peace, does not have to wander as if in need, *nor to search for some good which will satisfy soul and body*<sup>18</sup>. Cicero's term *appetere*, on the other hand means *to strive after, grasp after*, and implies a restless seeking which is contrary to the Epicurean ideal. The inaccuracy of this term is the more important in that Cicero, in his reply to Torquatus in the following book, uses the same word and makes it contribute to his criticism of the Epicurean idea of pleasure<sup>19</sup>.

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Epicurus offered the same definition of *the end* as did the Peripatetics and Stoics; he refers to the passage from Epicurus cited above (Menoeceus 128), and also to Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. XXV, Col. II. 6. Williams.

<sup>15</sup> D. F. 1. 29. Cf., e.g., Men. 128-129 (86).

<sup>16</sup> Omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem *appetere* eaque gaudere ut summo bono. . . . D. F. 1. 30.

. . . si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiae paene locuntur, magistra ac duce natura nihil esse prosperum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperum nisi dolorem, de quibus neque depravate *iudicant* neque corrupte . . . Ibid. 71.

<sup>17</sup> Ἀποδείξει δὲ χρῆται τοῦ τέλους εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τῷ τὰ ζῷα ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι τῇ μὲν εὐαρεστεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ πόνῳ προσκρούειν φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου. Vita Ep. 137 (170)

Ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμῶν, οὐκ ἔχοντες τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδεόν τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ὧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται. Men. 128 (86)

<sup>18</sup> See above n. 17, Men. 128 (86). Cf. Bignone, Arist. 2. 18-23 et passim.

<sup>19</sup> D. F. 2. 31, 32.

In 1. 71, where Torquatus again refers to the standard of infants and dumb animals, the word *iudicant* is used:

*neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte;*

but Epicurus expressly says that new-born animals accept pleasure and shun pain,

φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου (Vita Ep. 137 (170)).

As in the instance of the term *appetere* discussed above, Cicero has, perhaps unconsciously<sup>20</sup>, interpreted the Epicurean doctrine by the use of a word having an unsatisfactory connotation; it is possible that he has not caught the significance of Epicurus' use of the word meaning *enjoy* rather than *seek*, and of his emphasis on the idea that the pleasure involved is purely instinctive and apart from reason. This inaccuracy, whatever explanation may be given for it, becomes important in the latter case as in the former, because of the ironic turn that the argument takes in the second book, where Cicero bases his remarks on his own inexact translation of an Epicurean passage<sup>21</sup>.

In the matters here concerned then, it seems evident that, if we are to credit Cicero with an attempt at the honest interpretation which he claims for himself, he betrays an inadequate conception of the Epicurean doctrine:

In other respects, Torquatus is not unorthodox in his initial presentation of pleasure and pain; it will nevertheless be seen that the argument is not quite clear, and that the lack of clarity might easily be explained as a result of Cicero's own failure to realize the interrelations of the various points which are discussed.

The argument of Torquatus may be recast in the following form:

Epicurus considers pleasure to be the highest good and pain the greatest evil. He supports his position as follows:

<sup>20</sup> Cf. D. F. 1. 71: [infantes pueri, mutae . . . bestiae] de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte, with 1.30: . . . *ipsa natura* incorrupte atque integre *iudicante*. The latter statement is sufficiently Epicurean; it would seem that to Cicero the two statements are equivalent.

<sup>21</sup> See D. F. 2. 32: Neque enim haec movere potest appetitum animi . . . Itaque Epicurus semper hoc utitur ut probet voluptatem natura *experi*. . . . and 2. 31: . . . ab eis animalibus . . . ait optime *iudicari*. . . . vagiens puer utra voluptate *diuiudicabit*. . . .

do not find any comment from editors on this precise point. Reid, 145, notes that *appetitur* (2. 32) is a common rendering of ὁρμή and that *experi* translates αἰρεῖσθαι. Madvig (65) finds in Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. III. 194 a parallel for D. F. 1. 29-30, with the phrase ὁρμῶν . . . ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονήν. But I find neither αἰρεῖσθαι nor ὁρμῶν just this connection in the words of Epicurus. Neither Reid nor Madvig comments on the fidelity of *appetere* and *iudicant*, in this context, to the language of Epicurus. See the criticism of Lörcher (F & E 33n.) in regard to the word *iudicari*.

Every new-born animal, as yet unperturbed, seeks pleasure and enjoys it as the highest good, and spurns pain and avoids it as the greatest evil, at a time when its very nature uncorrupted and unimpaired makes its decision.

There is therefore no need of systematic argument as to the reason why pleasure should be sought and pain avoided: this is a matter of sense-perception. . . .<sup>22</sup>

Since man except for his senses is nothing, his nature itself must necessarily decide what is in accordance with itself or contrary to it,<sup>23</sup> both that pleasure must be sought for its own sake, and that pain for its own sake must be avoided. Pleasure and pain are the only perceptions and judgments of man's nature which offer a guide to choice and avoidance.

.....

Omne animal, simul atque natum sit, voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et, quantum possit, a se repellere, idque facere nondum depravatam, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante.

Itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione, quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentire haec putat, ut calere ignem. . . .<sup>22</sup>

Etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari,<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> There are omitted here two sentences explaining Epicurus' theory of reasoning. These sentences are faithful to Epicurus. Cf. Men. 129 (86); Vita 31, 32, 34 (160, 162, 164). See p. 17 below.

<sup>23</sup> At this point the editors, following Ms. A, omit the rest of the sentence as given above. The phrase does however appear in LPMCR (Madvig 68) and in the edition of Aldus Manutius, and it seems to define more clearly *quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit*. It is explained that the phrase appears in some (deteriores) Mss., having been transferred from section 31, end of the first sentence, Madvig 68 n.

Schiche, 12, 14, notes three occurrences of these words in various codices:

1) 1. 26. After the words *et ille melius* concerning Aristippus, R adds:

Etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nichil est necesse est quid ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. Et expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse.

(Schiche et al. omit, following A and other Mss. Madvig, 60 n., explains the phrase as being due to the error of the copyist in turning the pages of his exemplar. Cf. 1. 30.)

2) 1. 30. At the end of the penultimate sentence after *iudicari*, V adds the following: voluptatem etiam per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum.

N gives these words in a marginal note.

(Schiche and most other editors omit the phrase from the text. Madvig, as noted above, finds it added in LPMCR.)

3) 1. 31. R gives the following, differing from other codices:

esse: Et fugiendum itaque aiunt (om. *expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse*).

(This could not give a meaning in harmony with the context, and may possibly have resulted from the omission of a line of the exemplar.)

Editors and other Mss. read:

et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendam et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum.)

As to the history of the codices, Schiche (IX) states that codex A is the oldest and best of those available, with R *vetustate et fide* ranking next to A; he adds that

voluptatem etiam et per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. Ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem? (D. F. 1. 30)

In the passage from which the preceding sentences are quoted, the discussion of evidence from the instinctive choice of young animals is followed by a statement to the effect that Epicurus considers it unnecessary to establish axiomatic truth by an elaborate process of reasoning. This statement is true in itself<sup>24</sup>; but as it stands, it is an unnecessary interruption of an argument that is at best sufficiently difficult. The presentation would have gained in clearness if Torquatus had proceeded at once from a discussion of the report of the senses in instinctive choice to the subject of man's necessary dependence on sensation.

In the penultimate sentence quoted above, the phrase *necesse est* well expresses the Epicurean view of the necessity which exists in the nature of things that there be an inner standard of choice and avoidance. This idea receives added emphasis from the passive periphrastics in the following phrase:

voluptatem etiam et per se *expetendam* esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse *fugiendum*,

if we accept the phrase as a part of the text<sup>25</sup>.

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both were copied by those who knew not what they wrote. He further adds as a working principle (XI) that when ABER are diverse in reading, and especially when A is lacking and BER differ from each other, N and V then "valent ad augendam eius partis quacum faciunt auctoritatem." Although A is not lacking in 1. 30, NV may still have some value.

Ernesti, n. ad 1. 30, states that some codices and "editors P., Cret., Manut., et Lamb." give the phrase as a part of the text.

The erroneous passage of R quoted above from 1. 27 would, if we accept Madvig's explanation, tend to support the reading of V quoted above from 1. 30, for it would seem that the copyist of R erred in 1. 27 in turning the page of his exemplar, in which case he might have taken the phrase from 30 or 31 if it appeared in both. (Madvig, as above, includes R among codices which add the phrase in question to the penultimate sentence of 1. 30; he does not mention V. Schiche, who states, XIV, that his text is based on a collation of ABERNV, at this point quotes no variant in R from A et al. I have been able to check Ms. readings only from the critical apparatus of various editions. Reid differs slightly from Schiche.)

It would seem, therefore, that there is considerable Ms. evidence for the reading that I have given above. The sense suffers considerably in both 30 and 31 from the omission of the phrase in question, while its occurrence in both passages is no real objection if clearness is thereby achieved.

<sup>24</sup> See n. 22 above.

It seems possible that Cicero himself saw here a relation of common theme only, and failed to grasp the essential dependence of one part on the other in its logical structure.

<sup>25</sup> Bailey (Atomists, 484, n.) interprets the gerundives of 1. 31 used with reference to *animi etiam ac ratione* in a way that supports the above comment: "... some Epi-



Torquatus might go further, and say with Epicurus that pleasure is the natural condition in which our lives tend to exist<sup>26</sup>. He does add at the end of his discourse (I. 64) a few sentences which might serve as commentary on our present passage, especially on the phrase *detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est* (30). The later passage (I. 64) reads:

Quicquid porro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a sensibus; qui si omnes veri erunt, ut Epicuri ratio docet, tum denique poterit aliquid cognosci et percipi. Quos qui tollunt et nihil posse percipi dicunt, ei remotis sensibus ne id ipsum quidem expedire possunt quod disserunt. Praeterea sublata cognitione et scientia tollitur omnis ratio et vitae degendae et rerum gerendarum.

Torquatus thus explains why man is nothing if deprived of sensation<sup>27</sup> by stating the converse that all man's rational existence and intellectual attainments are based on the validity of sense-perception, and by drawing from this statement the corollaries that without sensation the opponents of his position can not explain their arguments, and that without the results of sense impressions no rational conduct of life is possible. It seems evident then that Cicero realized the importance of the theory of sensation in the Epicurean doctrine, and moreover that he was conscious, if dimly so, that in Epicurus' conception of things man has no possible guide of life and conduct except sensation<sup>28</sup>. But it is also true that the somewhat loose organization of this argument, as Torquatus presents it<sup>29</sup>, and the omission of clearly drawn conclusions indicate that Cicero did not clearly see the theory of dependence on sensation as an integral part of the Epicurean system.

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cureans . . . would argue that reason too tells us that pleasure *ought to be* the end . . . But he [Torquatus] rightly rejects this line of support as alien to the true doctrine . . . In I. 30, however, the construction is to be interpreted as indicating necessity rather than moral obligation.

<sup>26</sup> Epicurus to Men. 128, 129 (86, 88) τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔργαμεν. . . . πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθὸν . . .

<sup>27</sup> Reid 93 n. "*animo . . . sensibus*: here *sensibus* = 'sensations', not the five senses."

With D. F. I. 30, 64 cf. K. Δ. XXIII (100): Εἰ μάλῃ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδ' ἂν ἄν φῆς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν κρίνεις. See also K. Δ. XXIV, XXVI.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. e.g., the following: Hdt. 38 (20), 71 (44), 82 (52); K. Δ. XXII, XXIV, XXV (100). See also Bailey, *Atomists*, 483-484. These references support Cicero's statement quoted above (from I. 64):

. . . sublata cognitione et scientia tollitur omnis ratio et vitae degendae et rerum gerendarum.

<sup>29</sup> See above, especially p. 17.

In continuing his discourse, Torquatus digresses from the argument concerning pleasure to mention certain variations of opinion within the Epicurean school in regard to the method of supporting the doctrine of the guidance of pleasure and pain (1. 31). That there is a lack of clarity in Cicero's writing at this point is evinced by the fact that modern scholars differ emphatically in their interpretation of the passage<sup>30</sup>. The position taken by the *quidam*, mentioned who

<sup>30</sup> Madvig (68-69), Hirzel (1. 179-180, 2. 671), Thiaucourt (73-74), Bignone (Cicero 60), and Uri (24) find that Torquatus presents three classes of opinion, as follows:

- 1) sensation is adequate evidence;
- 2) sensation is supported by a *naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris notionem*;
- 3) reasoned argumentation should be offered to meet the attacks of contentious opponents.

On the other hand, Lörcher (F & E 7, and Cicero 155-157) finds here a clear differentiation of only two classes: those who hold that reasoned argumentation is necessary and those who, in agreement with the Master, do not. Madvig finds confusion in Torquatus' division.

There is rather general agreement among these same writers that the passage is wanting in clearness.

Bignone (Cicero 60-64) holds that Cicero misunderstood his source, and that no real difference existed within the Epicurean school of his day; with this opinion Lörcher (F & E 25) partially agrees. Uri (26-28) and Philippson (Bignone 232-3) vs. Bignone hold that there is here no misunderstanding of Cicero's in this respect.

It is generally assumed among the writers here mentioned that the phrase quoted above in expressing the opinion of the second group refers to prolepsis. Reid (D. F. 49 n.) considers Madvig (68-69) too severe in saying that Cicero understood *πρόληψις* to mean innate ideas, and refers to Mayor's comment (D. N. D. 1. 44, pp. 137-8) where Cicero is supported: "All that is implied is that our religious ideas are not arbitrarily imposed from without, but grow up from within as a natural and necessary result of experience." Bailey (Atomists 557) refers to Mayor's note with approval, and says: "Cicero is capable of a good deal of misinterpretation of Epicurus, but the notion of 'innate ideas' would be wholly repugnant to Epicureanism and it is not necessary to suppose that he held it." Elsewhere (245) Bailey speaks of prolepsis as a general concept. But here also there is variety of opinion. Uri (24-25) finds in the application of prolepsis to the doctrine of pleasure as the highest good a contradiction of the very foundation of the system. Philippson (Bignone 233) finds in Cicero's second class of opinion only a formal variation of his master's teaching. Bignone (Cicero 62-63) defines prolepsis as a memory of something many times appearing from without, and holds that it was often used by Epicurus in establishing the pleasure doctrine, and that it was misunderstood by Cicero who found in it something new.

As to the position of those who would defend their doctrine by reasoned argument, opinions again differ. Thiaucourt (74) holds that this group had become polemical in order to meet adverse views in Rome. Reid (D. F. 50) suggests that argument seems to have been used by Epicurean 'heretics' in Rome. Uri (31) is sure that Cicero was right in seeing a real divergence among late Epicureans. Philippson (Bignone 233-4) says that a clear difference existed among the members of the school in Cicero's time, and that this third group is so little a matter of Cicero's imagination that we know the names of some of its members: Zeno, Demetrios, and Philodemos. As evidence Philippson gives references to parts of the Herculanean Rolls.

Hirzel (1. 187-8) would trace the use of reasoned argument back to Epicurus himself, and would find it resulting from a development of Epicurus' thought in the years after he wrote the Canon; he further suggests that apparent divergence resulted from the

would have the truth *animo etiam ac ratione intellegi*, seems very little different from that of the *alii* with whom Torquatus agrees, who think *et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum*, except that the latter group might be more vociferous in the presence of opposition. The haziness in Cicero's division at this point may indicate some obscurity in his understanding of the situation<sup>31</sup>.

Moreover the digression from the consideration of the doctrine of pleasure to the method of defending the doctrine, especially when there is division as to the method, tends to obscure the presentation of the Epicurean position<sup>32</sup>. The interruption may even suggest a lack of coherence in Cicero's understanding of the doctrine as a whole. When the discussion is resumed (1. 32), instead of positive exposition, Torquatus offers a refutation of the argument against pleasure as a guide of conduct.

It is possible however, as Hirzel suggests<sup>33</sup>, to show a logical sequence of ideas at this point (between sections 31 and 32): Torquatus, having just identified himself with those who believe in meeting opposition with reasoned argument, now refutes the objections to pleasure as a standard of choice, which were offered by Cicero earlier in the conversation (section 23).

It is nevertheless also true that section 32 is a continuation of section 30: Torquatus has stated (1. 30) the position of Epicurus that pleasure is the natural good of mankind and pain is the natural evil; after the digression of section 31, he now proceeds to state Epicurus' refutation of opposing arguments<sup>33</sup>. This refutation declares that the opposition to the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure is due to error arising from observation of the consequences of an irrational pursuit of pleasure. Torquatus then develops the Epicurean doctrine of the

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difference in the presentation of the doctrine to the initiate and the uninitiate. Hirzel finds in the variation suggested by Torquatus a reflection of that mentioned in D. L. 10. 26, and suggests that the term *σοφισταί* in the latter passage is a term of praise rather than of reproach, and would have the word *ἄλλοι* include Zeno, Apollodorus, and Philodemus as *σοφισταί*. Bignone (Cicero 60-64) sees in the use of argument a development of Epicurus' own practices, and thinks that Cicero mis-read his sources.

<sup>31</sup> Cicero would so judge if he were studying the argument of an opponent. See his censure of Epicurus on the division of desires, D. F. 2. 26.

<sup>32</sup> Lörcher (F & B 6, 11-12) and Uri (23) note the interpolation. Hirzel (2. 671) sees a logical connection of ideas between 31 and 32. But Bignone (op.cit.) vs. Hirzel's explanation, notes that when Torquatus continues, he uses material derived from Epicurus himself; Bignone explains that Cicero wrote too hastily.

<sup>33</sup> Thiaucourt (72) says that Torquatus is an orator who attacks and defends, but that there is also considerable refutation in Epicurus. See n. 35 below.

selection of pleasures, and of the acceptance of pain when occasion so requires:

. . . ut aut reiциendis voluptatibus maiores alias consequatur aut perferendis doloribus asperiores repellat (1. 33 fin.).

He applies the doctrine to the deeds of the early Torquati, and then continues (37-39) with a discussion of the nature of pleasure as it is to be understood in the Epicurean sense. The general development of the doctrine throughout this passage is in harmony with that of Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus<sup>34</sup>, where Epicurus teaches that pleasure is the foremost natural good, teaches the choice of pleasure and the occasional acceptance of pain, and defines the term *ἡδονή* as he uses it. Moreover in Epicurus' development as in that of Torquatus, there is a considerable element of refutation<sup>35</sup>.

Although the fidelity with which Torquatus reflects certain passages of Epicurus is thus obvious<sup>36</sup>, it remains to be seen whether Torquatus' fidelity to his master's teaching is in other respects adequate. It is possible that the omission of certain phases of the Epicurean doctrine permits an interpretation that is not in harmony with the doctrine as a whole. This can best be determined after considering the discussion in which Torquatus applies the pleasure-pain theory to the deeds of his heroic ancestors.

This passage (34-37) is interesting from several points of view. It is clearly connected with Cicero's earlier reference to the old Roman heroes (1. 23-24)<sup>37</sup>.

. . . Torquatos nostros? quos tu paulo ante cum memoriter, tum etiam erga nos amice et benivole collegisti; nec me tamen laudandis maioribus meis corrupisti nec segniorem ad respondendum reddidisti. (1. 34)

<sup>34</sup> Men. 129-132 (86, 88, 90). The effect is not always the same.

<sup>35</sup> See Bailey, Epicurus, Notes, 327, 338; Bignone, Cicero 64; Uri 20-21. Bignone, Aristotle, esp. Ch. VI and VII.

<sup>36</sup> For detailed citation of parallels from Epicurus, see esp. Bignone, Cicero 64. Parallels are cited also by Uri 9, and by Madvig and Reid, notes ad loc. Lörcher (F & E 51), Bignone (op. cit. 63), and Reid (n. 1. 32) agree that Torquatus, even if he expresses himself as in sympathy with a contemporary group of Epicureans who differ somewhat with the Master, nevertheless draws these arguments almost literally from the Master's teachings.

<sup>37</sup> Uri (13-14, 36-37), although recognizing Cicero's introduction of this passage as given in connection with the earlier references to these heroes and with the discussion of pleasure immediately preceding, finds here an illustration of a tendency of Cicero's toward digression induced by certain favorite trains of thought. Lörcher (F & E 51, 52) curiously overlooks this passage (1. 34) in his comment on 2. 72, where Cicero says:

. . . quamquam te non possum, ut ais, corrumpere . . .

The latter passage has of course clear reference to the words quoted above from 1. 34.

It leads moreover to various references to these heroes in the second book (2. 60-61, 72-73, 105) with comment given in considerable detail. The deeds of the early Torquati are clearly of interest to Cicero; he particularly comments on the father's execution of his own son, and refers to it in other works as well as in this<sup>38</sup>. We have considerable evidence that the ancient world was interested in the problem of the sacrifice of a child to the patriotism of the father and used it as a topic of discussion in the *suasoria* and the *controversia* of the schools; this is especially true in the instances of the early Brutus, Titus Manlius Torquatus, and the tragic story of Iphigenia: "the whole problem, therefore, as to whether the father or the patriot should prevail had been thoroughly canvassed . . ."<sup>39</sup>.

Cicero's interest in the question as it is reflected in these passages of the *De Finibus* may possibly lie in the analysis of motive; when Cicero speaks in his own person in the earlier passages (1. 23-24), he commends the heroic sacrifice of one who would place duty to his country above paternal affection; when he speaks later (34-37) in the person of Torquatus, he sees that the hero's patriotism may not have been free from self-interest. The elder Torquatus, in the execution of his son as in the wresting of the necklace from a foe, was acting in the presence of the army: by the one deed he strengthened his authority in which was involved his own safety; from the other he received

laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu degendae praesidia firmissima.

Cicero's rational feeling is admiration for a sacrifice of private interests to patriotism; it is not impossible that he has a reluctant and

Philippon (Lörcher 605) notes this error, and Lörcher (Cicero 1913, 162) acknowledges the oversight and makes correction.

<sup>38</sup> T. D. 4. 49; De Off. 3. 112, esp. fin.: *magnus vir in primis et, qui perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbè severus in filium*.

Reid, 1. 23 n., refers to Virgil, Aen. 6. 825:

saevumque securi aspice Torquatum.

See Uri's comment (Uri, op. cit.; see note 37 above.)

<sup>39</sup> H. E. Butler (Sixth Book of the Aeneid, Oxford, 1920), Aen. 6. 822 n., makes this statement, and with Norden, Aen. 6. 822, speaks of the use of the topic in the schools of rhetoric. Reference is made to Ovid, M. 12. 29, ff. and 13. 181, ff; Sen. Contr. 10. 3. 8; Quint. 5. 11. 7, and other passages.

Servius, on Aen. 6. 819, says *saevaeque securae quae saevierunt etiam contra liberos*; he has a similar comment on Aen. 6. 824. Reid, 55 n., refers to Livy 7. 4. 6, for a comment on an incident similar to that of Torquatus (1.34), *at id ne feræ quidem faciunt*. Cf. also Gell. 9. 13 for these stories of ancient Romans and the phrase *et aspera et immitia*, as criticism of their sternness.

almost unconscious respect for the Epicurean analysis of motives which would rob such sacrifice of any theatrical glitter and question the ultimate value of such glory. It is not a common note in Cicero, but we do sometimes hear him questioning with a certain wistfulness the reality of the praise of men:

Etsi enim nihil habet in se gloria cur expetatur, tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur.

Verum multitudinis iudicium de bonis si quando est, magis laudandum est quam illi ob eam rem beati. Non possum autem dicere, quoquo modo hoc accipietur, Lycurgum, Solonem legum et publicae disciplinae carere gloria: . . . (T. D. I. 109-110)

He does not entirely doubt it, but neither is his sense of its value, especially in the light of his later years, unquestionably assured<sup>40</sup>.

But aside from the possibility of such an analysis on Cicero's part, the case of the Torquati as discussed by their descendant is not an entirely satisfactory illustration of the Epicurean position. Praise and honor won by wresting a necklace from a foe seem not altogether consistent with a life of serenity. Still less consistent with a quiet life is security gained by means of the execution of one's son. Of course these instances are not offered as examples from the lives of Epicurean sages, but they are in harmony with the preceding discussion concerning the Epicurean balance of pleasure and pain, and they remind us that Cicero sometimes fails to emphasize as Epicurean the life of "sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit"<sup>41</sup>. Nor does Cicero's presentation sufficiently emphasize the warnings contained in the following words from the Master:

Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature.

A man who causes fear cannot be free from fear.

The man who is serene causes no disturbance to himself or to another.

See Ad Att. 2. 5: . . . quoniam quae putavi esse praeclara, expertus sum esse.

Ad Att. 13. 20: De fama, nihil sane laboro.

These are moods to be sure, but they rose from unhappy experience. See also Rep. 1. 17 and D. F. 2. 49.

Men. 132, Bailey's translation (89); this is Epicurus' statement of the attitude essential to the pleasant life. See Philippon, Rechts 308, for Epicurean approval of life for mastery in early times, because it was essential to safety.

The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with causes of unlimited desire<sup>42</sup>.

Such sentences create a different atmosphere from the suggestion of careful expediency given by Cicero's words:

Temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessitatibus saepe eveniet, ut et voluptates repudiandae sint et molestiae non recusandae<sup>43</sup>.

As has been noted above, Cicero's words are not in themselves a misstatement of the doctrine. It is rather that the ideas presented in Torquatus' discourse need to be defined and developed by the addition of such conceptions as those here quoted from Epicurus.

In the study of Torquatus' presentation, we find again and again that Cicero's faults are faults of omission. The fidelity with which Cicero repeatedly presents the teaching of Epicurus himself would seem to indicate that the omissions are not deliberate, that Cicero here unconsciously omits a spiritual content that he has failed to recognize. Such a failure would help to explain his repeated assertions that the Epicurean doctrine has inconsistencies within itself, and that the lives of Epicurus and certain Epicureans are nobler than their doctrine gives them any logical right to be<sup>44</sup>.

Torquatus now (Sect. 37-38) offers a more positive treatment of his theme. He defines pleasure as all that we enjoy,

omne autem id quo gaudemus voluptas est (I. 37),

and undertakes to show that the system is *gravis, continens, severa*. In conformity with Epicurus, he denies the existence of a neutral state between pleasure and pain, states that absence of pain is the highest pleasure, and that beyond this point pleasure may be varied in kind but cannot be increased. The Epicurean doctrine is here stated in sentences that faithfully report certain sayings of Epicurus<sup>45</sup>. And yet again there is an effect of materialism not given by Epicurus in his extant writings. It is clear that Cicero understands

<sup>42</sup> K. Δ. VII (97); Frg. D 84 (139); Sent. Vat. LXXIX (119); Ibid. LXXXI (119), all in Bailey's translation.

<sup>43</sup> D. F. I. 33. These words and the statement of the 'calculus of pleasure' at the end of § 36, without the addition of the Epicurean ideals referred to above, would suggest a weakness and even a brutality of character which is inconsistent with the Epicurean ideal.

<sup>44</sup> See, e.g., D. F. 2. 30, 48-50, 80, 97-99; T. D. 5. 26-28.

<sup>45</sup> Men. 128 (86); K. Δ. III (94), XVIII (98).

well enough the pleasure that results from agreeable stimuli, and also that which results from the cessation of pain,

. . . cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis. . . (I. 37);

and both of these conceptions are Epicurean<sup>46</sup>. He states also (I. 38) with clearness that the so-called neutral state between pleasure and pain is not recognized by Epicurus as neutral, but is considered by him a state of pleasure, *etiam summam voluptatem*. But in the discussion of this last state of pleasure, Cicero gives no sympathetic suggestion of its real happiness comparable with that given by Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus:

The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and <the soul's> freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness. For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfil the good of the soul and the good of the body<sup>47</sup>.

This happy tranquillity is very little suggested in any of Cicero's discussion of Epicurean philosophy<sup>48</sup>. It is possible that his own inclination toward a life of great activity permitted him to see little attractiveness in what must have seemed to him a more or less negative condition.

The anecdote of the syllogism concerning the statue of Chryseus is introduced at this point in an obvious effort to make the distinction between the Epicurean conception of pleasure and that of the Cyrenaics. It is possible that the use of the anecdote betrays also some consciousness on the part of Cicero that his treatment of pleasure as absence of pain is not quite adequate, and he thus undertakes to support that doctrine. It is not a very successful addition from any standpoint, and Uri (15) justly observes that the story tends to interrupt the exposition<sup>49</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> Men. 128-129 (86); Frg. D 61 (134). Madvig approves Cicero's discussion here, and notes D. L. 10. 136, and other passages.

<sup>47</sup> Men. 128 (87), Bailey's translation. Madvig refers to this passage in this connection, but without noting any inadequacy of Cicero's.

<sup>48</sup> This limitation of Cicero's receives slight comment in the discussions of editors and commentators. Exceptions to the above statement of the text may be found in 44 and 62, but such suggestion of happy tranquillity is not frequent in Torquatus' discourse.

<sup>49</sup> Larcher (F & E 14) also comments on the difficulty of connection with the context.



Far less satisfactory is the illustration offered in the following passage (§§ 40-41), the comparison of the happy and the unhappy man, the most unfortunate passage in the whole of Torquatus' presentation of Epicurean philosophy. Torquatus here evidently undertakes to portray the Epicurean wise man<sup>50</sup>, and many of the phrases used are obviously faithful echoes of the words of Epicurus: this man is free from pain; he is relieved by his philosophy from all fear of pain, of death, of the gods; his life is enriched by the pleasures of memory<sup>51</sup>. But the total effect is not really Epicurean. This is true, partly because of the excessive emphasis on luxurious pleasures,

magnis multis perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus; partly because of the absence of comment on the happiness of a tranquil life. There is no hint of the difficult intellectual asceticism which Epicurus considers necessary to the attainment of a life free from disturbance. To such a conception of happiness as Torquatus here presents, Epicurus would reply:

A free life cannot acquire many possessions. . . .

Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems little. The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with causes of unlimited desire.

The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. . . .

For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.

The happy and blessed state belongs not to abundance of riches or dignity of position or any office or power, but to freedom from pain and moderation in feelings and an attitude of mind which imposes the limits ordained by nature<sup>52</sup>.

<sup>50</sup> Reid thinks it is successfully done. Reid, *De Fin.* 62, 63, n.

<sup>51</sup> It is easy to note parallels from Epicurus; they are given by various writers, e.g., see Reid and Madvig, notes ad loc. Madvig (85) however comments that Cicero's portrayal does not follow a statement of the importance of the virtues, as does Epicurus' picture of the wise man, *D. L. X.* 133. Madvig adds that it does not follow that he who experiences pleasure is the Epicurean *sapiens*. Reid differs from Madvig. For Epicurean parallels to Torquatus' conception of the wise man, see, e.g., *K. Δ.* I-IV (94); *Men.* 133-135 (90-92).

<sup>52</sup> *Sent. Vat.* LXVII (117); *ibid.* LXVIII; *ibid.* LXXXI (119); *K. Δ.* III (95); *Men.* 132 (89); *frg. D.* 85 (139), all quoted from Bailey's translation. Other passages might be added; see note 51 above, referring to Madvig's comment on the place of the virtues in Epicurean happiness.

Torquatus' description of the unhappy man is likewise unsatisfactory from the Epicurean standpoint. He is exhausted by the greatest possible ills of mind and body with no hope of alleviation or of pleasure. The description is too general to permit the use of the Epicurean analysis of trouble and its causes. Most of the statement moreover could be applied to the last hours of the life of Epicurus, which he nevertheless calls happy<sup>53</sup>.

The whole illustration here given by Torquatus, as well as Cicero's later reference to this passage (2. 63-65), reveals once more the inadequacy of Cicero's conception of Epicurus' ideal of the happy life<sup>54</sup>.

Torquatus, after deducing from his illustration that a life of pleasure is the highest good, adds (1. 41),

Nec enim habet nostra mens quicquam ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere.

Bignone (Cicero 66-67) would emend the first clause here quoted by interpolating after *quidquam* the words *praeter sensuum iudicia*. His argument for this is good. It seems possible however that the same idea is clearly implied in the manuscript reading if the context is considered: Torquatus says that the mind has in itself no abstract standard; all its fears and troubles are related to pain and to pain alone; moreover (1. 42) pleasure and pain furnish the initiative for choice and avoidance and for conduct in general. All this is satisfactorily Epicurean<sup>55</sup>, and is concluded by the statement that the values of conduct are to be referred to a life of pleasure. Thus Torquatus introduces his discussion of the virtues.

The treatment of the virtues (43-54) presents the true Epicurean view, that the virtues are means to an end rather than an end in themselves<sup>56</sup>. The Stoic virtues are the virtues here discussed, but the passage is evidently directed at the Stoic argument, and an attempt is made to show the meaning of the Stoic virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice, in the Epicurean doctrine.

<sup>53</sup> Vita 22 (154); D. F. 2. 96: note Cicero's charge of inconsistency.

<sup>54</sup> Lörcher, F & E 15, considers this contrast of the happy and the unhappy man drastic enough to do honor to an orator rather than a philosopher.

<sup>55</sup> E.g., K. Δ. XXII-XXIV. Cicero states the theory of sensation fairly enough at this point; he does not always show the recognition of what he makes evident here, that, from the Epicurean view, man has no other possible guide of action.

<sup>56</sup> See Epicurus' writings, Men. 132 (90) et passim.

