

Discussion of Blog Article - "Reality Does Not Require Being Eternally The Same"

Post by "Cassius" of April 3, 2026 at 7:09 AM

As to the arguments in recent posts as to the possibility of knowledge and proof and how to define terms, I want to cite and praise as insightful something that [Titus](#) raise in another context

[Quote from Titus](#)

What I am suggesting is, in analogy to information technology, an Epicurean thought serving on the kernel level that defines how the operative systems operate.

I think this is an excellent analogy to be brought to bear on the problem.

After 2000 years of Judeo-Christianity and all sorts of philosophical regression, and over 500 years of Pythagoreanism and Platonism and Academic Skepticism and even Democriteanism before that, what has happened is essentially the same thing as a "mind virus at the kernel level" which has destroyed any progress that Epicurus made with his canonic.

The virus is the idea that "proof" or "proving something" requires omniscience, omniscience, and omnipresence -- an unhuman an inhuman level of "certainty" that is impossible by definition for a human to reach. This mind virus has destroyed the ability of many people to think that anything can be "proven" or anything can be "known" or that anything can be "real" if it fails to meet such an impossible standard.

This is why I think philosophy has regressed so far since the Epicurean period. Rather than accept Epicurus' position that there is a reasonable standard of proof grounded in the senses in which the mind IS and SHOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGED to be able to prove things in human terms, such a position is denounced as the ultimate sin. Some will say "sin against god" but the majority of modern philosophers and intelligentsia will consider it a "sin against humanism" in a "good-without-god" kind of way.

This argument entirely dismisses or ignores or flies in the face of what is explained at length in Lucretius Book 4. There it is made perfectly clear that those who say "nothing can be known" are not making a simple error, they are removing the possibility of reason and life itself if they fail to "trust the senses." Not only is that section ignored, but it's not even given a legitimate meaning, because it is also clear that the senses in Epicurean philosophy do not contain opinions of their own - the senses simply provide data from which the mind must produce true or false opinion.

This thread makes clear that the Kantian-like attitude is to say that ALL opinion is false and can never be considered "truth" or "the way reality really is." That's clearly not the Epicurean framework, but people are so infected with this mind virus that they don't even recognize the issue and the self-contradiction implied in their anti-knowledge claim.

That self-refutation is what Epicurus latched onto as the most clear way of explaining the problem, and it's probable that that remains the best argument for the Epicurean position.

As Don might say "Thank Zeus" that this section of Lucretius remains preserved, and we can cite it as a red line for what it means to follow Epicurean philosophy:

[Quote from Lucretius 4-469](#)

4-469

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

4-478

But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason - that depends wholly upon the senses, which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

4-500

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

4-513

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

That's a statement that the kind of skepticism we're arguing about is a "mind virus" and "at the kernel level" and at the end of the day it's not feasible to live the happiest live possible unless you eradicate it from your thinking. I didn't agree with [Titus'](#) analogy that it makes sense to try to get too close to supernatural religions in order to plant such a virus in them, but I think an analogy of attacking skepticism as a "mind virus at kernel level" is extremely useful.