

# Welcome Max Duboff

**Post by "Max DuBoff" of July 8, 2026 at 6:13 PM**

Ahh, good, yes. Your interpretation is certainly a plausible one. But Torquatus's argument in 1.37, as I understand it, is trying to show that katastematic pleasure is a pleasure. He uses that general principle to make this conclusion. We rejoice at katastematic pleasure; therefore it's a pleasure. (He also thinks this is true for kinetic pleasure, but he doesn't need to say it because it's obvious.) The "equivalent to" in the translation you cited isn't in the Latin (*omne autem id, quo gaudemus, voluptas est*).

My translation is: "For—since, once we are deprived of pain, we rejoice in that very freedom and absence of all pain, and moreover everything in which we rejoice is a pleasure, as everything by which we're displeased is a pain—the absence of all pain has been rightly called 'pleasure.'"

Woolf's translation is: "Now everything in which one takes delight is a pleasure (just as everything that distresses one is a pain). And so every release from pain is rightly termed a pleasure."

(Woolf translates "every release" rather than "all pain" and I think he's incorrect; my version is also in several other translations.)

I'm not sure we disagree on the variation point. Kinetic pleasures are variation no matter whether they're separate from katastematic pleasure in any meaningful sense. Either way they make things different without increasing the total quantity of pleasure.