The whole passage in which the virtues are discussed abounds in phrases and statements that are clearly Epicurean<sup>57</sup>, a fact which would seem to indicate that Cicero was endeavoring to make an honest presentation of the doctrine. He may even betray some sympathy with the Epicurean attitude as against the Stoic at this point, when he has Torquatus speak of those who place the chief good in virtue alone and are *splendore nominis capti*; the phrase here used is not unlike that which Cicero uses in the fourth book when he speaks in his own person in criticism of the Stoic position:

Vos autem, Cato, quia virtus, ut omnes fatemur, altissimum locum in homine et maxime excellentem tenet, et quod eos qui sapientes sunt absolutos et perfectos putamus, *aciem animorum nostrorum virtutis splendore praestringitis* (D. F. 4.37)<sup>58</sup>.

I do not mean to suggest that Cicero agrees with Epicurus that the virtues have their real meaning only in relation to pleasure (that would be easily refuted, even in the sentence just quoted), but only that he does not always receive the extreme Stoic position with enthusiasm.

The word *sapientia* in Torquatus' discourse (1. 42-46) seems to be used in place of *φυσιολογία*<sup>59</sup>, *φρόνησις*, and even of *φιλοσοφία*<sup>60</sup>, as found in Epicurus. There are many Epicurean parallels for the comments on wisdom. Torquatus says that wisdom has the same kind of utility as has the science of navigation or medicine<sup>61</sup>, in that it has no end in itself (cf. Vita 138 (170)), but is useful in application; he speaks of ignorance of good and evil as the cause of most disturbance in human life (Men. 132 (88-90)); of wisdom as having power to take away fears and desires and the rashness of false opinions (Men., op. cit.; Sent. Vat. LIX (114); Frg. C. 45 (132)),

qua praeceptrice in *tranquillitate* vivi potest, omnium cupiditatum ardore restincto (1. 43)<sup>62</sup>.

He states that inner discord, hatred, and war are among the evils

<sup>57</sup> Reid, Madvig, et al., comm. ad loc., note this.

<sup>58</sup> Reid, D. F., 67, notes this similarity of phrase without further comment.

<sup>59</sup> Bignone, Cicero 68, notes this, and cites K. Δ. XI; cf. D. F. 1. 43.

<sup>60</sup> Reid, D. F. 68, cites Epicurean usage of the last two words. For Cicero's varying use of *prudencia* and *sapientia*, see Off. 1. 15-16, 152-153; 3. 117-118.

<sup>61</sup> It may be observed that the Stoic presentation of 3. 25 specifically denies this.

<sup>62</sup> These citations as given above are commonly found in such editions as Reid's and Madvig's. Reid (D. F. 70) refers to Lucr. 5. 12, as a parallel for the reference to tranquillity. The passages here given present the idea of tranquil contentment, as the Italics indicate. Such expressions are not too common in Cicero's Epicurean discussions.

caused by the desires; hence it is that only the wise man, freed from vain desires

*naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere* (1.44).

He then states Epicurus' classification of the desires as follows:

- 1) natural and necessary,
- 2) natural and not necessary,
- 3) neither natural nor necessary.

The first, he says, are easily satisfied; the second need little and find sufficiency in the riches of nature which are easily procured and limited in quantity; the third class are without bound or limit. This discussion of desires is a faithful representation of the teaching of Epicurus as we have it in K. Δ. XXIX (100-102), XV (98), Sent. Vat. XXI (108)<sup>63</sup>. It is true however that in his criticism in the second book (2. 26), Cicero demands a different organization as the only logical statement:

*naturales et inanes; naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae.*

But this is just the organization given by Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus 127 (86), of which Cicero seems not to know<sup>64</sup>.

Torquatus concludes his discussion of *sapientia* with a summary in which he speaks of wisdom as showing us the

*vias quae ad quietem et tranquillitatem ferant*<sup>65</sup>.

In this discussion more than anywhere in the earlier part of his discourse, Torquatus emphasizes the ideas of tranquillity, quiet, and contentment, ideas which are repeatedly expressed in the writings of Epicurus, but which Cicero seems sometimes to overlook.

The discussion of *sapientia* is so satisfactory at so many points that it may seem hypercritical to take issue with it anywhere. There is, however, early in the discussion of wisdom (1. 42 fin.) an expression that suggests a conception of pleasure too much like that of the voluptuary for the Epicurean ideal: Torquatus speaks of wisdom *tamquam artifex conquirendae et comparandae voluptatis*. It may be that Cicero is himself not quite satisfied with the expression *tamquam artifex*, for he immediately has Torquatus add a saving clause (§43):

*Quam autem ego dicam voluptatem iam videtis, ne invidia verbi labefactetur oratio mea*<sup>66</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> See Reid, Madvig, and others for these and other Epicurean parallels.

<sup>64</sup> Reid notes this (op. cit. 140). See further, pp. 85-87 below.

<sup>65</sup> For suggestions of a peaceful way of life, cf. Men. 128 (86), 135 fin. (92); Hdt. 80 (10), 82-83 (52-54); frg. D. 85 (138).

<sup>66</sup> I find no mention by editors of this point except that Reid, op. cit. 69, calls at-

In the same section (43) Torquatus speaks of ignorance of good and evil as a cause of unhappiness, and says,

*voluptatibus maximis saepe priventur.*

It will be questioned later whether the word *voluptas* is as satisfactory a translation for Epicurus' Summum Bonum as Cicero thinks that it is; but at this point it may be noted that the plural of the word is unsatisfactory. Epicurus usually uses the plural only with reference to something which he suggests is less desirable than the best (cf. K. Δ. VIII, X (96); Men. 131 (88)). To Epicurus ἡδονή is a way of life of which *pleasures* may be an interruption.

Torquatus next discusses the virtue of *temperantia* to which we find in the vocabulary of Epicurus no word precisely equivalent; but the virtue itself was a necessity in the carefully balanced life of the true Epicurean.

The maximum of pleasure for the body and therefore for the mind is always the aim of conduct, and it is only because as the result of the balancing of pleasures against pains it is found that through temperance this pleasure is secured at its maximum height and with the least break in continuity, that a practice anything like ascetic can be recommended: 'we think highly of frugality, not that we may always keep to a cheap and simple diet, but that we may be free from desire regarding it'<sup>67</sup>.

But although Torquatus keeps his discussion of temperance in the main in harmony with Epicurean teaching, he seems nevertheless too severe at some points. Epicurus does not talk much about the necessity of abiding by one's decisions or the tragedy of failing to do so; it is rather that he would advise referring every choice and avoidance to the end of nature, and wisely interpreting every desire in accordance with the ultimate maximum of pleasure, with "sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions. . ."<sup>68</sup>

When Torquatus speaks (47 fin.) of the miseries incurred for the sake of a pleasure trivial and unnecessary, which might even have been won in some wiser way, we hear an echo of a saying of Epicurus which seems to warn against injustice rather than intemperance:

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tention to 2. 116 without comment. The usage of 2. 116 supports the comment made above: . . . *neminem videbis ita laudatum ut artifex callidus comparandarum voluptatum diceretur.*

<sup>67</sup> Bailey, Atomists. 525. Bailey indicates that the closing words of the sentence are from Stob. Floril. XVII. 14; C. B. fr. 29.

<sup>68</sup> Men. 133 (89), Bailey's translation. Cf. K. Δ. XXV (100).

He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain; so that there is no need of actions which involve competition<sup>69</sup>.

Such reference to the *πέρατα τοῦ βίου* is not unrelated to the ideal of *εὐφροσύνη*, but Epicurus nowhere uses that word, nor any synonym for it<sup>70</sup>. Cicero has evidently manufactured here from Epicurean materials a doctrine of temperance which has not exactly caught the Epicurean point of view; his misunderstanding here, if it is an actual misunderstanding, may explain his unjust words in his attack on Epicurean standards of *temperantia*, which occurs in the second book (2. 60):

Satisne ergo pudori consulat, si quis sine teste libidini pareat?

He apparently fails to understand that concealment of unwise action could help the Epicurean not at all. For the orthodox Epicurean the standard of action is that of harmony with the laws of nature; penalty for the violation of his standard is inescapable.

There is clearer Epicurean reference to courage as a virtue:

. . . courage (*ἀνδρεία*) does not come by nature, but by a calculation of advantage<sup>71</sup>.

The advantage of courage from the Epicurean standpoint is, as Torquatus states (1. 49), the avoidance of anxiety and fear and of pain of mind and body, all of which are both caused and increased by timidity and cowardice. It is obviously Epicurean to state as Torquatus does that the fear of death and the dread of pain are assuaged by philosophical doctrines. It is evident then that Cicero recognizes the fact that the philosophical attitude of the Epicurean would naturally result in a patient endurance which would of itself tend to make life happier. But a limitation of Cicero's understanding of Epicurean fortitude is suggested by Torquatus' easy acceptance of suicide as a way of escape from evils that are not endurable; it is possible that Cicero underestimates the limit of the endurance of the true Epicurean, and overestimates the evils of life from the standpoint of the analysis made by Epicurean philosophy<sup>72</sup>. Such a

<sup>69</sup> K. A. XXI (99), Bailey's translation.

<sup>70</sup> This statement refers to the extant writings of Epicurus; there is however reference to a lost work, *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν*, which may have discussed all the so-called Stoic virtues from the Epicurean standpoint: Vita 28 (158).

<sup>71</sup> Vita 120<sup>b</sup> (169), Bailey's translation; the passage is cited by Reid and others, *op. cit.* ad. loc.

<sup>72</sup> Bailey (Atomists 510) and Guyau (128) present such a conception of the Epicurean doctrine of fortitude. Bailey supports his statements partly by reference to Cicero's passage here under discussion, but makes no reference to the possibility of

possibility might explain the passage in the second book (2. 96-99) in which Cicero attacks the phase of the doctrine here presented by Torquatus, and refuses to see in the Epicurean system any consistency with a courageous acceptance of pain, such as is shown in the letter written by Epicurus just before his death. It would seem that Cicero fails to realize the difference between the attitude of accepting death calmly as a satisfied guest serenely withdraws from the banquet of life, and that of deliberately choosing the time of departure, as one withdraws in displeasure from the theatre of life before the end of the play<sup>73</sup>. Although Epicurus did not forbid suicide under all circumstances, he indicated both by precept and example that he regarded it with disapproval<sup>74</sup>. It may be said then that, although Cicero realizes that courage has its place in the Epicurean life, he does not see the extent of courageous fortitude developed by a determination to see in life a preponderance of good<sup>75</sup>.

Justice like the other virtues is valued by Torquatus because it is necessary to happiness (50-53): it insures a continuance of the good things which are necessary, and a personal security based on the affection and good will of others<sup>76</sup>. Injustice on the other hand creates disturbance by its very presence, exciting desires which are never satisfied but become increasingly rapacious as they are indulged<sup>77</sup>: it exposes the evildoer to the fear of penalties which he can not be certain of escaping<sup>78</sup>. The balance of pleasure then is clearly on the side of justice: there is more personal loss in the very act of injustice than there is profit in ill-gotten gains.

All this is genuinely Epicurean, and might seem quite satisfactory were it not for Cicero's vicious attack on the Epicurean theory of

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suicide. Guyau (118-120) for the most part accepts Torquatus' position in the matter of suicide, but (120) speaks also of the Epicurean "perseverance in triumphing over pain," and of "desperately affirming the happiness of life in the presence of death." Reid and Madvig (comm. ad. loc.) find considerable reservation in Epicurus' approval of suicide as a means of escape.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Lucr. 3. 938-9, where Lucretius speaks rather of the folly of fearing death; the passage is noted in connection with D. F. 1. 49, comm. ad loc. by Reid et al.

<sup>74</sup> Epicurus, Men. 125-6 (84); Sent. Vat. XXXVIII (110); Vita 22 (154).

<sup>75</sup> See Guyau 120; Brochard 8-11; Bignone, Aristotle 2. 3-23. See also Sent. Vat. XLVII (112): . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῆν μετὰ καλοῦ παιῶνος ἐπιφωνοῦντες ὡς εὖ ἡμῖν βεβίωται.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. K. Δ. XXXIX, XL (104); Frg. D 70 (137).

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Men. 128 (86); 132-3 (90); Sent. Vat. XXI (108), LXXVI, LXXIX, LXXXI (118); Frg. C 45, 46 (132); D 68, 69-75 (136); D 85 (138).

<sup>78</sup> Cf. K. Δ. XXXV (102); Frg. D 82 (138) et passim. In all these points Cicero is abundantly supported by passages from Epicurus.

justice, as it is presented in the second book (D. F. 2. 52-59). That attack ignores entirely the inner tranquillity which is sought by the true Epicurean, which is violated as much by extravagant desires in themselves as by any disturbance which could attend the satisfaction of them by illicit means<sup>79</sup>; it ignores the fact that great wealth is, from the Epicurean point of view, inconsistent with happiness<sup>80</sup>; it ignores Epicurus' repeated statement that the wise man's justice is not merely the result of the fear of penalties of society<sup>81</sup>; it makes no mention at all of the Epicurean conception of justice and the tacit social compact<sup>82</sup>. Is it possible that Cicero did not see clearly the implications of all that he wrote in Torquatus' account of Epicurean justice?

To return then to the account given by Torquatus, we find in the middle of his discussion the clear statement,

Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad iustitiam, aequitatem, fidem. (1. 52, init.)

Certainly nothing more could be asked in one statement than is given in this; but the supporting argument is less clear. There is a confused repetition of topics, especially of the control of the desires, safety won by the winning of affection, the disquiet of fear<sup>83</sup>. Such loose organization might mean that Cicero recognized all these matters as parts of Epicurean doctrine, but saw no logical relation which would organize them into a consistent unity. Such a failure on Cicero's part would explain, for instance, the fact that in the matter of honesty in money matters (2. 58), Cicero finds Torquatus, and even Epicurus, nobler than their own doctrine. He does not see that for the man wise in the Epicurean sense there is almost an entire absence of motive for unjust action, since he is free from greed and from ambition for power and position; and yet he has Torquatus tell us almost that very thing.

It is more obviously true that Torquatus' account of the attitude of his school toward the virtue of justice is incomplete in that it does not at all touch upon the Epicurean theory of justice as based on

<sup>79</sup> K. Δ. XXI (98), XV (98); Frg. D 68. (136).

<sup>80</sup> Sent. Vat. LXVII (116); XLIII (112).

<sup>81</sup> K. Δ. XXI (98), XXXI (102); V (94); Frg. D 81, 83, 85 (138). Philippson, *Rechts*, repeatedly states this; see pp. 300, 301, 303, 317, 323, 332. He does however accept Torquatus' discussion as satisfactory (321). (For an opposing view of the Epicurean wise man's attitude toward wrong-doing, see Taylor 93-94.)

<sup>82</sup> See esp. K. Δ. XXXI-XXXVI (102).

<sup>83</sup> Both Usener (270 n.) and Bignone (Cicero 69-71) note a difficulty here and try to solve it, Usener by transposing a passage, Bignone by explaining it as it stands but admitting carelessness on the part of Cicero.



the tacit social compact, which occupies a definite part of the so-called Golden Sayings<sup>84</sup>. The fact that the true Epicurean will deal honestly even when unobserved depends at least partly on his recognition of his own rights and privileges as bound up with those of society. There is some evidence that Cicero did not understand this conception, for when he mentions the possibility of a compact of friendship among wise men, he adds with some irony,

Hoc foedus facere, si potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut aequitatem modestiam, virtutes omnes per se ipsas gratis diligant. (D.F. 2. 83)

WE may say then concerning Torquatus' discussion of justice that the omission of reference to the social compact as a basis for justice implies a definite limitation in Cicero's understanding of the Epicurean doctrine at this point, and that the implication is strengthened by a suggestion of confusion in Torquatus' discourse, as well as by the unfairness and severity of Cicero's attack on this point of the doctrine in the second book of the *De Finibus*<sup>85</sup>.

The same general criticism may be made of Torquatus' entire treatment of the virtues: considered by itself, it has so much that is unquestionably Epicurean that a casual reader is impressed with its adequacy and fairness<sup>86</sup>; considered in connection with the criticism given in the following book, and examined in itself with closer attention to details, it is considerably less satisfactory than it at first appears. The fidelity to the words of Epicurus which may be observed in instance after instance throughout the passage would indicate that Cicero is honestly attempting to give the fair presentation of Epicureanism which he promised early in the book; if he is to be so credited, he must then also be charged with a definite limitation in understanding the doctrine<sup>87</sup>.

<sup>84</sup> K. A. XXXI-XXXVI (102). For the importance of the compact in the Epicurean theory of justice, see Guyau, 145-152, and Philippson, *Rechts* 289-337. Both Madvig and Reid (notes ad loc.) in commenting on Torquatus' discussion of justice, refer to the social compact; neither of them comments on Cicero's omission of reference to it; nor do I find such comment elsewhere.

<sup>85</sup> D. F. 2. 52-59. See discussion below, pp. 91-93.

<sup>86</sup> This is perhaps an understatement, since Cicero's discussion at this point is almost entirely unquestioned by modern scholars; e.g., Bailey, *Atomists* 508-517, bases some of his comments on this passage of Cicero with no adverse criticism. See also Zeller 480. I do not find in the commentators any discussion of such limitations as I have tried to suggest above (27-34) of the adequacy of Cicero's presentation of the Epicurean attitude toward the virtues.

<sup>87</sup> The conclusion of Torquatus' discourse on the virtues stresses somewhat unfortunately the word *voluptas* with which Cicero chooses to translate ἡδονή : . . . beateque vivere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptate vivere. (I. 54)

AFTER his discussion of the virtues, Torquatus continues his discourse with the addition of certain more or less disconnected statements of various points of the doctrine. The content is as follows (D. F. I. 55-57):

- 1) Errors are due not to mistaking pleasure and pain as the ends of good and evil, but rather to ignorance of the sources of pleasure and pain.
- 2) Pleasures and pains of the mind have their origin in pleasures and pains of the body.
- 3) Mental experiences are nevertheless more intense than physical experiences, because of the elements of memory and anticipation.
- 4) Absence of pain is pleasure; absence of pleasure is not pain.
- 5) Memory is a source of pleasure to wise men, since they can exercise the power of selection.

The first, third, and fourth of these statements are in harmony with the teaching of Epicurus<sup>88</sup>; the same may be said of the second and fifth, but with some reservations. The second statement becomes rather less satisfactory in the light of the earlier reference to the same matter (I. 25), to which allusion is obviously here made. In that earlier passage, Cicero firmly denies that it is consistently Epicurean to find pleasure in history and poetry; the same idea is differently turned in the second book (2. 107) where Cicero asks Torquatus if he finds no pleasure in these and other things for their own sake<sup>89</sup>. (See also 2. 89 and 105.)

It is true that there are passages in Epicurus that in part support this attack, but most of our knowledge on this point comes to us from Plutarch, who is somewhat prejudiced<sup>90</sup>. On the other hand we do know from the statement which Epicurus makes in the letter to Herodotus that Epicurus himself found satisfaction in the investigation of nature, and elsewhere he clearly teaches the meditative, philosophical life<sup>91</sup>. When Epicurus refers all pleasure to the body, it must be remembered that his theory explained mind and soul as atomic compounds entirely dependent on enclosure within the body for their very existence<sup>92</sup>, and sensation as merely the re-

<sup>88</sup> 1) Men. 129-132 (86, 88, 90); 2) Frg. D 59 (134); 3) Vita 137 (168, 170); Frg. C 10 (126-128); 4) K. Δ. III (94); 5) Sent. Vat. XIX (108), LV (114).

<sup>89</sup> See D. F. I. 72, which seems to have good support.

<sup>90</sup> E.g., see Plut. Contr. Ep. Beat. 11, and Usener 229a; see also discussion in Bailey, *Atomists* 234, where these references are given.

<sup>91</sup> Hdt. 37 (20); Men. 135 (92); K. Δ. XX (98); Sent. Vat. XLI (112); etc.

<sup>92</sup> Hdt. 63-66 (39-41), Bailey's translation:

"Further . . . the soul possesses the chief cause of sensation: yet it could not have acquired sensation, unless it were in some way inclosed by the rest of the structure. And this in turn having afforded the soul this cause of sensation acquires itself too a

sult of the interplay of the atomic compounds of body, mind, and soul in response to stimuli received from without; sense-perception and thought are both the results of the action of the mind on images for which the mind is ultimately indebted to the senses<sup>93</sup>. Moreover all the investigations of the mind, Epicurus says, must be kept in accord with the evidence of the senses<sup>94</sup>. This being the case, Torquatus could not do otherwise than say that mental experiences are dependent on physical experiences. It is unquestionably true that Epicurus speaks at times of the pleasure of the flesh as such<sup>95</sup>, but Cicero sometimes seems to make the limits of Epicurean pleasure narrower than Epicurus himself implies; the study of physical science, for example, although it had for the Epicurean a utilitarian purpose in freeing the soul from fear, was also a source of noble pleasure:

In other words, the intellect has practically the whole range of physical science as its pleasure-ground, and in the pursuit of its own pleasure is incidentally securing the conditions of the pleasure of the mind as a whole<sup>96</sup>.

Cicero mentions more than once the satisfaction of the activity of the mind, especially in the study of the starry universe<sup>97</sup>; in view of the great poem of Lucretius, he might well have credited the followers of Epicurus with genuine interest in such investigation<sup>98</sup>.

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share in this contingent capacity of the soul. Yet it does not acquire all the capacities which the soul possesses: and therefore when the soul is released from the body, the body no longer has sensation. For it never possessed this power in itself, but used to afford opportunity for it to another existence, brought into being at the same time with itself. . . ." See also Lucretius 3. 94-633.

<sup>93</sup> See Bailey, *Atomists*, 387-437.

<sup>94</sup> Hdt. 38, 39 (20, 22.); K. Δ. XXIV (100).

<sup>95</sup> E.g., K. Δ. XVIII, XX (98).

<sup>96</sup> Bailey, *Atomists* 504. (See also Guyau 28, 34.)

<sup>97</sup> So, e.g., D. F. 2. 46; 3. 37; 5. 48-54, 57.

<sup>98</sup> Professor Paul Shorey speaking of the *De Rerum Natura* and the *Timaeus* says:

They are hymns of the universe rather than dry inventories of phenomena. Guided by a few great thoughts, their majestic rhetoric sweeps across the entire field of knowledge from the origins of the world to the diseases of the human body. Both approach the investigation of nature in a spirit of glad wonder and awe. Both thrill with a sense of the beauty of the cosmos, the glory of the sum of things, that reflects itself in a sustained intensity of rhythm, diction, and vivid imagery. Nothing is viewed in disconnection, lifeless and inert. Everywhere there is a sense of largeness and wholeness, and we are aware of nature related, moving, and alive in all her parts and processes. Shorey, *Lucr.* 206-207. See also Stanley 75-90.

In connection with Cicero's comments on Epicurus' lack of interest in the arts, we may note that Plato also, if for other reasons, placed some restrictions on poetry, drama, and music in his ideal republic (*Rep.* 3. 386<sup>a</sup>-403<sup>c</sup>), and that Cicero himself on occasion protests against certain ideas expressed by the poets (*T. D.* 1. 37; 4. 67-78).

Turning to the last of Torquatus' topics in the group under discussion<sup>99</sup>, the pleasures of memory, we find the subject undoubtedly Epicurean. Torquatus rightly couples the pleasure of memory with that of anticipation: as Guyau points out, the whole calculus of pleasure rests on a recognition of the future, and the Epicurean liberty of spirit is largely dependent on the ability to see the present moment as a part of the more extended plane which includes the past and the future<sup>100</sup>. While the flesh is experiencing only the joy or the pain of the moment, the mind "can 'look before and after' " and thus attain "a permanent condition of peaceful happiness"<sup>101</sup>.

Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it<sup>102</sup>.

Torquatus' advice of forgetfulness of unhappy things,

et adversa quasi perpetua oblivione obruamus (1.57),

becomes less satisfactory when we consider it in the light of Cicero's reply to the suggestion, given in the second book (2. 104-105), wherein Cicero comments with considerable severity on the unreasonableness of such a suggestion<sup>103</sup>. So considered, it becomes evident that Torquatus has made a stronger statement than can be found in the extant writings of Epicurus<sup>104</sup>. There is a somewhat different content in the sentence which might be quoted from the sayings of Epicurus found in the Vatican Collection (Sent. LV):

We must heal our misfortunes by the grateful recollection of what has been and by the recognition that it is impossible to make undone what has been done<sup>105</sup>.

Cicero's charge,

<sup>99</sup> In regard to Torquatus' third statement above, reference might have been made in the text to Cicero's reference in the second book (2. 108) to this matter. Cicero there combines this statement with one of Torquatus' statements about friendship, warping both surely from their clear intent. See Reid's comment to this effect (Comment ad loc. p. 214. 6).

<sup>100</sup> Guyau 37-38; 59.

<sup>101</sup> Bailey, Atomists 499.

<sup>102</sup> Men. 122 (83), Bailey's translation.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. T. D. 3. 18-43, an even more ironic attack on the suggestion of forgetting evils.

<sup>104</sup> It is of course possible that Cicero had access to works of Epicurus now lost, as implied in T. D. 3. 43-44, but it is only fair to Epicurus that we try to verify quotations assigned to him by his opponents. Philippson (Uri 108-109) speaks of Cicero's contribution to the unpopularity of Epicurus in ancient and modern times.

<sup>105</sup> Sent. Vat. LV (115), Bailey's translation.

res se tamen sic habet ut nimis imperiosi philosophi sit vetare meminisse (D.F. 2. 105),

is meaningless in the presence of that statement of acceptance of past evils.

This whole section in the speech of Torquatus (55-57<sup>a</sup>) has no clear and close connection with its immediate context, nor is there in every case a logical relationship of part to part within the section. That this is true even from Cicero's standpoint is suggested by the introductory sentence:

Huic certae stabilique sententiae quae sint coniuncta explicabo brevi (1. 55)<sup>106</sup>.

The whole passage has caused much discussion among modern scholars, some of whom undertake to show that the chapter is really coherent within itself and in its context, while others explain in one way or another the introduction of irrelevant matter<sup>107</sup>. For the purpose of the present inquiry, the significance lies in the fact of variation of opinion among commentators as being an indication of obscurity in Cicero's writing at this point; such obscurity would seem to betray a lack of clarity in his understanding of the logical relation of one part of the Epicurean system to another. Repeated instances of vagueness and inaccuracy in his grasp of the Epicurean doctrine would tend to explain Cicero's repeated declarations of inconsistency in Epicurus and Epicureanism as well as his assumption that Epicureanism is simple and easily understood<sup>108</sup>.

The following chapter (18. 57-61) offers a summary of the major

<sup>106</sup> So Uri suggests (11, 15), also Hirzel (2. 679).

<sup>107</sup> Usener (271 n.) says of Ch. XVII "magnae inscitiae specimen hic Cicero dedit"; referring to D. L. X. 136 f., he says that Epicurus was contending with the Cyrenaics at that point. Hirzel (2. 674-8), Thiaucourt (71-72), Bignone (Cicero 71-74), and Reid (D. F. comm. ad loc.) find the passage in whole or in part a polemic against the Cyrenaics, although Reid protests firmly against the severity with which Usener and Hirzel handle the passage. Reid outlines the chapter thus: a) criticism of certain Epicurean heretics; b) criticism of Cyrenaics; c) criticism of some unknown objectors; d) statement of a point in Epicurean ethics not hitherto handled. . . . Reid finds the whole chapter coherent in itself and in its context. Lörcher (F & E 23) finds the chapter confused and speaks of it as a 'witch's cauldron'; elsewhere (Cicero 150-2) he uses the loose connection of Ch. XVII with its context as evidence for his theory that D. F. 1. 39-42a and 55 are of Cicero's own composition, while the intervening parts are borrowed.

Uri (11-17) and Bignone (op. cit.) would attach 55 to 42a. Bignone thinks that Cicero followed a source which he did not quite understand, and therefore could not desert. Usener (271) finds the third argument *inepte* joined to the second; Reid opposes this remark of Usener's, but thinks that the second sentence is torn from its context.

<sup>108</sup> D. F. 2. 88, 99; 1. 13; et passim.

points of Epicurean ethics "omitting nothing *quod vitam adiuvet*". Beginning with the fine statement of Epicurus that no one can live pleasantly without living wisely, honestly, and justly, and the converse, Torquatus continues by referring to the evils attendant on conflicting and extravagant desires, the needless anxiety of the unphilosophical, the unnecessary fear of death, the unhappiness of living always in the anxious and deceptive hope of a future of wealth or fame or power, the misery of ill-adjusted and unsocial lives. It is a negative view of the Epicurean teaching and a gloomier view than that which pervades the writing of Epicurus<sup>109</sup>, but it is full of Epicurean material<sup>110</sup>. This passage with the one which follows (62-63a) seems to portray those Epicurean teachings concerning life and character which Cicero most respected. It may be his recognition of these things and his respect for them, mingled with his insistent feeling that they are not in harmony with the Epicurean doctrine in general<sup>111</sup>, that causes him to have Torquatus say (I. 14):

quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes . . .

Such a feeling would explain the attempt to express the Stoic doctrine in Epicurean terms (I. 62-63), and the expression thus given is not out of keeping with the Stoic expression at the end of the third book (3. 75-76).

Cicero's inclusion of logic and natural philosophy in his discussion of Epicurean ethics may be explained by a comparison of this book with book III (72-74) where dialectics and physics are discussed in connection with the virtues; the topic of friendship also is discussed in approximately the same relative position in the two books. It is possible that Cicero by conscious intention made these two books more or less uniform in this respect<sup>112</sup>.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. e.g. Men. 124-135 (84-92).

<sup>110</sup> See comments of various editors ad loc., e.g., Reid and Madvig.

<sup>111</sup> Repeatedly charged in the second book; see, e.g., his attack on the phrase referred to above, the necessity of living wisely, etc., 2. 49-51, 70-71.

<sup>112</sup> Thiaucourt (83), Hirzel (2. 681-2), Lörcher (F & E 8) find the arrangement of these topics faulty; Hirzel and Lörcher assume that the position of the topic of friendship is determined by the heavy attack which the Epicureans received from their opponents at this point. Lörcher adds that it is a topic of special interest to Cicero. Thiaucourt later in discussion of D. F. 3. suggests the explanation given above, that the similarity of arrangement in books I and III; Uri (18) holds that friendship should have been discussed with the virtues, but that Cicero adds here what he had hastily overlooked earlier. Philippson (Uri 105) finds the topic of friendship well placed as it stands, following 62 and 64, in that these sections show the relation of

It is of course true that to Epicurus the activity of the soul is as much a result of atomic movement as are other phenomena of the universe<sup>113</sup>, and his ethical doctrine, based as it is on sense-perception, is therefore necessarily a result of the study of natural philosophy. But this Cicero does not say, and does not seem to see. Torquatus therefore (1. 63-64) expresses ideas individually sufficiently Epicurean, but he fails to show any connection between the process of sense-perception and other activities of the universe; as a result the passage appears disconnected, and there is expressed no really apparent reason why a knowledge of the nature of things should enable us to establish the truth of sense perceptions.

THE doctrine of friendship is introduced somewhat negatively by a refutation of the statement that friendship cannot exist if pleasure is the highest good. To this charge Torquatus opposes the following arguments:

Epicurus teaches that friendship is the greatest, richest, and most pleasant of all the things which wisdom prepares for the happy life.

Epicurus himself gave an example of friendship in the company which he gathered together, bound by affection.

The custom has been observed by Epicureans down to Torquatus' own time.

Torquatus (66-70) seems to suggest three ways in which friendship is regarded by the Epicureans:

- 1) Since friendship is a protection from the lurking fears which attend the lonely life, it is sought not for its own sake, but as a reasonable defense for the person who seeks it. But since the protection of friendship cannot be secured unless we make the interests of our friends as our own, we do in effect come to love our neighbor as ourselves. Thus friendship like the virtues is a means to the pleasant life.

This statement not unfairly represents certain sayings of Epicurus<sup>114</sup>.

- 2) Those who are less courageous in the face of opposition from critics say that although the first associations of friendship are made from the motive of pleasure, familiarity and long-continued custom give rise to affection for friends as for the other as-

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pleasure to virtue and friendship; he grants that it would have been possible to discuss friendship in connection with pleasure.

<sup>113</sup> Hdt. 63-68 (38-42). The following parallels in Epicurus may be given for Torquatus' discussion in 63-64: Hdt. 37 (20), 78-9 (50), 81-3 (52-4); K. Δ. XI-XII (96); Vita 30, 31 (160); also as regards sensation: Hdt. 38 (20), 62 (38), 71 (44); K. Δ. XXII-XXV (100).

<sup>114</sup> K. Δ. XXVII, XXVIII (100), XL (104); Sent. Vat. XXXIV (110), LVI-LVII (114); Vita 120a, 121b (166), 120b (168).

sociations of life, and thus we come to love our friends even when no utility results.

This also can be supported by reference to Epicurus<sup>115</sup>.

- 3) Wise men in rational preparation for happiness form a kind of mutual compact to love their friends as themselves.

Again we find Epicurean support for this basis of affection<sup>116</sup>.

