



More explicit commitments to the view are found elsewhere. While dismissing Epicurus' arguments for the truth-as-correctness of perceptions in his summary of the *Canon*, Diogenes Laertius writes, "And the fact that the objects of perception exist guarantees the truth of perceptions."<sup>57</sup> Presumably, the

<sup>55</sup> In the course of this discussion, the Epicureans seem to have insisted that a future-tensed statement that is true-as-correct now is so in virtue of features of the present state of the world, rather than in virtue of the features of some future state of the world. I discuss their views in some detail in *How Epicureans*—in that discussion, however, I remain neutral with regard to the precise nature of these worldly features.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *De sensu* 110–11 (*De sensibus* 7). *De sensibus* 110–110 (*De sensibus* 7). I read *de sensibus* as 'object of perception' on the model of *aliquid*, which clearly has this meaning in *De sensibus* 109. For example, 109c: *aliquid* and *aliquid* (*aliquid*); "perception"—the meaning given by 112—would make poor sense of the sentence as a whole. But for a different view, see Long and Sedley 474, 4, B.

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'objects of perception' (*de sensibus*) are the same predicative complements elsewhere called 'perceptibles' since their existence is regarded as sufficient for the truth-as-correctness of the corresponding perceptions.<sup>58</sup> Here, then, Diogenes quite clearly reports that it is the existence of predicative complements that guarantees the truth-as-correctness of the corresponding perceptions; this can be taken as an explicit assertion that the former is responsible for the latter.

This post comes about, and is related to, this discussion here: [References to Epicurus' Attitude Toward The "Place of the Sciences And Liberal Arts"](http://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/1632-epicurus-on-truth-and-falsehood-statements-by-sextus-empiricus-article-by-brown/?postID=8285#post8285)