

General Identification of the Argument in "On Methods of Inference"

Post by "Cassius" of October 28, 2020 at 10:09 PM

One issue that has already come up in recent discussions is that posed by "exceptions to what we think is a general rule," Does not the frequency in which we discover exceptions to the rules which we think we know show that it is improper to ever generalize by analogy, from matters

Next comes the argument from particular signs (mentioned above), after which Philodemus takes up the problem of unique cases. The Stoics argue that the method of analogy is made invalid by the existence of unique cases within our experience. These unique cases, they say, destroy the uniformity of experience; and since it is possible that objects beyond our experience may also be unique, we are not justified in supposing that what is true in our experience is true everywhere (I.19–II.25). To this argument the Epicureans reply that the unique cases mentioned by the Stoics do not destroy analogy, but rather support it. Differences are as important as similarities for inference, as long as the differences are uniform (XIV.28–XVI.4). no direct evidence?