The last of these approaches to friendship is interesting because of its relation to the theory of justice, as both Philippson and Thiaucourt suggest<sup>117</sup>. It has been suggested also that the Epicurean community in the days of the founder was a kind of fraternity, a closed community offering some of the same kind of satisfactions and associations that Athenians of an earlier generation had found in participation in and service of the commonwealth<sup>118</sup>. Certainly Cicero in his attack on the Epicurean conception of friendship (L. 78-85) is thinking in no such terms.

The most serious charge made by the critics against Torquatus' account of friendship is that he has divided into three groups opinions, all of which were clearly taught by the master. The references given above offer considerable support for this charge. This view is stated with especial firmness by Bignone, who holds that Cicero was mistaken both in this matter and in the division of opinion among Epicureans concerning the method of determining the highest good<sup>119</sup>.

If we may accept the idea that Cicero failed to understand that all this discussion of the bases for friendship came originally from Epicurus himself, it would be evident that he misunderstood the

<sup>115</sup> Sent. Vat. XXIII (108).

<sup>116</sup> K. Δ. XXXIX, XL (104). All these references are quoted by various editors, comm. loc.

Thiaucourt (84 n) suggests that Cicero did not see that this third theory is a particular application of the Epicurean theory of justice resting on utility and on a reciprocal contract.

<sup>117</sup> Philippson (Uri 106) so comments vs. Uri (29-30), who thinks that this view is of Stoic origin. See Thiaucourt, op. cit.

<sup>118</sup> Pascal, 5-8, commenting on Lucretius' invitation to Memmius to join him in friendship (Lucr. 1. 140-142), says that since Memmius and Lucretius must already have been friends in the usual sense of friendly acquaintance, it would seem that Lucretius here invites Memmius to join the Epicurean brotherhood, the *foedus sapientum*. See also Philippson, Rechts. 309-310; DeWitt, Epicurus; Von Arnim 135; Bignone, Aristotle 2. 287-303. Gomperz (286-289) observes that Aristotle in the Politics speaks of friendship as developing a fraternity of equality which may in turn become a democracy.

<sup>119</sup> Bignone (Cicero 83). Torquatus' statement of division in the Epicurean school in his explanation of friendship is accepted by Uri (31) and Philippson (Bignone 235), and for the most part by Thiaucourt (73-74).



teaching of the founder in the whole matter of friendship. Thus it would be possible to understand Cicero's violence in his denunciation of the Epicurean theory of friendship, as we find it presented in the second book (78-85)<sup>120</sup>. The discussion of friendship in Book I seems then another instance where Torquatus' presentation seems fair and adequate to a casual reader; but here as elsewhere at various points in the discussion, it seems that Cicero has neither grasped nor given a unified conception of the matter; the inadequacy of his conception is further indicated by his later treatment of the subject (2. 78-85).

Torquatus' last grateful tribute to Epicurus suggests a reminiscence of Lucretius such as is seen by Martha in Cicero's Epicurean characters<sup>121</sup>. It is a tribute to one

e tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen  
qui primus potuit.

<sup>120</sup> See below, pp. 97-104.

<sup>121</sup> Martha, *Mélanges*, 170-171.

### *Summary of the above Study of De Finibus I*

As a result of the study above presented, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. Cicero consistently tried to present the ethical doctrines of the Epicurean school in terms that would be acceptable to the most orthodox Epicurean. This statement is supported as follows:
  - a) In the discourse of Torquatus, Cicero's choice of topics is adequate as compared with that of Epicurus' Letter to Menoecus and the *Kύριαι Δόξαι*.
  - b) In the development of individual topics there is abundant use of material that is definitely Epicurean, and there are comparatively few instances of expression of un-Epicurean ideas. Of the latter, the two most notable examples are the use of the words *appetere* in 1. 30, and *iudicant* in 1. 71 (see pp. 14-15 above), and the over-emphasis on luxurious pleasures in the picture of the Epicurean wise man in 1. 40-41 (see pp. 26-27 above).
2. There are definite limitations of Cicero's success in achieving an adequate and unbiased presentation of Epicurean ethics. The evidence for this conclusion may be stated as follows:
  - a) At many points in Torquatus' discourse there may be observed a failure to weave the argument into a closely connected whole, as, e.g., in the development of the sensation theory, 1. 30-31, 63-64 (pp. 15-20, 40, above); and in the discussion of friendship, 1. 65-70 (pp. 40-42 above).
  - b) There are repeated examples of the omission of ideas essential to an adequate presentation of the doctrine, e.g.,
    - 1) Lack of sufficient emphasis on the conception of happy tranquillity which pervades the Letter to Menoecus, e.g., in 1. 34-38 (pp. 23-25 above).
    - 2) Lack of sufficient emphasis on the ascetic standard which is set up by Epicurus, e.g., 1. 40-41 (pp. 26-27 above).

- 3) Omission of certain Epicurean tenets in connection with the treatment of the virtues, especially of all mention of the social contract as the basis of justice, i. 50-53 (see pp. 27-34 above).
- c) A loose organization of material at certain points betrays confusion of thought on the part of the writer, e.g., i. 31, 55-57 (see above pp. 17-20 and 38).
3. These limitations in Cicero's success in achieving a faithful presentation of Epicureanism suggest a failure in the sympathetic understanding of the doctrine as a whole; this would tend to explain the repeated charges made by Cicero in the second book, that the lives of some Epicureans and the Epicurean doctrine itself present evidences of a nobility that is inconsistent with what seems to Cicero the base materialism of the system.

## 2: CICERO

### CICERO'S CRITIQUE OF EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY, PRESENTED IN DE FINIBUS I AND II

IN THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS (I-28) of the first book of the *De Finibus* and in the whole of the second book, Cicero in varying degrees of severity expresses his disapproval of Epicurean philosophy and to some extent indicates the reasons for his attitude. It is to be noted that in these adverse criticisms of Epicureanism Cicero speaks in his own person, although the fiction of a reported conversation is maintained except for the first few sections (I-13) of the first book. In studying this critique we shall find that Cicero herein uses the methods of attack of which his experience in the field of oratory made him a master<sup>1</sup>, not the least effective of his weapons being a brilliant irony which varies from graceful amusement to bitter sarcasm.

The first reference to Epicureans and Epicureanism which appears in the first book (8-10) is a thinly veiled ironical allusion leading to another and yet another glancing shot<sup>2</sup>: Cicero speaks of the aversion to Latin literature experienced by some who have come upon

*inulta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius*  
(I. 8).

This passage must certainly refer to the Epicurean writers, Amafinius, Rabirius, and Catiu Insubris, whom he mentions elsewhere in similar context with more specific censure<sup>3</sup>.

After his reference to readers who have been thus discouraged with Latin literature, Cicero asks, "Who would not read a [Latin] book on a noble theme nobly expressed,—except such a pseudo-Greek as Albucius?" Then follows a quotation from Lucilius presenting a

<sup>1</sup> Thiaucourt, 70, 71, offers a similar suggestion.

<sup>2</sup> It seems hardly possible that the connection suggested in the following pages could be merely a matter of coincidence.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is so understood by the commentators, e.g., Reid and Madvig, *comm. ad loc.*; they refer to the following passages: *Acad.* I. 5; *Fam.* 15. 16, 19; *T. D.* I. 6; 2. 7; 4. 6-7; *D. F.* 3. 40. Of these note esp. *Acad.* I. 5: *Vides autem . . . non posse nos Amafini aut Rabiri similes esse, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant, nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant.*

witty anecdote told at the expense of this same Albucius, a Roman who was fond of imitating things Greek. The anecdote gains significance in its context from the fact that Albucius is thought to have been another member of the group of Roman writers on Epicureanism<sup>4</sup>; this would indicate that while Cicero is presenting the defense of philosophical studies, his mind is moved by a distinct undercurrent of annoyance at the extent to which Epicurean philosophy has already found expression in Latin writing. The use of the Albucius anecdote must not be pressed too far, but it is evident from his references elsewhere<sup>4</sup> that Cicero thought of the man as an Epicurean, and it seems more than likely that this allusion to him was made with a conscious association of ideas between Albucius and the crude writers previously mentioned. It is also probable that the connection would have been more obvious to Cicero's contemporaries than to a modern reader for whom Albucius' name has no immediate significance.

The same undercurrent of thought and feeling seems to extend to Cicero's next comment (1. 10), in which is expressed his disapproval of the *insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium* which finds the Latin language *inopem*; Cicero seems to feel that such scorn of the Latin tongue is widely prevalent: *ut vulgo putarent*<sup>5</sup>. As Professor J. S. Reid suggests<sup>6</sup>, this comment of Cicero's looks "like an answer to the wail of Lucretius about the *patrii sermonis egestas* (1. 139 and 832; 3. 260)". If we accept that suggestion, we may offer the following organization of the passage as a whole:

<sup>4</sup> Reid and Madvig, comm. ad loc. assume that Albucius was an Epicurean writer, and support the assumption by the following references: Brutus 35; T. D. 5. 108; Prov. Cons. 15; N. D. 1. 93; Orator 149; De Or. 3. 171; N. D. 1. 93 reads as follows, in part: *Et soletis queri; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat; quid dicam Albucium?* . . . (See Mayor's note ad loc.)

See also Orator 149, on the collocation of words:

. . . Nam esset cum infinitis tum puerilis labor; quod apud Lucilium scite exagitat in Albucio Scaevola:

quam lepide λέξεις compostae, ut tesserulae, omnes  
arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato!

(transl. by J. E. Sandys, ed. Orator, comm. ad loc.):

Oh! the neatly fitted phrases! all so cunningly combined,  
Like the little cubes in pavements, and mosaic intertwined.)

The same quotation from Lucilius is given in a similar context in De Or. 3. 171. These quotations are typical of the references given above; they all tend to show that Cicero regarded the character of Albucius with ironical amusement; and several of them refer to Albucius as an Epicurean.

<sup>5</sup> This phrase tempts us to recall Cicero's references to the Epicurean multitude: *multitudinem haec maxime allicit* (1. 25), etc., although such a parallel is opposed by the fact that Cicero often refers to the Epicurean multitude as unlearned, e.g., T. D. 4. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Reid, D. F. Comm. ad loc.

- 1) The reputation of Latin literature suffers from the crudeness of certain (Epicurean) writers.
- 2) Only a would-be Greek such as (the Epicurean) Albucius would hesitate to read a Latin book on a worthy theme expressed in suitable language.
- 3) Such pseudo-Greeks complain (as does the Epicurean poet Lucretius) of the poverty of the Latin language in its capacity for literary expression.

The entire passage then, if we are right in so organizing it, is an illustration of Uri's theory of an emotional unity which is to be found in passages where Cicero lets himself follow a favorite train of thought toward which he has an emotional bias<sup>7</sup>.

This undercurrent of dislike of Epicureanism may be recognized extending farther (I. 10-12). When Cicero suggests (I. 10) that his present undertaking in the field of philosophy is a service to his country comparable to that of his political career, we are reminded that his decision to engage in philosophical writing was in some degree a result of his desire to oppose the popularity of Epicureanism in Rome<sup>8</sup>. When he declares the importance of discussing matters *quae vitam omnem continent*, of which this book of his is to treat (I. 11-12), we remember that his belief in the importance of satisfactory ethical and moral standards was a determining factor in his attitude toward Epicurean philosophy as he understood it<sup>9</sup>.

We may say then that in the introductory material of the first book there is to be observed a pervasive emotion which may be regarded as the atmosphere in which is developed the discussion of Epicureanism in the first and second books. This emotional quality seems to be a subconscious or even an unconscious accompaniment of the logical development of Cicero's defense of his interest in philosophy; but the indication of feeling is significant in the study of his attitude toward Epicurus and his doctrine, and suggests a difficulty in the way of achieving the perfect fairness which Cicero evidently desires.

<sup>7</sup> Uri, 18-19, 36-39.

<sup>8</sup> T. D. I. 6: *In quo eo magis nobis est elaborandum, quod multi iam esse libri Latini videntur scripti inconsecutive ab optimis illis quidem viris, sed non satis eruditis.*

<sup>9</sup> Cf. T. D. 2. 6-7; 4. 6-7; 5. 1-2; etc.

<sup>10</sup> See Reid, *Academica*, Intr. 22: "Cicero hated and despised Epicureanism most sincerely, and one of his chief aims in undertaking his philosophical works was to stem the tide of its popularity in Italy." Holden, *De Off.* Intr. XXI-XXII, says: "Cicero was to the last consistent in his dislike of Epicureanism, and continued a war of extermination against it."

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., D. F. 3. 1-2; also Mayor, *Anc. Phil.* 225-226.

In his statement that he intends to present the Epicurean doctrine first in this study of the ethical teaching of the various schools, Cicero declares that it is the easiest of all the systems (I. 13)<sup>10</sup>, and is immediately concerned to state his intention of offering an adequate and unbiased presentation of Epicurean philosophy. At no point does he admit any doubt of his capacity to understand and interpret that philosophy<sup>10</sup>. There seems to be every reason to believe that Cicero is sincere in his belief that the Epicurean doctrine is easily comprehended, and that his knowledge of it is adequate for the task at hand. He had studied with Phaedrus and Zeno, and had discussed their lectures with his friend Atticus who admired them both and loved Phaedrus,

neque erat umquam controversia quid ego intellegerem, sed quid probarem (I. 16).

There is moreover considerable evidence of sincerity in Cicero's announced intention of presenting an unbiased and dispassionate study of Epicureanism. Indeed, although he makes no effort to conceal his disapproval of the philosophy, he seems to take some pride in indicating his judicial attitude of stating the facts fairly and offering his own criticism without rancor:

Verum enim invenire volumus, non tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere (I. 13).

He offers such an opinion of his own attitude in the words of Torquatus:

. . . quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes. . . (I. 14).

A little later (15), Cicero, speaking in his own character, says:

Re mihi non aequè satisfacit, et quidem locis plurimis. Sed quot homines, tot sententiae; falli igitur possumus.

To this Torquatus replies in part:

. . . te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo quae dicat ille, bene noris.

Cicero's standard of dispassionate discussion is expressed both in his own person, and in that of Torquatus (27-28):

<sup>10</sup> Cf. I. 26, 27: *cum praesertim illa perdiscere ludus esset*. (Reid, comm. ad loc., notes a contrast between this and Cicero's comment on Stoicism D. F. 4. 1). See also 2. 6; 2. 12, 13, 15, et passim; 3. 1-3, and elsewhere in Cicero's writings, for Cicero's self-assurance in the matter. It is fair to assume that in commenting on the speech of Torquatus, Cicero comments on his own success in presenting a careful defense of the doctrine: *Accurate autem quandam a L. Torquato, homine omni doctrina erudito, defensa est Epicuri sententia de voluptate*. . . (I. 13).

Fieri, inquam, Triari, nullo pacto potest ut non dicas quid non probes eius a quo dissentias . . . Quam ob rem dissentientium inter se reprehensiones non sunt vituperandae; maledicta, contumeliae, tum iracundae contentiones concertationesque in disputando pertinaces indignae philosophia mihi videri solent.

Tum Torquatus: Prorsus, inquit, assentior; neque enim disputari sine reprehensione nec cum iracundia aut pertinacia recte disputari potest.

When Torquatus introduces his long discourse on ethics, he says:

Nunc dicam de voluptate, nihil scilicet novi, ea tamen quae te ipsum probaturum esse confidam (28).

Cicero seems thus to indicate that he considers the statements included in Torquatus' discourse to be the most convincing that Epicureanism has to offer; and he says in reply in his own behalf:

Certe . . . pertinax non ero tibi, si mihi probabis ea quae dices, libenter assentiar;

to which Torquatus answers (29):

Probabo . . . modo ista sis aequitate quam ostendis.

Although in the second book the tone of the argument becomes decidedly more aggressive, there are nevertheless occasional avowals of fairness and courteous consideration of the opponent:

Dicam, inquam, et quidem discendi causa magis quam quo te aut Epicurum reprehensum velim. Ego quoque, inquit, didicerim libentius si quid attuleris quam te rependerim (2. 8).

Cicero's mildness in argument is acknowledged by Torquatus at the end of the second book (2. 119) in contrast to the Stoic severity of Triarius:

Eiuro . . . iniquum, hac quidem de re; tu enim ista lenius, hic Stoicorum more nos vexat.

Although this tribute is not entirely deserved in view of various severe statements which Cicero has made during the discussion<sup>11</sup>, it seems to be Cicero's own estimate (assigned to Torquatus) of his own manner and method of argumentation.

In the light of these statements<sup>12</sup>, it seems evident that Cicero, notwithstanding his disapprobation of the doctrine and his desire to oppose its influence, intended to be a calm and judicial critic of

<sup>11</sup> E.g., 2. 7, 21, 27, 30.

<sup>12</sup> Such statements are also found elsewhere in Cicero's works: e.g., . . . Epicureorum, quos equidem non despicio, sed nescio quo modo doctissimus quisque contemnit . . . T. D. 1. 77  
Sed defendat quod quisque sentit; sunt enim iudicia libera: . . . Ibid. 4. 7.



Epicureanism. In the first brief statement (1. 17-25) of his reasons for differing with Epicurus<sup>13</sup>, he succeeds admirably in presenting a temperate criticism. Although there is not an entire absence of emotion<sup>14</sup>, there is a satisfactory emotional restraint entirely free from bitter sarcasm. The second book is far less successful in the maintenance of a tone of moderation; in this there is often present a caustic severity<sup>15</sup>, and here for the most part Cicero's opponent receives only the doubtful courtesy of being separated from his philosophy, as for example in the discussion of friendship:

Faceres tu quidem, Torquate, haec omnia; nihil enim arbitror magna laude dignum esse quod te praetermissum credam aut mortis aut doloris metu. Non quaeritur autem quid naturae tuae consentaneum sit, sed quid disciplinae . . . (2. 80).

Again, speaking of fidelity in the transfer of property to the daughter of one who before his death had left it in trust in an unwitnessed conversation, Cicero says to Torquatus:

Tu quidem reddes; ipse Epicurus fortasse redderet. . . (2. 58).

In this case, where Epicurus is reluctantly credited with the same standard of integrity as that which is unquestioningly attributed to Torquatus, Cicero's concession is immediately followed by the assertion that such uprightness on the part of Epicureans is the result of innate virtue rather than of an unworthy philosophy<sup>16</sup>.

In such passages as those quoted above, Cicero endeavors to show that he regards his opponent Torquatus as a man of the highest nobility of personal character, despite the low ethical standard of the philosophy which he champions<sup>17</sup>. There is perhaps another manifestation of courtesy to his opponent in a turn of Cicero's argument, wherein the discussion is made to seem less personal:

. . . relinquitur non mihi cum Torquato sed virtuti cum voluptate certatio (2. 44).

All this evidence of a generous personal attitude toward his

<sup>13</sup> This comment refers not to the content of his criticism, but to the manner in which it is presented.

<sup>14</sup> See p. 54 below.

<sup>15</sup> See instances noted above, n. 11.

<sup>16</sup> Such an admission of nobility of character in Epicurus is by no means unusual in Cicero, as in 2. 92-99, and elsewhere; there is usually considerably more sharpness in noting the discrepancies of doctrine and character in respect to Epicurus than in respect to Torquatus: e.g., 2. 70, 80, etc. See Reid's note on D. F. 2. 70 (*consentaneum*).

<sup>17</sup> See also 2. 51, 74. It is however true that Cicero often includes Torquatus with his school, as in 2. 71.

. . . pro vera certaue iustitia simulationem nobis iustitiae traditis . . . , et passim.

opponent contributes to the general impression that Cicero intends to be entirely fair in the philosophical discussion.

It is even possible that, in his view, the development of the first part of the second book (1-16) in which Cicero opens his attack on Epicureanism is a matter of simple logic presented with perfect suavity. From the Epicurean standpoint it would appear so perverse and irritating a jumble of misinterpretations difficult to disentangle<sup>18</sup> that we do not wonder that Torquatus finally cries out,

Finem interrogandi, si videtur (2. 17).

It is, however, to be noted that much of the difficulty which Torquatus faces is due to the fact that Cicero has not clearly seen the interrelations of the various parts of Epicurus' doctrine of pleasure<sup>19</sup>. From Cicero's point of view, his Socratic<sup>20</sup> questioning has resulted, as sometimes happened in the experience of Socrates himself, in arousing the unreasonable anger of one who is convicted of error and unwilling to admit defeat; and the indignation of his opponent is to Cicero evidence of the penetrating power of his own argument<sup>21</sup>. Such an interpretation of Torquatus' restiveness under questioning would imply that Cicero had proceeded in a purely dispassionate effort to separate truth and error.

In the development of the dialogue in the early part of the second book, it must be said that Torquatus does not appear in a very favorable light, and it is necessarily true that the annoyance which he manifests under Cicero's comments and questions is an intentional development on the part of Cicero, the author. Early in the discussion (1. 27-28), Cicero and Torquatus had agreed that ill-

<sup>18</sup> The contents of the passage are as follows:

2. 1-5: The method of discussion; certain definitions.
2. 5, fin.: Cicero's request for a definition of pleasure.
2. 6: Cicero's definition of pleasure.
2. 7: Quotation from Epicurus that he knows not the good apart from various forms of self-indulgence. (Torquatus is not permitted to explain.)
2. 8-9: Hieronymus' opinion that absence of pain is not pleasure. (Torquatus' attempted explanation is brushed aside.)
2. 9-10: Torquatus' entanglement in discussion of static and kinetic pleasure.
2. 11: Cicero's insistence on confining Torquatus to one meaning of pleasure,—freedom from pain, if he chooses that definition.
2. 12-15: *Voluptas*, *ἡδονή*; and illustrations from Latin literature.
2. 15-17: Absence of pain is not pleasure but a neutral state.  
(The inaccuracy of Cicero's argument will be discussed later.)

<sup>19</sup> This has already been shown in connection with the examination of Book I: see, e.g., pp. 26-27, 35-36, above.

<sup>20</sup> Note the reference to the Socratic question in 2. 1-2. See Hirzel, *Dialog* 1. 517-519, for discussion of echoes of the Socratic dialogue in Cicero.

<sup>21</sup> So Corra speaks of Velleius, *D. N. D.* 1. 66-67.

tempered stubbornness (*iracundia aut pertinacia*) has no place in a philosophical discussion. But when in the second book (2. 9) Cicero undertakes to compel Torquatus' admission that freedom from pain is not the same thing as pleasure, saying,

. . . nisi valde pertinax fueris, concedas necesse est,

Torquatus replies,

Atqui reperies in hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest verius.

Later in another connection Cicero says,

Aut pertinacissimus fueris, si perstiteris ad corpus ea quae dixi referre, aut deserueris totam Epicuri voluptatem, si negaveris.  
(D. F. 2. 107)

Reid<sup>22</sup> points out that the word *pertinax* always conveys blame, = 'obstinate'. Such fault Cicero seems to have found in Torquatus throughout the argument for he says in the third book (3. 1):

Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror, convictam superiore libro, dignitati<sup>23</sup>.

It may be said then that it seems to be Cicero's intention to represent Torquatus, an Epicurean of admirable personal character and unusual culture, as being stubbornly unreasonable in argument concerning his philosophy, refusing to admit defeat in the face of the most convincing evidence. Cicero thus seems to use the dialogue form of his presentation to convey the idea that the Epicurean position is unreasonable, untenable, and inconsistent<sup>24</sup>.

And yet it seems as if Cicero himself could not be entirely unconscious that he has shown Torquatus to be decidedly his superior

<sup>22</sup> Reid, D. F. 2. 9, n. In a comment on 1. 28, *pertinacia*, Reid refers to 2. 9, 107.

<sup>23</sup> Note that at the end of Book II, Torquatus remains unconvinced.

<sup>24</sup> In his *Laelius* (4-5) Cicero states the basis of his choice of characters; he says that as Cato, because of his wise and happy old age, was a character particularly appropriate to a discussion *De Senectute*, so *Laelius*, because of his distinguished friendship with Scipio, is an appropriate speaker in a discussion *De Amicitia*. As to the effect which he has secured by the careful selection of appropriate characters, Cicero says (*Lael.* 4):

*Itaque ipse mea legens sic afficior interdum, ut Catonem, non me, loqui existimem.*

Hirzel, *Dialog* 1. 457-552, in his discussion of Cicero's development of the dialogue, gives considerable attention to the evident adaptation of character to content. Hirzel speaks in some detail (467-470) of the choice of Scipio as principal speaker in the *De Republica*, and (485-486) of the effect of the combination of characters presented in the *De Oratore*.

Lörcher (F & E 315-317) gives Cicero's assignment of rôles in the first two books of the *De Finibus* considerably less approval than it seems to me to deserve.

in the courteous presentation and defense of a position<sup>25</sup>. Torquatus nowhere descends to the petty bickering that is characteristic of Cicero's development of the attack presented in the second book.

Is it possible that Cicero thus betrays a half-unconscious admission that his methods are not entirely fair? Is it further possible that he is himself unconsciously a trifle bewildered that an argument with an Epicurean is so difficult when the whole matter seems so simple? From the evidence already presented in the study of the first book of the *De Finibus* (Chapter I above), it seems probable that the contradictory treatment of the character Torquatus may be the result of a confusion in Cicero's mind which in its turn results from a failure to understand the interdependence of the various parts of the Epicurean doctrine. Cicero knows, and knows that he knows, many fundamental tenets of Epicurus, but he does not seem to have attained an adequate, unified conception of the doctrine as a whole. In this case, the whole was greater than the sum of the parts as Cicero knew them. Further examination of the second book should yield more evidence on these points.

The results of the above study of the introductory passages of *De Finibus* I and II may be summarized as follows:

1. The undercurrent of dislike of Epicureanism found in 1. 8-12 as a persistent accompaniment of the defense of philosophy is an indication of a personal prejudice which would tend to interfere with Cicero's unbiased study of the doctrine. (Pp. 45-47)
2. Cicero considered Epicureanism an easily comprehended doctrine, and seems to have had no doubt of his own adequate and thorough understanding of it. (P. 48)
3. Cicero seems to take pride in his perfect fairness toward Epicurean philosophy, although he admittedly disapproves of it. (Pp. 48-50)
4. It is evident that Cicero was sincere in his intention to maintain an attitude of dispassionate courtesy throughout the entire discussion. (The conversation of the second book gives evidence of a limited success in abiding by this standard.) (Pp. 48-52)
5. Both by his choice of the upright Torquatus as the champion of Epicureanism, and by his development of the conversation in Books I and II, Cicero seems deliberately to suggest the difficulty of an attack upon the Epicurean doctrine when it is defended by a person entirely admirable in culture and character. At the same time Cicero thus emphasizes his contention that the uprightness of an occasional Epicurean fails to prove the nobility of his philosophy. (Pp. 50-53). See note 24.

<sup>25</sup> Cf., e.g., the restraint of Torquatus' rebuttal in D. F. 1. 42 with the severity of Cicero's attack in 2. 69-70.

WE TURN now to Cicero's organized attack on the Epicurean position. This is to be found compactly expressed in the first book of the *De Finibus*, sections 17-26, and more elaborately developed in the second book, sections 18-119; with the latter must be included the introductory sparring which precedes it (2. 4-18).

Cicero, in the criticism of Epicurean philosophy which he offers in the first book (17-26), rejects the atomic theory, the theory of the swerve, the theory of an indivisible minimum, Epicurus' estimate of the size of the sun, his theory of atoms and void, of images, of the infinity of space<sup>26</sup>. He further objects to Epicurus' position in his abuse of Democritus and his neglect of the science of logic (1. 21-22). He dissents also from the Epicurean doctrine that sensation is the criterion of truth, and that pleasure and pain determine all choice and avoidance; the latter doctrine in Cicero's opinion is such

ut nihil homine videatur indignius. Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. (1. 23)

After supporting his case against pleasure as a standard by the use of certain illustrations, Cicero concludes his criticism with the expression of a wish that Epicurus had been more scholarly, or at least had not discouraged others from maintaining scholarly standards (1. 26).

It is to be observed that, in this statement of his protest against Epicureanism, Cicero gives greatest emphasis to his dissent from the ethical standards of that philosophy. This emphasis is achieved not by greater length of discussion, but by various other means: the elaboration of the idea by the use of illustrations, the dramatic force of emotional appeal<sup>27</sup>, the more definite statements of disagreement<sup>28</sup>, the argument addressed to the individual, the increased severity of tone<sup>29</sup>, the use of irony<sup>30</sup>, and, finally, the position of climax which this passage of greater intensity receives in standing as it does at the end of the argument.

<sup>26</sup> 1. 21: *Quae . . . mihi nullo modo probantur*. A discussion of the fairness of Cicero's criticism of these matters lies outside the province of this paper. It may however be noted that Epicurus has been defended against Cicero in some of these matters; see, e.g., Reid, D. F. notes, pp. 27, n. 3; 30, n. 5; 34, nn. 2 and 5; the last of these references concerns Epicurus' attitude toward logic; cf. Bailey, *Atomists* 235. Behncke (10-13) discusses this section of Cicero's argument.

<sup>27</sup> Especially in the illustrations, and particularly in the references to the early Torquati, which appeal to national (and, in the case of Torquatus, to family) pride; and in the reference to courageous performance of duty, common to good men (which Cicero may feel is not unrelated to his own experience): 1. 23-25.

<sup>28</sup> As in 1. 23, quoted above.

<sup>29</sup> As in 1. 25: *Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus . . .*

<sup>30</sup> As in 25: *. . . sunt aliae quoque causae, Homines optimi, etc.*

It may be said then that even in this brief criticism, Cicero shows that his dislike of Epicurean philosophy is influenced in large degree by a dislike of its ethical doctrine as he understands it. The core of his dissent is expressed in the words,

Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit. . . .  
(1. 23)<sup>31</sup>.

In this same presentation (1. 17-26) of Cicero's reasons for his attitude toward Epicureanism, there may lie some evidence of a characteristic limitation<sup>32</sup> in his understanding of the doctrine: his failure to see a clear connection between the theory of sensation as the criterion of truth, and the theory of pleasure and pain as the standard of action.

At the end of the section concerning logic (1. 22) although no manuscript shows evidence of lacuna, the editors generally have held the passage to be unsatisfactory, and have indicated an omission. The manuscript reading is as follows:

. . . iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid falsi pro vero probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat.<sup>33</sup>

Confirmat autem illud vel maxime, quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et prober, id est voluptatem et dolorem. Ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus refert omnia. . . . (1. 22-23)

The sentence, *Confirmat autem* . . ., etc., as quoted above, is translatable. This is admitted even by Reid who, although he prefers an emendation, offers the following interpretation:

<sup>31</sup> The same idea is expressed elsewhere: 2. 113; 5. 21. See Reid's notes ad loc.

<sup>32</sup> See Ch. I above, esp. pp. 14-18.

<sup>33</sup> It is at this point that a lacuna is thought to exist. For a history of the discussion of the problem, see both Madvig and Reid, D. F., comm. ad loc. Madvig notes that an early editor offered the following sentence to supply the supposedly lost passage:

In tertio vero parte, quae est de vita et moribus, in constitutione finis nil generosum sapit ac magnificum.

It has been said that the passage on logic is incomplete, that the discussion of ethics has no words of formal introduction as have the preceding discussions of physics and logic respectively, and that the presentation of ethics must have begun with a statement concerning pleasure as the *summum bonum*, to which statement the *illud* following *confirmat* would refer. The last suggestion would involve the insertion of *eo* after *maxime*, or the supposition that *id est* is a late insertion in which case *quod* would be a conjunction (Reid, op. cit.). See Némethy on this passage.

Another comment made by Reid on the possible lacuna between sections 22 and 23 should be mentioned. In his note (2), p. 35 (Reid D. F.), Reid suggests that the lost passage may have included among other matters an attack on Epicurus for having borrowed the doctrine of pleasure from Aristippus. Reid supports this suggestion by reference to section 26 where Triarius in commenting on Cicero's statement of his points of difference with Epicurus, includes a reference to a statement that the doctrine of pleasure was taken from Aristippus who presented it more satisfactorily:

. . . nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. (1. 26)

He strongly maintains the principle which nature sets up and approves, viz. pleasure and pain<sup>34</sup>.

Such an interpretation seems entirely reasonable, and, so understood, strongly supports the manuscript reading. As Bignone points out<sup>35</sup>, the meaning is easily explained from the following sentence of the text:

ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus refert omnia.

This means, as Bignone continues, that the judgment of the senses rests not on error of opinion, but on the decrees of nature uncorrupted, since indeed the criterion of choice and avoidance is placed in the senses (*quod ipsa natura sciscat et probet*).

Accepting the text<sup>36</sup>, we might paraphrase the argument as follows:

Epicurus places the criterion of truth in the senses, which furnish our only existing standard of true and false.

He places the criterion of conduct in the feelings, i.e., pleasure and pain, which furnish nature's only ordained standard of choice and avoidance.

It seems sufficiently clear from Epicurus' writing that he feels an immediate connection between the criterion of truth and the standard of conduct; sense-perception and feeling (*αἰσθήσεις* and *πάθη*) are repeatedly mentioned in a single phrase<sup>37</sup>; the one is the basis of knowledge, the other the standard of action. In the words of Bailey,

. . . firstly, in order to act rightly, we must have a right understanding of the world around us and must therefore refer to our external perceptions . . . ; and secondly, we must refer to our internal sensations, . . . the immediate perceptions of pleasure and pain, to be

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In his comment on this passage (D. F. 42, n. 12), Reid says: "Reference is here made to words which existed in the lacuna at § 23."

