

DeWitt: "It Makes No Difference That Some Pleasures Are Static And Some Are Kinetic"

Post by "Maciej" of January 28, 2018 at 7:19 PM

I really do not know myself what to think about this doctrine. As isolated sentence it is understandable: if pleasures could be condensed they would not differ. But pleasures do differ. Therefore they cannot be condensed.

What does it mean that pleasure can be condensed? I am clueless.

(In my last post I misspoke. The conclusion is not that pleasures differ but that pleasures cannot be condensed. But it makes no difference for our discussion. The fact that pleasures differ is taken as self-evident premise of the judgement.)

I doubt that DeWitt interprets this doctrine correctly. He seems to think that the conclusion is that pleasure is a unit. But anyone who reads PD9 has to admit that is not the case in context of this doctrine.

I suppose that because it is PD it should be understandable for common Greek in time of formation of list of doctrines. This was the most public of Epicurean texts, introduction to philosophy. On the other hand it could be a reply to some obscure statement in Plato's dialogues or Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics or of the Megarian logicians or Cyrenaics.