Evolutionary Psychology and "Happiness"

Quote from Kalosyni

I apologize that I'm a bit unclear regarding whether you were making remarks regarding the article or whether you we saying what you yourself think is true.

I think it is true.

Quote from Kalosyni

but the emphasis here on the forum is "what would Epicurus say" )

I actually don't see how or where Epicurus would refute that both anxiety and happiness are illusions, or are illusory. I think we fool ourselves constantly both as far as fears as well as what results from our behavior in a good way. Some illusions are bad, and some are good.

And honestly, I'm not seeking a continuing debate into prior or additional rather extreme counter examples one might throw out which move off of the point I was trying to make. I respect your right to differ. It's all good, as they say.

The distinction between "pleasure" and "happiness" seems like it might be relevant to this conversation we're having about illusion and storytelling.

Happiness concepts might be illusory, but a warm bowl of pho brings actual, physical pleasure (if you like pho, of course). And if I get bitten by a snake, it's going to actually hurt. These are true sensations and not just invented narratives.

I think Matteng made a similar point earlier, suggesting that Epicureanism has a more robust response to evolutionary determinism, compared to Stoicism for example.

If this line of argument is correct, it would be a reason to question formulations of Epicureanism (such as Gassendi's) that frame the telos as happiness rather than pleasure.

I've been a little distracted but here are my thoughts on the comments since I posted previously:

There are lots of different views on what happiness means, in part because the word happiness can be used as both a feeling and a concept, just like pleasure. We can point to pleasure as a feeling and feel confident because we like the feeling, and all of us will probably agree that we know what it means to "feel happy."

But neither Epicurus nor any of the other Greeks used the word "happiness" so we have to consider both the question of whether we are translating "eudaimonia" accurately and even if so what it really means.

For purposes of this post I'll take it for granted that "happiness" is a good English equivalent of "eudaimonia."

That still leaves the ultimate question of "what is happiness?" And my first step in giving a short answer is that happiness is the word being used to describe the "best life" or "most desirable life." I will assert that for Epicurus, a life of happiness is a life in which pleasures predominate over pains. I see this as firmly established in the letter to Menoeceus in the discussion of pleasure being the beginning and end of a blessed life, in Torquatus where he explains more than once that a life of happiness is a life of pleasure, and by Diogenes of Oinoanda where he goes to the extreme of "shouting" that the questions is not what is the means of happiness but what is happiness and concludes that a life of happiness is a life of pleasure.

Given this background it is absolutely appropriate for Epicureans to talk about happiness by explaining as did Epicurus what a life a happiness is, which is a life of pleasure.

There's nothing we can do about the fact that Aristotle and the Stoics and virtually everyone else uses the word that we translate "happiness" as meaning entirely different things, whether it's "virtue" or "piety" or "reason" or whatever. All we can do is explain what WE mean by happiness, and give the reasons why.

This doesn't make happiness an "illiusion" in any way whatever, and that's the main problem I have with the coarseness of the articles under discussion. That whole way of talking is a rejection of the Epicurean viewpoint that what the senses , anticipations, and feelings reveal to us are in fact our reality, and if "illusion" means anything I presume it refers to a distortion of reality or something that is unreal.

So "happiness" is neither an illusion nor unreal, but if you don't spend the time to take a firm position on what the word means then it might as well be. And this is where I think the best position to take is to argue strongly for the Epicurean view and against the contrary views, rather than just musing about how interesting it is that people take such different positions.

Being spectator to life is part of living, but someone who is only a spectator is absolutely not following the example of the ancient Epicureans.

Cassius I'll defer to your point about it being appropriate for Epicureans to define the telos in terms of "happiness" if that term is being used in the correct Epicurean sense. I just don't want to see it used as a way to downplay ἡδονή. I have the impression that Gassendi did a bit of this--though I'll have to go back and look at his essays again.

As you say, "happiness" sometimes denotes a feeling, and a feeling can't be untrue/unreal. Even Pinsof acknowledges that happiness feels great.

Regarding happiness as a concept, though, wouldn't the validity depend on the criteria? If someone invents a type of εὐδαιμονία that is not founded on sensations, feelings, or prolepsis, then the concept is empty opinion and thus illusory. Since the majority of people are not Epicureans, would it be likely that many if not most people use incorrect criteria, and thus empty opinion/illusion prevails?

I have the sense that we are "agreeing fiercely," so this is all just to clarify/correct my earlier post.

Yes absolutely Robert - the validity or usefulness of the term happiness (or any other term?) is dependent upon the criteria or standard or definition being given to us. And opposing philosophies and religions are giving happiness a completely different definition.

As Don will often stress the root of eudaimonia appears to be good demon or evoking blessedness which itself implies a standard of the best possible life, as in worthy of the gods. I see all those terms as just superlatives indicating "the best" or "as good as possible" but every adjective like that just requires further explanation. The one thing that doesn't require explanation is 'pleasure' because that is a feeling we experience directly. But even pleasure can be used as a concept so we always have to be clear what we are talking about.

But ultimately if we are going to look at things through an Epicurean framework we have to take into account the phrasing of Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus, and there he references both happiness and pleasure as terms that he's finding useful. So if we were to apply a blanket decision that divergent uses of the word happiness render it useless as a word we would be ignoring Epicurus' own choices. Even the errors involved in the terms "god" and "virtue" did not prevent him from specifying his meaning and using the terms.