This suggestion of Reid's is very strange, because of the fact that the passage in 1. 26 clearly refers to a passage which is given by editors and manuscripts generally in 1. 23:

Quod quamquam Aristippi est a Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen eius modi esse iudico ut nihil homine videatur indignius.

The passage is given in Reid's text, and receives two comments by Reid himself under the words *quamquam* and *melius liberiusque*. It is therefore the more curious that he should have overlooked it in supporting his argument for the contents of the lacuna. (Reid quotes the passage from 1. 23 in his note on 2. 114).

<sup>34</sup> Reid, op. cit. The acceptance of the text seems better than the rather elaborate reconstruction suggested by Reid (see n. 33 above).

<sup>35</sup> Bignone, Cicero 59.

<sup>36</sup> Besides the warm defense of the manuscript reading offered by Bignone, Cicero 57-59, it is to be noted that Schiche prints the passage with no indication of lacuna.

<sup>37</sup> See esp. Epicurus, Vita 31-34 (160-164); Hdt. 38 (20), 82 (52); K. Δ. XXII-XXV (100).

sure that any action we choose is really productive of pleasure and not of pain<sup>38</sup>.

For Epicurus, sensation and its inevitable accompaniment, feeling,

<sup>38</sup> Bailey, Epicurus 362 (note to K. Δ. XXII). It is interesting at this point to consider further Bailey's comments on the close relation existing between sensation and feeling in Epicurus' philosophy (The following extended quotations from the books of Cyril Bailey, *Epicurus, the Extant Remains* and *The Early Atomists and Epicurus*, both published by the Oxford Press, are given with the permission of the Oxford Press.): Comment on Hdt. 82:

. . . The only safe principle in life is always to trust to the direct evidence of our external sensations and our internal feelings. Inference from them may be false, and may lead, as he has shown, to conclusions which greatly militate against our peace of mind; but the sensations are always true. This is the ultimate basis of the whole Epicurean system, physical and moral, and forms a fitting conclusion to the argument of the letter.

Bailey, Epicurus 256.

. . . . .

The third criterion of truth is feeling (*παράθος*). . . . 'Feeling' is an immediate sensation, but it acts in its own special field and is a test of its own peculiar truth. In a wide sense of course all sensation is 'feeling' (*παράθος*). . . . But 'feeling' as a 'criterion' of truth is used in a narrower and restricted sense, not of sensation itself, but of its invariable accompaniment. For in intimate and necessary connexion with every sensation we have also a 'feeling' of something 'akin' or 'alien' to us, a sensation of the agreeable or disagreeable, in other words of pleasure or pain. . . . 'Feeling', as such, is not concerned with knowledge but with morals: it does not inform us of the existence of things or their physical nature, but whether they are good or bad: for that which is pleasurable to us is invariably that which we seek, in other words, good, that which is painful to us we avoid, it is bad. In short 'feeling' plays the same part in Epicurean Ethics, which sensation does in his physical theory: it is the basis from which everything must start and the standard to which all must be referred. It is the test of rightness in morals, that is, of rightness in action, just as sensation is the test of truth in knowledge, that is, of the rightness of apprehension. . . . The third criterion of truth takes its place beside sensation, . . . and is the test of its own peculiar truth, of the goodness or badness which is to be judged immediately by pleasure or pain. Thus the ethical theory of Epicurus does not stand by itself as an independent or detached adjunct to the physical theory, but rests upon the same fundamental principle, the immediate and necessary validity of sensation.

Bailey, Atomists 248-250.

. . . . .

. . . In one and all of these sensations, there is a certain atomic dislocation and readjustment due to movement. In the vast majority of instances this dislocation causes not only the sensation of contact or perception, but also an added feeling (*παράθος*) of pleasure or pain, and this, not as a consequence, but as an inherent part of the sensation. . . . And in Epicurus' analysis just as the atomic movement of perception, so also the atomic dislocation or readjustment is pain or pleasure. By pleasure or pain then is meant simply that which is good or bad to the senses. . . . This feeling superadded to the mere perception is a direct indication, a test in its pleasantness or painfulness of the good and the bad. It is for this reason that feeling (*παράθος*) takes its place along with sensation (*αἰσθησις*) and the concept (*πρόληψις*) as a criterion of truth. Feeling is as immediate a test of goodness and badness as sensation is of truth: to the senses pain is always bad and pleasure always good. The criterion is direct and is the direct experience of all living creatures. Ibid. 485-486.



are true, and offer us the only truth on which action can be based:

. . . we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, . . . Hdt. 38 (21)<sup>39</sup>

. . . referring always to the sensations and the feelings <for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of beliefs> . . . Hdt. 63 (39)

. . . for we must remember that it is what we observe with the senses or grasp with the mind by an apprehension that is true. Hdt. 62 (39)

Now if one refers all these reasonings about the soul to the standards of feeling and sensation. . . . Hdt. 68 (43)

. . . they are seen to be just what our actual sensation shows their proper character to be. Hdt. 71 (45)

. . . . .

. . . a system which rests on the infallibility of sense-perception and on that alone, could give no other answer: for the only good and bad which the senses know is pleasure and pain. . . . The choice of pleasure as the end of life is not to Epicurus an arbitrary selection detached from his physical explanation of the world, but the immediate and necessary outcome of the fundamental trust in sensation on which the physical theory was likewise built. Just as in the physical world we trust sensation because it is true, so in the world of action we must trust the feelings of pleasure and pain: for they are the sole and infallible criterion of good and bad. Ibid. 486-487.

Bailey supports his interpretation (quoted above) by reference to Vita 31 (160); Plut. adv. Colot. 27. 1122d; Ū. p. 279 n; Lucr. 2. 963-6; Plut. adv. Colot. 27. 1122e and Ū. 411-14; and (perhaps the clearest evidence offered by Epicurus) K. Δ. XXII-XXV (100). See also Bignone, Epicuro 20-21 (comments on K. Δ. XXII-XXV in the same general tenor as the view of Bailey presented above), and Cicero 56-59; and Von Arnim 146-152.

These quotations from Bailey seem to me to refute the following statement made by Reid (D. F. 35 n.):

. . . there is no Epicurean text which warrants us in believing that Epic. connected the ethical test of good and bad with the intellectual test of true and false.

<sup>39</sup> The ten quotations from Epicurus here given are quoted from Bailey's translation. The Greek reads as follows:

- 1) "Ἐτι τε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἀπλῶς <κατὰ> τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἶτε διανοίας εἴθ' ὅτου δὴποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη . . . Hdt. 38 (20)
- 2) . . . δεῖ συνροᾶν ἀναφέροντα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ πάθη <οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιωτάτη πίστις ἔσται> . . . Hdt. 63 (38)
- 3) . . . ἐπεὶ τὸ γέ θεωρούμενον πᾶν ἢ κατ' ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀληθές ἐστιν. Hdt. 62 (38)
- 4) Ταῦτα οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλογίσματα <τὰ> περὶ ψυχῆς ἀνάγων τις ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις . . . Hdt. 68 (42)
- 5) . . . ἀλλ' ὅν τρόπον αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν ιδιότητα ποιεῖ θεωρεῖται. Hdt. 71 (44)

The size of sun <and moon> and the other stars is for us what it appears to be; . . . Pyth. 91 (61)

Wherefore we must pay attention to internal feelings and to external sensations in general and in particular, . . . Hdt. 82 (53)

Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; . . . Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. Vita 31 (161)

The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Vita 34 (165)

We must consider both the real purpose and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; . . . K. Δ. XXI (101)

Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam  
notitiam veri neque sensus posse refelli.

Lucr. 4. 478-479

Praeterea quoniam dolor est ubi materiai  
corpora vi quadam per viscera viva per artus  
sollicitata suis trepidant in sedibus intus,  
inque locum quando remigrant, fit blanda voluptas . . .

Lucr. 2. 963-966

If then it may be accepted that sensation and feeling are thus closely connected in the thought and teaching of Epicurus, and that the manuscript reading of this passage from Cicero is correct, it still remains true that Cicero does not make the connection any too clear for the reader who would learn the Epicurean doctrine from the *De Finibus*. This is evident from the extent to which the passage has been discussed and emended during the centuries.

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- 6) Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἡλίου τε <καὶ σελήνης> καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τηλικούτον ἔστιν ἡλικὸν φαίνεται. Pyth. 91 (60)
- 7) "Ὅθεν τοῖς πάθεσι προσεκτέον τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς κοιναῖς, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ταῖς ἰδίαις . . . Hdt. 82 (52)
- 8) Ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἔστιν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη. . . . Οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς [αἰσθήσεις] διελέγξαι Vita 31 (160)
- 9) Πάθη δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι δύο, ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα, ἰστάμενα περὶ πᾶν ζῶον, καὶ τὴν μὲν οἰκείον, τὴν δὲ ἀλλότριον· δι' ὧν κρίνεσθαι τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς. Vita 34 (164)
- 10) Τὸ ὑφ' ἐστῆκος δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ἐφ' ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν. K. Δ. XXII (100)

Bignone in his defense of the manuscript reading<sup>40</sup> suggests that the brevity of the discussion of logic is due to Cicero's opinion that Epicurus had no logic to be discussed (*inermis ac nudus est*), and that the whole discussion of physics and logic is a basis for the discussion of ethics. The latter suggestion makes Cicero quite in harmony on that point with the conception of Epicurus<sup>41</sup>. Bignone further suggests that the dissatisfaction of editors with the passage is the result not of an omission, but rather of a condensation, deliberate on Cicero's part, a device of the orator, by which he may refute at one stroke two Epicurean doctrines, the standard of knowledge and that of ethics.

I submit another explanation of the difficulty of the passage: a lack of clear understanding, on Cicero's part, of the essential connection between sensation and feeling in Epicurean philosophy in their relation to the standard of action<sup>42</sup>. Accepting Bignone's suggestion that Cicero sees the Epicurean discussion of logic and physics as merely a basis for the Epicurean structure of ethics, it seems very possible that he saw this dimly and missed entirely the stern necessity of logical sequence (pointed out in Bailey's comments quoted in n. 38 above), as Epicurus saw it in the unfolding of his doctrine, which found in sense-perception the only possible source of man's knowledge, and in the feelings of pleasure and pain the only possible guide to action on the basis of knowledge gained through the faithful reports of the senses. Cicero knew the Epicurean doctrines individually; he seems neither to have seen the interlocked argument of the system as a whole nor to have had any awareness that the integrated system was anything more than the sum of the individual tenets with which he was well acquainted.

The suggestion which I offer here regarding the probable authenticity of the manuscript reading of the passage in question (D. F. 1. 22-23), and the cause of the seeming abruptness in transition, is borne out by a similar passage in the discourse of Torquatus (1. 29-30) where both the subject and the difficulty are very much the same. It concerns the evidence that pleasure is the highest good, and runs in part as follows:

Hoc [extremum et ultimum bonorum] Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult summumque malum dolorem; idque instituit docere sic:

<sup>40</sup> Bignone, Cicero 57-59.

<sup>41</sup> E.g., Hdt. 82 (52); Vita 31-34 (160-162, 164).

<sup>42</sup> See n. 37 above, references to Epicurus' words on this point; and n. 38, quotations from Bailey.

Omne animal simul atque natum sit voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et quantum possit a se repellere; idque facere nondum depravatum, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. Itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. . . .

Etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari, voluptatem etiam et per se expetendam esse et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum<sup>43</sup>. Ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem? (1. 29-30)

Here, in the penultimate sentence quoted above, is an unclear reference to the senses (*detractis . . . sensibus . . .*) in the midst of a discussion of the evidences given by the feeling, i.e., by pleasure and pain<sup>44</sup>. In this passage as in 1. 22-23 it would seem that Cicero is vaguely conscious of a relation existing in the Epicurean argument between the sensations and the feelings, but that he does not clearly show what that relation is. Again it is possible that he does not clearly know<sup>45</sup>.

It may be said then in the light of the above discussion that the condensed form of the statements concerning the senses and the feelings, as found in De Fin. 1. 22-23, gives us some reason to believe, as has been stated above, that Cicero did not clearly see the relation existing in the Epicurean system between the dependence on the evidence of the senses and the dependence on the feelings of pleasure and pain. He knew that both ideas were a part of the Epicurean teaching, but he did not understand the necessary interrelation which the Epicureans found between the two conceptions.

**T**URNING NOW to the second book of the De Finibus in which Cicero replies to Torquatus, we may compare this second book with the first in respect to choice and development of topics.

The table offered below shows that for the most part the same topics appear in both books. They are of course treated from opposite standpoints. It will be seen that, except for the use of history

<sup>43</sup> For discussion of the text at this point, see Ch. I above, pp. 15-17.

<sup>44</sup> See the discussion of this passage in Ch. I above, pp. 16-17. It should be noted that in both passages (1. 22-23 and 1. 30) there has been considerable effort on the part of editors to change the text, in the one place by an addition, in the other by an omission. It is significant that both passages contain an abrupt transition from sensation to the feelings of pleasure and pain; this seems to me to indicate that Cicero's vague consciousness of a relation between the two ideas created sentences equally vague which have puzzled editors and readers.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. pp. 15-20 above.

of philosophy as a background (2. 34-35, 38-43), no new major topics<sup>46</sup> are introduced in the second book, and furthermore that there is a significant omission of certain important topics of Torquatus' discourse, which may be listed as follows:

the necessity of choice in relation to pleasure (1. 32-36; cf. Men. 129-132 (86-90), K. Δ. VIII-X (96)),  
 evils resulting from ignorance of the sources of pleasure and pain (1. 55; cf. Epicurus, op. cit.),  
 the healing of extravagant desires by means of the Epicurean way of life (1. 57-61; cf. Men. 127-132 (86-90); K. Δ. XXV-XXVI, XXIX-XXX (100-102)).

Two other topics, although treated in the second book, are discussed with such entire neglect of the true Epicurean position that there is no real clash of opinion<sup>47</sup>:

man's dependence on sensation (1. 30, 64; cf. K. Δ. XXII-XXV (100); with these passages cf. D. F. 1. 22-23),  
 control of the important issues of life vs. chance (1. 63; Men. 133-135 (90-92), K. Δ. XVI (98); with these references cf. D. F. 2. 86-108).

CHOICE AND ARRANGEMENT OF TOPICS IN DE FINIBUS I COMPARED WITH  
 THAT OF DE FINIBUS II<sup>48</sup>

Order of topics in D. F. I. 29-72 <sup>49</sup>	D. F. I. 29-72	D. F. II
Meaning of phrase <i>extremum et ultimum bonorum</i>	29	4-5
Natural guidance given by pleasure and pain		[senses]
Instinctive choice of young animals	30, 64	36-38 Reason vs.
Man's dependence on sensation	30	31-34 (109)
Division of Epicurean opinion as to methods of argument	30, 64	— (1. 22-23)
Doctrine of choice in relation to pleasure	31, 66-70	—
Epicurean conception of pleasure	32-36, 55	—
Conclusion that pleasure is the highest good	37-41, 43	6-25, 29-30, 63-69
The relation of the virtues to pleasure	42	109-119
	42-54, 57-59	44-78

<sup>46</sup> It is true that Cicero does introduce some new ideas in refutation of material found in Torquatus' discourse, but they are not new major topics: e.g., K. Δ. X is used in D. F. 2. 21; Hirzel, 2. 636, comments on such new material of the second book.

<sup>47</sup> See above pp. 14-18 and pp. 55-61 for discussion of the inadequacy of Cicero's treatment of the theory of sensation; and below, pp. 104-115 for the discussion of Cicero's argument against Epicurean control of happiness.

Thiaucourt, 80, 82, comments on the fact that Cicero has not discussed all of Torquatus' topics.

<sup>48</sup> Similar tables are to be found in Hirzel 2. 636, and Uri 34-35, although with some differences in organization.

<sup>49</sup> This table is virtually a repetition of that found in Ch. I, pp. 11-12 above, except for the column of references to Book II.

The nature of desires	43-45	26-28
Evils resulting from ignorance of the source of pain and pleasure	55	—
Relation between physical and mental pain and pleasure	55-56	107-8, 113-17
Great pleasure in the absence of pain	56	15-19
Pleasure arising from memory	57, 62	104-106
The healing of extravagant desires of the mind	57-61	—
Common ground between Stoic and Epicurean	62-63	
Limitation of desires	"	26-30
Indifference to death	"	63, 95
Absence of fear of the gods	"	63
Preponderance of pleasure over pain	"	85-108
Control of the important issues of life vs. chance	"	85-108, esp. 89
Independence of happiness in respect to the duration of life	"	88
Differences between Stoic and Epicurean	63-72	—
Natural philosophy and the canon of Epicurus vs. Stoic logic	63-64	18, 30 (1. 17-22.)
Foundations of friendship	65-72	78-85
Praise of Epicurus	{ 62-63 } { 71-72 }	96-103
	—	34-35 { History of 38-43 } philosophy

The prominence in Epicureanism of the doctrines which Cicero thus virtually omits from the discussion presented in *De Finibus* II is indicated by the attention given them in the writings of Epicurus. The importance of the doctrine of sensation has already been discussed<sup>80</sup>. The other four doctrines above listed as omitted or inadequately treated, form the basis for more than one-half of Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus and one-sixth of the *Κύριαι Δόξαι*<sup>81</sup>, the

<sup>80</sup> See note 47 above.

<sup>81</sup> Of the fourteen sections of the Letter to Menoeceus (122-135 (82-92)), these doctrines are discussed in eight (128-135 (86-92)); see the citations given on p. 62 above. The same citations include seven of the forty so-called Golden Sayings. It is true that the passage cited from the Letter to Menoeceus (128-135) contains some reference to matters other than the topics listed as omitted from Cicero's critique, especially a sentence (*Men.* 132) concerning the necessity of living prudently, honorably, and justly, which is included in Cicero's discussion (*D. F.* 2. 49-52); there is also in the passage from Menoeceus a brief mention of the Epicurean's freedom from fear of death and of the gods, both of which topics Cicero also mentions. But these matters treated by both Epicurus and Cicero (in the *De Fin.* II) occupy very little space in the passage cited from the Letter to Menoeceus (128-135).

two most important documents which we have from Epicurus in the field of ethics. These doctrines are so essentially a part of the whole intent and ideal of Epicurean philosophy that if they were entirely omitted from the writings of Epicurus, the doctrine as we know it would lose its characteristic atmosphere and coloring<sup>52</sup>. It is only by the neglect of these essential doctrines that Cicero can attack Epicureanism with the severity found in many passages of the second book<sup>53</sup>.

If we are to assume that Cicero in *De Finibus* II is still actuated only by a desire to find the truth, not to refute an adversary<sup>54</sup>, we must necessarily see in these omissions strong evidence that he has somehow failed to assimilate an important part of Epicurean ethics: he seems to be unaware of the close interrelation of the parts of the doctrine with which he is acquainted, for otherwise he could not omit essential points (which he knew well enough to incorporate in the discourse of Torquatus) and still appear unconscious that anything is missing<sup>55</sup>.

As to the order in which the topics are treated, it is obvious from the sequence of section numbers, as these are indicated in the chart given above, that the succession of topics in the second book is very different from that in the first. This difference seems to me to be due to a difference of emphasis. In organizing the discussion of Torquatus, Cicero saw, if none too clearly, that a presentation of Epicurean ethics should lead from the doctrine of the dependence on sensation to a discussion of the nature of pleasure from the Epicurean standpoint. In the refutation of Torquatus' discourse, Cicero proceeds on the principle that pleasure is an inadequate motive for the guidance of life:

Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. (D. F. I. 23)<sup>56</sup>

From this point of view Cicero attacks the consistency of Epicurus especially in regard to what he terms Epicurus' two-fold concep-

<sup>52</sup> See discussion of these topics above in Ch. I *passim*.

<sup>53</sup> E.g., 2. 21-23, 55-56, etc.

<sup>54</sup> D. F. I. 13.

<sup>55</sup> We are told that nothing is intentionally omitted:

Itaque . . . accedam ad omnia tua, Torquate, nisi memoria forte defecerit. (D. F. 2. 44)

Ac tamen, ne cui loco non videatur esse responsum, pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reliquam orationem tuam. (D. F. 2. 85) Cf. Uri 35.

<sup>56</sup> See also D. F. 2. 113 and 5. 21, and Schneidewin 8-11 et *passim*.

tion of pleasure<sup>57</sup>, his occasional statements of an ascetic nature<sup>58</sup>, the uprightness of character of Epicurus and many Epicureans in contrast to their principles<sup>59</sup>. To Cicero, who believes that pleasure is an unworthy end for the high endowments of humanity, it is confusing to find much the same nobility of life and doctrine in a philosophy based on pleasure as that which he finds in doctrines that he feels are established on worthier principles<sup>60</sup>.

It seems to me that it is this attitude toward Epicureanism which determines the order of topics in Cicero's refutation of Torquatus' argument. In an informal discussion such as the *De Finibus* offers, there is no necessity that the order of topics in Cicero's criticism should be the same as that in the presentation of the doctrine by Torquatus<sup>61</sup>.

It would seem therefore to be clear that Cicero, using a legitimate freedom in the organization of material, indicates by the massing of his argument the insistence of his attack on the theory that pleasure and pain can offer adequate guidance for the conduct of life<sup>62</sup>.

The organization of the second book may be indicated as follows:

Pleasure is inadequate as a standard of conduct and as an end in itself<sup>63</sup>.

1. Epicurus is unreasonable in his definition of pleasure, and illogical in the defense of his doctrine. (2. 5-38)
2. A life of pleasure provides no real basis for virtue or for friendship. (2. 39-85)
3. Constant happiness is not possible for the Epicurean wise man, because
  - a. pleasure is not always available;
  - b. pain cannot always be annulled.

(2. 85-108)

<sup>57</sup> D. F. 2. 16, 18-20, 44, et passim.

<sup>58</sup> D. F. 2. 49-50, 90; the latter reads in part as follows:

*Sed qui ad voluptatem omnia referens vivit ut Gallonius, loquitur ut Frugi ille Piso, non audio, nec eum quod sentiat dicere existimo.*

See also 2. 91, etc.

<sup>59</sup> D. F. 2. 58, 80-81, 96-99.

<sup>60</sup> See Thiaucourt 84-85; Uri 114-115.

<sup>61</sup> Hirzel (2. 635-637) seems to find the connection between the arguments of Books I and II a rather loose one; Thiaucourt (81-82) defends Cicero by giving him the orator's privilege, and adds:

"D'ailleurs on remarque entre les deux premiers livres un rapport aussi étroit qu'on pouvait l'espérer de Cicéron."

<sup>62</sup> The confused repetition that exists within Cicero's argument is discussed below, pp. 67-70.

<sup>63</sup> This idea pervades the whole discussion, but it is to be noted especially in 2. 24, 29, 36, 37, 38, 44, 112-119.



4. The unworthiness of pleasure as an end in itself is emphasized by the contrast between the triviality of such a purpose and the richness of man's natural endowment<sup>64</sup>. (2. 109-119)

When we proceed to Cicero's detailed development of these topics, we become inescapably conscious of certain faults, especially of the fact that the argument is diffuse and repetitious<sup>65</sup>, and at times violent, notwithstanding the position elsewhere taken by Cicero that contentiousness is unworthy of a place in philosophical discussion<sup>66</sup>. This is particularly true of the first part of the argument (5-38); the remainder, although not entirely beyond criticism, shows an increasing dignity and coherence of structure which achieves its climax in the fine discussion (109-119) of man's responsibility for using worthily the noble gifts with which nature has endowed him. Since that part of the argument which deals with Epicurus' definition of pleasure and his defense of his doctrine is the part most open to criticism, it seems reasonable to look to Cicero's attitude toward his subject to discover the cause of the flaws in his discussion. From this point of view, I offer the following explanation:

The doctrines of Epicurus are constantly escaping from the limits which Cicero would set for them, and Cicero therefore becomes repetitious, involved, and somewhat annoyed as he tries to show that his argument against a doctrine of hedonism is a consistent argument against the Epicurean system<sup>67</sup>. This suggestion is sup-

<sup>64</sup> Uri (33-34) offers an outline somewhat different from this, particularly in that he regards 2. 1-30 as introductory. Lörcher (Cicero 1924. 162) differs from Uri in regard to the introduction, and (158) offers his own organization in which he limits the introduction to 1-17. He finds the arrangement of D. F. 2 analogous to that of D. N. D. 1. 86 ff. See also Lörcher, F & E 29.

<sup>65</sup> This is noted by various writers, as Uri 36-40, Thiaucourt, 82-83 and nn., Lörcher, F & E 38-39, et passim.

<sup>66</sup> See Uri 50, etc., Lörcher F & E 32, Hutchinson XIII. For Cicero's position see D. F. 1. 27, etc.

<sup>67</sup> Some suggestion of this kind occurs in various places among the critics of Cicero, but it is usually an occasional remark in connection with another theme, and seems to me not to have been sufficiently developed. The following quotations serve to illustrate the comments that have been made:

Hutchinson XIII:

As to Book II, Cicero uses Stoic arguments to refute Epicurus, but here he does allow his own sentiments free play, and dropping his pose of philosophical detachment, he assails with all his wealth of rhetoric and illustration the system he abhorred on moral grounds. Ineffective as a piece of reasoning, this lengthy book is interesting as a side-light on its author's habit of mind; instead of asking 'Is this theory true?' he exclaims, 'How can there be truth in principles which lead to such deplorable consequences!'

ported by a closer study of Cicero's development of the various topics of the second book.

# I.

EPICURUS' limitations in definition and logic in the presentation of his doctrine (2. 5-38) are to Cicero unquestionable.

A detailed study of the various references which Cicero makes in developing this part of his argument<sup>68</sup> will show a repetition

Uri 39:

Ein einheitlicher Affekt gibt derartigen Stellen die Einheit, vom logischen Standpunkt aus kann man dagegen kein einheitliches Band finden. Und mir scheint es, dass dieser einheitliche Affekt in Ciceros Person wurzelt.

(See also Uri 35-52.)

Cf. Lörcher, F & E 31-32 et passim and Cicero 1924, 146-147.

- <sup>68</sup> a Epicurus is ambiguous in his definition of pleasure. 2. 6
- b . . . *voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes quam sensus accipiens movetur et incunditate quadam perfunditur.* 6
- c Epicurus sometimes declares that he knows no good except the pleasures of the senses. 7
- d Epicurus assumed for himself the title of *sapiens*. 7
- e The Greek *ἡδονή* and the Latin *voluptas* have the same meaning. 8
- b . . . *incundum motum quo sensus hilaretur.* . . . 8
- f Hieronymus, who considered absence of pain to be the highest good, thought *absence of pain* a different thing from *pleasure*. 8-9
- g The pleasure of drinking when thirsty differs from the pleasure of having one's thirst quenched: one is a kinetic, the other a static pleasure. 9
- h The doctrine that pleasure may vary in kind, but not in degree, is obscure. 10
- f Absence of pain is not the same thing as pleasure. 10-11
- i If the highest good is absence of pain, the Epicureans should hold to this good alone. 11
- j They should not introduce the *meretrix voluptas* into the company of the virtues. 12
- k Cicero is sometimes told that he does not understand what the Epicureans mean by pleasure. 12
- e The Greek *ἡδονή* and the Latin *voluptas* have the same meaning. 12
- l Cicero thinks he is as capable of understanding the meaning of words as is any chance Epicurean. 12
- m The Epicurean standard of scholarship is not high. 12
- e Cicero holds that what he calls *voluptas* is that which Epicurus calls *ἡδονή*. 13
- n *Voluptas* differs from *laetitia* in that the former may refer to pleasure of both body and mind (*vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant . . . : sublationem animi sine ratione opinantis se magno bono frui.* . . . 13
- b *Voluptas*, in Cicero's view, exists *cum percipitur ea quae sensum aliquem moveat incunditas.* 14
- o There is a neutral state between pleasure and pain. 14
- a Obscurity on the part of Epicurus is the cause of any misunderstanding of his use of language. 15
- k "If I do not understand what Epicurus means . . ." 15
- p The doctrine of Epicurus is easy to understand. 15
- i If he holds that the highest pleasure is absence of pain, he should abide by that phrase. 16

of certain topics, here stated in the order of frequency of occurrence  
(the less frequent placed first):

f	He cannot expect us to believe that absence of pain is pleasure.	16
o	There is a neutral state between pleasure and pain.	16
g	The pleasure of drinking when one is thirsty differs from the state of not being thirsty.	17
a	Epicurus obscures his exposition by his faults of logic and definition; he should have given a definition of <i>voluptas</i> .	18
q	He should really have maintained two ultimate goods.	18
f	Neither Hieronymus nor Aristippus thought absence of pain the same thing as pleasure.	19-20
c	Epicurus often states that he knows no good apart from the pleasure of Aristippus.	20
r	Epicurus would not object to the pleasures of sensualists, if such pleasures could free them from fear and limit their desires, since they would have an abundance of pleasure without any pain.	21-23
s	Epicurus does not find self-indulgence to be censurable in itself; in this he is right, if pleasure is the highest good.	23
t	Since even a refined self-indulgence cannot result in a good or a happy life ( <i>bonum . . . vivere aut beate</i> ), it follows, not that pleasure is not pleasure, but that pleasure is not the highest good.	23-26
c	There are certain pleasures apart from which Epicurus declares that he does not know what the highest good is.	23
a	Epicurus' division of the desires is badly organized,	
u	but good in substance.	26-27
r	Epicurus cannot be approved in indulging the desires within limits instead of rooting them out entirely.	27
c	Epicurus often seems too eager to embrace pleasure in the usual sense of the term.	28
i	Epicurus turns from pleasure to absence of pain in defining the highest good.	28
f	Absence of pain is not pleasure.	28
v	The Epicureans say that absence of pain is pleasure, but that absence of pleasure is not pain, because the opposite of pain is absence of pain.	28
l	Innumerable people, in Epicurus' opinion, agree with him in his use of language.	28
c	Epicurus declares that he knows no good except that of the senses.	29
i	Such pleasure is unnecessary and undesirable if the highest good is absence of pain.	29
a	Epicurus is at fault in logic and definition.	30
w	Epicurus sometimes disparages pleasure in the usual sense.	30
c	He sometimes says that he knows no other good.	30
a	He is at fault in definition and logic, and in morals.	30
x	He thus seems to be seeking disciples by inviting the sensualist to become a philosopher.	30
y	Epicurus' argument from the choice of young animals is inconsistent and inconclusive.	31-33
f	Epicurus is illogical in making two kinds of pleasure the primary attraction, if he meant the good only in the sense of Hieronymus.	34-35
z	The decision as to what constitutes the highest good is outside of the jurisdiction of the senses.	36-38

- g)<sup>69</sup> The pleasure of drinking when thirsty differs from the pleasure of having one's thirst quenched. (2.9, 17)
- k) Cicero is sometimes told that he does not understand what the Epicureans mean by pleasure. (12, 15)
- l) Cicero declares that his knowledge of language is equal to that of the mass of Epicureans. (12, 28)
- o) There is a neutral state between pleasure and pain. (14, 16)
- r) Epicurus is lenient toward the pleasures of sensualists. (21-23, 27)
- b) Cicero defines pleasure as an agreeable movement of the senses. (6, 8, 14)
- e) *Voluptas* and ἡδονή are identical in meaning. (8, 12, 13)
- i) Epicurus should abide by the phrase *absence of pain*, if he considers that the greatest good. (11, 16, 28, 29)
- a) Epicurus is obscure because of his neglect of logic and definition. (6, 15, 18, 26-27, 30, 30)
- c) Epicurus sometimes declares that he knows no good except the pleasures of the senses. (7, 20, 23, 28, 29, 30)
- f) Absence of pain is not pleasure. (8-9, 10-11, 16, 19-20, 28, 34-35)

From the list given above, it is clear that items occur in the following order of succession:

a b c d e b f g h f i j k e l m e n b o a k p i f o g a q f c r s t c a u r c i f v l c i a w c  
a x y f z,

in which the recurring items are *a b c e f g i k l o r*. Of these, *a* occurs six times, *b* three times, *c* six times, *e* three times, *f* six times, *g* twice, *i* four times, *k* twice, *l* twice, *o* twice, *r* twice.

<sup>69</sup> The letters here used indicate the items listed in note 68 above. It should be said that in grouping such items, it would be possible to combine them under fewer headings, as for example, *g*, *o*, and *f* might be considered as parts of the same thing, as indeed they are; but it seems worth while to notice Cicero's repeated use of these particular ways of stating his argument. On the basis of the above organization, we may observe that out of twenty-six minor topics, eleven are repeated from two to six times, and the repetitions are interwoven with each other and with the advancing development in a way that suggests incoherence as well as diffuseness. Uri (38) finds it necessary to explain the development of 2. 18-30, but defends the development of 1-17: "In der Einleitung 1-17 finden wir in etwas breiter, aber gut verarbeiteter Weise den Gedanken: Epikur nennt zwei verschiedene Dinge, Lust und Schmerzlosigkeit, mit einem Namen . . . etc." His defense seems not entirely justified. For comment on the looseness of Cicero's organization see Reid and Madvig, D. F. comm. ad loc., and Thiaucourt 83 n.

