

## PD24 - Alternate Translations

Post by "Cassius" of September 7, 2021 at 5:37 PM

A couple more comments on those of Geer that strike me as unusual. 39 and 40 strike me as questionable too, but the one I object to the most is 24:

140 III. The removal of all that causes pain marks the boundary of pleasure. Wherever pleasure is present and as long as it continues, there is neither suffering nor grieving nor both together.

I kind of like "the boundary of pleasure...." but he's removing "the limit of quantity" which is probably more exact.

141 VI. Any device whatever by which one frees himself from the fear of others is a natural good.

Pretty good.

VII. Some, thinking thus to make themselves safe from men, wished to become famous and renowned. They won a natural good if they made their lives secure; but if their lives were not secure, they did not have that for which, following the rule of nature, they first sought.

Pretty good

X. If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute were able to drive away from their minds their fears about what is above them and about death and pain, and to teach them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find fault with the dissolute; for they would fill themselves with pleasure from every source and would be free from pain and sorrow, which are evil.

Pretty good on a hard one, I think. BUT here is 24:

I have to object to this one because he is assuming the controversial conclusion that the anticipations part is well translated as "**the mental examinations of confirmed concepts.**" That is a dramatic raising of the flag in support of the position that "concepts" are part of the canon of truth. As I've said *ad nauseam*, as far as I am concerned that is the end of the game when you adopt that, because you have then adopted your own opinion as part of the standard of truth. Got to hand it to Greer, though - he makes his position on anticipations absolutely clear.

147 XXIV. If you reject any sensation, and if you fail to distinguish between conjecture based upon that which awaits confirmation and evidence given by the senses, by the feelings, and by the mental examinations of confirmed concepts,<sup>4</sup> you will confuse the other sensations with unfounded conjecture and thus destroy the whole basis for judgment. If among all opinions you accept as equally valid both those that await confirmation and those that have been confirmed, you will not free yourself from error, since you will have preserved all the uncertainty about every judgment of what is true and what is not true.<sup>5</sup>