

All Pleasure Is Desirable, Because It Is Pleasing To Us, But Is All Pleasure *Equally* Desirable?

Post by "Cassius" of May 7, 2018 at 8:40 AM

Why I see this question as important: It seems to me that this question is sort of a variation of that quote from DeWitt where the Platonist said "What, in a word, is to be said of a philosophy that begins by regarding pleasure as the only positive good and ends by emptying pleasure of all positive content?"

The twist here is "What, in a word, is to be said of a philosophy that begins by regarding pleasure as the only positive good, but ends by seeking the minimal amount of pleasure that is available without any exertion?"

If some pleasures are greater than others, then surely some pleasures are worth many multiples of the pain they require, and given the shortness of life should we not be pursuing those pleasures with all the vigor we can put into it?

And that is what I see as the deeper implication of your question, Pivot. If no pleasure is any more pleasing than any other, then the shortness of life is irrelevant, and it makes no difference whether we derive our pleasures while living in a cave staring at a candle, or on the summit of a mountain taking all the awesome beauties Nature has to offer.