The topics thus shown to be repeated may be organized under the following points:

- 1) Epicurus is obscure and illogical in maintaining two goods and calling them one and the same.  
Absence of pain is not pleasure, but a neutral state.  
(a f g i o)<sup>70</sup>
- 2) *Voluptas* is the Latin equivalent of the Greek ἡδονή.  
Cicero's command of both languages is sufficient to permit him to declare this with assurance.  
(b e k l)
- 3) Epicurus sometimes admits Cicero's definition of pleasure by declaring that he knows no good except the pleasures of the senses, and by showing himself lenient to all forms of sensuality.  
(c r)

These points taken in themselves make a logical development of Cicero's main contention in the early part of the second book, that Epicurus is unreasonable and illogical in the presentation of his doctrine; but the analysis given in the pages immediately preceding this shows a confusion of order that would indicate a confusion of thought on the part of Cicero himself.<sup>71</sup>

Turning now to a consideration of the truth of Cicero's charges against Epicurus, the following statements of Cicero should be considered:

*Voluptas* is equivalent to ἡδονή.

Absence of pain is not pleasure, but is a neutral state.

Epicurus is tolerant of the basest of pleasures.

Epicurus courts disciples by appeal to base instincts.

The Epicurean argument, based on the attitude of young animals, is untrustworthy and inconclusive.

Epicurus' exposition is unsatisfactory, especially because of the lack of definition and logic.

The Epicurean doctrine is easy to understand.

In discussing the first of these topics, the equivalence of the Latin *voluptas* and the Greek ἡδονή, it seems well to consider what Epicurus himself says about pleasure, what is for him the content of the term. It will be seen in the following quotations that Epicurus does not always confine himself to a single expression in his attempt to state his conception of the desirable condition of human life:

<sup>70</sup> The letters here used refer to the preceding tables.

<sup>71</sup> It is true that, as Uri (33, 38) indicates, Cicero changes in 2. 17 from conversation to connected discourse; this accounts for some of the repetition, but it must be noted that Cicero thus chose a device which permitted repetition.

We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness (*τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*), seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it<sup>72</sup>.

The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and <the soul's> freedom from disturbance (*τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν*), since this is the aim of the life of blessedness (*μακαρίως ζῆν*). For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfill the good of the soul and the good of the body. For it is then that we have need of pleasure (*ἡδονῆς*), when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure (*ἡδονῆν*); . . .<sup>73</sup>.

And for this cause we call pleasure (*ἡδονήν*) the beginning and end of the blessed life (*τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν*)<sup>74</sup>.

When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure (*ἡδονήν*) is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality (*τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας*), as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit<sup>75</sup>.

The happy and blessed state (*τὸ εὐδαιμον καὶ μακάριον*) belongs . . . to freedom from pain and moderation in feelings and an attitude of mind which imposes the limits ordained by nature<sup>76</sup>.

The stable condition of well-being in the body and the sure hope of its continuance holds the fullest and surest joy (*χαράν*) for those who can rightly calculate it<sup>77</sup>.

They say also that there are two ideas of happiness (*εὐδαιμονίαν*), complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures (*ἡδονῶν*)<sup>78</sup>.

The pleasures of the soul are greater [than those of the flesh] (*μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς*)<sup>79</sup>.

<sup>72</sup> Men. 122 (82, 83). In this and the following passages, I have quoted Bailey's translations, in which I have inserted certain important expressions from the Greek of Epicurus.

<sup>73</sup> Men. 128 (86, 87).

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Men. 131-132 (88-92).

<sup>76</sup> Frg. B 85 (138, 139); cf. Sent. Vat. LXXXI (118).

<sup>77</sup> Frg. B 11 (122, 123).

<sup>78</sup> Vita 121a (168, 169).

<sup>79</sup> Vita 137 (168-171).

. . . it [friendship] is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure (ἡδοναῖς)<sup>80</sup>.

Self-sufficiency is the greatest of all riches. (Πλουσιώτατον ἀντάρκεια πάντων.)<sup>81</sup>

. . . I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly (μάλιστα ἐγγαληνίζων) in a life so occupied. . . .<sup>82</sup>

. . . But peace of mind (ἀταραξία) is being delivered from all this [i.e., from various fears]<sup>83</sup>.

In passages such as these Epicurus tries to explain his conception of the highest good. There is an obvious variation of phrasing: happiness (εὐδαιμονία), blessedness or the blessed life (μακάριον, μακαρίως ζῆν), pleasure (ἡδονή), joy (χαρά), serenity (ἀταραξία), peace (γαληνισμός, ἐγγαληνίζων); but these expressions do not contradict each other; they serve rather to enrich the content of the word ἡδονή, which, because it signifies the immediate and instinctive response of the organism, seems to be Epicurus' chosen term<sup>84</sup>.

A particularly good instance of clarification of meaning by the use of varied terminology may be seen in the passages from the Letter to Menoeceus quoted above. We are told that we may refer all choice and avoidance to

the health of the body and <the soul's> freedom from disturbance (ἀταραξία), since this is the aim of the life of blessedness (τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος.)<sup>85</sup>,

and again that, because pleasure is the standard of the good,

we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life (τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν)<sup>86</sup>.

Since things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, we may from the above phrases venture the assumption that

pleasure (ἡδονή) is to be defined as a condition of physical health and spiritual serenity (ἡ τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία).

This assumption is confirmed a little later when we are told directly

<sup>80</sup> Vita 120b (168, 169).

<sup>81</sup> Frg. B 70 (136, 137).

<sup>82</sup> Hdt. 37 (20, 21); also πρὸς γαληνισμόν Hdt. 83 (54).

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. 82 (52, 53); see also Hdt. 80 (50).

<sup>84</sup> See Vita 137 (170), Epicurus' reference to young animals as proof that pleasure (ἡδονή) is the end.

For the multiplicity of phrases, cf. Cicero's practice, D. F. 3, 14.

<sup>85</sup> Men. 128 (86, 87) quoted above, p. 71, in full; there as here from Bailey's translation.

that the Epicurean statement that pleasure is the end has reference to a particular kind of pleasure,

freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind (*τὸ μῆτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μῆτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχὴν*)<sup>86</sup>.

This desired end of life which Epicurus chooses to call pleasure (*ἡδονή*), as a final term, is to be sought in part by the prevention of evils:

- a) in the release from those disturbing fears which can be removed by the study of natural science<sup>87</sup>;
- b) in the security of injury from other men, which is to be attained largely through one's withdrawal from conflict<sup>88</sup>;
- c) in the intelligent control of one's own desires which uncontrolled create confusion<sup>89</sup>.

It is furthered by the mastery of unavoidable pain<sup>90</sup>, and by the enjoyment of philosophical pursuits<sup>91</sup> and the associations of friendship<sup>92</sup>. Thus there is assured to the Epicurean a life whose important issues are in the control of the individual<sup>93</sup>.

Such is the life which Epicurus terms the life of pleasure, *ἡδονή*; such is the meaning of Epicurus' term *ἡδονή*, which Cicero insists is to be translated by *voluptas*.

It is moreover evident that Cicero in thus using the Latin *voluptas* chooses to reduce it to lowest terms<sup>94</sup>, although the Latin word like the Greek may vary a good deal in accordance with its context.

<sup>86</sup> Men. 131 (88, 89) Bailey's translation, quoted in full above, p. 71.

<sup>87</sup> Hdt. 37 (20), 80-83 (50, 52, 54); Pyth. 85 (56); K. Δ. XI, XII (96).

<sup>88</sup> K. Δ. XIV, XVII (96, 98), XXI (98), XXXI-XXXV (102), XXXIX, XL (104); Sent. Vat. LXXIX, LXXXI (118); Frg. B 80-87 (138); et passim. Of these note especially the following:

Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος... K. Δ. XVII  
Δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία. Frg. B 80.

<sup>89</sup> Men. 127-132 (86, 88, 90); K. Δ. XVIII-XXI (98), XXVI, XXVIII-XXX (100, 102); Sent. Vat. LXXX (118); etc.

<sup>90</sup> K. Δ. IV (94), etc.

<sup>91</sup> Hdt. 37 (20); Sent. Vat. XLI (112); etc.

<sup>92</sup> K. Δ. XXVII (100); Sent. Vat. LXXVIII (118); etc.

<sup>93</sup> Men. 133-135 (90, 92); etc. Note esp. B 70 (136):

Πλουσιώτατον αὐτάρκεια πάντων.

See Bailey, *Atomists*, 494-522; Guyau 35-43; Bignone, *Aristotle* 2. 573-595. Bignone (*Aristotle* 2. Ch. VI, esp. pp. 8-40) holds that, in answer to the insistence of the Platonic and early Aristotelian argument that pleasure is a genesis and therefore never a perfect and absolute reality, Epicurus evolved his ideal of happiness as absence of pain, thus setting limits to what the Academy considered illimitable, and making pleasure an enduring condition, simple (unmixed with pain) and unconfused.

<sup>94</sup> E.g., D. F. 2. 20-25, etc.



Cicero himself can use it in speaking of the pleasures of the mind,

. . . qua voluptate animi nulla certe potest esse maior<sup>95</sup>,

and of the varied interests of a farmer's life,

Venio nunc ad voluptates agrorum quibus ego incredibiliter delector<sup>95</sup>.

As a general term, Cicero seems to be right in considering ἡδονή, equivalent to the Latin *voluptas*<sup>96</sup>; and perhaps even in his insistence that *voluptas* (and ἡδονή) must imply

ea quae sensum aliquem moveat iucunditas<sup>97</sup>.

But when he further insists that pleasurable experience can mean only either the most debasing forms of pleasure or the extreme of refined luxury<sup>98</sup>, he does violence to the careful detail with which Epicurus explains the term ἡδονή in his own usage. If a philosopher has a new conception of life to present, he must either create new terms in the language or, by extension and definition, make use of the terminology which already exists<sup>99</sup>. Unless Cicero is willing to assume for the Latin *voluptas* the connotation which Epicurus

<sup>95</sup> Cato M. 50; see also Torquatus' definition of *voluptas*, D. F. 1. 37, 43.

Cato M. 51; see also Verr. 2. 5. 35.

<sup>96</sup> L & S (1929) defines ἡδονή as *enjoyment, pleasure*; "prop. of sensual pleasure"; but refers also to Pl. Th. 3. 38, ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, and Pl. R. 582 B τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς. Freund defines *voluptas* as "plaisir, joie, satisfaction, jouissance (sensuelle ou intellectuelle volupté)".

Forcellini (under *voluntas*, in a *nota* contrasting *voluntas* and *voluptas*) says, "*voluptas vero rei adeptae delectatio vel bonae vel malae*," quoted from Isid. Differ. 1. 374. Both Freund and Forcellini refer to Cicero's definitions in D. F. 1 and 2.

In usage, we find the word ἡδονή referring to pleasure other than that of the senses in such passages as the following from Plato:

Phil. 51 E τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς . . .

Ibid. 66 C ἡδονάς . . . καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς . . .

Rep. 1. 328 D αἰσθηταὶ αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί.

Ibid. 6. 485 D περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς . . . ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτήν . . .

Ibid. 9. 586 A βεβαίον τε καὶ καθαρὰς ἡδονῆς . . .

The same word is also freely used by Plato in reference to ignoble pleasure: Rep. 3. 402 E; 9. 591 C, etc. There is an interesting variety of usage of the word in the long discussion of the three types of pleasure, Rep. 9. 580 D-592.

In the Greek of the New Testament ἡδονή is commonly used in the sense of debasing self-indulgence: Tit. 3. 3; Jas. 4. 1; 2 Pet. 2. 13. Luke 8. 14, ἡδονῶν τοῦ βίου, and Jas. 4. 3, ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑμῶν δαπανήσητε, have possibly a less definite meaning. See Thayer, New Testament Lexicon.

In Latin, the case seems to be much the same for *voluptas*. In accordance with Cicero's use of the word, it seems to refer for the most part to sensual pleasure or idle amusement, as in the following passages of Horace: Sat. 1. 2. 39, 2. 2. 19; Ep. 1. 2. 55, 1. 6. 64, 2. 1. 187, 2. 2. 139; A. P. 338.

<sup>97</sup> D. F. 2. 14; cf. 2. 6, 8. (But see Bailey, Atomists 491, for static pleasure.)

<sup>98</sup> D. F. 2. 21-25, et passim.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Cicero, D. F. 3. 15: Si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatam, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen imponere, cur non licet Catoni? . . . etc.; Acad. 1. 1. 25.

has given to ἡδονή, all the weight of usage does not quite prove his contention that he understands what Epicurus meant.

In this connection the terminology of Lucretius is of interest<sup>100</sup>,

All these ideas are included in Epicurus' conception of the happy life, (see pp. 71-73 above), as well as the conception of happiness as found in absence of pain: *Lucret. 2. 16-21, 963-966; etc.*

Reiley, 18, notes Lucretius' translation of ἡδονή by words other than *voluptas*: "Lucretius uses *voluptas*, but his reference to the Greek is uncertain, e.g., II 3. He must have had Epicurus' definition of ἡδονή in mind when he wrote II 18, 19: [natura] mente fruatur | incundo sensu cura semota metuque. Cf. D.L. X. 128."

<sup>100</sup> Lucretius, like Epicurus (see pp. 70-72 above), makes use of a varied phrasing in expressing pleasantness and serenity; thus for pleasant things, we find the following nouns, adjectives, and verbs, and their derivatives: *cupido, dulcis, gaudium, incundus, inuat, laetus, lepores, suavis, voluptas*, etc.

These words moreover are used in varying context:

*cupido*: of change, *Lucret. 5. 169*; of life, 3. 1077; 6. 1240; of love, 1. 16, 20; 4. 1057, 1204; 5. 963; of expression of scorn, 5. 1140.

*dulcis*: of family caresses, 3. 895; of life, 2. 971, 997; 3. 66; 6. 4; of love, 4. 1059; of philosophy and poetry, 2. 7, 730; 3. 419; of music and dancing, 5. 1410; of taste, 1. 886-7, 938, 947; of water for the thirsty, 6. 1266.

*gaudium*: of change, 5. 170; of the mind, 3. 145; of love, 4. 1196, 1206; 5. 854.

*incundus*: of calm weather, 5. 1394; of general pleasure, 2. 19; 5. 898; of taste, 2. 399; of touch, 2. 403; of filth as it seems to cattle, 6. 977.

*inuat*: of love, 2. 437; of music, 5. 1390; of philosophy and poetry, 1. 927-28 (4. 2-3); of certain shrubs, as pleasant to goats, 6. 970.

*laetus*: *pabula laeta* (apparently a popular phrase, Munro 24), 1. 14, 257; 2. 364, 875, 1159; of trees, vines, etc., 1. 23; 2. 699, 994, 1157; 5. 1372; of home, 3. 894; of sportiveness, 5. 1400.

*laetitia*: of the mind and heart: 3. 142, 150.

*lepores*: of language, 1. 28; of poetry, etc., 1. 934; 3. 1036; of the seasons, 3. 1006; of Venus, 1. 15.

*suavis*: of the earth, 1. 7; of eloquence, 1. 39, 413; of friendship, 1. 141; of pleasantness in general, 2. 1, 4, 5; 5. 1413; of song, 1. 924, 945; of taste, 4. 623.

*voluptas*: of a divine ecstasy, 3. 28; of friendship, 1. 140; of general happiness, 2. 172; 3. 40; 5. 178, 1433; of music, dancing, etc., 3. 1081; 4. 984; of the passion of love, 4. 1057, 1075-6, 1081, 1085, 1201, 1208, 1263; vs. pain, 2. 966, 968; 3. 251; of taste, 4. 627, 629; of Venus and Calliope as the pleasure of gods and men. 1. 1-2; 6. 93-94.

These references, if not exhaustive, yet serve to indicate the variety of terms which Lucretius uses in expressing ideas of pleasantness, and also the variety of associations which cluster about each term. It should be observed that *voluptas* has an especially wide range of associations. This in itself will suggest the care that Cicero should have exercised in order to be sure that he used the word *voluptas* in the same sense in which Epicurus used ἡδονή.

The words which express the idea of serenity form an important part of Lucretius' vocabulary of happiness. Here also there is a variety of terms:

*aequo animo*: 1. 41-42; 3. 939; 5. 1119.

*pacatus*: 5. 1203.

*pax*: 1. 40; 5. 1155, 1230; 6. 78; of the gods: 3. 24; 2. 647, 1093; 5. 1229; 6. 73.

*placidus*: 1. 40; 3. 302; 5. 1122, 1154; 6. 75; of the gods: 2. 1094; 6. 73.

*quietus*: 3. 211, 939; 5. 1129; of the gods: 3. 18; 6. 73.

*securus*: 3. 939.

*semotum a curis*: 1. 50-51; 2. 19. (Similar expressions are often used.)

*serenus*: 1. 142; 2. 8; 3. 293; 4. 136-7; of the gods: 2. 1094.

*tranquillus*: 3. 293; 6. 78.

especially in that Lucretius does not confine himself to the word *voluptas* in his attempt to express the Epicurean conception of the good life; it is also true however that Lucretius can use the word *voluptas* with a wide range of implications from the pleasures of passionate love (which he condemns) to the true pleasure of a philosopher (5. 1433) and the ecstasy of soul resulting from the philosopher's vision of the universe (3. 28).

We may say then that it is not so much Cicero's choice of the word *voluptas* as a translation for *ἡδονή* that misleads him in his argument, as it is his refusal to accept for either word the connotations with which Epicurus has endowed the term *ἡδονή*. (Cf. Lörcher, Cicero, 1924, 161; F & E 37.) Cicero moreover seems the more perverse in this refusal in view of the statement which he makes earlier in the person of Torquatus:

Quam autem ego dicam voluptatem iam videtis, ne invidia verbi labefactetur oratio mea. (I. 43)

Cicero's refusal in this is interwoven with all the qualities of his character, especially with a magnificent stubbornness in his belief that only the highest integrity of personal character and the most absolute devotion to the good of the commonwealth is worthy of a man<sup>101</sup>. This established conviction is the basis of a prejudice that prevents him from seeing that his ideal may be approached by any other path than that which seems good to him. To Cicero the life of pleasure implies only careless irresponsibility which finds its extremes in depraved sensuality or in the refined luxury of delicate food and rich trappings, in any case a life devoted to amusement rather than to the serious performance of public and private duty<sup>102</sup>. It seems more than probable that the Roman life of his day presented many so-called Epicureans to support his interpretation and strengthen his prejudice<sup>103</sup>. Thus Cicero is confirmed in his refusal

<sup>101</sup> See D. F. 2. 109-118; Off. I. 14, 70-73, 122-124; Rep. I. 1-11, and Conway 43-45.

<sup>102</sup> Thus Cicero declares that the real contest is between virtue and pleasure: D. F. 2. 44; T. D. 3. 41-50. In connection with the latter passage, see Uri's comment, Uri 78. See also Uri 114-5.

Thiaucourt, 85-86, suggests that Cicero was also influenced by his dislike of the political activity of Caesar and some other Epicureans of his own day.

<sup>103</sup> De Witt, Epicurus 172, says of Epicureanism at Rome: "Its capacity for self-defense was simultaneously destroyed by the increase of gross hedonism under the same name. Between the Epicurean voluptuary and the Epicurean ascetic neither popular opinion nor serious legislation was likely to make a distinction."

So also Thiaucourt, 85, "Mais la philosophie du plaisir servait aux grands personnages de Rome à excuser leurs débauches."

to consider the real meaning of the Epicurean doctrine; he will permit no opening wedge in his own argument<sup>104</sup>, and he fears the doctrine of pleasure, if not for what it is, for what it may become; he reasons about pleasure as did Brutus concerning Julius Caesar:

and since the quarrel  
Will bear no colour for the thing he is,  
Fashion it thus: that what he is, augmented,  
Would run to these and these extremities.

The remaining points in this first section of Cicero's discourse (see p. 70 above) rest on his conception of Epicurus' idea of pleasure. Absence of pain, Cicero says, is not pleasure<sup>105</sup>; but in the Epicurean system it is the highest conception of pleasure, whether it be the instant of the cessation of pain, which may in itself be a kinetic pleasure<sup>106</sup>, or the continuing serenity of the mind in the absence of pain and fear<sup>107</sup>. Such a conception leaves no place for the neutral state which Cicero assumes to exist between pain and pleasure<sup>108</sup>. It seems reasonable to explain Cicero's repeated assertion of the existence of such a neutral state, in part at least, by his own marked preference for a life of activity. In his estimate of values, a period of tranquillity probably would have seemed a season less of happiness than of boredom; he recognized too many interesting spheres of activity to be much concerned with a desire to achieve the perfect equilibrium of the forces of life which was the Epicurean ideal<sup>109</sup>. It is indeed probable that the Roman temperament in general was not hospitable to the ascetic simplicity of the life of the Garden with its tendency to withdraw from the political and social activities of the great city<sup>110</sup>.

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Bailey, *Religion* 227, "As a moral code Epicureanism long persisted in Rome and had many disciples, though its easy debasement as an excuse for luxury and debauchery brought it into contempt and laid it open to severe criticism from those who did not take the trouble to understand it."

<sup>104</sup> Jastrow 30, "Intense conviction obscures vision . . ." Ibid. 33-36. See also James, *Psychology* 2. 311-318.

<sup>105</sup> D. F. 2. 9, 10, 16, et passim.

<sup>106</sup> K. Δ. III (94), etc. See Bailey, *Atomists* 491.

<sup>107</sup> See, e.g., *Men.* 128 (86); *Lucr.* 2. 16-19.

<sup>108</sup> *Frg. B.* 85 (138).

<sup>109</sup> Bailey, *Atomists*, 491-494: "The pleasure of equilibrium." See, e.g., D. F. 2. 113, 118 for Cicero's view. See also Lörcher F & E 37: "... die von Epikur gegebene Definition auf ihn gar keinen Eindruck machte. Eine so rastlos tätige, nimmer ruhende Natur . . . kann ein lediglich auf behaglichen Genuss, in welchem Sinne es sei, gerichtetes Dasein an sich nicht goutieren, bei andern so wenig als bei sich."

<sup>110</sup> Lörcher, op. cit.: "Er übersetzte . . . mit *voluptas* . . . ohne weiteres auf die einem anderen Empfinden und einer anderen geistigen Kultur entwachsene Bezeichnung des Epikur."

Perhaps Cicero does not achieve his usual felicity in conversation when he uses the immediate discussion with Torquatus and Triarius as an illustration of the neutral state which is neither pleasure or pain<sup>111</sup>. There can be no doubt that Cicero enjoyed a good argument<sup>112</sup>. Having classed the conversation as neutral, he might have included the dinner of Laelius (2. 24-25) in the same category; but this he makes an example of the good as against pleasure (*bonum* vs. *voluptas*). Perhaps, if he had been asked about it, Cicero would have said that Laelius' dinner was a neutral experience; he does class that of Gallonius as one of pleasure. He seems not to perceive at all that Lucilius' description and comments might very well have served for an Epicurean parable<sup>113</sup>, and thus betrays his failure to realize that simplicity of living is an integral part of the Epicurean conception of the wise man's way of life.

When Cicero accuses Epicurus of lenience toward sensuality, he bases his charge largely on the tenth Golden Saying and on Epicurus' statement that he knows not how to conceive the good except through the report of the various senses<sup>114</sup>. The former passage Cicero translates accurately enough by a Latin contrary to fact condition:

Si ea, quae sunt luxuriosis efficientia voluptatum, liberarent eos deorum et mortis et doloris metu docerentque qui essent fines cupiditatum, nihil haberemus, quod reprehenderemus, cum undique complerentur voluptatibus nec haberent ulla ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut aegrum, id est autem malum. (D. F. 2. 21)<sup>115</sup>

The Latin sentence like the Greek obviously means that since sensualists are not freed from fears nor taught the limits of desire by

<sup>111</sup> D. F. 2. 16.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Plato Rep. 1. 328 D; and also Cic. Cato M. 46: Ego vero propter sermonis delectationem tempestivis quoque conviviis delector. But for Cicero this is not *voluptas*!

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Men. 130-131 (88). Reid, D. F. Comm. ad loc., P. 136-7, suggests that Lucilius' passage might very well have been directly influenced by Epicurus. Reid notes also (138 n.) that Laelius dining *ut animo quieto satiaret desideria naturae* is exactly what Epicurus would praise, and that "the very phrase *desideria naturae* is Epicurean."

<sup>114</sup> Cf. K. Δ. X. (96) with D. F. 2. 21, et passim, and Vita 6 (142, 144) with D. F. 2. 7, et passim.

<sup>115</sup> In this passage the phrase *quod reprehenderemus* is an emendation of Davies, and is omitted in the Mss. (See Reid, Not. Crit. ad loc.). The emendation seems necessary in view both of Cicero's context and of the corresponding passage in Epicurus, K. Δ. X (96):

Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλνε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τοὺς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν <καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων> ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅτι μεμφαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐθαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

their indulgence, their pleasures are open to censure; Epicurus would say that their troubles are indeed increased<sup>116</sup>. Cicero per-versely interprets the statement to mean that there would be no reproof for a sensualist who limits his desires, since, *tamquam de narthecio*, the Epicurean doctrine offers remedies for pain and for fear of death and the gods<sup>117</sup>; he then proceeds to use his own interpretation in condemning the Epicurean position<sup>118</sup>. There seems to be no obscurity in the expression of Epicurus at this point, and no reason to doubt that the tenth Golden Saying is a condemnation of licentiousness<sup>119</sup>. Cicero's use of the passage is therefore a striking example of the confusion existing in his understanding of Epicureanism, a confusion due for the most part to his own initial prejudice<sup>120</sup>.

A similar misunderstanding exists in Cicero's mind in reference to Epicurus' saying that he knows not the meaning of the good except in terms of the various senses<sup>121</sup>. In regard to this statement, Cicero shares the interpretation frequently given it in antiquity; it is indeed quoted by Diogenes Laertius in a list of accusations of Epicurus made by his enemies<sup>122</sup>, to which Diogenes appends the comment:

But these calumniators are all mad<sup>123</sup>.

The true explanation of Epicurus' saying seems to rest on its con-

<sup>116</sup> Men. 129-132, esp. 131 (86, 88, 90); K. Δ. VIII (96); Sent. Vat. LI (114); Frg. C 37 (130), 46 (132).

<sup>117</sup> D. F. 2. 22. Madvig, Comm. ad loc., censures Cicero's use of the Epicurean passage; Reid, D. F., Comm. ad loc. (129), differs with Madvig on some minor points of interpretation, but says (127, n. 6), "This δόξα is a defiant version of the doctrine that virtue owes its value to the pleasure to which it gives birth; but it does nothing to impair the other doctrine that the two are fundamentally inseparable."

<sup>118</sup> Thiaucourt (82-83 n.): "... Le raisonnement d'Épicure ne semble pas aussi absurde que le croit Cicéron . . ."

Lörcher, F & E 32, speaks of parts of D. F. 2. 22-25 as "children of oratory, not of philosophy," the work of Cicero, the orator and the Roman, and finds in it disgusting exaggeration and the thunder of shrieking wrath. "... dass auch in 21, 23, 28 die Logik zum Pfeffern verwendet ist, . . ." Uri, 38, sees here an illustration of Cicero's inclination to follow favorite trends of thought.

<sup>119</sup> K. Δ. XI (96) offers another contrary to fact condition, which can only mean that since we are troubled about death, etc., we need physical science. A passage in similar construction (Sent. Vat. LI (114)) is immediately followed by Epicurus' own interpretation.

<sup>120</sup> Uri 38; Lörcher F & E 37-38. Cf. D. F. 2. 70.

<sup>121</sup> D. F. 2. 7, 20, 23, 28-30, 68; D. N. D. 1. 111; T. D. 3. 41-47; In Pisonem 68, 69. See Thiaucourt 80 n.

<sup>122</sup> Vita 6 (142, 144): Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τὰ γαθόν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι' ἀκροσμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς.

See also Frg. B 10 (122).

<sup>123</sup> Vita 9 (146-7) Bailey's translation of Μεμήνασι δ' οἶδοι. See Reid, D. F. 2. 7,

nection with his theory of man's dependence on sensation for guidance of his activity.

The choice of pleasure as the end of life is not to Epicurus an arbitrary selection detached from his physical explanation of the world, but the immediate and necessary outcome of the fundamental trust in sensation on which the physical theory was likewise built.

. . . <sup>124</sup>

The Epicurean philosophy, teaching that the mind and the soul as well as the body are atomic compounds and that thought and sensation are alike the results of atomic movement, must therefore consider all experience as in some way due to the reports of the senses<sup>125</sup>.

It seems clear that Cicero neither understood such interrelation of the various tenets of Epicureanism, nor realized that it existed. He evidently never thought of such an explanation of this statement from Epicurus at which he repeatedly takes offence<sup>126</sup>. He saw the passage only apart from its context and found in it just the view of life which he most heartily condemned, for Cicero markedly preferred those things which are lovely and of good report<sup>127</sup>. He is then sincere in his condemnation, even though he seems sometimes confused by evidences of a nobility in the Epicurean doctrine

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comm. ad loc., concerning the limited amount of kinetic pleasure held necessary in Epicurean philosophy. Bailey, Epicurus 405, says of the passage quoted above in n. 122: "There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the quotation, but its citation without context and the interpretation put on it are malicious and quite misleading. Epicurus must not be supposed to have recommended all these pleasures; the sentence should be read in connexion with such passages as *Ep. ad Men.* § 129, where he says that all pleasures are good, but not all to be chosen (*aipeiai*), or expressly goes on in § 130 to exclude the pleasures of the table because they are not pure, but bring pain with them." Cf. Guyau 47.

Cicero himself can say in the person of Torquatus:

Nunc autem explicabo voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut . . . intellegatur . . . ea quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Non enim hanc solam sequimur quae suavitatem aliqua naturam ipsam movet . . . sed maximam voluptatem illam . . . etc. D. F. 1. 37.

<sup>124</sup> Bailey, Atomists 486-7.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Hdt. 63-66 (39-41), and Lucr. 3. 94-633. See above, pp. 35-36 and 56-61.

<sup>126</sup> See n. 122. In Pisonem, 68, 69, seems, however, to indicate a little hesitation on Cicero's part:

Audistis profecto dici philosophos Epicureos omnis res, quae sint homini expetendae, voluptate metiri: rectene an secus, nihil ad nos, aut, si ad nos, nihil ad hoc tempus; sed tamen lubricum genus orationis adulescenti non acriter intellegenti est saepe praecipere . . . In Pisonem 68.

. . . etenim dicit, *ut opinor*, se nullum bonum intellegere . . . In Pisonem 69.

<sup>127</sup> See, e.g., Rep. 1. 1-11; 6, 29; also Henry 25, 106, etc.

which he must respect, but which he finds irreconcilable with a doctrine of pleasure<sup>128</sup>.

Thus both in the use of the tenth Golden Saying and in the repeated condemnation of Epicurus' statement that he conceives the Good only in terms of the senses, Cicero reveals a failure to understand Epicureanism as a consistently unified philosophy<sup>129</sup>.

Cicero more than once expresses concern over the number of people who were attracted to Epicurean philosophy, and he sometimes accuses Epicurus of seeking disciples by inviting men to a life of self-indulgence<sup>130</sup>. In reply to this accusation, we may quote the words of Epicurus himself:

I was never anxious to please the mob. For what pleased them, I did not know, and what I did know, was far removed from their comprehension<sup>131</sup>.

The doctrine of Epicurus was both too intellectual and too austere to have attracted a great multitude of followers<sup>132</sup>, and Cicero here again seems to betray an inadequate conception of the philosophy<sup>133</sup>.

Epicurus' reference to the instinctive choice and avoidance expressed by infants and young animals receives considerable attention in Cicero's discussion<sup>134</sup>. Of his criticism we may say in his own words, "*Quam multa vitiosa*"<sup>135</sup>. His argument (2. 31-33) is very circuitous, and moreover reveals on his part various points of misunderstanding of the meaning of Epicurus:

<sup>128</sup> E.g., D. F. 2. 6-7, 21, etc.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. Uri 115; Thiaucourt 84: "Cicéron croyait facile la critique de la doctrine épicurienne, parce qu'il n'en a pas toujours compris la nature ni les raisonnements"; and Lörcher, F & E 36-38.

<sup>130</sup> D. F. 2. 30: Hoc loco discipulos quaerere videtur, ut qui asoti esse velint philosophi ante fiant.

See also Ibid. 2. 12, 28, 81; T. D. 4. 6-7, et passim.

<sup>131</sup> Frg. C 43 (130-131), Bailey's translation. See also Sent. Vat. XXIX (110), and Bailey's comments on both passages, Bailey, Epicurus 396, 379.

<sup>132</sup> Professor Nelson G. McCrea, Lecture before the New York Classical Club, May, 1932.

<sup>133</sup> It is very likely true that a casual acquaintance with Epicureanism did, as Cicero suggests, In Pisonem 68, encourage ruinous conduct in many an *adulescenti non acriter intelligenti*, and thus attract a number of followers. But in the passage quoted above, Cicero is speaking of the motives of Epicurus himself.

<sup>134</sup> D. F. 1. 30; 2. 31-35 (The last two sections of the latter passage is a ponderous discussion of various philosophical opinions of choice in accordance with nature; it is rather far removed from the statement of Epicurus which seems to have been meant to be both simple and clear.)

<sup>135</sup> D. F. 2. 31.



1) The wording of Cicero's initial statement is not satisfactory. He says:

Simul atque natum animal est, gaudet voluptate et eam appetit ut bonum, aspernatur dolorem ut malum. De malis autem et bonis ab iis animalibus quae nondum depravata sint ait optime iudicari. (D. F. 2. 31)

The statement of Epicurus as we have it<sup>136</sup> uses *εὐαρεστεῖσθαι*, *to be well pleased*, a word not adequately translated by Cicero's Latin word *appetit*. Moreover the sentence *De malis . . . iudicari* is directly opposed to Epicurus' expression *φυσικῶς καὶ χωρὶς λόγου*, an expression which Cicero himself had satisfactorily represented in the speech of Torquatus, by the words,

*ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante* (1. 30).

Since Cicero writes the passage of the second book with obvious reference to the statement made by Torquatus<sup>137</sup>, it seems evident that to Cicero the two statements are identical, and that he is oblivious of the real intent of Epicurus, which is to discover the instinctive response of the living creature uninfluenced by any "conclusions of opinion"<sup>138</sup>.

2) In the development of his argument (2. 31-32), Cicero repeats his usual error of insisting that pleasure to Epicurus must mean 'kinetic' pleasure<sup>139</sup>; thus it is here urged that if new-born creatures are to be used as a standard of Epicurean pleasure, kinetic pleasure must be meant (*quod tamen dicitis*, 2. 31), and moreover that no other kind of pleasure could possibly be meant, since only that could have the power of arousing desire<sup>140</sup>.

<sup>136</sup> Vita 137 (170). See above p. 14, where the passage is quoted in full, with a discussion of Epicurus' meaning and Cicero's interpretation of it, pp. 14-17.

<sup>137</sup> The passage in the speech of Torquatus reads as follows:

Omne animal simul atque natum sit voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et quantum possit a se repellere; idque facere nondum depravatum, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre iudicante. (D. F. 1. 30) A comparison of this passage with that of D. F. 2. 31, quoted above, shows a wording so nearly the same as to make the passage of the second book an obvious echo of that of the first, with the exception noted above (*natura . . . iudicante*). (Cf. Lörcher, F & E 33 n.)

Another sentence in 2. 31 is an unfortunate echo of the error which immediately precedes it:

Summum enim bonum et malum vagiens puer utra voluptate *diinducabit*, stante an movente?

In 2. 33 we find again a wording very similar to that of 1. 30, but here the conclusion is: *et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit . . .*

<sup>138</sup> K. Δ. XXIV, XXV (100).

<sup>139</sup> See D. F. 2. 75, etc.; see also above pp. 70-77.

<sup>140</sup> Cicero repeatedly as here argues in a circle on a premise which in itself is not true to Epicurean teaching.

3) Cicero carries his argument to the point of absurdity when he says,

. . . si movente, quod tamen dicitis, nulla turpis voluptas erit  
quae praetermittenda sit, . . . (2. 31).

Epicurus' passage obviously refers to the quiet happiness of young creatures whose natural needs of warmth and nourishment have been satisfied, and Cicero's reference to scandalous pleasure is clearly out of keeping with the innocent serenity of well-nourished babies and kittens.

The pleasure of absence of pain, Cicero admits, is equivalent to that of self-preservation<sup>141</sup>; and having denied to Epicurus the possibility of referring his standard to this so-called static pleasure, Cicero proceeds (2. 33) to present as his own view of an infant's choice just that condition of normal well-being and development which Epicurus implies. Cicero's passage at this point is one which Epicurus himself might almost have written<sup>142</sup>.

4) By his insistence that Epicurus' references to the choice made by new-born creatures must imply kinetic pleasure, Cicero is led to charge Epicurus with the faulty logic of starting from one kind of pleasure and finding the highest good in another<sup>143</sup>. This accusation could not be made if Cicero were willing to find in Epicurus' language its true meaning, that pleasure is the sense of well-being which exists in the absence of pain<sup>144</sup>.

We turn now to a consideration of the confusion that pervades Cicero's own argument throughout the passage<sup>145</sup>, a confusion that

<sup>141</sup> D. F. 2. 31.

<sup>142</sup> See, e.g., Men. 128 (86).

<sup>143</sup> D. F. 2. 32. Cf. 2. 28, and Madvig's note ad loc.

<sup>144</sup> Cf. Vita 34 (164-5): The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. (Bailey's translation)

<sup>145</sup> The most involved part of the argument lies in 2. 31-32. It runs as follows:

- a. You say that a young child decides in accordance with kinetic pleasure; then
- b. no pleasure is too base to be chosen, and
- c. the new-born animal does not set out from the highest pleasure, which Epicurus says is absence of pain, and
- d. Epicurus does not prove from new-born creatures that absence of pain is sought by the guidance of nature, for
- e. the state of freedom from pain does not spur the mind, but
- f. this is done by the charms of pleasure (*voluptate*). Therefore,
- g. Epicurus always uses kinetic pleasure to prove that pleasure is sought by nature, because
- h. kinetic pleasure attracts young animals, not the static pleasure of absence of pain.

is obvious at even a casual reading. This intricacy is largely due to a kind of involved repetition that seems to insist too much, and is perhaps the more insistent because of Cicero's subconscious admission that his interpretation of the Epicurean argument is not quite sound<sup>146</sup>. There is considerable irony in the fact that this faulty and circuitous reasoning arrives at the conclusion that Epicurus' argument is inconsistent<sup>147</sup>.

Epicurus' weakness in logic is then the central and prevailing topic in the first part of Cicero's critique (2. 1-38)<sup>148</sup>. Cicero repeatedly finds Epicurus ambiguous in his definition of pleasure, and charges him with varying his meaning between the pleasures of the senses and the pleasure of absence of pain<sup>149</sup>. Here again Cicero's own argument is sometimes self-contradictory, as when he accuses Epicurus at one point of embracing too eagerly the pleasures of the senses, and at another of too often finding freedom from pain the highest good<sup>150</sup>. Cicero here as elsewhere misjudges Epicurus because of his own insistence on defining for Epicurus the term *ἡδονή*.

Das Missverständnis der *ἡδονή* des Epikur ist übrigens nicht Absicht; man sieht, selbst dieser gebildete Römer war nicht im Stand, sich in griechische Gedanken- und Begriffswelt hineinzudenken. Er

The argument may then be said to run thus:

If *a* is true, then *b*, *c*, and *d* are true,  
     because *e* and *f* are true;  
         therefore *g* is true,      (but *g* = *a*)  
         because *b* is true.      (and *b* = *f*)

To this argument we may then add that *a* is true because *f* is true; this Cicero would admit; but it is all unnecessarily involved, and is moreover untrue, because the initial premise is false (Epicurus does not here refer particularly to kinetic pleasure).

<sup>146</sup> So also Frank, Cicero 117, speaks of Cicero's habit of self-laudation: "He fell into the error of self-laudation by way of defensive apology. It was a mistake into which he was trapped only when under oblique fire." It would seem in keeping then that he should become over-assertive when, although his prejudice is unabated, he is subconsciously aware that somehow the situation is not exactly that which he continually assumes it to be.

Uri (76) offers such a suggestion. He is supported therein by Philippson (Uri 108), and opposed by Lörcher (Cicero 1924. 162). Lörcher (ibid., 164-165; F & E 50-56; et passim) explains the irritation of Cicero throughout the early part of this book by assuming that he had been involved in personal controversy on the subject under discussion.

<sup>147</sup> D. F. 2. 32, fin.

<sup>148</sup> See above pp. 67-70; cf. De Nat. Deor. 1. 68-72.

<sup>149</sup> D. F. 2. 6-12, 15-23, 28-35.

<sup>150</sup> D. F. 2. 28: . . . *eam voluptatem quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant videtur amplexari saepe vehementius*, . . .

Ibid., 41: . . . *cui summum bonum est idem quod vos interdum vel potius nimium saepe dicitis, nihil dolere*.

übersetzte . . . mit *voluptas* und übertrug die durch das römische Wort und seinen Erfahrungs- und Gefühlswert geweckten Empfindungen und Vorstellungen ohne weiteres auf die einem anderen Empfinden und einer anderen geistigen Kultur entwachsene Bezeichnung des Epikur<sup>151</sup>.

Cicero's strictures on the faulty reasoning of Epicurus are concerned mostly with what Cicero considers Epicurus' inconsistencies, a) in referring to two kinds of pleasure as one, and b) in presenting a nobility of life and precept out of harmony with his own sordid standard<sup>152</sup>. Cicero's confusion in the face of these matters is at once the result and the evidence of his failure to understand the Epicurean conception of the good life and the possibility of attaining it. There is another point at which Cicero criticizes Epicurus' process of reasoning; that is, in his division of desires, which Cicero states as follows:

Tria genera cupiditatum, naturales et necessariae, naturales et non necessariae, nec naturales nec necessariae. (D. F. 2. 26)

This, Cicero says, would have been better stated:

Duo genera cupiditatum, naturales et inanes; naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae. (Ibid.)

But Epicurus gives both forms<sup>153</sup>, a fact which Cicero evidently does not know. The form given by Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus is worded as follows:

Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀσχησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.  
Men. 127 (86)

This is exactly the form of division desired by Cicero in the passage quoted above (D.F. 2. 26).

Epicurus, as Bailey shows<sup>154</sup>, thus introduces that part of his discussion which concerns ethics; and in the subdivision of the necessary desires leads directly to his main point:

<sup>151</sup> Lörcher, F & E 37. See also pp. 70-77 above.

<sup>152</sup> a) D. F. 2. 18, 28, 30-35, etc.; b) Ibid. 58, 70, 80, 99.

<sup>153</sup> The former is given in K. Δ. XXIX (100, 102); the latter in Men. 127 (86). Reid, D. F., comm. ad loc., notes that Epicurus does state the form which Cicero prefers. See also Thiaucourt 83.

Uri, 39, suggests that Cicero was drawn to comment on the division of desires by his dislike of the word *cupiditates*, and further, that Cicero had a special interest in objecting to errors in formal logic.

Lörcher calls Cicero's criticism "eine schulmeisternde Kritik," and adds that "sie in den Mund eines recht grünen Anfängers besser passt als in die Schrift eines griechischen Philosophen." He therefore assumes that Cicero did not borrow this material from a Greek writer such as Antiochus. (F & E 32)

<sup>154</sup> Bailey, Epicurus 333-334.

Some desires are necessary for the preservation of life, e.g., those of food and shelter, some to the repose of the body (freedom from pain), some to happiness of mind (freedom from fear). From these he passes at once to health of the body and peace of mind—the two foundations of the true Epicurean conceptions of pleasure<sup>155</sup>.

The form of division which Cicero disapproves is translated by Bailey as follows:

Among desires some are natural <and necessary, some natural> but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination<sup>156</sup>.

Both Bailey and Bignone point out the relation of this Golden Saying to those which precede and follow it<sup>157</sup>. Δόξαι XVIII-XXV discuss the nature of sensation and man's dependence on it; then, since, as sensation is the criterion of truth for the logical judgment, so the ultimate good, calmness of body and tranquillity of spirit, is the criterion of the moral judgment, the discussion turns naturally from sensation to desire, which is subject to the moral judgment<sup>158</sup>. Δόξα XXVI deals especially with the distinction between necessary and unnecessary desires:

Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm<sup>159</sup>.

Bignone interprets this as implying that desires which do cause pain if they are not satisfied are necessary; and since the greatest good is friendship, the desire for friends is a necessary desire<sup>160</sup>. He thus explains the position of the next two Sayings, XXVII and XXVIII. The next one (XXIX), quoted above, completes the meaning of XXVI. Bignone puts it thus:

<sup>155</sup> Ibid. 334.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid. K. Δ. XXIX (100-103). The scholium on this passage (App. crit. Ibid. 102-103) reads in Bailey's translation (Ibid. 367-8):

Epicurus regards as natural and necessary desires those which put an end to pain, as for instance drink in the case of thirst; natural and not necessary are those which merely vary the pleasure but do not remove pain, as for instance expensive foods: neither natural nor necessary are for instance crowns and the setting up of statues.

Bailey, *Atomists* 493 n., rejects this in favor of the scholium on Arist. Eth. Nic. 3. 13: The desire for food and clothing is necessary: the desire for sexual pleasures is natural but not necessary, the desire for particular food or particular clothing is neither natural nor necessary.

<sup>157</sup> Bailey, *Epicurus* 365-8; Bignone, *Epicuro* 20-23.

<sup>158</sup> Bignone, *Epicuro* 21.

<sup>159</sup> K. Δ. XXVI (100-101), Bailey's translation.

<sup>160</sup> Bignone, *Epicuro* 22-23.

We have noted that XXVI establishes a first class of distinction of desires, necessary and not necessary—a distinction useful to determine the value of friendship. Thence Epicurus proceeds to others, and in XXIX proposes a more ample classification of three categories of desires: (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and not necessary, (3) neither natural nor necessary<sup>161</sup>.

Finally the group is completed by xxx which deals with desires physical and unnecessary, which are violently prolonged<sup>162</sup>, a special division of xxix.

It may be said then that Cicero, in objecting to the form of K. Δ. xxix, has taken one Saying out of its context where it stands as a part of a more detailed discussion; the form which he prefers (given in Men. 127) is a more condensed expression of the whole matter, and takes its place in the context as a briefly expressed statement leading to a discussion of the life of blessedness, and the means of attaining it. Cicero's biased treatment of the subject is the more surprising in view of the fact that he can elsewhere so satisfactorily interpret Epicurus' classification of desires in an Epicurean setting<sup>163</sup>.

It is true that Cicero does even here approve the idea of such classification:

Quamquam in hac divisione rem ipsam prorsus probo, elegantiam desidero (2. 27).

This would seem to justify Uri's suggestion<sup>164</sup> that Cicero has a special interest in the criticism of dialectics, while at the same time, his choice of material for criticism, and his severe remarks (2. 27) on the folly of trying to limit desire indicate his own limitations in the understanding of the true Epicurean doctrine.

If we may accept Epicurus' teaching as the logically integrated doctrine which modern scholars such as Bailey and Bignone consider it, all of Cicero's condemnation of Epicurean inconsistency and faulty reasoning betrays his own failure to understand it.

In view of the evidence of Cicero's inadequacy in understanding Epicureanism as a unit, there is considerable irony in his frequent

<sup>161</sup> Ibid. 23. (My rendering of the Italian of Bignone.)

<sup>162</sup> Bailey, Epicurus 368.

<sup>163</sup> As in D. F. 1. 43-45, where Torquatus presents Epicurus' classification of desires in connection with the wisdom (*sapientia*) which can prevent the evils due to unlimited desire; cf. Guyau 46. Cicero further treats this same classification in T. D. 5. 93-97, where he approves it for the most part, although here too he comments on the form: *non nimis fortasse subtiliter, utiliter tamen*.

<sup>164</sup> See n. 154 above.

assertions that the doctrine is an easy one<sup>165</sup>. He is deceived by the simplicity of the individual statements with which he is familiar, and proves by his criticisms of Epicurus' faulty logic the fact that in the acquaintance which he has so easily achieved, any logical coherency of the Epicurean doctrine has entirely escaped his notice.

When Cicero declares (36) that the determination of good and evil lies outside of the jurisdiction of the senses, he opposes the major premise of the whole Epicurean argument; and yet he here unconsciously evades the real clash of opinion, because he looks to virtue and wisdom in preference to pleasure as being able to decide, and does not debate Epicurus' fundamental conception that except for sensation man is without guidance, since opinion without the guidance of sensation is deceptive<sup>166</sup>.

This topic at once concludes Cicero's somewhat rambling attack on the weakness of Epicurus' logic, and leads to a discussion of certain major topics which are more compactly treated<sup>167</sup>. The first of these is the inadequacy of Epicurean philosophy as a basis for virtue and friendship (D. F. 2. 39-85).

## II

**T**O CICERO it is natural that the discussion of virtue and friendship should not be widely separated, since friendship can stand only on a foundation of virtue<sup>168</sup>.

In the discussion of the virtues (44-77) we meet again Cicero's firm conviction that uprightness is the only reasonable and desirable way of life<sup>169</sup>. In a fine passage (45-47) there is given a tribute to righteousness and a characterization of each of the four major Stoic virtues. With the latter should be compared<sup>170</sup> the Epicurean treatment of the same virtues as it is given by Torquatus in the first book of the *De Finibus*. A comparison shows such harmony of ideals that the two statements complement rather than contradict each other; the statements differ only when we come to the motive suggested: to Cicero always virtue is its own reward; to

<sup>165</sup> D. F. 1. 13, 16, 27; 2. 15; 3. 2-3, etc. Lucretius does not call the doctrine easy. *Lucr.* 1. 136-145.

<sup>166</sup> See *Thiaccourt* 79, and *Hirzel* 2. 637 n. Cf. *Behncke* 13.

<sup>167</sup> We continue to find here however some of the same faults of unjust accusation that appear earlier, as, e.g., 68, 70, 75-77; and the same warping of Epicurus' meaning: cf. 48-50 with 21-23.

<sup>168</sup> See *Lael.* 20, 32, et passim; *Uri* 52.

<sup>169</sup> *Petersson* 20; see above, n. 128.

<sup>170</sup> The comparison of the treatment of the virtues in D. F. 1 and 2 is here given:

Torquatus, virtue gains its value from its contribution toward a quiet, well-ordered life, and it is as practical as the art of navigation<sup>171</sup>.

#### TWO ACCOUNTS OF THE VIRTUES

Cicero  
Book II. De Fin.

Torquatus  
Book I. De Fin.

#### WISDOM

Nature gives us the desire of seeing truth; this is most clearly apparent by the fact that in our leisure we are eager to know even what takes place in the heavens. 2. 46.

(Cf. with this Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 37; K. Δ. XII)

Wisdom is supremely desirable for her own sake. 2. 52.

. . . *sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret.* It is to be sought because it prepares pleasure for us. Man's life is vexed by ignorance of good and evil; wisdom helps us to understand the desires with the aid of Epicurus' classification, and so leads us to a life of ordered peace. Its value is practical: to remove fear and the rash desires due to false opinion. Therefore its end is pleasure.

1. 42-46.

#### JUSTICE

This desire for truth leads us to love all sincerity, and to hate all that is false. 2. 46.

(Cf. Epicurus, K. Δ. XVII, XXI, XXXI-XXXVIII)

All conduct should be judged by its own value, not by whether or not it is witnessed. D. F. 2. 52-60

(Placed fourth in Torquatus' list) Reason invites sane men to justice. There is no adequate motive for dishonesty, for the necessary desires are easily and inexpensively satisfied and the vain ones cause trouble. Unjust dealing cannot possibly avert as much pain as it causes the doer. 1. 50-53

#### COURAGE

A noble quality which makes all human events endurable and even trivial, "*altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens, nemini cedens, semper invictum.*" 2. 46.

(Cf. Epicurus, K. Δ. IV; Sent. Vat. IV.)

*Fortitudo: Sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore.* . . . It scorns death, for the dead are not; it endures pain philosophically, knowing that it will either pass or bring release in death which may even be self-appointed if necessary. Courage protects men from the weakness that causes betrayal of others and ruin of self. 1. 49.

#### TEMPERANCE

A quality of order and restraint (*ordo et moderatio*), derived from the other virtues; it shuns rashness; avoids injury to any, fears any hint of weakness. It sees an analogy between outward beauty and dignity, and uprightness of word and deed. 2. 47.

(Cf. Epicurus, Men. 128-131; K. Δ. VIII, XVIII, XXVI, etc.)

Temperance teaches us to follow reason in matters of choice and avoidance, and to abide by a wise choice when once it is made.

It leads to the highest pleasure, sometimes by avoiding pleasures attended by suffering, and by choosing pain where pleasure results. It leads to a controlled way of life, followed for the sake of harmonious tranquillity. 1: 47-48.

<sup>171</sup> Cf. 1. 42-54, and the discussion above pp. 27-34, where the adequacy of Torquatus' statements is measured somewhat in the light of Cicero's comments in this part of the second book.



The discussion of the virtues in the second book, and especially the illustrations, constantly reveal the inadequacy of Cicero's comprehension of Epicurus' meaning. This discussion may be summarized as follows: Epicurus does not know the meaning of *honestum* in terms of those who measure it as the highest good<sup>172</sup>, and yet he says elsewhere quite inconsistently,

non posse iucunde vivi nisi etiam honeste<sup>173</sup>;

Publius Sextilius Rufus, who in careful adherence to the law cheated the daughter of Quintus Fadius Gallus, was acting, Cicero says, as a consistent Epicurean should act<sup>174</sup>; the regulated hedonism of Thorius must be called happiness by the Epicurean school<sup>175</sup>; an upright man who is also an Epicurean should blush for his doctrine when confronted with Cleanthes' word-picture of Pleasure as a queen, surrounded by the Virtues, her handmaidens, whose duty it is to obey her and to guide her in expediency<sup>176</sup>; Torquatus himself, in his praetor's edict, dares not state his Epicurean principles as the basis of his conduct in office, nor would he venture to do so in any public assembly<sup>177</sup>. Interspersed with these comments and illustrations are the names of various national heroes whose conduct is in harmony with Cicero's view of the good life<sup>178</sup>.

A detailed discussion of the adequacy of Cicero's interpretation of Epicurean views on wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance, has been previously given<sup>179</sup>. It is sufficient here to examine Cicero's comments and illustrations as listed above.

Epicurus' statement that he knows not *honestum* in terms of the highest good is a part of his argument of necessity; that is, man must be guided by sensation and feeling, since he can be sure of nothing else<sup>180</sup>. It is in connection with this statement that Cicero quotes the fifth Golden Saying, by way of demonstrating Epicurus' inconsistency. The Greek of Epicurus reads:

<sup>172</sup> D. F. 2. 48-49; cf. 5. 119; Acad. 2. 71. Reid, D. F. 2. 48, comm. ad loc., refers to a passage of Epicurus' *Περὶ τέλους* rendered in T. D. 3. 42. Cf. Epicurus. Frg. B 12 (122), B 79 (138).

<sup>173</sup> D. F. 2. 49-51, 70; cf. K. Δ. V (94), Men. 132 (90).

<sup>174</sup> D. F. 2. 55-57.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid. 63-65.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid. 69.

<sup>177</sup> D. F. 2. 74-77.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid. 61-62, 67, 73, et passim.

<sup>179</sup> Ch. I, pp. 27-34 above.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. Vita 6 (142, 144) and D. F. 2. 7, 20, 23, et passim. See above, pp. 79-80. See also Guyau, 31-32, where he compares Epicurus' ranking of pleasures from the standpoint of necessity with that of Plato from the standpoint of the ideal.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐ ζῆ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, <καὶ ὅτῳ ἐκεῖνο μὴ> ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν. K. Δ. V. (94)

The reasoning which Cicero uses here in showing that Epicurus is inconsistent in his own statements is very much like that which he used above in connection with the tenth Golden Saying and with his discussion of Epicurus' reference to new-born animals as a standard for determining the good<sup>181</sup>. It reveals once more Cicero's misconception of Epicurus' basic principle, the necessity of dependence on sensation and feeling for determination of conduct, since no other standard exists. The pleasant life is for Epicurus the *summum bonum*, and for him it is tranquillity. The tranquil life can be attained only by uprightness of conduct. Thus *honestum* is, for Epicurus, not the highest good, but an essential condition of attaining the highest good. (See above pp. 70-73.)

Cicero goes farther astray in his treatment of the Epicurean standard of justice and temperance than in his discussion of the other two virtues. The most obvious defect in his treatment of Epicurean justice is his omission of reference to Epicurus' theory of justice as based on a social contract, which provides the basis for the whole discussion from the Epicurean standpoint<sup>182</sup>. While admitting that neither Torquatus nor Epicurus would have been guilty of Sextilius' dishonesty, Cicero nevertheless maintains that in such a case their innocence would be due to the fact that their own inherent uprightness would lead them to violate their ignoble principles (D. F. 2. 58). Sections 56 and 57 are full of fallacies which are mostly summed up in the final sentence of section 55:

pecuniam . . . quae quidem vel cum periculo est quaerenda vobis;  
est enim effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum.

To these words should be opposed certain expressions of Epicurus<sup>183</sup>:

By means of occupations worthy of a beast abundance of riches is heaped up, but a miserable life results.

The happy and blessed state belongs not to abundance of riches . . . but to freedom from pain and moderation in feelings and an attitude of mind which imposes the limits ordained by nature.

<sup>181</sup> D. F. 2. 21-23 and 31-33. See above pp. 78-80 and 82-84.

<sup>182</sup> See K. Δ. XXXI-XXXVIII (102-104). See above, p. 33-34 and D. F. 2. 83.

<sup>183</sup> Frg. B 73 (137); Frg. B 85 (137); K. Δ. XV (99), XXI (99), all quoted from Bailey's translation. See also K. Δ. VII (96), XVII (98), XL (104); Sent. Vat. VII (106), XXV (108), XLIII (112), LXVII (116), LXXIX (118); Frg. 68-72 (136), 80-84 (138).

The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity.

He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain; so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

Cicero repeatedly declares<sup>184</sup> that the consistent Epicurean will be deterred from crime only by fear of detection and punishment:

. . . ut hominum conscientia remota nihil tam turpe sit quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus. (D. F. 2. 28)

What Cicero fails to see is that, as is shown from the quotations given in the paragraph above, the consistent Epicurean would lack the usual motives for crime; and moreover that the motive itself, as well as the crime and its results, would disturb the serenity which is his dearest possession. A statement from the *Διαπορίαι* of Epicurus has sometimes been used against him:

Will the wise man do things that the laws forbid, knowing that he will not be found out? A simple answer is not easy to find.<sup>185</sup>

In reference to this passage Taylor says:

Plutarch interprets this to mean, 'He will commit a crime if it brings him pleasure, but I do not like to say so openly.' It must be allowed that on Epicurus' own showing his 'wise man' would have no motive for refraining from a pleasant crime if he really could be sure of impunity. The 'sage' is not a person whom one would care to trust with the 'ring of Gyges'.<sup>186</sup>

Taylor like Cicero overlooks the fact that the sage would lack sufficient motive for committing the crime, however 'pleasant.'

A very different interpretation of Epicurus' statement and one much more consistent with the rest of his teaching is given by Philippson<sup>187</sup>, who says that since Epicurus made it a problem with no easy answer, he must have discussed it thoroughly; he adds significantly that it is not a question of *Gerechte* but of *Gesetze*.

If both agree, Epicurus will have the wise man observe the law. But in conflict of the two, will Epicurus violate the laws of his country contrary to the opinion of Socrates? There is the tacit social compact. According to Philodemus' Rhetoric, he must obey or go into exile whether the wrong is concealed or not. So probably Epicurus also taught. At all events he says, K. Δ. XXXV, that concealment is *never* sure<sup>188</sup>.

<sup>184</sup> D. F. 2. 28, 53-59. Reid, D. F. 2. 28 n., refers also to 3. 38; Leg. 1. 41; Off. 3. 77. To these should be added Off. 3. 35-41.

<sup>185</sup> Frg. B II (121), Bailey's translation.

<sup>186</sup> Taylor 94.

<sup>187</sup> Philippson, Rechts 302-3.

<sup>188</sup> My paraphrase of the German of Philippson, op. cit.

To this interpretation of Philippson's should be added a sentence from K. Δ. XXXVII (105) (Bailey's translation):

But if a man makes a law and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice<sup>189</sup>.

It is thus evident that Epicurus made a distinction between justice and the law. In the case of Sextilius then, who violated the trust of his dead friend on the pretext that he ought not to break the Voconian law which he had sworn to observe<sup>190</sup>, Epicurus might have advised that the law be violated for the sake of justice. At any rate Cicero's story of Sextilius and Fadius might well illustrate the question which Epicurus found difficult.

Cicero seems to be honestly and entirely unaware of the firm basis for justice which Epicureanism provided. He can see nothing beyond the fear of punishment, and therefore the fear of detection, and yet he has Torquatus say that the necessary things of life can be won without injustice<sup>191</sup>. He omits the social contract as a basis of justice. He does not see the doctrine as a whole.

Cicero's failure to understand the Epicurean standard of temperance and self-control, and the basis on which it rests, is made clear by his description of Thorius *potantem in rosa*<sup>192</sup>. Thorius is no less satisfactory as an example of Epicurean happiness than is the happy man described by Torquatus<sup>193</sup>, one whom he pictures as *magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus*. Cicero therefore in comparing the two and in saying, (2.65)

Non enim hilaritate nec lascivia nec risu aut ioco, comite levitatis,  
saepe etiam tristes firmitate et constantia sunt beati,

proves only that in neither case is the true Epicurean wise man portrayed<sup>194</sup>. And he does admit that pleasure may be found apart from luxurious indulgence when he says of Regulus' unhappy fate,

. . . illi perpetienti erat voluptarius (2. 65).

Cicero fails to see that the regulated hedonism of Thorius ignores entirely one of the Golden Sayings of the first group:

<sup>189</sup> See also K. Δ. XXXVIII (104).

<sup>190</sup> D. F. 2. 55.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid. 1. 50-53. See above, pp. 32-34, for discussion of Torquatus' presentation of Epicurean ideas of justice.

<sup>192</sup> D. F. 2. 63-65.

<sup>193</sup> D. F. 1. 40-41.

<sup>194</sup> See above pp. 26-27 for a contrast between Cicero's view of the Epicurean ideal and that of Epicurus.

The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. . . .<sup>195</sup>

The picture of Pleasure seated as a queen among her handmaids, the Virtues, who serve her and at the same time warn her against inexpediency<sup>196</sup> is a logical accompaniment of Cicero's conception of the Good of the Epicureans. Nothing in the words of Epicurus justifies such a conception, which is as far from his own ideal of serenity as it is from Cicero's standard of the good life. It is quite understandable that in contrast to the luxurious life of Thorius, Cicero should see genuine happiness in the deeds of Roman heroes who have suffered for their country. When he says:

. . . at ego quem huic anteponom non audeo dicere; dicet pro me ipsa virtus, nec dubitabit isti vestro beato M. Regulum anteponom  
. . . (2. 65),

it is to be remembered that he is writing at a time when his domestic life is full of sorrow, and his political life has been broken off by conditions which caused him to grieve both for himself and for the state. It seems here as if he hopes that Virtue may see fit to inscribe his own name in the list of martyrs whose happiness in patriotic service exceeds that of the seekers after pleasure. To the services which he had rendered to the state before the writing of this book, we must add his later heroic struggle against Antony, for which he paid with his life. For us his name belongs in the first rank of Roman martyrs who gave their lives for the good of the commonwealth.

The chaos had lasted for a century, and it was no small thing even to maintain in theory the standard of just administration; it was a greater thing to have vindicated such standards at grave personal cost in two cases like those of Verres and Catiline; but Cicero did more. More was demanded of him by the cruel conditions of his day. It was not only that he had thought and worked and lived for his great ideals; he must die for them too!<sup>197</sup>

The standard of service to the state is one of Cicero's fundamental convictions, and he here differs widely from the attitude of Epicurus

<sup>195</sup> K. Δ. III (95), Bailey's translation. Cf. Men. 131, 132 (88, 90).

<sup>196</sup> D. F. 2. 69. Cicero's personifications of Pleasure in none too admirable a light suggest a possible connection in his own mind between voluptas and Volupia, one of the Indigitamenta to whom, according to some shadowy evidence, there was an altar in Rome. D & S, *Indigitamenta*, q. v.

<sup>197</sup> Conway 43. See also 45: "To Antony's vile designs Cicero's death was a necessity. In a deeper sense it was an even greater necessity for the political salvation of the world."

Conway's whole essay, *The Originality of Cicero*, 20-45, is a fine tribute to the political ideals and courageous public service of Cicero.

toward the state. To Epicurus, serenity is gained by avoiding the prison of affairs and of politics, by living unknown<sup>198</sup>. To Cicero serenity at such a price is stagnation<sup>199</sup>.

And yet the roll of heroes, which includes Torquatus, suggests also that Cicero sometimes questions the value of the fame which he usually thinks of such great worth. His very argument against attributing the motive of pleasure to the great Torquatus (2. 60-61) suggests a stubborn defense of a cause of which he is none too sure<sup>200</sup>. Although he refers to Torquatus' argument about the deeds of his ancestor (60-61, 72), Cicero nowhere attacks the actual points made in Torquatus' discourse<sup>201</sup>: the idea that brave deeds in battle are performed from some motive of self-interest; that the individual is acting for his own safety or for the safety of his family or his own group in some larger unit of which himself and his own safety are more or less a part. It seems less that Cicero consciously avoids this argument than that he somehow does not see self-interest as working in one's defense of the group to which one belongs. When such a motive is pushed far enough it becomes not very different in effect from Cicero's ideal of service to the state.

When he challenges Torquatus to profess his Epicurean principles in his praetor's edict or elsewhere<sup>202</sup>, Cicero is again clearly reducing Epicureanism to the lowest possible terms; he sees in Torquatus a noble Roman who is engaging in the official career and fulfilling his public duties in violation of all the principles of the base philosophy to which he subscribes; this is to Cicero another instance of the innate desire for uprightness which makes men sometimes better than their creed. But in reality the challenge is not so conclusive as at first it seems. No one speech delivered by Torquatus could inform an ignorant populace of the highly intellectual and austere character of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure, nor could it convince a senate where Stoic prejudices were in control. The affairs of state would be very safe in the hands of a true Epicurean, if he should overcome his

<sup>198</sup> Sent. Vat. LVIII (114), Frg. D 86 (138). See also *ibid.* 87. Philippson, however, (Rechts 322-330) finds that the Epicurean would render service to the state, even outside of politics.

<sup>199</sup> See e.g., Rep. 1. 1-11.

<sup>200</sup> See above, Ch. 1. pp. 21-23.

<sup>201</sup> See Thiaucourt 84 n.

<sup>202</sup> D. F. 2. 74-77. This kind of argument seems to be a favorite with Cicero. He makes use of a similar challenge in addressing his Stoic adversary, 4. 21-23. See Lörcher, F & E 125 and n.

disinclination for politics sufficiently to take office; and a fairly satisfactory personal platform might be worked out for such an Epicurean magistrate<sup>203</sup>. But the quibbling criticisms of Cicero are sufficient evidence of the difficulty awaiting one who would make a public profession of Epicureanism in the philosophical catch-words which Cicero quotes.

The conversation which Cicero here presents indicates that some of the Epicureans of his time did lay aside their dislike of political struggle sufficiently to pursue the course of the official career<sup>204</sup>. Thiaucourt suggests that the political activity of certain of Cicero's Epicurean acquaintances was in itself one of the causes of his firm conviction that Epicurean philosophy was an unwholesome influence in Roman life; and it seems to be true, as Thiaucourt says, that the declining republic was defended not by Epicurean, but by Stoic patriots<sup>205</sup>.

It is evident that Cicero in his condemnation of Epicurean morality is most severe in regard to the virtues of justice and temperance, and that in discussing these virtues and their opposing vices he demonstrates his own limitations in realizing the importance of serenity

<sup>203</sup> An Epicurean magistrate might declare that

- 1) His personal conduct would be upright, for uprightness is necessary to the pleasant life. K. Δ. V (94).
- 2) He would be free from anxiety about public opinion as it might affect his personal or political future, for honor and respect of the populace can give neither peace nor joy. Sent. Vat. LXXXI (118); Frg. D 85 (138).
- 3) He would accept no bribes, for he would have no purpose in heaping up wealth. K. Δ. XXI (98); Sent. Vat. LXVII (116); Frg. C 45 (132).
- 4) He would never arrogantly abuse the magistrate's powers, for one who causes fear cannot be fearless. Frg. D 84 (138).
- 5) He would make just decisions, for injustice is a cause of disturbance in a man's life. K. Δ. XVII (98); XXXV (102); Frg. D 80 (138).
- 6) He would regard the purpose of the law as the protection of the individual. K. Δ. XXXI (102); Frg. D 81 (138).
- 7) He would interpret the law in accordance with the needs of society. K. Δ. XXXVII-XXXVIII (102, 104).

Philippson, *Rechts* 304-311, shows that although the Epicurean would avoid endangering the serenity of life by active participation in the affairs of state, he nevertheless would not fail in respect for the state, the laws, and the activity of the statesman. Philippson (*ibid.* 327) further states that the Epicurean will be of use to the state because of his patriotism and his freedom from ambition; by education of the youth in obedience to law, and by theoretical criticism and extension of the law, he will serve his country whether his services are recognized or not. *Ibid.* 334: Although the wise man will avoid the confusion of politics, the prohibition is not arbitrary.

<sup>204</sup> See De Witt, *Epicurus* 169, and Philippson, *Rechts* 334 (see above, n. 203).

<sup>205</sup> Thiaucourt 85: . . . enfin tous ceux qui voulaient le renversement de la république, César à leur tête, étaient Épicuriens. . . .

Of Cicero: C'est qu'il craignait de tels enseignements, pour les mœurs romaines et la constitution de l'État.

in the Epicurean conception of the good life. He does not see that the Epicurean goal of serenity removes all motive for injustice and intemperance. Moreover Cicero's failure to explain or attack the Epicurean theory of justice and the social compact is a significant omission in his discussion of Epicurean virtue<sup>206</sup>.

It is natural to Cicero that friendship should be discussed<sup>207</sup> in connection with the virtues, on which, he holds, it is founded<sup>208</sup>. His critique of Epicurean friendship (2. 78-85) is clearly a reply to the views presented by Torquatus in the preceding book, and is concerned in part (82-84) with the three motives for friendship which were stated by Torquatus:

- 1) friendship is sought for pleasure, because it insures safety;
- 2) friendship, sought at first for utility, develops into affection;
- 3) friendship develops among wise men as the result of a mutual compact to love one another as each loves himself.

In this discussion, Cicero assumes, as did Torquatus, that these three motives represent three different groups of Epicureans within the Epicurean school of Cicero's time. Since all three suggestions as to the origin of friendship are included in the writings of Epicurus, it seems reasonable to agree with Bignone that Cicero did not understand the doctrine of friendship as it was presented by the founder of the school himself<sup>209</sup>.

Cicero's statement of these points of view, as it is given in the second book of the *De Finibus* is clear enough, as is his refutation of them; but in and around this section there is to be found (2. 78-85) an attack none too compactly organized, and confusing because of its manifest unfairness. Therein Cicero declares:

- 1) that utility is an unsatisfactory basis for friendship (78-79, 84);
- 2) that loyalty in friendship on the part of Epicurus, Torquatus, and other Epicureans is an individual matter, and proves not that uprightness is consistent with the Epicurean doctrine, but that it is an inherent trait of human nature (80);

<sup>206</sup> See Off. 3. 118 for a brief statement of Cicero's objections to Epicurean ethics, a statement containing the same faults as those above indicated.

The social contract is to be recognized as the fundamental tenet of the Epicurean conception of justice (K. Δ. XXXI-XXXVIII). It is highly significant that it is omitted in the discussion of Torquatus as well as in that of Cicero. See above, pp. 33-34.

<sup>207</sup> Esp. D. F. 2. 78, 85; see also Lael. 18, 20, et passim.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. D. F. 2. 82-85 and Torquatus' discussion, D. F. 1. 65-70. Uri, 52, and others point out the correspondence between Books I and II in this discussion.

<sup>209</sup> See above, pp. 40-42, for references to the writings of Epicurus. Bignone (Cicero 83, also referred to in the preceding chapter) holds that Cicero had come upon three phases of the origin of friendship, as presented by Epicurus, and had understood them to represent differences in the school of his own time. Bignone's view is opposed by Uri 31 and by Philippon, Bignone, 235.



- 3) that the inconsistency of Epicurean theory with Epicurean practice is evidence of the intellectual weakness of Epicurus and his position (80-81);
- 4) that the number of Epicurus' followers proves only the low intellectual and moral standard of the multitude (80-81);
- 5) that the consistent Epicurean has plenty of resources other than those of friendship with which to meet his needs (83-85).

In discussing utility as a motive for forming a friendship, Cicero is as insistent on a special meaning of the word *utilitas* as he is elsewhere in respect to the word *voluptas*. He chooses it evidently to represent the Greek *ωφέλεια*<sup>210</sup>, and it is true that both words imply benefit, profit, advantage, utility. But like these English words, both the Latin *utilitas* and its Greek equivalent may be applied in usage to various kinds of benefits and utility. Cicero in these passages insists that Epicurean utility must be limited to advantages in material welfare, whereas Epicurus could find the usefulness and advantages of friendship included in Cicero's terms<sup>211</sup>:

Denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis; divitiae, ut utare; opes, ut colare; honores, ut laudare; voluptates, ut gaudeas; valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis: amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est. (Lael. 22)

Cicero is highly ironical in his references to utility as he understands it to function in Epicurean friendships (D. F. 2. 78-79). He uses some form of the word *utilitas* seven times within thirteen lines<sup>212</sup>, as well as the word *incommodo*, and the context is ironically disparaging.

Against Cicero's denunciation of the Epicurean conception of friendship and its origins must be set the evidence for an entirely different understanding of the values placed upon friendship by Epicurus and his school.

The members of the Epicurean school by their withdrawal from the affairs of the world and from political life<sup>213</sup> found themselves the more dependent on each other for companionship.

<sup>210</sup> Sent. Vat. XXIII (108): *πᾶσα φιλία δι' ἐαυτὴν αἰρετή· ἀρχὴν δ' εἰληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.*

<sup>211</sup> See Wallace 137-140.

<sup>212</sup> Teubner text, Schiche 68.

<sup>213</sup> Sent. Vat. LVIII (114). Von Arnim, 135, emphasizes the tendency to the greater affection within the school because of the absence of outside interests and attachments; he finds in this situation a tendency to mutual overestimation and flattery, as well as a tendency to disparage all other culture.

As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, . . .<sup>214</sup>

The Epicureans, according to DeWitt<sup>215</sup>, became the heirs of a cult of friendship which had existed in the ancient world from the time of Pythagoras, and which can be traced from Damon and Pythias, Orestes and Pylades, through Plato's Lysis, Aristotle's Ethics, and Theophrastus; this cult was taken up by the Epicureans and given the supreme place in their ethical system. Thus Epicurus and his disciples made for themselves a little world, a society in which men and women, and even slaves, were participants, wherein they found a substitute for activity in the politics of the city-state<sup>216</sup>; this small world conformed to the tenets of their philosophy and gave no cause for competition for wealth or fame or power<sup>217</sup>. So Horace says of the circle of Maecenas:

. . . 'non isto vivimus illic  
quo tu rere modo; domus hac nec purior ulla est  
nec magis his aliena malis; nil mi officit' inquam  
'ditior hic aut est quia doctior; est locus uni  
cuique suus.'<sup>218</sup>

To a circle of Epicurean friendship, according to Pascal, Lucretius invites Memmius<sup>219</sup>. In such a group both friendship and justice might well be established by mutual covenant<sup>220</sup>. DeWitt sees in Virgil's experience an illustration of the congenial atmosphere of an Epicurean circle:

It was through friendship that the Epicurean found himself, realized himself, and it was by this path that Virgil discovered his own gifts and talents. By Probus we are informed that he spent several years in honorable retirement, following the sect of Epicurus and living in rare and intimate harmony with Varus, Tucca, and Varius.

For such a one the cold Stoic theory of universal brotherhood contained no comfort or solace. He needed the friend in the flesh to satisfy his natural affections, to elicit his inborn tenderness, to develop his powers.

In this happy colony of congenial friends, a genuine brotherhood in the

<sup>214</sup> K. Δ. XL (105), Bailey's translation.

<sup>215</sup> DeWitt, Epicurus 173.

<sup>216</sup> Philippson, Rechts 309.

<sup>217</sup> DeWitt, op. cit. 174.

<sup>218</sup> Horace, Sat. 1. 9. 48-52.

<sup>219</sup> Pascal, 5-8; see above, Ch. I, n. 118.

<sup>220</sup> Philippson, Uri 106.

ethical sense of the term, a fruitful year seems to have passed away. . . . Epicurean friendship, it must be noted, was not of a narrowly exclusive type. It was communal and wide, and if one conceived it aright, and practiced it in harmony with its principles, invited and involved a multitude of friendships. This spirit of brotherhood brought out some of the best that was in Virgil. . . .<sup>221</sup>

Such a conception of the Epicurean doctrine and practice of friendship is supported by various passages in the writings of Epicurus, especially in the Golden Sayings and in the Vatican Collection<sup>222</sup>:

Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.

The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts forever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life.

The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself and the rest at least not alien. . . . (See also K. A. XL, quoted above.)

All friendship is desirable in itself, though it starts from the need of help.

We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship's sake we must even run risks.

It is not so much our friends' help that helps us as the confidence of their help.

He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barter kindly feeling for a practical return and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.

Friendship goes dancing round the world proclaiming to us all to awake to the praises of a happy life.

The wise man is not more pained when being tortured <himself, than when seeing> his friend <tortured>: <but if his friend does him wrong>, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.

Let us show our feeling for our lost friends not by lamentation but by meditation.

The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship: of these the one is a mortal good, the other immortal.

<sup>221</sup> DeWitt, Virgil 85-86. See also DeWitt, Gratitude 320-328, especially pp. 323-4.

<sup>222</sup> K. A. XXVII, XXVIII (100-101), XXXIX, XL (104-105); Sent. Vat. XXIII (108-109), XXVIII, XXXIV (110-111), XXXIX (110-113), LII, LVI-LVII (114-115), LXVI (116-117), LXXVIII (118-119). All these as given above are in Bailey's translation.

To these may be added a few other sentences from Epicurus<sup>223</sup>:

Sweet is the memory of a dead friend.

Only the wise man will show gratitude, and will constantly speak well of his friends alike in their presence and their absence.

In his sleep he will be as he is awake, and on occasion he will even die for a friend.

That friendship too has practical needs as its motive; one must indeed lay its foundations (for we sow the ground too for the sake of crops), but it is formed and maintained by means of community of life among those who have reached the fullness of pleasure.

As illustration of his conception of friendly companionship, we find at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus these words:

Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself, and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like to a mortal being<sup>224</sup>.

With this should be compared the kindly expression of the initial paragraphs of the Letter to Pythocles, various friendly greetings found in fragments of Epicurus' personal letters, the warmth of affection manifested in certain provisions of his will, and the passage in his last letter showing the pleasure derived from the memory of friendly conversations of the past, and persisting even in the midst of violent pain<sup>225</sup>.

To such expressions of Epicurus, Cicero would reply as he does to the words of Torquatus:

*Non quaeritur autem quid naturae tuae consentaneum sit, sed quid disciplinae. Ratio ista quam defendis, praecepta quae didicisti, quae probas, funditus evertunt amicitiam, quamvis eam Epicurus, ut facit, in caelum efferat laudibus*<sup>226</sup>.

Modern critics as well as Cicero have sometimes found the Epicurean attitude toward friendship incompatible with the principles of a doctrine of pleasure<sup>227</sup>. It may be nearer the truth to say that

<sup>223</sup> Frg. C 50 (132, 133); Vita 118 (164, 165), 121 b (166, 167), 120 b (168, 169), all quoted from Bailey's translation.

<sup>224</sup> Men. 135 (92-93), quoted from Bailey's translation.

<sup>225</sup> Pyth. 84-85 (56); Frg. C 25-42 (127-131); Epicurus' Will, Vita 16-22 (150-154); Frg. C 30 (126-128), with which should be compared Frg. C 36 (130). Epicurus' ideal of friendship is shown also in Vita 11 (146-7):

He adds that Epicurus did not recommend them to put their belongings into a common stock, as did Pythagoras, who said that 'Friends have all in common.' For to do so implied distrust: and distrust could not go with friendship. (Bailey's translation.)

<sup>226</sup> D. F. 2. 80.

<sup>227</sup> Uri, 29, thinks friendship one of the irrational points of the Epicurean system; see Hicks 180.

Epicurus here manifested the same logical development of his fundamental principles as that which in other respects characterized his doctrine<sup>228</sup>: the Epicurean will chart his course, not with reference to immediate pleasure or immediate pain, but "by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages"<sup>229</sup> he will form his decision with his eye fixed on the more distant result, the greatest ultimate happiness. Conforming to this principle, the Epicurean will then cultivate friendship, since, although it is accompanied by responsibilities and possible pain, it nevertheless outweighs these considerations by reason of the joy of companionship as well as the protection that it gives in the presence of danger. It seems to be quite in harmony with all of Epicurus' comments on friendship to say that abstractly his philosophy justified friendship on the ground that life is more pleasant with it than without it, and that concretely the relations existing between the true Epicurean and his individual friends were characterized by a rather higher standard of mutual kindness and service than is commonly found in the world<sup>230</sup>. It is true that Epicurus taught that there is protection in friendship, a doctrine with which most human beings will agree. Cicero more than once in time of trouble sought such protection and found it in his friend Atticus, an Epicurean<sup>231</sup>.

When Cicero declares,

'Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita.' Num igitur utiliore tibi hunc Triarium putas esse posse quam si tua sint Puteolis granaria?  
(D. F. 2. 84)

he again limits the word *utiliorem* to the narrowest of material advantages. It may be said moreover that any friendship, even one such as that of Cicero and Atticus, must find its beginning in some mutual interest whether of serviceable deeds or of conversation trivial or serious; one may find oneself amused or stimulated or helped by an acquaintance, but interest must in some way be aroused if acquaintanceship is to develop into friendship<sup>232</sup>. The fact that

<sup>228</sup> See Bailey, *Atomists* 528.

<sup>229</sup> Men. 130 (88, 89), Bailey's translation.

<sup>230</sup> Even Cicero admits the unselfish kindness of individual Epicureans, e.g., D. F. 2. 80; see Petersson 587. See Wallace 59 for the life of the Garden.

<sup>231</sup> Cicero himself knew what it was to need and seek friends for support, for example, in the time of his exile; see Petersson 308, 311, 312. As for the help which he found in Atticus, see *ibid.*, 9, 210, 315, 534-6.

<sup>232</sup> Cf. Cicero's advice on the selection of friends, Lael. 62: the contrast between men's ways in selecting flocks and herds and in selecting friends; a warning:

. . . in amicis diligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitiam essent idonei, iudicarent.

Epicurus saw in friendship a utility which included a solace of the spirit as well as a tower of defense does not necessarily mean that he deliberately sought friendship with those who were best equipped to serve his material needs. And further it must be remembered that the true Epicurean was not as other men, who may be tempted to use their friends as a means of furthering ambition or heaping up riches, so that the use of friendship for utilitarian purposes would mean for the disciple of Epicurus some utility other than that tending to wealth and power.

When one thus considers the Epicurean way of life, one finds no truth in Cicero's accusations<sup>233</sup> that only mercenary motives are consistent with Epicurean doctrine. And therefore when Cicero sets the Epicurean value of friendship in comparison with the granaries of Puteoli (2. 85), and declares that the prestige of wealth and power would enable the Epicurean to dispense with true friends<sup>234</sup>, he refuses to take into consideration the standard of life set up by the Master<sup>235</sup>:

The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity.

The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with causes of unlimited desire.

We may say then that the three bases which Cicero finds<sup>236</sup> for the formation of Epicurean friendships could be accepted without question, if he had seen in them only separate parts of a consistent doctrine offered by Epicurus himself. Epicurus could consistently teach, as he did, that friendship is valuable for the pleasure and the protection that it offers; and with his recognition of the development of society as the result of a tacit social compact, he would find especially within the community of his disciples a natural development of mutual consideration. From such a point of view, Cicero's condemnation of the Epicurean philosophy of friendship, and his charges that the kindly attitude of Epicurean individuals is inconsistent with their doctrine, indicates on Cicero's part a failure to

<sup>233</sup> D. F. 2. 78, 79.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid. 84, 85. Cicero here refers to such a statement as that found in Sent. Vat. LXVII (116), which he misconstrues.

<sup>235</sup> K. Δ. XV (98-99); Sent. Vat. LXXXI (118-119), both quoted above, from Bailey's translation.

<sup>236</sup> See above p. 97.

see the doctrine of friendship in its setting as a part of the Epicurean theory of life.

DeWitt, who sees in the Laelius a part of Cicero's campaign of propaganda against Epicureanism<sup>237</sup>, says<sup>238</sup> that the cult of friendship was in full career at Rome when Cicero composed his *De Amicitia*, but that after the publication of this essay the word 'friendship' was no longer recognized as exclusively an Epicurean term. In the doctrine of friendship as in other matters of Epicurean philosophy, the effect of Cicero's influence was to discredit the school. Philippson says:

Cicero contributed much to making Epicureanism seem immoral even to antiquity, so that, for example, Nepos in his biography of Atticus dared not mention his relation to Epicurus. Horace also avoided openly confessing the doctrine. Seneca tried a vindication of it as being misunderstood, but without lasting success. . . . We see this feeling still working in Zeller<sup>239</sup>.

### III

WHEN CICERO turns (85-108) to a refutation of the doctrine that the Epicurean wise man enjoys a life in which happiness prevails, his principal contention is that pleasure is not always available and that pain cannot always be annulled. The major points of discussion are as follows:

- 1) Pleasure is dependent on external circumstances, and is therefore constantly threatened. (2. 86-89)
- 2) It is inconsistent for one who places the highest good in pleasure to say that happiness is not increased by long duration. (2. 87-88)
- 3) Epicurus' insistence on plainness and simplicity of life is inconsistent with a doctrine of pleasure. (2. 90-92)
- 4) The Epicurean doctrine for the endurance of pain is inadequate as a support for one who must meet any real pain worthy of consideration. (2. 92-98)
- 5) The courage of Epicurus' last letter and the kindness manifested by certain terms of his will are inconsistent with his philosophy, as is also his provision for the observance of his birthday<sup>240</sup>.  
(2. 96-103)

<sup>237</sup> Lecture before the New York Classical Club, 1931.

<sup>238</sup> DeWitt, *Epicurus* 174.

<sup>239</sup> Philippson, *Uri* 108-9, a paraphrase from the German of Philippson. Cf. here also DeWitt, *op. cit.*, 175.

<sup>240</sup> *Uri* (64), who is concerned with sources, considers §§ 96-103 to be a digression of Cicero's which disturbs the original, and which is suggested to Cicero by the idea of a reproof of Epicurus for inconsistency. We must agree with *Uri* at least in regard to Cicero's interest in Epicurean inconsistency, a topic to which he returns again and again.

- 6) It is not always possible so to control memory as to recall only pleasant things; consistency moreover would require that for Epicurus the pleasures of memory should be connected with pleasure of the senses. (2. 104-106)
- 7) The Epicurean doctrine that pleasures and pains of the mind pertain to and exceed those of the body is difficult to prove, since it is self-contradictory. (2. 107-108)

To discuss the first, third, sixth, and seventh of these topics and Cicero's development of them is merely to repeat what has been previously said concerning Epicurus' teaching and Cicero's misunderstanding of it<sup>241</sup>.

Concerning the second topic there is, however, something to be said. Cicero (86-87) has stated that every school of philosophy seeks the happy life as its end, and that life is not happy unless happiness once achieved is a permanent possession:

. . . neque expectat ultimum tempus aetatis, quod Croeso scribit Herodotus praeceptum a Solone. (2. 87)

With these premises Epicurus would agree<sup>242</sup>:

Ungrateful towards the blessings of the past is the saying, 'Wait till the end of a long life.'

And just as with food he [the wise man] does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

It is from the point of view of the second of these quotations that Epicurus can say:

Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure<sup>243</sup>.

Cicero's objection comes at just this point:

. . . negat Epicurus ne diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis quam si illa sit sempiterna. Haec dicuntur inconstantissime. (D. F. 2. 87)

But Cicero understands only a part of the statement of Epicurus and he overlooks the very important condition which Epicurus attaches:

. . . if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure.

It is characteristic of his attack on Epicureanism that, in his condemnation of the doctrine as base or as inconsistent within itself,

<sup>241</sup> See above, e.g., pp. 70-77, where Epicurus' conception of pleasure is presented as a kind of pleasure which is little at the mercy of external events; the same pages show how Epicurus' conception of pleasure is consistent only with the simple life. See above, pp. 31-32, for the place of courage in Epicureanism. See also pp. 37-38.

<sup>242</sup> Sent. Vat. LXXV (118-119); Men. 126 (84-85). Both quoted from Bailey's translation.

<sup>243</sup> K. A. XIX (98-99).



Cicero never seems to be conscious of the recurring idea of *the limits* of pleasure<sup>244</sup>. Bignone<sup>245</sup> explains the saying of Epicurus above quoted by referring to the context in which it stands, where is to be found (K. Δ. XVIII-XXI (98)) a discussion of the function of reason in interpreting the needs of the flesh.

. . . the mind, having obtained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life. . . . (K. Δ. XX (99), Bailey's translation)

Bignone's interpretation of the matter is as follows<sup>246</sup>:

To desire that enjoyment last infinitely is to utter a judgment on the excellence of unlimited pleasure as compared with limited pleasure. The body does not do this, nor can it do it: the reason, if anything, affirms it, as seems fitting; and of the reason, Epicurus speaks later and shows how it solves the question otherwise. (p. 29)

. . . . .

That 'the flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited' can be true only if the sense in its pure and divine nature lives in the pure instant which flees and, in that, does not have disturbance or presentiment concerning successive instants, wherefore in every instant it perceives the fullness of eternity. . . .

For the child . . . who lives in the purity of sensation, all that in which his soul is placed is boundless and immense, and he sees no bounds to the fullness of sensation. For this reason, the years of childhood and of earliest youth seem so long and rich. . . . (29)

According to Epicurus, then, the body, naturally pleasure-loving, does not foresee a limit to its own pleasure: it rejoices in its perfection and enjoys the taste of it: it is no inauspicious prophet, but in every instant gathers the blessedness of the infinite.

. . . . .

The reason then renders an account as to what is the highest good of the body and what indeed are its limits<sup>247</sup>, dissipates the terror regarding eternity, and gives order and security to the whole life. Hence there is no desire for infinite time.

. . . . .

The flesh does not utter a judgment; the intellect attends to judgment and passes sentence according to the analysis of pleasure which Epicurus has premised elsewhere. It knows then that the highest good

<sup>244</sup> Cf. K. Δ. III (94): "Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν; XV (98): καὶ ὥρισται καὶ ἐπὶ ὁρίστῳ ἐστίν. . . ; XVIII-XXI (98), to which reference is made in the text; Sent. Vat. LIX (114), LXIII, LXVIII (116); Frg. C 45-46 (132); Frg. D 68-75 (136), 85 (138). Of these, note especially the last: Τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὀρίζουσα. See supplementary note below, p. 121.

<sup>245</sup> Bignone, *Epicuro* 27-32. See also Bignone, *Aristotle* 2. 18-19 et passim.

<sup>246</sup> Bignone, *Epicuro* 2-31: paraphrased from the Italian of Bignone.

<sup>247</sup> Bignone here refers to Men. 131(88); K. Δ. XXV (100), III (94); Men. 133 (90).

of the body is the absence of pain, and that pleasure does not increase beyond this limit, but is only varied in refinements which are not necessary to happiness. (30-31)

From this point of view the reason is in control of life, teaching that pleasure cannot be increased beyond the point of relieving pain<sup>248</sup>, and that the pain caused by natural and necessary desires can be assuaged by modest resources which are easily available<sup>249</sup>.

Thus it is that Epicurus can say that for the wise man little is left outside his own control:

In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters reason has ordained and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain. (K. Δ. XVI (99), Bailey's transl.)

He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain: he laughs at <destiny>, whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. <He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity> and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame.

. . . . .

. . . he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it. (Men. 133-134 (91), Bailey's transl.)

To paraphrase again from Bignone:

There is an inner source of perennial happiness; rarely does it depend on fortune, for in the conception of the Greek sage the wise man is the master-builder whom the chances of life serve as mere material: with this material, cheap and untrustworthy, he will be able to sketch the austere and harmonious work of art of his own serene life<sup>250</sup>.

The wise man's independence of chance and destiny is an idea dear to Epicurus<sup>251</sup>. In practice, by the attitude toward life above presented such independence is to be achieved; in terms of man's relation to the universe, it results, as Epicurus believes, from the swerve of the atom. This is stated most clearly perhaps by Lucretius:

<sup>248</sup> K. Δ. III (94).

<sup>249</sup> K. Δ. XV, XXI (98); it is to be observed that reason is expected to control the restlessness of unnecessary desire: K. Δ. XXVI (100), XXX (102).

<sup>250</sup> Bignone, Epicuro 17, comment on K. Δ. XVI, paraphrased from the Italian.

<sup>251</sup> Men. 134 (90); Sent. Vat. XLVII-XLVIII (112); Frg. D 77 (136-138).

But that the very mind feels not some necessity within in doing all things, and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer, this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings in no determined direction of place and at no determined time<sup>252</sup>.

Since in the Epicurean system the mind like the body is composed of atoms, the atomic swerve would necessarily have its effect here as well as in the action of matter in the universe at large. When the mind receives images from without, the fine atoms of which it is composed are set in motion, but the impact of such images cannot in itself determine the result of the mind's decision to act, because of the possibility of the swerve inherent in the nature of the fine atoms of the mind as in all other atoms; thus the mind determines within itself the course which it will pursue, and through the possibility of atomic swerve is not driven in a predetermined direction by the product of the images which impinge upon it<sup>253</sup>.

In the Epicurean literature there is one reference<sup>254</sup> to indicate that as the swerve of the atoms of the mind makes possible the mind's freedom of decision, so the swerve of the atoms of the universe gives rise to the fortuitous circumstances of life, events outside the control of the individual, which Epicurus sees not as determining factors, but as opportunities to be used for advantage or disadvantage. Guyau gives credit to this theory of the origin of chance<sup>255</sup> and its connection with freedom of the will; Bailey, however, with a more conservative attitude, after having reviewed Guyau's argument, takes his position as follows:

On the whole it seems safest to conclude that Epicurus did admit the element of contingency in the world, and may possibly have attributed it to the atomic 'swerve'; most probably the brilliant idea devised by Guyau did not occur to him, but he would gladly have adopted it if it had<sup>256</sup>.

After thus examining Epicurus' doctrine of the continuity of the wise man's happiness, we find Cicero's criticisms superficial and inaccurate. The cause of his error lies in his misunderstanding of

<sup>252</sup> Lucretius 2. 289-293, Bailey's translation (75).

<sup>253</sup> This is discussed in greater detail by Bailey, *Atomists* 318-321.

<sup>254</sup> Bailey, *Atomists* 327, translates from Plutarch, *De Sollertia Anim.* 7, p. 964 e, as follows:

An atom swerves the very least so that heavenly bodies and living beings *and chance* may come into existence and our free will may not be lost.  
(The italics are Bailey's.)

<sup>255</sup> Guyau 95, where it is observed that Epicurus always places the term *hasard* and *liberté* parallel to each other, without confusing them.

<sup>256</sup> Bailey, *Atomists* 327. See Bailey's review of Guyau's argument, *Ibid.* 324-327. Bailey here shows that Guyau's theory rests on rather scanty evidence.

Epicurus' conception of pleasure. In failing to see that for Epicurus pleasure consists of serenity, Cicero declares that the happiness of the Epicurean is transient, and therefore non-existent (2. 87-88), and that such happiness as he may enjoy is at the mercy of fortune (2. 89). In such conclusions there is clearly a clash of opinion between Cicero and Epicurus; but in the argument by which Epicurus supports his conclusions (as it is presented above), there is no clash of opinion, because Cicero never seems to be aware that any such logical reasoning was developed by Epicurus<sup>257</sup>.

Cicero declares:

Ita fit beatae vitae domina fortuna, quam Epicurus ait exiguum intervenire sapienti (2. 89),

in obvious reference to the idea expressed by Epicurus in K. Δ. XVI. (98)<sup>258</sup>. To such arguments as Cicero's, the Epicurean would reply:

I have anticipated thee, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all thy secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to thee or to any other circumstance; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well<sup>259</sup>.

When Cicero speaks of pain as destructive of the happiness of an Epicurean<sup>260</sup>, there is clearly considerable depth of feeling in his discussion. It is evident in his repetition of the word *dolor*, in his use of strong expressions for pain, such as *tanta tormenta* and *cruciatus perferibat*, and finally in his allusion to the tortures of Philoctetes<sup>261</sup>. He finds the general subject of such importance that in the *Tusculans* he devotes the entire second book to the discussion of pain as an evil.

An interesting theory offered by Lörcher suggests that Cicero's discussion of pain is clearly a reflection of his own personal experience. Lörcher's argument may be paraphrased as follows<sup>262</sup>:

There is a similarity of feeling and thought in the passage about Philoctetes (2. 93-95) and, e.g., one of the letters to Atticus (12. 18), which reads thus:

<sup>257</sup> Cf. Torquatus' presentation in D. F. 1. 62-63, where the statements though not un-Epicurean are not elaborated sufficiently to meet Cicero's criticism in 2. 87-89. See Uri's analysis of Cicero's argument in 2. 87-89, Uri 52-55, 63-64.

<sup>258</sup> See Reid, D. F. 1. 63 n. for this and other references to Epicurean expression of the same idea. Reid here notes also Cicero's references to the matter in T. D. 3. 49 and 5. 26.

<sup>259</sup> Sent. Vat. XLVII (113), Bailey's translation.

<sup>260</sup> D. F. 2. 92-98; cf. the outline given above, p. 104.

<sup>261</sup> D. F. 2. 92-95.

<sup>262</sup> Lörcher F & E 94-95. It should be noted that this argument of Lörcher's is incidental to his study of Cicero's original contributions and his use of source material.

Dum recordationes fugio, quae quasi morsu quodam dolorem efficiunt, refugio ad te . . . etc.

Afterwards with complaint of the *dolores* not to be banned, Cicero speaks of the little time which he has yet to live:

. . . quod mihi tamen nimium longum videtur; habeo enim nihil tentatis rebus omnibus, in quo acquiescam. Nam dum illud tractabam, de quo ad te ante scripsi, quasi fovebam dolores meos, nunc omnia respuo, nec quidquam habeo tolerabilius quam solitudinem. . .

With this compare D. F. 1. 93:

Maximus dolor, inquit, brevis est . . . Quid enim? Summus dolor plures dies manere non potest? Vide, ne etiam menses! Nisi forte eum dicis, qui, simul atque arripuit, interficit. Quis istum dolorem timet?

The form of Philoctetes which presents itself to the reader of the letter now appears and has stood before the writer of the letter. Its image appears in the book in the work of art where he must seek for an object outside himself to represent himself; thus it is that one feels that it could represent only exhaustive subjective grief:

Sic Epicurus: Philocteta, st! brevis dolor. At iam decimum annum in spelunca iacet. Si longus, levis, dat enim intervalla et relaxat. (D. F. 2. 94)

There follows directly the introductory and chief thought of the letter above referred to:

Primum non saepe, deinde quae est relaxatio, cum et praeteriti doloris memoria recens est et futuri atque impendentis torquet timor? (95)

The suggestion of suicide which follows is to be understood only as a suggestion of personal necessity. Again echoing<sup>263</sup> the words of the letter, is the self-challenge:

Potius ergo illa dicantur, turpe esse, viri non esse debilitari dolore, frangi, succumbere. (95)

And then the bitter words,

Nam ista vestra: 'Si gravis, brevis, si longus, levis,' dictata sunt, and the attempt to conclude with consolation,

Virtutis, magnitudinis, animi, patientiae, fortitudinis fomentis dolor mitigari solet.

These last words seem to me evidence that Cicero wrote the passage in just these sad days.

Lörcher further sees in this whole passage a distant echo of De Fin. 1. 59, where he considers Cicero's effort to think himself into an Epicurean not altogether successful in spite of the insistent enthusiasm there expressed.

Lörcher's interesting reference to the correspondence of Cicero offers evidence for the assumption that Cicero, in the severity of his

<sup>263</sup> Lörcher here refers to another letter, Att. 12. 38. 3, where Cicero assures Atticus that he has achieved the dignity of control of his grief, as evidenced by his literary output.

attack on the Epicurean theory of pain, is considerably influenced by his own unhappiness at the time and his struggle against it. In the second *Tusculan* where pain is the major topic of discussion, Philoctetes is mentioned more than once (*T. D.* 2. 19, 33, 44, 55), usually with some comment on the weakness of spirit betokened by his outcry. To push Lörcher's theory further, we might assume that here too Cicero urges upon himself the necessity of self-control.

Such self-control is not a necessary part of the Epicurean's philosophy of conduct: he will cry out in a moment of torture<sup>264</sup>. In his philosophy, there is no reason why he should not. Yet even for one on the rack the pain is not continually excruciating, for even there the Epicurean can find happiness<sup>264</sup>. This is perhaps the extreme example of the Epicurean doctrine that the most severe pain is brief in duration:

Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh<sup>265</sup>.

Epicurus' philosophy of pain has been stated by Guyau as follows:

Pain is only an hiatus in the happiness of life, and even so the interval of pain is not complete, for really pain is never pure: the most intense is also the briefest; and that which is more lasting is less vivid and often gives way to pleasure. In long illnesses, as Epicurus says, pain cannot entirely dispel pleasure, which, as he holds, often dispels pain as soon as it appears. Thus long illnesses all in all have more of pleasure than of pain, and that which is rightly regarded as the greatest of evils cannot entirely destroy happiness. To be happy it suffices not always to suffer, and how brief in all are the instants of pain in the whole of life! Happiness is then by no means inaccessible; it returns of itself as soon as pain has withdrawn<sup>266</sup>.

Thus to Epicurus, whose aim in life is the pleasure of tranquillity, the achieved harmony<sup>267</sup> which is in the control of the individual, pain can be only a brief interruption; it can never destroy his happiness. The result is independence of fortune in this as in the other affairs of life. Courage thus becomes a calculation of advantage<sup>268</sup> rather than a grim endurance of evil. Cicero himself can have Torquatus say,

<sup>264</sup> *Vita* 118 (164).

<sup>265</sup> *K. A.* IV (95), Bailey's translation.

<sup>266</sup> Guyau 50-51, my paraphrase of the French of Guyau.

<sup>267</sup> Guyau 52-53.

<sup>268</sup> *Vita* 120<sup>b</sup> (168).

. . . Sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore,  
. . . (D. F. I. 49)

and that the Epicurean has prepared his spirit to meet the accidents of life<sup>269</sup>. Basing his remarks on the statements of Torquatus, Bailey says<sup>270</sup>,

For courage he [the Epicurean] has both a stronger motive and a greater capacity than others: for the sake of his own peace it is infinitely worth while, and he knows that the demand on it is not so great as it might seem.

If the Epicurean doctrine is thus understood, Cicero, in the presentation of Torquatus, and in his own attack (D. F. 2. 92-95) on this theory of pain, seems to have caught the phrases rather than the substance of the argument of Epicurus. When (2. 95) Cicero accuses Epicureanism of too readily offering death as an escape from pain, he underestimates the Epicurean capacity for endurance and adjustment; certainly suicide as an escape receives scant respect in the Epicurean saying:

He is a little man in all respects who has many good reasons for quitting life<sup>271</sup>.

On the other hand, Cicero himself at the end of the second Tusculan (2. 66-67) can suggest death as a refuge if life is unendurable:

. . . nam si omnia fugiendae turpitudinis adipiscendaeque honestatis causa faciemus, non modo stimulos doloris, sed etiam fulmina fortunae contemnamus licebit, praesertim cum paratum sit illud ex hesterni disputatione perfugium . . . sic urgentibus asperis et odiosis doloribus, si tanti sint, ut ferendi non sint, quo sit confugiendum vides.

To accept the interpretation above presented for the Epicurean theory of pain is to find in Epicurus' farewell letter<sup>272</sup> a noble expression of the experience of one whose life adorned his profession. Cicero, however, sees it otherwise, and his comments vary from sarcastic disparagement of Epicurus' experience with pain to a tribute of respect paid to a man whose innate heroism contradicted

<sup>269</sup> D. F. I. 49. See above, 31-32, for suggested limitations in Torquatus' presentation of courage.

<sup>270</sup> Bailey, *Atomists*, 510.

<sup>271</sup> Sent. Var. XXXVIII (111), Bailey's translation. Cf. Vita 119 (166) and Lucr. 3. 79 ff.

<sup>272</sup> D. F. 2. 96; cf. Epicurus' letter to Idomeneus, Frg. C 30 (126-129), Bailey's translation: On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you, . . .

his unmanly philosophy<sup>273</sup>. Cicero's tribute to Epicurus' heroic endurance of pain, which, unorthodox though he finds it, he yet compares with that of Epaminondas, is much less satisfactory than the words of a modern writer who compares the death of Epicurus with that of Socrates<sup>274</sup>:

Every philosopher should offer his own model of supreme human perfection, should witness it in his own life, and complete it by a death harmoniously serene. . . . And while the Hellenic age consecrated, as the ideal type of a philosopher who died by execution, Socrates, conversing in his cell with his disciples in the hope of the marvelous mystery of the human soul re-born, with the women waiting at a distance, the Alexandrian age found its ideal in Epicurus, who with his last words affirmed his happiness victorious in the face of death: "I write this to you on the last and happiest day of my life." These two deaths, so diverse and so purely Greek, mark the limits of the two ages, and represent for the ancient world the imprint of two human types and two spiritual forms, each with its own faith and piety,—*l'imitatio Socratis e l'imitatio Epicuri*.

In the farewell letter of Epicurus, Cicero finds inconsistency not only in the mastery of pain by the spirit, but also in the loyalty manifested to affection and friendship, and in the fact that the pleasure which he mentions is philosophical rather than sensual. Cicero here follows his usual custom of attributing all nobility of Epicurean statement and conduct to the inherent uprightness of mankind which makes men noble even in contradiction of a vicious philosophy which they may profess. His own repeated charges of such inconsistency might well cause him to inquire whether these apparent contradictions ought not to suggest to him the possibility of some 'significant flaw in his own analysis of the Epicurean doctrine'<sup>275</sup>.

Of a somewhat different nature is the inconsistency which Cicero finds in that provision of Epicurus' will which arranges for an annual commemoration of his birthday and for a meeting on the twentieth of each month in memory of Metrodorus and himself<sup>276</sup>. Epicurus' purpose in the establishment of these memorials can hardly have been anything other than an attempt to insure the continuation of his philosophy, although it may also have been accompanied, as Cicero seems to think, by a human desire that he and Metrodorus

<sup>273</sup> Cf. T. D. 2. 45; 5. 88-89; D. F. 2. 96-98.

<sup>274</sup> Bignone, *Epicuro* 40-41 (paraphrase from the Italian).

<sup>275</sup> With Cicero's charges of Epicurean inconsistency may be compared the statement of Professor Paul Elmer More, *Hellenistic Philosophies* (61): "Were it not for the flaunting paradox of the phrase, one would declare that of all Epicureans he who gave them their name was the least Epicurean."

<sup>276</sup> *Vita* 18 (152); D. F. 100-103.



should be remembered by the school. Cicero's criticism, however, is captious and unreasonable; it maintains that such provision is inconsistent with a belief that there is no existence after death, as well as with the dignity of a natural philosopher who should not believe in the observance of birthdays.

Of these criticisms the former seems to connect the memorial ceremony with the custom of banquets for the dead (*velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis*, D. F. 2. 103), in which according to some authorities the spirit of the dead was thought to participate in the pleasure and fellowship of the occasion<sup>277</sup>. Some such association of ideas would account for Cicero's remark that the provision for such a birthday observance ill becomes one who insists that the dead are without sensation<sup>278</sup>. The other criticism regarding the folly of thinking that any day can be anyone's natal day may possibly be an attempt of Cicero's to connect Epicurus' provision with some of the practices of astrology which were so prevalent in his own day<sup>279</sup>. The purpose of Epicurus in the matter is obvious enough<sup>280</sup>, and even Cicero must here have been conscious that he was somewhat perverse in these particular criticisms.

Since this whole section (2. 86-108) is obviously intended as a completion of the reply to Torquatus<sup>281</sup>, the discussion of Cicero's criticism throughout this passage is related to that of the previous chapter on the same topics; the inadequacy of Cicero's comments on the pleasures of the mind, including those of memory, has already been discussed<sup>282</sup>. It is evident throughout this entire section (2. 86-108) that Cicero's conception of Epicurean pleasure is limited by his refusal to accept tranquillity of life as Epicurus' definition of

<sup>277</sup> Festivals for the dead are discussed (not with reference to Epicurus) by Cumont 199-204; Fowler, 387. Schmidt, 41-43, refers to the birthday celebration in memory of Epicurus in a discussion in which he shows that the birthday of a founder of a philosophical school was often kept in the same way as that of the father of a family. Schmidt also discusses (11-14) celebrations held monthly, and especial connection between an individual and a god whose birthday is the same day of the month. Cumont (11-12) tells of a goblet found at Boscoreale showing Epicurus with hand outstretched toward a cake on a table.

<sup>278</sup> D. F. 2. 100-101. Reid, comm. ad loc., shows that Aelian and Plutarch made the same criticism as that of Cicero.

<sup>279</sup> Fowler, op. cit., 396-8; Schmidt, 9-10, connects the monthly celebration of the day of one's birth with the birthday of a god, and with the practice of astrology. I do not find that these or other writers suggest astrology in connection with Cicero's criticism of Epicurus.

<sup>280</sup> See Cumont 20, and Thiaucourt 84 n.

<sup>281</sup> See D. F. 2. 85: . . . pauca etiam nunc dicam ad reliquam orationem tuam.

<sup>282</sup> See above Ch. I, pp. 37-38.

pleasure. Starting from an erroneous conception of Epicurus' *summum bonum*, Cicero diverges ever farther and farther from Epicurus in the application of the theory of pleasure and pain to the affairs of life.

#### IV

THE FINAL section of Cicero's critique (109-119) undertakes to show that man's rich gifts fit him for a high destiny far beyond the range of one whose aim is pleasure. Although it contains the usual measure of Cicero's false assumptions in regard to the Epicurean position, it contains also the resounding call to duty in which Cicero himself so firmly believed, and as such rings with sincere feeling. The passage has been called oratorical<sup>283</sup>, and so it is, but it is to be remembered that it is an orator's presentation of those things which Cicero held essential to the good life: the pursuits of culture for one's interest and relaxation, the service of one's fellows for the serious business of life.

As elsewhere, Cicero here presents the lowest interpretation of the Epicurean conception of pleasure:

Epicureans might learn from animals the social virtues. (109-111)

Epicurean pleasure is greatest when all the senses are flooded with delight. (114)

A doctrine of pleasure is inconsistent with noble service to one's fellow men. (117)

Pleasure is inconsistent with virtue. (117)

In the light of Epicurus' own teaching, these censures are unjust. But Cicero's attitude is to be explained partly by the fact that he could not or would not see the Epicurean doctrine as anything but base. He insists on finding nobility inconsistent with its tenets, even when he must respect Epicurean character and expressions; he seems not to see in such admirable instances a product of the philosophy which should make him examine further his own conception of it. It is the integrity of Cicero which creates his prejudice, as is shown particularly in this section where he finds man's high endowments a challenge to nobility of life, and his conception of a noble life is thus expressed:

Perpetuisne malis voluptatibus perfruens in ea quam saepe usurpas tranquillitate degere omnem aetatem sine dolore, assumpto etiam illo quod vos quidem adiungere soletis sed fieri non potest, sine doloris metu, an, cum de omnibus gentibus optime mererere, cum

<sup>283</sup> Thiaucourt 84 n.; Uri 65.

opem indigentibus salutemque ferres, vel Herculis perpeti aerumnas.  
(D. F. 2. 118)

It must be remembered that Cicero himself, both before and after these words were written, took the course of service and paid the full price. Epicureanism, even if understood in its true dignity, is considerably out of the range of sympathies of one who can be characterized as follows:

. . . Cicero, who felt that every activity of life should be socialized and who practiced what he preached, to whom the founding, development, and preservation of those assemblages of human beings which are called "States" constituted the noblest work in which a good man could engage, who gave up his life, when he was more than sixty years of age, in a heroic attempt to save the *ancien régime* which had become to him so unspeakably dear<sup>284</sup>.

<sup>284</sup> McCrea 46.

### *Summary of the Above Study of Cicero's Critique of Epicurean Ethics, De Fin. I. 22-27 and II, Entire.*

1. The study of De Finibus 1. 22-27 and 2. 1-119 tends to substantiate the theory presented at the end of the preceding chapter (pp. 43-44), that the inadequacy of Cicero's view of Epicurean ethics as given in the discourse of Torquatus is due to a failure to see individual doctrines in their proper relation to each other, and to comprehend the philosophy of Epicurus as a closely coherent and integrated structure.

The second book of the De Finibus, like the first, both by reference and quotation, shows a familiarity with many individual tenets of Epicureanism; it is therefore the more significant that Cicero, by the nature of his attack on these points of doctrine, seems to show himself entirely unaware of their position in the logical structure of which they are a part. It is significant also that Cicero translates accurately and carefully the wording of the doctrines which he attacks; for his very effort at fidelity compels us to believe that the unsatisfactory result of his presentation and criticism is due, not to an intentional misrepresentation, but rather to a failure, unrecognized on his own part, to see the doctrine as a whole.

Some of the more striking instances in support of these statements are the following:

#### 1) The treatment of the sensation theory.

Cicero recognizes this sufficiently to have it more or less clearly presented by Torquatus (1. 30-31, 64), but the attack made in the critique shows no realization of the necessary results of Epicurus' belief that sensation is man's only available guide to action: e.g.,

- a) Cicero does not see that sensation as the only source of knowledge is closely connected with feeling as the only standard of action, e.g., 1. 22-27; see above pp. 55-61.
- b) He does not realize that to the Epicurean there can be no existing guide of conduct other than pleasure and pain, e.g., 2. 29, 36; see above pp. 79-81, 88, 90.
- c) He fails to realize that by the theory of the atomic conception of mind and soul, pleasure of mind as well as of body is necessarily a result of sense-impressions, e.g., 2. 29, 107-108; see above pp. 39-40, 79-81.

2) The treatment of the virtues.

Cicero in his insistence on the Stoic virtues, especially temperance and justice, fails to realize that the Epicurean conception of tranquil happiness offers no incentive for intemperance and injustice; to the Epicurean, the life of uprightness and self-control is the normal life. In these matters Torquatus' discourse is not quite adequate, and moreover Cicero seems not to have realized the full implication of all that was said on these matters by Torquatus. (See 1. 42-54; 2. 45-77; and the discussion given above, pp. 28-34, 88-97). Cicero's treatment of justice in both the first and the second book omits all reference to the social contract, an important conception in the Epicurean theory of justice.

3) The discussion of friendship.

- a) In the second book (2. 78-85) as in the first, Cicero presents three Epicurean motives for friendship which seem to be in reality not opinions quoted from three different groups of Epicureans, but rather fragments of the teaching of Epicurus himself. Cicero seems not to have realized their fragmentary character.
  - b) Cicero has not realized that the Epicurean can consistently incur trouble and danger in connection with friendship, in accordance with his theory of the calculation of advantages, incurring pain for the sake of a greater pleasure.
  - c) There is in Cicero's discussion too much pressure on the word *utilitas*; it thus becomes evident that Cicero has not realized that 'utility' for the consistent Epicurean could have little reference to wealth or power, since such utility could have no place in the Epicurean idea of happiness.
  - d) Cicero's charges that the loyalty of certain Epicureans in their friendships is inconsistent with their doctrine betray his limitations in the comprehension of the doctrine.  
(See the discussion of these matters above pp. 97-104).
- 4) Cicero's charge that Epicurean happiness is dependent on circumstances. (2. 85-108) :
- a) Cicero seems unaware of Epicurus' repeated advice: that one measure by reason the limits of pleasure.
  - b) He does not realize the Epicurean way of meeting pain through the calculation that pain is never absolute, and that it is to be met by the philosophical enjoyment of every instant of serenity, rather than by the grim endurance of a difficult situation.
  - c) Epicurus' last letter reveals an attitude toward life that adorns his profession rather than a noble inconsistency with an ignoble doctrine.
  - d) Cicero attacks Epicurus' doctrine that the wise man is independent of circumstances, but does not attack the method of reasoning by which Epicurus supports that doctrine.  
(See the discussion above pp. 104-115).

2. Cicero's critique of Epicureanism reveals also an unwillingness to accept the terminology of Epicurus in the sense in which Epicurus himself uses it. This is true particularly in relation to the word *ἡδονή* which Cicero insists on translating by *voluptas*, without any consideration at all for the care with which Epicurus defines his conception of pleasure; the true Epicurean conception of pleasure is reflected in the varied phrases used by Lucretius, among which the word *voluptas* is not conspicuous. Cicero not only translates by the word *voluptas*, but in most cases insists on giving that word its basest connotation. He shows a similar perversity in his use of the word *utilitas* in connection with his discussion of the Epicurean conception of friendship (2. 78-79). (See discussion above, pp. 70-77, 97-104.)

3. There is to be observed in Cicero's argument against Torquatus a confusion in the development of certain topics, involving both repetition and unclear reasoning; this confused argument sometimes ends, ironically enough, in the declaration that Epicurus is illogical and inconsistent. Cicero thus seems to betray his own confusion of mind in regard to the matters which he is discussing, a confusion which partly explains his declarations of Epicurus' inconsistency. (See e.g., 2. 5-38, and the discussion above pp. 66-70, 90-91, 92-94.)

4. Cicero's dislike of the Epicurean doctrine is obvious both in his conscious refutation as presented in the first two books of *De Finibus*, and in his casual references to the philosophy at points where he is trying to take the attitude of an impartial judge (see above, pp. 45-53). There is an abundance of evidence that he has not been deliberately and intentionally unfair in his presentation and his criticism. The reason for his aversion seems to lie partly in the fact that he never understood the philosophy, and partly in the fact that he would not have liked it and could not have accepted it if he had understood it.

One of the clearest examples of his failure to achieve a sympathetic understanding of the atmosphere in which the Epicurean wise man would live is the omission in his critique of all references to doctrines which he knew well enough to have stated by Torquatus, which are essential to a sympathetic comprehension of the Epicurean way of life: these are especially, the necessity of choice in relation to pleasure and pain; the necessity of right understanding of the sources of pleasure and pain, and the healing of extravagant desires by the Epicurean way of life (see above, pp. 61-65).

Cicero was himself a man of action whose personal standards and inclinations resulted in a life of high integrity and devotion to public service. A life of tranquil equilibrium, even if good and useful, would not have appealed to his nature. He was therefore temperamentally out of sympathy with the Epicurean ideal, and was confirmed in his attitude by the price which he had paid for his own devotion to public interests, and partly perhaps by conflict with certain nominal Epicureans of his own day (see above pp. 64-65, 94-97, 115-116). It would seem that these influences worked in a circle, so that Cicero by his disinclination toward the ideals of Epicureanism is blinded toward much in the doctrine with which he must have agreed; and by his failure to realize much that he could have agreed with in theory, he is led to assume for the doctrine certain inconsistencies and vicious tendencies which were in no degree inherent in the system. The respect which he admits for certain individual Epicureans, and even for certain tenets of their philosophy, might well have led him to re-examine his own conclusions concerning the system as a whole.

In the light of the above study it is fair to say that Cicero's treatment of Epicurean ethics is an untrustworthy source from which to seek a fundamental understanding of the philosophy.

## SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

The recent work of Ettore Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto*, Volumes I and II, is of considerable interest to a student of Epicureanism.

It is Bignone's thesis that Epicurus developed his ethical philosophy largely in reply to the attacks made upon hedonism by Plato and by Aristotle in his earlier (and lost) works. It is, according to Bignone, this background that accounts for Epicurus' insistence on the *limits* of pleasure. (See esp. Ch. VI.)

It is of especial interest to a reader of Cicero that Bignone derives Cicero's argument against pleasure from the early Aristotle whom Epicurus opposed. (See esp. Vol. 2. 336.) It may be said in favor of this theory of Bignone's that it accounts for the vividness of debate which almost seems to be a mutual argument between Cicero and Epicurus. It seems at times even that Epicurus replies to Cicero, especially in the argument as to whether absence of pain can be pleasure, and whether Epicurean justice is a policy of concealment: when Cicero says, "But if you were *sure* that the crime were absolutely concealed," Epicurus as if in reply declares, "But you never can be sure."

Bignone is so certain of Epicurus' development in response to the early Aristotle that he would derive a part of the lost Aristotle by formulating that to which Epicurus evidently replies.



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bailey, Remains	Bailey, Cyril London, 1926.	Epicurus, the Extant Remains with short critical apparatus, translation, and notes
Bailey, Atomists	Bailey, Cyril London, 1928.	The Greek Atomists and Epicurus
Bailey, Religion	Bailey, Cyril Berkeley, 1932.	Phases in the Religion of of Ancient Rome
Behncke	Behncke, Gustav Berlin, 1879.	De Cicerone Epicureorum Philosophiae Existimatore et Iudice
B. P. W.	Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift Berlin 1884-1920.	
Bevan	Bevan, Edwyn London, 1921.	Hellenism and Christianity
Bignone, Arist.	Bignone, Ettore Firenze, [1936].	L'Aristotele Perduto e la For- mazione Filosofica de Epicuro. I and II
Bignone, Cicero	Bignone, Ettore Riv. di Fil. 37. 1909. 54-84.	Qua Fide quibusque Fontibus Instructus Moralem Epicuri Philosophiam Interpretatus Sit Cicero in Primo De Finibus Libro.
Bignone, Epicuro	Bignone, Ettore Bari, 1920.	Epicuro. Opere, Frammenti, Testimonianze sulla sua Vita, tradotti con introduzione e commento
Brochard	Brochard, Victor L'Année Philosophique 14. 1903. 1-12.	La Morale d'Épicure
C. P.	Classical Philology Chicago. 1906-	
Conway	Conway, Robert Sey- mour, Cambridge, Mass. 1931.	Makers of Europe
Cumont	Cumont, Franz New Haven, 1922.	After Life in Roman Paganism
D. F.	Cicero, Marcus Tullius	De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum

Deiter, H.	Deiter, H. JB 84. 1895. Esp. p. 71.	Bericht über die Litteratur zu Ciceros Philosophischen Schriften aus den Jahren 1891-1893
DeWitt, Epicurus	DeWitt, Norman W. T.A.P.A. 63. 1932. 166-176.	Notes on the History of Epi- cureanism
DeWitt, Gratitude	DeWitt, Norman W. American Journal of Philology 58. 1937. 320-328.	The Epicurean Doctrine of Gratitude
DeWitt, Virgil	DeWitt, Norman W. London, 1923.	Virgil's Biographia Litteraria
Diog. Oen.	William, Johannes Lipsiae, 1907.	Diogenis Oenoandensis Frag- menta ordinavit et explicavit
Ep.	Epicurus (For abbreviations of titles, see the end of this list.)	
Fowler	Fowler, W. Warde London, 1922.	The Religious Experience of the Roman People
Frank	Frank, Tenney Proceedings of the British Academy XVIII 1932. 111-134.	Annual Lecture on a Master Mind. Cicero
Glover	Glover, T. R. London, 1927.	The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire
Gomperz	Gomperz, Theodor Translated by Berry, G. G. London, 1912.	Greek Thinkers. A History of Ancient Philosophy. Vol. IV
Gordis	Gordis, Warren Stone Chicago, 1905.	The Estimates of Moral Values Expressed in Cicero's Letters (A Study of the Motives Pro- fessed or Approved)
Guyau	Guyau, M. Paris, 1917.	La Morale d'Épicure et ses Rapports avec les Doctrines Contemporaines <sup>8</sup>
Hartfelder	Hartfelder, Karl Carlsruhae, 1875.	De Cicerone Epicureae Doc- trinae Interprete
Hastings	Hastings, James, Ed. Edinburgh and New York, 1908-1927.	Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics
Haussleiter	Haussleiter, Johannes JB. 255. 1937. 1-64.	Bericht über die Literatur zu den Nacharistotelischen Philo- sophen (mit Ausschluss der älteren Akademiker und Peri- patetiker und von Lukrez, Cicero, Philon, und Plutarch)

Henry	Henry, Margaret Young Geneva, N. Y. 1925.	für 1926-1930. Epikur und seiner Schule. Pp. 13-18 The Relation of Dogmatism and Scepticism in the Philosophical Treatises of Cicero
Hirzel 1 & 2	Hirzel, Rudolf Leipzig, 1877, 1882.	Untersuchungen zu Cicero's Philosophischen Schriften. I and II
Hirzel, Dialog	Hirzel, Rudolf Leipzig, 1895.	Der Dialog. Ein Literar-historischer Versuch. Erster Theil
Hutchinson	Hutchinson, W. M. L. London, 1909.	De Finibus I-V, with introduction and commentary
JB	Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft. Berlin, 1875-1898; Leipzig, 1899-Conrad Bursian, et al.	
James	James, William New York, 1890.	The Principles of Psychology Vol. II
Jastrow	Jastrow, Joseph Boston, 1918.	The Psychology of Conviction. A Study of Beliefs and Attitudes
Kaussen	Kaussen, Joseph Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie Alfred Schöne dargebracht. Kiel. 1903. Pp. 3-10.	De Cicerone et Torquato Epicureo
Lecky	Lecky, William E. H. New York and London, 1927.	History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne <sup>3</sup>
Lörcher, Cicero 1913	Lörcher, A. JB 162. 1913. (Esp. pp. 77-179).	Bericht über die Literatur zu Ciceros Philosophischen Schriften aus den Jahren 1902-1911
Lörcher, Cicero 1924	Lörcher, A. JB 200. 1924. 71-165.	Bericht über die Literatur zu Ciceros Philosophischen Schriften aus den Jahren 1912-1921
Lörcher, F & E	Lörcher, A. Halle, 1911.	Das Fremde und das Eigene in Ciceros Büchern De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum und den Academica
Madvig	Madvigius, D. Io. Nicolaus Hauniae, 1869.	De Finibus I-V. (Edition, introduction, commentary, and excursus) <sup>2</sup>
Martha, Mélanges	Martha, Constant Paris, 1896.	Mélanges de Littérature Ancienne
Martha, Lucrèce	Martha, Constant Paris, 1885.	Le Poème de Lucrèce. Morale-Religion-Science


Masson	Masson, John London, 1907.	Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet
Mayor	Mayor, Joseph B. Cambridge, 1880.	De Natura Deorum I-III Edition and Commentary
Mayor, Anc. Phil.	Mayor, Joseph B. Cambridge, 1912.	A Sketch of Ancient Philosophy from Thales to Cicero
McCrea	McCrea, Nelson Glenn New York, 1936.	Literature and Liberalism with Other Classical Papers
Merrill	Merrill, W. A. C. P. 11. 1916. 244-245.	Review of the dissertation of Hans Uri
More	More, Paul Elmer Princeton, 1923.	Hellenistic Philosophies
Munro	Munro, H. A. J. London and Cambridge, re-issued 1928	T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex. Vol. II. Explanatory Notes
Némethy	Némethy, Geyza Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny XXIV. 779- 786, reviewed by Hoyer in Der Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie 18. 1901. 42-43.	In Ciceronis De Finibus 1. 7. 23
Pascal	Pascal, Carlo Roma-Milano, 1903.	Studii Critici sul Poema di Lucrezio
P-W	Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft Georg Wissowa, Kurt Witte, Karl Mittlehaus, Wilhelm Kroll Stuttgart, 1894-	
Petersson	Petersson, Thorsten Berkeley, 1920.	Cicero. A Biography
Philippson, Bignone	Philippson, Robert R. M. Neue Folge. 66. 1911. 231-236.	Zu Ciceros Erstem Buche De Finibus [Review of Bignone, Cicero]
Philippson, Lörcher	Philippson, Robert B. P. W. 33. 1913. 598-617.	Review of Lörcher, F & E.
Philippson, Rechts.	Philippson, Robert Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 23. 1910, 289-337, 443-446.	Die Rechtsphilosophie der Epicureer
Philippson, Uri	Philippson, Robert B. P. W. 36. 1916. 103-110.	Review of Uri's dissertation

Phil. Anz.	Philologischer Anzeiger, als Ergänzung des Philologus 11. 1881. 590-593.	Review of Behncke's dissertation ( <i>Unsigned</i> )
Reid, Acad.	Reid, J. S. London, 1885.	Academica Introduction, edition, and commentary
Reid, D. F.	Reid, J. S. Cambridge, 1925.	De Finibus I and II. Introduction, edition, and commentary
Reiley	Reiley, Katharine C. New York, 1909.	Studies in the Philosophical Terminology of Lucretius and Cicero
R. M.	Rheinisches Museum für Philologie Frankfurt am Main, 1927-	
Richards	Richards, G. C. Boston and New York, 1935.	Cicero. A Study
Riv. di Fil.	Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica. Torino, 1872-	
Schanz	Schanz-Hosius Munich, 1927.	Geschichte der Römischen Literatur. Erster Teil, Zweite Hälfte. Die Römische Literatur in der Zeit der Republik <sup>4</sup>
Schiche	Schiche, Th. Lipsiae (Teubner), 1915.	De Finibus I-V. Edition
Schmidt	Schmidt, Wilhelm Giessen, 1908.	Geburtstag in Altertum
Schneidewin	Schneidewin, [M.] Hameln, 1893.	Ein Zusammenfassender und Metakritischer Rückblick auf Cicero's Beurteilung der Epikureischen Ethik in seinem Zweiten Buche de Finibus.
Shorey, Lucr.	Shorey, Paul Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 12. 1901. 201-210.	Plato, Lucretius, and Epicurus
Shorey, Cicero	Shorey, Paul Hastings, s. v.	Roman Philosophy, Cicero
Shorey, Plato	Shorey, Paul Chicago, 1933.	What Plato Said
Stanley	Stanley, Carleton London, 1936.	Roots of the Tree
Taylor, Epicurus	Taylor, A. E. London, 1911.	Epicurus

Taylor, Bailey	Taylor, A. E. The Classical Review 43, 1929. 68-70.	Review of Bailey's Atomists
T.A.P.A.	Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association	
Thiaucourt	Thiaucourt, C. Paris, 1885.	Essai sur les Traités Philosophiques de Cicéron
Uri	Uri, Hans Borna-Leipzig, 1914.	Cicero und die epikureische Philosophie. Ein Quellenkritische Studie
Usener	Usener, Hermannus Lipsiae, 1887.	Epicurea
Von Arnim	Von Arnim, J. P-W VI 1907. 133-135.	Epikuros
Wallace	Wallace, William London, 1880.	Epicureanism
Zeller	Zeller, E. (transl. by O. J. Reichel) London, 1880.	The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics

References to the works of Epicurus are based on Bailey's edition listed above. References are given by title and section number, followed by the page number in parenthesis. The following abbreviations are used:

Hdt.	Letter to Herodotus
Pyth.	Letter to Pythocles
Men.	Letter to Menoeceus
K. Δ.	Κύριαὶ Δόξαι
Sent. Vat.	Sententiae Vaticanae
Frg.	Fragments B, C, and D, with numbers as given by Bailey
Vita	Vita Epicuri



## VITA

I was born in Mackinaw, Illinois, on September 24, 1883. I graduated from the Mackinaw High School, and later from the two-year course at Illinois State Normal University. I received the A.B. and M.A. degrees from the University of Michigan, and have continued graduate study at the University of Chicago and at Columbia University. It has been my privilege to study with Professors Crittenden, Sanders, and Winter, and the late Professor Kelsey at the University of Michigan; with Professors Bonner and Prescott and with the late Professor Shorey at the University of Chicago; and with Professors Keyes, McCrea, Moore, Perry, Van Hook, and Young at Columbia University. I am at present a member of the Classical Department of Brooklyn College.